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Copyright © 2019 by McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. Except as permitted under
the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication may be reproduced or
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Acknowledgments
The author would like to acknowledge the contribution of the faculty and staff of Advantage
Education. You are not only the smartest, but also the best.

Contributing authors Aishah Ali, Pamela Chamberlain, Jennifer Gensterblum, Matt Mathison,
Blair Morley, Ryan Particka, BethAnne Pontius, Andrew Sanford, Sasha Savinov, Kim So, Kyle
Sweeney, and Amanda Thatcher.

All of you put in extra effort to make this book a success.

Contents

About the Authors

Note from the Authors

PART I Getting Started

CHAPTER 1 Understanding the ACT

WHAT IS THE ACT?
WHAT IS THE STRUCTURE OF THE ACT?
WHO WRITES THE ACT?
REGISTERING FOR THE ACT
WHY DO ACT EXAMS EXIST?
ACT SCORES
BIAS ON THE ACT
DISABILITIES AND THE ACT
TESTING IRREGULARITIES
SAT DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES

PART II ACT Diagnostic Assessment

ACT Diagnostic Assessment Test

ENGLISH TEST
MATHEMATICS TEST
READING TEST
SCIENCE TEST
WRITING TEST
ANSWER KEY
SCORING GUIDE
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS

PART III Strategies and Review

CHAPTER 2 Strategies to Get Your Best Score

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TESTING
STRATEGIC THINKING
RELAX TO SUCCEED
GETTING READY TO TAKE THE TEST
TAKING THE TEST
GUESSING ON THE TEST
AFTER THE TEST

CHAPTER 3 ACT English Test: Strategies and Concept Review

GENERAL STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES
USAGE AND MECHANICS
RHETORICAL SKILLS
ACT ENGLISH SKILLS EXERCISES
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS
PRACTICE QUESTIONS
 ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS

CHAPTER 4 ACT Mathematics Test: Strategies and Concept

Review
GENERAL STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES
MATHEMATICS CONCEPT REVIEW
ACT MATHEMATICS SKILLS EXERCISES
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS
PRACTICE QUESTIONS
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS

CHAPTER 5 ACT Reading Test: Strategies and Concept Review

TIMING
GENERAL STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES
QUESTION TYPES
STRATEGIES FOR SPECIFIC QUESTION TYPES
ACT READING SKILLS EXERCISES
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS
PRACTICE QUESTIONS
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS

CHAPTER 6 ACT Science Test: Strategies and Concept Review

GENERAL STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES
THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
ACT SCIENCE TEST EXERCISES
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS
PRACTICE QUESTIONS
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS

CHAPTER 7 ACT Writing Test: Strategies and Review

HOW TO PREPARE
THE ESSAY PROMPT
ESSAY WRITING TECHNIQUES
COMMON MISTAKES
ESSAY SCORING
SIMPLIFIED ESSAY SCORING RUBRIC
SAMPLE ESSAY TO SCORE
ACT WRITING SKILLS EXERCISES
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS

PART IV Four Practice Tests

ACT Practice Tests

ACT Practice Test 1

ENGLISH TEST
MATHEMATICS TEST
READING TEST
SCIENCE TEST
WRITING TEST
ANSWER KEY
SCORING GUIDE
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS

ACT Practice Test 2

ENGLISH TEST
MATHEMATICS TEST
READING TEST
 SCIENCE TEST
WRITING TEST
ANSWER KEY
SCORING GUIDE
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS

ACT Practice Test 3

ENGLISH TEST
MATHEMATICS TEST
READING TEST
SCIENCE TEST
WRITING TEST
ANSWER KEY
SCORING GUIDE
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS

ACT Practice Test 4

ENGLISH TEST
MATHEMATICS TEST
READING TEST
SCIENCE TEST
WRITING TEST
ANSWER KEY
SCORING GUIDE
ANSWERS AND EXPLANATIONS

100 Extra Challenging ACT Questions Every Top-Scoring Student Should

Know

PART V APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1 What’s Next?

CHOOSING THE BEST COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY FOR YOU
APPLYING TO COLLEGE
SUGGESTED HIGH SCHOOL COURSES

APPENDIX 2 Grammar and Punctuation Rules

PUNCTUATION RULES
GRAMMAR RULES
SENTENCE STRUCTURE RULES
COMMONLY MISUSED WORDS

APPENDIX 3 ACT Vocabulary List

Practice Test Question Index

About the Authors
Steve Dulan has been helping students to prepare for success on the ACT and other
standardized exams since 1989. He attended the Thomas M. Cooley Law School on a full
honors scholarship after achieving a 99th percentile score on his Law School Admission Test
(LSAT). In fact, Steve scored in the 99th percentile on every standardized test he has ever
taken. While attending law school, Steve continued to teach standardized test prep classes
(including ACT, SAT, PSAT, GRE, GMAT, and LSAT) an average of 30 hours each week, and
tutored some of his fellow law students in a variety of subjects and in essay exam-writing
techniques. Since 1997, Steve has served as president of Advantage Education®, a company
dedicated to providing unparalleled test preparation. Thousands of students have benefited
from his instruction, coaching, and admissions consulting and have gone on to their colleges
of choice. Steve’s students have gained admission to some of the most prestigious institutions
in the world and have received many scholarships of their own. A few of them even beat his
ACT score!

Amy Dulan put her analytical skills and nurturing personality to work as an ACT coach after
receiving a Psychology degree from Michigan State University in 1991. During forays into the
corporate world over the next several years, Amy continued to tutor part-time, eventually
helping to found Advantage Education® in 1997. Since then, Amy has worked with thousands
of high school students in both private and classroom settings, helping them to maximize their
ACT scores. Her sense of humor and down-to-earth style allow Amy to connect with her
students and make learning fun.
Note from the Authors
Based on student feedback over the past few years, we’ve made some improvements for this
edition of our book.

1. Expanded Explanations. We identified questions in the content area chapters that are
particularly ripe for “teachable moments.” In our individual tutoring sessions, we’ve found
that applying our strategies to specific questions is a great help to students. So, we’ve
added several longer, more detailed explanations. They are identified in the explanations
and are easy to spot because they are in a blue box.
2. “Amy Says/Steve Says” tips. We’ve each included our favorite strategy reminders. These
are the tips that we often hear ourselves repeating to our students.
3. Index of Question Types. We know that many students reach a point where they need to
practice specific question types rather than simply doing full practice sections. We’ve
included the Index (starting on page 815) so that it will be easy to find examples of each
type of question. Repetition can really help with nailing down methods of solving
whichever type of question you are mastering at the moment.
4. 100 Extra-Challenging Questions Section. We have included difficult questions from
each of the four multiple choice test sections: English, Mathematics, Reading, and Science.
The explanations are fairly detailed in order to help you understand the best way to
approach each of these challenging question.
 PART I

Getting Started

CHAPTER 1
Understanding the ACT

ACT Format

Following a 10-minute break, the optional 40-minute Writing Test will be

administered.
 CHAPTER 1

Understanding the ACT

WHAT IS THE ACT?

Each year, more than 2 million students take the ACT in order to gain entrance into the
colleges of their choice. The ACT is a standardized test designed to measure your critical
thinking skills and to assess your ability to apply knowledge and logic when solving problems.
Your ACT score will be evaluated along with your high school Grade Point Average,
involvement in school and extracurricular activities, letters of recommendation, and college
application essay. While the ACT is just one factor that is examined during the admissions
process, it is essential that you maximize your ACT score so that you can remain competitive
among the many other applicants hoping to gain admission.
The authors of the ACT insist that the ACT is an achievement test, meaning that it is
designed to measure your readiness for college instruction. There is ongoing debate about
how well the ACT accomplishes that mission. What is not debated is that the ACT is not a
direct measure of abilities. It is not an IQ test. The ACT is certainly not a measure of your
worth as a human being. It is not even a perfect measure of how well you will do in college.
Theoretically, each of us has a specific potential to learn and acquire skills. The ACT doesn’t
measure your natural, inborn ability. If it did, we wouldn’t be as successful as we are at
raising students’ scores on ACT exams.
The ACT actually measures a certain knowledge base and skill set. It is “trainable,”
meaning that you can do better on your ACT if you work on gaining the knowledge and
acquiring the skills that are tested.

WHAT IS THE STRUCTURE OF THE ACT?

The ACT is broken up into four multiple-choice tests and one optional essay task. The
multiple-choice tests are called English, Mathematics, Reading, and Science. They are always
given in this same order. In fact, there is a lot of predictability when it comes to the ACT. The
current exam still has very much in common with ACT exams from past years. This means that
we basically know what is going to be on your ACT in terms of question types and content.
Refer to the chart on page 2 for more information on the structure of the ACT.

WHO WRITES THE ACT?

There is a company called ACT, Inc. that decides exactly what is going to be on your ACT
exam. This group of experts consults with classroom teachers at the high school and college
levels. They look at high school and college curricula and they employ educators and
specialized psychologists called “psychometricians” (measurers of the mind), who know a lot
about the human brain and how it operates under various conditions. We picture them as “evil
genius” researchers in white coats somewhere, gleefully rubbing their hands together and
trying to think up ways to keep you out of college. Don’t fear, however, we are the “good
geniuses” trying to get you into the college of your choice. We’ll lay out the details of how you
will be tested so that you can get yourself ready for the “contest” on test day.

