PSYCHOLOGY LIBRARY EDITIONS:

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Volume 20

STIGMA
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 STIGMA

ROBERT M. PAGE
First published in 1984
This edition first published in 2015
by Psychology Press
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© 1984 Robert M. Page
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Concepts in Social Policy Two

Stigma
Robert M. Page

Routledge & Kegan Paul

London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley
First published in 1984
by Routledge & Kegan Paul pic
39 Store Street, London WC1E 7DD, England
9 Park Street, Boston, Mass. 02108, USA
464 St Kilda Road, Melbourne,
Victoria 3004, Australia and
Broadway House, Newtown Road,
Henley-on-Thames, Oxon RG9 1EN, England
Set in 10ll2pt Times
by Columns of Reading
and printed in Great Britain
by T.J. Press (Padstow) Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall
© Robert Page 1984
No part of this book may be reproduced in
any form without permission from the publisher,
except for the quotation of brief passages
in criticism
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Page, Robert M.
Stigma.
(Concepts in social policy; 2)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Stigma (Social psychology) 2. Social service -
Great Britain. 3. Great Britain - Social policy.
I. Title. II. Series.
HM291.P25 1984 30T.12 83-24638
British Library CIP data also available
ISBN 0-7100-9786-7
For my parents, Monica and John, who have shown such
remarkable resilience in the face of adversity
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Contents

Acknowledgments xi
1 The anatomy of stigma 1
2 Stigma: the social administration approach 25
3 Stigma and the unmarried mother 72
4 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 129
Notes 163
Bibliography 184
Index of authors 202
Subject index 205

vii
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Tables and Figures

Tables
1.1 Stigmas and the ways in which they may be carried 5
2.1 Reasons for not applying for National Assistance -
June 1965 (Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance) 43
2.2 Retirement pensioners not claiming National
Assistance to which they are entitled and reasons for
not doing so by age - June 1965 (Atkinson) 44
2.3 Reasons why people with difficuties did not ask about
extra help from the SBC (Hennessey) 46
2.4 Principal reasons for not claiming given by non-
claimers (Taylor-Gooby) 47
2.5 Principal reasons why other entitled tenants do not
claim (Taylor-Gooby) 48
2.6 Grounds of entitlement to free prescriptions (Blaxter) 49
2.7 Reasons for non-take-up of ‘passport’ benefits (Nixon) 50
2.8 Proportions of families with no experience of free
meals and who had not considered applying for
free meals giving various reasons for not considering
applying (%) (Davies in association with Reddin) 51
2.9 Proportion of respondents giving various explanations
of why eligible families did not apply for free school
meals (Davies in association with Reddin) 52
2.10 Proportions of respondents agreeing with propositions
as important explanations of why eligible children did
not receive school meals (Davies in association with
Reddin) 53
2.11 Percentages of elderly and younger recipients,
IX
X

according to their attitudes to receiving

supplementary benefit (Townsend) 54
2.12 Dislikes about being on supplementary benefit
(Marshall) 55
2.13 Attitudes towards seeking help from the welfare state
(Pinker) 59
2.14 Reluctance of people in general towards approaching
services (Clifford) 60
2.15 Reasons for reluctance (Clifford) 60
2.16 Public opinion on the causes of poverty (EEC)
(Commission of the European Communities) 63
2.17 Respondents’ attitude to giving help in specific family
circumstances (Glastonbury) 64
2.18 Respondents’ attitudes to giving help in specific family
circumstances (Clifford) 66
2.19 Respondents’ attitudes towards welfare priorities
(Pinker) 68
3.1 Estimated number of one-parent families in Great
Britain in 1971, 1976 and 1979 (Leete and National
Council for One Parent Families) 99
3.2 Illegitimate live births in England and Wales since
1945 (selected years) (National Council for One
Parent Families) 99
3.3 Illegitimate live births by mother’s age at birth:
1980 (England and Wales) 121

Figures
3.1 A psychological explanation of ‘illegitimacy’ 101
4.1 An example of combined physical and psychological
sanctions: the punishment of the ‘undeserving’
poor in the sixteenth century 153
Acknowledgments

The completion of this book owes much to the help and advice I
have received from various sources. I have benefited greatly from
the comments and criticisms I have received from members of the
Board of Studies in Social Policy and Administration and Social
Work at the University of Kent. In addition, other members of
the Faculty of Social Science at Kent have provided valuable
assistance with particular sections of this book, though needless
to say I alone am responsible for all errors and omissions.
I also owe a debt of gratitude to my series editors, Vic George
and Paul Wilding, who have commented perceptively on
successive drafts of this book. In particular, I would like to thank
Vic George for his constructive advice and help during my years
as an undergraduate and postgraduate student at the University
of Kent.
I would also like to thank the SSRC for their financial
assistance during my period of postgraduate research.
Finally, I would like to thank: my parents for the encourage­
ment they have given me over the years; Fulham football club
and Worcestershire County cricket club for keeping me enter­
tained; all my friends and colleagues (especially Graham Stevens,
Chris Gerrard, Mick Griffiths, Linda Keen, Rob Young, Steve
Burt, Libby Graham, Chris Morgan, Tim Marks, Phil Bell and
Mike Harmer) whose success in making me laugh is much
appreciated; Joanna Treacy for her Mansfield accent and her
affection.
The author and publishers are grateful to the following for
their kind permission to reproduce the tables and figures used in
this book: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, for tables 2.1, 2.2,
2.3, 2.7, 2.12, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, which are Crown copyright;
xi
xii Acknowledgments
Cambridge University Press, for tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6;
Heinemann Educational Books, for tables 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10;
Penguin Books Ltd and University of California Press, for table
2.11; Robert Pinker, for tables 2.13 and 2.19; Policy and Politics,
for tables 2.14, 2.15, 2.17 and 2.18; the Commission of the
European Communities, for table 2.16; and the University of
Surrey, for figure 3.1.
1 The anatomy of stigma1

References to stigma are now commonplace in the media and in

general discourse. The term is readily applied to any ‘dis­
reputable’ person, group, activity, occupation2 or location.
However, stigma remains a relatively imprecise concept. As
Titmuss reminds us, ‘the concept itself is as elusive and complex
as other key concepts like class, alienation, participation,
democracy, poverty and so forth.’3 The relevance of this
statement can clearly be seen if one considers just a few of the
ways in which the term stigma has been defined in the social
science literature.
Whether it is a visible mark or an invisible stain, stigma
acquires its meaning through the emotion it generates within
the person bearing it and the feeling and behavior toward him
of those affirming it. These two aspects of stigma are indivisible
since they each act as a cause or effect of the other. (J. and E.
Cumming)4
In the final analysis, stigma might best be considered to be the
negative perceptions and behaviors of so-called normal people
to all individuals who are different from themselves. (English)5
In its most general sociological sense, the term stigma can be
used to refer to any attribute that is deeply discrediting and
incongruous with our stereotype of what a given type of
individual should be. (Kando)6
Given the differences in these definitions (at least in emphasis),
it is not surprising that the notion of stigma has acquired
1
2 The anatomy of stigma
something of an elusive reputation. To counter this shortcoming
it is necessary to distinguish clearly between the various aspects
of this concept.

Stigmas
In its most literal usage the term stigma refers to some form of
mark or stain. As Osborne points out:
‘Stigma’ dates back to the Greek word for ‘tattoo-mark,’ a
brand made with a hot iron and impressed on people to show
that they were devoted to the services of the temple or, on the
opposite spectrum of behavior, that they were criminals or
runaway slaves.7
More recently, however, the term stigma has tended to be
associated almost exclusively with ‘inferior’ forms of physical
appearance, conduct or ethnicity.8
Any discussion of socially inferior attributes (stigmas) neces­
sarily requires some consideration of the question of social
normality. A number of commentators have given attention to
this subject.9 For example, Merton and Nisbet10 have outlined six
distinctive dimensions of social norms:
(i) Norms may prescribe or proscribe conduct or merely
indicate the type of behaviour which is preferred or
permitted.
(ii) The extent of agreement concerning such norms will vary
within society.
(iii) There are likely to be varying degrees of commitment
amongst those who accept a particular norm.
(iv) Informal or formal sanctions may be applied to those who
fail to conform to a particular social norm.
(v) Norms differ in the type of adherence required (i.e.
norms may require implicit or explicit support).
(vi) The ‘elasticity’ of norms will vary. With some norms
adherence to a restricted range of conduct may be
required whereas greater flexibility may be permitted with
others.
 The anatomy of stigma 3
Although this classification is useful, it does not provide any
means for precisely identifying prevailing social norms. Indeed,
any classification is likely to be deficient in this respect given the
diversity of opinion over the question of what actually constitutes
a social norm. Nevertheless, there is likely to be some agreement
concerning what can loosely be regarded as the ‘major’ social
norms in society (many of which will be embodied in legal
codes). As Plummer contends:
Groups may reject societal definitions, but they cannot wish
them away or remain unaware of them. You cannot steal,
murder, rape, be blind, deaf or mentally ill without being
aware that you are violating some publicly held norms.11
However, in a discussion of societal and situational deviance,
Plummer clearly acknowledges that the relative dimension of
social norms cannot be ignored.
A simple distinction must be made between ‘societal deviance’
and ‘situational deviance’. The former is that conduct des­
cribed as deviant in the public, abstract and reified values
systems which all societies must have - even though individual
actors may dissent from them, and even though such systems
need not be clear, non-contradictory, or without competition.
The latter is that conduct which emerges as deviant in
interpersonal encounters. The former - while relative cross
culturally - is perceived as absolute by most members of a
society and possesses moral authority; while the latter is
capable of considerable relativity. The former thereby sets
constraints on what can be called deviant in any given society
though these constraints are far from being rigid and fixed.12
It would appear, then, that reactions to norms infractions are
likely to vary to some degree. As Cohen points out, the public
may respond to deviance in a number of ways.
It can be indifferent- the problem doesn’t concern us, ‘let
him do his thing’; it can welcome the deviance, heralding it, for
example, as pointing the way for society to advance; it can be
punitive, advocating deterrent and retributive measures, rang-
 4 The anatomy of stigma
ing from £5 fines to the death penalty; or, finally, it can be
progressive, advocating various treatment and therapeutic
measures ostensibly designed for the deviant’s ‘own good’.13
It seems, therefore, that stigma will not necessarily attach to all
types of norm infractions. For example, adults who indulge in
activities associated with childhood such as ‘train-spotting’ may
well be regarded as odd or eccentric but it is unlikely that they
will be stigmatized unless their conduct is perceived as evidence
of an established stigma attribute such as mental illness.
In general, stigma has tended to be associated with those
inferior attributes which are commonly regarded as major norm
infractions. Certain attributes, such as physical handicap, have
had stigmatic connotations for many centuries14 whilst others
have only been negatively regarded for much shorter periods of
time.15 (It should also be noted that the stigma which attaches to
a particular attribute in one historical period may decline in
another e.g. divorce.16) In addition, the rationale for a particular
stigma may change over time. For example, the unmarried
mother was stigmatized in earlier centuries because her conduct
directly contravened the teaching of the Christian church.
However, since the mid-sixteenth century the dependency of
unmarried mothers on public aid has been the main reason for
such stigma (see chapter 3).
Goffman has identified ‘three grossly different’ types of stigma
which exist in contemporary society.
First there are the abominations of the body - the various
physical deformities. Next there are the blemishes of individual
character perceived as weak will, domineering or unnatural
passions, treacherous and rigid beliefs, and dishonesty, these
being inferred from a known record of, for example, mental
disorder, imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, homosexuality,
unemployment, suicidal attempts, and radical political
behaviour. Finally there are the tribal stigma that can be
transmitted through lineages and equally contaminate all
members of a family.17
According to Goffman:
 The anatomy of stigma 5
In all these various instances of stigma . . . the same socio­
logical features are found: an individual who might have been
received easily in ordinary social intercourse possesses a trait
that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn those of us
whom he meets away from him, breaking the claim that his
other attributes have on us.18
Goffman also outlines two ways in which each type of stigma
can be ‘carried’19 (discredited and discreditable). Goffman uses
the term discredited to describe those who presume that their
stigma is known about already or is immediately obvious to
others (usually because it is visual in nature). In contrast, the
term discreditable is used by Goffman to describe those who
believe that their stigma ‘is neither known about by those present
nor immediately perceivable by them.’20 (See Table 1.1.)
Table 1.1 Stigmas and the ways in which they may be carried
Types of stigma Ways in which stigmas may be carried
Discredited Discreditable
1 PHYSICAL Paraplegic in a Woman who has
wheelchair undergone a
mastectomy
2 CONDUCT Well-known criminal ‘Secret’ homosexual
e.g. Myra Hindley,
Ronald Biggs
3 TRIBAL Negro Jew

In general, those with physical or tribal stigmas will tend to be

discredited rather than discreditable. For example, the blind or
the physically handicapped will find it difficult to ‘conceal’
information about their stigmas from others. There will be
exceptions. A paraplegic sitting at an office desk which effectively
conceals any hint of disability may be thought of as physically
able by others who do not know of her disability.
Individuals with conduct stigmas are more likely to be
discreditable than discredited. In many cases, such individuals are
able to limit public information about their discrediting attri­
butes. For example, a lesbian may decide to ‘pass’ as hetero­
6 The anatomy of stigma
sexual with colleagues at work and with casual acquaintances.
For others, such passing may not be possible. For instance,
‘Great Train Robber’ Ronald Biggs has become so well known
that his name has even been used by a British car manufacturer
in an advertising campaign (The Mini: Nips in and out Quicker
than Ronald Biggs).
It must also be noted that varying degrees of blame attach to
the types of stigma outlined by Goffman. In general, those with
physical or tribal stigmas are granted a measure of social
acceptance because they are not considered to be personally
responsible for their ‘failing’. As such, they may tend to elicit
favourable rather than unfavourable reactions from others. As F.
Davis states in a discussion of the physically handicapped: ‘. . .in
our society the visibly handicapped are customarily accorded,
save by children, the surface acceptance that democratic manners
guarantee nearly all.’21
There are exceptions to this generalisation. For example,
Cahnman argues that the obese are perceived as blameworthy.
. . . contrary to those that are blind, one-legged, paraplegic, or
dark-pigmented, the obese are presumed to hold their fate in
their own hands; if they were only a little less greedy or lazy or
yielding to impulse or oblivious of advice, they would restrict
excessive food intake, resort to strenuous exercise, and as a
consequence of such deliberate action, they would reduce.
Actually, the moral factor which is thus introduced aggravates
the case. While blindness is considered a misfortune, obesity is
branded a defect.22
Those with conduct stigmas are generally considered to be
personally responsible for their failings. It is commonly believed
that such individuals have deliberately chosen to behave in
socially unacceptable ways. As such, they are liable to be treated
unfavourably by others. Again, there are exceptions. For
example, a woman who gives birth to an illegitimate child as a
result of being raped may be seen as blameless rather than
blameworthy.
Pardo has paid particular attention to this blameless­
blameworthy dimension of stigma in his research in Canada.23
Using a non-stigmatized ‘normal’ as a baseline for comparison,
 The anatomy of stigma 7
Pardo attempted to discover how a group of undergraduates
would respond to various stigmatized individuals: a blind man -
physical stigma; an ex-convict - moral stigma; a blind ex-convict
- multiple stigma. Pardo tested three hypotheses.
1 People will tend to evaluate a blind man more favourably
than an ex-convict. (Pardo termed this a justice effect.)24
2 People will tend to compensate a blind victim of an accident
more generously than an ex-convict who has experienced an
identical mishap. (Social responsibility effect.)25 (In order to
test this particular hypothesis, Pardo asked his respondents
to award damages (of between 1,000 and 3,000 dollars) to
individuals (with the various stigmas mentioned above) who
had suffered identical injuries (a hip fracture and bruising) as
a result of being hit by a driverless bus which had faulty
brakes.
3 An individual with both a physical and moral (conduct)
stigma will tend not only to be evaluated in an unfavourable
way by the public but will also tend to be denied material
support because of the overtrumping effect of moral
turpitude. (Overtrumping effect.)26
Pardo found that his subjects responded in the manner
predicted with regard to both his first (the blind man was
evaluated far more favourably than the ex-convict) and second
(larger amounts of compensation were awarded to the blind
plaintiff than to the ex-convict) hypotheses. In terms of the third
hypothesis the results were less conclusive. Although the
respondents formed a negative impression of the blind ex-convict
(as predicted) they nevertheless decided to award this person the
highest amount of compensation.27
Despite the numerous methodological objections that can be
raised about research of this kind (e.g. a highly selective group of
respondents; the use of hypothetical case-studies) it can be
confidently asserted that Pardo has provided valuable evidence
to support the contention that the blameless-blameworthy
dimension is of importance for the study of the concept of stigma.
The idea that the notion of stigma should be associated
exclusively with major, negative, norm infractions has been
rejected by a number of writers. Goffman, for example, has
8 The anatomy of stigma
expressed certain reservations about this approach. Although he
acknowledges that ‘there are important attributes that almost
everywhere in our society are discrediting’,28 Goffman still
maintains ‘that a language of relationships, not attributes, is
really needed. An attribute that stigmatizes one type of possessor
can confirm the usualness of another, and therefore is neither
creditable nor discreditable as a thing in itself.’29 This argument
has found favour with others. For instance, Reisman argues that
stigma attaches to General Practitioners because they are ‘less
technically expert than the specialist, the scientist or the
consultant in a big hospital.’30 Similarly, Tony Benn has stated
that stigma tends to attach to Labour party politicians with
intellectual reputations.31 Posner, who has paid particular
attention to this idea (in an article entitled ‘The stigma of
excellence: on being just right’32), contends that in addition to
those who fail to live up to a particular norm ‘those who personify
it or go beyond it may at times feel uncomfortable, guilty and
stigmatized.’33 In support of this assertion Posner cites the case of
the male ‘non-drinker’. She argues
that the basis of the non-drinker’s stigma is his flaunting of
ideal behaviour. We all know drinking is bad for us, but we all
do it, and if there’s one thing that really irritates us it is a
superior moral person who has himself totally under control
and who therefore reminds us of our own failings!34
From this basis it would appear that stigma can just as easily
attach to the Queen, doctors, clergymen, mothers, children,
manual and non-manual workers as it can to groups such as the
disabled, homosexuals or ex-prisoners. However, such a conten­
tion squeezes the useful life out of the concept of stigma.
Accordingly, it is maintained here that the term should be used
exclusively in connection with inferior as opposed to normal or
superior attributes. As Dinitz et al. assert:
there are certain persons at the extreme who are defined as
unfortunate - the severely retarded, the midget . . .etc.
Others, who are also at the extremes, such as the genius, the
seven-foot-tall basketball player . . . and the overendowed
female, may be positively valued. . . . Both ends may be
 The anatomy of stigma 9
equidistant from the average or norm. This underscores the
point that it is not the extreme, the variation, or the
freakishness in itself that defines social deviation; the extreme
has to be evaluated by the society in a negative fashion.35
Even if one accepts that the term stigma should only be applied
to negative attributes, there is still likely to be considerable
disagreement over questions such as the extent of stigma in
society. For example, Goffman is of the opinion that:
it is not very useful to tabulate the numbers of persons who
suffer [stigma] . . . the number would be as high as one wanted
to make it; and when those with a courtesy stigma are added
[friends, family and associates of the stigmatized], and those
who once experienced the situation or are destined, if for no
other reason than oncoming agedness, to do so, the issue
becomes not whether a person has experience with a stigma of
his own, because he has, but rather how many varieties he has
had his own experience with.36

Stigma recognition
There are two main ways in which individuals tend to come to
recognize that they possess a stigma. This process may, firstly,
take the form of self-recognition. As a result of socialization most
members of society will gain some understanding of the various
types of prevailing stigma. They will thus be in a position to
compare their own conduct or appearance with existing stigma
types. If they find that their appearance or conduct mirrors a
particular stigma type it is possible that they may come to the
conclusion that they possess a stigma. As Plummer, in a
discussion of homosexuality, argues:
a person who experiences a homosexual feeling does not have
to be hounded out of town, sent to prison, or treated by a
psychiatrist to come to see himself as a homosexual - he may
quite simply ‘indicate’ to himself, through the ‘interpretation’
of the given feeling and the accompanying awareness of the
societal hostility, that he is a homosexual.37
10 The anatomy of stigma
For those with inborn physical or tribal stigmas such self­
recognition is likely to take a different form. As Goffman points
out, such individuals ‘become socialized into their disadvantag­
eous situation even while they are learning and incorporating the
standards against which they fall short.’38
The second main way in which individuals come to recognize
that they possess a stigma is through the reactions of others. Such
reactions may be of a direct kind. One homosexual recalls such
an incident: ‘. . . when I was about sixteen and had a romp with
a boy friend in the street, another boy suddenly called me
“queer”.’39 Alternatively, such reactions may be of a more
indirect type. For example, a woman (upon hearing her friends
discussing the behaviour of agoraphobics) may come to the
conclusion that her own behaviour could be perceived as
evidence of mental illness.
Finally, it is important to note that many individuals may come
to recognize that they have a stigma by a combination of self­
recognition and audience reaction.

Stigmatization
An individual may be stigmatized by the intentional or ‘uninten­
tional’ actions or comments of officials (e.g. magistrates, police
officers, social workers), employers, fellow employees, other
family members, friends, neighbours or strangers.
Intentional stigmatization may take a variety of forms ranging
from snubs or adverse comments to legal sanctions. In all such
cases, attention is focussed on a particular inferior attribute of
the individual concerned. As Suchar states:
The individual . . . is assigned a ‘master status trait’: homo­
sexual, drug addict, prostitute, juvenile delinquent, or
others . . . this label will dominate all other ‘characteristics’ of
the individual; ‘good athlete,’ ‘good conversationalist,’ ‘good
dancer,’ and the like are subordinated to or negated by this
trait, which is immediately felt to be more central to the
‘actual’ identity of the individual.40
The class, status and power of the stigmatizer can be of
 The anatomy of stigma 11
importance in terms of the impact of stigmatization. For
example, someone classified as mentally ill by members of the
medical profession may find it difficult to refute such typing or
convince others that such labelling is inappropriate.41
Although the precise effects of official labelling are far from
clear cut,42 it can be argued that such labelling tends to create
more problems for an individual than ‘lay’ labelling. For
example, a young offender describing his relationship with the
police states:
You can just be walking down-town with millions of shoppers
and they’ll stop you. If they know your face you’re fucked. If
you’ve done a bit of robbing and they don’t like your face,
that’s it.43
It must be noted, though, that those who have not been
stigmatized by officials may still experience difficulties in their
day-to-day lives because of the possibility of such labelling44 or
because of the hostility of other members of the community.
Intentional and explicit forms of stigmatization tend to be
directed towards those with conduct or tribal stigmas. In contrast,
those with physical stigmas rarely experience overt hostility from
others. The stigmatization of this group takes a different form
(‘unintentional’ stigmatization). Evidence from a number of
studies45 indicates that ‘normals’ tend to be over-sympathetic or
inhibited during contact with the physically stigmatized. For
example, in a study in the 1960s, Kleck46 found that his subjects
were more inhibited when they were in the presence of an
assistant who had assumed the role of a left leg amputee than
they were during interaction with a physically normal assistant.
Subjects interacting with the ‘disabled’ assistant were found to
have:
(i) Displayed greater relative motoric inhibition (i.e. they
didn’t move about as much as they did with the normal
assistant).
(ii) Formed a more positive impression of this particular
assistant.
(iii) Distorted their opinions in the direction of making them
more consistent with those assumed to be held by disabled
persons.
12 The anatomy of stigma
Although it can be argued that this form of stigmatization is
preferable to overt hostility, it must be remembered that such
‘stereotyped’ responses can have important implications for the
life chances of the physically stigmatized. For example, such
individuals have frequently been ‘cared’ for in separate commun­
ities, ostensibly for their own good. However, the physically
stigmatized may find such segregation extremely distasteful.47 For
instance, a girl recalling her first impressions of a home for the
blind states:
I was to spend the rest of my life making mops with other blind
people, eating with other blind people, dancing with other
blind people. I became nauseated with fear, as the picture grew
in my mind. Never had I come across such destructive
segregation.48
The relationship between stigmatization and stigma types can
depend upon what Goffman has termed the known-about-ness of
a particular attribute, its obtrusiveness and its perceived focus.49
In the case of those with physical stigmas, explicit forms of
stigmatization may be avoided provided that they observe certain
forms of social etiquette and accept that interaction with normals
will tend to be superficial. Indeed, F. Davis has compared the
position of the visibly handicapped in ‘mixed’ social situations
with the ‘poor relation at the wedding party . . . sufficient that he
is here, he should not expect to dance with the bride.’50
However, if those with physical stigmas become too obtrusive,
they may suffer explicit stigmatization. Berk, in a study of
patrons at a dance hall in the United States, gives an example of
such a situation.
A number of paraplegics in wheel chairs arrived at a dance,
and their presence in one of the halls where the dances were
held resulted in an exodus of over two hundred and fifty of the
approximately seven hundred patrons in the room within a half
hour. Patrons fled the immediate vicinity so as to avoid contact
with ‘those misfits’ as they were described by several patrons
who felt that the handicapped should have had the good sense
not to come to such places and embarrass everybody.51
 The anatomy of stigma 13
The stigmatization of those with conduct stigmas may also vary
in relation to known-about-ness, obtrusiveness and perceived
focus.52 Members of a local community may, for instance, refrain
from stigmatizing an elderly, acknowledged, homosexual who
lives in the vicinity on the grounds that his conduct poses no form
of threat. In contrast, a local school teacher with a recent
conviction for gross indecency may experience intense hostility
from members of the same community.

Felt stigma
All individuals who carry stigmas are likely to experience feelings
of stigma to some degree. For those with conduct or tribal
stigmas such feelings may be induced by the adverse comments or
actions of others. For example, a former mental patient (recalling
a discussion with a colleague after being discharged from
hospital) comments: ‘I said: “That argument doesn’t make sense:
you’re mad,” and he replied: “At least I’ve never been a patient
in a mental hospital.” I was desperately hurt. . . .’53 Such feelings
may also result from ‘official’ stigmatization. A prostitute
recalling her experiences of court appearances states:
You go in through that door and everyone’s waiting for you
and looking at you. I keep my head down and never look on
either side. Then they say those awful words: ‘Being a common
prostitute . . .’ and you feel awful, all the time not knowing
who’s watching you at the back of the court.54
For the physically stigmatized, feelings of stigma are more
likely to be experienced as a result of the inhibited or over-
sympathetic reactions of normals (see p. 11). For instance, a
physically handicapped person confined to a wheelchair states:
I get suspicious when somebody says, ‘Let’s go for a . . . push
with me down the hall,’ or something like that. This to me is
suspicious because it means that they’re aware, really aware,
that there’s a wheelchair here. . . . A lot of people in trying to
show you that they don’t care that you’re in a chair will do
crazy things. Oh, there’s one person I know who constantly
14 The anatomy of stigma
kicks my chair as if to say ‘I don’t care that you’re in a
wheelchair. I don’t even know that it’s there.’ But that is just
an indication that he really knows it’s there.55
A one-legged girl, recalling her experiences with school sports,
provides a good illustration of how over-helpful reactions can
also result in feelings of stigma:
Whenever I fell, out swarmed the women in droves, clucking
and fretting like a bunch of bereft mother hens. It was kind of
them, and in retrospect I appreciate their solicitude, but at the
time I resented and was greatly embarrassed by their
interference. For they assumed that no routine hazard to
skating - no stick or stone - upset my flying wheels. It was a
foregone conclusion that I fell because I was a poor, helpless
cripple.56
For those with blameless stigmas any reorientation by normals
may result in feelings of stigma, even if such changes result in a
more favourable attitude being adopted. For example, former
England cricket captain Tony Grieg was perturbed by the
thought that the Australian cricket public might respond to him
more favourably after it was revealed that he suffered from
epilepsy.57
The frequency of felt stigma experiences is likely to vary from
individual to individual. For those who interpret all their life
experiences within a stigma framework (i.e. those who believe
that their stigma obtrudes in all forms of social intercourse) such
feelings may be relatively common. For instance, a criminal
states: ‘. . . I always feel this with straight people - that
whenever they’re being nice to me, pleasant to me, all the time
really, underneath they’re only assessing me as a criminal and
nothing else.’58
For others such feelings may be quite rare. As an unmarried
mother told me, ‘I’ve very rarely felt stigmatized. It’s just the odd
reaction from people . . . but then I sit and reason it out within
myself and think sod ’em.’ Obviously, it seems likely that those
individuals who continually feel stigmatized will find life
extremely difficult to cope with (even if they are living within a
 The anatomy of stigma 15
tolerant and understanding community). In contrast, those
individuals who rarely feel stigmatized (especially those who
make a determined effort to minimize such feelings) are likely to
find life relatively unproblematic (even if they should be
unfortunate enough to be treated unfavourably by members of
their local community).
Earlier (p. 9) it was suggested that individuals may come to
recognize that they possess a stigma by means of self-recognition.
Similarly, it is possible to feel stigmatized without experiencing
explicit stigmatization. As Weinberg and Williams point out in a
discussion of homosexuality:
Even if the homosexual himself has not actually been
sanctioned because of his sexual orientation, the way he feels
about himself can be damaged by his imputing negative
reactions to the heterosexuals he knows and to people in
general.59
Although feelings of stigma are more likely to be experienced
by those who possess stigmas it is important to note that others
may report similar feelings even though they do not possess a
seriously discrediting attribute.60 A comment from a nail-biter
provides a perfect illustration in this regard:
Going to a party and having to hold a glass is agony to me
because my hands, and bitten nails, are so obvious, writing a
cheque in a shop with the assistant gazing at my hand as I write
is dreadful. I am aware of her scrutiny and my hand
shakes. . . . The solitary pain of the true nail-biter, his sense of
inadequacy and self-disgust and the condemnatory indifference
to his plight which ordinary society bestows on him are not
generally recognised.61
In addition, individuals may feel stigmatized merely by being
present in a stigmatic situation. For example, a female
researcher, recounting her feelings whilst visiting an area
associated with prostitution states:
The deserted appearance of the footpaths and the apparent
purposefulness of any woman who did walk along them . . .
16 The anatomy of stigma
forced upon me the realisation that this area was reserved for
prostitutes - it was a place set aside for them and would lend
its colouring to anyone who chose to enter it. . . ,62
It should also be noted that individuals with courtesy stigmas63
(see p. 9) may experience feelings of stigma. For example, in a
letter submitted to an advice columnist, a young girl writes:
Dear Ann Landers:
I’m a girl 12 years old who is left out of all social activities
because my father is an ex-convict. I try to be nice and friendly
to everyone but it’s no use. The girls at school have told me
that their mothers don’t want them to associate with me
because it will be bad for their reputations. My father had
some bad publicity in the papers and even though he has
served his time nobody will forget it.
Is there anything I can do? I am very lonesome because it’s
no fun to be alone all the time. My mother tries to take me
places with her but I want to be with people my own age.
Please give me some advice - AN OUTCAST.64
Interestingly, it also seems possible that the associates of
individuals with ‘stigmas of excellence’ (see pp. 7-9) may
experience feelings of stigma. For instance, the family of an
Oxbridge student state:
After working extremely hard and giving up pastimes and
pleasures, our son achieved his ambition and won a place at
Cambridge. We are an ordinary family and were so proud of
his success. However, we have been disillusioned by the
resentment we receive from friends, workmates, even family, if
we mention his locality. Whereas parents with children at other
universities can discuss their offsprings’ progress, and express
natural pride in achievements, we are barred by looks,
innuendo and rejected from participation.65
It is difficult to define precisely what constitutes a feeling of
stigma. In order to cast some light on this matter it is useful to
consider two other closely related unpleasant sensations -
namely, embarrassment and shame.
 The anatomy of stigma 17
According to Modigliani:
Embarrassment is a common experience. It may be elicited by
a surprising range of apparently dissimilar situations: being
introduced to an unfamiliar audience, arriving at a social
occasion under-dressed, talking to a person who stutters badly,
mistaking a stranger for an acquaintance, and so on. Subjec­
tively it entails a sense of exposure, of inadequacy, of awkward
self-consciousness. It is sometimes accompanied by such
distressing symptoms as blushing, sweating, tremor, fumbling
and stuttering.66
As Modigliani points out, embarrassment appears to be a very
mild form of unpleasant sensation which we are all likely to
experience. Embarrassment generally occurs at a specific moment
in a social situation; is often instantaneous in effect; and rarely
has any permanent effect on the future actions or self-esteem of
the individuals experiencing it. However, in some cases an
individual may have felt so embarrassed in a particular situation
that future plans are geared towards ensuring that such
embarrassment is avoided in the future. For example, a woman,
embarrassed by her lack of proficiency at badminton, may decide
to avoid attending the club of which she is a member.
Shame67 appears to be a more intense form of unpleasant
sensation. As with embarrassment, shame may be experienced in
a number of situations and may affect us all at some time in our
lives. We may experience shame as a result of a particular action,
such as deliberately travelling on a train without a ticket, or due
to some form of inaction, such as neglecting an aged relative.
Unlike embarrassment, a feeling of shame is likely to have a
more marked effect on the actions of individuals. Such a
sensation may result in determined efforts to improve one’s
performance in a particular social role e.g. father, employee,
lover, gardener. By experiencing shame, individuals generally
acknowledge that their conduct in one or more social roles has
fallen below an accepted standard (such acknowledgment may be
self-initiated or result from the reactions of others).
A feeling of stigma appears, at least in theory, to be the most
severe form of unpleasant sensation. Those experiencing stigma
may feel that their whole identity is tarnished because of a
18 The anatomy of stigma
particular attribute. Such feelings may be intense; experienced in
many situations; and persist for long periods of time. For
example, a man convicted of shoplifting states:
Though the whole business fell into some sort of manageable
perspective, as time passed I still felt tainted by it all. . . .
Every time I passed the store concerned, I would relive the
experience. . . . I was never able to make myself go into the
shop either. The fear of people finding out always worried me,
and the chance that I might meet one of the solicitors from the
court socially and they would recognise me was another
constant, if highly improbable, worry.68
Many individuals who experience feelings of stigma may, like
those who feel ashamed, accept that their physical appearance,
conduct or ethnicity is evidence of inferiority. However, others
who experience such feelings may hold the belief that it is the
reactions of stigmatizers which is reprehensible rather than their
own discrediting attribute (i.e. they question the assumption that
they are inferior members of society. Note that further attention
will be given to this subject in the next section).
Finally, it is important to note that the distinctions I have made
between embarrassment, shame and stigma are highly specu­
lative. In general and academic discourse these terms are
frequently used as if they were synonymous.69

