Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi İktisadi İşletmesi

Climate Change and Security: Different Perceptions, Different Approaches

Author(s): Başar BAYSAL and Uluç KARAKAŞ
Source: Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations , Vol. 14, No. 54, Özel Sayı /Paris
İklim Zirvesi ve Yansımaları (2017), pp. 21-44
Published by: Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi İktisadi İşletmesi

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Climate Change and Security: Different

Perceptions, Different Approaches
Başar BAYSAL* and Uluç KARAKAŞ**

* PhD Candidate, Department of International Relations, Bilkent

University

** PhD Candidate, Department of International Relations, Bilkent

University

To cite this article: Baysal, Başar and Karakaş, Uluç, “Climate

Change and Security: Different Perceptions, Different
Approaches”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Volume 14, No. 54, 2017, pp.
21-44.

Copyright @ International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT). All rights reserved. No

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and the Editorial Board as well as the International Relations Council of Turkey.

Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi Derneği | Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi

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 Climate Change and Security:
Different Perceptions, Different Approaches

Başar BAYSAL
PhD Candidate at the Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara.
E-posta: [email protected]

Uluç KARAKAŞ
PhD Candidate at the Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara.
E-posta:[email protected]

ABSTRACT
The concerns about the results of climate change have been increasing as new scientific proofs emerge and
people witness its direct effects in environmental catastrophes. There also have been different efforts to frame
climate change as a security issue. This study aims to analyze different security approaches to climate change
with a particular framework. The framework divides these approaches into two: opponents and proponents of
the securitization of climate change. It also analyzes different approaches and logics within both camps. Finally,
the study examines and evaluates the emerging literature on the “climatization of security” which focuses on the
impacts of climate change on the understanding of security in the discipline of International Relations.

Keywords: Climate Change, Security, Securitization, Human Security, Climatization of Security

İklim Değişikliği ve Güvenlik: Farklı Algılar, Farklı Yaklaşımlar

ÖZET
İklim değişikliğinin sonuçlarına yönelik ilgi, ortaya çıkan bilimsel deliller ve karşılaşılan çevresel felaketlerin de
etkisiyle gitgide artmaktadır. Son zamanlarda iklim değişikliğini bir güvenlik sorunu olarak ele alan çalışmalar da
dikkat çekmektedir. Bu çalışma, belli bir çerçeve dâhilinde, iklim değişikliğini ele alan farklı güvenlik yaklaşımlarını
analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çerçevede, iklim değişikline olan güvenlik yaklaşımları, iklim değişikliğinin
güvenlikleştirilmesini destekleyenler ve karşı çıkanlar olmak üzere ikiye bölünmüştür. Bu çalışmada, iki grubun
içindeki farklı yaklaşımlar ve mantıklar analiz edilmiştir. Son olarak, literatürde son zamanlarda ortaya çıkan ve iklim
değişikliğinin Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinindeki güvenlik anlayışına etkilerini irdeleyen, “güvenliğin iklimleştirilmesi”
konusu incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İklim Değişikliği, Güvenlik, Güvenlikleştirme, İnsani Güvenlik, Güvenliğin

iklimleştirilmesi.

ULUSLARARASIiLiŞKiLER, Cilt 14, Sayı 54, 2017, s. 21-44

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ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

Introduction
Climate change is taking place with increasing pace and the concerns about its results have been
increasing in recent years. In line with these emerging concerns, climate change started to be framed
as a security issue. Brown and Crawford summarize these increasing concerns as follows:
We are beginning to realize that the speed and scope of climate change—the way it threatens
to affect where we can live, where we can grow food and where we can find water—could
undermine the economic and political stability of large parts of the world in the coming years. In
so doing, climate change could become a threat multiplier that makes existing problems such as
water scarcity and food insecurity more complex and intractable.1

In addition to the academic concerns, the issue started to take place within domestic and
international political agendas too. In his Nobel peace prize speech, for instance, President Obama
warned that “there is little scientific dispute that if we do nothing, we will face more drought, more
famine, more mass displacement – all of which will fuel more conflict for decades.”2 Additionally
traditional security actors started to regard climate change as a security issue too. Both the Ministry
of Defense of the UK (2010 - Global Strategic Trends –Out to 2040) and Pentagon (2014 – Climate
Change Adaptation Roadmap) have adopted climate adaptation into their operations.3
As new studies started to emerge about climate change and security, there emerged a debate
over if it is true or not to frame climate change as a security issue. There are supporters and opponents
of the securitization4 of climate change. Additionally, there are different thoughts both among
the supporters and opponents. The following figure summarizes the different approaches to the
securitization of climate change.

Figure 1 Framework for Analyzing Different Security Approaches to Climate Change

1 Oli Brown and Alec Crawford, “Battling the Elements: The Security Threat of Climate Change”, International Institute
for Sustainable Development Commentary, December 2009, p.1.
2 Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Whither the Weather? Climate Change and Conflict”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.49, No.1, 2012, p.3.
3 Delf Rothe, Securitizing Global Warming: A Climate of Complexity, Abingdon, Routledge, 2016, p.5.
4 In this article the term “securitization” is used to express only “construction of an issue as a security issue” or “framing
an issue as a security issue.” To refer the Securitization Theory of the Copenhagen School, we used Securitization with
capital “S”. Securitization Theory has a certain framework based on speech acts to securitize issues. For this framework
see Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, Lynne Rienner
Pub, 1998; and Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, New York,
Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 46-86.

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 Climate Change and Security

The aim of this study is to examine the literature on the securitization of climate change by using
the framework used in the figure above, and to examine and evaluate the emerging literature on the
climatization of security. For this aim we have conducted a literature review and classified the studies
according to the framework. The first part gives a brief history of the securitization of climate change
including its roots. The second part analyzes the arguments of the proponents of the securitization
of climate change. Although this part divides the supporters of the securitization into two logics,
namely human security and traditional security, it also analyzes interrelated security implications of
both logics. The third part analyzes the arguments of the opponents of the securitization of climate
change. Opponents of climate change are also divided into two: the first group, climate security skeptics,
argues that climate change is not a security issue and it is impossible to build a causal linkage between
climate change and violent conflicts.5 The second group maintains that climate change should not
be securitized since the securitization of climate change will have adverse effects. The fourth part
explains and evaluates the emerging literature on the climatization of security. It focuses on how
climate change, with its unique features, has been affecting the understanding of security in the
discipline of International Relations.