REGISTERING FOR THE ACT

You must register for the ACT in advance. You can’t just show up on test day with a number 2
pencil and dive right in. The best source of information for all things ACT is, not surprisingly,
the ACT website: www.act.org. There is also a very good chance that a guidance counselor,
and/or pre-college counselor at your school has an ACT Registration Packet, which includes
all of the information that you need for your test registration.
WHY DO ACT EXAMS EXIST?
Back in the mid-twentieth century, some people noticed that there was a disturbing trend in
college admissions. Most of the people who were entering college came from a fairly small
group of people who went to a limited number of high schools. Many had parents who had
attended the same colleges. There wasn’t much opportunity for students from new families to
“break into” the higher education system. Standardized entrance exams were an attempt to
democratize the situation and create a meritocracy, where admissions decisions were based
on achievement and not just social status. The ACT was not the first standardized college
entrance exam. It came a little later as an attempt at improving on the older SAT.
Colleges use the ACT for admissions decisions and, sometimes, for advanced placement. It
is also used to make scholarship decisions. Since there are variations among high schools
around the country, the admissions departments at colleges use the ACT, in part, to help
provide a standard for comparison. There are studies that reveal a fair amount of “grade
inflation” at some schools. So, colleges cannot rely simply upon grade point averages when
evaluating academic performance.
The ACT also measures a certain skill set that is not necessarily measured as part of a
Grade Point Average (GPA). We’ll dig a little more into that in the individual test chapters.

Amy Says:

One important thing about scores is that you don’t have to be perfect to get a good score
on the ACT. The truth is that you can miss a fair number of questions and still get a score
that places you in the top 1% of all test-takers. In fact, this test is so hard and the time limit
is so unrealistic for most test-takers that you can get a score that is at the national average
(about a 21) even if you get almost half of the questions wrong.

ACT SCORES
Each of the multiple-choice sections of the ACT is called a Test (English Test, Mathematics
Test, Reading Test, and Science Test). Each test is given a score on a scale of 1 to 36. These
four “scale scores” are then averaged and rounded according to normal rounding rules to
yield a Composite Score. It is this Composite Score that is most often meant when someone
refers to your ACT score.
Your actual score report will also refer to detailed results for each test section. These are
based on your performance on a subset of the questions on each of these tests. These results
will help you to determine your readiness for college-level courses.

BIAS ON THE ACT

Some research suggests that members of different ethnic groups and residents of different
states have different average scores on the ACT. The reasons for the different scores are
beyond the scope of this book. However, we would like to point out that the differences are
small and that the variations among different members of any group are far more substantial
than the differences in averages among groups. In other words, if you are a member of a
group that does well on the ACT, don’t rely on that group membership to guarantee a good
score. Conversely, if you are a member of a group with a slightly lower average, don’t turn
that group membership into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Those students who take the exam
seriously and put time and effort into their preparation are the ones who succeed, regardless
of ethnicity or state of residence.
Males and females, overall, score about the same. Males tend to do slightly better on Math
and Science and females tend to do better on English, Reading, and, it is predicted, Writing.
Nevertheless, the gender differences are not significant enough to allow anyone to make
score predictions for any one individual. So, as with ethnicity and state of residence,
disregard your gender and work hard if you want to maximize your scores.

DISABILITIES AND THE ACT

Some students identify learning and other cognitive disabilities for the first time when they
begin to prepare for the ACT. Factors to look out for include extreme anxiety or panic, a
marked inability to focus, and major differences in scores between timed and untimed exams.
If any of these warning signs apply to you, it is recommended that you seek assistance from
your parents, school counselors, and other professionals who can advise you regarding the
screening process for learning disabilities.
If you have a diagnosis from a qualified professional, a law called the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) states that reasonable accommodations must be granted that will allow
you a level playing field. No discrimination is allowed against anyone who has a legitimate
medical condition that affects performance on the ACT.
The most common accommodation is to allow extra time for completion of the exam.
Previously, ACT, Inc. would flag score reports of students who were granted extra time. Such
is no longer the case. Students with accommodations are not identified to the colleges
anymore. Most people see this as a great step forward in fairness under the ADA.
Of course, accommodations are also allowed for physical disabilities. For more information
on accommodations for disabilities, contact ACT directly. Be sure to contact ACT very early in
the process. You must allow a reasonable length of time for ACT to confirm your diagnosis and
for some back and forth discussion regarding proposed accommodations.

TESTING IRREGULARITIES
A “testing irregularity” is basically an accusation of cheating. You can avoid this situation by
following all instructions and only working on the section on which you are supposed to be
working. This includes marking the answer sheets. Don’t go back to a previous section or
forward to a later section, either in the test book or on the answer sheet. Do write in the test
booklet. We are aware of one student who could have saved himself the time, inconvenience,
and expense of a testing irregularity accusation if he had merely shown some work in his test
book. If you are accused of a testing irregularity, don’t panic. You have certain due process
rights. Discuss the matter with your parents and perhaps an attorney as soon as possible so
that you can react appropriately.

SAT DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES

The SAT is another standardized college admissions examination. It includes multiple-choice
sections and an optional writing test. Some of the material tends to be the same as on the
ACT. For instance, the reading comprehension passages are often very similar in structure
and content, and some of the math questions are very similar as well.
The SAT is a longer exam overall. The SAT math section has more problems that are really
logic questions and less like what you probably learned in your high school math classes. Visit
www.sat.org for more information.
The vast majority of colleges and universities accept both SAT scores and ACT scores.
There are persistent myths that say that schools in certain states either all require the ACT or
all require the SAT. These myths simply are not true. Rather than relying upon generalities,
you should investigate the colleges in which you are interested and find out for yourself which
entrance exams they will accept and whether they have a preference for one or the other.
 PART II

ACT Diagnostic Assessment

ACT Diagnostic Assessment Test

 ACT Diagnostic Assessment Test

This test will help you to assess your strengths and weaknesses. Take the test under realistic
conditions (preferably early in the morning in a quiet location), and allow approximately 3.5
hours for the entire test. Each of the test sections should be taken in the time indicated at the
beginning of the sections, and in the order in which they appear. Fill in the bubbles on your
answer sheet once you have made your selections.
When you have finished the entire test, check your answers against the Answer Key. Follow
the directions on how to score your test, and calculate your score using the Scoring Guide
that appears on pages 65 through 67. Then, read the Answers and Explanations, paying close
attention to the explanations for the questions that you missed.
Your scores should indicate your performance on the individual test sections, as well as
your overall performance on the Diagnostic Test. Once you have identified your areas of
strength and weakness, you should review those particular chapters in the book.
 ACT DIAGNOSTIC ASSESSMENT TEST
Answer Sheet

ENGLISH

MATHEMATICS

READING
SCIENCE
You may wish to remove these sample answer document pages to respond to the practice ACT
Writing Test.

ENGLISH TEST
45 Minutes – 75 Questions
DIRECTIONS: In the passages that follow, some words and phrases are underlined and
numbered. In the answer column, you will find alternatives for the words and phrases that
are underlined. Choose the alternative that you think is best and fill in the corresponding
bubble on your answer sheet. If you think that the original version is best, choose “NO
CHANGE,” which will always be either answer choice A or F. You will also find questions
about a particular section of the passage, or about the entire passage. These questions will
be identified by either an underlined portion or by a number in a box. Look for the answer
that clearly expresses the idea, is consistent with the style and tone of the passage, and
makes the correct use of standard written English. Read the passage through once before
answering the questions. For some questions, you should read beyond the indicated portion
before you answer.

PASSAGE I
Helen Keller’s Light in the Darkness

Helen Keller was born in 1880. Her life normally.

She was like her toddler peers. It was not until a

high fever robbed her of sight and hearing just before her second birthday that her
remarkable journey started. Although the exact cause of Helen’s fever was never
determined, modern doctors believe Helen suffered from meningitis. The illness plunged

Helen into a dark silence that most people cannot even imagine . The Kellers’

beloved first-born child was blind and deaf.

Helen wandered around the family’s property, anxious to but

unable to understand anything that she experienced. Her resulting tantrums became more
violent as she continued to grow.

Feeling sorry for their allowed the tantrums to occur

with no consequences. In a last-ditch effort to keep the increasingly unmanageable Helen

from being the State Insane Asylum, the Kellers contacted the Perkins Institute in

Boston, Massachusetts. its staff had once helped a child

who was both blind and deaf.

Enter Annie Sullivan, who truly became the “miracle worker” in Helen’s life.

be able to overcome her tremendous challenges.

Unfortunately, Helen’s parents’ constant coddling of their daughter was undermining

Annie’s efforts. exhausting, but Annie knew that, if would

be Helen’s salvation. In order to work her “miracle,” Annie needed to get Helen away from
her parents’ pampering. Annie permission to take Helen to live in a little house

on the opposite side of the Kellers’ garden. Initially, Helen continued to fight

but gradually the girl began to behave. Soon, Helen’s submission gave way to trust in
Annie. Helen began to comprehend that everything she touched had a name. Her constant
darkness was suddenly illuminated by this new-found understanding, and her hunger for
knowledge became .
 For the remainder of her life, Annie Sullivan continued to feed Helen’s appetite for
learning, providing a constant light in Helen’s otherwise impenetrable darkness.

1. A. NO CHANGE
B. had began
C. begins
D. began

2. F. NO CHANGE
G. happy and healthy, learning to walk and talk
H. happy, and healthy, learning to walk, and talk,
J. happy, and healthy learning to walk, and talk

3. A. NO CHANGE
B. to think about
C. or really think about
D. DELETE the underlined portion.

4. Which of the following sentences, if added here, would best introduce the new subject
of Paragraph 2?
F. Helen didn’t obey her parents.
G. The next few years were frustrating for Helen and physically and emotionally
draining for her family.
H. Annie Sullivan came to teach Helen.
J. Helen loved plants and animals, and many different kinds could be found near her
home.