Responses to stigma acknowledgment

Individuals are likely to respond to stigma acknowledgment in
one of two ways. They may either accept or reject the assumption
that a particular attribute is evidence of inferiority.
For acceptors, ‘the denial of respectability by their audience
represents an accepted-as-accurate response to their genuine lack
of respectability. This obtains in situations where there is
consensus between the viewer and the viewed concerning a true
lack of moral worth.’70 Acceptance can lead some individuals to
seriously consider changing their job, address, or even their
name.71 In contrast, others may view acceptance as being an
important first step on the road back to normality. For example,
 The anatomy of stigma 19
a homosexual may seek medical help in an effort to remedy his
sexual ‘affliction’.72 Similarly, a member of Alcoholics Anony­
mous may accept ‘assignment to the role of alcoholic as a step
towards overcoming his alcoholic behavior’.73 However, as
Goffman points out: ‘Where such repair is possible, what often
results is not the acquisition of fully normal status, but a
transformation of self from someone with a record of having
corrected a particular blemish.’74 In some cases acceptance may
have an instrumental purpose. For example, in order to obtain
accommodation in a hostel run by the Salvation Army, an
alcoholic may readily agree with the staff that heavy drinking is a
social evil.
‘Rejection’ may also take a variety of forms. For some, a
passive form of rejection may be adopted. Such individuals,
though rejecting any notion of inferiority, are unwilling to
commit themselves to more active forms of protest for fear of
hostile reactions from others.75 In contrast, other individuals may
decide to draw attention to their stigmas in an effort to
demonstrate the inappropriateness of associating a particular
attribute with inferiority. For example, a prostitute may readily
refer to her professional status during casual conversations with
others. Similarly, a Jew may prominently display a Star of David
necklace.76 Such individuals may adopt this method of ‘confront­
ing’ stigma in their public, as well as private, lives. For instance,
a clergyman may decide to disclose the fact that he is a
homosexual to his congregation.
Rejection may take a collective form.77 Groups or movements,
of varying degrees of political militancy, may be established to
provide mutual support in countering existing, negative, public
stereotypes. This process can be difficult. As Goffman argues:
When the ultimate political objective is to remove stigma from
the differentness, the individual may find that his very efforts
can politicize his own life, rendering it even more different
from the normal life initially denied him - even though the
next generation of his fellows may greatly profit from his
efforts by being more accepted. Further, in drawing attention
to the situation of his own kind he is in some respects
consolidating a public image and of his fellow-stigmatized as
constituting a real group.78
20 The anatomy of stigma
Collective action may be undertaken for very different purposes.
Certain groups, such as the disabled, may act collectively in order
to achieve a greater degree of social acceptance within the
existing framework of society. In contrast, other groups, such as
militant homosexual organizations, may use collective action to
challenge the existing social system. In addition, it should be
noted that some groups (e.g. hippies) may demonstrate their
rejection of prevailing social norms by establishing peripheral,
‘alternative’ communities.79

Stigma disavowal
Some individuals, upon experiencing stigmatizing reactions from
others, may respond by attempting to neutralize such labelling.80
This group, whilst accepting that certain attributes are evidence
of inferiority, contest the applicability of such labelling in their
particular case. Such neutralization may be of a formal or
informal kind. Formal attempts at neutralization may involve an
appeal to an official body (e.g. a mental patient who feels that
she has been unjustly detained may appeal to a Mental Health
Review Tribunal) or to members of the general public (e.g a
criminal campaigning for a re-trial). At an informal level,
individuals’ ability to contest or neutralize adverse labelling will
frequently depend on their class, status and power. This is
especially the case with regard to infringements of the law.81

Stigma management
There are two main ways in which individuals can manage their
spoilt identities - namely, passing or covering.82

(i) Passing
Individuals with information to manage (the discreditable: see
pp. 5-6) may attempt to pass as normal during various forms of
social interaction. Some individuals may pass frequently whilst
others may employ this technique more sparingly.
 The anatomy of stigma 21
Opportunities to pass will depend on the type of stigma an
individual possesses. Those with physical or tribal stigmas will
have fewer chances to pass because of the visibility of their
stigmas. Nevertheless, such individuals may pass successfully in
certain situations. For instance, a near-blind man recalls how he
succeeded in passing as sighted with a girlfriend:
I managed to keep Mary from knowing my eyes were bad
through two dozen sodas and three movies. I used every trick I
had ever learned. I paid special attention to the color of her
dress each morning, and then I would keep my eyes and ears
and my sixth sense alert for anyone that might be Mary. I
didn’t take any chances. If I wasn’t sure, I would greet
whoever it was with familiarity. They probably thought I was
nuts, but I didn’t care. I always held her hand on the way to
and from the movies at night, and she led me, without knowing
it, so I didn’t have to feel for curbs and steps.83
Individuals with discreditable conduct stigmas will be able to
pass more frequently because they will be in a position to control
information about their discrediting attribute. Some individuals
may decide to restrict information about their stigma to a small
group such as their immediate family or closest friends, whilst
others may be prepared to inform a much wider social
audience.84 The stigmatizing attribute possessed by an individual
may be of importance in terms of the type of passing undertaken.
For example, a prostitute may wish to pass as ‘respectable’ with
both her family and the police whilst simultaneously remaining
‘well known’ to her potential clientele.
Even after the stigmatized have selected their confidantes they
may still find that passing is fraught with difficulties. For
example, an ex-criminal (who has passed in a new neighbour­
hood) may find his recently acquired respectability threatened by
the appearance of a former prisonmate in the locality.
For some, passing may present numerous practical difficulties.
For example, a stutterer recalls:
having a very bad time with initial ‘m’s . . . and, very foolishly
under the circumstances, travelling to Marble Arch. I could see
the conductor coming down the corridor towards me and I
22 The anatomy of stigma
knew I would have to say, ‘M-M-M-’, and, finally, as often
happens with stammerers, a fantastic act of creation took
place. I said ‘One to the arch that is made of marble, please.’85
Passing may be a painful experience for those, such as passive
rejectors (see p. 19) who feel that their discrediting attribute
should not be negatively regarded by others. As a homosexual
states:
When jokes were made about ‘queers’ I had to laugh with the
rest, and when talk was about women I had to invent conquests
of my own. I hated myself at such moments, but there seemed
to be nothing else that I could do. My whole life became a
lie.86
The extent to which individuals engage in passing is likely to
depend upon whether they accept or reject (see pp. 18-20) that a
particular attribute is evidence of inferiority. It seems probable
that those who accept such an association will pass more
frequently than rejectors.
There may be occasions, though, when rejectors omit to refer
to their stigma during social interaction, not because of any fear
of hostile reactions but, rather, because disclosure is perceived as
inappropriate or unnecessary in the particular situation. For
example, an ex-prisoner engaged in casual conversation may
make no reference to his stigma because he believes that such
information is not relevant to the subject under discussion. Even
if a suitable opportunity for disclosure presents itself he may still
refrain from referring to his stigma on the grounds that personal
information should not be disclosed during casual meetings.
Although it could be argued that this man has engaged in
passing, it should be remembered that we are all likely to limit
the amount of information we disclose about our private lives
during brief discussions with comparative strangers. Indeed, we
would be surprised if brief acquaintances violated the rules of
social etiquette by divulging intimate details of their private
lives.87 As such, it seems inappropriate to infer that individuals
have engaged in passing merely because they have omitted to
refer to their stigma during a particular social encounter. In
addition, individuals may engage in deliberate episodes of passing
 The anatomy of stigma 23
for reasons other than a desire to minimize the possibility of
receiving unfavourable reactions from others. For example, an
epileptic may decide to avoid referring to her stigma when
meeting people casually because she has found that disclosure
results in inhibited forms of interaction (i.e. others feel obliged to
express sympathy or restrict their conversation to the subject of
epilepsy).

(ii) Covering
The discredited (see pp. 5-6) may attempt to manage their
stigmas by means of covering. By engaging in covering an
individual hopes to reduce tension during social interaction.88
Although such individuals recognize that passing is inappropriate
due to the visibility or fame of their stigma, they may
nevertheless attempt to ensure that their stigma is as unobtrusive
as possible during social interaction. For instance, a near-blind
person who knows that others in his company are aware of his
differentness may ‘hesitate to read, because to do this he would
have to bring the book up to a few inches of his eyes, and this he
may feel expresses too glaringly the qualities of blindness.’89
Similarly, a man with a previous conviction for theft may decide
to withdraw his application for the post of treasurer at his local
social club after acknowledging the possible tension that could
be created.
As with passing, it seems likely that those who accept, rather
than reject, the assumption that a particular personal attribute is
evidence of inferiority will cover more frequently. For example,
blind acceptors may try to ensure that they behave in ways
regarded as normal by the sighted. This may involve such actions
as ‘looking’ directly at other people when engaged in conversa­
tion.90 In contrast, blind rejectors are likely to pay little heed to
the norms of the sighted. Instead, they are likely to behave in
ways which they consider to be expedient. For example, such
individuals may use their hands rather than cutlery when eating
in ‘mixed’ company.
Three final points need to be made in relation to stigma
management. Firstly, intentional passing or covering by the
stigmatized precludes any effective challenge to existing social
24 The anatomy of stigma
values and, as such, is likely to reinforce contemporary patterns
of stigmatization.91 Secondly, passing and covering may also be
undertaken by those with courtesy stigmas.92 For instance, a
prisoner’s wife may inform neighbours that her husband’s
absence from home is due to temporary overseas employment.
Thirdly, it should be remembered that we are all likely to pass in
certain situations in an effort to maintain ‘face’.93
In this chapter attention has been focused exclusively on
sociological and social psychological approaches to the notion of
stigma. In the next chapter consideration will be given to the
rather distinctive way in which this concept has been used in the
social administration literature.
2 Stigma: the social
administration approach

Although the adoption of the notion of stigma by social

administrators owes much to the work of sociologists and social
psychologists it would be misleading to give undue emphasis to
these particular influences. The importance contemporary social
administrators attach to the concept of stigma owes far more to
the deep-rooted historical association between this notion and
certain developments in social policy. In particular, the concept
of stigma has been inextricably linked with the treatment of the
able-bodied poor over the centuries. For example, a series of
repressive measures were introduced by Tudor governments
during the sixteenth century in an attempt to curb the incidence
of vagrancy.1 The punishments meted out to those deemed to be
members of the undeserving poor were intended not only to be
physically unpleasant but also highly ‘stigmatizing’ (e.g. whip­
ping, stocking, branding and ear-boring).2
In later periods the poor were often subjected to sanctions of a
more ‘exclusively’ stigmatizing kind. For example, in the late
seventeenth century a number of parishes introduced a regulation
which required recipients of poor relief to wear a distinctive mark
or badge on their clothing.3 It was hoped that this stipulation
would deter all but the most needy from applying for poor relief.
The deterrent value of stigmatization was also clearly recog­
nized by the Poor Law Commissioners in their report on the
operation of the poor laws (1834). Believing that parish
allowance schemes were demoralizing the poor, the Commis­
sioners recommended the introduction of a number of reforms
based on the principle of less eligibility.4 The Commissioners
were of the firm opinion that a minimal form of poor relief
(which ensured that the living standards of recipients were less
25
26 Stigma: the social administration approach
favourable than those of the poorest independent labourers)
would stem the demand for poor relief provided that such
provision was linked to a workhouse test (i.e. applicants applying
for relief should be required to: accept institutional care (a
sanction which also applied to other dependent family members);
forfeit their voting rights (where applicable); wear distinctive
clothing; undertake monotonous and degrading forms of work).
As Pinker points out:
The concept of ‘less eligibility’ was a psychological device
which, in the non-market context of a workhouse, reminded
individuals in a forceful way of what they did not want. Since
the economic market, in most instances, had never offered
these paupers much more than marginally superior material
rewards, the sanction of less eligibility took a necessarily
psychological form. It imposed the pain of humiliation and
stigma.5
The introduction of the new poor law was instrumental in
ensuring that the subject of stigmatization was kept in the
forefront of subsequent discussions about poor relief during this
period. For example, local opposition to the workhouse system
(with all its stigmatic associations) proved highly successful in
forcing the Poor Law Commission to agree to the re-introduction
of outdoor relief in 1842.6 The resultant growth in outdoor relief
found little favour, however, with the Local Government Board
(which was established in 1871 to replace the Poor Law Board).
Concerned about the growing cost of this form of provision the
new board encouraged local unions to introduce an even more
stigmatizing form of institutional relief. The first of these ‘test’
workhouses was established by the Poplar guardians in 1871.
Inmates within this repressive institution were compelled to
perform degrading and painful tasks such as stone breaking or
oakum picking (separating the fibres of tarred rope). If they
failed to meet the specified daily production targets (women, for
example, were expected to pick 61b of beaten, or 31b of
unbeaten, oakum each day) inmates were liable to be brought
before a magistrate or placed in solitary confinement in the
workhouse refractory ward on a bread and water diet.7
The overt stigmatization enshrined in this scheme was
 Stigma: the social administration approach 27
markedly absent from other social policy measures of the
period.8 Indeed, efforts were made to reduce the stigma
attaching to other institutionalized pauper groups (e.g. children,
the sick and the elderly9). For instance, in the case of children
the principle of less eligibility was gradually diluted by the
introduction of educational provision and by the acceptance of
the advantages of community care (e.g. scattered homes and
boarding out).10
The question of stigma was also given consideration in the poor
law reports of 1909. In their report, the majority (represented by,
amongst others, the permanent heads of the Local Government
Boards and members of the Charity Organisation Society such as
Loch and Bosanquet)11 argued that a distinction should continue
to be maintained between the type of relief afforded to the
deserving as opposed to the undeserving poor. Accordingly, they
recommended that the former should be provided with relief (on
more favourable terms) by Voluntary Aid Committees whilst the
latter should be forced to seek sustenance from Public Assistance
Committees. The majority acknowledged, however, that the
public poor relief scheme needed to be modified in certain
respects if it was to shed its stigmatic image. They therefore
recommended that:
(i) Outdoor relief should be known in future as home
assistance.
(ii) Applicants for relief should be classified as necessitous
rather than destitute.
(iii) Disenfranchisement should be abolished for short-term
claimants (i.e. under three months).12
Given their commitment to the introduction of specialised,
non-stigmatized, public welfare services, the minority (B. Webb,
Chandler, Lansbury and Wakefield) not unsurprisingly saw no
need (unlike the majority) for the continued operation of a
distinctive destitution authority.13 Nevertheless, they did accept
that stigmatizing measures were necessary, for the purpose of
deterrence, in cases of idleness and malingering (reformatory
detention colonies).14
Although both these reports had little immediate impact on
government policy,15 they were nonetheless highly significant in
28 Stigma: the social administration approach
terms of ensuring that consideration continued to be given to the
notion of stigma in subsequent income-maintenance programmes.
Awareness of the stigmatizing propensities of poor law provision,
and the consequent threat to public order posed by those
members of the unemployed dependent upon such aid,16
prompted governments of all parties to devise various
unemployment income maintenance schemes during the early
decades of this century.17 A major aim of these schemes - to
provide unemployment relief on more socially acceptable terms -
was never fully realized because of continuous concern about cost
and abuse. As a result these schemes became, to greater or lesser
extents, tainted by less eligible procedures such as seeking work
or means tests.18
Subsequent attempts to reduce the stigma attaching to non­
contributory unemployment assistance (e.g. the abolition of the
household means test in 194119; the establishment of the National
Assistance board in 1948)20 have proved largely unsuccessful. A
major reason for this failure centres around the belief that a
distinction should continue to be maintained between contribu­
tory and non-contributory forms of income support. The means
test remains the most significant administrative device for
distinguishing between these two types of benefit. As Beveridge
argued in his report on social insurance (1942):
National Assistance must be felt to be something less desirable
than insurance benefit; otherwise the insured persons get
nothing for their contributions. Assistance therefore will be
given always subject to proof of needs and examination of
means; it will be subject also to any conditions as to behaviour
which may seem likely to hasten restoration of earning
capacity.21
The divisive nature of means-testing was a source of particular
concern for a number of post-war academics in the developing
discipline of social policy and administration. Fully aware of the
stigmatizing propensities of residual forms of welfare, these
commentators attempted to inform both the public and policy
makers alike of what they considered to be the overwhelming
social and economic advantages of ‘institutional’ welfare provi­
sion. It is to this collectivist tradition that attention will now be
 Stigma: the social administration approach 29
given in order to demonstrate how the concept of stigma has
been used in the contemporary study of social policy.
This collectivist tradition, which can usefully be termed the
Fabian socialist22 or social democratic23 approach to welfare is
characterized by: (i) adherence to social values such as equality,
freedom and fellowship; (ii) acceptance of the belief that
capitalist society can be transformed by positive forms of
government intervention; and (iii) whole-hearted support for
benevolent public welfare services.24 No one within this tradition
has expressed greater faith in the part that social policy can play
in creating a more socially just society than Richard Titmuss.
Titmuss believed that social policy could, by providing oppor­
tunities for the expression of altruism, effectively counter the
divisive and alienating aspects of economic life.25 For Titmuss
the decision to expand welfare services after the Second World
War was an indication of the increasing influence of social as
opposed to market ethics:
the fundamental and dominating historical processes which led
to these major changes in social policy were connected with the
demand for one society; for non-discriminatory services for all
without distinction of class, income or race; for services and
relations which would deepen and enlarge self-respect; for
services which would manifestly encourage social integration.26
According to Titmuss the blood donation system in Britain
provides one of the best examples of the positive effects of social
policy.27
Unlike gift-exchange in traditional societies, there is in the free
gift of blood to unnamed strangers no contract of custom, no
legal bond, no functional determinism, no situations of
discriminatory power, domination, constraint or compulsion,
no sense of shame or guilt, no gratitude imperative and no
need for the penitence of a Chrysostom.28
Titmuss was greatly encouraged by the fact that the majority of
blood donors did not demand or expect any tangible form of
reward for their services.29 Instead, they tended to observe what
Gouldner has termed the norm of beneficence.30
30 Stigma: the social administration approach
This norm requires men to give to others such help as they
need. Rather than making help contingent upon past benefits
received or future benefits expected, the norm of beneficence
calls upon men to aid others without thought of what they have
done or can do for them, and solely in terms of a need imputed
to the potential recipient.31
The concept of need formed a central part of Titmuss’s analysis
of social policy. He argued that public welfare services should be
provided on the basis of this principle rather than on criteria such
as ability to pay, desert, or some inflexible notion of legal
entitlement. In order to support his assertion that need-based,
universal public social services could play a vital role in creating a
more integrated and just society, Titmuss frequently referred to
what he considered to be the deficiencies of private, and
selectivist public, welfare provision.32 In this examination of the
relative merits and demerits of institutional and residual forms of
welfare Titmuss utilized, and developed, the notion of stigma.
Titmuss drew attention to two main ways in which the private
welfare sector could stigmatize the poorer members of the
community. Firstly, he argued that the very existence of private
welfare services within a market-dominated society was likely to
have a detrimental effect on public welfare services. For
example, with regard to education, he stated that:
Until we, as a society, can rid ourselves of the dominating
influence of the private sector of education we shall not have
the will to embark on an immensely higher standard of
provision for all those children whose education now finishes
when it has hardly begun.33
Secondly, and more specifically, he pointed out that the selection
procedures most commonly used in the private welfare sector
were inherently stigmatizing for particular groups in society:
Private enterprise social service institutions have to operate on
the principle of excluding the ‘bad risks’ and the social
casualties of change. Thus, private occupational schemes
exclude the chronically sick, the disabled, the elderly, the
mentally handicapped, new entrants, most categories of
 Stigma: the social administration approach 31
women - especially unmarried mothers - and so on. Private
medical institutions similarly exclude ‘the bad risks’, the over-
80s, the indigent and so-called charitable cases.34
Although Titmuss discounted any suggestion of deliberate
stigmatization on the part of the private welfare sector,35 he was
none the less concerned about their marked lack of interest in the
social effects of their services:36
[if applicants] are excluded because they cannot pay or are
likely to have above-average needs . . . who can blame them if
they come to think that they have been discriminated against
on grounds of colour and other criteria of rejection?37
Titmuss also contended that selectivist public welfare services
had stigmatizing propensities:
In the past, poor quality selective services for poor people were
the product of a society which saw ‘welfare’ as a residual; as a
public burden. The primary purpose of the system and the
method of discrimination was, therefore, deterrence (it was
also an effective rationing device). To this end, the most
effective instrument was to induce among recipients (children
as well as adults) a sense of personal fault, of personal failure,
even if the benefit was wholly or partially a compensation for
disservices inflicted by society.38
Titmuss argued that the residual nature of selectivist public
welfare services was likely to create staff recruitment difficulties
which would only serve to increase the possibility of stigma­
tization.
Insofar as they are able to recruit at all for education, medical
care and other services, they tend to recruit the worst rather
than the best teachers, doctors, nurses, administrators and
other categories of staff upon whom the quality of service so
much depends. And if the quality of personal service is low,
there will be less freedom of choice and more felt discrimina­
tion.39
32 Stigma: the social administration approach
Titmuss was also deeply opposed to the major administrative
procedure of selectivist welfare provision - namely the means
test:
If all services are provided - irrespective of whether they
represent benefits, amenity, social protection or compensation
- on a discriminatory, means-test basis, do we not foster both
the sense of personal failure and the stigma of public burden?
The fundamental objective of all such tests of eligibility is to
keep people out; not to let them in. They must, therefore, be
treated as applicants or supplicants; not beneficiaries or
consumers.40
Titmuss contrasted the stigmatizing propensities of private, and
selectivist public, forms of welfare with (what he perceived as)
the status-enhancing qualities of universal public social services.
One fundamental historical reason for the adoption of this
principle was the aim of making services available and
accessible to the whole population in such ways as would not
involve users in any humiliating loss of status, dignity or self-
respect. There could be no sense of inferiority, pauperism,
shame or stigma in the use of a publicly provided service; no
attribution that one was being or becoming a ‘public burden’.
Hence the emphasis on the social rights of all citizens to use or
not to use as responsible people the services made available by
the community in respect of certain needs which the private
market and the family were unable or unwilling to provide
universally.41
Titmuss welcomed the move towards universalism which
occurred in areas such as education, housing and health care after
the Second World War.42 Titmuss was particularly proud of the
developments in health care. He believed that the National
Health Service provided the finest example of a non-
discriminatory, non-judgmental, social service.43 In The Gift
Relationship he stated:
Attitudes to and relationships with the National Blood
Transfusion Service among the general public since 1948 can
 Stigma: the social administration approach 33
only be understood within the context of the Health Service.
The most unsordid act of British social policy in the twentieth
century has allowed and encouraged sentiments of altruism,
reciprocity and social duty to express themselves; to be made
explicit and identifiable in measurable patterns of behaviour by
all social groups and classes. In part, this is attributable to the
fact that, structurally and functionally, the Health Service is
not socially divisive; its universal and free access basis has
contributed much, we believe, to the social liberties of the
subject in allowing people the choice to give or not to give
blood for unseen strangers.44
Though committed to the principle of universality, Titmuss was
fully aware of the limitations of this approach.
Universalism in social welfare, though a needed prerequisite
towards reducing and removing formal barriers of social and
economic discrimination, does not by itself solve the problems
of how to reach the more-difficult-to-reach [who are in
need]. . . ,45
For example, Titmuss recognized that higher-income groups were
tending to make more extensive use of the National Health
Service.
They tend to receive more specialist attention; occupy more of
the beds in better equipped and staffed hospitals; receive more
elective surgery; have better maternity care, and are more
likely to get psychiatric help and psychotherapy than low
income groups - particularly the unskilled.46
Titmuss accepted that certain selectivist measures were needed
in order to overcome the deficiencies of universalism. However,
the type of selectivity that Titmuss had in mind was qualitatively
different from the negative form of selectivity associated with
residual forms of welfare. Unlike negative selectivity (which
merely attempted to identify those members of a particular
population group who were eligible, by reason of extreme
poverty, for some form of benefit),47 the positive selectivity
(discrimination) advocated by Titmuss was intended to provide
34 Stigma: the social administration approach
additional help for those groups whose needs were not being fully
met by existing universal services. As he states:
The challenge that faces us is not the choice between
universalist and selective social services. The real challenge
resides in the question: what particular infrastructure of
universalist services is needed in order to provide a framework
of values and opportunity bases within and around which can
be developed socially acceptable selective services aiming to
discriminate positively, with the minimum risk of stigma, in
favour of those whose needs are greatest.48
Titmuss’s success in establishing stigma as a concept of central
importance for the study of social policy cannot be overstated.
The fact that academics, politicians, and others have continued to
take both a theoretical and practical (e.g. the effect of stigma on
the take-up rate for social security benefits) interest in the
concept is due in no small measure to his pioneering contri­
bution.

