Second Intentions
Second Intentions
Aristotle, one of the most influential figures in Western philosophy, laid the foundation for a vast
array of disciplines, including logic, metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology. Among his many
philosophical contributions, his work in logic has had a profound and lasting impact. Within the
broader tradition of scholastic and medieval philosophy, the concept of "second intentions" emerged
as a crucial development, deeply rooted in Aristotelian thought, though the terminology itself was
To understand Aristotle's contribution, we must begin by distinguishing between first and second
intentions. First intentions refer to the immediate concepts or representations of real things-entities
that exist in the world and that the mind apprehends directly. For instance, the concept of "tree" or
Second intentions, on the other hand, are concepts about concepts-they are reflections on the
mental acts or logical structures used to think about first intentions. These include notions such as
"species," "genus," "predicate," or "subject." They do not refer to entities in the world but rather to
Although Aristotle did not use the term "second intentions," his logical works, especially the
*Organon*, laid the groundwork for this distinction. The *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and
especially the *Posterior Analytics* and *Metaphysics*, contain rich discussions that would later be
In Aristotle's logical system, which was systematized later by medieval thinkers into what we call
"Aristotelian logic," the central concern is the structure and validity of reasoning. Terms like genus,
species, differentia, property, and accident play a pivotal role in this framework. When Aristotle
categorizes terms and analyzes propositions, he is engaging in a meta-level of discourse about how
language and thought relate to being. This meta-discourse is essentially what later philosophers
identified as the...
For example, when Aristotle discusses the difference between essential and accidental predication,
he is not just making a claim about substances but about how we talk about substances. The
distinction between what something is (essence) and what it has (accident) is a distinction that
arises from reflection on the act of predication itself-a hallmark of second intention thinking.
Development in Scholasticism
It was the scholastic philosophers, particularly Thomas Aquinas and the commentators on Aristotle,
who formalized the terminology of first and second intentions. They recognized that Aristotle's
logical treatises were not merely descriptive of the natural world but also descriptive of how we think
and speak about the world. Thus, they labeled concepts like "genus" and "species" as second
intentions because they describe relations between concepts, not between things in themselves.
In this context, Aristotle is understood to have implicitly developed a theory of second intentions by
virtue of his attention to the structure of logical discourse. For instance, when he discusses
syllogisms or categorical frameworks, he is not speaking about the world per se but about the
Aristotle's emphasis on abstraction is also relevant here. He argues that the human intellect is
capable of abstracting universal concepts from particular experiences. First, we apprehend things as
they are; then, we reflect upon the mental operations involved in that apprehension. This act of
This idea is essential to Aristotelian epistemology: true knowledge (*episteme*) arises not merely
from sensory data but from the intellect's ability to recognize patterns and form universal concepts.
Second intentions play a role in this process by enabling us to evaluate and refine our methods of
Modern Relevance
Although the language of first and second intentions has largely fallen out of use in contemporary
analytic philosophy, the issues remain relevant. Discussions about meta-language, logical form, and
the philosophy of language echo Aristotelian concerns about how we think about thinking.
Contemporary logicians and epistemologists still wrestle with questions that stem from Aristotelian
distinctions-such as the relationship between logic and ontology, or the difference between objects
Conclusion
Aristotle's understanding of second intentions, while implicit and lacking the formal terminology of
later scholastics, is foundational to the history of logic and epistemology. His meticulous analysis of
language, thought, and being paved the way for later developments in medieval logic and
metaphysics. By reflecting on how we classify, define, and infer, Aristotle set the stage for a deeper
understanding of how knowledge is structured-not just in terms of what we know, but in terms of how