5. A. NO CHANGE
B. discover and feel new sensations
C. feel new sensations about making discoveries
D. make discoveries and sense new feelings

6. F. NO CHANGE
G. impaired daughter, Helen’s parents
H. impaired daughter Helens’ parents
J. impaired daughter Helen’s, parents

7. A. NO CHANGE
B. sent to
C. sent with
D. sent for

8. F. NO CHANGE
G. Primarily a blind school,
H. Just a school for the primarily blind,
J. For the blind, primarily, this school, along with

9. A. NO CHANGE
B. Helen, only with her self-discipline, would
C. Only by including self-discipline, would Helen
D. Only Helen, with self-discipline, would

10. F. NO CHANGE
G. One’s stubbornness was
H. Her stubbornness being
J. Helen’s stubbornness was

11. A. NO CHANGE
B. channeled it
C. channeled: it
D. channeled, it
 12. F. NO CHANGE
G. had gave
H. was giving
J. gave

13. A. NO CHANGE
B. Annies’ efforts
C. Annies efforts
D. Annie’s efforts,

14. F. NO CHANGE
G. excited
H. insatiable
J. unfounded

Question 15 asks about the preceding passage as a whole.

15. Suppose the writer was asked to write a brief essay about Helen Keller’s professional
accomplishments. Would this essay successfully fulfill this goal?
A. Yes, because the essay focuses on the skill of Annie Sullivan in communicating
with Helen.
B. Yes, because the essay indicates that Helen eventually stopped having tantrums
and began learning from Annie Sullivan.
C. No, because this essay mostly addresses Annie Sullivan’s accomplishments
concerning Helen.
D. No, because Helen’s disabilities prevented her from having a successful career.

PASSAGE II

The following paragraphs may or may not be in the most logical order. You may be asked
questions about the logical order of the paragraphs, as well as where to place sentences
logically within any given paragraph.

Holiday Joy (and Chaos)

[1]

Why do the holidays make you feel like a kid again? I’m not talking about the wide-eyed
wonder of seeing the tree at Rockefeller Center No, I

mean the tantrum-filled, “I want to do it all” attitude of a two-year-old. You begin the
season with enthusiasm. You begin thinking about the Christmas season soon after Labor

Day, anticipating the many joys sure to unfold.

[2]

A critical part of the holiday Not wanting to be rushed with last-

minute begin your holiday shopping early. In September, you buy the perfect

gift for Aunt Susie. You compliment yourself for thinking ahead. In October, you just

the right gift for Uncle John (who collects ghost figurines). holiday shopping

is going to be a snap!

[3]
 Suddenly, it’s Thanksgiving. The holiday invitations begin to arrive. As you mark the

dates on the calendar, you vow that from those in the past. You

notice a but you’re not concerned.

You are determined to enjoy every holiday occasion.

[4]

You calmly begin writing a list that includes names of family and

checkmarks next to those whose gifts you’ve purchased. What’s this? You’ve purchased only
two gifts for fifteen relatives and twelve friends? Suddenly, the holiday season a

nightmare. You begin making frantic phone calls to obtain wish lists, but to no avail.

[5]

Now it’s November, and the radio stations are playing Christmas carols. How silly—we
have six weeks until Christmas! There is still plenty of time to find gifts for everyone on
your shopping list.

[6]

You rush from store to store. Your eyes dart among the displays for the perfect gift.
Finally, you give up and purchase 25 generic gift certificates at a department store.

They are not the most inspired gifts, but you’re done shopping! You

begin baking cookies. Immediately, your son asks, “What did you

get Miss Jones?” You into tears, realizing you forgot not only his teacher but seven
other people who somehow didn’t make your list. Your son cautiously approaches and gives
you a gentle hug. You feel a glimmer of joy return. You decide to skip the cookies and get
some sleep. As you turn out the lights, you silently vow to start your shopping earlier next
year!

16. F. NO CHANGE
G. illuminated at the initial time.
H. illuminated for the first time.
J. firstly illuminated, initially.

17. A. NO CHANGE
B. enthusiastic
C. enthusiastically
D. enthusiasm in

18. F. NO CHANGE
G. being shopping for gifts.
H. is shopping for gifts.
J. for the shopping of gifts.

19. A. NO CHANGE
B. purchases, you
C. purchases you
D. purchases; you

20. F. NO CHANGE
G. found
H. will find
J. have found
21. A. NO CHANGE
B. This year, your
C. This year: your
D. This year you’re,

22. F. NO CHANGE
G. this Christmas will be different
H. the differences this Christmas would have
J. a different Christmas it would be

23. A. NO CHANGE
B. scheduled, overlapping set of events on the schedule,
C. few overlapping events,
D. few overlapping events scheduled to occur at the same time,

24. F. NO CHANGE
G. friends. Placing
H. friends; placing
J. friends, placing

25. A. NO CHANGE
B. has become
C. becoming
D. will become

26. Which of the following sentences offers the best introduction to Paragraph 6?
F. Deciding that you must come up with your own gift ideas, you head to the mall.
G. Christmas should not be stressful.
H. Malls have a diverse selection of stores within steps of each other.
J. Most stores offer gift options for last-minute shoppers.

27. A. NO CHANGE
B. trudging home, exhausted, to
C. exhausted trudge home to
D. trudge home, exhausted, to

28. F. NO CHANGE
G. erupt
H. burst
J. jump

Questions 29 and 30 ask about the preceding passage as a whole.

29. What function does Paragraph 6 serve in relation to the rest of the essay?
A. It refers back to the opening sentences of the essay, suggesting that all adults act
like toddlers.
B. It indicates that the narrator will likely succeed in next year’s goal of completing
her holiday responsibilities early.
C. It summarizes the essay’s main point that Christmas is the most relaxed holiday of
the year.
D. It indicates that, despite the narrator’s feelings of being overwhelmed, she may
eventually be able to enjoy the holiday.

30. For the sake of unity and coherence of the essay, Paragraph 5 should be placed:
F. where it is now.
G. after Paragraph 1.
H. after Paragraph 2.
J. after Paragraph 3.

PASSAGE III
 Have You No Shame?

Popular opinion teaches us that guilt is a wasted emotion. Ironically, this same

teaches us “No pain, no gain.” Although we recognize that physical fitness may involve
occasional discomfort, we are unwilling to accept that may as well. Despite

what we have learned about pain, studies show that if an exercise hurts, you’re probably
doing it wrong. Similarly, if a course of action (or inaction) causes pangs of guilt,
Nature provides our bodies with pain receptors to limit injury to

ourselves—if you place your hand on a hot stove, pain prompts you to remove your hand.

Likewise, guilt helps to

Imagine driving through your local business district. A car is left

into your lane. Although you could safely allow the car to merge, you instead accelerate so
as not to delay your trip another second.
As you drive by, you

recognize your neighbor behind the wheel—the one who watched your dog during your
vacation. You feel an uncomfortable twinge of guilt, and you more

courteously for the rest of your trip.

Discounting guilt is akin to turning off conscience. Imagine a society in which no one

a manner that benefits another unless failure to cooperate will result in

Although you may joke that I’ve just described rush-hour traffic, in fact,

described sociopathic behavior.

By definition, guilt is “a feeling of being blame-worthy.” Shame is a “feeling of strong

regret” or “painful emotion caused by consciousness of guilt.” Not surprisingly, an insanity
plea is usually sought when a criminal feels no

regret for his actions. So how did guilt get its bad reputation? First, we hate pain, and if we

can avoid it, we do. In the case of it is difficult to escape the negativity.

Therefore, we decide the guilt itself—not the action that prompted the wrong.

Second, guilt, if improperly can lead to devastation. Guilt should not be ignored,

but it should be examined (What caused me to feel guilty?), analyzed (How can I avoid that
mistake in the future?), and then released (I move on with new wisdom). Unfortunately,
some people spend so much time on the examination that they never move to the
analysis and release. They become crippled by the guilt. The purpose of guilt is not to cause
people to withdraw from society but to become better members of it.

31. Which choice would most precisely sharpen the focus of this paragraph, in keeping
with the way the writer develops the argument in the rest of the essay?
A. NO CHANGE
B. physicality
C. improvement
D. DELETE the underlined portion.
32. F. NO CHANGE
G. societal fitness
H. societal’s fitness
J. societies fitness

33. Which choice best supports the argument that guilt serves a purpose?
A. NO CHANGE
B. you should call a psychiatrist.
C. you should ignore it.
D. you should change your course of action.

34. F. NO CHANGE
G. stop us from causing unnecessary and grievous pain to other people.
H. limit emotional injury to others.
J. limit unnecessary and emotionally grievous injury to others.

35. A. NO CHANGE
B. trying to attempt a turn
C. trying to attempt to turn
D. attempting to turn

36. F. NO CHANGE
G. The faster you are traveling, the longer it will take you to stop.
H. Vehicles today can stop faster than in the past.
J. DELETE the underlined portion.

37. A. NO CHANGE
B. find yourself, driving,
C. find yourself driving
D. find, yourselves, driving

38. F. NO CHANGE
G. acts in
H. acts as if he is in
J. performs of and for

39. A. NO CHANGE
B. penalties of a legal nature, which may include fines and/or imprisonment.
C. fines, imprisonment, or other legal penalties.
D. penalties of a legal nature.

40. F. NO CHANGE
G. I, myself, just
H. by just having,
J. I have,

41. A. NO CHANGE
B. that he is criminally insane
C. that he is not of sound mind
D. DELETE the underlined portion.

42. F. NO CHANGE
G. guilt, so,
H. guilt, then,
J. guilt, thereby,

43. A. NO CHANGE
B. guilt, is
C. guilt: is
D. guilt. Is

44. F. NO CHANGE
 G. managed, which
H. managed,
J. managed, it

45. A. NO CHANGE
B. like
C. on
D. in time

PASSAGE IV
A Picture of Health

President John F. Kennedy’s public image was one of and trim, he

embodied the tanned, athletic image other men sought. In reality, his ‘‘tan’’ was a symptom
of Addison’s disease.

forced to watch as healthier children

played outside.

