1. In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (The ...

vs Unknown on 10 March, 1995

Equivalent citations: AIR 1995 SC 2348, 1995 (1) ALT Cri 674, 1995 CriLJ 3994, (1995) 2
GLR 992, JT 1995 (2) SC 587, 1995 (2) SCALE 200, (1995) 2 SCC 584, 1995 2 SCR 638, 1995
(2) UJ 93 SC
Bench: K S Verma, P Sawant
ORDER: P.B. Sawant, J.
Date: 10.03.1994

FACTS IN BRIEF :- Shri Vinay Chandra Mishra, the then President of the Bar Council of India, was accused
of abusing a judge of the Allahabad High Court. The said incident occurred while the Court was in
session and the applicant Judge was in the process of hearing a case in which the contemnor was
appearing on behalf of one of the parties. According to the applicant judge [Justice SK Keshote], the
contemnor had started shouting in reply to a question and had threatened that he would get the judge
transferred and even impeached. The judge further complained that the contemnor had insulted him in
open Court. The matter was referred to the Supreme Court of India for decision. In this case an advocate
was found guilty of criminal contempt of Court and he was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of six years and suspended from practising as an advocate for a period of three years. The
punishment of imprisonment was suspended for a period of four years and was to be activated in case
of his conviction for any other offence of contempt of Court within the said period.
ARGUMENTS:- Before the Supreme Court, the following was argued by the Contemnor;
 That the applicant judge had treated him unfairly and had proceeded to set aside an
order of the lower court without even hearing the arguments.
 That he was being ‘roughed’ up by the judge for taking a fearless stand to protect the
freedom of the Bar.
 That an investigation must be ordered into the incident to find out whether contempt
had been committed punishable under Article 215 of the Constitution or under Section
16 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
 That his conduct did not amount to contempt as normally altercations take place
between a Judge and the arguing advocate, which may technically be contempt on
either side but there being no intention, provisions of contempt were not attracted.
 That the Supreme Court did not have the jurisdiction to punish for an act of contempt
committed in respect of another Court of Record which was invested with identical and
independent power for punishing for contempt of itself.
JUDGMENT:- The Supreme Court rejecting the contention of the contemnor that the Court
could not take cognizance of the contempt committed in respect of another Court held that
being a Court of Record, the Court had the power to punish for contempt of High Courts also.
The Apex Court also did not accept the subsequent unconditional apology of the contemnor for
the reasons, (a) it was a free and frank admission of misdemeanor and (b) as the Court did not
find any sincere regret for his act of disrespect shown to the applicant. Instead, the apology was
concealed in such a garbed language that justified his conduct. Thus the Supreme Court,
exercising its power to do complete justice under Article 142 read with Article 129, found the
contemnor guilty of criminal contempt of court. The Court held that the license of an advocate
to practice legal profession may be suspended or cancelled by the Supreme Court or High Court
in the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction.
FOR COMMON MAN:- The important aspects of the judgment can be summarized as follows;
 The Supreme Court held that under Articles 129, 215 and 142 of the Constitution, the
Court had the power to take suo moto cognizance of contempt proceedings.
 It also held that Article 129 vested the Supreme Court not only with the power to punish
for contempt of itself but also of lower courts and tribunals in its capacity as the highest
court of the land.

2. Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union Of India & Anr on 17 April, 1998
Bench: S.C. Agrawal, G.N. Ray, A.S. Anand, S.P. Bharucha, S. Rajendra Babu
PETITIONER: SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION
RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/04/1998
BENCH: S.C. AGRAWAL, G.N. RAY, A.S. ANAND, S.P. BHARUCHA,S. RAJENDRA BABU

Facts
In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra, this Court found the Contemner, an advocate, guilty of
committing criminal contempt of Court for having interfered with and "obstructing the course of
justice by trying to threaten, overawe and overbear the court by using insulting, disrespectful and
threatening language".
