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 Optimization of
Multilayered Radar
Absorbing Structures
(RAS) using Nature
Inspired Algorithm
 Optimization of
Multilayered Radar
Absorbing Structures
(RAS) using Nature
Inspired Algorithm

Vineetha Joy, Vishal G. Padwal, Hema Singh

and Raveendranath U. Nair
First edition published 2022
by CRC Press
6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300, Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742

and by CRC Press

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

© 2022 Vineetha Joy, Vishal G. Padwal, Hema Singh and Raveendranath U. Nair

CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the author and pub-
lisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or the consequences of their use.
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ISBN: 978-0-367-75912-4 (hbk)

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Typeset in Palatino
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India
 To

Our Families
Contents

Preface......................................................................................................................ix
Acknowledgment...................................................................................................xi
Authors Biography.............................................................................................. xiii
Introduction ...........................................................................................................xv

1. Introduction .....................................................................................................1
1.1 Methods for Reduction of Radar Cross Section ...............................1
1.2 Signifcance of Multilayered Radar Absorbing Structures
(RAS) and Design Challenges.............................................................2

2. EM Wave Propagation in Multilayered Radar Absorbing

Structures (RAS).............................................................................................5
2.1 Computation of Overall Refection/Transmission
Coeffcients in Multilayered RAS for Normal Incidence ................5
2.2 Computation of Overall Refection/Transmission
Coeffcients in Multilayered RAS for Oblique Incidence ................8
2.2.1 Transverse Electric (TE) Polarization.................................. 10
2.2.2 Transverse Magnetic (TM) Polarization ............................. 12

3. Application of Nature Inspired Algorithms for Optimization

Problems ......................................................................................................... 17
3.1 Nature Inspired Algorithms for Optimization of RAS................. 17
3.2 Overview of Particle Swarm Optimization .................................... 18
3.3 Key Terminology in PSO Algorithm................................................ 19
3.4 Description of Generalized PSO Algorithm ................................... 20

4. PSO-based Algorithm for the EM Design and Optimization of

Multilayered RAS......................................................................................... 25
4.1 Methodology of PSO for the Optimal Design of
Multilayered RAS................................................................................ 25
4.2 Algorithm for the Optimization of Multilayered RAS
Using PSO ............................................................................................ 27

5. Validations and Performance Evaluation ................................................ 35

5.1 Validation of Developed Subroutine ................................................ 35

vii
viii Contents

5.2 Case Study for Performance Evaluation of Developed

PSO-based Algorithm ........................................................................ 46
5.3 Conclusion............................................................................................ 60

Appendix: Database of Materials Used for the Optimal

Design of Multilayered RAS.............................................................................63
References .............................................................................................................65
Author Index ......................................................................................................... 67
Subject Index ........................................................................................................ 69
Preface

In recent decades, stealth technology has emerged as a major determinant of

defense superiority among global super powers. It plays a crucial role in the
combat zone, where swiftness, surprise and instantaneity are the decisive
elements for survivability. The supreme goal here is to reduce the radar cross
section (RCS) of military vehicles from rival radar systems, thereby allowing
the user to conduct surprise military missions. Several techniques like shap-
ing, application of radar absorbing materials (RAM), passive cancellation,
active cancellation, etc., can be used to minimize RCS. Among all of them,
multilayered radar absorbing structures (RAS) have gained exceptional
research interest recently due to their broadband RCS reduction capabilities
in combination with reduced weight penalties. The various design param-
eters in a multilayered RAS model can be tailored to achieve the desired
performance over the specifed range of frequencies and incident angles.
However, when a huge database of potential materials is available, the selec-
tion of suitable material for each layer becomes extremely cumbersome.
Furthermore, the thickness of each layer has to be appropriately designed
so as to get appreciable performance. This is a clear case of an optimization
problem where the position of a particular material and its thickness become
the parameters to be optimized. Although commercially available software
suites provide algorithms (like particle swarm optimization (PSO), genetic
algorithm (GA), etc.), for optimization of thickness, they do not have options
for optimizing the position of a particular material inside the multilayered
RAS confguration. In this regard, this book presents an effcient algorithm,
based on particle swarm optimization, for the material selection as well as
optimization of thickness of multilayered RAS models considering both nor-
mal and oblique incidence cases. It includes a thorough overview of the theo-
retical background required for the analysis of multilayered RAS as well as
the step-by-step procedure used for the implementation of PSO-based opti-
mization algorithm. Further, the accuracy and computational effciency of
the indigenously developed algorithm in comparison with full wave simula-
tion software is also established using suitable validations and case studies.
This book will serve as a valuable resource for students, researchers, scien-
tists and engineers involved in the electromagnetic design and development
of multilayered radar absorbing structures.

ix
Acknowledgment

First and foremost, we would like to thank God Almighty for being a beacon
of hope during the course of this research work.
Further, we would like to thank Shri. Jitendra J. Jadhav, Director, CSIR-
National Aerospace Laboratories, Bengaluru, for permission to write this
book.
We would also like to acknowledge the valuable suggestions from our col-
leagues at the Centre for Electromagnetics during the course of writing this
book.
But for the concerted support and encouragement of Dr. Gagandeep Singh,
Publisher (Engineering), CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Books India Pvt. Ltd.,
it would not have been possible to bring out this book within such a short
span of time.
We are also forever beholden to our family members for their incessant
inspiration which supported us to stay on rough tracks.
Vineetha Joy would like to specially thank her husband, Johnu George,
for his constant support and encouragement during the course of this work.
Vishal G. Padwal would like to thank his parents for their motivation and
support during this tenure.
Hema Singh would like to thank her daughter, Ishita Singh, for her con-
stant cooperation and encouragement during the preparation of the book.

xi
Authors Biography

Vineetha Joy is working as Scientist at Centre for Electromagnetics of CSIR-

National Aerospace Laboratories, Bengaluru, India. She obtained B. Tech
in Electronics and Communication Engineering with Second Rank from
University of Calicut in 2011 and received M. Tech degree with First Rank
in RF & Microwave Engineering from Indian Institute of Technology (IIT),
Kharagpur, in 2014. She is actively involved in various R&D programs span-
ning domains such as computational electromagnetics, electromagnetic
design and performance analysis of radomes, design and development of
broadband radar absorbing structures, hybrid numerical techniques for scat-
tering analysis, and electromagnetic characterization of potential materials
for airborne structures. She has authored/co-authored over 100 research
publications, including one book, peer-reviewed journal papers, symposium
papers, technical documents and test reports.