Kennedy’s ailments a two-month hospitalization for scarlet fever at age two. At

age thirteen, he developed colitis. By 1940, he had osteoporosis and compression fractures
in his lower back, and in 1944 he had his first back surgery. In 1947, Kennedy was officially
diagnosed with Addison’s disease, He underwent two more unsuccessful back surgeries
in 1954 and 1955 and took chronic pain medication from that point until his death in 1963.

By the time Kennedy became president, he was taking ten to twelve pills every day,
including anti-spasmodics, muscle relaxants, various steroids, pain medications, and
sleeping pills. In addition,

How did Kennedy hide such significant health problems from the American people
? His best alibi was his appearance: He looked healthy. His well-being

was clear to anyone saw him, in person or on television.

In addition, he was well-practiced at acting was able to hide his

and closest relatives. Finally, he was prepared with

answers to any for example, he

his back problems to old football and war injuries.

The answer is a testimony to

Kennedy’s incredible strength and perseverance. A detailed time-line comparison of his

illnesses and treatments with his official decisions and actions resulted in the following

discovery: Neither his illness seemed to have affected his performance as

president.
 By today’s standards, Kennedy had medical problems severe enough to qualify him for
federal disability or retirement. Nevertheless, he not only survived but

46. F. NO CHANGE
G. enviable health, tall
H. enviable health, but tall
J. enviable health tall

47. A. NO CHANGE
B. He had been bedridden for much of his life. He was genuinely athletic. He was
C. Although genuinely athletic, he had been bed-ridden for much of his childhood,
D. He was a childhood athlete bedridden

48. F. NO CHANGE
G. began by
H. began for
J. began with

49. The writer would like to add more detail to help the reader to understand the
symptoms of Addison’s disease. Assuming all are true, which of the following
completions of this sentence best achieves this effect?
A. an auto-immune disorder that has numerous symptoms.
B. which is rare.
C. a rare auto-immune disorder characterized by weight loss, muscle weakness,
fatigue, low blood pressure, and darkening of the skin.
D. which causes a variety of unpleasant symptoms and can result in death, often at a
very early age.

50. F. NO CHANGE
G. in his back he received anesthetic injections up to six times a day.
H. in his back, up to six times a day, he received anesthetic injections.
J. up to six times a day in his back, he received anesthetic injections.

51. A. NO CHANGE
B. without their knowledge or noticing it
C. without noticing them
D. DELETE the underlined portion.

52. F. NO CHANGE
G. which
H. that
J. whom

53. A. NO CHANGE
B. healthy, and he
C. healthy. As he
D. healthy; by showing he

54. F. NO CHANGE
G. crippling pain from his doctors, except
H. pain, which was crippling, from all except his doctors
J. doctors from his crippling pain

55. A. NO CHANGE
B. related questions about his health;
C. health-related questions about his well-being;
D. health-related questions;

56. F. NO CHANGE
G. attributed
 H. is attributing
J. was attributed

57. Which of the choices provides the most effective introductory sentence for this
paragraph?
A. NO CHANGE
B. Perhaps a better question would be whether Kennedy played football.
C. Perhaps a better question would be whether such an ill man was competent to be
president.
D. Perhaps a better question would be why Kennedy had Addison’s disease.

58. F. NO CHANGE
G. and not the drugs
H. nor the drugs
J. and either the drugs

59. A. NO CHANGE
B. at the highest level, performed.
C. highly performed at his level.
D. achieved high performance above his expected level.

Question 60 asks about the preceding passage as a whole.

60. Suppose the writer had been assigned to write a brief essay about Addison’s disease
and treatment of the disease. Would this essay successfully fulfill the assignment?
F. Yes, because the essay describes the symptoms of Addison’s disease.
G. Yes, because the essay explains that Addison’s disease is treated with steroids.
H. No, because the essay focuses on President Kennedy’s health.
J. No, because the essay does not describe any symptoms of the disease.

PASSAGE V
Warmth in the Arctic

“We’re going where?” “To the gateway to the Arctic—the Land of the Midnight Sun!

We’re to Tromso, Norway!’’ As the school year ended, I was looking

forward to going home to Southern California, to lifeguard and use my spare time

to surf. Now my friend was proposing that we spend the summer 250 miles north of the
Arctic Circle. Was he nuts? As I look back, it was the best crazy decision I ever made.

Although the weather in Tromso wasn’t hot, it wasn’t particularly cold, either. I
occasionally needed a sweater, but seldom a coat. And, though I didn’t develop my usual
summer tan, the warmth of the people of Tromso more than made up for what the climate

did not provide.

(1) That summer, my days weren’t spent sitting in a lifeguard chair, a whistle

around my finger. (2)

(3) Although I feared that the time would drag, I was

pleasantly surprised that it did not. (4) I know I slept less that summer than I ever have;
yet, I didn’t feel tired.
Discovering Diverse Content Through
Random Scribd Documents
ULTIMATE QUESTIONS
XV
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF MONISM
An explanation of Nature on a single principle, or, in other words, Monism,
derives from human experience all the material which it requires for the
explanation of the world. In the same way, it looks for the springs of action
also within the world of observation, i.e., in that human part of Nature
which is accessible to our self-observation, and more particularly in the
moral imagination. Monism declines to seek outside that world the ultimate
grounds of the world which we perceive and think. For Monism, the unity
which reflective observation adds to the manifold multiplicity of percepts,
is identical with the unity which the human desire for knowledge demands,
and through which this desire seeks entrance into the physical and spiritual
realms. Whoever looks for another unity behind this one, only shows that he
fails to perceive the coincidence of the results of thinking with the demands
of the instinct for knowledge. A particular human individual is not
something cut off from the universe. He is a part of the universe, and his
connection with the cosmic whole is broken, not in reality, but only for our
perception. At first we apprehend the human part of the universe as a self-
existing thing, because we are unable to perceive the cords and ropes by
which the fundamental forces of the cosmos keep turning the wheel of our
life.

All who remain at this perceptual standpoint see the part of the whole as if
it were a truly independent, self-existing thing, a monad which gains all its
knowledge of the rest of the world in some mysterious manner from
without. But Monism has shown that we can believe in this independence
only so long as thought does not gather our percepts into the network of the
conceptual world. As soon as this happens, all partial existence in the
universe, all isolated being, reveals itself as a mere appearance due to
perception. Existence as a self-contained totality can be predicated only of
the universe as a whole. Thought destroys the appearances due to
perception and assigns to our individual existence a place in the life of the
cosmos. The unity of the conceptual world which contains all objective
percepts, has room also within itself for the content of our subjective
personality. Thought gives us the true structure of reality as a self-contained
unity, whereas the multiplicity of percepts is but an appearance conditioned
by our organisation (cp. pp. 178 ff.). The recognition of the true unity of
reality, as against the appearance of multiplicity, is at all times the goal of
human thought. Science strives to apprehend our apparently disconnected
percepts as a unity by tracing their inter-relations according to natural law.
But, owing to the prejudice that an inter-relation discovered by human
thought has only a subjective validity, thinkers have sought the true ground
of unity in some object transcending the world of our experience (God, will,
absolute spirit, etc.). Further, basing themselves on this prejudice, men have
tried to gain, in addition to their knowledge of inter-relations within
experience, a second kind of knowledge transcending experience, which
should reveal the connection between empirical inter-relations and those
realities which lie beyond the limits of experience (Metaphysics). The
reason why, by logical thinking, we understand the nexus of the world, was
thought to be that an original creator has built up the world according to
logical laws, and, similarly, the ground of our actions was thought to lie in
the will of this original being. It was overlooked that thinking embraces in
one grasp the subjective and the objective, and that it communicates to us
the whole of reality in the union which it effects between percept and
concept. Only so long as we contemplate the laws which pervade and
determine all percepts, in the abstract form of concepts, do we indeed deal
only with something purely subjective. But this subjectivity does not belong
to the content of the concept which, by means of thought, is added to the
percept. This content is taken, not from the subject, but from reality. It is
that part of reality which is inaccessible to perception. It is experience, but
not the kind of experience which comes from perception. Those who cannot
understand that the concept is something real, have in mind only the
abstract form, in which we fix and isolate the concept. But in this isolation,
the concept is as much dependent solely on our organisation as is the
percept. The tree which I perceive, taken in isolation by itself, has no
existence; it exists only as a member in the immense mechanism of Nature,
and is possible only in real connection with Nature. An abstract concept,
taken by itself, has as little reality as a percept taken by itself. The percept is
that part of reality which is given objectively, the concept that part which is
given subjectively (by intuition; cp. pp. 90 ff.). Our mental organisation
breaks up reality into these two factors. The one factor is apprehended by
perception, the other by intuition. Only the union of the two, which consists
of the percept fitted according to law into its place in the universe, is reality
in its full character. If we take mere percepts by themselves, we have no
reality but only a disconnected chaos. If we take the laws which determine
percepts by themselves, we have nothing but abstract concepts. Reality is
not to be found in the abstract concept. It is revealed to the contemplative
act of thought which regards neither the concept by itself nor the percept by
itself, but the union of both.