Further theoretical developments

Titmuss’s ideas concerning the relationship between stigma and
social policy have been critically examined by a number of other
commentators.
Some writers49 have expressed doubts, for instance, about the
link between means-testing and stigma. For example, Klein
asserts that:
Stigma is the phlogiston of social theory: a label attached to an
imperfectly understood phenomenon - when low take-up of
means-tested benefits can be explained just as well, perhaps
better, by the information costs involved, by the fact that
expense in time, trouble and travel may outweigh the value of
small benefits and by the ability of some people to manage on a
given amount of money better than others (all of which
indicate providing more free information and streamlining
administrative procedures rather than condemning the means
tests and discretionary benefits as instruments of policy.50
 Stigma: the social administration approach 35
Although contemporary universalists have acknowledged that
factors other than stigma might affect the take-up rate for means-
tested benefits, they have none the less continued to reaffirm
their belief that such procedures are inherently stigmatizing. This
is clearly illustrated if one considers their response to the
suggestion made by Rose51 and others that it is possible to find
examples of non-stigmatized forms of means-testing (e.g. income
tax returns, student grant applications). For example, Room
argues that the means tests commonly applied to the poor differ
from the former in two important respects.
First, secrecy and procedural complexities are often allowed to
compound the general ill-informedness of claimants, so that
the opportunity cost to the latter in terms of time and energy is
high. Second the manner in which officials deal with claimants
in their face-to-face contacts typically reinforces the sense of
stigmatisation that claimants may expect of their neighbours
and fellow citizens.52
As Reddin concludes: ‘The middle class versions of the means
test, such as that for university grants, tend to be more civilised
and socially acceptable devices than anything to be found
amongst the lower income groups.’53
Questions have also been raised about the status enhancing
qualities of universal social services. As Pinker points out, client
and official perceptions of the social services may differ quite
significantly:
Each user of a social service brings the subjective facts of his
personal biography to the experience. These facts will be more
authentic to him than the officially defined aims or traditions of
the service.54
As he continues:
The relationship between social services and citizenship is thus
largely determined by subjective evaluations of the purpose of
the service. For some citizenship is enhanced while for others it
is debased by reliance upon social services. Perceptions of
status vary according to service and category of need, and it is
36 Stigma: the social administration approach
no more true to say that all universalist services always endow
status than it is to claim that selectivist services always
stigmatize.55
Certainly, it seems likely that some recipients of universal social
services will experience feelings of stigma (particularly as such
feelings are highly subjective - see pp. 13-18). For example,
streaming or assessment procedures within the educational
system may induce feelings of stigma amongst pupils. Similarly,
patients with chronic complaints may experience a sense of
inferiority because of the priority which tends to be given to
acute conditions within the National Health Service56 (the
creation of the NHS has done little, for instance, to improve the
quality of care afforded to groups such as the mentally
handicapped).57 Even positive discrimination programmes may
have stigmatizing propensities. As Reisman states:
Positive discrimination implies direction of resources without
stigma towards a particular group. Here, of course, the
question is not (as it is with a means test) whom to exclude but
whom to include more intensively. Whether or not this can be
done without stigma is another matter. Some groups may feel
stigmatized by being selected (and therefore branded as
deficient); and there is no a priori reason to think that the
people in Plowden’s Educational Priority Areas do not
experience a collective sense of shame.58
Pinker has drawn attention to some of the underlying reasons
for the failure of contemporary welfare services to eradicate the
problem of stigma. He points out that dependency on public
welfare services is always likely to be potentially stigmatizing for
any citizen who has been socialized in a community where market
rather than welfare values predominate. ‘In a society where self-
help and independence are powerfully sanctioned values, the
subjective facts of social consciousness . . . impose inferior status
on the dependent.’59
In addition, he argues that the stigma attaching to a particular
form of dependency (and the extent to which stigma is
experienced as a result of dependency) will vary according to the
dimensions of depth, distance and time.
 Stigma: the social administration approach 37
The first variable of depth refers to the extent to which the
recipient is made aware of his dependence and sense of
inferiority and accepts the definition of his status as legitimate.’60
For example, individuals who are receiving benefits in recog­
nition of past (e.g. industrial disablement claimants) or future
(e.g. higher education students) service are unlikely to be made
continually aware of their dependent status or to feel stigmatized
by the receipt of such aid. The opposite is more likely to be the
case with groups who contravene the norm of reciprocity61 (e.g.
the mentally handicapped) or who are deemed to be responsible
for their public dependency (e.g. voluntary unemployed). Pinker
contends, however, that certain groups may question the
appropriateness of associating stigma with their particular
dependency (see on this point pp. 18-20). ‘Groups exposed to
short-run risks of dependency, such as redundant able-bodied
workers and minority groups with a high proportion of young
members, are more likely to reject or be indifferent to prevailing
forms of stigma.’62
Pinker also stresses the importance of the social or spatial
distance between recipients of welfare services and their ‘donors’.
He argues that groups with tenuous grips on citizenship such as
ethnic minorities and the institutionalized elderly or handicapped
are much more likely to be made aware of their dependent
status.63 Finally, Pinker asserts that individuals who are depend­
ent on welfare provision for long periods of time are most likely
to experience intense or persistent feelings of stigma.64
In his discussion of the relationship between stigma and public
dependency, Pinker also draws attention to the stigmatizing
effects of personalized forms of welfare.
The aim of personalizing a welfare-exchange relationship is
supposedly to identify more accurately the needs of the
applicant, but by so heightening the sensibilities of ‘giver’ and
‘receiver’ we also risk making one party more acutely aware of
his dependency.65
To counter this possibility, which may be compounded by the
superior knowledge and expertise of welfare professionals,66
Pinker suggests that greater use should be made of impersonal,
non-stigmatized forms of welfare such as subsidised transport.
38 Stigma: the social administration approach
‘Any user of a free service of this kind would enjoy an increase in
disposable income without any risk of stigma and without any
danger that ignorance or apathy might exclude them from
maximum benefit.’67 More generally, Pinker argues that the
stigma attaching to dependency can be reduced if a variety of
donors are involved in the process of providing aid for recipients.
Dependencies of a stigmatizing or humiliating nature are most
likely to be avoided when the individual receives aid of a
partial nature from a number of providers. Since individuals
require aid from both familial and organizational sources in
order to enhance their life-chances, recipients are most likely
to prosper when there is an element of competition between
donors.68
Like Titmuss,69 Pinker has also highlighted the fact that social
policy has controlling as well as caring functions.
Social services are used to transmit skills and a variety of goods
and services designed to enhance the freedom and indepen­
dence of individuals. They are also used to impose sanctions,
and therefore stigma, upon individuals.70
These conflicting aims of social policy can clearly be seen to
operate, for example, in the sphere of income support for the
unemployed. The welfare objective - providing aid for the
unemployed and their families (care) - is not permitted to
overshadow economic considerations such as the need to
reinforce the work ethic. Accordingly, sanctions (control) are
applied to those individuals who have left their previous
employment without good reason or who have failed to make
satisfactory efforts to find a new job.71
Control of the poor inevitably increases the possibility of
intentional or unintentional forms of stigmatization. Welfare
personnel, by virtue of their relatively powerful position vis-à-vis
welfare recipients, will often be the perpetrators of such
stigmatization. In many cases welfare recipients will be unable to
challenge the exercise of this authority because of the very nature
of their dependency (i.e. a request for social service aid is often
made as a last resort; as such, ‘custom’ cannot easily be
 Stigma: the social administration approach 39
withdrawn, especially if material aid is required). There is
considerable evidence that the controlling activities of welfare
officials creates feelings of stigma amongst recipients of social
services. For example, groups such as one-parent families72 and
the unemployed73 have frequently referred to their humiliating
experiences with National Assistance and Supplementary
Benefits officers. In addition, Jordan has expressed concern
about the increased risk of stigmatization within the personal
social services which (he argues) resulted from the implementa­
tion of the 1963 Children and Young Persons Act (section 1 of
this act empowered social workers to provide material aid in
cases where there was a risk of family break-up).
The obligation to provide poor relief has not only altered the
whole structure and ethos of local authority departments; it has
created a new kind of relationship between social workers and
their clients, based not on principles of casework, but on
principles of public assistance. Services which were once
provided as best they could be, within the limited resources of
local authorities as personal services, are now rationed
according to the means-tested ideology of the supplementary
benefits system, with all the humiliation of the recipient that
this entails.74
The assumption that administrative procedures are uniquely
responsible for the stigma that attaches to certain social services
has also been challenged by Pinker and others:
In our present state of knowledge it is very difficult to
understand the cultural processes by which social services and
their users become stigmatized. It may be that some groups of
users are held in such low public esteem that any service and
personnel concerned mainly with their needs become stig­
matized merely by association.75
Donnison, the former chairman of the Supplementary Benefits
Commission, contends that any service dealing with ‘vulnerable
people who attract least public sympathy’76 such as deserted
wives, ex-prisoners and mental patients is always likely to
become stigmatized by association. In the case of supplementary
40 Stigma: the social administration approach
benefits, he argues that the service has only been able to retain
some semblance of respectability because of the presence of a
large number of deserving claimants (pensioners).77
Although there may be some disagreement as to which social
service attracts the greatest degree of stigma78 there seems to be
little doubt that services which attract the least amount of public
approbation tend to be those which are used predominantly by
the lower social classes (e.g. supplementary benefits, social work
services and public housing). In contrast, those social services
which are patronized by clients from both lower and higher
income groups tend to be regarded more positively (e.g.
education and health services). Far from being subjected to
disapproval or stigmatization, the users of these services are
likely to be commended ‘for their social competence’.79
The media, particularly the press, have played a significant part
in creating and reinforcing negative public attitudes towards
social services such as supplementary benefits and public housing.
In the case of the former, attention has frequently been given
either to the disreputable nature of claimants or to the
supposedly widespread incidence of fraud and abuse.80 Despite
the lack of evidence to substantiate these allegations of abuse,81
parts of the press have continued to mount campaigns against
scroungers. Indeed, as Golding and Middleton point out: ‘the
very lack of evidence . . . is taken as proof that there must
indeed be a hidden depth of social security abuse.’82 Interest­
ingly, after castigating the News O f The World for unfairly
stigmatizing the supplementary benefits service and its clientele,
the then chairman of the commission was himself subjected to
‘stigmatization’ by the same paper.
Where has he been all his life? A different world to that most
of us live in. His father helped run the Burma branch of the
British Empire. The Prof went from Marlborough (Captain
Mark Phillips’s old school: fees £2,000 a year) to Magdalen
(King Edward VIII’s old college). It is a mystery why a gent
with such a background should be regarded as an expert on
poverty.83
Finally, it is important to note that criticism has been directed
at the collectivist aim of reducing the incidence of stigma within
 Stigma: the social administration approach 41
the field of social policy. For example, Reisman argues that the
movement towards a system of welfare rights has increased the
likelihood of irresponsible and unacceptable patterns of behav­
iour within the community (e.g. voluntary unemployment, child
neglect, excessive gambling or drinking). To counter this trend,
Reisman advocates that the feckless poor should be subjected to
potentially stigmatizing forms of control.84 In similar vein, both
Page and Boyson have stressed the need for explicitly stigma­
tizing procedures within income support schemes for the
unemployed. Page suggests that it would be sensible:
to arrange for daily signing on by all those who are
unemployed for longer than three months, or, better still, to
allow the officers concerned to use their discretion so that
those who are making a genuine effort to find work need sign
on only once each week, while those obviously ‘swinging the
lead’ could be instructed to sign on more frequently and at
specific times. For each day when such a person failed to sign
on his money would be stopped.85
Boyson, meanwhile, believes that: ‘A basic work test on roads,
municipal parks, clearing waste land could be offered to the
workshy at the place of their application.’86

Social administration and the concept of stigma: the complement

provided by research
The development of social policy and administration as an
accredited academic subject has led to a rapid growth in the
number of research studies undertaken in this field since 1945. A
number of these studies have been concerned with the relation­
ship between stigma and welfare provision. In these investiga­
tions consideration has generally been given to one or more of
the following themes:
(1) The effect of stigma upon the take-up rate for means-
tested benefits.
(2) Experiences of stigma resulting from social service use.
(3) Public attitudes towards the social services.
42 Stigma: the social administration approach
(4) Public attitudes towards the poor and welfare recipients.
Each of these themes will be considered in turn.

(1) The effect o f stigma upon the take-up rate for means-tested
benefits
Given the collectivist and problem-solving tradition of social
policy studies it is not altogether surprising that a good deal of
research has been devoted towards the question of how the take-
up rate for various means-tested benefits might be adversely
affected by considerations of stigma. It is useful to examine this
research according to the type of benefit under investigation.
(a) Social Security benefits
The fact that it is now commonly acknowledged that considera­
tions of stigma may deter poor people from claiming means-
tested benefits to which they are entitled is due in no small part
to the efforts of a number of researchers who investigated the
circumstances of the elderly during the 1950s and 1960s. For
example (following Townsend’s initial work on the elderly, which
had drawn attention to the link between stigma and unclaimed
benefit),87 Cole and Utting collected data (during 1959 and 1960)
on the economic circumstances prevailing in 400 ‘elderly income
units’ (one unit consisted either of a man or woman over
retirement age or a married couple where the husband was over
retirement age).88 The authors found that 12 per cent of these
units were not receiving benefits to which they were entitled.
Stigma was identified as one of the reasons for non-claiming
amongst this group.89
Further evidence of the detrimental effect of stigma upon the
take-up rate for National Assistance amongst pensioners was
provided in a government survey published in 1966 - Financial
and Other Circumstances of Retirement Pensioners.90 As Table
2.1 shows, pride, dislike of charity or reluctance to visit the
National Assistance office were cited as reasons for non-claiming
by a substantial proportion of pensioners. This direct indicator of
the adverse effect of stigma upon the take-up rate for National
Assistance amongst the elderly should not, however, be dis-
 Stigma: the social administration approach 43
Table 2.1 Reasons for not applying for National Assistance -
June 1965
Proportion giving the Married Single Single
following reasons:* couples men women
n= (121,500) (63,000) (427,200)
% % %
Lack of knowledge or misconcep­
tion 37.4 33.5 34.8
‘Managing all right’ 19.7 30.0 37.7
Pride, dislike of charity, dislike
visiting National Assistance Board 33.4 26.5 22.9
Source: Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, Table III.21, p.42.
Note: *Some pensioners gave more than one reason and are counted
more than once in this table.

sociated from the other reasons given by pensioners for non­

claiming. For example, a reason for non-claiming such as lack of
knowledge can justifiably be linked to the notion of stigma. As
George explains:
a service which for one reason or another is considered by the
public to be ‘stigmatized’ is likely to be both misunderstood
and not adequately understood for the perceived ‘stigma’ tends
to distort any information about the service that reaches the
public.91
This particular study also highlighted the potentially intractable
difficulty of eradicating the stigma associated with the claiming of
means-tested social security benefits. As Table 2.2 shows,
considerations of stigma were found to deter younger as well as
older pensioners (who, one could justifiably assume, would be
more likely to experience feelings of stigma because of their
familiarity with previous forms of poor relief) from claiming
benefits to which they were entitled. As Atkinson points out: ‘On
the basis of this evidence there are no strong grounds for
expecting that the problem [of stigma] will disappear with time.’92
These studies of the elderly poor certainly had an impact on
44 Stigma: the social administration approach
government policy. In response to this and other evidence93 the
Labour government decided to establish a new semi-autonomous
board - the Supplementary Benefits Commission - to carry out
those duties previously performed by the NAB.94 It was
optimistically hoped that the abolition of the term National
Assistance coupled with the proposed merger of local contribu­
tory and non-contributory benefit offices would improve the
image of the means-tested sector. As Kincaid states: ‘It was
hoped that some of the respectability of national insurance would
rub off on the supplementary sector.’95
Table 2.2 Retirement pensioners not claiming National
Assistance to which they are entitled and reasons for not doing so
by age - June 1965
Percentage o f those eligible not Percentage of those not claiming
claiming attributing it to pride, or to
dislike of charity or National
Assistance Board
Married Single Single Married Single Single
couples men women couples men women
Age:
60-64 - - 38 - - 20
65-69 45 35 40 31 14 25
70-74 33 36 36 32 36 24
75-79 40 40 37 45 35 22
80-84 36 39 35 30 21 23
Over 85 37 42 39
All ages 39 38 39 33 27 23
Source: Atkinson, A .B ., Table 3.8, p. 59.

A number of specific administrative changes were made in

order to encourage the elderly poor (who were to remain firmly
within the means-tested sector) to claim their supplementary
benefit entitlements.96 First, elderly claimants were to be
provided with a combined pension and supplementary pension
order book rather than two order books (thus ensuring that they
could not be easily identified as claimants during visits to the post
office). Second, the circumstances of supplementary pensioners
were to be reappraised after a year instead of six months. Third,
 Stigma: the social administration approach 45
this group were to be given the option of visiting their local
supplementary benefit office if they did not wish to be visited at
home. In addition, it was also hoped that the elderly poor (along
with other claimants) would benefit from more general changes in
the means-tested system such as: improved forms of publicity for
the new scheme; the decision to pay long-term additions without
regard to family circumstances; the rationalization and improve­
ment of the ‘disregard’ regulations; the acceptance that claimants
had a ‘right’ to benefit.
The fact that the elderly demonstrated a greater willingness to
claim their entitlement to benefit after the introduction of the
new scheme should not, however, be taken to indicate that the
image of the means-tested sector had been dramatically improved
as a result of the cosmetic changes outlined above. It seems more
likely that this increase in the take-up rate was caused by
improvements in the level of allowances and by the more
generous system of ‘disregards’.97
Evidence linking stigma with the non-take-up of means-tested
social security benefits has continued to be found in more recent
surveys.98 For example, in a study of funeral expenses,
Hennessey found that a number of people living on low incomes
were unwilling to ask the Supplementary Benefits Commission for
addtional help with funeral costs because of the stigma involved
in claiming.99 As Table 2.3 shows, thirteen respondents referred
directly to the stigma associated with claiming when they were
asked to explain why they had not requested assistance from the
SBC. It should also be noted, though, that some of the other
reasons given by respondents for not approaching the SBC can be
linked to the notion of stigma. For example, those respondents
who were critical of the social security system or who had used
their own savings may have been indirectly referring to the effect
of stigma.
(b) Rate/rent rebates/allowances
As part of a research project in the early 1970s, Meacher
attempted to find out what effect stigma had upon potential rate
rebate claimants in Islington.100 To carry out this task, Meacher
renewed contact (September 1971) with a group of eligible, non­
claiming occupiers who had previously indicated (May 1971) that
they would apply for a rate rebate. Having eliminated the factor
46 Stigma: the social administration approach
Table 2.3 Reasons why people with difficulties did not ask about
extra help from the SBC
Number of
people giving
this reason
(weighted)
Didn’t know about it/ never thought about it 25
Claiming benefits is degrading/ respondent too proud to
go to DHSS or ask anyone for money/ only idlers ask
for social security 13
Respondent knew that insurance/ estate would pay out
eventually 10
Didn’t think there was anything besides Death Grant/
didn’t think they were entitled to or qualified for
anything else 9
Respondent was working full time and knew SBC could
not help 8
Social security are unhelpful/ don’t care/ respondent
had had claims for benefit(s) turned down in the past 7
Respondent used own savings/ cut down instead 6
Weighted total number of people asked this question 66
(More than one reason possible)
Source: Hennessey, P.J., Table 6.5, p. 86.

of ignorance (all members of the survey group had been clearly

informed of their eligibility for this benefit), Meacher found that
the worthlessness of claiming (low level of rebate not deemed to
be a sufficient reward for the effort involved in claiming) and
stigma were the two most important reasons for non-take-up. In
terms of the latter Meacher found that:
(i) The elderly were more likely to be influenced by
considerations of stigma than other eligible families.
(ii) Private tenants tended to refer to stigma as a reason for
not claiming rebate more frequently than their council
counterparts.
Given the deep-rooted historical association between stigma and
 Stigma: the social administration approach 47
means-tested benefits, Meacher was not surprised that the elderly
tended to be deterred from claiming rebates to which they were
entitled (because of stigma) more than other groups. As she points
out:
Since we did our utmost for more than a century until the
1940s to inculcate feelings of guilt, shame and stigma, their
presence among older people is evidence of the success of
earlier publicity carried out over a very long period.101
In terms of her second finding, Meacher was prompted to
hypothesize that:
acceptance of a Council house may itself be seen as a certain
loss of independence, so that further claims are less inhibited.
Several respondents in private accommodation made
comments such as ‘you’re not your own once you claim these
things’ or ‘they know all about you once you fill in those
forms’. Council tenants may well feel that they have already
revealed some personal information to the council so that to do
so again is less a deterrent.102
Table 2.4 Principal reasons for not claiming given by non-claimers
Ignorance and misconception 23
Stigma, pride, dislike of charity 8
Don’t know 5
Total 36
Source: Taylor-Gooby, P.F., ‘Rent benefits’, Table 5, p. 44.

In a survey conducted by the Batley community development

project a link was also found between stigma and the non-take-up
of rent rebates and allowances.103 In a qualitative follow-up
survey conducted in 1973, 36 tenants were asked to account for
their failure to claim either rent allowances (12) or rebates
(24).104 As Table 2.4 shows, only a small number of respondents
cited stigma as a reason for their reluctance to claim. However,
greater significance was accorded to the factor of stigma when
48 Stigma: the social administration approach
this group of non-claimers and a group of claimers were asked to
speculate as to why eligible tenants were not claiming these
benefits (see Table 2.5).
Table 2.5 Principal reasons why other entitled tenants do not
claim
Claimers Non-claimers Total
Ignorance 1 9 16
Stigma and pride 1 12 19
Scared of rebuff 9 4 13
Don’t know 9 10 19
Other 3 1 4
Total 35 36 71
Source: Taylor-Gooby, P.F., ‘Rent benefits’, Table 6, p. 45.

According to Taylor-Gooby, the apparent discrepancy between

these results may indicate, on the one hand, that respondents
believe that stigma is an important influence upon others but not
upon themselves or, alternatively, that there is some general
reluctance to admit to personal feelings of stigma.105 This latter
explanation is certainly worthy of serious consideration given the
fact that many of us would no doubt find it difficult, or even
belittling, to admit to feelings of stigma.
(c) Free prescriptions and ‘passport’ benefits
In a study conducted in a Scottish city in 1972, Blaxter collected
data on 237 former hospital patients of working age.106 She found
that the take-up rate for free prescriptions amongst those
members of her sample who were entitled to this benefit was
relatively low. As Table 2.6 shows, most of the non-claimers
were entitled to this benefit on grounds of low income.
In attempting to account for this reluctance to claim, Blaxter
found that her respondents distinguished between those benefits
which were provided on the basis of a particular medical
condition, insurance record or ‘stage-of-life’ criteria (e.g.
children, pensioners) and those forms of assistance which were
 Stigma: the social administration approach 49
provided on a discretionary basis for those in financial need (i.e.
‘ “need” of itself: not entitlement because of belonging to a
special group, or “need” because of special circumstances’).107 As
Blaxter points out:
To accept any benefit supplied by ‘the welfare’ was seen as
passing a watershed. Many people refused to apply for free
prescriptions even though they admitted money problems,
because they thought that ‘it means inspectors prying’; I’m not
telling them how much money I’ve got . . . ‘everyone says they
make you feel degraded if you ask for anything free’; ‘I’m not
applying for charity’.108
Although Blaxter’s non-claimers did not appear to feel
stigmatized about being poor,109 they did appear to be deterred
(by considerations of stigma) from applying for those benefits
which they did not believe they had a ‘legitimate’ right to receive.
Table 2.6 Grounds of entitlement to free prescriptions
Receiving Not receiving Total
Low income 18 36 54
‘Prescribed’ diseases 9 2 11
Both income and disease 8* 2 10
Both income and service pension 1+ 2 3
Both disease and service pension 1+ - 1
Pregnancy 1 - 1
Total 38 42 80
Source: M. Blaxter, Table 1, p. 43.
Notes: *Five of these respondents had received ‘income’ certificates and
three ‘disease’ certificates.
+Both of these respondents were in receipt of service pension
certificates.
In a survey of fatherless families receiving Family Income
Supplement, Nixon also found that there was a link between
stigma and the non-take-up of ‘passport’ benefits.110 Although
stigma was not found to be the main reason for non-take-up, it
was found to deter a number of mothers from claiming a variety
50 Stigma: the social administration approach
of benefits to which they were entitled (see Table 2.7).
Interestingly, Nixon found that considerations of stigma affected
mothers’ decisions concerning claiming in both a direct and
indirect way. For example, in terms of the latter Nixon
discovered that 40 mothers had refused to claim free school meals
because they felt that this would cause embarrassment for their
children.
Table 2.7 Reasons for non-take-up of ‘passport’ benefits
Type o f ‘passport’ benefit not taken up
School Prescrip- Hospital Dental! Legal
meals tion fares optical advice
charges charges
Base of percentages 400 314 823 518 700
% % % % %
Did not know it was
included with FIS 4 16 7 11 5
Did not think I was
entitled 5 18 10 12 6
Embarrassing for
children 10 1 0 1 0
Pride 4 5 1 3 1
Too much bother/
not worth it 1 6 3 3 1
Too much form
filling 0 0 0 1 0
Total eligible 24 46 21 31 13
Source: J. Nixon, Table 3.5, p. 34.

(d) Free school meals

Evidence indicating that stigma contributes towards the non-take-
up of free school meals has been found in a number of studies.111
For example, in a ‘snapshot’ survey in 1974, Field found that the
humiliating treatment meted out to ‘free meal’ pupils in certain
schools (different payment schemes, separate entrances/tables,
different/smaller meals) had deterred some poor parents from
claiming this benefit on behalf of their children.112 Davies also
found evidence of an association between stigma and non-take-up
in his meticulous study of free school meals, which was conducted
 Stigma: the social administration approach 51
Table 2.8 Proportions of families with no experience of free
meals and who had not considered applying for free meals giving
various reasons for not considering applying (%)
Non-takers' Payers'
sample* sample*
U O U O
Income too high 26 36 50 41
Ineligible because working 7 3 5 7
Ignorance about free meals scheme 19 5 3 2
Unwillingness to reveal personal
information 2 0 2 2
Pride as parents 4 8 7 12
Embarrassment to child 2 3 2 7
Disagreement with free meals in principle 0 3 2 4
Thought ineligible 17 10 17 18
Parental preference 19 10 2 0
No answer 6 26 15 16
Families who had no experience of free
meals and did not consider applying 100 100 100 100
Source: Davies, B. in association with Reddin, M., Table 3.2, p. 68.
Note: *U denotes ‘under-achieving area’: O denotes ‘over-achieving’
area. For details of this classification see Davies, B., pp. 19-20.

in the late 1960s.113 In order to gauge the effect of stigma upon

take-up, Davies asked a group of mothers to explain why they
had not applied for free school meals. As Table 2.8 shows, only a
relatively small proportion of respondents referred to stigma
factors (e.g. unwillingness to reveal personal information; pride
as parents; embarrassment to child. It should also be noted that
the category parental preference may also include references to
stigma).114 However, when Davies asked his respondents to
account for non-take-up amongst other eligible families he found
that far greater weight was given to stigma factors (see Tables 2.9
and 2.10). Davies believes that there may have been three
possible reasons for the discrepancy between these two results:115
(i) Respondents were unwilling to be completely honest with
interviewers and thus avoided referring to stigma when
talking about themselves.
52 Stigma: the social administration approach
Table 2.9 Proportion of respondents giving various explanations
of why eligible families did not apply for free school meals
Non-takers' Payers' Free meals
families families receivers'
families
U O U 0 U 0
% % % % % %
(a) Stigma (including parents’
pride or shame, or the
dislike of the invasion of
privacy involved) 39 43 48 55 40 39
(b) Ignorance (including not
realizing that they are
eligible, not knowing about
free meals, not under­
standing the system 35 24 40 22 18 20
(c) Dislike of food 12 18 5 7 19 17
(d) Parents can afford to pay 6 0 2 7 2 1
(e) Parents apathetic 0 4 7 6 12 10
(f) Prefer to eat at home 4 11 0 3 5 10
(g) Others 6 2 2 0 4 1
Total number of persons % 100 100 100 100 100 100
giving codable explanation No. 66 56 61 71 67 69
Source: Davies, B. in association with Reddin, M., Table 3.7, p. 82.

(ii) Respondents may have been unwilling to admit to feeling

stigmatized about receiving a financially advantageous
family benefit.
(iii) Respondents’ ideas about what influences other people’s
behaviour may have reflected political mythology and
stereotypes rather than their own knowledge, experience
or feelings.
After examining each of these possible reasons, Davies concludes
that ‘the last is the most probable explanation; the second is less
probable; and the first is much less probable.’116 Davies’s
conclusion on this point is clearly open to question. It could be
argued, for example, that he has not given sufficient considera­
tion to the possibility that respondents may find it difficult to
admit to personal feelings of stigma (see p. 48). This particular
issue will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.
 Stigma: the social administration approach 53
Table 2.10 Proportions of respondents agreeing with
propositions as important explanations of why eligible children
did not receive free school meals
Non-takers’ Payers’ Free meals
families families receivers’
families
% N* % N* % N*
‘Under-achieving’ authority
(a) Do not need them 32 76 27 79 53 68
(b) Other children stigmatize
receivers 58 77 61 79 56 68
(c) Teachers pick on receivers 30 77 15 79 10 68
(d) Thought to be charity 70 76 70 79 78 68
(e) Application too
complicated 51 76 56 79 34 68
(f) Don’t like stating incomes 44 77 70 79 76 68
(g) Don’t like employer to
know that applying 57 77 54 79 50 68
(h) Don’t know about the
service 74 77 70 79 60 68
‘Over-achieving’ authority
(a) Do not need them 40 67 27 78 19 81
(b) Other children stigmatize
receivers 68 68 65 79 62 81
(c) Teachers pick on receivers 12 68 15 79 12 81
(d) Thought to be charity 82 68 75 79 78 81
(e) Application too
complicated 43 68 52 79 25 81
(f) Don’t like stating incomes 65 68 63 79 74 81
(g) Don’t like employer to
know that applying 57 68 52 79 63 81
(h) Don’t know about the
service 63 68 47 79 46 81
Source: Davies, B. in association with Reddin, M., Table 3.8, p. 84.
*Number of persons giving an answer to the proposition. The percentages are
proportions of this number.

(2) Experiences of stigma resulting from social service use

Much of the evidence linking social service use and stigmatizing
experiences has come from surveys of claimants receiving means-
tested social security benefits. In numerous instances researchers
54 Stigma: the social administration approach
have found that the mere process of applying for, or receiving,
such benefits can induce feelings of stigma. For example, 75 per
cent of the female single parents interviewed by Marsden in the
mid-1960s reported that they had felt very embarrassed when
applying for national assistance.117 In a survey of supplementary
benefit recipients in the late 1960s, Townsend also found that a
third of his respondents felt embarrassed to some degree about
receiving this form of aid (see Table 2.11).118 In another study,
conducted in the early 1970s, Marshall interviewed a group of
mothers who were dependent upon supplementary benefit.119 She
found that a substantial proportion of her respondents (particu­
larly divorced women, separated wives and wives with sick
husbands) felt stigmatized about receiving supplementary benefit
(see Table 2.12). In terms of this particular study it is important
to note that the extent of felt stigma amongst respondents should
not be gauged solely from the category ‘feelings of stigma or
dislikes feeling of dependency’. Clearly, mothers who reported,
for example, that they disliked: (i) visiting the local SB office; (ii)
the questions posed by, or attitude adopted by, SB officials; (iii)
‘just . . . being on it’, may equally well have been referring to
feelings of stigma.

Table 2.11 Percentages of elderly and younger recipients,

according to their attitudes to receiving supplementary benefit
Whether embarrassed or Recipients Recipients Recipients
uncomfortable at receiving aged 60 under 60
supplementary benefit or and over
accepting it like a pension
or other income
Male Female All
Very embarrassed or
uncomfortable 5.3 19.2 8.0 9.7 9.1
A little embarrassed 20.7 19.2 18.4 21.2 20.0
Not embarrassed 74.1 61.6 73.6 69.1 70.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number 189 73 87 175 265
Source: P. Townsend, Poverty in the United Kingdom, Table 24.11, p. 846.
 Stigma: the social administration approach 55
Table 2.12 Dislikes about being on supplementary benefit
Unem­ Sick Unmarried Separated Divorced Widows
ployed men mothers wives wives
men (wives)
(wives)
% % % % % %
Dislikes going to
local office, be­
cause of waiting
times, lack of
privacy, or
unspecified
reasons 24 28 29 36 36 30
Dislikes questioning
by staff; type of
question or atti­
tude of staff 47 26 20 30 31 36
Feels that excep­
tional needs
grants are not
given to them
when they should
be 11 4 6 3 6
Feeling of stigma
or dislikes feeling
of dependency 24 37 29 37 41 26
Dislikes being short
of money, income
inadequate 22 11 20 16 18 9
‘Just don’t like
being on it’ 7 7 6 5 5 8
Nothing disliked,
or favourable
comments only 24 32 27 19 16 42
Source: R. Marshall, Table 59, p. 53.
Note: Percentages add up to more than 100 because several mothers gave more than one
answer.