Climate Change and Security – A Brief History

The roots of the securitization of climate change can be found in the wider environmental security
framework.6 In line with the broadening efforts7 of the concept of security, environmental issues
started to take place within the security realm in the late 1970s. Richard Ullman’s famous study
“Redefining Security” can be regarded as an important attempt in the securitization of environmental
(and economic) issues.8 In line with this, Jessica T. Mathews’ article titled “Redefining Security”
also puts a particular emphasis on the necessity to rethink the concept of security beyond national
security, and in this way, to incorporate environmental issues into security agendas. Mathews, in
the article, especially highlights the transnational character of environmental issues.9 Other than
the efforts to broaden the concept of security, Club of Rome’s “Limits of Growth” study in 1972
and Brundland Commission’s “Our Common Future” report in 1987 played a major role in the
emergence of public awareness and the politicization of the environmental issues.10 Especially
the so-called Brundland Report “marked the entry of the phase ‘environmental security’ into
international debates.”11
The end of Cold War intensified the discussion of environmental security. In 1991, Barry Buzan
emphasized, “environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere

5 Rothe, Securitizing Global Warming, p.120.

6 Ibid. p.85-87.
7 The term broadening is used to refer both the widening and deepening efforts of security in the discipline of International
Relations. In simple terms, the term widening is related to adding novel issues (such as environmental and economic) to
the agenda of security studies other than military ones. The term deepening refers to adding new reference objects other
than states. See Keith Krause and Michael Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,”
Mershon International Studies Review. Vol. 40, No.2, 1996, p.229-254; Buzan et.al. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, p.2.
8 Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining Security”, International Security, Vol. 8, No.1, 1983, p.129-153.
9 Jessica T. Mathews, “Redefining Security”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.68, No.2, 1989, p.162-177.
10 Rothe, Securitizing Global Warming, p.85.
11 Maria Julia Trombetta, “Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analyzing the Discourse”, Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, Vol.21, No.4, 2008, p.585.

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ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.”12 Furthermore, the
studies of so-called Toronto Group led by Thomas Homer-Dixon put their mark on the academic
discussions about the security implications of environmental issues in the 1990s. In these studies,
Homer-Dixon presented the relationship between the environmental problems (including climate
change, deforestation, land and water degradation and reduction of ozone layer), and violent conflict.13
Although Homer-Dixon did not suggest a direct linkage between environmental problems and violent
conflict, he concluded that these problems, in combination with other social, economic and political
problems, could cause new conflicts or exacerbate existing ones.14 The arguments of Homer-Dixon
were popularized by Robert Kaplan’s 1994 article “The Coming Anarchy,” which presented a dark
future in which environmental problems will cause national security issues.15
As expressed above, the discussions about the environmental security provide roots for the
securitization of climate change. Most of the arguments used in the securitization of climate change
are same as the wider environmental security discourses such as migration, conflict because of water
problems or food insecurity. In addition to environmental security, securitization of development
also provided basis for the securitization of climate change. In the late 1990s and especially after the
9/11 attacks and during the War on Terror, underdevelopment was constructed as a security issue.
In this securitization, underdeveloped and failed states were presented as a threat since they provide
base for terrorists, cause migration and political instability.16 These arguments provided basis for
the securitization of climate change since climate change will directly or indirectly contribute to the
emergence of new failed states. Novel problems, deriving from climate change, like food insecurity
and droughts will further deteriorate the situation in already fragile countries.17
Although there were previous attempts to present climate change as a security issue (apart
from wider environmental security),18 these efforts intensified in the early 2000s. In 2002, German
Ministry of Environment prepared a report questioning the effects of climate change on the violent
conflict.19 In 2003, Schwartz and Randall prepared another report titled “An Abrupt Climate Change
Scenario and its Implications for United States National Security” on behalf of Pentagon, an explicit
security actor.20 In the same period, the UK Ministry of Defense also demanded a similar report from
its meteorological unit.21 The securitization of climate change intensified when the end of Kyoto
Protocol, the first binding quantitative emission reduction agreement, came closer. The efforts
of Margaret Beckett, foreign secretary of the UK, were remarkable for the securitization of climate

12 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed.,
Boulder, Lynne Rienner Pub, 1991, p.19-20.
13 Thomas Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict”, International Security,
Vol.16, No.2, 1991; Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases”,
International Security, Vol.19 No.1, 1994, p.5–40; Trombetta, “Environmental Security and Climate Change”, p.592.
14 Rothe, Securitizing Global Warming, p.86.
15 Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy”, Atlantic Monthly, Vol.273, No.2, 1994, p.58.
16 Rothe, Securitizing Global Warming, p.89-90.
17 Examples of this argument are given below. See also Denise Garcia, “Warming to a Redefinition of International Security:
The Consolidation of a Norm Concerning Climate Change”, International Relations, Vol.24, No.3, 2010, p.273.
18 Peter H. Gleick, “The Implications of Global Climatic Changes for International Security”, Climatic Change, Vol.15,
No.1–2, 1989, p.309–325.
19 Rothe, Securitizing Global Warming, p.92.
20 Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and its Implications for United States National
Security. Washington, DC, Global Business Network, 2003.
21 Rothe, Securitizing Global Warming, p.92.

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 Climate Change and Security

change in this period. She was also the first person to use the term “climate security.”22 In 2006, during
the UK presidency, the G8 accepted the fundamental links between energy, security, climate change
and sustainable development.23
2007 was the year that witnessed the most intense securitization efforts for climate change.
Denise Garcia argues that “2007 was a pivotal year for the prominence of the security dimension of
climate change debate.”24 Firstly, after a considerable lobbying by the UK, the first United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) meeting on Climate Change was held on April 17, 2007. Although
there was no concrete solution or statement, the debate exposed different views about the security
implications of climate change.25 This UNSC meeting was crucial since, even taking an issue on the
agenda of the UNSC implies that the issue is regarded within the realm of security because the duty of
the UNSC is maintaining international peace and security.26
Another major event that occurred in 2007 for the securitization of climate change was the
release of the fourth assessment report of International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The report,
which presented a dark picture of regionally differentiated impacts of climate change, grasped vast
public attention.27 After the report, on October 12, 2007, both the IPCC and Al Gore28 were awarded
with the Nobel Peace Prize “for their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about
man-made climate change and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract
such change.”29
In 2008, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the
European Commission proposed a joint document titled “Climate Change and International
Security” to the European Council. This document presented climate change as “a threat multiplier
which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability.”30 While explaining why climate change
should be seen as a security issue, the document provided seven different threats posed by climate
change: Conflict over resources; economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure;
loss of territory and border disputes; environmentally induced migration; situations of fragility and
radicalization; tensions over energy supplies; pressure on international governance.31 Additionally, on
December 11, 2011 the European Council approved a statement that argues that “climate change can
also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones, and resources previously inaccessible.”32

22 Trombetta is referring to Beckett in “Environmental Security and Climate Change”, p.595.

23 Shirley V. Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close have We Come and would Full
Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of Global Climate Change Policy?”, Review of European Community & International
Environmental Law, Vol.21 No.3, 2012, p.221.
24 Garcia, “Warming to a Redefinition of International Security”, p.290.
25 Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change”, p.225.
26 Rafaela Rodrigues de Brito, “A Climate for Conflict or Cooperation? Addressing the Securitization of Climate Change”,
Paper presented at the Third Global International Studies Conference, Portugal, August 2011, p.44.
27 Rothe, Securitizing Global Warming, p.93.
28 45th Vice President of the US and a climate change activist.
29 “The Nobel Peace Prize”, 2007, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/, (Accessed on 1
March 2016).
30 “Climate Change and International Security”, High Representative for CFSP and the European Commission, 2008, p.2,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf, (Accessed on 1 March 2016).
31 Ibid.
32 Hans Gunter Brauch, “Securitizing Climate Change”, Paper Presented at 50th ISA Annual Convention, New York,
February 2008, p.11.