Even the most orthodox Idealist will not deny that we live in the real world
(that, as real beings, we are rooted in it); but he will deny that our
knowledge, by means of its ideas, is able to grasp reality as we live it. As
against this view, Monism shows that thought is neither subjective nor
objective, but a principle which holds together both these sides of reality.
The contemplative act of thought is a cognitive process which belongs itself
to the sequence of real events. By thought we overcome, within the limits of
experience itself, the one-sidedness of mere perception. We are not able by
means of abstract conceptual hypotheses (purely conceptual speculation) to
puzzle out the nature of the real, but in so far as we find for our percepts the
right concepts we live in the real. Monism does not seek to supplement
experience by something unknowable (transcending experience), but finds
reality in concept and percept. It does not manufacture a metaphysical
system out of pure concepts, because it looks upon concepts as only one
side of reality, viz., the side which remains hidden from perception, but is
meaningless except in union with percepts. But Monism gives man the
conviction that he lives in the world of reality, and has no need to seek
beyond the world for a higher reality. It refuses to look for Absolute Reality
anywhere but in experience, because it recognises reality in the very content
of experience. Monism is satisfied with this reality, because it knows that
our thought points to no other. What Dualism seeks beyond the world of
experience, that Monism finds in this world itself. Monism shows that our
knowledge grasps reality in its true nature, not in a purely subjective image.
It holds the conceptual content of the world to be identical for all human
individuals (cp. pp. 84 ff.). According to Monistic principles, every human
individual regards every other as akin to himself, because it is the same
world-content which expresses itself in all. In the single conceptual world
there are not as many concepts of “lion” as there are individuals who form
the thought of “lion,” but only one. And the concept which A adds to the
percept of “lion” is identical with B’s concept except so far as, in each case,
it is apprehended by a different perceiving subject (cp. p. 85). Thought
leads all perceiving subjects back to the ideal unity in all multiplicity, which
is common to them all. There is but one ideal world, but it realises itself in
human subjects as in a multiplicity of individuals. So long as man
apprehends himself merely by self-observation, he looks upon himself as
this particular being, but so soon as he becomes conscious of the ideal
world which shines forth within him, and which embraces all particulars
within itself, he perceives that the Absolute Reality lives within him.
Dualism fixes upon the Divine Being as that which permeates all men and
lives in them all. Monism finds this universal Divine Life in Reality itself.
The ideal content of another subject is also my content, and I regard it as a
different content only so long as I perceive, but no longer when I think.
Every man embraces in his thought only a part of the total world of ideas,
and so far, individuals are distinguished one from another also by the actual
contents of their thought. But all these contents belong to a self-contained
whole, which comprises within itself the thought-contents of all men.
Hence every man, in so far as he thinks, lays hold of the universal Reality
which pervades all men. To fill one’s life with such thought-content is to
live in Reality, and at the same time to live in God. The thought of a
Beyond owes its origin to the misconception of those who believe that this
world cannot have the ground of its existence in itself. They do not
understand that, by thinking, they discover just what they demand for the
explanation of the perceptual world. This is the reason why no speculation
has ever produced any content which has not been borrowed from reality as
it is given to us. A personal God is nothing but a human being transplanted
into the Beyond. Schopenhauer’s Will is the human will made absolute.
Hartmann’s Unconscious, made up of idea and will, is but a compound of
two abstractions drawn from experience. Exactly the same is true of all
other transcendent principles.
The truth is that the human mind never transcends the reality in which it
lives. Indeed, it has no need to transcend it, seeing that this world contains
everything that is required for its own explanation. If philosophers declare
themselves finally content when they have deduced the world from
principles which they borrow from experience and then transplant into an
hypothetical Beyond, the same satisfaction ought to be possible, if these
same principles are allowed to remain in this world to which they belong
anyhow. All attempts to transcend the world are purely illusory, and the
principles transplanted into the Beyond do not explain the world any better
than the principles which are immanent in it. When thought understands
itself, it does not demand any such transcendence at all, for there is no
thought-content which does not find within the world a perceptual content,
in union with which it can form a real object. The objects of imagination,
too, are contents which have no validity, until they have been transformed
into ideas that refer to a perceptual content. Through this perceptual content
they have their place in reality. A concept the content of which is supposed
to lie beyond the world which is given to us, is an abstraction to which no
reality corresponds. Thought can discover only the concepts of reality; in
order to find reality itself, we need also perception. An Absolute Being for
which we invent a content, is a hypothesis which no thought can entertain
that understands itself. Monism does not deny ideal factors; indeed, it
refuses to recognise as fully real a perceptual content which has no ideal
counterpart, but it finds nothing within the whole range of thought that is
not immanent within this world of ours. A science which restricts itself to a
description of percepts, without advancing to their ideal complements, is,
for Monism, but a fragment. But Monism regards as equally fragmentary all
abstract concepts which do not find their complement in percepts, and
which fit nowhere into the conceptual net that embraces the whole
perceptual world. Hence it knows no ideas referring to objects lying beyond
our experience and supposed to form the content of purely hypothetical
Metaphysics. Whatever mankind has produced in the way of such ideas
Monism regards as abstractions from experience, whose origin in
experience has been overlooked by their authors.

Just as little, according to Monistic principles, are the ends of our actions
capable of being derived from the Beyond. So far as we can think them,
they must have their origin in human intuition. Man does not adopt the
purposes of an objective (transcendent) being as his own individual
purposes, but he pursues the ends which his own moral imagination sets
before him. The idea which realises itself in an action is selected by the
agent from the single ideal world and made the basis of his will.
Consequently his action is not a realisation of commands which have been
thrust into this world from the Beyond, but of human intuitions which
belong to this world. For Monism there is no ruler of the world standing
outside of us and determining the aim and direction of our actions. There is
for man no transcendent ground of existence, the counsels of which he
might discover, in order thence to learn the ends to which he ought to direct
his action. Man must rest wholly upon himself. He must himself give a
content to his action. It is in vain that he seeks outside the world in which
he lives for motives of his will. If he is to go at all beyond the satisfaction
of the natural instincts for which Mother Nature has provided, he must look
for motives in his own moral imagination, unless he finds it more
convenient to let them be determined for him by the moral imagination of
others. In other words, he must either cease acting altogether, or else act
from motives which he selects for himself from the world of his ideas, or
which others select for him from that same world. If he develops at all
beyond a life absorbed in sensuous instincts and in the execution of the
commands of others, then there is nothing that can determine him except
himself. He has to act from a motive which he gives to himself and which
nothing else can determine for him except himself. It is true that this motive
is ideally determined in the single world of ideas; but in actual fact it must
be selected by the agent from that world and translated into reality. Monism
can find the ground for the actual realisation of an idea through human
action only in the human being himself. That an idea should pass into action
must be willed by man before it can happen. Such a will consequently has
its ground only in man himself. Man, on this view, is the ultimate
determinant of his action. He is free.
1. Addition to the Revised Edition (1918).

In the second part of this book the attempt has been made to justify the
conviction that freedom is to be found in human conduct as it really is. For
this purpose it was necessary to sort out, from the whole sphere of human
conduct, those actions with respect to which unprejudiced self-observation
may appropriately speak of freedom. These are the actions which appear as
realisations of ideal intuitions. No other actions will be called free by an
unprejudiced observer. However, open-minded self-observation compels
man to regard himself as endowed with the capacity for progress on the
road towards ethical intuitions and their realisation. Yet this open-minded
observation of the ethical nature of man is, by itself, insufficient to
constitute the final court of appeal for the question of freedom. For, suppose
intuitive thinking had itself sprung from some other essence; suppose its
essence were not grounded in itself, then the consciousness of freedom,
which issues from moral conduct, would prove to be a mere illusion. But
the second part of this book finds its natural support in the first part, which
presents intuitive thinking as an inward spiritual activity which man
experiences as such. To appreciate through experience this essence of
thinking is equivalent to recognising the freedom of intuitive thinking. And
once we know that this thinking is free, we know also the sphere within
which will may be called free. We shall regard man as a free agent, if on the
basis of inner experience we may attribute to the life of intuitive thinking a
self-sustaining essence. Whoever cannot do this will be unable to discover
any wholly unassailable road to the belief in freedom. The experience to
which we here refer reveals in consciousness intuitive thinking, the reality
of which does not depend merely on our being conscious of it. Freedom,
too, is thereby revealed as the characteristic of all actions which issue from
the intuitions of consciousness.

2. Addition to the Revised Edition (1918).

The argumentation of this book is built up on the fact of intuitive thinking,
which may be experienced in a purely spiritual way, and which every
perception inserts into reality so that reality comes thereby to be known. All
that this book aimed at presenting was the result of a survey from the basis
of our experience of intuitive thinking. However, the intention also was to
emphasise the systematic interpretation which this thinking, as experienced
by us, demands. It demands that we shall not deny its presence in cognition
as a self-sustaining experience. It demands that we acknowledge its
capacity for experiencing reality in co-operation with perception, and that
we do not make it seek reality in a world outside experience and accessible
only to inference, in the face of which human thinking would be only a
subjective activity.

This view characterises thinking as that factor in man through which he

inserts himself spiritually into reality. (And, strictly, no one should confuse
this kind of world-view, which is based on thinking as directly experienced,
with mere Rationalism.) But, on the other hand, the whole tenor of the
preceding argumentation shows that perception yields a determination of
reality for human knowledge only when it is taken hold of in thinking.
Outside of thinking there is nothing to characterise reality for what it is.
Hence we have no right to imagine that sense-perception is the only witness
to reality. Whatever comes to us by way of perception on our journey
through life, we cannot but expect. The only point open to question would
be whether, from the exclusive point of view of thinking as we intuitively
experience it, we have a right to expect that over and above sensuous
perception there is also spiritual perception. This expectation is justified.
For, though intuitive thinking is, on the one hand, an active process taking
place in the human mind, it is, on the other hand, also a spiritual perception
mediated by no sense-organ. It is a perception in which the percipient is
himself active, and a self-activity which is at the same time perceived. In
intuitive thinking man enters a spiritual world also as a percipient.
Whatever within this world presents itself to him as percept in the same
way in which the spiritual world of his own thinking so presents itself, that
is recognised by him as constituting a world of spiritual perception. This
world of spiritual perception we may suppose to be standing in the same
relation to thinking as does, on the sensuous side, the world of sense-
perception. Man does not experience the world of spiritual perception as an
alien something, because he is already familiar in his intuitive thinking with
an experience of purely spiritual character. With such a world of spiritual
perception a number of the writings are concerned which I have published
since this present book appeared. The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity lays
the philosophical foundation for these later writings. For it attempts to show
that in the very experience of thinking, rightly understood, we experience
Spirit. This is the reason why it appears to the author that no one will stop
short of entering the world of spiritual perception who has been able to
adopt, in all seriousness, the point of view of the Philosophy of Spiritual
Activity. True, logical deduction—by syllogisms—will not extract out of the
contents of this book the contents of the author’s later books. But a living
understanding of what is meant in this book by “intuitive thinking” will
naturally prepare the way for living entry into the world of spiritual
perception.
 TRUTH AND SCIENCE1