Aggrieved by the direction that the contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an
advocate for a period of three years issued by the Supreme Court by invoking powers under
Articles 129 and 142 of the Indian Constitution, the Supreme Court Bar Association, through its
Honorary Secretary, filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking relief
by way of issuing an appropriate writ, direction, or declaration, declaring that the disciplinary
committees of the Bar Councils set up under the Advocates Act, 1961, alone have exclusive
jurisdiction to inquire into and suspend or debar an advocate from practising law for professional
or other misconduct, arising out of punishment imposed for contempt of court or otherwise and
further declare that the Supreme Court of India or any High Court in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction has no such original jurisdiction, power or authority in that regard notwithstanding
the contrary view held by this Hon'ble Court in In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra.
Issue For Consideration
The petition was placed before a Constitutional Bench for passing the appropriate direction,
order or declaration. The bench identified a single question and had to decide upon was whether
the Supreme Court of India can while dealing with Contempt Proceedings exercise power under
Article 129 of the Constitution or under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution or
under Article 142 of the Constitution can debar a practicing lawyer from carrying on his
profession as a lawyer for any period whatsoever.
The petitioner's assailed the correctness of the findings in In Re: Vinay Mishra submitted that:
# although the powers conferred on this Court by Article 142, though very wide in their aptitude,
can be exercised only to "do complete justice in any case or cause pending before it "and since
the issue of 'professional misconduct' is not the subject matter of "any cause" pending before this
court while dealing with a case of contempt of court, it could not make any order either under
Article 142 or 129 to suspend the license of an advocate contemner, for which punishment,
statutory provisions otherwise exist.
# the Supreme Court can neither create a "jurisdiction" nor create a "punishment" not otherwise
permitted by law and that since the power to punish an advocate (for "professional misconduct")
by suspending his license vests exclusively in a statutory body constituted under the Advocates
Act, this Court cannot assume that jurisdiction under Article 142 or 129 or even under Section 38
of the Advocates Act, 1961.The bench came to the conclusion that the Supreme Court under
Article 129 and the High Court under Article 215 of the Indian Constitution declaring them court
of records has the power to punish the for contempt of itself. The Court observed that Parliament
is competent to make law in relation to Contempt of Court. After analyzing Article 246 and entry
77 of List I of the VIIth Schedule and entry 14 of List III of the said schedule it is evident that
the legislature can make a law regarding the same, but cannot take away contempt jurisdiction
from the Courts which flows from the Courts being deemed as Courts of record which embodies
the power to punish for the contempt of itself.
With reference to Article 142 of the Constitution of India the Court observed that when this court
takes cognizance of a matter of contempt of Court by an advocate, there is no case, cause or
matter before it regarding his professional misconduct even though in a given case, the contempt
committed by an advocate may also amount to an abuse of the privilege granted to an advocate
by virtue of the license to practice law. No issue relating to his suspension from practice is the
subject matter of the case.
The Court opined that power to punish in matters of contempt of Court, though quite wide, is yet
limited and cannot be expanded to include the power to determine whether the advocate is also
guilty of professional misconduct in a summary manner giving a go by to the procedure
prescribed under the Advocates Act, 1961.
The power to do complete justice, in a way is a corrective power which gives preference to
equity over law but it cannot be used to deprive a professional lawyer of the due process of law,
contained in the Advocates Act, 1961, while dealing with a case of contempt of Court.
From a reading of Article 142 it is clear the statutory provisions cannot be ignored or taken away
or assumed by the Supreme Court. The Advocates Act, 1961, empowers the Bar Council to take
action against the advocate for professional misconduct. The Bar Council is empowered under
Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 to punish advocates for professional misconduct. The act
contains a detailed and complete mechanism for suspending or revoking the license of an
advocate. A disciplinary committee hears the case of the advocate concerned and then order any
of the punishments listed in Section 35(3) (a-d). If the advocate is guilty of contempt of Court as
well as professional misconduct the Court must punish him for the contempt, whereas refer the
professional misconduct to the Bar. The Bar will then initiate proceedings against, this provides
the advocate with right to be heard and appropriate action is taken by the disciplinary committee.