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ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

In 2009, UN General Assembly held its first debate on climate change and security. Following an
intense campaign by Small Island Developing States (SIDS), the General Assembly passed resolution
63/28 in which it acknowledged that the impacts of climate change could have possible security
implications.33 The resolution also “invited the UN organs to intensify their efforts in considering and
addressing climate change, including its possible security implications.”34
The second UNSC debate on climate change was held in 2011. Similar to the previous one, the
Council did not adopt a binding statement or agreement. However, this time it agreed on a non-binding
presidential statement. The statement warned that possible negative impacts of climate change may
exacerbate existing threats to international peace and security. The Council also expressed concerns
for the SIDS, which will be threatened from the possible rise of sea level.35
It should be kept in mind that the 1990s were the same period that the broadening efforts to
security intensified with the end of the Cold War. Therefore, putting climate change in the security
agenda and broadening efforts of the concept of security went hand in hand. Both processes positively
affected the advance of the other one. Moreover, in addition to academic works that tried to find out
the linkages between climate change and security, and discursive efforts to securitize environment
and climate change, other factors also played a crucial role in the process of the securitization of
climate change. According to Trombetta, movies contributed to the creation of public awareness
about the security implication of climate change and consequently to the process of securitization.
“Movies like the day after tomorrow and an inconvenient truth reinforced the representation of climate
change as a threat and security issue.”36 This is in line with the argument of Michael Williams that
emphasizes the importance of images in the securitization process. He states that “security policies
today are constructed not only with the question of their linguistic legitimation in mind; they
now are increasingly decided upon in relation to acceptable image-rhetorics.”37 To add that certain
events also played a crucial role for the securitization of climate change. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina,
which killed 1833 people in the US, and the summer heat wave in Europe in 2003, contributed to
the emergence of public awareness about climate change. The conflict in Darfur and the Genocide
in Rwanda also increased the awareness about the security implications of climate change since it is
argued that the both events are directly or indirectly related to environmental degradation.38 Finally,
increasing scientific data about the ongoing climate change played a major role in the securitization
of climate change by making people aware of the problem and making them think about its possible
outcomes. The most significant of these is the Release of IPCC reports, which scientifically lay bare
the devastating outcomes of climate change.39

33 Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change”, p.225.

34 “Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications”, UNGA Resolution A/RES/63/281, June 2009, paragraph 1,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/res%2063%20
281.pdf, (Accessed on 21 January 2016).
35 Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change”, p.226.
36 Trombetta, “Environmental Security and Climate Change”, p.595.
37 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, International Studies Quarterly,
Vol.47, No.4, p.527.
38 Oli Brown, Anne Hammill and Robert McLeman, “Climate Change as the ‘New’ Security Threat: Implications for
Africa”, International Affairs, Vol.83 No.6, 2007, p.1148; Oli Brown and Robert McLeman, “A Recurring Anarchy? The
Emergence of Climate Change as a Threat to International Peace and Security”, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 9,
No.3, 2009, p.289-305.
39 Selena Tramel, “Social Movements Gain Momentum in the Fight for Climate Justice” The World Post, 14 April 2014,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/salena-tramel/social-movements-gain-mom_b_6102184.html, (Accessed on 10
October 2016).

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 Climate Change and Security

Proponents of the Securitization of Climate Change

As expressed in the introduction, the first camp supports the framing of climate change as a
security issue. In this study the proponents of the securitization of climate change is divided into
two logics. The first logic focuses on traditional security implications of climate change such as its
role as a threat multiplier and a source for violent conflicts while the second logic focuses on human
security implications of climate change such as hunger, poverty, food insecurity and other forms of
human suffering. Although there are based on different logics, these implications are interrelated.
In most cases, climate security has direct implications for human security and these human security
implications result in traditional security issues. In this study we divided the traditional and human
security implications of climate change for analytic clarity, but the interrelated security consequences
of climate change are also analyzed in the following part.
Before looking at the discussion of different perspectives about the securitization of climate
change, the reasons of this securitization should be stated. In the literature, two broad reasons for
the securitization of climate change can be detected. The first one is “self-evident; it is becoming
increasingly clear that future climate change threatens to exacerbate existing drivers of conflict in a
way that could roll back development across many countries.”40 In addition to this reality, there is
another reason that can be seen as pragmatic or political: “it is part of a clear process to invest the
international debate with greater sense of urgency.”41

Climate Change is a Security Issue since it has Human Security Implications

In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) came up with the notion of human
security. Human security simply changed the focus of security from states to human beings in order
to alleviate their suffering stemming from existing power asymmetries and processes.42 In line
with this, the Commission on Human Security (CHS) advanced the conceptualization of human
security by underscoring empowerment of human beings.43 From this wider conceptualization,
human security is defined as “moving away from traditional, state-centric conceptions of security
that focused primarily on the safety of states from military aggression, to one that concentrates
on the security of the individuals, their protection and empowerment.”44 Therefore in human
security the referent objects of security are human beings. The possible human security threats are
as follows:

40 Brown et al., “Climate Change as the ‘New’ Security Threat”, p.1143.

41 Ibid. p.1144.
42 “UNDP Human Development Report”, 1994, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_
complete_nostats.pdf, (Accessed on 03 March 2016).
43 “Human Security Now”, The Commission on Human Security, 2003, http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.
un.org.humansecurity/files/chs_final_report_-_english.pdf, (Accessed on 03 March 2016).
44 “Human Security in Theory and Practice”, Human Security Unit, United Nations, p.6, http://www.un.org/
humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/human_security_in_theory_and_practice_english.pdf,
(Accessed on 02 March 2016).

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ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

Figure 2 Possible Human Security Threats

Type of Security Examples of Main Threats

Economic Security Persistent poverty, unemployment

Food Security Hunger, famine

Health Security Deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, malnutrition, lack of access to basic health care

Environmental Security Environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, pollution

Personal Security Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child labor

Community Security Inter-ethnic, religious and other identity based tensions

Political Security Political repressions, human rights abuses

Source: Human Security in Theory and Practice, Human Security Unit, United Nations. p.6

The studies which approach climate change from the perspective of human security focus on
its consequences on the lives of individual human beings and their well-being. Detraz and Betsill name
this approach as environmental security discourse.45 According to Nicole Detraz, the main focus in the
environmental security discourse is the human vulnerabilities resulting from climate change. These
include food insecurity, health problems, and poverty.46
According to Joshi, climate change helped us to realize that security should not be understood as
state-centric. The main referent object of security has to be individuals and we need to re-conceptualize
security with regard to human security.47 Salami also argues that climate change is associated with
human security related problems like “food insecurity, increased poverty and reverse development”48
Verbeke also argues that state-centric security understanding is unsuitable for the context of climate
change and we need a broader concept of security.49 According to Denise Garcia, the human security
implications of climate change are as follows:
From a human security point of view, it is likely to aggravate already precarious living conditions
in low-lying countries and regions struck by floods. The public health consequences, such as an
increased risk of malaria and other diseases, will be noticeable, presenting an extra burden on
poor countries. Over a million children under age five die every year from water-borne diseases.
(…) It can also affect other trends that can diminish human security in the twenty-first century,
such as rising sea levels and migration, internal population displacement, loss of territory, crop
failure, and many other unforeseen but drastic weather events that may dramatically reduce
human security in many regions of the world (the second route of securitization based on human
security).50

45 Nicole Detraz and Michele Betsill, “Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts”,
International Studies Perspectives, Vol.10, No.3, 2009, p.306.
46 Nicole Detraz, “Threats or Vulnerabilities? Assessing the Link between Climate Change and Security”, Global
Environmental Politics, Vol.11, No.3, 2011, p.114.
47 Sunjoy Joshi, “Climate Change a More Serious Threat than Islamic Radicalism”, Hindustan Times, 2009; See also Rothe,
Securitizing Global Warming, p.279.
48 Nawaf Salami, (Speech), United Nations Security Council, Sixty-sixth year 6587th meeting, July 20, 2011, http://www.
un.org/press/en/2011/sc10332.doc.htm, (Accessed on 3 April 2016).
49 Johan Verbeke, (Speech), United Nations Security Council, Sixty-second year 5663rd meeting, April 17, 2007, http://
www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9000.doc.htm, (Accessed on 3 April 2016).
50 Garcia, “Warming to a Redefinition of International Security”, p.272-273.