1 The Preface and Introduction to the original edition of “Truth and Science” are printed
as Appendix III and Appendix IV at the end of this volume. ↑
I
 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
Theory of Knowledge aims at being a scientific investigation of the very
fact which all other sciences take for granted without examination, viz.,
knowing or knowledge-getting itself. To say this is to attribute to it, from
the very start, the character of being the fundamental philosophical
discipline. For, it is only this discipline which can tell us what value and
significance belong to the insight gained by the other sciences. In this
respect it is the foundation for all scientific endeavour. But, it is clear that
the Theory of Knowledge can fulfil its task only if it works without any
presuppositions of its own, so far as that is possible in view of the nature of
human knowledge. This is probably conceded on all sides. And yet, a more
detailed examination of the better-known epistemological systems reveals
that, at the very starting-point of the inquiry, there is made a whole series of
assumptions which detract considerably from the plausibility of the rest of
the argument. In particular, it is noticeable how frequently certain hidden
assumptions are made in the very formulation of the fundamental problems
of epistemology. But, if a science begins by misstating its problems, we
must despair from the start of finding the right solution. The history of the
sciences teaches us that countless errors, from which whole epochs have
suffered, are to be traced wholly and solely to the fact that certain problems
were wrongly formulated. For illustrations there is no need to go back to
Aristotle or to the Ars Magna Lulliana. There are plenty of examples in
more recent times. The numerous questions concerning the purposes of the
rudimentary organs of certain organisms could be correctly formulated only
after the discovery of the fundamental law of biogenesis had created the
necessary conditions. As long as Biology was under the influence of
teleological concepts, it was impossible to put these problems in a form
permitting a satisfactory answer. What fantastic ideas, for example, were
current concerning the purpose of the so-called pineal gland, so long as it
was fashionable to frame biological questions in terms of “purpose.” An
answer was not achieved until the solution of the problem was sought by
the method of Comparative Anatomy, and scientists asked whether this
organ might not be merely a residual survival in man from a lower
evolutionary level. Or, to mention yet another example, consider the
modifications in certain physical problems after the discovery of the laws of
the mechanical equivalents of heat and of the conservation of energy! In
short, the success of scientific investigations depends essentially upon the
investigator’s ability to formulate his problems correctly. Even though the
Theory of Knowledge, as the presupposition of all other sciences, occupies
a position very different from theirs, we may yet expect that for it, too,
successful progress in its investigations will become possible only when the
fundamental questions have been put in the correct form.

The following discussions aim, in the first place, at such a formulation of

the problem of knowledge as will do justice to the character of the Theory
of Knowledge as a discipline which is without any presuppositions
whatever. Their secondary aim is to throw light on the relation of J. G.
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre to such a fundamental philosophical discipline.
The reason why precisely Fichte’s attempt to provide an absolutely certain
basis for the sciences will be brought into closer relation with our own
philosophical programme, will become clear of itself in the course of our
investigation.
II
 THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF KANT’S
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
It is usual to designate Kant as the founder of the Theory of Knowledge in
the modern sense. Against this view it might plausibly be argued that the
history of philosophy records prior to Kant numerous investigations which
deserve to be regarded as something more than mere beginnings of such a
science. Thus Volkelt, in his fundamental work on the Theory of
Knowledge,1 remarks that the critical treatment of this discipline took its
origin already with Locke. But in the writings of even older philosophers,
yes, even in the philosophy of Ancient Greece, discussions are to be found
which at the present day are usually undertaken under the heading of
Theory of Knowledge. However, Kant has revolutionised all problems
under this head from their very depths up, and, following him, numerous
thinkers have worked them through so thoroughly that all the older attempts
at solutions may be found over again either in Kant himself or else in his
successors. Hence, for the purposes of a purely systematic, as distinct from
a historical, study of the Theory of Knowledge, there is not much danger of
omitting any important phenomenon by taking account only of the period
since Kant burst upon the world with his Critique of Pure Reason. All
previous epistemological achievements are recapitulated during this period.

The fundamental question of Kant’s Theory of Knowledge is, How are

synthetic judgments a priori possible? Let us consider this question for a
moment in respect of its freedom from presuppositions. Kant asks the
question precisely because he believes that we can attain unconditionally
certain knowledge only if we are able to prove the validity of synthetic
judgments a priori. He says: “Should this question be answered in a
satisfactory way, we shall at the same time learn what part reason plays in
the foundation and completion of those sciences which contain a theoretical
a priori knowledge of objects;”2 and, further, “Metaphysics stands and falls
with the solution of this problem, on which, therefore, the very existence of
Metaphysics absolutely depends.”3

Are there any presuppositions in this question, as formulated by Kant? Yes,

there are. For the possibility of a system of absolutely certain knowledge is
made dependent on its being built up exclusively out of judgments which
are synthetic and acquired independently of all experience. “Synthetic” is
Kant’s term for judgments in which the concept of the predicate adds to the
concept of the subject something which lies wholly outside the subject,
“although it stands in some connection with the subject,”4 whereas in
“analytic” judgments the predicate affirms only what is already (implicitly)
contained in the subject. This is not the place for considering the acute
objections which Johannes Rehmke5 brings forward against this
classification of judgments. For our present purpose, it is enough to
understand that we can attain to genuine knowledge only through
judgments which add to one concept another the content of which was not,
for us at least, contained in that of the former. If we choose to call this class
of judgments, with Kant, “synthetic,” we may agree that knowledge in
judgment form is obtainable only where the connection of predicate and
subject is of this synthetic sort. But, the case is very different with the
second half of Kant’s question, which demands that these judgments are to
be formed a priori, i.e., independently of all experience. For one thing, it is
altogether possible6 that such judgments do not occur at all. At the start of
the Theory of Knowledge we must hold entirely open the question, whether
we arrive at any judgments otherwise than by experience, or only by
experience. Indeed, to unprejudiced reflection the alleged independence of
experience seems from the first to be impossible. For, let the object of our
knowledge be what it may—it must, surely, always present itself to us at
some time in an immediate and unique way; in short, it must become for us
an experience. Mathematical judgments, too, are known by us in no other
way than by our experiencing them in particular concrete cases. Even if,
with Otto Liebmann,7 for example, we treat them as founded upon a certain
organisation of our consciousness, this empirical character is none the less
manifest. We shall then say that this or that proposition is necessarily valid,
because the denial of its truth would imply the denial of our consciousness,
but the content of a proposition can enter our knowledge only by its
becoming an experience for us in exactly the same way in which a process
in the outer world of nature does so. Let the content of such a proposition
include factors which guarantee its absolute validity, or let its validity be
based on other grounds—in either case, I can possess myself of it only in
one way and in no other: it must be presented to me in experience. This is
the first objection to Kant’s view.

The other objection lies in this, that we have no right, at the outset of our
epistemological investigations, to affirm that no absolutely certain
knowledge can have its source in experience. Without doubt, it is easily
conceivable that experience itself might contain a criterion guaranteeing the
certainty of all knowledge which has an empirical source.

Thus, Kant’s formulation of the problem implies two presuppositions. The

first is that we need, over and above experience, another source of
cognitions. The second is that all knowledge from experience has only
conditional validity. Kant entirely fails to realise that these two propositions
are open to doubt, that they stand in need of critical examination. He takes
them over as unquestioned assumptions from the dogmatic philosophy of
his predecessors and makes them the basis of his own critical inquiries. The
dogmatic thinkers assume the validity of these two propositions and simply
apply them in order to get from each the kind of knowledge which it
guarantees. Kant assumed their validity and only asks, What are the
conditions of their validity? But, what if they are not valid at all? In that
case, the edifice of Kantian doctrine lacks all foundation whatever.

The whole argumentation of the five sections which precede Kant’s

formulation of the problem, amounts to an attempt to prove that the
propositions of Mathematics are synthetic.8 But, precisely the two
presuppositions which we have pointed out are retained as mere
assumptions in his discussions. In the Introduction to the Second Edition of
the Critique of Pure Reason we read, “experience can tell us that a thing is
so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise,” and, “experience never
bestows on its judgments true or strict universality, but only the assumed
and relative universality of induction.”9 In Prologomena,10 we find it said,
“First, as regards the sources of metaphysics, the very concept of
Metaphysics implies that they cannot be empirical. The principles of
Metaphysics (where the term ‘principles’ includes, not merely its
fundamental propositions, but also its fundamental concepts), can never be
gained from experience, for the knowledge of the metaphysician has
precisely to be, not physical, but ‘metaphysical,’ i.e., lying beyond the reach
of experience.” Lastly Kant says in the Critique of Pure Reason: “The first
thing to notice is, that no truly mathematical judgments are empirical, but
always a priori. They carry necessity on their very face, and therefore
cannot be derived from experience. Should anyone demur to this, I am
willing to limit my assertion to the propositions of Pure Mathematics,
which, as everybody will admit, are not empirical judgments, but perfectly
pure a priori knowledge.”11