Various studies have also shown that the conduct of national

assistance and supplementary benefits officers can induce feelings
of stigma amongst claimants.120 Claimants’ complaints about the
unfavourable attitude of officials have often been linked to
particular administrative procedures. For example, in a study of
the unemployed in North Tyneside, it was found that many of the
respondents who had been refused exceptional needs payments
were highly critical of the behaviour of the supplementary
benefits officers concerned.121 Two ‘typical’ comments can be
cited in this regard.122
56 Stigma: the social administration approach
He was snotty. He didn’t ask to see the clothing . . . . a bugger,
I was gonna sock him one.
I’d asked for a grant for wallpaper and paint - the children’s
room is damp all winter and their blankets are no good - 1 just
got cheek. I threw him out.
Lister123 found that the majority of the eighteen wage-stopped
claimants she interviewed in the early 1970s also felt aggrieved
because of the treatment they had received from SB officers.
They treat you like dirt. One woman was so rude you’d think
she was talking to a tramp. Department of Public Humiliation I
call it.
The Social Security make you feel they’re doing you a favour,
that you should be grateful for everything you get. A frightfully
demoralising experience the whole thing.124
Research has also shown that female claimants are particularly
likely to be treated in a stigmatizing way by social security
officials. Women suspected of cohabitation have frequently
drawn attention to the totally unacceptable comments made by
national assistance and supplementary benefits officers.125 A
comment from one of Marsden’s respondents provides a good
example of how feelings of stigma can result from a remark made
by an official in these circumstances.
They were really horrible. First one man came round, then
another, saying, ‘Do you sleep with Mr Barnes? Are you
committing adultery with him?’ And I told him it’s my own
private business, but the man says, ‘You can’t tell me that a
man and a woman living in the same house don’t go to bed
together,’ and I told him that’s dirty talk and I don’t like it at
all.126
Comments made by officials during questioning about future
employment plans127 or the identity of a putative father128 have
also been shown to induce feelings of stigma amongst female
claimants.
 Stigma: the social administration approach 57
It should also be noted that feelings of stigma have been
reported by other social service users such as council house
tenants129 and social work clients.130 For example, in terms of the
latter, Rees found that 35 (59 per cent) of his respondents had
felt ashamed (to some degree) about being referred to a social
worker.131
In addition, it is important to remember that evidence relating
to felt stigma has not always been found in welfare consumer
research. For instance, in a recent study of supplementary benefit
claimants, Briggs and Rees132 found little evidence to support the
assertion that contact with SB officials is liable to induce feelings
of stigma amongst the poor. As they point out:
Some experiences regarded by claimants as humiliating were
recounted to us, but they were not very common. Spontaneous
favourable comments about the last interview and the manners
and helpfulness of officers greatly outnumbered unfavourable
ones. Among pensioners in particular, there appeared to be
the raw materials for the emergence of a Supplementary
Benefit Fan Club.133
A number of researchers in the United States have attempted
to pinpoint the precise reasons for the link between felt stigma
and the receipt of welfare benefits. In a survey of fifty,
predominantly black, female recipients of AFDC (Aid to Families
with Dependent Children) who were living in a southern state of
America, Horan and Austin found that educated or longer-term
beneficiaries were more likely to report feelings of stigma than
other respondents.134 In addition, it was found that (other things
being equal) mothers who knew about the existence of local
welfare rights organisations were less likely to feel ‘stigma­
tized’.135
Horan and Austin’s results contrast markedly with those
obtained in a survey conducted by Handler and Hollingsworth.136
After interviewing over 700 AFDC recipients, who were living in
one of six Wisconsin states, these authors came to the conclusion
that:
although feelings of stigma do exist among AFDC recipients,
our indicators of stigma are only very weakly related or not
58 Stigma: the social administration approach
related at all to the more obvious background characteristics of
welfare recipients such as race, employment experience,
education, type of community, length of residence, or friend­
ships.137
Kerbo (in a study of 103 mothers who were receiving AFDC in
a midwestern urban area)138 also found little or no evidence to
link felt stigma with race, employment experience, education,
length of residence or age (over forties only). However, he did
find that respondents who believed in individualistic explanations
of poverty were more likely to feel stigmatized than those who
favoured structural explanations.139
Kerbo’s findings conflicted, however, with Handler and
Hollingsworth’s results concerning the effect of felt stigma upon
recipients’ attitudes towards the welfare system. Contrary to the
evidence of the latter,140 Kerbo found that respondents who had
experienced intense feelings of stigma tended to adopt ‘a passive
uncritical orientation toward the welfare system’.141

(3) Public attitudes towards the social services

Evidence from a number of sources indicates that welfare
services have stigmatic connotations for some members of the
general public. For example, as part of an exploratory examina­
tion of the relationship between the individual and the welfare
state, Pinker142 asked three groups of male respondents (1 The
chronically sick - bronchitics; 2 The acutely sick - coronaries; 3
A control group - ‘fit’ men) about their attitudes towards welfare
services. He found that just over one third of his respondents
believed that welfare dependencies were bad for self-respect (see
Table 2.13). More specifically, Pinker found that respondents
held the social security service in particularly low esteem. Some
80 per cent of his respondents contended that people took unfair
advantage of this service, though only 30 per cent believed that
there was large-scale abuse.143
Similar results to those obtained by Pinker were found in a
recent survey (1977) conducted by Golding and Middleton in two
English cities (Leicester and Sunderland).144 For example, these
authors found that nearly a quarter of their 650 respondents
 Stigma: the social administration approach 59
Table 2.13 Attitudes towards seeking help from the welfare state
Bad for Not bad for
self-respect self-respect
Bronchitics 11 19
Coronaries 10 24
Controls 5 11
Total (N=80) 26 54
Source: Pinker, R.A., Dependency, Table 4, p. 59.

believed that people who claimed social security benefits should

feel guilty about living off taxpayers’ charity.145 In addition, some
97 per cent of Golding and Middleton’s respondents believed that
scrounging was prevalent within the social security system.
Indeed, a third of this latter group were of the opinion that more
than 25 per cent of all claimants were scroungers.146
Social security is not the only welfare service that has stigmatic
connotations for the general public. For example, in a study of
community perceptions of social work, Glastonbury et al. found
that 30 per cent of their respondents held the view that social
work clients were feckless and lazy.147
Evidence that the public tends to associate stigma with
particular welfare programmes has been found in two other
studies. Clifford148 asked a cross-section of people living in three
different parts of a large, southern Irish town to speculate about
public attitudes towards three particular income support services
(St Vincent de Paul - a voluntary Catholic organization which
provides cash and other material aid for the poor; Home
Assistance - a discretionary, family means-tested, income-
support scheme for those unable to obtain other state benefits;
Unemployment Assistance - claimants eligible for this benefit
must:- (i) be aged betwen 18 and 69; (ii) have resided in the state
for at least six months prior to their application; (iii) be not only
capable and available for, but also genuinely seeking, work; (iv)
be willing to submit to a means test). As Table 2.14 shows, most
respondents believed that the general public would be reluctant,
to some degree, about approaching either the St Vincent de Paul
society or the Home Assistance service. In contrast, few
60 Stigma: the social administration approach
respondents believed that the general public would be reluctant
in any way about approaching the Unemployment Assistance
service.
Table 2.14 Reluctance of people in general towards approaching
services
Service (%)
Attitudes towards Home Assistance St Vincent Unemployment
approaching de Paul Assistance
services
Very reluctant 30.0 31.4 4.6
Quite reluctant 22.6 26.6 5.6
A bit reluctant 27.2 27.9 11.8
Not reluctant 20.2 14.1 80.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number 287 290 285
Source: D. Clifford, Table 4, p. 39

Table 2.15 Reasons for reluctance

Factors Home St Vincent Unemployment
Assistance de Paul Assistance

Pride and independence 45.5 29.6 41.7

Shame and embarrassment 16.1 28.2 27.1
Dissatisfaction with the
service 2.3 1.7 2.1
Fear of being refused 10.6 6.4 4.2
Service seen as charity 10.1 12.8 4.2
Dislike of officials 7.8 3.8 2.1
Fear of being ‘classed’ as
poor 5.0 11.5 8.3
Service too public 1.8 6.0 6.3
Felt obligation to pay back
benefit 1.8 1.7 4.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number of respondents to
question 218 234 48
Source: D. Clifford, Table 5, p. 39.
 Stigma: the social administration approach 61
Most respondents referred to stigma factors when they were
asked to account for the public’s reluctance to approach these
various services (see Table 2.15).
Clifford suggests four possible reasons for the relatively
superior public image of the Unemployment Assistance scheme
(which was, incidentally, not only means-tested but also widely
assumed to be open to abuse):149
1 Fixed rates of benefit.
2 The absence of discretion.
3 Benefits were paid at the same office as insurance benefits.
4 The high status of many of the claimants (low-paid
smallholders were entitled to claim this benefit).150
In a study in the United States, Williamson asked 230 white
women living in Boston (1972) to estimate the degree of stigma
associated with various types of welfare programmes.151 In terms
of job training schemes, Williamson found that his respondents
tended to give higher stigma ratings to those schemes in which
eligibility was restricted to welfare recipients.152 Similarly, two
‘welfare’ income support programmes - General Relief (a scheme
in which cash payments are provided for low-income families who
are unable to obtain any other means of support) and AFDC (an
income maintenance scheme for low-income families in which
dependent children are deprived of the support of one parent)
were also given high stigma ratings.153
When asked to give reasons for their negative attitude towards
AFDC, respondents referred to a number of factors: admin­
istrative procedures; the incidence of abuse amongst claimants;
the characteristics of recipients (prostitutes, alcoholics, unfit
mothers) and the inferior treatment accorded to claimants and
their children by others.154
In addition to finding that the more highly stigmatized
programmes tended to be those which were restricted to welfare
claimants, Williamson also found some evidence which suggested
that respondents with liberal views or from higher socio-economic
backgrounds tended to give higher stigma ratings to the various
programmes than their conservative or lower socio-economic
counterparts.155
62 Stigma: the social administration approach
(4) Public attitudes towards the poor and welfare recipients
Much of the rather limited evidence concerning public attitudes
towards the poor has come from research conducted in the
United States. In general it has been found that the public hold
rather unfavourable opinions of the poor. For example, in a
nationwide survey of 1,017 Americans, Feagin found that 84 per
cent of his respondents believed that many of those receiving
welfare payments should have been working; 71 per cent thought
that claimants made dishonest assessments of their own needs;
whilst 61 per cent contended that female welfare recipients were
deliberately having illegitimate children in order to increase their
incomes.156 Unfavourable public attitudes towards the poor were
also found in a Gallop survey conducted in 1964. A third of the
3,055 white Americans inteviewed in this survey were of the
opinion that poverty resulted from a lack of effort on the part of
the poor themselves.157 Three groups of respondents particularly
favoured this explanation: (i) the young; (ii) the better educated;
(iii) low-status white-collar workers and farmers.158 Interestingly,
Golding and Middleton (in their recent study of public percep­
tions of poverty in England) also found that their respondents
tended to favour this ‘victim-blaming’ explanation of poverty.159
In looking in more detail at the characteristics of those
respondents who had linked poverty with prodigality (wasteful
spending patterns, financial ineptitude, imprudent breeding
habits and sheer fecklessness or lack of motivation of the poor),
Golding and Middleton found that women, pensioners and
people living in middle-class neighbourhoods were more likely to
favour this particular explanation of poverty.160 It should be
noted with regard to the latter that unfavourable middle-class
attitudes towards the poor have also been found, to varying
degrees, in a number of American studies (e.g. Lauer,161
Goodwin,162 and Williamson163).
Golding and Middleton’s evidence concerning ‘victim-blaming’
tends to confirm one of the findings of an earlier EEC study on
public perceptions of poverty.164 In this survey it was found that
British citizens were more likely to accept individualistic
explanations of poverty than their European counterparts (see
Table 2.16).
In this study it was also found that lower income groups and
 Stigma: the social administration approach 63
Table 2.16 Public opinion on the causes of poverty (EEC)
United Whole
Kingdom community
Causes % %

Laziness 45 28
Drink 40 28
Too many children 31 27
Lack of foresight 21 18
Chronic unemployment 42 27
111 health 36 37
Old age and loneliness 30 34
Lack of education 29 39
Deprived childhood 16 46
Source: Commission of the European Communities, Tables 27 and 28,
pp. 69-70.
Note: Totals higher than 100 per cent because of multiple replies.

the less well educated (throughout the community) were more

likely to associate poverty with individual failings whilst higher
income groups and the better educated tended to link poverty
with social injustice.165 In contrast, Golding and Middleton’s
evidence (relating only to England) suggests that it is claimants,
manual workers and inner-city residents who are more likely to
associate poverty with structural injustice.166
Three surveys in the British Isles have shown, in addition, that
when the general public are asked to make assessments of the
welfare entitlements of particular groups in society they attach
great importance to the characteristics and circumstances of
potential recipients.
Glastonbury et al. asked their respondents whether social work
services (including material aid) should be provided, at public
expense, for various groups in society (six of these groups were
portrayed as having blameless or accidental dependencies whilst
negative characteristics were ascribed to the remaining eight
groups i.e. blameworthy or non-accidental dependencies).167 (See
Table 2.17.) The former (blameless) were seen to be the most
deserving of support - 68 per cent of respondents said that they
64 Stigma: the social administration approach
Table 2.17 Respondents’ attitude to giving help in specific family
circumstances
Specified groups Respondents' replies (%)
Yes Sometimes No Don't Total
Know

1 Mothers and children where

father is dead or deserted 90 2 3 5 100
2 Families who are homeless
or in very poor housing 85 8 3 4 100
3 Poor families 74 19 3 4 100
4 Families where the father
is out of work 54 37 5 4 100
5 People, like students, who
do not pay taxes 52 20 22 6 100
6 Coloured families 51 25 20 4 100
7 Families in which father is
in prison 82 6 7 5 100
8 Unmarried mothers and
children 74 14 8 4 100
9 Families with delinquent
children 68 11 20 1 100
10 Families with a lot of
children 52 24 19 5 100
11 Families who have only
recently moved to the area 33 29 33 5 100
12 Families in debt 25 44 26 5 100
13 Families with parents who
drink, smoke or gamble 18 20 55 7 100
14 Families in which the father
is unwilling to work 15 28 53 4 100
Source: B. Glastonbury, Table 3, p. 196.

would offer unconditional help; 19 per cent - conditional help; 9

per cent - no help at all. In contrast, the latter (blameworthy)
were perceived as being relatively undeserving - 46 per cent of
those interviewed stated that they would grant unconditional aid;
22 per cent conditional aid; 28 per cent - no aid at all.168
Not unexpectedly, a large percentage of respondents were
willing to grant unconditional aid to deserving groups such as
single-parent families in which the father had either died or
deserted (90 per cent) and homeless families or those in very
poor housing (85 per cent). Similarly, it was not surprising to find
 Stigma: the social administration approach 65
that respondents were unwilling to give aid to two particular
types of family: (i) those in which parents drink, smoke or
gamble (55 per cent); (ii) those in which the father is unwilling to
work (53 per cent). More surprising, however, was the fact that
may respondents were willing to give unconditional help to three
groups commonly perceived as being undeserving - families in
which the father was in prison (82 per cent); unmarried mothers
and their children (74 per cent); and families with delinquent
children (68 per cent).
Evidence from Clifford’s survey in the Republic of Ireland
lends support to Glastonbury et al.’s findings. Clifford found that
a large proportion of his interviewees were willing to give
unconditional help to deserving groups such as the elderly (97 per
cent and above): families with a sick wage earner (93 per cent)
and widows with children (92 per cent).169 (See Table 2.18.)
Similarly, respondents were unwilling to help ‘undeserving’
groups such as single men who were unwilling to work (83 per
cent) and families which run up debts (51 per cent). Clifford also
found that there was a good deal of public support for unmarried
mothers with children and families in which the father was in
prison. Widows, somewhat surprisingly, elicited a rather unfav­
ourable response from those interviewed - only 34 per cent said
that they would offer unconditional aid to this group.
In comparing the surveys of Clifford and Glastonbury et al. it
is possible to detect certain regional differences in public
attitudes towards potential recipients of welfare aid. For
example, needy large families were viewed far more favourably
in the Republic of Ireland than in south Wales (81 per cent of
Clifford’s respondents stated that they would offer unconditional
help to this group whereas only 52 per cent of Glastonbury et
al.’s sample said that they would act likewise (see Tables 2.17 and
2.18).
It is important to note that caution should be exercised when
interpreting the results obtained in these two studies. For
example, in both surveys favourable attitudes were displayed
towards unmarried mothers. This may well indicate, as Clifford
suggests, a change in public attitude towards this group.170
However, the precise phrasing of the question used in this and
other cases is likely to have affected the results obtained. In both
surveys respondents were generally asked to consider whether
66 Stigma: the social administration approach
Table 2.18 Respondents’ attitudes to giving help in specific
family circumstances
Class of person Proportions of interviewees
Help Help Should
without with never
conditions conditions help

Old who are poor 98.4 1.6 0.0

Old who are ill 97.3 2.7 0.0
Families whose husband is sick
and out of work 93.0 7.0 0.0
Families whose husband has
deserted without trace 87.9 11.4 0.7
Very big families whose fathers’
wage is small 81.2 18.5 0.3
Families whose father is too
lazy to seek work 29.2 50.7 20.1
Families whose fathers drink
most of the wages 35.8 48.2 16.1
Single men who are unwilling to
work 1.7 15.1 83.3
Wives of alcoholic husbands 68.5 27.9 3.7
Unmarried mothers who keep
their child 86.6 12.4 1.0
Widows with children 9.2.3 7.0 0.7
Widows without children 33.6 55.7 10.7
Itinerant men not in work 33.7 45.8 20.5
Families of itinerants not at
work 63.1 32.9 4.0
Families whose fathers are in jail 80.3 17.7 2.0
Families where both parents drink 38.6 41.9 19.5
Families where both parents
gamble 27.9 40.7 31.3
Families where wife is an
alcoholic 46.6 38.9 14.4
Families who run up debts and
have large Hire Purchase arrears 14.1 34.2 51.3
Source: D. Clifford, Table 7, p. 43.
Note: Based on 300 interviewees.
they would offer help to certain groups within the context of
family situations (i.e. they were not asked to consider providing
aid solely for specific groups such as criminals, immigrants or
 Stigma: the social administration approach 67
unmarried mothers). The inclusion of dependants may therefore
have neutralized underlying public hostility towards such groups.
Indeed, in the case of widows, Clifford found that the inclusion
of children was significant. Whilst 92 per cent of his respondents
were willing to give unconditional help to a widow with children
only 34 per cent were willing to provide similar aid for a widow
living alone (see Table 2.18).
In the third of these surveys in the British Isles, Pinker171
asked his respondents to consider which of a number of specified
groups should be given priority in terms of additional welfare aid.
As Table 2.19 shows, the deserving or undeserving characteristics
of the specified groups did not appear to have been a major
consideration in respondents’ evaluations. For example, both the
bronchitic and control groups indicated that they would give
higher priority to ex-convicts than to either the disabled or old
age pensioners. In addition, all groups believed that priority
should be given to ex-convicts as opposed to sick men. It is a
matter for speculation as to why respondents made these
distinctions. For example, those interviewed may have ignored
the deserving or undeserving characteristics of the various groups
specified when making their assessments of welfare priorities
(alternatively, they may have had highly distinctive views about
what precisely constitutes a deserving or undeserving group).
Instead, they may have decided to make their assessments of
welfare priorities on the basis of existing levels of welfare
provision for each of the groups concerned (i.e. given low
priority to those groups deemed to be currently receiving an
adequate level of aid).

Social policy research on stigma: an assessment

The collectivist and problem-solving roots of the discipline of
social policy and administration can clearly be seen in the
research studies that have been conducted into the notion of
stigma within the welfare field. For example, most researchers
have accepted the collectivist assumption that considerations of
stigma can unnecessarily deter citizens from using selectivist
public welfare services. Accordingly, a good deal of research has
been devoted towards investigating the various ways in which
68 Stigma: the social administration approach
Table 2.19 Respondents’ attitudes towards welfare priorities
Vignette Rank order
Overall Bronchitics Coronaries Control

Low earner 1 2 1 1
Sick old age
pensioner 2 4 3 3
Fit old age
pensioner 3 5 4 4
Ex-convict 4 3 8 2
Sick child 5 1 6 9
Disabled man 6 9 2 8
Child in trouble 7 8 7 5
Backward child 8 7 9 6
Sick man 9 6 10 7
Bright child 10 10 5 10
Source: R.A. Pinker, Dependency, pp. 50-2.
Note: Low numbers = high priority.

stigma can lead to the under-utilization of this type of social

service provision. In particular, attention has been paid to the
way in which the take-up rate for various means-tested benefits
can be adversely affected by considerations of stigma (see pp. 42-
5).
This type of research has certainly been of some use,
particularly in the realm of policy-making. For example, a
number of researchers have suggested various ways in which ‘the
problem of stigma’ can be countered: e.g. the abolition of
modification of selectivist services; better training schemes for
officials; more widespread publicity of various entitlements; less
complex procedures; improvements in the furnishings and
facilities provided in welfare offices used by the public.
In general, however, social policy research on the effect of
stigma upon the actions and feelings of welfare recipients (or
potential welfare recipients) has been rather disappointing.
Importantly, the problem-solving ethos of the discipline has
tended to militate against the use of sound theoretical frame­
works. As a result, insufficient attention has been given to the
various aspects of the concept (i.e. distinctions have rarely been
 Stigma: the social administration approach 69
made between stigmas, stigmatization, felt stigma and so forth:
see chapter 1). For instance, in much of this research the
impression has often been conveyed that selectivist forms of
welfare provision are the major source (as opposed to one
particular source) of stigma in society. The promulgation of this
viewpoint has tended to result in stigma becoming commonly
regarded not as a pervasive and highly resilient social phenom­
enon but, rather, as a technical problem which can be solved by
purposeful government intervention. Indeed, the failure to give
due emphasis to the way in which stigma can (by functioning as a
means of social control) bolster the existing social and economic
structure of society has been a serious weakness of social policy
research in this area. It should be noted here, however, that the
public attitude surveys have served to highlight the way in which
stigma can help to sustain a particular value system within
society. (These issues will be discussed more fully in chapter 4 of
this book.)
When examining social policy research on stigma it is
important to recognize that there are certain problems in
measuring this particular phenomenon. For example, researchers
are liable to encounter a number of problems when constructing
questions which are designed to accurately tap the extent of felt
stigma amongst a particular survey group. This can clearly be
seen if one considers the questions employed in surveys
conducted by Handler and Hollingsworth172 and Horan and
Austin.173 The former (in a study of AFDC recipients) attempted
to obtain data about felt stigma by the use of the following two
questions:
(1) How embarrassed do you feel in the company of non-
AFDC recipients?
(2) What is the attitude of people in the community towards
AFDC recipients?
Respondents who stated that they always felt embarrassed in the
company of non-AFDC recipients and who, in addition, thought
that the public were very hostile towards AFDC recipients were
adjudged to feel stigma most strongly.174 In contrast, Horan and
Austin measured felt stigma in terms of respondents’ replies to
two different questions:
70 Stigma: the social administration approach
(1) How often do you feel ashamed about being on welfare?
(2) How often do you feel bothered by being on welfare?
Respondents who always felt both ashamed and bothered were
awarded the highest stigma ratings.175
Clearly, the questions used in both these surveys were rather
imprecise. For example, the second question posed by Handler
and Hollingsworth does not appear to be a particularly reliable
indicator of felt stigma. Although it is likely that some of the
respondents in this survey (who expressed the view that people in
the community were very hostile towards AFDC recipients) were
likely to have experienced feelings of stigma, it is equally likely
that others may have responded to this community hostility in a
markedly different way (e.g. indifference, resentment). In
addition, it can be argued that felt stigma cannot be accurately
measured by the use of terms such as embarrassment or shame.
For example, it was suggested earlier that distinctions could be
made between feelings of embarrassment, shame and stigma (see
pp. 16-18).
It was also pointed out earlier in the chapter that individuals
may be somewhat reluctant to admit to personal feelings of
stigma (see p. 48). Indeed, Davies contends that those who have
failed to claim welfare benefits to which they are entitled may be
especially reluctant to admit to the fact that feelings of stigma
had influenced their behaviour (i.e. refusing a benefit on the
grounds of stigma may be seen as an irrational form of
conduct).176
Given this possibility, it seems likely that the extent of felt
stigma amongst welfare recipients may have been significantly
under-estimated in a number of the surveys referred to earlier.
To counter this problem, it may well be necessary to directly
confront respondents with the possibility that their actions or
inactions were influenced by considerations of stigma. Although
methodological objections can be raised about the use of
‘suggestive’ questioning (i.e. it can be argued that respondents
will tend to over-emphasize the importance of stigma if it is
suggested to them that their behaviour may have been affected
by this factor), it would appear that the very nature of this
phenomenon demands this type of approach.
If the impact of stigma upon welfare recipients has been under­
 Stigma: the social administration approach 71
estimated in the research studies conducted in this area then
there would appear to be even stronger grounds for doubting the
assertion, made by a number of commentators, that undue
emphasis has been given to the notion of stigma in the field of
social policy.177 On the contrary, given the theoretical and
practical limitations of much of the research in this area, there
would appear to be every reason to examine this phenomenon in
a more detailed and extensive way.
In this chapter, then, we have seen that within the field of social
policy and administration the concept of stigma has (largely as a
result of the efforts of Titmuss and other advocates of welfare
collectivism) become associated predominantly with private and
selectivist public forms of welfare provision. Although extremely
useful, this approach to the concept of stigma has (by its rather
narrow focus) tended to stifle discussion about other aspects of
the relationship between stigma and social policy (e.g. the
rationale for the stigmatization of certain ‘welfare’ groups: the
functions of welfare stigmatization). It is to these wider
dimensions of stigma that attention will be given in the following
two chapters.
3 Stigma Behavioral
and the Behavioral
unmarried
and and
mother and
Behavioral

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how the social

administration approach to the concept of stigma can be enriched
by more extensive examinations of the reasons why, and the ways
in which, certain ‘welfare’ groups have been stigmatized over the
centuries. For present purposes, attention will be given to one
such group - namely unmarried mothers.
Throughout the years, stigma has tended to attach to the
unmarried mother for two main reasons. Firstly, the sexual
conduct of these women has elicited disapproval from the
Christian church. Secondly, secular authorities have responded
unfavourably to what they have perceived to be the ‘blame­
worthy’ public dependency of this group. Let us look at each of
these main sources of stigma in turn.

Challenge to Christian doctrine

There are two main ways in which the conduct of the unmarried
mother runs contrary to Christian teaching:
(i) Sexual relationship outside marriage.
(ii) Threat to the institution of the family.
The early church fathers were highly critical of both marital
and non-marital sexual relationships. They believed that such
relationships prevented individuals from devoting themselves
fully to the service of God. A passage from St Paul’s first letter to
the Corinthians neatly captures their attitude in this regard.
72
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 73
The unmarried man cares for the Lord’s business; his aim is to
please the Lord. But the married man cares for worldly things;
his aim is to please his wife; and he has a divided mind. The
unmarried or celibate woman cares for the Lord’s business; her
aim is to be dedicated to him in body as in spirit; but the
married woman cares for worldly things; her aim is to please
her husband.1
The church fathers’ disapproval of sexual relationships can also
be linked to the notion of ‘the fall’. For example, St Augustine of
Hippo contended that Adam and Eve lost control of their sexual
impulses after they had succumbed to temptation. As Bailey
points out, this belief
led Augustine to a virtual equation of original sin, con­
cupiscence, and venereal emotion, from which he drew the
inference that while coitus in theory is good, every concrete act
of coitus performed by fallen man is intrinsically evil - so that
every child can be said literally to have been conceived in the
‘sin’ of its parents.2
It is important to note that the condemnatory attitude
displayed by the church fathers towards sexuality was based in
large part upon their belief that the end of the world was
imminent (i.e. a commitment towards celibacy was seen as
essential if the city of God was to be filled speedily and the end of
the world hastened).3
The early Christians, by way of contrast, found much to
commend in marriage and family life. The fact that Christ
performed his first miracle at a wedding service in Cana was
taken to indicate divine approval of the institution of marriage.
Indeed, marriage was eventually accorded sacramental status (the
uniting of a man and a woman was deemed to symbolize the
relationship between Christ and the church;4 in addition,
marriage came to be recognized as the appropriate institution for
the procreation of children).5 Support for the family unit also had
a strong theological underpinning. As Troeltsch points out,
Christ drew upon the institution of the family
for symbols of the highest attributes of God, for the name of
74 Stigma and the unmarried mother
the final religious goal, for the original description of the
earliest group of His disciples, and for material for most of His
parables; indeed, the idea of the family may be regarded as
one of the most fundamental features of His feeling for human
life.6
Given their firm commitment towards marriage and family life,
the early Christians tended to look disparagingly upon those
individuals (such as unmarried mothers) whose sexual conduct
contravened their ideals (i.e. monogamy, chastity before
marriage, fidelity within marriage, Christian upbringing of
children). The censorious attitude displayed towards unmarried
mothers was compounded by the fact that the early Christians
believed that all women were inherently inferior to men. The
rationale for this viewpoint can also be traced back to the notion
of ‘the fall’. As St Paul states in a letter to Timothy:
A woman must be a learner, listening quietly and with due
submission. I do not permit a woman to be a teacher, nor must
woman domineer over man; she should be quiet. For Adam
was created first and Eve afterwards; and it was not Adam who
was deceived; it was woman who, yielding to deception, fell
into sin.7
Women thus came to be seen as potentially dangerous individuals
who needed to be kept under close control, particularly in the
realm of sexuality. As Russell comments, the importance
Christians placed on sexual virtue
did a great deal to degrade the position of women. Since the
moralists were men, women appeared as the temptress; . . .
Since woman was the temptress, it was desirable to curtail her
opportunities for leading men into temptation; consequently
respectable women were more hedged about with restrictions,
while the women who were not respectable, being regarded as
sinful, were treated with the utmost contumely.8
The spread of Christianity in Europe had serious repercussions
for the unmarried mother and other sexual ‘transgressors’. For
instance, by the end of the thirteenth century in England, the
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 75
Christian church had managed to secure for itself the exclusive
right to deal with sexual offenders in its own courts. As Wrighton
points out, the essential concern of these church courts ‘was to
maintain the boundaries of permitted behaviour and to enforce,
by the imposition of public penance, the public reaffirmation of
the norms which had been breached.’9
Individuals could be summoned to appear before an eccles­
iastical court for various sexual misdemeanours - bridal preg­
nancy, incontinence (fornication and adultery), prostitution,
incest, rape and bastardy. One of two courses of action were
open to those individuals who were charged with any of these
offences. They could either plead guilty and accept the punish­
ment of the court or, alternatively, deny the charge and undergo
purgation. In some cases, purgation merely involved the making
of a solemn declaration of innocence. More commonly, such an
oath would have had to have been made in the presence of two
or more compurgators (of ‘good’ reputation). Provided the
precise conditions of purgation were complied with the accused
was deemed to be innocent.10
Obviously, unmarried mothers could be summoned to appear
before the ecclesiastical courts on a number of the charges
mentioned above. Like other sexual offenders, they were liable,
upon conviction, to be ordered to undergo penance. This usually
involved some form of public humiliation (the severity of which
tended to vary according to the seriousness of the offence).11 For
example, one unmarried mother, convicted of bastardy by a
church court in Farnham (Kent) in 1562, was ordered to attend
her parish church on the following Sunday (barefoot and
barelegged)
in her petticoat with a white sheet about her, her hair loose,
and a kercher upon her head, and there at the chancel door to
remain standing with her face towards the people at all the
time of morning prayer until the end; that done to go about the
Church before the procession be read, and to come to the
chancel door where she shall remain kneeling the whole time
of the Litany until such time as the priest goeth into the pulpit
and there to read the wholy homily of adultery, whereat she
shall come and stand before the pulpit and then to depart.12
76 Stigma and the unmarried mother
It is difficult to estimate what effect this form of stigmatization
had upon unmarried mothers and other sexual offenders. One
commentator who has given some thought to this question (in
relation to bridal pregnancy) came to the conclusion that local
parishioners were not particularly fearful of church discipline.
Public penance was, of course, supposed to be humiliating, but
it may be doubted whether there were many . . . who found it
so. Any offence of ante-nuptial fornication had, of course,
been common knowledge for months: public confession by the
offenders was no revelation, indeed, it must often have seemed
like a triumphant announcement of successfully completed
courtship, marriage and parenthood. Above all, . . . the
offence was too common to be regarded as scandalous.13
Hair holds to this theory despite finding (in his study of bridal
pregnancy in a number of parishes in earlier rural England) that
there were relatively few baptisms recorded to families whose
names had appeared on the marriage registers.
It might be reasonably argued that the failure of some of the
brides to record maternities in the register of the parish of
marriage was due to their obviously pregnant condition at or
soon after marriage, so that shame drove them to another
parish where their recent date of marriage was unknown. . . .
In view of the high proportion of brides who were pregnant,
including many who were obviously so at marriage, it is
difficult to believe that this assumed shame was widespread, or
indeed markedly existent.14
Certainly the absence of any widespread public hostility towards
those convicted of offences such as premarital fornication or
bridal pregnancy15 is likely to have lessened the possibility of felt
stigma amongst these groups of sexual transgressors. However, it
seems equally likely (given the propensity of the general public to
respond less favourably towards unmarried mothers)16 that
pregnant, unmarried women with no immediate marriage plans
would have found their predicament much more stigmatizing.
Such women may have attempted to abort their children or
dispose of them shortly after birth in order to avoid the
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 11
possibility of public humiliation.17 There must have been a
tendency for unmarried women to conceal their pregnancies
because the harbouring of such women was a separate eccles­
iastical offence.18 For example, in 1564 an East Horndon man
who had sheltered a pregnant girl pleaded that ‘he took her in for
God’s sake’, but was sentenced to public penance in the market
and had to pay 2s to the poor.19 Even members of an unmarried
mother’s own family were liable to be sanctioned under this law.