Vishal G. Padwal obtained his B.E. in Electronics & Tele-communication

Engineering from University of Pune, India, and M. E. in Electronics and
Tele-communication (Microwave) in 2017 from Department of Electronics &
Tele-communication Engineering, Pune Institute of Computer Technology,
India. He is currently working as Research Scientist at Society for Applied
Microwave Electronics Engineering & Research (SAMEER), Mumbai. In
2018–2019, he was working as Project Assistant at Centre for Electromagnetics
of CSIR-National Aerospace Laboratories, Bengaluru, India. His research
interest includes EM design and analysis of multilayered radar absorbing
structures, optimization techniques, computational electromagnetics, etc.
He has co-authored several conference papers, technical documents and test
reports.

Dr. Hema Singh is working as Senior Principal Scientist at the Centre for
Electromagnetics, National Aerospace Laboratories (CSIR-NAL), Bengaluru,
India. She received her PhD degree in Electronics Engineering from IIT-
BHU, Varanasi, India, in 2000. For the period 1999–2001, she was Lecturer in
Physics at P.G. College, Kashipur, Uttaranchal, India. She was Lecturer in EEE
of Birla Institute of Technology & Science (BITS), Pilani, Rajasthan, India, for
the period 2001–2004. She joined CSIR-NAL as Scientist in January 2005. Her
active areas of research are computational electromagnetics for aerospace
applications, EM analysis of propagation in an indoor environment, phased
arrays, conformal antennas, radar cross section studies including active RCS
reduction. She has contributed to projects sponsored by DRDO on low RCS
phased array, active RCS reduction and RAS development, and also in a proj-
ect sponsored by Boeing USA on EM analysis of RF feld build-up within

xiii
xiv Authors Biography

Boeing 787 Dreamliner. She received Best Woman Scientist Award in CSIR-
NAL, Bengaluru for the year 2007–2008 for her contribution in the area of
active RCS reduction. Dr. Singh has co-authored 14 books, 2 book chapters,
7 software copyrights, 370 scientifc research papers and technical reports.