After such proceedings if the advocate is aggrieved he may approach the Supreme Court. Section
38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court. This Section confers
upon the Court appellate jurisdiction. If once the matter has been reported to the Bar and it does
not take any action, the Court may take up the matter. This Section can in no way be construed to
give original jurisdiction to the Court.
The Court opined that the Supreme Court makes the statutory bodies and other organs of the
State perform their duties in accordance with law, its role is unexceptionable but it is not
permissible for the Supreme Court to take over the role of the bodies and other organs of the
State and perform their functions.
There was an inherent fallacy in the case of Vinay Mishra, it was said once the matter is before
the court it can pass any order or direction. But the matter is that of contempt of Court not of
professional misconduct. The Court has jurisdiction on the matter of contempt but professional
misconduct vests with the Bar. As the Bar can suspend an advocate only after giving him an
opportunity to represent himself which is the requirement of due process of law, after the case of
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. The Court in Vinay's case vested with itself with the
jurisdiction that it never had.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court is vested with the right to punish those guilty of contempt of Court under
Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The power to punish contemners is
also vested with the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution and the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 also governs the punishments given by the High Court. This act in no way
controls the jurisdiction of the Apex Court. The Court in In Re: Vinay Mishra misconstrued
Article 129 read with 142 and robbed the Bar to of all powers to try and punish those for
professional misconduct. It even assumed jurisdiction when Section 38 of the Advocates Act,
1961 explicitly provides only appellate jurisdiction to the Apex Court. The Court punished Shri
Mishra by suspending him thus the petition arose in the 1998 case, Supreme Court Bar
Association v. Union of India.
The Court overruled the Mishra case and recognized the Bar Council's power to try and punish
all those guilty of professional misconduct. It is well settled that contempt proceedings are
brought about to protect the majesty of law and uphold the judiciary's position, the central pillar
in Indian democracy, among the public and give them reason to keep their faith in the
administration of justice. Contempt proceedings are not brought about to restore the pride of the
Judge in who's Court or against whose order their was contempt.
In the Mishra case the Court instead of protecting the image of the Judiciary, the upholder of the
law, knowingly or un-knowingly, tried to restore the pride of the Judge by suspending the
advocate Mishra who might have been influenced by his high position in the Bar, and felt that
appropriate punishment might not be meted out to him.
In the Supreme Court Bar Association case the court took a very objective view and taking the
help of law and construing it in the right way came to the conclusion that the power to punish for
any professional misconduct rests with the Bar, whereas to punish for contempt only it has
jurisdiction for itself and subordinate courts. No statute can take contempt jurisdiction away from
the Supreme as well as the High Court.

3. Harish Chandra Tiwari vs Baiju on 8 January, 2002

Bench: K.T. Thomas, S.N. Phukan
CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 200 of 2000
PETITIONER: HARISH CHANDRA TIWARI
RESPONDENT:BAIJU
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/01/2002
BENCH: K.T. THOMAS & S.N. PHUKAN
Brief Facts Of The Case
Appellant was selected as an Advocate with the Bar Council of U. P. in May 1982, and has been
practicing from that point forward. Appellant was locked in by Baiju the respondent, in a land
obtaining case in which the respondent was an inquirer for remuneration. The appellant applied
for delivering the sum and according to the Courts request pulled out the sum on September 2,
1987 yet he didn't restore it to the customer to whom it was expected nor did he educate the
customer about the receipt regarding the sum.
When the customer got the information on it and subsequent to get the sum composed by the
Advocate, a complainant was lodged by him with the bar committee of state for reasonable
disciplinary action against Appellant. On June 12, 1988, appellant documented an answer to the
said accepting the representation of the respondent by him for pulling out cash, however he used
the defense that he had restored the add up to the customer subsequent to deducting his charges
and costs.
Notwithstanding this Appellant on 3 August 1988 recorded an affidavit before State Bar
gathering bar board in which a trade-off between the appellant and respondent had been shown
up was expressed. State Bar Disciplinary Advisory Group was checking the affidavit with the
respondent.