We may open the Critique of Pure Reason wherever we please, we shall

always find that in all its discussions these two dogmatic propositions are
taken for granted. Cohen12 and Stadler13 attempt to prove that Kant has
established the a priori character of the propositions of Mathematics and
Pure Natural Science. But all that Kant tries to do in the Critique may be
summed up as follows. The fact that Mathematics and Pure Natural Science
are a priori sciences implies that the “form” of all experience has its ground
in the subject. Hence, all that is given by experience is the “matter” of
sensations. This matter is synthesised by the forms, inherent in the mind,
into the system of empirical science. It is only as principles of order for the
matter of sense that the formal principles of the a priori theories have
function and significance. They make empirical science possible, but they
cannot transcend it. These formal principles are nothing but the synthetic
judgments a priori, which therefore extend, as conditions of all possible
empirical knowledge, as far as that knowledge but no further. Thus, the
Critique of Pure Reason, so far from proving the a priori character of
Mathematics and Pure Natural Science, does but delimit the sphere of their
applicability on the assumption that their principles must become known
independently of experience. Indeed, Kant is so far from attempting a proof
of the a priori character of these principles, that he simply excludes that
part of Mathematics (see the quotation above) in which, even according to
his view, that character might be called in question, and confines himself to
the part in which he thinks he can infer the a priori character from the bare
concepts involved. Johannes Volkelt, too, comes to the conclusion that
“Kant starts from the explicit presupposition” that “there actually does exist
knowledge which is universal and necessary.” He goes on to remark, “This
presupposition which Kant has never explicitly questioned, is so profoundly
contradictory to the character of a truly critical Theory of Knowledge, that
the question must be seriously put whether the Critique is to be accepted as
critical Theory of Knowledge at all.” Volkelt does, indeed, decide that there
are good grounds for answering this question in the affirmative, but still, as
he says, “this dogmatic assumption does disturb the critical attitude of
Kant’s epistemology in the most far-reaching way.”14 In short, Volkelt, too,
finds that the Critique of Pure Reason is not a Theory of Knowledge free
from all assumptions.

In substantial agreement with our view are also the views of O.

Liebmann,15 Holder,16 Windelband,17 Ueberweg,18 Eduard von
Hartmann,19 and Kuno Fischer,20 all of whom acknowledge that Kant
makes the a priori character of Pure Mathematics and Physics the basis of
his whole argumentation.

The propositions that we really have knowledge which is independent of all

experience, and that experience can furnish knowledge of only relative
universality, could be accepted by us as valid only if they were conclusions
deduced from other propositions. It would be absolutely necessary for these
propositions to be preceded by an inquiry into the essential nature of
experience, as well as by another inquiry into the essential nature of
knowing. The former might justify the first, the latter the second, of the
above two propositions.

It would be possible to reply to the objections which we have urged against

the Critique of Pure Reason, as follows. It might be said that every Theory
of Knowledge must first lead the reader to the place where the starting-
point, free from all presuppositions, is to be found. For, the knowledge
which we have at any given moment of our lives is far removed from this
starting-point, so that we must first be artificially led back to it. Now, it is
true that some such mutual understanding between author and reader
concerning the starting-point of the science is necessary in all Theory of
Knowledge. But such an understanding ought on no account to go beyond
showing how far the alleged starting-point of knowing is truly such. It
ought to consist of purely self-evident, analytic propositions. It ought not to
lay down any positive, substantial affirmations which influence, as in Kant,
the content of the subsequent argumentation. Moreover, it is the duty of the
epistemologist to show that the starting-point which he alleges is really free
from all presuppositions. But all this has nothing to do with the essential
nature of that starting-point. It lies wholly outside the starting-point and
makes no affirmations about it. At the beginning of mathematical
instruction, too, the teacher must exert himself to convince the pupil of the
axiomatic character of certain principles. But no one will maintain that the
content of the axioms is in any way made dependent on these prior
discussions of their axiomatic character.21 In exactly the same way, the
epistemologist, in his introductory remarks, ought to show the method by
which we can reach a starting-point free from all presuppositions. But the
real content of the starting-point ought to be independent of the reflections
by which it is discovered. There is, most certainly, a wide difference
between such an introduction to the Theory of Knowledge and Kant’s way
of beginning with affirmations of quite definite, dogmatic character.

1 l.c., p. 20. ↑
2 cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Intr. to 2nd edit., Section vi. ↑
3 Prolegomena, Section v. ↑
4 Critique of Pure Reason, Intr., Section iv. ↑
5 cf. his Analyse der Wirklichkeit, Gedanken und Tatsachen. ↑
6 “Possible” here means merely conceivable. ↑
7 cf. Die Welt als Wahrnehmung und Begriff, pp. 161 ff. ↑
8 This attempt, by the way, is one which the objections of Robert Zimmermann (Über
Kant’s mathematisches Vorurteil und dessen Folgen) show to be, if not wholly mistaken, at
least highly questionable. ↑
9 Critique of Pure Reason, Intr. to 2nd edit., Section ii. ↑
10 cf. Kant’s Theorie der Erfahrung, pp. 90 ff. ↑
11 l.c., Section v. ↑
12 cf. Kant’s Theorie der Erfahrung, pp. 90 ff. ↑
13 cf. Die Grundsätze der reinen Erkenntnistheorie in der Kantischen Philosophie, p.
76. ↑
14 l.c., p. 21. ↑
15 Zur Analyse der Wirklichkeit, pp. 211 ff. ↑
16 Darstellung der Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie, p. 14. ↑
17 Vierteljahrsschrift für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 1877, p. 239. ↑
18 System der Logik, 3rd edit., pp. 380 ff. ↑
19 Kritische Grundlagen des Transcendentalen Realismus, pp. 142–172. ↑
20 Geschichte der Neueren Philosophie, Vol. v., p. 60. Volkelt is mistaken about Fischer
when he says (Kant’s Erkenntnistheorie, p. 198, n.) that “it is not clear from Fischer’s
account whether, in his opinion, Kant takes for granted only the psychological fact of the
occurrence of universal and necessary judgments, but also their objective validity and
truth.” For, in the passage referred to above, Fischer says that the chief difficulty of the
Critique of Pure Reason is to be found in the fact that “its fundamental positions rest on
certain presuppositions” which “have to be granted if the rest is to be valid.” These
presuppositions consist for Fischer, too, in this, that “first the fact of knowledge is
affirmed,” and then analysis reveals the cognitive faculties “by means of which that fact
itself is explained.” ↑
21 How far our own epistemological discussions conform to this method, will be shown
in Section iv, “The Starting-points of the Theory of Knowledge.” ↑
III
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE SINCE KANT
Kant’s mistaken formulation of the problem has had a greater or lesser
influence on all subsequent students of the Theory of Knowledge. For Kant,
the view that all objects which are given to us in experience are ideas in our
minds is a consequence of his theory of the a priori. For nearly all his
successors, it has become the first principle and starting-point of their
epistemological systems. It is said that the first and most immediate truth is,
simply and solely, the proposition that we know our own ideas. This has
come to be a well-nigh universal conviction among philosophers. G. E.
Schulze maintains in his Ænesidemus, as early as 1792, that all our
cognitions are mere ideas and that we can never transcend our ideas.
Schopenhauer puts forward, with all the philosophical pathos which
distinguishes him, the view that the permanent achievement of Kant’s
philosophy is the thesis that “the world is my idea.” To Eduard von
Hartmann this thesis is so incontestable, that he addresses his treatise,
Kritische Grundlegung des Transcendentalen Realismus, exclusively to
readers who have achieved critical emancipation from the naïve
identification of the world of perception with the thing-in-itself. He
demands of them that they shall have made clear to themselves the absolute
heterogeneity of the object of perception which through the act of
representation has been given as a subjective and ideal content of
consciousness, and of the thing-in-itself which is independent of the act of
representation and of the form of consciousness and which exists in its own
right. His readers are required to be thoroughly convinced that the whole of
what is immediately given to us consists of ideas.1 In his latest work on
Theory of Knowledge, Hartmann does, indeed, attempt to give reasons for
this view. What value should be attached to these reasons by an
unprejudiced Theory of Knowledge will appear in the further course of our
discussions. Otto Liebmann posits as the sacrosanct first principle of the
Theory of Knowledge the proposition, “Consciousness cannot transcend
itself.”2 Volkelt has called the proposition that the first and most immediate
truth is the limitation of all our knowledge, in the first instance, to our own
ideas exclusively, the positivistic principle of knowledge. He regards only
those theories of knowledge as “in the fullest sense critical” which “place
this principle, as the only fixed starting-point of philosophy, at the head of
their discussions and then consistently think out its consequences.”3 Other
philosophers place other propositions at the head of the Theory of
Knowledge, e.g., the proposition that its real problem concerns the relation
between Thought and Being, and the possibility of a mediation between
them;4 or that it concerns the way in which Being becomes an object of
Consciousness;5 and many others. Kirchmann starts from two
epistemological axioms, “Whatever is perceived is,” and, “Whatever is self-
contradictory, is not.”6 According to E. L. Fischer, knowledge is the science
of something actual, something real,7 and he criticises this dogma as little
as does Goering who asserts similarly, “To know means always to know
something which is. This is a fact which cannot be denied either by
scepticism or by Kant’s critical philosophy.”8 These two latter thinkers
simply lay down the law: This is what knowledge is. They do not trouble to
ask themselves with what right they do it.

But, even if these various propositions were correct, or led to correct

formulations of the problem, it would still be impossible to discuss them at
the outset of the Theory of Knowledge. For, they all belong, as positive and
definite cognitions, within the realm of knowledge. To say that my
knowledge extends, in the first instance, only to my ideas, is to express in a
perfectly definite judgment something which I know. In this judgment I
qualify the world which is given to me by the predicate “existing in the
form of idea.” But how am I to know, prior to all knowledge, that the
objects given to me are ideas?