Dr. Raveendranath U. Nair is working as Senior Principal Scientist & Head

at the Centre for Electromagnetics, National Aerospace Laboratories (CSIR-
NAL), Bengaluru, India. He holds a PhD degree in Microwave Electronics
from MG University, India. He has over 20 years’ experience in the feld of
electromagnetic design and analysis of radomes, design and development
of FSS-based structures for airborne platforms, radar cross section studies,
design and development of artifcially engineered materials, etc. He has
contributed signifcantly to the National Radome Programs, including the
Doppler Weather Radar (DWR) radome installed at SHAAR Sreeharikota,
Fire Control Radar (FCR) radome for Jaguar aircraft, Astra missile ceramic
radome, nosecone radome for Saras aircraft, multiband radomes for TU-142M
aircraft, etc. He has authored/co-authored over 200 research publications,
including peer-reviewed journal papers, symposium papers, technical
reports and two books.
Other documents randomly have
different content
 2. The Philosophy of Gotama and Canade. The philosophy of
Gotama and that of Canade belong to one another.[18] The
philosophy of Gotama is called Nyaya (reasoning), and that of
Canade, Vaiseshica (particular). The first is a specially perfect
dialectic, and the second, on the other hand, occupies itself with
physics, that is, with particular or sensuous objects. Colebrooke
says:—“No department of science or of literature has taken up the
attention of the Indians more than the Nyaya; and the fruit of this
study is an infinite number of writings, included in which there may
be found the works of very celebrated men of learning. The system
which Gotama and Canade observe is that indicated in one part of
the Vedas as being the path which must be trodden in the pursuit of
learning and study; viz., enunciation, definition, and investigation.
Enunciation is the specification of a thing by its name, that is, by the
expression denoting it, as revelation directs; for language is
considered as revealed to man. Definition sets forth the particular
quality which constitutes the real character of a thing. Investigation
consists in an inquiry into the adequacy and sufficiency of the
definition. In conformity with this, the teachers of philosophy
presuppose scientific terms, proceed to definitions and then come to
the investigation of the thus premised subjects.” By the name, the
ordinary conception is indicated, and with it what is given in
definition is compared in investigation. What comes next is the
object to be contemplated. “Gotama here adduces sixteen points,
amongst which proof, evidence” (which is formal), “and what has to
be proved, are the principal; the others are merely subsidiary and
accessory, as contributing to the knowledge and confirmation of the
truth. The Nyaya concurs with the other psychological schools in
this, that it promises happiness, final excellence, and freedom from
evil as the reward of a perfect knowledge of the principles which it
teaches, that is to say, of the Truth, meaning the conviction of the
eternal existence of the soul as separable from body,” which makes
spirit independent. Soul then is itself the object which is to be known
and proved. This has still to be shown more particularly.
 a. The first point of importance, the evidence brought forth as
proof, is said to be divided into four kinds:—first of all, perception;
secondly, inference, of which there are three kinds, viz. inference
from result to cause, that from cause to effect, and that derived
from analogy. The third kind of evidence is comparison, the fourth,
trustworthy authority, including both tradition and the revelation
implied in it. These kinds of proof are much brought forward, both in
the ancient Treatise ascribed to Gotama and in innumerable
commentaries.
b. The second point of importance is found in the subjects which
have to be proved, and which have to be made evident; and of
these twelve are here given. The first and most important is,
however, the soul, as the seat, distinguished from the body and from
the senses, of feeling and of knowledge, the existence of which is
proved through inclination, disinclination, will, &c. It has fourteen
qualities: number, size, individuality, connection, separation,
intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, dislike, will, merit, fault, and
imagination. We see in this first commencement of reflection, which
is quite without order, neither connection nor any totality of
determinations. The second object of knowledge is body; the third,
the organs of sensation, as the five outward senses are called.
These are not modifications of consciousness, as the Sanc’hya
asserts, but matter constructed out of the elements, which
respectively consist of earth, water, light, air, and ether. The pupil of
the eye is not, they say, the organ of sight, nor the ear of hearing,
but the organ of seeing is a ray of light that proceeds from the eye
to the object; the organ of hearing is the ether that in the cavity of
the ear communicates with the object heard, through the ether that
is found between. The ray of light is usually invisible, just as a light
is not seen at mid-day, but in certain circumstances it is visible. In
taste, a watery substance like saliva is the organ, and so on. We find
something similar to what is here said about sight in Plato’s Timæus
(pp. 45, 46, Steph.; pp. 50-53, Bekk.); there are interesting remarks
upon the phosphorus of the eyes in a paper by Schultz, contained in
Goethe’s Morphology. Examples of men seeing at night, so that their
eyes lighted up the object, are brought forward in numbers, but the
demonstration certainly demands particular conditions. The objects
of sense form the fourth subject. Here Cesava, a commentator,
inserts the categories of Canade, of which there are six. The first of
these is substance, and of this there are nine kinds: earth, water,
light, air, ether, time, space, soul, understanding. The fundamental
elements of material substances are by Canade regarded as if they
were original atoms, and afterwards aggregates of the same; he
maintains the everlasting nature of atoms, and thus much is
adduced about the union of atoms, by which means motes are also
produced. The second category is that of Quality, and of it there are
twenty-four kinds, viz. 1, colour; 2, taste; 3, smell; 4, tangibility; 5,
numbers; 6, size; 7, individuality; 8, conjunction; 9, separation; 10,
priority; 11, posteriority; 12, weight; 13, fluidity; 14, viscidity; 15,
sound; 16, intelligence; 17, pleasure; 18, pain; 19, desire; 20,
dislike; 21, will; 22, virtue; 23, vice; 24, a capacity which includes
three different qualities, viz. celerity, elasticity, and power of
imagination. The third category is action; the fourth, association of
qualities; the fifth, distinction; the sixth, is aggregation, and,
according to Canade, this is the last; other writers add negation as
the seventh. This is the manner in which philosophy is regarded by
the Indians.
c. The philosophy of Gotama makes doubt the third topic,
succeeding those of the evidence of knowledge, and the subjects of
interest to knowledge. Another topic is regular proof, formal
reasoning, or the perfect syllogism (Nyaya), which consists of five
propositions:—1, the proposition; 2, the reason; 3, the instance; 4,
the application; 5, the conclusion. To take examples:—1. This hill is
burning; 2, because it smokes; 3, what smokes is burning, like a
kitchen fire; 4, accordingly the hill smokes; 5, therefore it is on fire.
This is propounded as syllogisms are with us, but in the manner
adopted, the matter which is in point is propounded first. We should,
on the contrary, begin with the general. This is the ordinary form,
and these examples may satisfy us, yet we shall recapitulate the
matter once more.
 We have seen that in India the point of main importance is the
soul’s drawing itself within itself, raising itself up into liberty, or
thought, which constitutes itself for itself. This becoming explicit of
soul in the most abstract mode may be called intellectual
substantiality, but here it is not the unity of mind and nature that is
present, but directly the opposite. To mind, the consideration of
nature is only the vehicle of thought or its exercise, which has as its
aim the liberation of mind. Intellectual substantiality is in India the
end, while in Philosophy it is in general the true commencement; to
philosophize is the idealism of making thought, in its own right, the
principle of truth. Intellectual substantiality is the opposite of the
reflection, understanding, and the subjective individuality of the
European. With us it is of importance that I will, know, believe, think
this particular thing according to the grounds that I have for so
doing, and in accordance with my own free will; and upon this an
infinite value is set. Intellectual substantiality is the other extreme
from this; it is that in which all the subjectivity of the “I” is lost; for it
everything objective has become vanity, there is for it no objective
truth, duty or right, and thus subjective vanity is the only thing left.
The point of interest is to reach intellectual substantiality in order to
drown in it that subjective vanity with all its cleverness and
reflection. This is the advantage of arriving at this point of view.
The defect in such a view is that because intellectual
substantiality, while represented as end and aim for the subject, as a
condition that has to be produced in the interest of the subject, even
though it be most objective, is yet only quite abstractly objective;
and hence the essential form of objectivity is wanting to it. That
intellectual substantiality that thus remaining in abstraction, has as
its existence the subjective soul alone. Just as in empty vanity,
where the subjective power of negation alone remains, everything
disappears, this abstraction of intellectual substantiality only signifies
an escape into what is empty and without determination, wherein
everything vanishes. Therefore what remains to be done is to force
forward the real ground of the inwardly self-forming and determining
objectivity—the eternal form within itself, which is what men call
Thought. Just as this Thought in the first place, as subjective, is
mine, because I think, but in the second place is universality which
comprehends intellectual substantiality, it is likewise in the third
place forming activity, the principle of determination. This higher
kind of objectivity that unfolds itself, alone gives a place to the
particular content, allows it to have free scope and receives it into
itself. If in the Oriental view, the particular shakes and is destined to
fall, it still has its place grounded on thought. It is able to root itself
in itself, it is able to stand firm, and this is the hard European
understanding. Such Eastern ideas tend to destroy it, but it is
preserved active in the soil of thought; it cannot exist when
regarded as independent, but must exist only as a moment in the
whole system. In the Eastern Philosophy we have also discovered a
definite content, which is brought under our consideration; but the
consideration is destitute of thought or system because it comes
from above and is outside of the unity. On that side there stands
intellectual substantiality, on this side it appears dry and barren; the
particular thus only has the dead form of simple reason and
conclusion, such as we find in the Scholastics. Based on the ground
of thought, on the other hand, the particular may receive its dues; it
may be regarded and grasped as a moment in the whole
organization. The Idea has not become objective in the Indian
Philosophy; hence the external and objective has not been
comprehended in accordance with the Idea. This is the deficiency in
Orientalism.
The true, objective ground of thought finds its basis in the real
freedom of the subject; the universal or substantial must itself have
objectivity. Because thought is this universal, the ground of the
substantial and likewise “I”—thought is the implicit and exists as the
free subject—the universal has immediate existence and actual
presence; it is not only an end or condition to be arrived at, but the
absolute character is objective. It is this principle that we find in the
Greek world, and the object of our further consideration is its
development. The universal first appears as quite abstract, and as
such it confronts the concrete world; but its value is both for the
ground of the concrete world and for that which is implicit. It is not
a beyond, for the value of the present lies in the fact that it exists in
the implicit; or that which is implicit, the universal, is the truth of
present objects.
 PART ONE