The respondent denied the substance as well as denied having gotten any sum from the appellant
Advocate. Under area 36-B the Act of procedures stood moved to the Bar Council of India. The
disciplinary board of trustees led enquiry and reached the resolution that the affidavit dated
August 3, 1988 was fabricated one and that application was created. On this conclusion the
advisory group forced a discipline of suspending the Advocate from practice for duration of 3
years.
Issues Involved In The Case
1. What ought to be the quantum of punishment to be imposed on the advocate?
Arguments Of The Parties
Plaintiff: The plaintiff, who is an old, poor, vulnerable and an uneducated person, had assigned
the appellant for his land acquisition case and later when he realized that his assets had been
misappropriated by the appellant, he filled a case with the Bar Council of the State for initiating
suitable disciplinary actions against him and also to make sure that he gets his due back.
Defendant: The defendant Harish Chandra Tiwari, was enlisted as an advocate with the Bar
Council of the State of U. P. had filed a reply to the said complaint before the Bar Council of the
State. Although he admitted of withdrawing a certain amount of money, he used the defence of
returning the money to the client after a deduction of his fees and expenses.
Then later an affidavit implying to be that of Baiju was filled by the defendant before the State
Bar Council in which it is expressed that a trade-off had been shown up between him and his
customer and that no further move should be made on the complaint made by the respondent and
pleaded no liability, however when the Bar Council of the State confronted the plaintiff
regarding the same, he flat out denied of having received any amount from the appellant-
advocate.
Legal Aspects Involved In The Case
This case deals with the extent of punishment that the offending Advocate should be imposed.
The advocate had filled his appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 Court upholding
the appeal of misconduct, asked the advocate why the punishment shall not be enacted to strike
his name from the roll of the Bar Council of the State.
Further grievance and the procedures later stood move to the Bar Council of India by excellence
of Section 36B (2) of the Act. Coming to the gravity of the punishment that is to be given to the
guilty Advocate Section 38 of the Act empowers the Supreme Court to "pass such order
including an order varying punishment awarded by the disciplinary committee of the Bar
Council of India as it deems fit".
The only condition for varying the punishment awarded by the Bar Council of India is that if
such variation is to prejudicially affect the appellant, he should be given a reasonable opportunity
of being heard. Three unique punishments are acted in Section 35 of the Act: (1) censure the
advocate (2) suspend the advocate from practice for such period as it might consider plausible (3)
eliminate the name of the advocate from the State Roll of Advocates.

Judgement In Brief
In the current scenario, the misappropriation stayed unabated even after the disciplinary
procedures initiated and it proceeded even till now as the deficient advocate didn't want to return
even a solitary pie to the customer. The wrongdoing of the appellant-advocate turned out to be
more disturbed when he resolved to fabricated an affirmation for the sake of his customer, which
he created before the disciplinary committee to swindle his customer and to delude the
disciplinary committee to accept that he and his customer had settled the contest by making a late
instalment to his customer.
The court thinks holding such advocate on the move of the legal profession, it is risky to the
calling. The circumstance for this situation along these lines warrants the discipline of expulsion
of his name from the move of advocates. In deciding the discipline to be granted by the
disciplinary committee on demonstrated wrongdoing for each situation, the committee ought to
weigh different factors.
One of them is the intense need to scrub the legal profession from the individuals who are
inclined to abusing the cash of the customers. Prevention is consequently a noticeable thought.
This is especially vital when the legal profession has gotten swarmed as it is today, without there
being any powerful sifting measure at the confirmation stage. Besides, to keep up the
professional principles, it is important that no one should frame the feeling that once an
individual is admitted to the legal profession, he would be safe to any corrective measures and is
allowed to enjoy evil or wretched activities.
The solitary position which can successfully keep up the fidelity of the legal profession is the
disciplinary committee of the Bar Council, both of the State or of India. The appropriate message
which should go to all individuals from the legal profession is that they are generally being
watched, in regards to their professional activities, through optics by the Bar Council of the State
just as by the Bar Council of India and that their disciplinary committees would not submit any
professional misconduct with escape nibble discipline.