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 Climate Change and Security

The human security implications of climate change are usually direct. For example, decrease in
the amount of rain-fed arable lands by climate change can directly affect the well-being of people by
leading food insecurity or rising of sea level by the impact of climate change can lead to the replacement
of many people especially in low lying coastal places. The 2007 UN Human Development Report
outlined a number of risks that threatened human development including:
The breakdown of agricultural systems, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, leaving up to 600
million more people facing malnutrition;
An additional 1.8 billion people at risk from water scarcity by 2080;
Up to a third of a billion people living in coastal regions being displaced by tropical storms and
flooding;
Hundreds of millions of people at increased risk from consolidating diseases, such as malaria.51

As the examples indicate, the securitization of climate change, through the logic of human
security focuses on the security implications of climate change on the individual human beings. The
next part analyzes the securitization of climate change by the logic of the traditional security approach.

Climate Change is a Security Issue since it has Traditional Security Implications

The traditional security approach, which has Realist roots, adopts a narrow definition of security
in which state is the main referent object and security agent (provider of security), and security is
achieved through the use of force. Moreover, national independence, maintenance of territorial
integrity and sovereignty are the core values in this state-centric understanding of the traditional
security logic.52 Stephen Walt describes security as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military
force.”53 Additionally, Miller argues that “threats to national security are posed by other states; the
nature of threats and the way to deal with them require military responses.”54
Scholars who tend to securitize climate change by the traditional security logic focus on violent
conflict and state security. Detraz and Betsill call this logic of securitization as environmental conflict
discourse.55 According to this logic, climate change can generate violent conflicts or aggravate existing
conflicts.
The main focus in the environmental conflict discourse is “the potential for violent conflict
over resources.”56 This understanding is based on the idea that “when crops fail, people may take up a
gun to make a living.”57 In addition to violent conflicts, climate-induced scarcity may result in climate-
induced destabilizing migration and state instability.58 Garcia also explains this logic as follows: “From

51 Ibid, p.288; “UNDP Human Development Report”, 2007/2008,

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/268/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf, (Accessed on 3 March 2016).
52 Benjamin Miller, “The Concept of Security: Should it be Redefined?”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.24, No.2, 2001, p.17.
53 Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.3, No.5, 1991, p.212.
54 Miller, “The Concept of Security”, p.16-17.
55 Detraz and Betsill, “Climate Change and Environmental Security”, p.306.
56 Detraz, “Threats or Vulnerabilities”, p.109-112.
57 Rothe, Securitizing Global Warming, 2016, p.125 referring to Betsy Hartmann “Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate
Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse”, Journal of International Development, Vol. 22, No. 2,
2010, p.770; and Damian Carrington, “Climate Changes Double Risk of Civil War, Scientists Warn”, The Guardian, 25
August 2011, p.23.
58 Detraz, “Threats or Vulnerabilities”, p.109-112.

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ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

a national security point of view, an inability to pursue wealth will lead to instability and ultimately
failed states, which will in turn be breeding grounds for conflicts over resources and large population
movements.”59
Homer Dixon, in his famous study titled “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict:
Evidence from Cases,” presents three areas in which climate-induced scarcity generate security problems.
In the first one, scarcity simply leads to conflict between states. Conflicts for water or possible water wars
between upstream and downstream states can be given as an example for this area. In the second area,
climate-induced scarcity causes migration, which in turn results in identity-based conflict. In the final
area climate-induced scarcity causes “economic deprivation, institutional disruption, and civil strife.” In
this category climate change generates failed states, civil war or insurgencies.60
It should be stressed that there is no direct link between climate change and armed conflict. The
link between climate change and conflict is indirect or secondary: climate change generates scarcity (it
is not the only factor that generate scarcity) and scarcity generates conflict. Moreover, in addition to
climate-induced factors, there are also other factors like political and ethnic tensions, which play a role
in the rise of a conflict. Brown et al. explains this indirect link as follows:

Figure 3 Common Conceptualization of Security Impacts of Environmental Changes

Source: “Climate Change as the ‘New’ Security Threat”, p.1148.

As the figure indicates, violent conflict itself has a feedback effect for scarcity “since rival groups
may increase their consumption of resources to fund further conflict, and refugees fleeing areas of
violence may create new demands for resources elsewhere.”61
In addition to this main focus based on climate-induced scarcity and conflict, there are other
traditional security implications of climate change. The first one is that climate change plays the role
of threat multiplier. According to Delf Rothe, there is a consensus among different actors of climate
change that climate change plays (or can play) the role of a threat multiplier in which it “does not pose
a security threat itself… but it worsens a whole series of factors that are commonly associated with
conflicts.”62 Secondly, the situation of low-lying small islands also can be regarded within traditional
security implications of climate change. The rise of sea levels, resulting from climate change, threats
the existence of these states and state survival is a traditional security issue.

59 Garcia, “Warming to a Redefinition of International Security”, p.273.

60 Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict.”
61 Brown et al.,“ Climate Change as the ‘New’ Security Threat”, p.1148.
62 Rothe, Securitizing Global Warming, p.131.

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 Climate Change and Security

Climate-Induced Insecurities
As expressed above, the human security implications and traditional security implications of climate
change are mostly interrelated. In most cases climate change has primary human security implications
and secondary traditional security implications. What’s more, in the academic literature on the climate
security, most works analyze these implications together. This part will briefly examine the security
implications of climate change that are referred in the literature on climate security. By that way, this
part will present the interrelated character of these security implications.
One of the security implications of climate change is food insecurity. According to Dupond
and Pearman, there are several reasons of food insecurity that are related to climate change. Firstly,
increasing temperatures and unevenly distributed rainfall will result in desertification and erosion in
different areas and this will diminish the arable lands. Secondly, rising sea levels also will make arable
lands unusable. Finally, extreme weather events will drastically deteriorate the agriculture. All of these
impacts will result in food insecurity. 63 Moreover, Brown and Crawford also argue that diminishing
arable lands will result in reduction in agricultural production and this will lead to food insecurity,
political instability, and conflicts on the control over arable lands.64
In addition to food insecurity, climate change will generate water scarcity. This also derives
from uneven distribution of rain because of climate change.65 Brown and Crawford argue that reduced
water supply is a climate-induced insecurity and it will lead to increasing competition.66 Dupond and
Pearman also argue that both food insecurity and water scarcity can also exacerbate existing tensions
or raise new ones, which may result in violent conflicts for the control of resources.67 Moreover,
these scarcities, with the help of “temperature increases, extreme weather, air pollution” will lead to
infectious diseases.68
Another direct security implication of climate change is emergence of weather related disasters
because of warmer ocean temperatures resulting from climate change.69 Low-lying coastal areas and
islands will also face severe insecurities including loss of whole territory (or arable lands) because of
rising sea levels.70 In addition to this, fresh waters will get salted in these low-lying places because of
the rise of sea levels. As an indirect security implication, climate change will also cause unregulated
population movements deriving from water scarcity, food insecurity, rising sea levels and devastating
natural disasters. These movements will lead to destabilization and conflict within and between
origin, transit and destination countries.71