GREEK PHILOSOPHY
 INTRODUCTION

The name of Greece strikes home to the hearts of men of education

in Europe, and more particularly is this so with us Germans.
Europeans have taken their religion, the life to come, the far-off
land, from a point somewhat further off than Greece—they took it
from the East, and more especially from Syria. But the here, the
present, art and science, that which in giving liberty to our spiritual
life, gives it dignity as it likewise bestows upon it ornament, we
know to have proceeded from Greece either directly or indirectly—
through the circuitous road of Rome. The latter of these two ways
was the earlier form in which this culture came to us; it also came
from the formerly universal church which derived its origin as such
from Rome, and has retained its speech even until now. The sources
of authority in addition to the Latin Gospels have been the Fathers.
Our law, too, boasts of deriving its most perfect forms from Rome.
Teutonic strength of mind has required to pass through the hard
discipline of the church and law which came to us from Rome, and
to be kept in check; it is in this way that the European character first
obtained its pliability and capacity for freedom. Thus it was after
European manhood came to be at home with itself and to look upon
the present, that the historical and that which is of foreign derivation
was given. When man began to be at home with himself, he turned
to the Greeks to find enjoyment in it. Let us leave the Latin and the
Roman to the church and to jurisprudence. Higher, freer philosophic
science, as also the beauty of our untrammelled art, the taste for,
and love of the same, we know to have taken their root in Greek life
and to have created therefrom their spirit. If we were to have an
aspiration, it would be for such a land and such conditions.
 But what makes us specially at home with the Greeks is that they
made their world their home; the common spirit of homeliness
unites us both. In ordinary life we like best the men and families that
are homely and contented in themselves, not desiring what is
outside and above them, and so it is with the Greeks. They certainly
received the substantial beginnings of their religion, culture, their
common bonds of fellowship, more or less from Asia, Syria and
Egypt; but they have so greatly obliterated the foreign nature of this
origin, and it is so much changed, worked upon, turned round, and
altogether made so different, that what they, as we, prize, know,
and love in it, is essentially their own. For this reason, in the history
of Greek life, when we go further back and seem constrained so to
go back, we find we may do without this retrogression and follow
within the world and manners of the Greeks, the beginnings, the
germination and the progress of art and science up to their maturity,
even seeing the origin of their decay—and this completely
comprehended within their own range. For their spiritual
development requires that which is received or foreign, as matter or
stimulus only; in such they have known and borne themselves as
men that were free. The form which they have given to the foreign
principle is this characteristic breath of spirituality, the spirit of
freedom and of beauty which can in the one aspect be regarded as
form, but which in another and higher sense is simply substance.
They have thus not only themselves created the substantial in
their culture and made their existence their own, but they have also
held in reverence this their spiritual rebirth, which is their real birth.
The foreign origin they have so to speak thanklessly forgotten,
putting it in the background—perhaps burying it in the darkness of
the mysteries which they have kept secret from themselves. They
have not only done this, that is they have not only used and enjoyed
all that they have brought forth and formed, but they have become
aware of and thankfully and joyfully placed before themselves this
at-homeness [Heimathlichkeit] in their whole existence, the ground
and origin of themselves, not merely existing in it, possessing and
making use of it. For their mind, when transformed in this spiritual
new birth, is just the living in their life, and also the becoming
conscious of that life as it has become actual. They represent their
existence as an object apart from themselves, which manifests itself
independently and which in its independence is of value to them;
hence they have made for themselves a history of everything which
they have possessed and have been. Not only have they represented
the beginning of the world—that is, of gods and men, the earth, the
heavens, the wind, mountains and rivers—but also of all aspects of
their existence, such as the introduction of fire and the offerings
connected with it, the crops, agriculture, the olive, the horse,
marriage, property, laws, arts, worship, the sciences, towns, princely
races, &c. Of all these it is pleasingly represented through tales how
they have arisen in history as their own work.
It is in this veritable homeliness, or, more accurately, in the spirit
of homeliness, in this spirit of ideally being-at-home-with-themselves
in their physical, corporate, legal, moral and political existence; it is
in the beauty and the freedom of their character in history, making
what they are to be also a sort of Mnemosyne with them, that the
kernel of thinking liberty rests; and hence it was requisite that
Philosophy should arise amongst them. Philosophy is being at home
with self, just like the homeliness of the Greek; it is man’s being at
home in his mind, at home with himself. If we are at home with the
Greeks, we must be at home more particularly in their Philosophy;
not, however, simply as it is with them, for Philosophy is at home
with itself, and we have to do with Thought, with what is most
specially ours, and with what is free from all particularity. The
development and unfolding of thought has taken place with them
from its earliest beginning, and in order to comprehend their
Philosophy we may remain with them without requiring to seek for
further and external influences.
But we must specify more particularly their character and point of
view. The Greeks have a starting-point in history as truly as they
have arisen from out of themselves: this starting-point,
comprehended in thought, is the oriental substantiality of the natural
unity between the spiritual and the natural. To start from the self, to
live in the self, is the other extreme of abstract subjectivity, when it
is still empty, or rather has made itself to be empty; such is pure
formalism, the abstract principle of the modern world. The Greeks
stand between both these extremes in the happy medium; this
therefore is the medium of beauty, seeing that it is both natural and
spiritual, but yet that the spiritual still remains the governing,
determining subject. Mind immersed in nature is in substantial unity
with it, and in so far as it is consciousness, it is essentially sensuous
perception: as subjective consciousness it is certainly form-giving
though it is devoid of measure. For the Greeks, the substantial unity
of nature and spirit was a fundamental principle, and thus being in
the possession and knowledge of this, yet not being overwhelmed in
it, but having retired into themselves, they have avoided the
extreme of formal subjectivity, and are still in unity with themselves.
Thus it is a free subject which still possesses that original unity in
content, essence and substratum, and fashions its object into
beauty. The stage reached by Greek consciousness is the stage of
beauty. For beauty is the ideal; it is the thought which is derived