Commentary
Advocacy is an honourable profession and an Advocate is the most responsible, favored and
intelligent individual of the general public and his act are good example for the general public,
which are important to be controlled. Professional wrongdoing is the conduct beyond what is
viewed as satisfactory or deserving of its enrolment by the overseeing body of a profession.
Professional offense alludes to shocking or disreputable direct not befitting an advocate. Section
V of the Advocate Act, 1961, manages the lead of Advocates. It portrays arrangements
identifying with discipline for professional and different wrongdoings. Section 35(1) of the
Advocate Act, 1961, says, where on receipt of a grievance or in any case a State Bar Council has
motivation to accept that any advocate on its roll has been liable of professional or other
wrongdoing, it will allude the case for removal to it disciplinary committee.
For the most part legal profession isn't an exchange or business, it's a benevolent, respectable,
and purified profession of the general public. Individuals having a place with this profession
ought not to support trickery and debasement; however they need to endeavor to tie down justice
to their customers.
The believability and notoriety of the profession relies on the way wherein the individuals from
the profession act. It's an image of sound connection among Bar and Bench. This case is a classic
example of the quantum of punishment that any advocate will get if he/she misappropriates the
client's money, here the advocate fraudulently withdrew a certain amount of money from the
client without informing him and further when a case was filed against him, he forged a
document claiming that he had settled the matter with his client personally and no further action
should be taken against him. The Court observing all these activities of the advocate forced the
punishment of removal of the name of appellant from the roll of Advocates.

4. Bhupinder Kumar Sharma vs Bar Association Pathankot on 31 October, 2001

Bench: D.P. Mohapatra, Shivaraj V. Patil
CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 6304 of 1998
PETITIONER: BHUPINDER KUMAR SHARMA
RESPONDENT: BAR ASSOCIATION PATHANKOT
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 31/10/2001
Brief Facts
 In this case, the appellant was enrolled with the State Bar Council as an advocate on
16/09/1994 vide enrollment number P/771/94
 The respondent association made a written complaint to the State Bar Council making
allegations that the appellant was carrying on and continued his business and business
activities even after his enrollment as an advocate.
 The State Bar Council took recognition of the complaint and referred the complaint to its
disciplinary committee.
 That he was running a photocopies documentation centre in the court compound
Pathankot and the space for the same was allotted to the appellant in his personal capacity
on account of being handicapped. He was also running a PCO/STD Booth.
 That he was the proprietor/ General Manager of the Punjab Coal Briquettes Pathankot, a
private concern and he was pursuing the business / his interest in the said business even
on the date when his statement was recorded by the Disciplinary Committee on
12/05/1996.
 The Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council witnessing Senior
Telecommunication Office Assistant who deposed that STD/PCO has been allotted to
appellant in the handicapped quota and the same is continuing in the name of the
appellant even after his enrollment as an advocate and a clerk in the office of SDO also
stated in his evidence that space for installment of photocopy machine was allotted on
lease basis to the appellant in the handicapped quota. Thus, the Disciplinary Committee
passed an order to remove the name of the Appellant from the State`s Roll of Advocates
under Section 35(3)(d) of Advocates Act 1961 and debarred him from practicing as an
advocate.
 The appellant filed an appeal to the Bar Council of India on re-appreciation of the
material on record. The Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of India confirmed the
 decision of the State Bar Council held the appellant guilty of professional misconduct and
dismissed the appeal.
 The appellant filed an appeal under Section 38 of the Advocate Act, 1961 before the
Supreme Court against the judgment an order passed by the Disciplinary Committee of
the Bar Council of India, confirming the order passed by the Disciplinary Committee of
State Bar Council removing the name of the appellant from the State Roll`s of Advocates
under Section 35(3)(d) of the Act.
Issues
 Whether or not applicant was engaged or has ever being engaged in any trade, business or
profession?
 Whether there order of removal of applicant name from the State Roll`s of Advocates and
debarring him from practicing as an advocate is valid?