A cleric, apparently the curate, offended in 1595. William

Vixar of Fyfield, let his own daughter ‘go away unpunished’.
His plea was that she departed without his knowledge, but he
was enjoined to confess in church that ‘he had offended God
and the congregation in harbouring his daughter’.20
It is important to note that the vast majority of those who were
summoned to appear before the church courts came from the
poorer sections of society. In the case of bastardy, this is not
altogether surprising. Unmarried women in the wealthier social
classes were expected to observe the strictest standards of sexual
propriety as the loss of virginity before marriage could seriously
damage their social and economic worth (chastity was seen as
essential in order to dispel any doubts about the legitimacy of
those children who would eventually inherit titles and property).21
Given that these women were likely to be closely chaperoned
until they were married there was little possibility of premarital
pregnancy amongst this group. However, if such a woman did
become pregnant it is likely that a marriage would have been
hastily arranged (provided that the putative father came from the
right social background). If this proved difficult for any reason, it
is likely that the woman concerned would have been persuaded
to abort or (in the event of the pregnancy running to term)
dispose of the child in some way.
The only group of upper-class women who ignored these
restrictions on their sexual freedom were the mistresses of the
nobility.22 Owing to the influence of their benefactors, these
women were rarely required to submit to the jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts (a notable exception, however, was Jane
Shore, the mistress of Richard III, who was ordered to undergo
78 Stigma and the unmarried mother
penance in St Paul’s Cathedral before the bishop of London in
1483).23
Due to increased secular intervention, ecclesiastical influence
in the sphere of sexual misconduct slowly declined from the
sixteenth century onwards.24 Although sexual offenders con­
tinued to be brought before the church courts until well into the
eighteenth century, there were relatively few prosecutions.25
Indeed, by the end of the eighteenth century the ecclesiastical
courts had become largely obsolete as a result of the demise of
shame punishments (1704s)26 and the abolition of the offence of
incontinence (1788).27 As Chadwick points out:
the courts of the State were . . . much more efficient and
commanded so much more of the public confidence . . . that a
system of church courts was no longer needed, and it slowly
withered away except for the internal needs of church life and
the moral discipline of the clergy.28
It is important to note, however, that the declining influence of
the ecclesiastical courts did not herald the development of a more
liberal ruling class attitude towards the unmarried mother and
other sexual offenders. For example, Puritan censoriousness was
clearly at the heart of two pieces of secular legislation which were
introduced in the first half of the seventeenth century. The first of
these acts (1624) attempted to stem the incidence of infanticide.
This act declared that the concealment of the death of a newly
bom illegitimate child would be regarded as murder unless
evidence to the contrary could be produced (the sworn oath of a
witness that the child was stillborn).29 Unmarried mothers were
frequently prosecuted and convicted for this offence.30 The
second act (1650) introduced severe penalties for adulterers
(execution) and fornicators (imprisonment).31 This measure
proved to be so unpopular with the public, though, that it was
repealed shortly after the end of the interregnum.
This concern with morality was not, however (at least in the
case of unmarried mothers), a significant feature of post-1500
secular legislation. In general, attention was directed towards the
consequences of sexual misconduct (i.e. the financial cost of
supporting unmarried mothers and their children).
We have seen, then, that the Christian church attempted to
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 79
impose its authority in the realm of sexuality by means of
sanctioning those members of the community who were deemed
to have behaved in an immoral way. By subjecting unmarried
mothers and other sexual offenders to the ordeal of public
penance, the church hoped to engender and sustain a high level
of public commitment towards Christian ideals. As we will see
below, this pattern of stigmatization contrasts markedly with the
sanctions used by the secular authorities to deal with the
‘problem’ of bastardy amongst the poorer groups in society.

‘Blameworthy’ public dependency

Two distinctive patterns of secular stigmatization can be identi­
fied in relation to the treatment of publicly dependent unmarried
mothers over the centuries. From 1500 to 1900, the secular
authorities employed a variety of physical and economic sanc­
tions in an effort to minimize the number of unmarried mothers
(and their dependants) seeking public aid. This formal type of
stigmatization was compounded by the informal economic and
social sanctions which were imposed by other members of the
community. Since 1900, these harsh and direct forms of secular
stigmatization have gradually withered away. However, implicit
forms of secular stigmatization have continued to operate (i.e.
inappropriate or inadequate ‘welfare’ services for this group). In
addition, informal economic and social sanctions have continued
to be applied to unmarried mothers by certain members of the
public at large. Let us look, then, at each of these distinctive
stigmatization periods in turn.

Stigmatization period 1: 1500-1900

Before examining the ways in which unmarried mothers were
treated by the secular authorities in the sixteenth century, it is
useful to refer briefly to the situation of this group under
feudalism. During this period, the ruling class did not regard
illegitimacy amongst the poor as a particularly serious social
problem. Such an attitude is not surprising given that the
financial consequences stemming from such behaviour were
80 Stigma and the unmarried mother
minimal at this time. The lord of the manor merely stood to lose
the small contribution (a merchet - which was to be provided by
fathers when their daughters married) he would have received by
way of compensation for the loss of a member of his workforce.
In order to obtain some form of recompense for this loss, the lord
imposed fines on those unmarried women who were convicted of
either incontinence (legerwite) or bastardy (childwite).32 It seems
unlikely, however, that there would have been large numbers of
unsupported, unmarried mothers bringing up children on their
own in feudal society: given the close-knit nature of manorial
communities it would have been relatively easy to trace (and
obtain financial contributions from) the putative fathers con­
cerned.
The decline of feudalism seriously threatened the social and
economic security of unmarried mothers and their children. ‘Cut
off from the ever-sustaining resources of an uncomplicated rural
parish’,33 unmarried mothers were forced, along with others in a
similar position, to travel around the country in search of work or
alms. As was noted earlier (see p. 25), the ruling class regarded
this vagrant group as a serious threat to public order. Accord­
ingly, unmarried mothers, in common with other members of the
‘undeserving’ poor, were subjected to harsh, deterrent punish­
ments. For example, under the Poor Law Act of 1531 all vagrants
were liable to be whipped in the nearest market town and then
returned to their place of birth or to the area in which they had
resided in the previous three years.34
Public concern about the economic implications of illegitimacy
intensified during the latter part of the sixteenth century. With
increased geographical mobiliity it became more and more
difficult to trace the parents (especially the fathers) of illegitimate
children. Parishes were thus often faced with the prospect of
supporting relatively large numbers of unmarried mothers and
their children. Given that poor rate contributions had been made
compulsory during this period,35 it seems likely that local
parishioners would have been deeply opposed to this form of
parish expenditure, particularly if the women and children
concerned had migrated from other localities.36
The Poor Law Act of 1576 attempted to deal directly with the
problem of illegitimacy amongst the poor. Under this act,
penalties (fines, whippings) were imposed on those parents who
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 81
failed to support their illegitimate offspring. Such parents were
also expected (on pain of imprisonment) to indemnify the parish
against any further expenditure in this regard.37
Gill contends that this statute had three main purposes:38
(i) To reduce parish expenditure on bastardy.
(ii) To demonstrate public disapproval of reproduction out­
side marriage.
(iii) To strengthen public support for marriage and family life.
However, this act cannot be said to have been primarily
concerned with bolstering the social and moral fabric of society
(ii and iii). If this had been the case one would have expected all
parents of illegitimate children to have been made equally liable
to prosecution. Instead, only those parents who were unable to
provide financial support for their illegitimate offspring were
liable to be sanctioned under this act.39 This concern with
minimizing parish expenditure on bastardy is also clearly
reflected in the treatment accorded to publicly dependent
illegitimate (and other vagrant) children during this period. Such
children were liable to be forcibly apprenticed with local families,
where they were unlikely to be treated as anything more than
slave labour.40
Publicly dependent unmarried mothers continued to be treated
harshly by secular authorities throughout the seventeenth
century. Legislation introduced in 1609 ordered that unmarried
mothers who had given birth to ‘chargeable bastards’ should be
detained in a house of correction.41 These detentions (to which
mothers who had given birth to more than one illegitimate child -
repeaters - were particularly prone)42 were often recommended
on moral grounds. For example, at Warwick quarter sessions in
1627 it was proclaimed:
that one Bridget Walker of Asley . . . is of very rude and evil
behaviour and hath had three bastards and hath not received
any condign punishment for the same, whereby she taketh
encouragement to go on still in that lewd course, it is therefore
ordered by the court that she shall be sent to the house of
correction there to remain a year and a day. . . ,43
82 Stigma and the unmarried mother
However, the fact that unmarried mothers could obtain a
premature release from such an institution if they could convince
local magistrates that they would not become dependent upon
parish relief in the future tends to suggest that financial
considerations were again of paramount importance. For
instance, in Warwick in 1649, Alice Ireland was granted an early
discharge from the house of correction after the putative father
had ‘given good security to the . . . parishioners to free them
from any charge that may happen by reason of the . . . bastard
child. . . .,44 Indeed, the justices tended to take a dim view of
any mother who declined to accept an offer of maintenance. In
1642, the Warwick justices decided to reduce the allowance paid
by the inhabitants of Spernall towards the keep of Anne
Mawdick because of this woman’s refusal to accept an offer of
financial support from a local gentleman.45
The conditions prevailing within houses of correction can only
be described as abject. Inmates were not only forcibly set to work
but also subjected to physical punishments for even the most
minor breach of the regulations. Not surprisingly, therefore, the
health of many of the unmarried mothers who were sent to these
institutions declined to such an extent that they were unable to
undertake any work. For instance, in 1631 the master of the
Warwick house of correction informed the inhabitants of Sowe
that Goodith Checkley and her child (for whom they were
responsible) were ‘likely to perish unless some speedy course be
taken for their relief. . . .’46 In the same year, Mary Barber was
given 12d a week from the Studley poor fund because she was
‘very sick and weak and not able to get work or get any
livelihood or maintenance for herself or her . . . child . . .
whereby they are likely to perish for want of sustenance. . . .’47
Even those unmarried mothers who were fortunate enough to
secure their release from a house of correction were liable to be
readmitted for an indefinite period if they gave birth to another
chargeable bastard.48
The Warwick judiciary’s unfavourable treatment of unmarried
mothers and other members of the undeserving poor contrasts
markedly with the approach they adopted towards other needy
groups during this period. For instance, the justices had no
compunction about ordering the wardens of Woolverton to
provide a servant (who had become unemployable - and hence
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 83
destitute - as a result of lameness) with ‘a convenient habita­
tion . . . fit for a Christian to dwell in . . .’.49
At local level, parishes used every available means to prevent
unmarried mothers and their children from becoming dependent
on poor relief. For example, parish officers were not averse to
forcibly removing an expectant, unmarried woman from their
locality in order to prevent her from becoming a charge on parish
funds.50 A statute of 1662, which had been introduced to clarify
the issue of settlement, tended to encourage action of this kind.51
Under this act, local overseers were authorized to remove (within
forty days) any recent arrivals in their parish (who were renting a
tenement worth £10 a year or less) whom they considered likely
to become dependent on parish aid in the future. The fact that
illegitimate children were to be granted settlement in the area in
which they were born clearly provided an incentive for parish
officers to remove poor, expectant, single women from their
locality. Unmarried women who became pregnant whilst being
employed as domestic servants were particularly likely to be
forcibly removed by parish officials (such women were often
working away from home in an area in which they were not
legally settled).
Clause nineteen of this statute (which permitted local church­
wardens and overseers of the poor to seize, by way of
recompense, the property of those parents whose illegitimate
children were being supported by the parish) also had serious
repercussions for poor, single, expectant women. Such women
were frequently pressurized into naming the putative father of
their child so that the parish could serve maintenance orders,
where appropriate. Midwives often played a key role in securing
this information: they would frequently refuse to provide
assistance to unmarried women in labour unless the name of the
putative father had been disclosed.52
The large increase in illegitimacy in the eighteenth century53
(the causes of which are difficult to unravel)54 led to further steps
being taken to limit parish liability for unmarried mothers and
their children. Legislation introduced in 174455 attempted to deal
specifically with the problem of obtaining maintenance payments
from putative fathers. To this end, substantial credence was
accorded to the declarations of single women (who were
expecting children deemed likely to become a burden on the poor
84 Stigma and the unmarried mother
rate) concerning the identity of putative fathers. On the basis of
these oaths, putative fathers were liable to be summoned to
appear at the local quarter sessions, where they could be ordered
to make a regular payment towards the upkeep of their children.
Although this measure improved the financial situation of a
small number of unmarried mothers (i.e. in cases where the
putative father was relatively wealthy) it did little to help the vast
majority of such women (many putative fathers proved difficult
to trace or were very poor). Mothers in this latter category
continued to be admitted to houses of correction and, subse­
quently, to workhouses (which were frequently used as maternity
wards for poor, homeless, pregnant, single women).56 As Oxley
points out, many parish authorities believed that indoor relief
was particularly suitable for unmarried mothers and their
children.
Outdoor accommodation was likely to be costly and the
woman’s time used inefficiently because the need to care for
the child would keep her from work. In the workhouse a few
could look after the children while the remainder were set on
useful tasks.57
Public provision for unmarried mothers and their children did
not improve during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
despite the growth of charitable activity in this area (e.g.
foundling58 and magdalen59 hospitals). It was still commonly
believed that unmarried mothers and their children were nothing
more than an unnecessary burden on public expenditure. This
viewpoint was never more clearly expressed than in the Poor Law
Report of 1834.
The authors of this report contended that the immoral conduct
of unmarried women was the root cause of the problem of
bastardy. Accordingly, they recommended that unmarried
mothers should be held legally responsible for the maintenance of
their illegitimate children.
This is now the law with respect to a widow; and an unmarried
mother has voluntarily become a mother, without procuring to
herself and her child the assistance of a husband and a father.
There can be no reason for giving to vice privileges which we
deny to misfortune.60
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 85
The Commissioners suggested a number of ways in which the
public cost of illegitimacy could be reduced. For example, they
recommended that other family members (i.e. parents) should be
required to contribute towards the upkeep of an unmarried
mother and her child.
In a natural state of things they must do so, whether the child
be legitimate or not; and when we consider that, in the vast
majority of cases, the neglect or ill example, and in many cases
the actual furtherance of those parents has occasioned their
daughter’s misconduct, it appears not only just, but most
useful, that they should be answerable for it.61
Even some of the Commissioners’ more humane recommendations
were based on financial considerations. For instance, their
disapproval of the hounding of expectant unmarried women by
parish officials certainly fits into this category.
We feel confident that if the woman were allowed to remain
unmolested until she asked for relief, she would, in many
cases, by her own exertions, and the assistance of her friends,
succeed in maintaining herself and her infant; . . ,62
As a result of the Commissioners’ deliberations, the Poor Law
(as it related to illegitimacy) was modified in six important ways.
1 Unmarried mothers were no longer to be detained in houses
of correction.
2 An illegitimate child was to acquire the same settlement as
its mother.
3 Affiliation orders were only to be made out if the mother’s
evidence concerning paternity could be independently veri­
fied.
4 Maintenance payments were to be fixed at realistic levels
(i.e. the actual cost of supporting a child); these payments
were to continue until the child was seven.
5 Money recovered from putative fathers was not to be paid
directly to the mothers concerned.
6 Men who failed to comply with the terms of a maintenance
order by virtue of poverty were not to be imprisoned.
86 Stigma and the unmarried mother
These modifications proved highly unpopular. As Henriques
points out:
A stream of petitions flowed into parliament, complaining that
bastardy cases in Quarter Sessions were far too expensive; that
affiliation orders were only enforceable against propertied
men, so that only the rich could be made to pay for fathering
bastards; that parishes were prevented from recovering the cost
of supporting mother and child; that the law dealt severely with
the weaker party and overlooked the stronger and generally
more blameable one; and that, relieved of the fear of
punishment, the men did what they pleased.63
Although the Poor Law Commissioners attempted to counter
these criticisms by arguing that their measures were proving
successful in reducing the incidence of illegitimacy64 (a highly
dubious claim),65 they eventually succumbed to this pressure, and
the rights of parishes to obtain maintenance payments from
putative fathers were accordingly restored.66
As a result of the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act, poor,
unmarried mothers were forced, along with other members of the
undeserving poor, to enter the workhouse if they required public
aid. In many of these institutions unmarried mothers were
treated more harshly than other inmates. As Longmate points
out: T o remind them that they were moral outcasts, many unions
put their unmarried mothers into a distinctive yellow uniform,
the colour of a ship’s plague flag, the wearers being nicknamed
“canary wards,”. . . .’67 Some workhouse guardians also recog­
nized the deterrent value of ‘badging’ unmarried mothers. For
example, in 1837, the Andover guardians reported to the Poor
Law Commissioners that the introduction of a yellow stripe on
the uniforms of unmarried mothers ‘had proved a great success
and that several women had left the workhouse as soon as the
stripe had been forced upon them.’68
Advances in welfare provision for pauper children during the
latter part of the nineteenth century (e.g. ‘scattered homes’,
boarding out and educational opportunities)69 brought little
benefit to those unmarried mothers who did not wish to be parted
from their children (or to remain with their children in the
workhouse). Such mothers were often left with no alternative but
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 87
to leave their children in the ‘care’ of woefully inadequate baby
farmers, if they wished to retain their economic independence in
the wider community.
The poor standard of much of this provision was brought to
public attention in the late nineteenth century when a number of
foster mothers were prosecuted for neglect.70 The public outcry
which greeted these revelations improved the position of some
unmarried mothers in society. For example, the bastardy laws
were amended in 1872 in an effort to alleviate some of the
economic difficulties which had necessitated unmarried mothers
to place their children with baby farmers (under this act
unmarried mothers were: (i) given more time in which to submit
maintenance claims; (ii) provided with higher weekly
allowances).71
These measures were, however, completely irrelevant to those
unmarried mothers who had been forced to accept institutional
relief. Indeed, workhouse mothers were even faced with the
prospect of losing their last few remaining parental rights.
Legislation introduced in 1889 and 1899 permitted boards of
guardians to assume parental control over those children who
were deemed to have unfit parents. Extensive use was made of
this legislation (some 12,000 children were, for example,
‘adopted’ in this way in 1908).72
This compulsory form of adoption provides yet another
example of the repressive way in which unmarried mothers were
treated by secular authorities in the period from 1500 to 1900.
Throughout this period, attempts were made to limit the
demands made by unmarried mothers (and their children) for
public aid. Given that the public dependency of unmarried
mothers was deemed to be both wilful and unnecessary, it is not
surprising to find that the secular authorities showed little
compunction about using harsh sanctions to contain this partic­
ular source of public expenditure.
In addition to this institutional form of stigmatization,
unmarried mothers were also liable to experience hostile
reactions and sanctions (e.g. loss of accommodation or employ­
ment) from their immediate family, their employer and other
members of the community.
From the end of the nineteenth century onwards, however, one
can detect a gradual softening of secular attitudes towards
88 Stigma and the unmarried mother
unmarried mothers. There are a number of possible explanations
for this change. First, unmarried mothers benefited from the
growing concern that was displayed by both governments and the
general public towards the poor during this period. For example,
it can be argued that late nineteenth-century politicians were
compelled, as a result of the enfranchisement of large numbers of
the working class (which had been brought about by a series of
legislative measures from 1867 to 1885) and the spectre of
socialism, to re-examine their attitudes towards the poor. The
Webbs contend, for instance, that government reforms aimed at
improving the care of elderly paupers, which were introduced
immediately prior to the 1885 general election, were a deliberate
attempt to secure the support of some two million first-time
working-class voters.73 In addition, the social surveys conducted
by Booth (London) and Rowntree (York) in the 1880s served to
discredit the prevailing individualistic notions of poverty. Both
researchers concluded that poverty was far more likely to be
experienced as a result of an inadequate income from work,
sickness or disability than through idleness, drunkenness or some
other ‘character’ defect.74
Second, the more enlightened approach that was adopted
towards the needs of deprived children during the twentieth
century (the social and economic benefits of providing for the
basic needs of all children was clearly recognized in this period)
inevitably led to consideration being given to some of the various
ways in which unmarried mothers could be helped to bring up
their children. For example, the 1948 Children’s Act encouraged
local authorities to reunite children (who were in care) with their
natural parents or guardians wherever possible.75
Third, the effects of war served to underline the fact that the
material needs of unmarried mothers were very similar to those
of other, supposedly more deserving, categories of single parents
such as widows. As a result, unmarried mothers have become
more generally regarded as a group worthy of some form of
public support.
Fourth, recent (post-1940) social science research in the areas
of sociology, social administration and psychology has helped to
dispel the notion that unmarried mothers are immoral, promis­
cuous women who are undeserving of public support. It is
important to note, however, that many researchers in this area
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 89
may have hindered (often unwittingly) the development of even
more favourable public attitudes being displayed towards
unmarried mothers by their assertions that such women have a
tendency to be psychologically disturbed and/or socially deprived
(in terms of their social background). This contemporary source
of stigma will be discussed more fully later in the chapter.
Fifth, the establishment of pressure groups such as the
National Council for the Unmarried Mother and her Child
(1918)76 helped to increase public awareness of the problems
faced by unmarried mothers and their children. In particular, the
NCUMC played a key role in persuading the general public and
central and local government of the need to provide unmarried
mothers with an opportunity to care for their own children.77
Finally, the realization that harsh, deterrent sanctions had little
effect in terms of regulating sexual behaviour in society prompted
secular authorities to consider other ways of dealing with publicly
dependent unmarried mothers. Let us now look in more detail at
this second distinctive stigmatization period.

Stigmatization period 2: 1900 to the present day

The majority Poor Law Report of 1909 provides a good example
of how secular attitudes towards publicly dependent unmarried
mothers were changing at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Unlike their predecessors, the majority did not accept the idea
that all unmarried mothers should be treated in a uniform way.
Instead, they argued that there were three distinctive types of
unmarried mother:
1 the feeble-minded,
2 the depraved,
3 the unfortunate.
According to the majority, women who fell into the first category
needed to be strictly supervised and controlled as they were liable
to continually give birth to ‘chargeable’ illegitimate children.78
The depraved (‘women who habitually make a convenience of
the workhouse for the purpose of being confined with illegitimate
children’)79 were considered to be more amenable to treatment.
90 Stigma and the unmarried mother
The majority therefore recommended that this group of mothers
should be detained in a suitable institution for a fixed period of
time in order to regain their respectability. The majority were
even more optimistic about the rehabilitative potential of the
unfortunates (young mothers who had lapsed for the first time).80
They suggested that this group should be cared for in voluntary
homes rather than in the workhouse. Although there was a
degree of benevolence in this particular proposal it should be
remembered that the conditions in many of these homes were
little different from those pertaining in workhouses. As
Middleton points out, the regimes in such homes were often
‘callously punitive and exploitative, based on long hours of
drugery in the damp, hot, working conditions of a steam laundry
or an institutional kitchen, the only respite from the round of toil
and sleep being religious services and limited food.’81
The majority also made recommendations relating to maternity
and after-care facilities for mothers and the system of affiliation
awards. In terms of the latter, the majority questioned the
advisability of the existing direct payments scheme. They argued
that this procedure (which necessitated a mother making a visit to
the putative father at his place of work or at his lodgings in order
to collect her weekly allowance) could prove most unsettling for
mothers who were trying to regain their respectability, ‘it soon
becomes well known why she is there . . . with the result that her
shame is blazoned abroad and she becomes . . . the centre of a
degraded notoriety.’82
Although Poor Law Guardians were continually reminded of
the need to discriminate between these different categories of
unmarried mothers,83 they showed little inclination to act on the
recommendations contained in the majority’s report. As a result,
most publicly dependent unmarried mothers continued to be sent
to workhouses rather than voluntary homes.84
The plight of single parents was given considerable attention
after the outbreak of the First World War. The government of
the day accepted that it had a responsibility to protect the widows
and wives (both lawful and illicit) of servicemen from Poor Law
dependency. It was decided, therefore, to set up a national relief
fund to help those who had suffered financial hardship as a result
of the war (1914).
The Women’s Advisory Committee at the Ministry of Recon­
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 91
struction expressed particular concern about the situation of
unsupported mothers during this period.85 For example, in a
report submitted in 1918, the committee suggested that pensions
should be provided for all unsupported mothers.86. However,
when statutory provision was eventually introduced in this area
(1925) it was decided (on financial87 and ‘social’88 grounds) to
exclude all but widows from the scheme.89 As Finer and
McGregor point out:
the mothers’ pension movement broke down on its inability to
translate an aspiration into an administrative system that was
viable in itself and acceptable to currrent notions of family
responsibility, legal and moral. Thus, for divorced, deserted or
separated wives, and the mothers of illegitimate children, the
situation remained at the outbreak of the last world war as it
always had been: either they could secure maintenance from
their husbands or the fathers of their children by agreement, or
a court order, or failing such means of support, they had to
seek subsistence from the public.90
Unmarried mothers did, however, derive benefit from a
number of inter-war social policy initiatives. For example,
maternity and child welfare services were substantially improved
during this period. The high mortality rate amongst young
illegitimate children (particularly workhouse children)91
prompted the introduction of the Maternity and Child Welfare Act
in 1918. This statute empowered local authorities (in conjunction
with voluntary agencies) to improve services for expectant and
nursing mothers and for children below school age.92
A number of unmarried mothers also benefited from the
introduction of the 1926 Adoption Act. For example, this statute
provided unmarried women with an alternative means of parting
with an unwanted child (previously such women were forced to
resort to either abortion or infanticide).93 In addition, this act
permitted unmarried mothers to adopt their own children (many
young mothers experienced difficulties, however, when they
attempted to exercise their rights in this regard).94
It is important to note, though, that this act was not universally
welcomed. For example, a young, financially impoverished
unmarried mother who expressed a wish to keep her child was
92 Stigma and the unmarried mother
liable (because of this statute) to be pressurised (by her family
and welfare workers) into placing her child for adoption.95 In
addition, this statute enabled a number of adoption associations
to exploit unmarried mothers. These organizations would often
require mothers to make an undertaking that they would engage
in unpaid domestic work (for periods of up to two years) before
an adoption would be arranged. Given the heavy demand for
‘unwanted’ children, it was possible for the more unscrupulous of
these agencies to obtain ‘a double rake-off, the first payment
coming from the girl for being relieved of her child, the second
for finding a suitable child from couples who were willing to pay
sums ranging from £5 to £100.,96
Further attention was given to the plight of the unmarried
mother during the Second World War - a period in which the
number of illegitimate maternities rose sharply.97 As Ferguson
and Fitzgerald point out:
The war affected not only the size but also the character of the
social problem which was caused by illegitimacy: unmarried
mothers met with greater obstacles in trying to help themselves
or to obtain help. They were often away from their home
communities, living in hostels, billets or service camps. The
social services were curtailed and disorganised. There were
fewer beds in hospitals and homes. There was less chance of
finding foster-mothers or places in nurseries for the babies.
There were fewer welfare workers to devote their time to the
problems of unmarried mothers.98
As the war progressed the government gradually recognised
that the needs of unmarried mothers could not be adequately met
by voluntary and Poor Law services.99 For example, in a Ministry
of Health circular issued in 1943, local welfare authorities were
encouraged to improve the services they offered to unmarried
mothers. In particular, it was suggested that these authorities
should:
(i) appoint their own social workers;
(ii) introduce subsidized foster-mother schemes;
(iii) provide hostels and other residential accommodation.100
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 93
It is clear that the situation of publicly dependent unmarried
mothers improved markedly as a result of the collectivist nature
of much Second World War welfare policy-making. Accordingly,
post-war unmarried mothers were no longer forced to rely on
charity or Poor Law relief. Instead, they were seen as having a
clear entitlement to various welfare benefits and services. For
example, unmarried mothers (or expectant unmarried women)
were to be provided with:
1 Free maternity care either at home or in hospital.
2 Sickness benefits during any period of incapacity prior to the
birth of their child (employed women only).
3 Maternity allowances of 26s/week (for a period of thirteen
weeks) during their absence from work at the time of their
confinement (this allowance could also be supplemented by
discretionary National Assistance Board payments).
4 Free accommodation in a public or voluntary home in the
event of homelessness.101
It is important to note, however, that post-war income
maintenance schemes for unmarried mothers still bore the
remnants of the ethos of less eligibility. For example, in his
report on social insurance, Beveridge contended that single
parenthood was not a suitable case for this form of income
support.102 Accordingly,
the principles on which the State made provision for one-
parent families remained after the Beveridge Report precisely
what they had been before. Widows received pensions with the
possibility of supplementation, from the poor law or public
assistance or, after 1948, from national assistance. But
divorced, deserted or separated wives and unmarried mothers
remained throughout dependent on the poor law or its
substitutes, in the event of their receiving no support from
their husbands.103
Unmarried mothers have experienced considerable degrees of
stigmatization as a result of this continued dependency on means-
tested social security benefits. The administrative procedures of
the National Assistance Board (1948-66) and, subsequently, the
94 Stigma and the unmarried mother
Supplementary Benefits Commission (1966-80) have been identi­
fied as an important source of this stigmatization.104 For
example, in line with previous legislation, the Supplementary
Benefits Act of 1976 was designed to restrict demand for public
aid. To this end, all potential claimants were deemed to have
certain obligations with regard to both the maintenance of their
immediate dependents and to the seeking of employment.105
Unmarried mothers have expressed concern about two partic­
ular aspects of the liability to maintain regulations. In the first
place a number of mothers, who have exercised their right to
withhold information about the whereabouts of the father of their
child, have complained that they have been treated unfavourably
by social security officials. In certain cases mothers have even
been informed (quite incorrectly) that their benefit will be
withdrawn if they fail to provide information about their child’s
father.106 Secondly, unmarried mothers have complained about
cohabitation regulations. Mothers suspected of cohabiting have
frequently reported being harassed by social security officials.107
In addition, mothers who are not required to register for work
(on the grounds that they are caring for a dependent child) have
reported that officials have exerted considerable pressure on
them to return to full-time employment. A good example of such
pressure is provided by one of Marsden’s respondents.
They’ve [National Assistance Board officers] been right nasty
with me. They’re always trying to get me to get a job. They
made me sign on twice a week at the Labour Exchange. They
keep telling me, ‘You’ve got to find a job,’ and that used to
make me nervous and insecure, because I used to think they
might cut off my assistance and leave me with nothing.108
It should be noted that the distressing nature of both liable
relative and seeking work regulations may be compounded by the
attitude adopted by some of the officials who administer these
rules (i.e. unmarried mothers may be subjected to adverse
comments about their sexual conduct).
The difficulties experienced by unmarried mothers during their
contact with social security officials was one of the issues
considered by the Finer Committee in its report on one-parent
families, which was published in 1974.109 The publication of this
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 95
report can justifiably be regarded as a landmark in terms of
public recognition of the needs of unmarried mothers and other
single-parent families. In the view of the committee a thorough­
going review of the provision made for single parents in society
was essential given the change that had occurred in post-war
public attitudes towards sexual relationships and family life.
In this climate of opinion, compassion for the disadvantages
suffered by one-parent families has grown quickly. The old
tariff of blame which pitied widows but attached varying
degrees of moral delinquency to divorced or separated women
or to unmarried mothers is becoming irrelevant in the face of
the imperative recognition that what chiefly matters in such
situations is to assist and protect dependent children, all of
whom ought to be treated alike irrespective of their mothers’
circumstances.110
The committee devoted considerable attention to the question
of the financial situation of one-parent families. They recom­
mended that improvements should be made in both the
administration of court orders and supplementary benefit.111 For
example, in terms of the latter, the committee proposed that:
1 A special additional allowance should be paid to all lone
parents.
2 The full adult non-householder scale rate should be paid to
lone parents under eighteen (provided that they are
receiving supplementary benefit in their own right).
3 The withdrawal of benefit on grounds of cohabitation should
be delayed until the mother concerned has been given a
written statement of the facts and an opportunity to
appeal.112
The proposed introduction of a new, non-contributory, benefit
for all one-parent families (Guaranteed Maintenance Allowance)
was the most important financial recommendation made by the
committee. This new benefit was intended to:
1 Replace the existing, inadequate, system of maintenance
payments.
96 Stigma and the unmarried mother
2 Offer single parents a real choice about whether or not to
work.
3 Provide help for those with part-time or low full-time
earnings.
4 Be available to all categories of single parents.
5 Be simple to claim (i.e. postal application).
6 Be equitable vis-à-vis low income two-parent families.113
The proposed introduction of this benefit, which was to be paid
(at a rate dependent on individual circumstances) to all single
parents with sole responsibility for a dependent child was warmly
received by a number of commentators. For example, Murch
argues that GMA represented a
serious attempt to offer single fathers the opportunity of
staying at home and single mothers the opportunity of going to
work. Quite apart from the material benefits the symbolic
significance is that 90 per cent of single parents would be
spared prolonged dependence on a system which is still
stigmatically associated with the poor law and pauperism. In
this way GMA would offer some single parents a chance to
recover their lost dignity.114
Others, however, have been rather critical of certain aspects of
this scheme. For example, both Kincaid115 and Townsend116 have
expressed reservations about the inclusion of a means test in the
administration of this benefit and the high marginal rate of tax or
benefit reduction that single parents would experience upon
resuming work.
The committee also recognized that provision for single parents
needed to be improved in other areas - housing,117 employ­
ment,118 day care,119 personal social services,120 education121 and
family planning.122 For instance, in the case of the personal social
services, the committee were concerned that single parents were
not using this form of provision because of ignorance or fear of
disapproval.123 The committee recommended, therefore, that
social work services should be more effectively publicized and
that improvements should be made in reception and interviewing
facilities, office opening times and the system of financial
payments.124 The committee did not think it advisable, however,
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 97
to recommend the establishment of some form of separate
provision for one-parent families within each local social service
department. ‘Such an arrangement would tend to isolate one-
parent families from other families with social problems, and a
certain amount of stigma might come to attach to the new
service.’125
The main recommendations of the Finer Report have shown
little sign, however, of being implemented.126 Importantly, there
has been a complete absence of official support for the
introduction of a Guaranteed Maintenance Allowance for single
parents.127 As a result, large numbers of single parents have been
forced to rely on supplementary benefit (392,000 - November/
December 1981)128 and family income supplement (65,000 -
April 1982)129 as a means of financial support. The unsatisfactory
nature of this type of provision is reflected in the fact that
substantial numbers of needy, single parents fail to claim the
benefits to which they are entitled (single-parent take-up has
been estimated at 89 per cent for supplementary benefit (1977)130
and 53 per cent for family income supplement (1981)131). Take-
up has also been disappointing for the special single-parent
supplement - one-parent benefit (formerly child benefit increase)
- which was introduced in 1977 (estimated take-up 70 per cent in
December 1981).132
Although certain improvements have been made in both the
supplementary benefits system (e.g. an increase in the earnings
disregard for claimants;133 the payment of supplementary benefit
to schoolgirl mothers between the ages of sixteen and eighteen)134
and in housing provision (e.g. the housing needs of single parents
and other groups were given priority under the 1977 Housing
(Homeless Persons) Act)135 since the publication of the Finer
Report, it can generally be concluded that there has been no
major attempt to improve the material and social circumstances
of single parents in recent years.
Unmarried mothers have undoubtedly benefited from a
number of twentieth-century social policy initiatives (i.e. the
provision of certain welfare benefits and services has enabled this
group to obtain a limited degree of economic and social security).
Nevertheless, despite the emergence of this more enlightened
approach, unmarried mothers have continued to be denied full
social acceptance. Indeed, instead of being seen as an integral
98 Stigma and the unmarried mother
part o f society, unmarried mothers have tended to be regarded as
a social problem for society.
Dependency on public aid is the principal reason why
unmarried mothers continue to be regarded as a social problem.
The demand for public aid made by unmarried mothers is only to
be expected, though, given the difficulties this group face if they
wish to remain financially independent. For example, financial
self-sufficiency necessitates unmarried mothers (and other single
parents with dependent children) finding:
1 A local job which is relatively well paid.
2 An employer who appreciates that there will be a need to
take time off work at short notice.
3 Suitable day-care facilities for their children.
Given these difficulties, which are compounded by the precarious
position of women in the labour market, it is not surprising that
unmarried mothers are prone to public dependency.
The recent growth in the number of unmarried mothers (and of
one-parent families in general: see Table 3.1) has tended to
intensify public concern about this source of public dependency.
It should not be assumed, however, that this increase results from
some rapid rise in the number of illegitimate births (though there
has been a marked increase since 1977: see Table 3.2). This
increase in the number of unmarried mothers owes far more to
the reluctance shown by such women to either marry or place
their children for adoption.136
Doubts about the ability of unmarried mothers to perform
certain vital familial duties is another (related) reason why this
group continue to be regarded as a social problem. For example,
according to Perlman an infant ‘presents a problem of social
concern when he is kept by a socially, economically, and
culturally impoverished mother. There is question and concern
whether children reared under such complex disadvantaged
conditions can grow into “good citizens”.’137 The fact that
relatively large numbers of illegitimate children have been
received into care over the years138 has often been cited as an
example of the general inability of unmarried mothers to provide
a secure home environment for their children. Obviously, the
social standing of unmarried mothers has not been enhanced by
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 99
Table 3.1 Estimated number of one-parent families in Great
Britain in 1971,1976 and 1979