from Mind, but in such a way that the spiritual individuality is not yet
explicit as abstract subjectivity that has then in itself to perfect its
existence into a world of thought. What is natural and sensuous still
pertains to this subjectivity, but yet the natural form has not equal
dignity and rank with the other, nor is it predominant as is the case
in the East. The principle of the spiritual now stands first in rank,
and natural existence has no further value for itself, in its existent
forms, being the mere expression of the Mind shining through, and
having been reduced to be the vehicle and form of its existence.
Mind, however, has not yet got itself as a medium whereby it can
represent itself in itself, and from which it can form its world.
Thus free morality could and necessarily did find a place in
Greece, for the spiritual substance of freedom was here the principle
of morals, laws and constitutions. Because the natural element is,
however, still contained in it, the form taken by the morality of the
state is still affected by what is natural; the states are small
individuals in their natural condition, which could not unite
themselves into one whole. Since the universal does not exist in
independent freedom, that which is spiritual still is limited. In the
Greek world what is potentially and actually eternal is realized and
brought to consciousness through Thought; but in such a way that
subjectivity confronts it in a determination which is still accidental,
because it is still essentially related to what is natural; and in this we
find the reason as promised above, for the fact that in Greece the
few alone are free.
The measureless quality of substance in the East is brought, by
means of the Greek mind, into what is measurable and limited; it is
clearness, aim, limitation of forms, the reduction of what is
measureless, and of infinite splendour and riches, to
determinateness and individuality. The riches of the Greek world
consist only of an infinite quantity of beautiful, lovely and pleasing
individualities in the serenity which pervades all existence; those
who are greatest amongst the Greeks are the individualities, the
connoisseurs in art, poetry, song, science, integrity and virtue. If the
serenity of the Greeks, their beautiful gods, statues, and temples, as
well as their serious work, their institutions and acts, may seem—
compared to the splendour and sublimity, the colossal forms of
oriental imagination, the Egyptian buildings of Eastern kingdoms—to
be like child’s play, this is the case yet more with the thought that
comes into existence here. Such thought puts a limit on this wealth
of individualities as on the oriental greatness, and reduces it into its
one simple soul, which, however, is in itself the first source of the
opulence of a higher ideal world, of the world of Thought.
“From out of thy passions, oh, man,” exclaimed an ancient, “thou
hast derived the materials for thy gods,” just as the Easterns, and
especially the Indians, did from the elements, powers and forms of
Nature. One may add, “out of Thought thou takest the element and
material for God.” Thus Thought is the ground from which God
comes forth, but it is not Thought in its commencement that
constitutes the first principle from which all culture must be grasped.
It is quite the other way. In the beginning, thought comes forth as
altogether poor, abstract, and of a content which is meagre in
comparison to that given to his subject by the oriental; for as
immediate, the beginning is just in the form of nature, and this it
shares with what is oriental. Because it thus reduces the content of
the East to determinations which are altogether poor, these thoughts
are scarcely worth observation on our part, since they are not yet
proper thoughts, neither being in the form of, or determined as
thought, but belonging really to Nature. Thus Thought is the
Absolute, though not as Thought. That is, we have always two
things to distinguish, the universal or the Notion, and the reality of
this universal, for the question here arises as to whether the reality
is itself Thought or Nature. We find in the fact that reality at first has
still the immediate form and is only Thought potentially, the reason
for commencing with the Greeks and from the natural philosophy of
the Ionic school.
As regards the external and historical condition of Greece at this
time, Greek philosophy commences in the sixth century before Christ
in the time of Cyrus, and in the period of decline in the Ionic
republics in Asia Minor. Just because this world of beauty which
raised itself into a higher kind of culture went to pieces, Philosophy
arose. Crœsus and the Lydians first brought Ionic freedom into
jeopardy; later on the Persians were those who destroyed it
altogether, so that the greater part of the inhabitants sought other
spots and created colonies, more particularly in the West. At the
time of the decline in Ionic towns, the other Greece ceased to be
under its ancient lines of kings; the Pelopideans and the other, and
for the most part foreign, princely races had passed away. Greece
had in many ways come into touch with the outside world and the
Greek inhabitants likewise sought within themselves for a bond of
fellowship. The patriarchal life was past, and in many states it came
to be a necessity that they should constitute themselves as free,
organized and regulated by law. Many individuals come into
prominence who were no more rulers of their fellow-citizens by
descent, but who were by means of talent, power of imagination
and scientific knowledge, marked out and reverenced, and such
individuals came into many different relations with their fellows. Part
of them became advisers, but their advice was frequently not
followed; part of them were hated and despised by their fellow-
citizens, and they drew back from public affairs; others became
violent, if not fierce governors of the other citizens, and others again
finally became the administrators of liberty.
The Seven Sages. Amongst these men just characterized, the
seven sages—in modern times excluded from the history of
Philosophy—take their place. In as far as they may be reckoned as
milestones in the history of Philosophy, something about their
character should, in the commencement of Philosophy, be shortly
said. They came into prominence, partly as taking part in the battles
of the Ionic towns, partly as expatriated, and partly as individuals of
distinction in Greece. The names of the seven are given differently:
usually, however, as Thales, Solon, Periander, Cleobulus, Chilon,
Bias, Pittacus. Hermippus in Diogenes Laertius (1, 42) specifies
seventeen, and, amongst these, various people pick out seven in
various ways. According to Diogenes Laertius (1, 41) Dicæarchus,
who came still earlier in history, only names four, and these are
placed amongst the seven by all; they are Thales, Bias, Pittacus and
Solon. Besides these, Myson, Anacharsis, Acusilaus, Epimenides,
Pherecydes, &c., are mentioned. Dicæarchus in Diogenes (1, 40),
says of them that they are neither wise men (σοφούς) nor
philosophers, but men of understanding (συνετξύς) and law-givers;
this judgment has become the universal one and is held to be just.
They come in a period of transition amongst the Greeks—a transition
from a patriarchal system of kings into one of law or force. The fame
of the wisdom of these men depends, on the one hand, on the fact
that they grasped the practical essence of consciousness, or the
consciousness of universal morality as it is in and for itself, giving
expression to it in the form of moral maxims and in part in civil laws,