Important Arguments (from both parties)
Appellant
The appellant contended that the allegations made were not established or proved and the
allegations were not judged by the standard of proof required in such case, the appellant was not
actually carrying on business and the evidence on the point was not properly appreciated, the
punishment imposed on the appellant is grossly disproportionate.
Respondent
The respondent contended that the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct as he was
carrying his business even after his enrollment as an advocate. So his interest in continuing the
business before and even after filing of the appeals before the Bar Council of India and this court
cannot be accepted or sanctioned, further in spite of giving and undertaking before this court, he
is still continuing his business supported by the report of the sub judges made to the court.
According to respondent the punishment imposed on the appellant is proper in the absence of
any good ground to take any lenient view.
Judgment
The Supreme Court held that having persuaded both orders and evidence place on record the
appellant was guilty of professional misconduct supported by and based on cogent and
convincing evidence and the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court further held that having regard to the nature of misconduct and taking note
of the handicap of the appellant debarring him from practicing for all time is too harsh. So they
debar the appellant from practicing up to the end of December 2006. His licensed was cancelled
for 5 years.
Present Status of the Judgment
The judgment given by the Supreme Court of India in Bhupinder Kumar Sharma v/s Bar
Association Pathankot is still applicable. An advocate shall be held liable for professional
misconduct if he carries any business other than his legal profession under the provisions of
Advocate Act 1961.
Conclusion
It can be concluded that an advocate cannot carries any other business activities or profession. If
he practiced any such activities, he shall be held guilty. The rules of the Bar Council of India
clearly specified that no advocate can be a full time salaried employed person or a person
carrying on any other business. He should not be personally engaged in any business but as per
the rules of Bar Council of India he can be a share holder, partner, investor etc. The nature of
such business is inconsistent with the dignity or nobility of profession. The nature of such
business is a professional misconduct as per Advocate Act 1961.

5. Dr. D.C. Saxena vs Hon'Ble The Chief Justice Of India on 19 July, 1997
Bench: K. Ramaswamy
PETITIONER: DR. D.C. SAXENA
RESPONDENT:HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/07/1997
BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY

CASE NOTE
The Present Case was about the Contempt Proceedings initiated based on a writ petition filed
by the petitioner and once the writ petition was dismissed, he again filed another writ petition
on the same grounds and was repeatedly informed about the same but he insistently instituted
the proceedings.
RELEVANT FACTS AND BACKGROUND
 The petitioner had initiated public interest litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution
to direct Sri. P.V. Narsimha Rao, the President of Indian National Congress and the
former Prime Minister of the country to pay a sum of Rs. 8.29 Lakhs said to be due to the
union of India for use of Indian Air Force aircraft or helicopters from October 1, 1993, to
November 30, 1993.
 When the Writ petition was posted for hearing on July 17, 1995, before the learned Chief
Justice of India and Justice S.C Sen, the Solicitor General of India, Shri Dipankar P.
Gupta was sent for and the Court directed him to have the averments verified to be
correct and directed the petition to be listed after two weeks.
 On August 7, 1995, the writ petition came before the bench comprising the learned CJI,
Justice S.C. Sen and Justice K.S. Paripoornan.
The Solicitor General had placed the record before the Court and upon perusal thereof and
after hearing the petitioner-in-person, the Bench summarily “dismissed” the writ petition
which had triggered the petitioner to file yet another writ petition, this time against the
learned Chief Justice of India, Justice A.M. Ahmadi.
 The Registry raised objections for its maintainability but, at the insistence of the
petitioner, it was posted, with office objections, for hearing, as an unregistered Writ
petition before a Bench of three learned Judges, viz. Justice J.S. Verma, Justice N.P.
Singh and Justice S.P. Bharucha.
 The petitioner, again appearing in person, persisted to justify the averments made against
the learned CJI Justice Ahmadi in the writ petition.