63 Alan Dupond and Graeme Pearman, “Heating up the Planet Climate: Change and Security”, Lowy Institute Paper 12,
2006, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/LIP12_Dupont_WEB.pdf, (Accessed on 1 March 2016).
64 Brown and Crawford, “Battling the Elements”, p.1.
65 Dupond and Pearman, “Heating up the Planet Climate”, p.36.
66 Brown and Crawford, “Battling the Elements”, p.1.
67 Dupond and Pearman, “Heating up the Planet Climate”, p.36; See also Kurt M. Campbell, Alexander T.J. Lennon and
Julianne Smith, “The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate
Change Report”, Center for Strategic & international Studies, November 2007, p.106-108, http://csis.org/files/media/
csis/pubs/071105_ageofconsequences.pdf, (Accessed on 3 April 2016); “Climate Change and International Security”,
High Representative for CFSP and the European Commission, 2008.
68 Dupond and Pearman, “Heating up the Planet Climate”, p.36; See also Campbell et al., “The Age of Consequences”.
69 Dupond and Pearman, “Heating up the Planet Climate”.
70 Detraz and Betsill, “Climate Change and International Security”; Dupond and Pearman, “Heating up the Planet
Climate”.
71 Campbell et.al., “The Age of Consequences”; Dupond and Pearman,“Heating up the Planet Climate; Detraz and Betsill,
Climate Change and International Security”; Brown and Crawford, “Battling the Elements”.

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 ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

Other climate induced insecurities include disputes over ownership of new energy resources in
the arctic, passages to which will be opened by rising temperatures; increasing north-south tensions
related to the responsibilities and measures against climate change; increasing nuclear activity for
eliminating the use of fossil fuels. Moreover, these impacts, cumulatively, will contribute to domestic
political problems and generate increasing number of failed states. 72
In addition to these examples, climate security literature focuses also on the climate related
roots of contemporary conflicts. Two of the most referred examples of these cases are the Darfur
conflict and the genocide in Rwanda.73 Even United Nations Secretary General Ban ki Moon linked
conflict in Darfur with climate change.74 More current than these events, the emergence of ISIS and
the conflict in Syria has also been linked to the climate change. According to Kelley et al. the drought
between 2007 and 2010 in the Fertile Crescent has contributed to the emergence of “social conflicts
and ultimately the outbreak of war and the rise of the ‘Islamic State’.”75 The drought increased food
prices and this led to migration to peri-urban areas. These places later became a hub for crime and
social unrest. According to Sellers, climate change also has contributed to the Syrian catastrophe
although it cannot be argued that climate change is the unique reason.76
This part analyzed the arguments of the proponents of the securitization of climate change
including analyses based on both human security implications and traditional security implications.
However, as the examples above indicate, the security implications of climate change are usually
interrelated. In most cases, climate change has direct/primary human security implications and
indirect/secondary traditional security implications and it is mostly the primary human security
implications, which lead to secondary traditional security implications. Therefore, in the literature on
the security implications of climate change, it is possible to detach chains such as:

Figure 4 Interrelated Security Implications of Climate Change Chains

Food Insecurity Conflict Over Arable Lands

(Direct Human or Destabilizing Migration
Climate Security Implication) (Indirect Traditional Sec.
Change Scarcity Implication)

Water Scarcity Water Wars (Indirect

Climate (Direct Human Sec. Traditional Sec. Implication)
Change
Change Implication)

72 Dupond of
Opponents andthe
Pearman, “Heating up the
Securitization Planet Climate”;
of Climate ChangeBrown and Crawford, “Battling the Elements“; Campbell et.al.
“The Age of Consequences”.
The
73 opponents of the securitization
Brown et.al. “Climate of climate
Change as the ‘New’ changep.1148;
Security Threat”, argueBrown
that climate change
and McLeman, is not or Anarchy?”
“A Recurring should
74 “UNEP Annual Report“, 2007,
not be a security issue. We can also divide this group into two. These are the climate security
http://www.unep.org/PDF/AnnualReport/2007/AnnualReport2007_en_web.pdf, (Accessed on 4 September 2016).
skeptics
75 Colinwho argue
P. Kelley et.al.,that thereChange
“Climate is noincausal linkage
the Fertile between
Crescent climateof change
and Implications the Recentand violent
Syrian conflict
Drought“, Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America(PNAS), Vol.112, No.11, 2015, p.3241–3246.
and the group, which argues that climate change should not be securitized since securitization of
76 P. J. Sellers, “Cancer and Climate Change“. New York Times, 16 January 2016. See also Lucas Hermwille, “Climate Change
as a Transformation
climate change will Challenge. A New effects
have adverse Climate Policy Paradigm?”,
for its solution.GAIA - Ecologicalboth
Although Perspectives
groups for oppose
Science andthe
Society,
Vol.25, No.1, 2016, p.19-22.
security framing of climate change, their arguments are completely different.
32

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At first glance it seems like that, according totothe
All use subject traditional approach to security environmental
https://about.jstor.org/terms
issues such as climate change cannot take place in the security agenda since these issues are in
the realm of “low politics”. As expressed above the traditional security understanding has a state
 Climate Change and Security

Opponents of the Securitization of Climate Change

The opponents of the securitization of climate change argue that climate change is not or should not
be a security issue. We can also divide this group into two. These are the climate security skeptics who
argue that there is no causal linkage between climate change and violent conflict and the group, which
argues that climate change should not be securitized since securitization of climate change will have
adverse effects for its solution. Although both groups oppose the security framing of climate change,
their arguments are completely different.

Climate Change is not a Security Issue

At first glance it seems like that, according to the traditional approach to security environmental issues
such as climate change cannot take place in the security agenda since these issues are in the realm of
“low politics”. As expressed above the traditional security understanding has a state centric security
approach which is based on military measures. Moreover, this approach stands against the broadening
efforts of the concept of security in International Relations. According to Trombetta, realists tend
to create a hierarchy of threats, distinguishing between threats that can be legitimately included in
the security agenda, and those that cannot.77 Walt explains the dangers of broadening the concept of
security as follows:
Because nonmilitary phenomena can also threaten state and individuals, some writers have
suggested broadening the concept of “security” to include topics such as poverty, AIDS,
environmental hazards, drug abuse, and the like (Buzan, 1983; N. Brown, 1989). Such proposals
remind us that non-military issues deserve sustained attention from scholars and policymakers,
and that military power does not guarantee well-being. But this prescription runs the risk of
expanding “security studies” excessively; by this logic, issues such as pollution, disease, child
abuse, or economic recession could all be viewed as threats to “security.” Defining the field in this
way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any
of these important problems.78

However, the literature about the securitization of climate change shows that climate change
has already passed this broadening-not broadening debate. This is because, as explained above, there
are two logics for the securitization of climate change, and according to the second logic, which is
based on the traditional security understanding, climate change can be seen as a security issue from
traditional perspective too.
However, although climate change can be securitized from a traditional security logic, there
are skeptics who reject climate change as a security issue. Skeptics argue that climate security is
not a security issue since there is no link between the climate change and conflicts. For example,
Brown et al. argue that “there is comparatively little empirical evidence on the links between climate
change, state security and conflict.”79 According to the skeptics, even without climate change it is very
difficult to anticipate conflict among or inside states. Climate change, with its complex and uncertain
consequences, further complicates this already tough prediction. “A further analytical challenge is
to disaggregate the role of climate change from other environmental, economic, social and political

77 Trombetta, “Environmental Security and Climate Change”, p.587.

78 Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies”, p.213.
79 Brown et.al., “Climate Change as the ‘New’ Security Threat”, p.1147.