making these actual in the state; on the other hand it depends on
their having, in theoretic form, expressed the same in witty sayings.
Some of these sayings could not merely be regarded as thoughtful
or good reflections, but in so far, as philosophic and speculative;
they have a comprehensive, universal significance ascribed to them,
which, however, does not explain them. These men have not really
made science and Philosophy their aim; it is expressly said of Thales
that it was in the latter part of his life that he first took to
Philosophy. What had relation to politics appeared most frequently;
they were practical men, men of affairs, but not in our sense of the
word; with us practical activity devotes itself to a special line of
administration or to a particular business, or to economics, &c. They
lived in democratic states and thus shared the responsibilities of the
general administration and rule. They were not statesmen like the
great Greek personalities, like Miltiades, Themistocles, Pericles and
Demosthenes, but they were statesmen in a time when safety,
preservation and, indeed, the whole well-being, disposition and well
nigh the very foundation of civic life were in question; and certainly
when this was so with the foundations of legally established
institutions.
Thales and Bias thus appear as the representatives of the Ionic
towns. Herodotus (I. 169-171) speaks of both, and says of Thales
that he advised even before the overthrow of the Ionians
(apparently through Crœsus), that they should constitute a supreme
council (ἓν βουλευτήριον) in Teos, in the centre of the Ionian
people, and thus make a federal state with a capital and principal
federal town, so that they might still remain separate nations (δῆμοι)
as before. However, they did not follow this advice, and this isolated
and weakened them, and the result was their conquest; it has
always been a difficult thing for the Greeks to give up their
individuality. Later on, when Harpagus, the general of Cyrus who
accomplished their overthrow, pressed in upon them, the Ionians
took no better the most excellent advice of Bias of Priene, given
them at the decisive moment when they were assembled at
Panionium, “to go in a common fleet to Sardinia, there to found an
Ionic state. By so doing they would escape servitude, be happy, and,
inhabiting the largest island, subdue the others. But if they remained
in Ionia there was no hope of liberty to be seen for them.”
Herodotus gives his corroboration to this advice—“If they had
followed him they would have been the happiest of Greeks.” Such
things take place, but through force and not voluntarily.
We find the other sages under similar conditions. Solon was an
administrator in Athens, and thereby became famous; few men have
attained the honourable position of being a law-giver. Solon shares it
with Moses, Lycurgus, Zaleucus, Numa, &c., alone. No individuals
can be found amongst Teutonic peoples who possess the distinction
of being the law-givers of their people. Nowadays there can be law-
givers no longer; legal institutions and regulations are in modern
times always ready to hand, and the little that can still be done by
means of the law-giver and by law-making assemblies is simply the
further modification of details or making very insignificant additions.
What is dealt with is the compilation, wording and perfecting of the
particular only; and yet neither Solon and Lycurgus did more than
respectively bring the Ionic mind and the Doric character—being that
which had been given them and which was implicitly present—into
the form of consciousness, and obviate the temporary inconvenience
of disorder through effective laws. Solon was thus not a perfect
statesman; this is manifest from the sequel of his history. A
constitution which allowed Pisistratus in Solon’s own time to raise
himself into the Tyranny, showing itself to be so destitute of strength
and organization that it could not prevent its own overthrow, (and
by what a power!) manifests some inward want. This may seem
strange, for a constitution must be able to afford resistance to such
an attack. But let us see what Pisistratus did.
What the so-called tyrants really were, is most clearly shown by
the relation borne by Solon to Pisistratus. When orderly institutions
and laws were necessary to the Greeks, we find law-givers and
regents of states appearing, who laid down laws, and ruled
accordingly. The law, as universal, seemed and still seems now to
the individual to be force, inasmuch as he does not have regard to
or comprehend the law: it applies first to all the people, and then
only, to the individual; it is essential first of all to use constraint until
the individual attains discernment, and law to him becomes his law,
and ceases to be something foreign. Most of the law-givers and
administrators of states undertook themselves to constrain the
people and to be their tyrants. In states where they did not
undertake it, it had to be done by other individuals, for it was
essential. According to Diogenes Laertius’ account (I. 48-50), we find
Solon—whom his friends advised to secure the mastery for himself
since the people held to him (προσεῖχον), and would have liked to
see him become tyrant—repulse them, and try to prevent any such
occurrence, when he became suspicious of Pisistratus’ intentions.
What he did when he remarked upon the attitude of Pisistratus, was
to come into the assembly of the people, and tell them the design of
Pisistratus, accoutred in armour and shield; this was then unusual,
for Thucydides (1, 6) makes it a distinguishing feature between
Greeks and Barbarians, that the former, and pre-eminently the
Athenians, put aside their arms in time of peace. He said, “Men of
Athens, I am wiser than some and braver than others: I am wiser
than those who do not see the deceit of Pisistratus, braver than
those who certainly see it, but say nothing from fear.” As he could
not do anything, he left Athens. Pisistratus is said to have then
written a most honourable letter to Solon in his absence, which
Diogenes (I. 53, 54) has preserved for us, inviting him to return to
Athens, and live with him as a free citizen. “Not only am I not the
only one of the Greeks to have seized the tyranny, but I have not
taken anything which was not my due, for I am of the race of
Codrus. I have only taken back to myself what the Athenians swore
they would preserve to Codrus and his race, and yet took from
them. Moreover I am doing no evil toward gods and men, but as
thou hast given laws to the Athenians, I take care (ἐπιτροπῶ) that in
civil life they shall carry them out (πολιτεύειν.) His son Hippias did
the same. And these relations are carried out better than they would
be in a democracy, for I allow nobody to do evil (ὑβρίζειν), and as
Tyrant, I lay claim to no more (πλεῖόν τι φέρομαι) than such
consideration and respect and specified gifts (τὰ ῥητὰ γέρα) as
would have been offered to the kings in earlier times. Every
Athenian gives the tenth part of his revenue, not to me, but towards
the cost of the public offering, and besides for the commonwealth,
and for use in case of war. I am not angry that thou hast disclosed
my project. For thou didst it more out of love to the people than
hate against me, and because thou didst not know how I would
conduct my rule. For if thou hadst known this, thou wouldst have
submitted to it willingly, and wouldst not have taken flight;” and so
he goes on. Solon, in the answer given by Diogenes, (I. 66, 67)
says, that he “has not a personal grudge against Pisistratus, and he
must call him the best of tyrants; but to turn back does not befit