Despite the Court pointing out that the averments were scandalous, the proceedings of the
Court did indicate that the petitioner reiterated that he “stood by the averments made
therein” and sought for the following declarations:
1. That Justice Ahmadi is unfit to hold the office of the CJI,
2. That he should be stripped of his citizenship,
3. To direct registration of FIR against him under various provisions of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 for committing forgery and fraud under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
4. To direct prosecution of him under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
5. To direct him to defray from his pocket the expenses incurred by the petitioner in filing
the two writ petitions
 6. To direct Justice Ahmadi to reimburse from his pocket to the public exchequer the entire
loss caused to the state, as a consequence of non-payment of the dues by Shri. P.V.
Narsimha Rao with the interest at 18% per annum, and
7. Other Consequential directions.
ISSUES
1. Whether the above-stated conduct of the petitioner amounts to contempt of Court?
2. Are the Provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act,1971 ultra vires Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution?
3. Is it relevant in a contempt proceeding that the petitioner did not seek any personal gains
for himself and that he had made the averments for the public good with np intention to
scandalize the court?
4. Whether defense under Sections 4&5 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is available to
the contemnor?
ANSWER TO THE ISSUES GIVEN BY THE COURT
1. The conduct of the petitioner was held to be amounting to Contempt of Court.
2. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was not held to be ultra vires Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
3. In this regard, the Court held that it is true that in an indictable offense, generally mens
rea is an essential ingredient and requires to be proved for convicting the offender but for
criminal contempt as defined in Section2 (c) any act which tends to create disaffection,
disbelief in the efficacy of judicial dispensation or tendency to obstruct the administration
of justice or tendency to lower the authority or majesty of law constitutes criminal
contempt. Thereby, it excludes the proof of mens rea. What is relevant is that the
offending or affront act produces interference with or tendency to interfere with the
course of justice. The Court, therefore, is required to consider whether the imputations
made by a contemnor are calculated to bring to have the effect of bringing the court into
contempt or casting aspersions on the administration of justice or tends to impede justice,
etc. The Court has to consider the nature of the imputations, the occasion of making the
imputations, and whether the contemnor foresees the possibility of his act.
4. The Court held that the said provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are inapplicable to
the present case as they would apply only to the publication of a report of the judicial
proceedings fairly and with accuracy to outside the world. Further, it was held that there
is a distinction between expression in pleading and publication of a report of the judicial
proceeding or order without malice as fair and constructive criticism to the readers. What
he has written in the second writ petition is neither a fair and accurate report of the
proceedings of the earlier writ petition nor a fair criticism thereof.
ACTS REFERRED
1. The Constitution of India, 1950- Article 19(1)(g)
2. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Sections 4 and 5.
DECISION OF THE COURT
Having regard to the gravity of the contumacious statements, the recklessness with which they
are made, the in-temperateness of their language, the mode of their publication in a writ petition
in this Court, and the alleged Contemnor’s influential position in the society, the Court held that
punishment only in nature of a fine would not be adequate. A contemnor such as the present
must also undergo imprisonment.
Accordingly, the alleged contemnor was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for
three months and to pay a fine of Rs 2,000/-
In default of such payment within three months, the alleged contemnor shall undergo further
simple imprisonment for one month.
PRINCIPLES OF LAW LAID DOWN IN THE CASE
1. Liberty of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) brings within its ambit, the
corresponding duty and responsibility, and puts limitations on the exercise of that liberty.
The liberty of free expression is not to be confounded or confused with the license to make
unfounded allegations against any institution including the judiciary.
2. Any citizen is entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness of a judgment,
order, sentence with moderate language pointing out the error or defect or illegality in the
judgment, order, or sentence.
Constructive public criticism, even if it slightly oversteps its limits, thus has fruitful play in
preserving the democratic health of public institutions. But liberty of expression should not
be a license to violently make a personal attack on a judge.
3. Scandalising the judges or courts tends to bring the authority and administration of law into
disrespect and disregard and tantamount to contempt. All acts which bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity or its majesty or challenge its authority,
constitute contempt.
4. It is not necessary to establish actual intention on the part of the contemnor to interfere with
the administration of justice. Making reckless allegations or vilification of the conduct of the
court or the judge would be contempt.
The defense of intention, therefore, cannot be taken in the proceedings for contempt of
Court.