Sex and 1971 1976 1979 Percentage

marital status Number % Number % Number % change:
(000’s) (000’s) (000’s) 1971-1979
Mothers
Single 90 16 130 17 140 16 56
Widowed 120 21 115 15 110 13 -8
Divorced 120 21 230 31 310 36 158
Separated 170 30 185 25 200 23 18
Total 500 88 660 88 760 88 52
Fathers
Total 70 12 90 12 100 12 43
TOTAL
(All Families) 570 100 750 100 860 100 52

Sources: Compiled from, R. Leete, Table 4, p. 7 and National Council for One
Parent Families, 1981, p. 2.

Table 3.2 Illegitimate live births in England and Wales since 1945
(selected years)
Year Illegitimate live Percentage of all
births live births
(the illegitimacy ratio)
1945 63,420 9.3
1950 35,250 5.1
1955 31,145 4.7
1960 42,707 5.4
1965 66,249 7.7
1970 64,744 8.3
1975 54,891 9.1
1976 53,766 9.2
1977 55,379 9.7
1978 60,637 10.2
1979 69,467 10.9
1980 77,372 11.8
Source: National Council for One Parent Families, 1982, Table 6, p. 20.
100 Stigma and the unmarried mother
the expression of these doubts about their parenting skills.
When considering some of the reasons as to why stigma has
continued to attach to unmarried mothers in recent years, it is
important to reflect on the part played by social researchers in
this process. Since the 1940s the unmarried mother and her child
have been the subject of a number of social science research
studies (particularly in Britain and the United States). Clearly,
the results that have emerged from such investigations are likely
to have some effect on the way in which the unmarried mother is
regarded by both official bodies and the general public. It is
useful, therefore, to look in some detail at research in this area.
Studies of the unmarried mother have generally been under­
taken from either a psychological or sociological perspective. Let
us look at each of these approaches in turn.

Psychological Studies
Like Bowlby, most ‘psychological’ researchers in this field have
tended to assume that ‘in a western community, it is emotionally
disturbed . . . women who produce illegitimate children of a
socially unacceptable kind.’139 Accordingly, attempts have been
made to identify the particular personality factors which pre­
dispose unmarried women to engage in behaviour likely to lead
to the birth of an illegitimate child.
Extraversión, neuroticism, ambivalent ego identity, impuls-
ivity, poor tolerance and low IQ have been identified as the
predisposing factors which are likely to precipitate behaviour
which will lead to illegitimacy. For example, a neurotic girl might
become pregnant in order to secure a relationship with her
boyfriend (see Figure 3.1).
It should be noted at this point that a number of researchers
have specifically studied the unmarried mother from a psycho­
analytical perspective. Crucial to this form of investigation (which
derives largely from the work of Freud)140 is the ideal that all
behaviour has an underlying meaning. According to Young, this
method of investigation has helped to dispel the myth
that having an out-of-wedlock child is something that just
happens. On the contrary, everything points to the purposeful
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 101
nature of the act. Although a girl would obviously not plan
consciously and deliberately to bear an out-of-wedlock child,
she does act in such a way that this becomes the almost
inevitable result.141
Although psychoanalytical studies will be referred to in the
subsequent discussion, it should be remembered that a number of
psychologists have expressed grave doubts about the scientific
rigour of this particular form of investigation.142

Predisposing Precipitating
factors behaviour

Extraversión - Outgoing disposition and

gets more sexual contacts
Neuroticism
Not used contraception
Ambivalent i ILLEGITIMACY
identity

Wants secure and

understanding
relationship and sexual
fulfilment
Impulsivity z
poor toleran
Low IQ

Source: J.A. Vincent, Illegitimacy, p. 128.

Figure 3.1 Psychological explanations of ‘illegitimacy’
102 Stigma and the unmarried mother
Evidence of psychological disturbance amongst unmarried
mothers was found in a number of studies conducted in the 1940s.
For example, in one such study Kasanin and Handschin143 (United
States: 1941) came to the conclusion that each of their sixteen
respondents had displayed some form of unresolved oedipal
conflict. In another survey (of ten unmarried mothers aged between
thirteen and seventeen), Bernard144 (United States: 1944) found
that:
All the girls showed effects of early emotional malnutrition;
they received too little parental love, protection, esteem,
encouragement, and liberation to develop adequate emotional
security or inner controls and ideals in harmony with reality.
This general anxiety-ridden personality disturbance seems basic
to the elaboration of their psychosexual pathology.145
After studying a random sample of one hundred unmarried
mothers, who were known to an agency dealing with this group,
Young146 (United States: 1945) came to the conclusion that
dominant parents (especially mothers) could have an adverse
effect on the subsequent sexual behaviour of their daughters.
Fifty-eight out of the 100 girls had known mothers who
controlled their lives and their emotional development to an
extent that they could only result in damage to the whole
structure of their personalities. The degree of that damage
seemed to be in direct proportion to the power and destructive
quality of that control. In other words, the more dominating,
the more sadistic, the more rejecting the mother, the sicker
and more hopeless was the girl.147
For Young, all of these ‘unhappy’ girls ‘had blindly sought a way
out of their emotional dilemma by having an out-of-wedlock
child.’148
Pearson and Amacher (United States: 1956)149collected data on
3,594 unmarried mothers, who had been tested by the Minnesota
Department of Public Welfare psychological service as part of a
child placement programme (1946-51). Although 2,506 of these
mothers were judged to be emotionally and behaviourally
normal, some 657 were deemed to be neurotic (19 per cent); 123
- psychopathic (3.6 per cent); 116 - primary mental deficients
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 103
(3.4 per cent); 28 - psychotic (0.8 per cent) and 20 neurologically
disordered in various other ways (0.6 per cent). As they were
unable to draw any general conclusions from their study (a
control group had not been used), Pearson and Amacher had to
be content with merely expressing a hope ‘that the incidence of
rather serious personality or behavioural inadequacy (in the
general population) would not approach the 27.4 per cent which
we encountered in our sample of unwed mothers.’150
Psychological disturbance amongst unmarried mothers has also
been found in a number of research studies which have been
conducted since the 1940s. For example, Cattell151 (United
States: 1954) found that each of the 54 unmarried mothers he
interviewed in a New York nursing home in the early 1950s were
suffering from some form of personality problem (30 were
deemed to have a character disorder; to be neurotic; and 17 to
be schizophrenic).
In another survey (of 31, randomly selected, unmarried,
pregnant women), Greenberg et al.152 (United States: 1959)
found that:
the ego of most of the subjects appeared infantile and fragile.
Generally speaking, their concerns and orientations appeared
definitively preoedipal in quality and not primarily explainable
by the dependency state of pregnancy. They were particularly
sensitive to separations and often described themselves as both
frequently and severely depressed.153
Further investigations indicated that these mothers (unlike a
control group of 20 married mothers) ‘had marked, overt
psychopathology prior to pregnancy.’154
Eysenck155 (Great Britain: 1961) compared the personalities of
100 primiparous women with a similar sample of married women.
On the basis of her results, Eysenck provisionally concluded that
‘girls who might be expected to become pregnant before
marriage, would be those with high extraversión scores, or those
with high neuroticism scores, or, most likely of all, those who
score high on both.’156
In a study of 51 unmarried mothers (who had received
casework services from the Children’s Aid society of Pennsylvania
during the years 1959 to 1962), Bonan157 (United States: 1963)
104 Stigma and the unmarried mother
found that each of his subjects had a narcissistic character
structure. According to Bonan, a woman with such a character
structure is unlikely to become pregnant by accident.
In her acting out she is trying to escape from a serious internal
problem. Her level of ego development is infantile, or
primitive, and she has not developed mature methods for
resolving conflicts. Her reality-testing is defective; she is self-
absorbed and she cannot love others.158
Kravitz et al.159 (Canada: 1966) interviewed 83 unmarried
mothers (aged between fourteen and thirty-nine) who had been
referred to a special hospital clinic for unmarried mothers. They
found that unmarried women became pregnant ‘primarily as a
result of a deficient ego control in the presence of sexual
drive’.160
Two studies of the unmarried mother were undertaken by
Naiman161 (Canada: 1966 and 1971). In the first of these
investigations, a group of 14 unmarried mothers (who had
attended the Montreal Children’s service between December
1963 and March 1965) were compared with 18 married mothers
(who had attended the obstetrics clinic at a Montreal hospital
between February 1964 and March 1965). Both of these groups
were comprised of white, Protestant, Canadian born, women
aged between eighteen and twenty-five. It was found that the
unmarried mother group had ‘a greater degree of impulsivity and
a poorer ability to form stable relationships’162 than the control
group of married mothers. In the second of these surveys, the
same group of unmarried mothers was compared with a group of
15, predominantly white, Canadian born, women (aged between
eighteen and twenty-five) who had applied for a therapeutic
abortion at a Jewish general hospital. After finding a similarity
between the personalities of this ‘abortion group’ and the
‘married group’ in the previous survey, Naiman felt confident
enough to suggest that:
unmarried mothers constitute a distinct group, with particular
if not unique psychodynamic characteristics and that other
unmarried women either do not get pregnant or, if they do,
handle the matter either by getting married or by getting an
abortion. . . .163
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 105
Floyd and Viney164 (Australia: 1974) attempted to test the
applicability of a number of psychoanalytic hypotheses concern­
ing the ego identity and the ego ideal of unmarried mothers.
They compared 32, unmarried pregnant women (aged between
fifteen and twenty-five, who were residing in charitable homes)
with two control groups:
1 30, single, non-pregnant women who had been matched by
age and socio-economic status.
2 15, married, pregnant women who had been matched by
occupation, socio-economic status and education.
It was found that the unmarried pregnant women were more
ambivalent about their ego identities (the ability to experience
one’s self as something that has continuity and sameness, and to
act accordingly) and less inclined to view themselves as adequate
feminine individuals than either of the control groups.165
Finally, evidence from a number of studies has suggested that
unmarried mothers who keep their children are more likely to be
psychologically disturbed than those who place their children for
adoption. For example, Vincent166 (United States: 1961) tested
the personalities of 105 unmarried mothers who were living in
two Californian maternity homes. Mothers who decided to keep
their children were found to display a greater degree of
neuroticism than those who opted to place their children for
adoption.167
Jones et al.168 (United States: 1962) studied 90 unmarried
mothers who had been clients at a private New York city social
welfare agency. When compared with the women who had
surrendered their children for adoption, the 19 mothers who had
kept their children were found in general to be: (a) lower in
intelligence; (b) lower in ego strength or emotional stability; (c)
more submissive.169
Yelloly170 (Great Britain: 1965) compared 88 unmarried
mothers who had kept their children with 72 mothers who had
offered their children for adoption (all of these mothers had been
referred to a voluntary social work agency in the west of
England). She found that unstable or emotionally disturbed
mothers were more likely to keep their children ‘despite the
presence of characteristics which would ordinarily tend towards
106 Stigma and the unmarried mother
adoption’171 (e.g. a married putative father).
Two points should be borne in mind when considering the
results obtained in these various psychological studies of the
unmarried mother. Firstly, research in this area has tended to
focus almost exclusively on those unmarried mothers who have
been living in mother and baby homes or similar institutions.
Clearly, respondents obtained from such sources are unlikely to
provide a representative cross-section of the unmarried mother
population. Secondly, results based on personality tests or
professional evaluations of an individual’s psychological make-up
should be treated with the utmost caution given the highly
subjective nature of these procedures. In particular, it should be
remembered that unmarried mothers have often been encouraged
(or, indeed, required) to adopt a psychological interpretation of
their previous behaviour by the welfare professionals they have
come into contact with.172
Public acceptance of the notion that unmarried mothers are
likely to be psychologically disturbed owes much to the
emergence of professional social work practice in both Britain
and the United States. Psychological theories were widely
adopted by social workers for two main reasons. Firstly, these
theories were ideally suited to the dominant social work method
- casework. For example, as Croxen points out, psychoanalytic
theory provided social workers with ‘a therapeutic procedure and
a whole technique of enquiry’.173 By the use of this theory, social
work clients could thus be encouraged ‘to analyse their situation,
come to terms with their problem, adjust accordingly and re­
enter the social system as “cured” individuals.’174
Secondly, the adoption of these theories enabled social
workers to press their claims for professional status. By
emphasizing the psychological basis of many of the problems that
were being experienced by various members of society, social
workers attempted to demonstrate that the care and therapy
required by those in need necessitated the involvement of well-
trained experts rather than unqualified voluntary workers.
Unmarried mothers were considered (amongst others) to be a
particularly suitable client group for psychoanalytical casework.
For instance, the fact that relatively large numbers of unmarried
mothers tended to reside in maternity homes (of one sort or
another) both before and after their confinements, provided
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 107
social workers with a ready-made opportunity to establish the
long-term casework relationships (which were deemed essential if
this form of intervention was to prove beneficial) with this group.
In addition, it was possible to gauge the effectiveness of this form
of therapy with unmarried mothers in a relatively straightforward
way (i.e. by examining the level of ‘recidivism’175 and the extent
of dependency on welfare services).
It is now pertinent to consider the possible effect that this
evidence of psychological disturbance has had upon the stigma
attaching to the unmarried mother.
Cheetham, for example, argues that the development of
psychological theories of unmarried motherhood
represents an attempt, most important and much needed, to
challenge the sometimes sentimental or ill-informed stereo­
types of unmarried mothers as either the innocent victims of
predatory men or as over-sexed women whose uncontrollable
urges make them careless and undiscriminating in their sexual
relations.176
As she continues:
such explanations can be extremely useful in attempting to
understand the pregnancies of women who seem very ambiva­
lent about what course of action they should take; of those who
are at a loss to explain how they became pregnant; of the
older, educated or sophisticated woman whose pregnancies
would seem, at first sight, to be a social and personal disaster
which apparently they could have avoided; of some of those
who repeatedly conceive outside marriage; and of the girls who
seem caught in a web of unhappy family relationships. In some
circumstances these explanations throw light on behaviour that
is apparently meaningless, self-centred and self-damaging, and
can alert workers to the importance of designing help which
takes account of the complex needs and emotions contributing
to such behaviour.177
Clearly, from this perspective psychological explanations of
unmarried motherhood are seen as having a positive role to play
108 Stigma and the unmarried mother
in terms of countering the stigma that has attached to the
unmarried mother. Indeed, Gill even suggests that a prior
softening of public attitudes towards illegitimacy was necessary in
order to facilitate the acceptance of these particular theories.178
In contrast, it can be argued that psychological explanations of
unmarried motherhood have merely reinforced the stigma that
has attached to such mothers. Individuals deemed to be
psychologically disturbed in contemporary society are unlikely to
be treated in a particularly favourable way by their fellow
citizens.179 On the contrary, they are liable instead to experience
a considerable degree of social rejection (e.g. snubs, adverse
comments, difficulties in obtaining and retaining a job). In
addition, the psychologically disturbed are liable to be subjected
to official forms of control and treatment on the grounds that
they constitute some forms of threat to society. Indeed,
unmarried mothers have been a target for a particularly
repressive form of such control in the not-so-distant past (e.g.
compulsory detention under the 1913 Mental Deficiency Act).180
This approach to the impact that psychological explanations of
unmarried motherhood are likely to have upon the stigma
attaching to this group appears to be far more plausible than the
one previously outlined. Although psychological theories may be
of some use in explaining the pregnancies of a small number of
unmarried women, it seems highly questionable to suggest (or, at
least imply), as many researchers appear to have done, that
unmarried motherhood per se is evidence of some underlying
psychological disturbance. Such a contention only serves to
sustain the notion that unmarried motherhood is a social problem
which requires containment and control. As a result, little or no
attention is given to the possibility that women may deliberately
choose to become (or, at least, are prepared to become) pregnant
outside of marriage. Importantly, psychological explanations of
unmarried motherhood can effectively serve to conceal the
major, underlying reason why stigma continues to attach to
unmarried mothers - namely, their dependency on public aid.

Sociological Studies
A number of sociological studies have tended to suggest that
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 109
unmarried motherhood is more likely to be found amongst the
poorer sections of society and in certain racial groups.

Unmarried motherhood: lower social class association

Evidence associating illegitimacy with the lower social classes has
been found in a number of studies. For example, in a survey of
278 illegitimate births in a Midlands city (‘Midboro’) in the late
1940s, Hughes181 (Great Britain: 1949) found that the majority of
the mothers concerned came from the lower social classes.
Similarly, after studying the records of all women who had given
birth to an illegitimate child in Aberdeen during the years 1949 to
1952, Thompson182 (Great Britain: 1956) came to the conclusion
that ‘illegitimacy tends to be associated with unskilled, unattrac­
tive, or menial occupations.’183 This finding was confirmed in a
subsequent survey of illegitimacy in Aberdeen in the early 1960s.
(It should be noted, however, that the association between
illegitimacy and lower social class membership was not found to
be as strong as in the previous survey: see Gill184 (Great Britain:
1977).)
Unmarried mothers have also been found to have a lower
social class profile in a number of other surveys. For example, in
a study of 39 cohabiting, and 27 non-cohabiting, unmarried
mothers, who were living in south-east Essex, Yarrow185 (Great
Britain: 1964) found that 36 of the former and 22 of the latter
could be classified as working class. Hopkinson186 (Great Britain:
1976) also found that the vast majority (86 per cent) of the 116
unmarried mothers she interviewed in the early 1970s came from
social classes III to V. In Addition, evidence from surveys
conducted by Yelloly187 (see pp. 105-6) and Weir188 (Great
Britain: 1970) suggests that lower social class unmarried mothers
are more likely to keep their children than place them for
adoption.
Before looking at the question of the potential impact of these
sociological studies upon the stigma attaching to the unmarried
mother, it is necessary to point out that neither Weir189 (who
collected data on 288 illegitimate maternities in an area of
Scotland) or Crellin et al.190 (Great Britain: 1971, who examined
the social background of 679 illegitimate children as part of the
110 Stigma and the unmarried mother
National Child Development Study) found any evidence to
suggest that working-class women were over-represented in their
surveys of illegitimacy.191
Despite the usual objections that can be made about the
sampling procedures used in these research studies, there does
not appear to be any valid reason why one should reject the
notion that working-class women are more likely to become
unmarried mothers than their middle class counterparts. How­
ever, greater caution needs to be exercised when one comes to
examine some of the explanations that have been put forward to
account for the fact that illegitimacy tends to be more prevalent
amongst the lower social classes. For example, a number of
commentators have argued that the higher rate of illegitimacy
amongst this section of the population is directly attributable to
the defective nature of working-class culture. As Thompson, an
exponent of this viewpoint, states:
Illegitimacy, like delinquency, thrives when social values,
cultural as well as material, are low. Insecure family life, poor
and overcrowded homes, lack of constructive recreational aims
and outlets, lack of general planning ability, and permissive
attitudes to extra-marital relations may all contribute to its
occurrence.192
This ‘working-class culture’ explanation of illegitimacy has
proved extremely popular despite the existence of alternative
(and arguably more persuasive) explanations as to why working-
class women are more likely to have illegitimate children. For
example, it can be argued that working-class women run a far
greater risk of involuntary unmarried motherhood because of the
fact that they tend to (i) be more poorly informed about the
availability and use of contraceptives; (ii) find it more difficult to
obtain an abortion.193
The fact that most researchers working in this field have tended
to accept the assumption that unmarried motherhood constitutes
a serious social problem for society, is one of the reasons why this
working-class culture explanation of illegitimacy has proved so
popular (i.e. it is an explanation which suggests that the ‘problem
of unmarried motherhood’ can be solved within the existing
structure of society). Indeed, many researchers have presented
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 111
and interpreted their survey findings in ways which have enabled
this particular explanation of illegitimacy to flourish. For
example, the interpretation that has frequently been placed on
the fact that working-class unmarried mothers are more likely to
keep their children than place them for adoption is that such
women lack social responsibility because of the inadequacy of
their cultural background. However, this type of explanation is
clearly open to question. As Macintyre points out:
it is equally plausible to attribute higher rates of keeping
among working cass women to socially valued characteristics
such as a greater love for children, a greater willingness to
sacrifice reputation and personal advancement for the sake of
a child, and on the part of kin and neighbours to provide
support.194
The appeal of this working-class culture explanation of
illegitimacy can be linked to other theoretical developments in
the social sciences. In particular, it is necessary to refer (in this
context) to the culture of poverty thesis which has been advanced
by Lewis and others.195 Lewis contends that the poor have, in
response to their experiences of deprivation (e.g. ill-health, low
incomes, unemployment, inadequate housing), developed their
own distinctive culture. According to Lewis, this culture of
poverty is characterized by: early sexual experience, promiscuity,
high illegitimacy and desertion rates and non-participation in
formal and informal social agencies such as trade unions or clubs.
In addition, those imbued with the culture of poverty are deemed
to be fatalistic, impulsive, helpless and prone to dependency.196
Lewis lays great stress on the resilient nature of the culture of
poverty, arguing that it can be transmitted from one generation
to the next.
By the time slum children are age six or seven they have
usually absorbed the basic values and attitudes of their sub­
culture and are not psychologically geared to take full
advantage of changing conditions or increased opportunities
which may occur in their lifetime.197
Despite the fact that Lewis’s culture of poverty thesis has
112 Stigma and the unmarried mother
attracted numerous theoretical and methodological criticisms,198
it has nonetheless proved to be extremely popular in certain
political quarters in both Great Britain and the United States.199
For example, Sir Keith Joseph (paying scant regard to Lewis’s
assertion that a culture of poverty is unlikely to flourish in an
advanced capitalist society with adequate welfare services)200 has
argued that a ‘cycle of deprivation’ exists in Britain. Joseph and
others who subscribe to this hypothesis believe that:
Certain inadequate parents do not provide the love, firmness,
guidance and stimulus which most normal children receive.
Being poorly socialized, their children do not acquire the
motivation, skills and capacities necessary to avail themselves
of educational and job opportunities. In turn, they will grow up
only to transmit the same behaviour patterns to their offspring
who, therefore, will also remain in poverty.’201
Importantly, unmarried mothers have been identified as one
group of ‘inadequate’ poor parents who are likely to transmit
such deprivation.202
By linking illegitimacy with the culture of poverty, it has been
possible to reinforce the notion that unmarried motherhood is
socially disreputable (i.e. it is a phenomenon peculiar to the
poorer (and behaviourally deficient) sections of society).

Unmarried motherhood: the dimension of race

The racial dimension of unmarried motherhood has been given a
good deal of attention in the United States.203 In particular,
illegitimacy has tended to be linked with negro culture. It has
been argued, for example, that the ‘acceptance’ of illegitimacy by
the negro population can be directly traced back to the forcible
enslavement of their forebears (i.e. negro slaves were permitted,
and often encouraged, to form illicit sexual relationships).204
Following the ‘emancipation’ (latter half of the nineteenth
century) and subsequent migration of negroes from the rural
south to the industrial north (early twentieth century), the white
community began to express considerable concern about what
they perceived as deficiencies in the negro family structure. As
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 113
Gutman points out: ‘The twin evils of familial “instability” and
sexual “immorality” supported the advocacy of new forms of
external control over blacks, including disenfranchisement and
increasingly rigorous legal separation.’205
Sociological research studies on negro unmarried mothers have
tended to reflect this ‘white’ concern about negro culture. For
example, after studying 11 unmarried, pregnant negro women in
North Carolina, Hertz and Little206 (United States: 1944) came to
the conclusion that ‘illegitimacy can best be understood when
examined in its cultural context, which may be responsible for the
differential rate of illegitimacy between white and negro
groups.’207 Similarly, Knapp and Cambria208 (United States:
1947) found (after interviewing 49 negro unmarried mothers who
had been accepted for study and treatment by the Family Service
Association of Washington during 1945) that the greater
acceptance of illegitimacy amongst this group was primarily
related to cultural factors.
The assertion that illegitimacy can be linked to deficiencies in
negro culture has also received official support in the United
States. For example, in a Department of Labor report209 - The
Negro Family: The Case For National Action (The Moynihan
Report: 1965) - it was argued that high illegitimacy rates and
welfare applications amongst the negro population could be
explained by reference to cultural factors.
The assertion that the negro family structure is inherently
unstable has, however, been challenged by a number of
commentators.210 For instance, Ryan has drawn attention to the
way in which negro culture explanations can effectively serve to
conceal the fact that the organization of American society
provides disproportionate advantages for the white, middle-class
section of the population.
Pointing to the supposedly deviant Negro family as the
‘fundamental weakness of the Negro community’ is another
way to blame the victim. Like ‘cultural deprivation,’ ‘Negro
family’ has become a shorthand phrase with stereotyped
connotations of matriarchy, fatherlessness, and pervasive
illegitimacy.211
Interestingly, there has also been a movement in the United
114 Stigma and the unmarried mother
States (since the late 1950s) to distinguish between the culture of
middle- and lower-class negroes (the former being seen as much
more inclined to accept white, middle-class values). As the
Billingsleys point out, middle-class negroes have come to be
regarded as having ‘tendencies towards monogamy, stable
residence, the ideal of economic dominance by the father, rigid
discipline and sex mores, heterogeneous occupations, thrift,
caution, inhibition of aggression and sex, ambition, initiative and
manners.’212 In contrast, lower-class negroes have continued to
be regarded as impulsive, aggressive and lacking in rigid sexual
mores. 213
Although illegitimacy has not been linked with race to anything
like the same degree in Great Britain, it is important to note that
a greater emphasis has been given to the factor of ethnicity in
recent years. In particular, medical and other welfare personnel
have been showing increased concern about the incidence of
illegitimacy amongst young, ‘West Indian’ women.214 It seems
likely, therefore, that the racial dimension of unmarried mother­
hood will be subjected to more extensive scrutiny in forthcoming
years. Indeed, there are already signs of a movement in this
direction. For example, one notable commentator has recently
argued that the civil disturbances in Brixton during the summer
of 1981 can be attributed to the growth of West Indian single­
parent families.215
What effect, then, is this association between illegitimacy and
race likely to have upon the stigma attaching to the unmarried
mother? It seems highly probable that this association will only
serve to intensify the stigma which has come to be attached to the
unmarried mother. By linking illegitimacy with racial groups,
who are commonly regarded as socially inferior, it has been
possible to highlight the unacceptable nature of unmarried
motherhood. Similarly, persistent levels of illegitimacy amongst
certain ethnic groups is likely to be regarded by many as yet
further ‘evidence’ of the innate inferiority of this section of the
population. Researchers working in this area who wish to avoid
intensifying the stigma which has attached both to the unmarried
mother and certain racial groups would be well advised,
therefore, to exercise caution when presenting their ‘findings’.
When considering the part social researchers may have played
in reinforcing the stigma which has attached to the unmarried
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 115
mother, it is also necessary to examine a number of social
administration studies of the illegitimate child (the highlighting of
the social and economic disadvantages suffered by illegitimate
children who are not adopted can clearly help to sustain the
belief that unmarried mothers are unlikely to make adequate
parents).