him. For he made equality of rights essential in the Athenian
constitution, and himself refused the tyranny. By his return he would
condone what was done by Pisistratus.” The rule of Pisistratus
accustomed the Athenians to the laws of Solon, and brought them
into usage, so that after this usage came to be general, supremacy
was superfluous; his sons were hence driven out of Athens, and for
the first time the constitution of Solon upheld itself. Solon
undoubtedly gave the laws, but it is another thing to make such
regulations effectual in the manners, habits and life of a people.
What was separate in Solon and Pisistratus, we find united in
Periander in Corinth, and Pittacus in Mitilene.
This may be enough about the outward life of the seven sages.
They are also famed for the wisdom of the sayings which have been
preserved to us; these sayings seem in great measure, however, to
be superficial and hackneyed. The reason for this is found in the fact
that, to our reflection, general propositions are quite usual; much in
the Proverbs of Solomon seems to us to be superficial and
commonplace for the same reason. But it is quite another thing to
bring to the ordinary conception for the first time this same universal
in the form of universality. Many distichs are ascribed to Solon which
we still retain; their object is to express in maxims general
obligations towards the gods, the family and the country. Diogenes
(I. 58) tells us that Solon said: “Laws are like a spider’s web; the
small are caught, the great tear it up: speech is the image of action,”
&c. Such sayings are not philosophy, but general reflections, the
expression of moral duties, maxims, necessary determinations. The
wisdom of the sages is of this kind; many sayings are insignificant,
but many seem to be more insignificant than they are. For instance,
Chilon says: “Stand surety, and evil awaits thee” (ἐγγύα, πάρα δ̓
ἄτα). On the one hand this is quite a common rule of life and
prudence, but the sceptics gave to this proposition a much higher
universal significance, which is also accredited to Chilon. This sense
is, “Ally thyself closely to any particular thing, and unhappiness will
fall upon thee.” The sceptics adduced this proposition independently,
as demonstrating the principle of scepticism, which is that nothing is
finite and definite in and for itself, being only a fleeting, vacillating
phase which does not last. Cleobulus says, μέτρον ἄριστον, another
μηδὲν ἄγαν, and this has likewise a universal significance which is
that limitation, the πέρας of Plato as opposed to the ἄπειρον—-the
self-determined as opposed to undetermined—is what is best; and
thus it is that in Being limit or measure is the highest determination.
One of the most celebrated sayings is that of Solon in his
conversation with Crœsus, which Herodotus (I. 30-33) has in his
own way given us very fully. The result arrived at is this:—“Nobody is
to be esteemed happy before his death.” But the noteworthy point in
this narrative is that from it we can get a better idea of the
standpoint of Greek reflection in the time of Solon. We see that
happiness is put forward as the highest aim, that which is most to
be desired and which is the end of man; before Kant, morality, as
eudæmonism, was based on the determination of happiness. In
Solon’s sayings there is an advance over the sensuous enjoyment
which is merely pleasant to the feelings. Let us ask what happiness
is and what there is within it for reflection, and we find that it
certainly carries with it a certain satisfaction to the individual, of
whatever sort it be—whether obtained through physical enjoyment
or spiritual—the means of obtaining which lie in men’s own hands.
But the fact is further to be observed that not every sensuous,
immediate pleasure can be laid hold of, for happiness contains a
reflection on the circumstances as a whole, in which we have the
principle to which the principle of isolated enjoyment must give way.
Eudæmonism signifies happiness as a condition for the whole of life;
it sets up a totality of enjoyment which is a universal and a rule for
individual enjoyment, in that it does not allow it to give way to what
is momentary, but restrains desires and sets a universal standard
before one’s eyes. If we contrast it with Indian philosophy, we find
eudæmonism to be antagonistic to it. There the liberation of the soul
from what is corporeal, the perfect abstraction, the necessity that
the soul shall, in its simplicity, be at home with itself, is the final end
of man. With the Greeks the opposite is the case; the satisfaction
there is also satisfaction of the soul, but it is not attained through
flight, abstraction, withdrawal within self, but through satisfaction in
the present, concrete satisfaction in relation to the surroundings.
The stage of reflection that we reach in happiness, stands midway
between mere desire and the other extreme, which is right as right
and duty as duty. In happiness, the individual enjoyment has
disappeared; the form of universality is there, but the universal does
not yet come forth on its own account, and this is the issue of the
conversation between Crœsus and Solon. Man as thinking, is not
solely engrossed with present enjoyment, but also with the means
for obtaining that to come. Crœsus points out to him these means,
but Solon still objects to the statement of the question of Crœsus.
For in order that any one should be conceived of as happy, we must
await his death, for happiness depends upon his condition to the
end, and upon the fact that his death should be a pious one and be
consistent with his higher destiny. Because the life of Crœsus had
not yet expired, Solon could not deem him happy. And the history of
Crœsus bears evidence that no momentary state deserves the name
of happiness. This edifying history holds in its embrace the whole
standpoint of the reflection of that time.
Division of the Subject. In the consideration of Greek philosophy
we have now to distinguish further three important periods:—in the
first place the period from Thales to Aristotle; secondly, Greek
philosophy in the Roman world; thirdly, the Neo-platonic philosophy.
1. We begin with thought, as it is in a quite abstract, natural or
sensuous form, and we proceed from this to the Idea as determined.
This first period shows the beginning of philosophic thought, and
goes on to its development and perfection as a totality of knowledge
in itself; this takes place in Aristotle as representing the unity of
what has come before. In Plato there is just such a union of what
came earlier, but it is not worked out, for he only represents the
Idea generally. The Neo-platonists have been called eclectics, and
Plato was said to have brought about the unity; they were not,
however, eclectics, but they had a conscious insight into the
necessity for uniting these philosophies.
2. After the concrete Idea was reached, it came forth as if in
opposites, perfecting and developing itself. The second period is that
in which science breaks itself up into different systems. A one-sided
principle is carried through the whole conception of the world; each
side is in itself formed into a totality, and stands in the relation of
one extreme to another. The philosophical systems of Stoicism and
Epicureanism are such; scepticism forms the negative to their
dogmatism, while the other philosophies disappear.
3. The third period is the affirmative, the withdrawal of the
opposition into an ideal world or a world of thought, a divine world.
This is the Idea developed into totality, which yet lacks subjectivity
as the infinite being-for-self.