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ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

factors, if it is at all possible to do so.”80 They also criticize the case of Darfur, which is one of the most
referred examples for the security implications of climate change, by arguing that drought cannot
explain the violence there fully since in other places with similar environmental conditions, such as
the northern Nigeria, there was no similar conflict.
Theisen et al. also argue that the political debate related to the securitization of climate change “has
run far ahead of the scientific evidence”.81 In their study, they analyzed whether droughts are the reason
for civil conflicts in Africa, as suggested by the proponents of the securitization of climate change.82 The
results of their study indicate that there is no direct and short-term relationship between droughts and
civil conflicts.83 The authors conclude that the primary reason of the civil conflicts is political rather than
environmental, and ethnopolitical exclusion is the main reason for these conflicts.84
Halvard Buhaug also empirically investigates whether drought and prolonged heat waves
drive civil wars in Africa in his study titled “Climate not to blame for African civil wars.”85 Similar
to the previous study, Buhaug concludes that, rather than climate change other factors like “generic
structural and contextual conditions: prevalent ethno-political exclusion, poor national economy,
and the collapse of the Cold War system” explain the African civil wars.86 In a similar study, Tor A.
Benjaminsen criticizes the environmental security approach and presents that supply-induced scarcity
is not directly related to conflict by analyzing Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali.87
In addition to these climate security skeptics, developing countries also stand against the
securitization of climate change for political reasons. Firstly, they reject climate security narratives
of West by arguing that these narratives aim to blur the responsibilities of Western industrialized
countries in the case of climate change and shift attention to the conflict areas in the global South.
According the developing world, climate security should be seen as a development issue.88 Secondly,
developing countries (G77) reject the securitization of climate change since when securitized the
issue get out of more inclusive bodies like United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) or United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to exclusive UNSC.89

Climate Change should not be Framed as a Security Issue

In addition to the skeptics who believe climate change is not a security issue, there are other scholars
who argue that climate change should not be framed as a security issue since securitization will have
adverse effects for the solution of the issue. The most evident example of this group is the Copenhagen

80 Ibid.
81 Ole Magnus Theisen, Helge Holtermann and Halvard Buhaug, “Climate Wars? Assessing the Claim that Drought
Breeds Conflict”, International Security, Vol.36, No.3, 2012, p.80.
82 The authors refer to the studies of Thomas Homer-Dixon (1991-1999) and Colin Kahl (2006) as examples which
present climate change as a security issue.
83 Theisen et al., “Climate Wars”, p.98 and 105.
84 Ibid, p.105.
85 Halvard Buhaug, “Climate Not to Blame for African Civil Wars”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
USA, Vol.107, No.38, 2010, p.16477–16482.
86 Ibid, p.16477.
87 Tor A. Benjaminsen, “Does Supply-Induced Scarcity Drive Violent Conflicts in the African Sahel? The Case of the
Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.45, No.6, 2008, p.819-836.
88 Rothe, Securitizing Global Warming, p.127 referring to Ingrid Boas, “Where is the South in Security Discourse on Climate
Change? An Analysis of India”, Critical Studies on Security, Vol.2, No.2, 2014, p.152-153.
89 Rothe, Securitizing Global Warming, p.94.

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 Climate Change and Security

School and its Securitization Theory. According to the Copenhagen School scholars, security does
not have a positive value; rather it is seen as a failure of normal politics. It legitimizes extraordinary
measures in which normal democratic rules can be broken.90 Therefore, they claim “Less Security,
More Politics”.91
For the Copenhagen School scholars, security has its own dynamics and it is about “survival,
urgency and emergency”.92 The logic of security is based on zero-sum understanding and friend-
enemy dichotomy. Therefore, the Copenhagen School scholars argue that securitization is something
that should be avoided and they stand for desecuritization.93 According to this standing, when
climate change is securitized, the logic of security will be applied to it and this will have problematic
consequences like the militarization of the issue and the legitimization of undemocratic decision
making processes.
In addition to the Copenhagen School’s standing, from the perspective of the Paris School’s
insecuritization approach, the securitization of climate change may have adverse effects too.
Insecuritization approach focuses on how the securitization of certain issues results in insecuritization
of individual human beings or groups. According to the school, security of one referent object is always
provided by sacrifice of the security of individual human beings or groups.94 In other words “security
of x always leads to the insecurity of y.”95 From this perspective, securitization of climate change, and
the security practices as a result of this securitization will result in insecurities for other people such as
the migrants who have to move because of the results of climate change.
In addition to the Securitization Theory and the Insecuritization approach, there are other
scholars who reject the securitization of climate change with pragmatic or normative reasons. According
to Oli Brown, there are several important risks in the securitization of climate change. Firstly, since
there are increasingly more desperate predictions or worst case scenarios, there is the risk of “climate
change fatigue” among the public in which there is going to emerge a feeling of “hopelessness and the
resignation” against an undefeatable threat. In the securitization attempts of climate change, it is usually
presented as if climate change will inevitably result in conflict or catastrophe, and this presentations
creates sense of hopelessness, which will diminish the motivation for fighting against climate change.96
Secondly, these dire predictions about climate change and framing it as a security issue imply that
climate change requires military or military-like solutions. This includes protecting the resources or
preventing climate-induced migration via military like methods. Thirdly, shifting the focus to military
solutions may move attention and efforts away from the current development problems that already
pose immediate threats to vulnerable societies; “extreme poverty, access to education, HIV/AIDS
and so on.”97 This shift of focus may even aggravate these vulnerabilities. Finally, the securitization of
climate change may create a perception that climate security is an “another way for northern interests

90 Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, p.21.

91 Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, p.56.
92 Trombetta, “Environmental Security and Climate Change”, p.588.
93 In simple terms desecuritization means removing an issue from the security agenda, by which the issue is no longer
regarded as a security threat.
94 Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, “Understanding (In)security”, Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, Terror
Insecurity and Fear, Abingdon, Routledge 2008, p.2.
95 Columba Peoples and Nick/Voughan–Williams, Critical Security Studies: An Introduction, Abingdon, Routledge, 2010, p.69.
96 Brown et al., “Climate Change as the ‘New’ Security Threat”, p.1153.
97 Ibid, p.1154.