Social administration studies of the illegitimate child

The National Child Development Study has provided some of the
most detailed information about the circumstances of illegitimate
children (see pp. 109-10). As part of this study, Crellin et al.216
compared the development of a group of illegitimate children
(679) with a sample of legitimate children (16,321). In this
investigation, it was found that the mortality rate amongst
illegitimate children (in the first seven years of life) was markedly
higher than in the legitimate group217 and that the former tended
to be more clumsy and restless than the latter.218
Illegitimate children who remain with their natural mothers
also showed poorer intellectual ability and attainment (i.e. in
terms of arithmetic, reading, general knowledge, oral ability,
creativity and perceptual development) than either illegitimate
children who had been adopted or legitimate children.219 In
addition, illegitimate children who remained with their natural
mothers were also found to experience greater difficulties in
terms of their behaviour and adjustment in school.220
Non-adopted illegitimate children also fared less well in terms
of their home environment than either of the other groups.
A high proportion among the illegitimate sample lived in a
home which had no father figure; a majority of the mothers
went out to work, both before and after the child went to
school; mobility was high and so was the degree of over­
crowding; a third of the children’s homes lacked the use of one
or more of such amenities as an indoor lavatory, hot water
supply, a bathroom and their own cooking facilities; and a high
proportion of the children experienced some form of substitute
care, either on a day or residential basis.221
116 Stigma and the unmarried mother
In the light of this evidence, it is not surprising to find that these
authors came to the conclusion that illegitimate children:
were beset by a multiplicity of unfavourable circumstances which
not only gave them a relatively poorer start in life but which
continued to build up into a complex web of cumulative and
interacting disadvantages and deprivations. Thus at the present
time, to be born illegitimate is still to be born disadvantaged.222
Subsequent surveys by Ferri223 (Great Britain: 1976) and
Lambert and Streather224 (Great Britain: 1980) (which made use
of the same population group) have merely served to confirm the
fact that illegitimate children are prone to experiences of
deprivation.
Unfavourable evidence relating to illegitimate children has also
been found in other studies.225 In one such study, the home
backgrounds of 79 illegitimate children who were either living
with their natural mothers (70) or with relatives (9) were assessed
by caseworkers on behalf of Steel226 (Great Britain: 1955). The
care received by a third of these children was adjudged to be
unsatisfactory.
In some cases there were quarrels and rivalry over the
upbringing of the child between the mother and the grand­
mother, who often had the care of the child during the day
when the mother was at work. In other cases the mother was
backward or unbalanced, lazy or promiscuous. Some mothers
frequently changed their work and their lodgings, their home
background having little stability.227
In another study in which the circumstances of one- and two-
parent families in five areas of Great Britain were compared,
Hunt et al.228 (Great Britain: 1973) found that children living in
one-parent households were more likely to be deprived in some
way (e.g. in terms of the level of household income, standard of
housing and educational opportunity).
Evidence of maladjustment and emotional disturbance
amongst illegitimate children (and amongst children from one-
parent families in general) has also been found in a number of
surveys in this field. For example, in a study of children in
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 117
residential maladjusted schools, Pringle229 (Great Britain: 1961)
found that 15 per cent of the children concerned were illegitimate
and that a further 53 per cent had suffered some form of family
disruption. A Scottish Education Department working party230
(Great Britain: 1964) also found evidence that illegitimate
children brought up in female-headed households were quite
frequently maladjusted.
Murchison231 (Great Britain: 1974) has also drawn attention to
the results obtained in two inner London educational reports.
The first report was based on a study of an inner London
maladjusted school. It was found that all of the 100 children who
had been admitted to this school during the period from
December 1964 to November 1970 (30 per cent of whom had
come from single-parent families) ‘had serious problems of
behaviour or conduct, and all had severe learning disturbances,
despite being of at least average intelligence.’232 The second
report was concerned with a study of 30,000, eight-year-old
children who were attending inner London schools during 1968-9.
It was found that children from one-parent families (of varying
income levels) were more likely to experience emotional
problems than other deprived children.233
Both Dell234 (Great Britain: 1972) and Gill235 (Great Britain:
1977) have found evidence that children living in single-parent
families are poorer in terms of intellectual ability and attainment
than children being brought up in two-parent households. Dell
studied 1,562, fourteen-year-old Glasgow schoolchildren and
found that pupils from one-parent families performed less well on
reading tests than their two-parent counterparts. Gill, in a
random survey of primary schoolchildren in Aberdeen, found
that the educational attainment of those children who had spent
the whole of their life in a single-parent family compared
unfavourably with those children who had been brought up either
in a two-parent family or in an ‘anomalous’ family situation (i.e.
with step-parents or adoptive parents). However, Gill is quick to
point out that the poorer educational achievements of children
living in single-parent families ‘may be attributed as much to the
lower social class of these families as to the experience itself.’236
Surveys by Packman237 (Great Britain: 1968) and Rowe and
Lambert238 (Great Britain: 1973) have also indicated that large
numbers of illegitimate children are likely to be taken into (and
118 Stigma and the unmarried mother
remain in) some form of residential care. In a study of 4,500
applications for reception into care, Packman found that
illegitimate children accounted for 28 per cent of the long-term
admissions. Rowe and Lambert collected data on 2,812 children
(aged 11 or under) who had been in the care of either a local
authority or a voluntary agency for at least six months. They
found that some 50 per cent of their total sample was illegitimate.
Unlike legitimate children in care, this illegitimate group tended
to: come into care when very young; have little contact with their
natural parents; remain in care for relatively long periods of time;
be in poorer health; be at greater risk of inherited illness; be
lower in average intelligence and more prone to behavioural
problems.
In other surveys, illegitimate children (and children living in
single-parent families) have been found to be particularly prone
to delinquency.239 For example, in a study of 92 teenage
illegitimate children (aged between fourteen and fifteen), who
had been brought up by their natural mothers, The Unmarried
Parenthood Committee of the Welfare Council of Toronto240
(Canada: 1943) found that nearly a quarter of this group had
engaged in some form of delinquent behaviour.
In another survey (based on a long-term investigation of 411
boys who had attended one of six junior primary schools in a
working-class district of London), West241 (Great Britain: 1969)
found that illegitimate boys (25) were ‘particularly delinquent-
prone: 10 of the 25 became juvenile delinquents, of whom 7 had
a record of at least two delinquencies, and when convictions of
young adults were included 11 were delinquents, with 10 of them
having more than one delinquent record.’242
More favourable evidence relating to illegitimate children has,
however, been found in other surveys. For instance, in a study in
Leicester (Macdonald243: Great Britain: 1956) health visitors
were asked to assess the home circumstances and physical and
emotional development of 238 five-year-old illegitimate children
(the vast majority of whom (182) were living with their natural
mothers). Macdonald reports that:
In the great majority of cases the assessments in all respects
were satisfactory, there being no financial or emotional
problem in the home, the care, physical and mental develop-
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 119
ment of the child, and the child’s emotional development being
satisfactory.244
In a survey by Steel245 (Great Britain: 1960), caseworkers also
formed a favourable impression of the progress that a group of
six-year-old illegitimate children, whom they had been asked to
assess, had made (these children had all been brought up by their
natural mothers).
Three studies in the United States lend support to the
viewpoint that illegitimate children can be satisfactorily cared for
by their natural mothers. In the first of these studies, Reed246
(United States: 1962) found that the physical, mental and
emotional development of illegitimate children being cared for by
their natural mothers (118) was, in the majority of cases, highly
satisfactory.
In a survey by Wright247 (United States: 1965), caseworkers
were asked to make an assesment of the progress that had been
made by a group of three- and four-year-old illegitimate children
who had been brought up by their natural mothers. Contrary to
their expectations, the caseworkers found that the majority of
these children had been well cared for and were progressing
satisfactorily.
After comparing the care and development of a sample of
black, illegitimate children, who had remained with their
mothers, with a matched group of legitimate children, Oppel248
(United States: 1969) could find no significant differences
between the two groups. In addition, it should be noted that
studies by Buchinal249 (United States: 1964), Feldman and
Feldman250 (United States: 1975) and Raschke and Raschke251
(United States: 1979) have all indicated that children are not
adversely affected by living in single-parent households.
The fact that these favourable results can be used to counter
the less favourable impressions of the circumstances of illegiti­
mate children which have been presented in other social
administration studies in this area, does not negate the need to
give consideration to the possible impact that these latter findings
may have had upon the stigma attaching to the unmarried mother
in contemporary society.
At the onset, it must be stressed that researchers working in
this field have not deliberately set out to stigmatize the unmarried
120 Stigma and the unmarried mother
mother. Indeed, many researchers have constantly drawn atten­
tion to the need for greater public support and improved levels of
material aid for unmarried mothers and their children.252
However, there has been a marked tendency to regard unmarried
mothers, per se, as unsatisfactory parents. For example, when
speculating about why unmarried mothers may find it difficult to
satisfactorily carry out their parental obligations, many
researchers have seen fit to focus exclusively on the individual
characteristics of mothers themselves rather than on the impact
that social and economic deprivation may have in this regard.253
Crellin et al. provide a useful illustration:
One would expect, for example, that a stable, well-educated
woman of 25 with some professional training might well be
able to provide a satisfactory environment for her child even
though he lacks a constant father figure; at least, she is more
likely to do so than say a 17-year-old, backward girl. . . .254
In addition, researchers often refer to the individual character­
istics of unmarried mothers when making suggestions for reform
in ‘family policy’. Consider, for instance, the following sugges­
tions that Pringle, a leading exponent in this field, has put
forward.
The myth of the blood tie should be replaced by the concept of
responsibility and informed parenthood. The ability and
willingness to undertake its responsibilities are neither depen­
dent nor necessarily consequent upon, biological parenthood.
Rather it is the unconditional desire to provide a caring home,
together with the emotional maturity to do so, which are the
hallmarks of good parenting. Responsible parenthood also
includes having only as many children as the couple can
emotionally tolerate and financially afford.255
a social climate will have to be created in which it is considered
irresponsible to have children before, say, the age of twenty-
two or twenty-three.256
Bringing up children is too important a task to be left entirely
to those parents who are patently in need of support, guidance
and, where necessary, sanctions on part of the community.257
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 121
Clearly, unmarried mothers, who are likely to: (a) experience
financial difficulties in bringing up their children; (b) be under
twenty-two years of age when their child was born (see Table
3.3); and (c) require various forms of community support are one
group of parents whom Pringle would regard as potentially
unsuitable parents. Indeed, she even seems to be suggesting that
some unmarried mothers (perhaps the majority) should not be
permitted to care for their own children.
Table 3.3 Illegitimate live births by mother’s age at birth: 1980
(England and Wales)
Age of mother at birth Illegitimate live births %
Under 16 1,274 1.6
16-19 24,586 31.8
20-24 2b,mi 34.4
25-29 13,462 17.4
30-34 7,588 9.8
35-39 3,047 3.9
40-44 761 1.0
45-49 44 0.1
50 And Over 3 -

All Ages 77,372 100.0

Source: National Council for One Parent Families, 1981, Table 4, p. 19.

Such statements merely serve to sustain the belief that

unmarried motherhood (being a reflection of some form of
individual inadequacy) is a social problem requiring policies of
containment and control. No credence is given to the possibility
that unmarried motherhood might be better regarded as an
alternative, but equally acceptable, family unit.
It is difficult to assess the impact that unfavourable social
science research findings relating to unmarried motherhood may
have upon the stigma attaching to this group. For example, it can
plausibly be argued that the limited circulations of the journals in
which social science research tends to be published will minimize
the potential impact that unfavourable findings may have upon
either the attitudes of policy-makers or the general public.
Alternatively, though, research findings may (as a result of
122 Stigma and the unmarried mother
dissemination via the mass media) receive a good deal of
attention and, as such, play a significant role both in the
formation of public opinion and in terms of influencing policy­
makers. From this latter perspective, the publication of unfav­
ourable research findings could (in the absence of any reference
to the various economic and social disadvantages which
unmarried mothers are forced to endure) reinforce the stigma
attaching to the single mother.
Before looking finally at the question of whether contemporary
unmarried mothers are likely to feel stigmatized in their day-to-
day lives, it is useful, at this stage, to briefly summarize the main
arguments that have been presented in this chapter. It has been
contended that there are two principal reasons why stigma has
attached to the unmarried mother over the centuries - (1) the
challenge presented to Christian beliefs; (2) ‘blameworthy’ public
dependency. As was shown earlier, ecclesiastical authorities
attempted to express their disapproval of illegitimacy by imposing
some form of penance on those unmarried mothers who were
brought before the church courts. Although it is difficult to assess
the impact that this form of stigmatization had upon unmarried
mothers, it seems likely that the public humiliation involved
would have adversely affected a large percentage of those women
who were sanctioned in this way.
Although ‘Christian stigmatization’ of the unmarried mother
has markedly declined since the sixteenth century, it is important
to note that unmarried motherhood is still regarded as a serious
moral problem by certain sections of contemporary society. In
addition, the Christian church has continued to take an active
interest in the moral welfare of the unmarried mother and her
child (e.g. by the employment of their own social workers).
‘Blameworthy’ public dependency has, however, been identi­
fied as the main reason why stigma has tended to attach to the
unmarried mother over the centuries (particularly since 1500).
During the period from 1500 to 1900, secular authorities
attempted to limit the demand made by unmarried mothers upon
public funds by means of the imposition of various physical and
economic sanctions. Since 1900, however, there has been a
detectable softening in secular attitudes towards the unmarried
mother. Four possible explanations for this change were identi­
fied: (i) greater commitment towards the poor on the part of
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 123
governments; (ii) more enlightened approach towards the needs
of dependent children; (iii) the effects of war; (iv) the impact of
social science research. It was pointed out, though, that implicit
forms of secular stigmatization have still tended to persist in
recent decades (e.g. unmarried mothers have tended to be given
either inadequate or inappropriate forms of economic and social
support).
In the latter part of this chapter attention was also given to one
(rather neglected) way in which the stigma attaching to the
unmarried mother may have been reinforced in recent years -
namely the influence of social science research. It was argued that
the tendency on the part of researchers working in this field to
associate unmarried motherhood with other negative character­
istics (e.g. psychological disturbance) could, in the absence of
more detailed discussions about the social and economic
disadvantages that these mothers are likely to experience, tend to
create the impression that single motherhood is an unacceptable
social phenomenon rather than an alternative (but equally
acceptable) family formation.
Finally, in looking at the relationship between stigma and
unmarried motherhood, it is useful to consider (albeit briefly)
whether contemporary unmarried mothers actually feel stigma­
tized in their day-to-day lives. A survey which I conducted in
south-east England in the late 1970s is of some use in this
regard.258 Although the majority (86 per cent) of the 36 mothers
who took part in this survey reported that they did not generally
feel stigmatized in their day-to-day lives, they did admit to
experiencing some form of felt stigma. For example, a number of
mothers (13)259 stated that they had felt stigmatized because of their
dependency on supplementary benefit. These mothers outlined
various reasons as to why they had felt stigmatized about
receiving this form of welfare support:
1 Dependency per se (‘I would much sooner earn it myself. I
prefer to get it that way’).
2 The possibility of being classified as a scrounger (‘I don’t like
people pointing out that the state keeps me - you live off the
state’).
3 The attitude adopted by social security staff (‘They’re so sort
of nosey when they come round. They just want to know
124 Stigma and the unmarried mother
everything. How many sets of clothes you’ve got, how many
pairs of pants, bras, etc. How many cigarettes do you
smoke? What do you do with your money? They just want to
know everything about your life and I’m not prepared to tell
them’).
4 The claiming procedure (‘It’s sitting in the social security
office. Although there are people sitting around you in
similar situations I hate having to go up to the desk within
ear shot of other people’).
In addition (when questioned directly about the attitude that had
been displayed by supplementary benefits officers with whom
they had come into contact) a number of mothers (13) stated that
they had experienced feelings of stigma as a result of certain
adverse comments which had been made by SB officials.
‘You have to go for interviews, it’s quite upsetting you know
“How many times have you been to bed with anyone since.”
They upset me quite a bit.’
‘It wasn’t directly said that I don’t like you going on the dole
’cause you’re a single parent but it was indirectly said, the
visiting officer said: “Our first priority is to the tax-payer and
we’ve got to look after them before you.” Those were his exact
words. . . . I told the guy you don’t have to come and insult
me, it’s not the sort of situation that I wanted to be in. They
want to know all about your business, nosing in, sending spies
round to see if you’ve got a man hidden in the cupboard.’
Respondents also referred to the social disgrace attached to
unmarried motherhood when they were questioned about their
experiences of felt stigma. For instance, 9 mothers admitted
feeling stigmatized when they discovered that they were preg­
nant. As one mother commented:
‘Things like that just don’t happen in our family anyway. . . .
It’s the worst thing that could happen. It’s worse than if you’re
dying, the sorrow and heartbreak. It’s the biggest tragedy I’m
telling you. It’s the worst disgrace of all.’
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 125
In general, the respondents only tended to feel stigmatized on the
grounds of social disgrace in particular circumstances. Three
situations can be referred to for the purpose of illustration.
1 Disclosing information about their pregnancy to relatives (‘I
didn’t exactly tell them (parents) myself. . . . I knew my
mother was going to see the doctor so I asked him to
tactfully tell her. I was really worried about telling them
’cause I just didn’t know what their reaction would be’).
2 Visiting time in hospital (‘Why couldn’t I have a husband to
come and see me. . . . Why couldn’t I be like everybody
else? I thought the child’s father might come into hospital
just to see me. I was hoping but of course he didn’t. It upset
me a great deal’).
3 Subsequent relationships with men (‘They’re going to think
you’re an easy lay. . . . You feel you don’t want to meet
other guys generally ’cause you think that’s going to be their
reaction’).
A number of respondents also reported feeling stigmatized as a
result of the reactions of certain people they had come into
contact with during their ‘unmarried mother career’. For
example, 10 mothers stated that they had felt stigmatized during
their period of confinement in hospital because of adverse
comments which had been made by some members of the
medical staff. As the following examples indicate this source of
stigmatization could be quite savage:
‘One morning she had me crying from half past eight to half
past twelve. You’re feeling depressed anyhow and I was
reading a book and she said, “I think that ought to be the Bible
you’re reading.” She told me I was very extravagant and a spoilt
child and that I should have known better at my age . . . and
did I realise I was bringing a child into the world without a
father. It was pretty evil. She even brought another nurse over
to my bed to help her make the bed and went on to her about
me.’
(Hospital nurse)
‘Matron said, “Mothers like you shouldn’t be feeding your
126 Stigma and the unmarried mother
children”. I continued to breast feed my child so matron put
me in a cubicle without curtains so all the porters and
everybody coming past could see. She thought it would put me
off . . . but it didn’t stop me.’
(Hospital matron)
‘She knew I was single, she turned round and said, “You
mustn’t have too many boyfriends because it will be upsetting
for the child to have too many fathers,” . . . I could just
picture what she meant by that. I’d be going out every night
with my boyfriends leaving the child and not looking after him
properly.’
(Hospital paediatrician)
Five mothers also reported that they had experienced feelings
of stigma as a result of the comments or actions of casual
aquaintances. One mother’s description of the response of a
woman she had met at a playgroup provides a good illustration of
this form of stigmatization.
‘There was a girl I met up there - we used to sit and natter
while the children were playing. One day she asked me what
my husband did and I said, “Oh, I’m not married”, and she
just turned her back on me and started talking to the girl next
to us. . . . She took her little boy away from my little girl and
she wouldn’t let him near her. She said, “You’re not to play
with that little girl again - you leave her alone.” That annoyed
me.’
It is important to stress, however, that experiences of stigma
were (amongst this particular group of respondents) not only
relatively rare but also highly situational in character (i.e. feelings
of stigma only tended to be experienced in particular situations).
Many mothers commented on the fact that they had received
relatively favourable responses (often from quite unexpected
sources - e.g. local authority housing officials) from many of the
people whom they had come into contact with since becoming an
unmarried mother. Clearly, this could be seen as indicative of a
softening of public attitudes towards unmarried mothers. How­
ever, given the fact that all respondents in this study reported
 Stigma and the unmarried mother 127
that they had been subjected to some form of stigmatization
during their unmarried mother career, this conclusion would
appear to be somewhat premature. What is interesting to note is
the fact that such stigmatization did not tend to induce feelings of
stigma amongst respondents. On the contrary, most mothers
stated that the adverse reactions they had received from others
had merely caused them to feel resentful. This may be a highly
significant finding (i.e. it may indicate that stigmatized groups are
much more willing than they were previously to contest the
legitimacy of their disadvantageous economic and social position
in society).260 These mothers were, for example, highly resentful
of the fact that they were:
1 Expected to live on meagre incomes
‘I have to live on handouts from my family. Heating is the
biggest problem. We have a meter which takes 50p per time
and in the winter time you can put in £3 on just one fire with
one bar and you go out into the hallway you might just as well
go out to the North Pole, it’s so cold. I feel resentful. I feel as
though I should be able to buy decent food for myself which I
can’t do.’
‘I could just buy the food for that week, pay the rent, gas,
electricity and that was it, the money was gone. It used to
annoy me because I couldn’t add a little personal touch by
doing something or buying a lamp or lampshade.’
2 Denied the opportunity to be independent
‘I don’t like living on social security. I don’t like living off the
state. I’d much rather be working.’
‘Day care is so difficult to get. It’s a case of me working,
putting my child somewhere I’m not quite sure of or staying
home. . . . I reckon there should be more day-care ’cause if I
worked I’d be saving the state a lot of money.’
Given this more assertive tendency on the part of unmarried
mothers, which owes much to the support and encouragement
128 Stigma and the unmarried mother
they have received from organizations such as The National
Council for One Parent Families and Gingerbread, it is not
surprising to find (as the following extract shows) that a number
of mothers in this survey laid great stress on the fact that they
had an entitlement to a decent standard of living.
‘I’m doing a valuable job bringing up a member of the next
generation. I’ve paid taxes in the past, I will pay taxes in the
future. . . . It isn’t a question of scrounging, it’s a question of
redistribution of resources.’
(Mother’s opinion on why she was entitled to supplementary
benefit)
Two important issues have been highlighted by this survey.
1 The need to distinguish between stigmatization and felt
stigma.
2 The need for caution when one is confronted with evidence
relating to felt stigma, (i.e. the absence of reports of felt
stigma should not necessarily be taken to indicate that the
general public and various institutional bodies have begun to
adopt a more favourable attitude towards a particular
stigmatized group. On the contrary, the absence of felt
stigma reports may merely indicate that there has been a
change in attitude on the part of the stigmatized rather than
the stigmatizers.)
In conclusion, then, this chapter has attempted to demonstrate
(through a case study of the unmarried mother) how the concept
of stigma can be developed more fully by means of more detailed
examinations of some of the various reasons why stigma has
attached to certain welfare groups over the centuries. Appraisals
of this kind inevitably lead one on to consider some of the wider
functions of stigma in society. This theme will be taken up in the
final chapter.
4 Stigma and social policy:
wider dimensions

A number of commentators1 have drawn attention to the

atheoretical nature of much of the social administration literature.
For example, Mishra contends that social administrators have, in
general, tended to be far more concerned with intervention and
reform than with theoretical issues.
This reformist tradition is pragmatic and practical rather than
theoretical and speculative. Its interest lies not so much in
building a knowledge base about social welfare institutions as
in understanding the nature and dimensions of a particular
social problem - poverty, child abuse, homelessness - with a
view to its solution. In short, the study of welfare is
approached from an interventionist point of view: not
academic knowledge perse but, rather, recommending a course
of action or at least laying bare the choices facing a society with
regard to a particular issue is the main objective. Given these
practical concerns it is not surprising that social
administration . . . deals far more in facts than in theories of
welfare.2
Far greater attention has, however, been given to theoretical
issues in recent years. This interest has been displayed in two
inter-related ways. Firstly, a number of writers have attempted to
clarify and refine some of the concepts most commonly referred
to in discussions of social policy. By drawing attention to the
complexities of concepts such as need3 and equality,4 these
writers have significantly advanced the level of welfare theorizing.
Secondly, emphasis has been given to the different ideological
positions regarding the role and purpose of state welfare in
129
130 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
contemporary society.5 In particular, the emergence of Marxist
analyses of the welfare state have done much to highlight the
limitations of the institutional/residual approach to the study of
social policy.6
The relationship between stigma and these theoretical
developments will be the main subject matter of this final
chapter. To this end, consideration will be given to two important
issues:
1 The relationship between stigma and other ‘welfare’ concepts.
2 The social control function of stigma in contemporary society.
Finally, by way of conclusion, attention will be given to the
question of whether stigma should be regarded as a key social
policy concept.

The relationship between stigma and other ‘welfare’ concepts

As we saw in chapter 2, the fact that the concept of stigma has
achieved such prominence in the field of social policy owes much
to the efforts of those who can broadly be said to subscribe to the
Fabian socialist or social democratic approach to welfare. From
this perspective stigma has been commonly regarded as an
unnecessary hindrance to the creation of a more just society.

Stigma and social justice

According to the Fabian socialists a more just society can be
created by means of purposeful government intervention. It is
argued, for example, that a government committed to social
justice can, by pursuing policies of equality, gradually bring
about a fundamental change in the very nature of society. As
Tawney states, in discussing the achievements of Atlee’s first
post-war Labour government:
the experience of 1945-50 established, I think, one important
point. It showed that a capitalist economy is not the solid,
monolithic block, to be endured as a whole, or overthrown as a
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 131
whole, that some simpletons suggested. It proved that a
Socialist Government, with the public behind it, can change
the power relations within the system, can ensure that a larger
part of the resources yielded by it are devoted to raising the
standard of life of the mass of the population, and can compel
those directing it to work on lines which, left to themselves,
they would not choose.7
Social policy is seen as having a key role to play in the creation
of a more just society. According to Tawney,
It is possible, by means of a wisely planned system of
communal provision, to ensure that the whole population
enjoys, as far as environmental influences are concerned, equal
opportunities of health and education, and is equally protected
against the contingencies of life.8
In addition, as Titmuss points out, social policy can also serve to
‘promote an individual’s sense of identity, participation and
community and allow him more freedom of choice for the
expression of altruism . . .’9
For the Fabian socialists the pursuit of social justice is
inextricably linked to the notion of need. This can clearly be seen
if one considers their approach to the question of state welfare
provision. They contend that the provision of state welfare
services, on the basis of need, can help to counter the injustices
and disadvantages which certain sections of the population are
forced to endure as a result of the unfettered operation of the
free market.
Given the importance that the Fabian socialists attach to
‘institutional’ forms of welfare, it is not surprising to find that
they have been anxious to allay any fears that the public might
have about using public welfare services. Accordingly, attempts
have been made (e.g. the adoption of the principle of
universalism; policies of positive discrimination - see pp. 31-4)
to minimize the potentially negative impact that a factor such as
stigma can have upon the public’s willingness to use particular
welfare services. Clearly, if public welfare services become
tainted by stigma they are unlikely to advance the cause of social
justice to any great extent.
132 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
It is important to note that the Fabian socialists’ objection to
stigma is not based solely upon the detrimental effect that this
phenomenon can have upon both potential, and existing, welfare
recipients. At the heart of their objection is the belief that no
society can be regarded as socially just if it permits the
stigmatization of certain of its minority groups.
Support for this contention can be found in Rawls’s major
work A Theory of Justice.10 Rawls gives a good deal of attention
to the principles of justice which individuals (under a ‘veil of
ignorance’)11 might formulate if they were given the opportunity
to decide upon the way in which their society should be ordered.
Rawls suggests that the following two principles might serve
their purposes well:12
1 Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all.
2 Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, con­
sistent with the just savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
In constructing these principles, Rawls gives particular emphasis
to the notion of primary goods. According to Rawls, all
individuals require certain primary goods (e.g. rights, liberty,
opportunities, power, income and wealth) if they are to enjoy a
meaningful citizenship. As such, his principles of justice seek to
maximise (as far as possible) every individual’s access to such
primary goods.
In terms of this particular discussion (i.e. the relationship
between stigma and social justice) it is important to note that
Rawls contends that self-respect is probably the most important
primary good.13
We may define self-respect (or self-esteem) as having two
aspects. First of all . . . it includes a person’s sense of his own
value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 133
plan of life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-respect
implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s
power, to fulfil one’s intentions. When we feel that our plans
are of little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take
delight in their execution. Nor plagued by failure and self­
doubt can we continue in our endeavours. It is clear then why
self-respect is a primary good. Without it nothing may seem
worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack the
will to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes empty
and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism. Therefore the
parties in the orginal position would wish to avoid at almost
any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect.14
From this basis it is possible to infer that the stigmatization of
certain individuals or minority groups would be incompatible
with the pursuit of social justice.
However, this alleged incompatibility may be challenged by
those who reject the possibility of formulating a contractual
theory of justice. For example, Miller suggests that conceptions
of social justice are likely to vary according to the primacy given
to a particular underlying principle (e.g. rights, desert or need).15
Thus, the stigmatization of certain individuals or groups might be
deemed to be appropriate by those who adopt a desert-based
theory of justice. For instance, from this perspective the
stigmatization experienced by a relatively solvent family from
both their neighbours (e.g. verbal abuse) and the local housing
department (e.g. forcible eviction to a ‘sink’ estate) on the
grounds of rent arrears could well be regarded as socially just.