SECTION ONE

First Period, from Thales to Aristotle

In this first period we shall again make three divisions:—

1. The first extends from Thales to Anaxagoras, from abstract
thought which is in immediate determinateness to the thought of the
self-determining Thought. Here a beginning is made with the
absolutely simple, in which the earliest methods of determination
manifest themselves as attempts, until the time of Anaxagoras; he
determines the true as the νοῦς, and as active thought which no
longer is in a determinate character, but which is self-determining.
2. The second division comprises the Sophists, Socrates, and the
followers of Socrates. Here the self-determining thought is conceived
of as present and concrete in me; that constitutes the principle of
subjectivity if not also of infinite subjectivity, for thought first shows
itself here only partly as abstract principle and partly as contingent
subjectivity.
3. The third division, which deals with Plato and Aristotle, is
found in Greek science where objective thought, the Idea, forms
itself into a whole. The concrete, in itself determining Thought, is,
with Plato, the still abstract Idea, but in the form of universality;
while with Aristotle that Idea was conceived of as the self-
determining, or in the determination of its efficacy or activity.
 CHAPTER I
Period I.—Division I.—Thales to Anaxagoras

Since we possess only traditions and fragments of this epoch, we

may speak here of the sources of these.
1. The first source is found in Plato, who makes copious
reference to the older philosophers. For the reason that he makes
the earlier and apparently independent philosophies, which are not
so far apart when once their Notion is definitely grasped, into
concrete moments of one Idea, Plato’s philosophy often seems to be
merely a clearer statement of the doctrines of the older
philosophers, and hence it draws upon itself the reproach of
plagiarism. Plato was willing to spend much money in procuring the
writings of the older philosophers, and, from his profound study of
these, his conclusions have much weight. But because in his writings
he never himself appeared as teacher, but always represented other
people in his dialogues as the philosophers, a distinction never has
been made between what really belonged to them in history and
what was added by him through the further development which he
effected in their thoughts. In the Parmenides, for instance, we have
the Eleatic philosophy, and yet the working out of this doctrine
belongs peculiarly to Plato.
2. Aristotle is our most abundant authority; he studied the older
philosophers expressly and most thoroughly, and he has, in the
beginning of his Metaphysics especially, and also to a large extent
elsewhere, dealt with them, in historical order: he is as philosophic
as erudite, and we may rely upon him. We can do no better in Greek
philosophy than study the first book of his Metaphysics. When the
would-be-wise man depreciates Aristotle, and asserts that he has
not correctly apprehended Plato, it may be retorted that as he
associated with Plato himself, with his deep and comprehensive
mind, perhaps no one knew him better.
3. Cicero’s name may also occur to us here—although he
certainly is but a troubled spring—since he undoubtedly gives us
much information; yet because he was lacking in philosophic spirit,
he understood Philosophy rather as if it were a matter of history
merely. He does not seem to have himself studied its first sources,
and even avows that, for instance, he never understood Heraclitus;
and because this old and deep philosophy did not interest him, he
did not give himself the trouble to study it. His information bears
principally on later philosophers—the Stoics, Epicureans, the new
Academy, and the Peripatetics. He saw what was ancient through
their medium, and, generally speaking, through a medium of
reasoning and not of speculation.
4. Sextus Empiricus, a later sceptic, has importance through his
writings, Hypotyposes Pyrrhonicæ and adversus Mathematicos.
Because, as a sceptic, he both combated the dogmatic philosophy
and also adduced other philosophers as testifying to scepticism (so
that the greater part of his writings is filled with the tenets of other
philosophers), he is the most abundant source we have for the
history of ancient philosophy, and he has retained for our use many
valuable fragments.
5. The book of Diogenes Laertius (De vitis, &c., Philoss. lib. x.,
ed. Meibom. c. notis Menagii, Amstel. 1692) is an important
compilation, and yet it brings forward copious evidence without
much discrimination. A philosophic spirit cannot be ascribed to it; it
rambles about amongst bad anecdotes extraneous to the matter in
hand. For the lives of philosophers, and here and there for their
tenets, it is useful.
6. Finally, we must speak of Simplicius, a later Greek, from Cilicia,
living under Justinian, in the middle of the sixth century. He is the
most learned and acute of the Greek commentators of Aristotle, and
of his writings there is much still unpublished: to him we certainly
owe our thanks.
I need give no more references, for they may be found without
trouble in any compendium. In the progress of Greek philosophy
men were formerly accustomed to follow the order that showed,
according to ordinary ideas, an external connection, and which is
found in one philosopher having had another as his teacher—this
connection is one which might show him to be partly derived from
Thales and partly from Pythagoras. But such a connection is in part
defective in itself, and in part it is merely external. The one set of
philosophic sects, or of philosophers classed together, which is
considered as belonging to a system—that which proceeds from
Thales—pursues its course in time and mind far separate from the
other. But, in truth, no such series ever does exist in this isolation,
nor would it do so even though the individuals were consecutive and
had been externally connected as teacher and taught, which never is
the case; mind follows quite another order. These successive series
are interwoven in spirit just as much as in their particular content.
We come across Thales first amongst the Ionic people, to whom
the Athenians belonged, or from whom the Ionians of Asia Minor, as
a whole, derived their origin. The Ionic race appears earlier in
Peloponnesus, but seems to have been removed from thence. It is,
however, not known what nations belonged to it, for, according to
Herodotus (I. 143), the other Ionians, and even the Athenians, laid
aside the name. According to Thucydides (I. 2 and 12), the Ionic
colonies in Asia Minor and the islands proceeded principally from
Athens, because the Athenians, on account of the over-population of
Attica, migrated there. We find the greatest activity in Greek life on
the coasts of Asia Minor, in the Greek islands, and then towards the
west of Magna Græcia; we see amongst these people, through their
internal political activity and their intercourse with foreigners, the
existence of a diversity and variety in their relations, whereby
narrowness of vision is done away with, and the universal rises in its
place. These two places, Ionia and Greater Greece, are thus the two
localities where this first period in the history of Philosophy plays its
part until the time when, that period being ended, Philosophy plants
itself in Greece proper, and there makes its home. Those spots were
also the seat of early commerce and of an early culture, while
Greece itself, so far as these are concerned, followed later.
We must thus remark that the character of the two sides into
which these philosophies divide, the philosophy of Asia Minor in the
east and that of Grecian Italy in the west, partakes of the character
of the geographical distinction. On the Asia Minor side, and also in
the islands, we find Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus,
Leucippus, Democritus, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes from Crete. On
the other side are the inhabitants of Italy: Pythagoras from Samos,
who lived in Italy, however; Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno,
Empedocles; and several of the Sophists also lived in Italy.
Anaxagoras was the first to come to Athens, and thus his science
takes a middle place between both extremes, and Athens was made
its centre. The geographical distinction makes its appearance in the
manifestation of Thought, in the fact that, with the Orientals a
sensuous, material side is dominant, and in the west, Thought, on
the contrary, prevails, because it is constituted into the principle in
the form of thought. Those philosophers who turned to the east
knew the absolute in a real determination of nature, while towards
Italy there is the ideal determination of the absolute. These
explanations will be sufficient for us here; but Empedocles, whom
we find in Sicily, is somewhat of a natural philosopher, while Gorgias,
the Sicilian sophist, remains faithful to the ideal side.
We now have to consider further:—1, The Ionians, viz. Thales,
Anaximander, Anaximenes; 2, Pythagoras and his followers; 3, the
Eleatics, viz. Xenophanes, Parmenides, &c.; 4, Heraclitus; 5,
Empedocles, Leucippus and Democritus; 6, Anaxagoras. We have to
trace and point out the progression of this philosophy also. The first
and altogether abstract determinations are found with Thales and
the other Ionians; they grasped the universal in the form of a natural
determination, as water and air. Progression must thus take place by
leaving behind the merely natural determination; and we find that
this is so with the Pythagoreans. They say that number is the
substance or the essence of things; number is not sensuous, nor is it
pure thought, but it is a non-sensuous object of sense. It was with
the Eleatics that pure thought appeared, and that its forcible
liberation from the sensuous form and the form of number came to
pass; and thus from them proceeds the dialectic movement of
thought, which negates the definite particular in order to show that
it is not the many but only the one that is true. Heraclitus declares
the Absolute to be this very process, which, according to the
Eleatics, was still subjective; he arrived at objective consciousness,
since in it the Absolute is that which moves or changes. Empedocles,
Leucippus, and Democritus, on the contrary, rather go to the
opposite extreme, to the simple, material, stationary principle, to the
substratum which underlies the process; and thus this last, as being
movement, is distinguished from it. With Anaxagoras it is the
moving, self-determining thought itself that is then known as
existence, and this is a great step forward.