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ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

to interfere in southern affairs.”98 Rita Floyd supports this argument by maintaining that securitizer
may abuse the securitization process and securitization usually takes place in favor of the securitizer,
not the referent object.99
In line with these arguments, Ben Buckland argues that the securitization of climate change is an
unsuitable reaction for the solution of the issue. According to him, climate change requires a political
solution rather than a military one.100 Idean Salehyan considers that trying to deal with climate change
with military means brings about wasting resources and efforts while “missing more productive
opportunities” to solve the problems derived from climate change.101 Rita Floyd approaches the issue
from an environmentalist perspective and argues that “climate security is not a desirable concept
as it may inhibit much needed cooperation between states.”102 She believes cooperation on climate
action seems much more likely in the absence of securitization. Hartman concentrates on U.S. defense
interests and argues that framing climate change as a security issue may “militarize the provision of
development assistance and distort climate policy.”103 Finally, Theisen et al. argue that “raising alarm
about coming ‘climate wars’ may do more harm than good, as it could lead to a militarization of the
issue and rising of barriers to prevent immigration, thereby harming those who are most in need of
assistance.”104
In addition to these anthropocentric105 arguments, eco-centric approach puts the environment
itself in the center of analysis. As opposed to the anthropocentric approaches to the securitization
of climate change, which are related to the threats to human beings or their aggregates like the
nation state, the eco-centric understanding considers that environment should be protected for
the sake of environment. According to this perception, the securitization of climate change with
an anthropocentric focus will lead to the change of focus from saving our planet to saving human
beings or nation states, or preventing violent conflicts and destabilizing climate-induced population
movements. This change of focus is dangerous since it cannot address the essence of the issue. Both
the traditional security logic and human security logic that are explained above miss this point of
view. They take either human beings or nation states as the referent objects of security and ignore
the environment and earth itself. The securitization of climate change with this anthropocentric
perception will lead to focus on secondary pragmatic and political issues and have adverse effects for
the solution of the issue.106
One point that deserves attention in the literature is that the opponents of the securitization
of the issue mostly oppose the securitization of climate change via the traditional security logic. They

98 Ibid.
99 Rita Floyd, “Climate Change, Environmental Security Studies, and the Morality of Climate Security”, 20 January 2012,
http://www.e- ir.info/2012/01/20/climate- change- environmental- security- studies- and- the- morality- of- climate-
security/, (Accessed on 2 March 2016).
100 Ben Buckland, “A Climate of War? Stopping the Securitization of Global Climate Change”, Geneva, International Peace
Bureau, 2007, p.1, http://www.ipb.org/uploads/tbl_contingut_web/176/documents/paper.pdf, (Accessed on 1
March 2016).
101 Idean Salehyan, “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.45, No.3, 2008,
p.323.
102 Floyd, “Climate Change”, p.63.
103 Hartmann, “Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict“, p.233.
104 Theisen et al., “Climate Wars”, p.100.
105 Anthropocentric refers to human-centric: taking human beings or groups as the primary referent object.
106 This eco-centric perception has been under-analyzed and has not impacted climate security discourses yet, and it is
open to further analysis and research.

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 Climate Change and Security

either claim climate change will not cause traditional security issues like violent conflict or interstate/
civil war, or they argue that it is not true to securitize climate change with a traditional security logic
since this securitization will have negative effects like the militarization of the issue. However, the
scholars in this camp do not oppose that climate change has/will have human security implications
(they either do not mention about the human security implications of climate change or accept these
implications). For example, Buckland argues that “while climate change is clearly a major threat to
human security – to food, to housing, to water and to livelihoods – it is unlikely to be a major cause
of violent conflict.”107 Theisen et al. also reject that climate change and droughts will directly generate
traditional security issues like violent conflict while accepting that “drought and other climatic shocks
frequently cause dismay and poverty, and more extreme weather in the years to come suggests more
human suffering.”108 Therefore, it can be argued that there is a common point of view in the literature
about the human security implications of climate change.

Climatization of Security: For Whom?

As the meaning of security is contested, the relationship between security and climate can be
considered contested as well.109 Scholars and security professionals diverge from each other regarding
the questions of what security is and what security does. One’s take on the relationship between
security and climate change differentiates in accordance with different conceptions in Security
Studies as well as in security professionals’ minds. What’s more, the consequences of climate change
and its relation to security thinking and doing make scholars and policy-makers rethink what has been
thought about security so far. For instance, according to McDonald, climate change will be the most
important issue in the 21st century.110
In line with the growing interest in understanding security in relation to climate change, one of
the prominent attempts in developing a novel security paradigm is Burke’s security cosmopolitanism.111
By drawing on a lack of connecting cosmopolitan thinking with security, Burke puts forward security
cosmopolitanism in order to propose a new global security architecture to offer solutions to global
problems including climate change. Burke starts out his inquiry by portraying security cosmopolitanism
as a project to reconceptualize security towards overcoming diverse and all-encompassing threats to
human existence.112 Accordingly, a novel security understanding intertwined with cosmopolitanism,
argues Burke, may help to transform existing state-centric security relations, and in line with this, to
pave the way for new transnational norms and global institutional arrangements.113 By doing so, this
new security understanding can urge states to take part in finding solutions to globalized security
issues including climate change.114

107 Buckland, “A Climate of War”, p.1.

108 Theisen et al., “Climate Wars”.
109 Steve Smith, “The Contested Concept of Security”, Ken Booth (ed), Critical Security Studies and World Politics, Boulder
& London, Lynne Rienner, 2005, p.27-62; Ken Booth, Theory of World Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2007; Matt McDonald, Security, the Environment and Emancipation: Contestation over Environmental Change,
London & New York, Routledge, 2012; Simon Dalby, Security and Environmental Change, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009.
110 McDonald, Security, the Environment and Emancipation, p.109-110.
111 Anthony Burke, “Security Cosmopolitanism”, Critical Studies on Security, Vol.1, No.1, 2013, p.13-28.
112 Burke, “Security Cosmopolitanism”, p.13.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.

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ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

Security cosmopolitanism, as a novel security understanding, problematizes a global insecurity

condition that affects individuals, communities, states as well as humanity’s planetary existence. By
putting a particular emphasis on a global insecurity condition stemming from various security issues,
security cosmopolitanism sees the state-centric ontology of international relations as a problem,
and offers a transformative alternative that aims to re-build international relations in a cosmopolitan
manner.115 While doing this, Burke differentiates his approach from the transformative and progressivist
vision of emancipatory security theory.116 Burke argues that, given the impact of emancipatory security
theory on his security cosmopolitanism, security cosmopolitanism goes beyond the limitations of
emancipatory security theory by offering a relational global ontology and a different ethical stance
that is more sensitive to otherness and to global issues such as climate change.117
By drawing on the points security cosmopolitanism emphasized, Burke comes up with a
new ethical stance for security actors such as states, non-governmental organizations, multinational
companies including military ones.118 Instead of being a source of insecurity for their citizens, security
actors may develop a different and inclusive global governance that favors collective decision-
making, gives voices to the voiceless and considers the growing problem of climate change as well
as its consequences for all humanity. Burke also argues that security cosmopolitanism “would also
aim to create space for more radical projects in which people and communities can build peace and
security from below”. Nevertheless, given the whole strength of security cosmopolitanism in terms of
examining climate change in relation to security, his proposition that claims that one of the aspects
of security cosmopolitanism is to pave the way for bottom-up projects is problematic. Since people
on the bottom are the most affected from climate change but least powerful in terms of having an
influence to overcome insecurities resulting from climate change119, the questions of how exactly
security cosmopolitanism may empower humans and how humans can empower themselves are not
elaborated sufficiently. Therefore, security cosmopolitanism can be considered a powerful but limited
opening in terms of climatization of security.
When it comes to the question of how security professionals take up the issues of climate
change, a different understanding comes about. Security professionals’ particular readings of climate
change put forward practices and discourses that combine climate change with defense, military,
migration and development.120 Contrary to Burke’s positive security cosmopolitanism and its
associated sensitivity toward climate change, security professionals’ practices and discourses toward
dealing with climate change, instead, reflect an insecuritization process. Accordingly, even though the
relationship between security and climate change can be examined under the practices and discourses