The best way to convince ourselves of the truth of the assertion that this
proposition has no right to be put at the head of the Theory of Knowledge,
is to retrace the way which the human mind must follow in order to reach
this proposition, which has become almost an integral part of the whole
modern scientific consciousness. The considerations which have led to it
are systematically summarised, with approximate exhaustiveness, in Part I
of Eduard von Hartmann’s treatise, Das Grundproblem der
Erkenntnistheorie. His statement, there, may serve as a sort of guiding-
thread for us in our task of reviewing the reasons which may lead to the
acceptance of this proposition.

These reasons are physical, psycho-physical, physiological, and properly

philosophical.

The Physicist is led by observation of the phenomena which occur in our

environment when, e.g., we experience a sensation of sound, to the view
that there is nothing in these phenomena which in the very least resembles
what we perceive immediately as sound. Outside, in the space which
surrounds us, nothing is to be found except longitudinal oscillations of
bodies and of the air. Thence it is inferred that what in ordinary life we call
“sound” or “tone” is nothing but the subjective reaction of our organism to
these wave-like oscillations. Similarly, it is inferred that light and colour
and heat are purely subjective. The phenomena of colour-dispersion, of
refraction, of interference, of polarisation, teach us that to the just-
mentioned sensations there correspond in the outer space certain transverse
oscillations which we feel compelled to ascribe, in part to the bodies, in part
to an immeasurably fine, elastic fluid, the “ether.” Further, the Physicist is
driven by certain phenomena in the world of bodies to abandon the belief in
the continuity of objects in space, and to analyse them into systems of
exceedingly minute particles (molecules, atoms), the size of which,
relatively to the distances between them, is immeasurably small. Thence it
is inferred that all action of bodies on each other is across the empty
intervening space, and is thus a genuine actio in distans. The Physicist
believes himself justified in holding that the action of bodies on our senses
of touch and temperature does not take place through direct contact,
because there must always remain a definite, if small, distance between the
body and the spot on the skin which it is said to “touch.” Thence it is said to
follow that what we sense as hardness or heat in bodies is nothing but the
reactions of the end-organs of our touch- and temperature-nerves to the
molecular forces of bodies which act upon them across empty space.

These considerations from the sphere of Physics are supplemented by the

Psycho-physicists with their doctrine of specific sense-energies. J. Müller
has shown that every sense can be affected only in its own characteristic
way as determined by its organisation, and that its reaction is always of the
same kind whatever may be the external stimulus. If the optical nerve is
stimulated, light-sensations are experienced by us regardless of whether the
stimulus was pressure, or an electric current, or light. On the other hand, the
same external phenomena produce quite different sensations according as
they are perceived by different senses. From these facts the inference has
been drawn that there occurs only one sort of phenomenon in the external
world, viz., motions, and that the variety of qualities of the world we
perceive is essentially a reaction of our senses to these motions. According
to this view, we do not perceive the external world as such, but only the
subjective sensations which it evokes in us.

Physiology adds its quota to the physical arguments. Physics deals with the
phenomena which occur outside our organisms and which correspond to our
percepts. Physiology seeks to investigate the processes which go on in
man’s own body when a certain sensation is evoked in him. It teaches us
that the epidermis is wholly insensitive to the stimuli in the external world.
Thus, e.g., if external stimuli are to affect the end-organs of our touch-
nerves on the surface of our bodies, the oscillations which occur outside our
bodies have to be transmitted through the epidermis. In the case of the
senses of hearing and of sight, the external motions have, in addition, to be
modified by a number of structures in the sense-organs, before they reach
the nerves. The nerves have to conduct the effects produced in the end-
organs up to the central organ, and only then can take place the process by
means of which purely mechanical changes in the brain produce sensations.
It is clear that the stimulus which acts upon the sense-organs is so
completely changed by the transformations which it undergoes, that every
trace of resemblance between the initial impression on the sense-organs and
the final sensation in consciousness must be obliterated. Hartmann sums up
the outcome of these considerations in these words: “This content of
consciousness consists, originally, of sensations which are the reflex
responses of the soul to the molecular motions in the highest cortical
centres, but which have not the faintest resemblance to the molecular
motions by which they are elicited.”
If we think this line of argument through to the end, we must agree that,
assuming it to be correct, there survives in the content of our consciousness
not the least element of what may be called “external existence.”

To the physical and physiological objections against so-called “Naïve

Realism” Hartmann adds some further objections which he describes as
philosophical in the strict sense. A logical examination of the physical and
physiological objections reveals that, after all, the desired conclusion can be
reached only if we start from the existence and nexus of external objects,
just as these are assumed by the ordinary naïve consciousness, and then
inquire how this external world can enter the consciousness of beings with
organisms such as ours. We have seen that every trace of such an external
world is lost on the way from the impression on the sense-organ to the
appearance of the sensation in our consciousness, and that in the latter
nothing survives except our ideas. Hence, we have to assume that the
picture of the external world which we actually have, has been built up by
the soul on the basis of the sensations given to it. First, the soul constructs
out of the data of the senses of touch and sight a picture of the world in
space, and then the sensations of the other senses are fitted into this space-
system. When we are compelled to think of a certain complex of sensations
as belonging together, we are led to the concept of substance and regard
substance as the bearer of sense-qualities. When we observe that some
sense-qualities disappear from a substance and that others appear in their
place, we ascribe this event in the world of phenomena to a change
regulated by the law of causality. Thus, according to this view, our whole
world-picture is composed of subjective sensations which are ordered by
the activity of our own souls. Hartmann says, “What the subject perceives is
always only modifications of its own psychic states and nothing else.”9

Now let us ask ourselves, How do we come by such a view? The bare
skeleton of the line of thought which leads to it is as follows. Supposing an
external world exists, we do not perceive it as such but transform it through
our organisation into a world of ideas. This is a supposition which, when
consistently thought out, destroys itself. But is this reflection capable of
supporting any positive alternative? Are we justified in regarding the world,
which is given to us, as the subjective content of ideas because the
assumptions of the naïve consciousness, logically followed out, lead to this
conclusion? Our purpose is, rather, to exhibit these assumptions themselves
as untenable. Yet, so far we should have found only that it is possible for a
premise to be false and yet for the conclusion drawn from it to be true.
Granted that this may happen, yet we can never regard the conclusion as
proved by means of that premise.

It is usual to apply the title of “Naïve Realism” to the theory which accepts
as self-evident and indubitable the reality of the world-picture which is
immediately given to us. The opposite theory, which regards this world as
merely the content of our consciousness, is called “Transcendental
Idealism.” Hence, we may sum up the outcome of the above discussion by
saying, “Transcendental Idealism demonstrates its own truth, by employing
the premises of the Naïve Realism which it seeks to refute.” Transcendental
Idealism is true, if Naïve Realism is false. But the falsity of the latter is
shown only by assuming it to be true. Once we clearly realise this situation,
we have no choice but to abandon this line of argument and to try another.
But are we to trust to good luck, and experiment about until we hit by
accident upon the right line? This is Eduard von Hartmann’s view when he
believes himself to have shown the validity of his own epistemological
standpoint, on the ground that his theory explains the phenomena whereas
its rivals do not. According to his view, the several philosophical systems
are engaged in a sort of struggle for existence in which the fittest is
ultimately accepted as victor. But this method appears to us to be
unsuitable, if only for the reason that there may well be several hypotheses
which explain the phenomena equally satisfactorily. Hence, we had better
keep to the above line of thought for the refutation of Naïve Realism, and
see where precisely its deficiency lies. For, after all, Naïve Realism is the
view from which we all start out. For this reason alone it is advisable to
begin by setting it right. When we have once understood why it must be
defective, we shall be led upon the right path with far greater certainty than
if we proceed simply at haphazard.

The subjectivism which we have sketched above is the result of the

elaboration of certain facts by thought. Thus, it takes for granted that, from
given facts as starting-point, we can by consistent thinking, i.e., by logical
combination of certain observations, gain correct conclusions. But our right
thus to employ our thinking remains unexamined. There, precisely, lies the
weakness of this method. Whereas Naïve Realism starts from the
unexamined assumption that the contents of our perceptual experience have
objective reality, the Idealism just described starts from the no less
unexamined conviction that by the use of thought we can reach conclusions
which are scientifically valid. In contrast to Naïve Realism, we may call
this point of view “Naïve Rationalism.” In order to justify this term, it may
be well to insert here a brief comment on the concept of the “Naïve.” A.
Döring, in his essay Über den Begriff des Naiven Realismus,10 attempts a
more precise determination of this concept. He says, “The concept of the
Naïve marks as it were the zero-point on the scale of our reflection upon
our own activity. In content the Naïve may well coincide with the True, for,
although the Naïve is unreflecting and, therefore, uncritical or a-critical, yet
this lack of reflection and criticism excludes only the objective assurance of
truth. It implies the possibility and the danger of error, but it does not imply
the necessity of error. There are naïve modes of feeling and willing as there
are naïve modes of apprehending and thinking, in the widest sense of the
latter term. Further, there are naïve modes of expressing these inward states
in contrast with their repression or modification through consideration for
others and through reflection. Naïve activity is not influenced, at least not
consciously, by tradition, education, or imposed rule. It is in all spheres (as
its root nativus, brings out), unconscious, impulsive, instinctive, dæmonic
activity.” Starting from this account, we will try to determine the concept of
the Naïve still more precisely. In every activity we may consider two
aspects—the activity itself and our consciousness of its conformity to a law.
We may be wholly absorbed in the former, without caring at all for the
latter. The artist is in this position, who does not know in reflective form the
laws of his creative activity but yet practises these laws by feeling and
sense. We call him “naïve.” But there is a kind of self-observation which
inquires into the laws of one’s own activity and which replaces the naïve
attitude, just described, by the consciousness of knowing exactly the scope
and justification of all one does. This we will call “critical.” This account
seems to us best to hit off the meaning of this concept which, more or less
clearly understood, has since Kant acquired citizen-rights in the world of