6. M.B. Sanghi, Advocate vs High Court Of Punjab And Haryana ... on 31 July, 1991
Equivalent citations: 1991 AIR 1834, 1991 SCR (3) 312
Bench: Ahmadi, A.M. (J)
PETITIONER: M.B. SANGHI, ADVOCATE
RESPONDENT: HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:31/07/1991
BENCH:AHMADI, A.M. (J) AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)
CITATION: 1991 AIR 183 1991 SCR (3) 312 1991 SCC (3) 600 JT 1991 (3) 318
1991 SCALE (2)228

In this case, the appellant, MB Sanghi, was representing the plaintiff in a civil suit titled Hari
Ram vs. Municipal Committee. During a proceeding, the plaintiff prayed for an ex-parte ad
interim order, but the court declined his request. During the case was in motion and some of the
filing of documents was to be done. An ex parte ad interim order was asked for by the
respondent, and it was provided for them.
Unable to secure an ad interim stay in favour of his client, M.B. Sanghi uttered certain words
imputing motives to the sub-judge in refusing to grant a stay. The plaintiff asked the judge
whether he was a sitting judge or a contractor to the Municipal Committee.
The sub-judge submitted a report to the District and Sessions judge setting out the words uttered
by the appellant. The District and Sessions Judge in turn submitted a report to the High Court
and proceedings for contempt were initiated by the High Court. In the contempt proceedings,
M.B. Sanghi denied uttering the words mentioned in the report of the Sub Judge and offered him
an unqualified apology. But the high court held that the appellant was guilty of contempt of court
under Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as he had attacked the integrity of the
Sub Judge. The High Court did not accept the appellant's apology and also mentioned that the
appellant was addicted to using contemptuous language against the judges as there had been a
discharged contempt proceeding against him prior to this case. The High Court sentenced him
for two months imprisonment.
Aggrieved by this, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 19(3) of the Contempt of Court
Act,1971 before the Supreme Court. It was contended that he did not utter the word mentioned
by the subjudge in his report. He also presented three advocates as witnesses, stating that the
appellant did not use any unparliamentary or foul language towards the subjudge.
ISSUE:
(i) Is there a contempt of court in the case?
(ii) Was the rejection of the appellant's apology justifiable?
JUDGEMENT :
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by saying that the appellant frequently used
contemptuous language against the judges. It was also added that, as a senior advocate, an
apology for disparaging remarks against judges cannot be accepted. The SC judge also justified
the High court's decision. Here, the appellant was found guilty of Contempt of Court according
to Section (2)(c)(i) of the Contempt of Court Act 1971. It was also found that this is not the first
time the appellant is facing a contempt proceeding. So the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme
Court. In reference to the judgement of the High Court, accepting the apology of a senior
advocate for attacking the integrity of a judge may encourage other legal professionals to behave
in a similar way. It was also noted that incidents of using improper language toward the judge.
The Supreme Court on appeal held that punishing an advocate for Contempt of Court, no doubt,
must be regarded as an extreme measure, but to preserve the dignity of Judiciary, it becomes the
duty of the Court to punish the contemptor. It was held that the sentence of two months
imprisonment is in no way calls for interference. The Court, hence, confirmed the punishment
and dismissed his criminal appeal.
and insubordination are on the rise. So, taking the facts and circumstances of the case into
consideration, an apology for the same cannot be accepted.
CASE ANALYSIS :
According to the High Court, the appellant's goal in insulting the judge was to influence the court
to act in a certain way. He believed he might get his client an ad interim by using disparaging
words against the judge. Such behaviour is inappropriate for a lawyer in the legal profession. He
must behave in a way that upholds the public's perception of the legal system. A complaint or
constructive criticism of a judicial action that is made in good faith is permissible.
Punishing the contemptor, who has a habit of speaking derogatorily of judges, will assist to curb
this behaviour among legal practitioners. However, it is also important to keep an eye on the
judges' rulings and embrace reasonable criticism. Even in this situation, the granting of an ad
interim to the other party when it was refused for the plaintiff should have been questioned, but
professionally and without disrespecting the judge.