115 Ibid, p.14.

116 Ibid, pp.14-15. Emancipatory security theory is basically a transformative understanding of security that offers its own
deepening of security, that takes the individual as the referent-object of security, and that aims to widen life-options
of individuals beyond their survival. By drawing this, Booth in his Theory of World Security argues that “survival is
being alive; security is living” (p.107). For the most comprehensive account of emancipatory security theory and its
understanding of security, Booth, Theory of World Security.
117 Burke, “Security Cosmopolitanism”, p.14-15. Booth’s Theory of World Security also sees climate change as one of the
most urgent problems; however, anthropo-centric perspective of emancipatory security theory may have a difficulty in
examining climate change as a security issue. This difficulty can also be relevant to McDonald’s Security, The Environment
and Emancipation.
118 Burke, “Security Cosmopolitanis”, p.21.
119 McDonald, “Security, the Environment and Emancipation”, p.109-110.
120 Angela Oels, “From Securitization of the Climate Change to Climatization of the Security Field”, Jürgen Scheffran,
Michael Brzoska, Han Günter Brauch, Peter Michael Link and Janpeter Schilling (der), Climate Change, Human Security
and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability, Heidelberg, London & New York, Springer, 2012, p.198.

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 Climate Change and Security

of human security, these practices and discourses help to govern the populations of the global south
when human security becomes one of the means for the biopolitical governance of populations121
under the risk of climate change-induced disasters and displacement.122
In this sense, while “the defense community in northern industrialized states”123 sees the issue
of climate change as a security issue, their attitude is rather to protect existing parameters of the global
mobility of goods and individuals.124 This framing of the issue of climate change in relation to security
differs from the way security cosmopolitanism advocates “global security as a universal good”125 or
UNDP’s original understanding of human security that is inclined to development of humans beyond
physical existence.126 To this aim, security professionals underscore the importance of disaster
management to provide technical, civil and military humanitarian assistance to those countries likely
to be affected by climate change. Disaster management functions by detecting “migration hot spots”
and “conflict hot spots”127 that includes potential populations that are under the risk of climate change-
induced migration or conflict.
In order to prevent the potential mobility of climate change-induced immigrant or the climate
change-induced conflict, there are two strategies: namely, (1) “civilian-military stability interventions”
and (2) “military responsibility-to-protect interventions”.128 Civil-military stability interventions aim
to develop weak states or the so-called failed states under the risk of climate change by building a better
functioning infrastructure that may overcome insecurities stemming from climate change. By doing
so, civil-military stability interventions not only help vulnerable states possess a better functioning
infrastructure and disaster management, but also direct conduct of those states under the existing
power asymmetries and hierarchies. Second, military responsibility-to-protect interventions aims to
help disaster-affected states and their populations. Since those states are not able to properly protect
their citizens and are inclined to produce climate-change induced immigrants, military responsibility-
to-protect interventions aim to provide assistance to those states to “secure global circulation from
disruption.”129 It can be argued that climatization of security, therefore, help to make the issue of
climate change manageable and becomes to a tool to govern already disempowered regions, states and
populations.

121 Instead of sovereign power that is organized around a set of laws and that sees power as something solid and inherently
possessed by states, institutions or individuals, a biopolitical understanding of power focuses on populations, sees laws
as tactics to govern populations, depends upon multiple forms of political technologies to shape and classify both by
totalizing populations and by individualizing each body in those populations. For Foucault’s investigations about power,
see Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended, David Macey (trans.), New York, Picador, 1997; Michel Foucault, The
Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume 1, Robert Hurley(trans.), London, Penguin Books, 1998; Michel
Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, Graham Burchell (trans.), New York, Picador, 2007.
122 Angela Oels, “From Securitization of the Climate Change”; David Chandler and Nik Hynek, Critical Perspectives on
Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations, London & New York, Routledge 2011;
Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell, “Securing Humans in a Dangerous World”, International Politics, Vol.43, No.1,
2006, p.1-23.
123 Oels, “From Securitization of the Climate Change”, p.199.
124 Ibid.
125 Burke, “Security Cosmopolitanism”, p.14.
126 “UNDP Human Development Report”, 1994.
127 Oels, “From Securitization of the Climate Change”, p.199.
128 Ibid, p.199; Hartman, “Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict”.
129 Oels, “From Securitization of the Climate Change”, p.199.

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ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

Conclusion
This study analyzed different approaches to the security implications of climate change. In other words,
it examined the framing climate change as a security issue: should it be framed as a security issue or not?
It also examined and critically reviewed the emerging literature on the climatization of security.
In both academia and political agendas, there are supporters and opponents of framing climate
change as a security issue. The approaches of the supporters of framing climate change as a security
issue can be divided into two. The first logic focuses on the human security implications of climate
change. These include the food insecurity or problems about reaching fresh water. These implications
are usually direct. The second logic focuses on traditional security implications of climate change
such as violent conflicts and destabilizing migration. In this category, traditional security implications
of climate change are usually indirect. In most cases other factors like weak governance or ethnic or
religious tension play a role in the emergence of conflicts too.
Although there are two logics, we argue that the human security implications and traditional
security implications of climate change are mostly interrelated. In most cases primary human security
implications leads to secondary traditional security implications. Therefore it is possible to see chains
such as: climate change leads to scarcity and this leads to food insecurity (a direct human security
implication) and this leads to a conflict over arable lands or destabilizing population movements
(indirect traditional security implications).
The opponents of the securitization of climate change argue that climate change is not or
should not be a security issue. We can also divide this group into two. Climate security skeptics claim
that it is impossible to draw a causal link between climate change and conflict. According to them,
rather than climate change, political factors play a primary role in the emergence of violent conflicts.
The second group argues that climate change should not be framed as a security issue since this will
have adverse effects.
As another conclusion, it can be argued that, although the opponents of the securitization
climate change reject the traditional security implications of climate change, they do not reject its
human security implications. Therefore, it can be argued that there is a consensus in the literature
about the human security implications of climate change.
When it comes to the emerging literature on the climatization of security, it necessitates
considering how to act together against the consequences of climate change. Nevertheless, while
coming up with an idea to act together, it is vital to keep in mind the immense power asymmetries
between states or between regions. Additionally, the question of how to empower against climate
change also begins with the question of how to empower humans against state-centric exclusionary
practices in international relations. Thus, these two questions are closely interrelated and cannot be
solved with being sensitive to climate change.
As was emphasized in security cosmopolitanism, new global arrangements are necessary
to deal with climate change. Nevertheless, as was underscored in governing climate change as a
security issue, security professionals’ reading of the issue is quite different from the way security
cosmopolitanism puts forward. Therefore, it is necessary to bear in mind that an all-encompassing
solution to climate change in relation to security needs to take security professionals’ reading of the
issue into consideration. In line with this, existing power asymmetries permeating global politics
further complicates the issue.

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 Climate Change and Security

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