Stigma, discretion and welfare rights

Over the centuries there has also been a strong link between the
concepts of stigma and discretion, particularly in the realm of
income-maintenance programmes. For example, it has only been
in the comparatively recent past that the poor have been
regarded as having some form of entitlement to financial support
from public funds.16 Previously, the acceptance or rejection of a
request for public aid depended largely upon the discretionary
benevolence, or otherwise, of local officials. This method of
134 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
dispensing financial aid was clearly likely to have had a
stigmatizing effect on some claimants. In particular, feelings of
stigma were likely to have been engendered amongst those whose
claims were refused on the grounds of some alleged character
defect (e.g. the unemployed, unmarried mothers and other
members of the ‘undeserving’ poor).
Attention has continued to be given to the stigmatizing
potential of discretion in contemporary discussions of social
policy. Before looking more closely at this debate, it is useful,
firstly, to consider what is meant by the term discretion within the
welfare field. For Davis: ‘A public officer has discretion
whenever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make
a choice among possible courses of action or inaction.’17 This
definition is particularly appropriate for our present discussion
given the fact that ‘official discretion’ has often been regarded as
problematic not only by those who administer, but also by those
who receive, various forms of welfare provision.
In looking at the notion of discretion within the welfare field, I
think a distinction can be drawn between what can loosely be
described as ‘service’ discretion and ‘individual’ discretion.
Consider, for example, the provision of health care in this
country. Although all health regions and districts are expected to
have regard to the medical needs of all members of their target
population, they will be able to exercise a good deal of discretion
when deciding upon the precise facilities and services to be
provided at any given time (service discretion). Discretion will
also be exercised by medics during their consultations with
patients. For instance, a GP has the authority to decide upon
what initial treatment (if any) a patient requires (individual
discretion). Both these forms of discretion can, either directly or
indirectly, be potentially stigmatizing. In the case of the former
(service discretion), a decision to give priority to patients with
acute conditions may result in some patients with non-urgent
complaints (e.g. hernias, varicose veins) coming to feel stigma­
tized. Similarly, in the case of the latter (individual discretion) a
manual worker with a persistent backache may feel stigmatized
when his GP implies (by suggesting that there is no good reason
why he should not return to work immediately) that he may be
malingering.
The negative dimensions of discretion have been highlighted by
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 135
a number of commentators.18 Not surprisingly (given the punitive
forms of discretion which were employed in previous poor relief
programmes) a good deal of this attention has been focussed on
the supplementary benefits scheme.
The directives of the Supplementary Benefits Commission
(which was abolished in 1980) (service discretion) and the
apparently arbitrary nature of a number of the decisions made by
individual officers (individual discretion) have been the subject of
much criticism over the years. Concern has often been expressed,
for example, about the guidelines which the SBC issued to its
staff in relation to the payment of additional or exceptional
allowances. For instance, the commission contended that excep­
tional needs payments for clothing should only be awarded (in
general) when:19
(a) the claimant has lived at or below supplementary benefits
standards for some time before making a claim and may
therefore be in difficulty over the replacement of major
items;
(b) there are dependent children (where ordinary clothing is
concerned; school uniforms are the responsibility of local
education authorities);
(c) the claimant or one of his dependants is suffering from a
chronic or serious disease where an adequate stock of
warm clothing is essential, e.g. respiratory tuberculosis or
other serious bronchial conditions;
(d) hardship will result if a payment is not made to meet an
urgent need.
These guidelines do not appear to offer much hope to certain
‘short-term’ claimants such as the single unemployed or childless
couples under pensionable age. As such, it can justifiably be
argued that this form of service discretion should be regarded as
a form of stigmatization (i.e. some claimants are being seen as
less worthy of additional support than others). However,
claimants who have been refused additional allowances have
tended to be far more critical of the official who actually dealt
with their case than with the commission in general. Indeed, the
discretion exercised by individual officers has been a major
source of grievance for many claimants.20
136 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
SB officials are able to exercise a considerable degree of
negative discretion in their work (i.e. they have the power to
refuse, withhold or reduce benefit payments). For example,
although such officials are not permitted (when processing a new
claim) to arbitrarily decide on the amount of benefit that should
be paid or the level of resources which should be taken into
account for the purpose of determining entitlement, they are
authorized to use their discretion in related matters (i.e. when
deciding whether a claim for a rent allowance is ‘excessive’ or
whether resources have been ‘unnecessarily squandered’ just
prior to an application for benefit). In addition, SB officials can
exercise negative discretion when:
(i) confronted with claimants who are suspected of defrauding
the DHSS (e.g. claimants who neglect to inform the
department that they are cohabiting with a wage earner or
who fail to declare that they are in receipt of substantial
part-time earnings).
(i) claims are submitted for exceptional circumstances
additions (ECAs) or exceptional needs payments (ENAs).
Clearly, this type of negative individual discretion may cause
some claimants to feel stigmatized. For example, a separated
mother whose benefit is withheld because of a suspicion of
cohabitation may well experience an intense feeling of stigma.
Similarly, claimants who have had a request for an exceptional
needs payment turned down may also feel stigmatized in certain
circumstances. For instance, an unemployed man whose request
for some new stair carpet is rejected may well feel stigmatized as
a result of his experience, particularly if he discovers that other
claimants in his locality have received awards for household
items. Indeed, it has been suggested that some SB officers are
likely to give vent to their own prejudices when making
discretionary payments. As such, ‘deserving’ claimants (e.g.
pensioners, the disabled) may find it relatively easy to obtain
additional payments whilst the ‘undeserving’ (e.g. the
unemployed, single parents) may experience considerable diffi­
culties in this regard.
It is important to note, however, that highly stigmatizing
negative forms of discretion also occur in other spheres of social
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 137
policy. For example, a social worker may decide to curtail her
much-appreciated visits to an elderly client on the grounds that
her time can be spent more ‘profitably’ with other clients on her
caseload. More significantly, social workers may employ negative
forms of discretion when deciding which of their clients should
receive financial aid (e.g. under section one of the 1963 Children
and Young Persons Act) or material aid (e.g. under the 1970
Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act). Indeed, there has
been growing concern expressed in recent years over the question
as to whether social workers should be able to make the
provision of financial assistance dependent upon improvements in
the behaviour of their clients.21
One of the reasons why social workers and other welfare
workers such as doctors and teachers may have been relatively
immune from criticism relating to their discretionary powers may
be linked to their professional status (i.e. they are generally seen
to be using their ‘professional judgment’ as opposed to some
form of arbitrary discretion). In contrast, relatively low-status
employees such as SB officials have been continually portrayed as
exercising their discretionary powers in an arbitrary, unprofes­
sional manner.22
The stigmatizing nature of much welfare discretion, particu­
larly in the field of income maintenance, has led a number of
commentators to press for the introduction of a more extensive
system of welfare rights.23 As Jones points out, such advocates
believe that once a ‘right to welfare becomes a generally
established conviction, then no stigma will attach to claimants or
clients and that, conversely, without a basis of rights, welfare
provision will inevitably be tainted with stigma.’24 From this
perspective, then, the establishment of welfare rights (by virtue
of their capacity to enhance the self-esteem of those in need) is
seen as being one of the most effective means for countering
degrading forms of discretionary welfare provision (i.e. it is
envisaged that individuals will eventually come to regard welfare
services not as a form of charitable donation but as an
entitlement of citizenship). As Jones states in a discussion of this
issue:
Charity precludes entitlement. The giving of charity is at the
discretion of the charitable. The supplicant is, therefore,
138 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
dependent upon the will of the donor and has no right to
complain if he does not receive; on the contrary, he should feel
indebted when he does receive. The relationship between giver
and receiver in charity is inherently unequal and it is
understandable, therefore, that the receipt of charity should be
thought to involve a loss of esteem both in one’s own eyes and
in those of others. By contrast, to receive what is one’s right is
to receive no more than one is entitled to expect, requires no
debt of gratitude, and, in itself, involves no loss of status.25
It is open to question, though, whether a more extensive
system of welfare rights will eradicate the stigma which has
attached to discretionary forms of social service provision. For
example, it is important to consider whether the establishment of
welfare rights is intended to enhance the ‘substantive’ or merely
the ‘procedural’ rights of individuals. As Adler and Asquith point
out:
Procedural rights refer to process - to a ‘fair’ trial, to having
one’s claims dealt with according to the rules or, in the absence
of explicitly formulated rules, according to generally accepted
conventions of natural justice. Substantive rights refer to
outcomes - to the receipt of redundancy pay, or unemploy­
ment benefit at a given level for the unemployed, to the
allocation of tenancies to homeless families or to medical (or
social work) help of a certain kind to a sick person or someone
with social or personal problems, etc. Most of those who have
wished to limit discretion have wished to strengthen the
procedural rights of those who are subject to it.26
Improvements in citizens’ procedural welfare rights are
unlikely to have any significant effect in terms of reducing the
stigma which attaches to the receipt of public aid if the services or
benefits being provided are of poor standard. For example, it
would appear to be highly optimistic to expect an unemployed
worker to retain his self-esteem if the level of his unemployment
benefit compares unfavourably with the incomes of the lowest
paid workers.
However, even if citizens’ substantive welfare rights are
dramatically improved there is no guarantee that this would have
 Stigma and social policy : wider dimensions 139
a positive effect on the self-esteem of social service recipients.
For example, as was pointed out earlier (see p. 36), Pinker has
suggested that the dependant are always likely to feel stigmatized
in a society where market values predominate. If this assertion is
correct, it is difficult to envisage how improvements in citizens’
substantive rights can be expected to reduce the incidence of felt
stigma amongst welfare recipients.
In addition, it should be noted that efforts to improve citizens’
substantive welfare rights wili only, at best, serve to remove one
source of stigma in society (i.e. the stigma associated with the
receipt of welfare benefits and services).27 Such measures will do
little to counter the stigma which has attached to individuals or
groups with other negatively valued characteristics (see chapter
1).
It has also been suggested that a successful welfare rights
campaign may have the unintended consequence of making the
needy even more reluctant to apply for services to which they
have no clear-cut entitlement. As Jones states:
the stronger the sense of entitlement, the stronger will be the
sense of charity when that entitlement is exceeded. (There is,
therefore, a danger that, while inducing people to think in
terms of rights may make them more willing to claim that to
which they believe they have a right, it will also make them
more reluctant to receive anything to which they believe they
have none.)28
Finally, it can be argued that some welfare rights advocates
have, perhaps, tended to neglect the positive dimensions of
welfare discretion. For example, in a discussion of the supple­
mentary benefits scheme, Titmuss maintains that positive dis­
cretion (individualized justice) provides a necessary complement
to the rights dimension of the service (proportional justice).
We need . . . individualised justice in order to allow a universal
rights scheme, based on principles of equity, to be as precise
and inflexible as possible. These characteristics of precision,
inflexibility and universality depend for their sustenance and
strength on the existence of some element of flexible,
individualised justice. But they do not need stigma.29
140 Stigma and social policy : wider dimensions
Certainly, positive forms of welfare discretion have the
potential to enhance the self-esteem of social service recipients.
For example, the Supplementary Benefits Commission often used
its discretionary powers in a humane and creative way (even to
the extent, in one case, of providing funds for a new tyre for a
man who had broken down on a motorway with a car-load of
children).30 Such positive forms of welfare discretion may also
help in the identification of unmet need within the community,
thereby aiding the development of a more comprehensive system
of welfare rights. However, it is important to remember that the
status-enhancing potential of positive welfare discretion may be
seriously limited in a market economy. As Marshall notes:
It would be nearer the truth to say that this notion of discretion
as positive, personal and bénéficient can only be fully realised
in a ‘welfare society’, that is to say a society that recognises its
collective responsibility to seek to achieve welfare, and not
only to relieve destitution or eradicate penury.31

Stigma and rationing

The introduction of a comprehensive system of welfare rights is
obviously likely to have serious resource implications. As
Scrivens points out:
For the past thirty years the British public have been able to
receive free of charge or at a very reduced price, services such
as health, education and personal social services. Expenditure
on these services has increased over this period and has been
accompanied by parallel increases in consumption and appar­
ent demand which has mostly exceeded the resources available.
The effect of demand increasing at a faster rate than available
resources has led to concern about the ways in which the
resources are allocated among the demands, and concern about
how decisions are made to exclude some demands altogether.
The methods by which these objectives are achieved have
become known as rationing processes.32
A number of commentators have highlighted the various ways
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 141
in which rationing operates within the sphere of social policy.33
From such discussions it is possible to identify seven principal
devices which have been used to ration welfare services.
1 Charges34
The imposition of charges can stem the demand for a particular
welfare service in two main ways. Firstly, charging can help to
curb ‘frivolous’ forms of demand (i.e. the demands made by
those who aren’t ‘really in need’). Secondly, and more impor­
tantly, charges can serve to limit the demands made by those in
need who are unwilling or unable to contribute towards the cost
of the provision they require.
2 Eligibility regulations
It is also possible to ration social services by means of highly
restrictive eligibility criteria (e.g. qualifications, age, residence).
For example, many local housing authorities have found
residential qualifications to be extremely effective in terms of
limiting the ‘demand’ for publicly rented housing.
3 Delay
Delay has also proved to be a highly effective way of rationing
welfare services. Such delays may be organized and explicit (e.g.
queues, waiting lists) or unplanned and implicit (e.g. a decision
by a social worker to defer an elderly client’s request for a
residential home place).
4 Deflection
Potential social service recipients may also find that their requests
for particular welfare services are ‘deflected’ (i.e. they are
advised by one agency to apply elsewhere for the service they
require). For instance, a woman with persistent backache may be
advised by her GP to visit a local osteopath.
5 Dilution
Services can also be rationed by means of dilution. As Parker
points out:
There are many variations upon this theme. If more has to be
done with the same resources standards have to be lowered
142 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
and the service spread more thinly. In the home help service,
for instance, extra demand is not often deflected, turned away
or kept waiting. Instead the amount of time allocated to each
recipient is reduced.35
6 Inadequate information
Poor publicity can also be deemed to be a form of rationing.
There is always likely to be a shortfall in the take-up rate for
various benefits and services if potential recipients are inade­
quately informed about the availability of such provision.
7 Deterrence
The final rationing device that merits attention is that of
deterrence. In this case, attempts are made to restrict the
demand for a particular welfare benefit or service by making the
receipt of such provision deliberately unattractive. Such deter­
rence can take a variety of forms (e.g. censorious staff attitudes,
complex administrative procedures, forbidding offices). As
Parker notes, the image acquired by a particular welfare service
over the years may be of considerable importance in terms of its
deterrent potential. ‘How people imagine they will be treated,
and what they believe they are entitled to may reflect the
experience of a previous generation, and effectively stop them
seeking assistance.’36
The notion of deterrence is the key element in the link
between the concepts of stigma and rationing. Over the
centuries, secular authorities have deliberately stigmatized
certain sections of the poor in an effort to limit the demand for
public aid. For example, under the 1834 Poor Law Amendment
Act, relief was only provided for those who were willing to
submit to a quite brutal form of personal and familial humiliation
- namely the workhouse test (see p. 26). Although this particular
form of welfare stigmatization has fallen into disrepute, other
forms have persisted.
In examining the ways in which stigma has been used as a form
of deterrence in contemporary social policy it is useful to
distinguish between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ procedures. An
example of the former would be explicit references to the need
for deterrence in official policy statements, directives or reports.
In general, little reference has been made (except in the case of
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 143
fraud or other kinds of abuse) to the need for deterrence in such
documents. This absence should not, however, be taken to
indicate that present-day governments are now unwilling to use
stigma as a means of rationing welfare services. For instance, it is
commonly acknowledged that substantial numbers of claimants
are deterred from claiming the supplementary benefit to which
they are entitled (the take-up rate for SB was only 70 per cent in
1979 according to official estimates37) because of considerations
of stigma (see pp. 42-5). The failure of successive governments
to deal effectively with this problem can be explained in part by
their reluctance to dispense with stigma as a rationing device.
Indeed, the new housing benefit scheme (under which claimants’
rent allowances are ‘paid direct’) provides yet another example of
central government’s willingness to reinforce the stigmatizing
propensities of the SB scheme (i.e. claimants are now deemed to
lack even the necessary responsibility to pay their rent regularly).
At an ‘informal’ level, stigma is often used to restrict demand
for welfare services. For example, patients who make frequent
use of the services of their GP for minor complaints are likely to
be reminded either implicitly (‘I hope you’re not becoming a
hypochondriac’) or explicitly (‘You housewives are continually
wasting my time’) that their requests for consultations are
‘unreasonable’. Similarly, a child who requests the opportunity to
sit an ‘O’ level examination paper may be dissuaded from this
course of action by the stigmatizing remark of a teacher (‘You’re
only CSE standard’).
Although there are difficulties in estimating the overall impact
that stigma has on potential or existing welfare recipients, it can
safely be concluded that its effect is far from minimal in terms of
restricting demand for social service provision.

Stigma and participation

‘Consumer participation’ represents one possible way of combat­
ing the stigma associated with the receipt of public welfare. As
was mentioned in chapter 2, stigma has tended to attach to three
particular social services - namely, social security (especially the
means-tested sector), local authority housing and the personal
social services (see p. 40).
144 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
The introduction of some form of consumer participation
would appear to be particularly apt in the case of these services
given the fact that the vast majority of the recipients of such
provision are unlikely to be in a position (owing to the nature or
extent of their needs) to withdraw their ‘custom’ in the event of
experiencing any of the stigma commonly associated with public
dependency.
Consumer participation can help to reduce the possibility of
welfare stigmatization in four main ways. Firstly, it can provide
welfare recipients with an opportunity to express any grievances
they might have about the quality of the services they are
receiving. For example, consumers may want to draw attention to
the stigmatizing nature of certain administrative procedures or
highlight the patronizing treatment they have received from
certain officials.
Secondly, consumer participation can help welfare admin­
istrators and professionals to minimize the stigma that might arise
as a result of some form of misunderstanding on the part of those
in need. For instance, an elderly person in receipt of a
supplementary pension may have been experiencing feelings of
stigma as a result of an erroneous belief that her allowance would
be withdrawn if she permitted a relative to stay with her for a
week.
Thirdly, the stigma that consumers are liable to experience as a
result of being subjected to various forms of ‘professional power’
may also be reduced by more extensive forms of participation.
For example, social workers may attempt to limit the negative
aspects of their professional powers by taking their clients more
fully into their confidence (e.g. by instigating joint consultations
about the purpose and aims of the casework relationship).
Finally, the self-esteem of welfare consumers may be consider­
ably enhanced if they are invited to become more fully involved
in the decision-making processes of the various services which
they use.
Consumer participation has certainly been a popular theme in
social policy in recent decades. For example, the Seebohm
Report on the personal social services stressed the need for
effective forms of consumer participation.
Implicit in the idea of a community-oriented family service is a
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 145
belief in the importance of the maximum participation of
individuals and groups in the community in the planning,
organisation and provision of the social services. This view
rests not only upon the working out of democratic ideas at the
local level, but relates to the identification of need, the
exposure of defects in the services and the mobilisation of new
resources. The consumer of the personal social services has
limited choice among services and thus needs special oppor­
tunity to participate.38
Similarly, the 1973 NHS act provided for the establishment of
Community Health Councils which were required to feed back
local opinion and to act as ‘visitors’ to the health amenities in
their locality.39
However, the effectiveness of such measures (in terms of
reducing welfare stigma) is likely to depend to a large extent on
the type of participation that is eventually established. For
instance, Arnstein has argued that there are various types of
‘participation’ ranging from manipulation and therapy (non­
participation) to informing, consultation and placation (token­
ism) and finally to partnership, delegated power and citizen
control (citizen power).40 It can justifiably be argued that
consumer participation within the social services has never
extended far beyond the tokenism stage. Participation in the field
of social policy has always been tightly controlled from ‘above’
(i.e. what constitutes a representative view or a justifiable
grievance tends to be decided by those in authority). For
example, although local housing authorities have actively
encouraged tenant participation they have been extremely
reluctant to concede to tenants’ demands for a greater say over
such matters as the level of rents, new building programmes or
tenancy allocation procedures.41
The cosmetic nature of much social service participation has
led a number of commentators to speculate about some of the
underlying reasons for the introduction of such measures. For
example, Plant et al. have suggested that:
Co-operative participation . . . does not challenge the struc­
ture of power and the existing distribution of benefits and
burdens in society, but, on the contrary, it may well provide
146 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
procedures for practical socialization in which the values of
those who hold the power in society are learned and
internalized by those who are involved in the participation. In
this way people may learn to identify their needs or modify
their identification of them as a result of internalizing the goals,
norms and conventions of the existing social and political order
through participatory schemes.42
From this perspective, it would seem highly optimistic to
believe that welfare stigmatization can be dramatically reduced
by the introduction of limited forms of consumer participation.
On the contrary, the limited nature of existing forms of consumer
participation in the social services only serves to highlight the
need for consideration to be given to wider issues - such as the
role and purpose of social policy in contemporary society.

The social control function of stigma in contemporary society

Ever since it was first coined by Ross43 in the late nineteenth
century the term social control has figured prominently in
sociological44 (and, much more recently, social policy45) liter­
ature. Despite its relative popularity, the theoretical development
of this term has been somewhat stifled because of doubts about
its value neutrality as a sociological concept. For example, some
critics on the left have argued that because the concept was
formulated and developed within a highly conservative socio­
logical tradition it has become too closely associated with order
or consensus models of society. In contrast, others have
expressed disquiet about the more recent association of the term
with social repression in western society. Limitations on the use
of this concept should, however, be resisted as the term can
usefully be employed in the study of any community or society.
As Donajgrodzki states: ‘The use of social control, like the
concept of “socialisation” does not imply adherence to a sociology
based on any particular ideology.’46
Stigma can justifiably be regarded as a major form of social
control in contemporary society. Indeed, Pinker believes that:
The imposition of stigma is the commonest form of violence
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 147
used in democratic societies. Stigmatization is slow, unobtru­
sive and genteel in its effect, so much so, that when the
stigmatized hit back physically in Londonderry or Chicago they
can technically be accused of being the first to resort to force.
Stigmatization is a highly sophisticated form of violence in so
far as it is rarely associated with physical threats or attack. It
can best be compared to those forms of psychological torture in
which the victim is broken psychically and physically but left to
all outward appearances unmarked.47
In general, stigmatization has tended to be regarded as an
extreme form of psychological social control (i.e. persistent,
negative, psychological sanctioning). It is useful, therefore, to
look in a little more detail at the way in which psychological
sanctions can be used as a form of social control.
At an informal level, it can be argued that virtually all
members of society will resort, at some time or other, to the use
of psychological sanctions in order to exert social control. This
form of disapproval may be expressed in a variety of ways.
Displeasure may, for instance, frequently be displayed in a non­
verbal way. To be on the receiving end of a solemn facial
expression, an outright glare or a ‘forced’ smile is likely to alert
all of us to the possibility that our present or past conduct has
caused offence. Confirmation of this possibility may lead many of
us not only to offer an apology to the offended party but also to
make an undertaking to improve our behaviour in the future (a
variety of factors are, however, likely to determine the precise
response adopted in any situation e.g. the relationship between
the actors concerned). If this relatively minor form of psycho­
logical control fails to induce conformity, it is possible that a
more direct type of sanction will be employed. In such
circumstances, individuals may be directly informed about the
unacceptable nature of some aspect of their conduct. For
example, a woman may reprimand her former husband for failing
to make regular maintenance payments. In this situation the
woman concerned may attempt to induce feelings of shame in her
ex-spouse (by drawing attention to the considerable hardship that
their children are being forced to endure because of his neglect)
in the hope that this will lead him to fulfil his obligations in a
more satisfactory manner in the future. Such shaming can, of
148 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
course, be intensified. In this particular case the woman
concerned could decide to exert further pressure on her ex-
husband by informing others of his reprehensible conduct.
Other types of psychological sanctions which are commonly
used in informal social situations include snubbing, ridicule and
ostracization. Snubbing can take various forms:
(i) A deliberate decision to engage only in the most
superficial conversation with those individuals of whom
one disapproves. (Former lovers who - having parted on
less than favourable terms - find themselves obliged to
engage in conversation with one another at a subsequent
social gathering often employ this form of snubbing.)
(ii) The withdrawal of an invitation. (A university may decide
to withdraw a lecture invitation because of the highly
contentious political views of the prospective speaker.)
(iii) The return of a gift. (An elderly man may decide to
return the birthday present he has received from his
daughter in order to register some form of protest about
her infrequent visits.)
Ridicule is another prominent form of psychological sanction­
ing. Most of us have been instigators of, as well as targets for,
some form of ridicule. Individuals who stray a little too far from
existing group norms may be subjected to relatively mild forms of
ridicule. For example, a junior typist, who spends her lunch
breaks reading literary criticism rather than engaging in other
activities, is likely to find that her less academically inclined
colleagues will make occasional jokes about her intellectual
pursuits. In addition, individuals who conform too exactly to a
particular norm may also experience mild forms of ridicule. As
Roucek points out by way of illustration:
The college professor who is so typical as to meet every
expectation which goes with the stereotype of his calling may
be laughed at for his typicality. The ‘Joe College’ who looks
and acts exactly as a college student is expected to act may
thereby become the butt of many jokes. Such application of
ridicule is aimed at making their subjects more ‘human’ and
therefore less perfect in their roles.48
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 149
In other situations, individuals may be subjected to much
harsher forms of ridicule. For example, in their interaction with
one another, children will often use quite severe forms of ridicule
as a means of social control. Accordingly, a child who attempts to
curry favour with her teachers may well find herself subjected to
intense ridicule from her classmates. Adults, on the other hand,
tend to use severe forms of ridicule in a much more selective
fashion. Indeed, they often reserve this form of disapproval
exclusively for those individuals who have behaved in deceitful or
hypocritical ways. For example, an ex-serviceman who has
frequently let it be known that he was decorated for gallantry
during his commission in the army may find himself subjected to
considerable ridicule when it is revealed that he received no such
award during what was, in reality, a rather undistinguished
military career, notable only for the fact that it had been brought
to a premature end as a result of a dishonourable discharge.
Another important psychological sanction which individuals
are likely to experience is ostracization. For example, a man who
refuses to support a union strike call in furtherance of a wage
claim may well find that he is ‘sent to Coventry’ when his
colleagues return to work after the dispute has been resolved.
Similarly, a mother who is known to have neglected her children
may find that her applications for membership of local women’s
organizations are continually turned down.
In many circumstances informal psychological sanctions can
justifiably be regarded as ‘positive’ forms of social control - i.e.
they are intended to induce conformity amongst those individuals
who are deemed to have strayed too far from some particular
behavioural norm. However, these sanctions can also be used in
a negative way (stigmatization). For example, individuals with
conduct stigmas are likely to be subjected to a whole range of
psychological sanctions on the grounds that they constitute a
threat to cherished norms and values. Accordingly, a homosexual
may find that he is continually snubbed by his neighbours,
ridiculed by local children and ostracized by work associates. In
such cases, psychological sanctions can be said to serve two main
purposes:
(i) They enable individuals to express their personal dis­
approval of certain types of conduct.
150 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
(ii) The attention of the public can be drawn to the fact that a
particular individual has a serious character defect.
‘Negative’ forms of psychological sanctioning are even likely to
be experienced by those with courtesy stigmas (see pp. 9, 16).
For example, a woman may find that her neighbours and
friends shun her after she has informed them that her husband is
receiving psychiatric treatment at the local hospital.
Exposure to negative psychological sanctions may induce some
individuals (who would, in general, tend to be acceptors rather
than rejectors - see pp. 18-20) to seek ways of improving their
public image (in such circumstances negative sanctions can be
said to have had unintended ‘positive’ effects). For example, in
the hope of regaining some form of social acceptance, an ex­
convict may offer to organize fund-raising activities for various
local charities. However, as was noted earlier, it may prove very
difficult for such individuals to regain complete social acceptance
(see p. 19).
In turning to the question of formal psychological sanctions it is
useful, for the purpose of illustration, to examine certain aspects
of the law enforcement process. Within this sphere, relatively
mild psychological sanctions are often administered. For
instance, a motorist who commits a minor traffic infringement is
much more likely (at least in certain areas) to receive a stern
lecture (‘words of advice’) from a police officer than to be
formally charged with the particular offence. In situations of this
kind the mere threat of a court appearance is often sufficient to
prompt the offender concerned to make an undertaking to drive
more carefully in future.
Criminal prosecutions, by way of contrast, frequently involve
the use of more punitive psychological sanctions. Indeed, given
their potential for tarnishing personal reputation,49 court appear­
ances can usefully be regarded as a highly effective form of social
control in their own right. Accordingly, most of us will seek to
minimize such appearances by behaving, whenever possible, in a
law-abiding way.
A formal stigma is the most severe psychological sanction that
can be imposed within the court setting. A conviction for an
offence such as theft, soliciting or murder carries with it an
inherent stigma. To be officially degraded50 in this way can often
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 151
have a detrimental effect on an individual’s self-image. As Matza
argues:
To be signified a thief does not assure the continuation of such
pursuits; but it does add to the meaning of a theft in the life of
the perpetrator. . . . to be signified a thief is to lose the blissful
identity of one who among other things happens to have
committed a theft. It is a movement, however gradual, towards
being a thief and representing theft.51
In addition, an individual’s negative self-image can often be
reinforced by the reactions of others. Those formally labelled as
criminals may for example:
(i) receive hostile reactions from their family, friends and
other associates;
(ii) experience difficulties in obtaining employment and/or
accommodation;
(iii) be continually subjected to official scrutiny (e.g. by the
police).
There is likely to be considerable disagreement over the
question of whether the imposition of formal psychological
sanctions should be regarded as a positive or negative form of
social control. For example, there are grounds for contending
that criminal convictions are essentially a positive form of social
control (i.e. this sanction enables social disapproval to be
expressed in a way that maximizes the possibility of rehabilita­
tion). Indeed, a number of measures have been introduced for
the specific purpose of rehabilitation. For instance, the Rehabili­
tation of Offenders Act (1974) provides special forms of legal
protection for ‘rehabilitated’ offenders. As Walker points out:
A rehabilitated offender must be treated for all purposes in law
as if he had not committed, been charged with, prosecuted for,
convicted of, or sentenced for the offence in question, so that
he can safely deny this, and sue for defamation if it is alleged in
a defamatory way.52
In a similar vein, children are often given special forms of legal
152 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
protection when they are brought before a juvenile court (e.g.
the media are expressly prohibited from identifying any of the
children who are required to attend these hearings).53
In contrast, though, the fact that many individuals have
experienced severe forms of economic and social hardship as a
result of a criminal conviction provides powerful support for the
viewpoint that these sanctions should properly be regarded as a
negative form of social control (i.e. certain types of offenders
tend to be excluded from full social participation).
The impact of formal labelling has also been given serious
consideration within the field of social policy. This is certainly not
surprising given that most welfare service users are likely to be
categorized in either a general (patient, client, claimant) or
specific (homeless person, neurotic, educationally sub-normal)
way. The question that concerns us here is whether some of these
classifications can be used for the purpose of psychological social
control. In certain cases there would appear to be valid reasons
for supporting this supposition. For example, an individual who is
informed that she requires compulsory psychiatric care is likely to
experience a severe loss of self-esteem. As Schur remarks:
Mental illness designations are highly stigmatizing and thus
impose reductions in power and social standing . . . despite the
undoubted benefits that voluntary psychotherapy may confer,
and notwithstanding the good intentions of most therapists,
compulsory impositions of psychiatric ‘help’ represent a
significant mode of social control. Particularly when the state
becomes implicated in its public uses, psychiatry may become a
potent tool for controlling any or all individuals deemed to
threaten or undermine the (political as well as social or
cultural) status quo.54
In this passage, Schur also alludes to the principal argument
that has been put forward to counter the suggestion made above.
Proponents of this latter perspective contend that welfare
categorizations are used solely for benevolent purposes. For
instance, a classification such as ‘educationally sub-normal’
should not, it is argued, be viewed in a negative light. On the
contrary, such a classification is seen as being extremely useful in
terms of helping to ensure that children of limited intelligence are
 Stigma and social policy : wider dimensions 153
placed in an educational environment that best serves their needs
(i.e. a school in which the other pupils have similar intellectual
capabilities). In short, from this perspective, welfare classifica­
tions are seen as being an entirely favourable form of social
control. However, the fact that many individuals have reported
feeling stigmatized as a result of welfare labelling55 tends to
suggest that such categorizations should, at the very least, be
regarded as an unintentional form of negative, psychological
social control.
It is important to note that physical (e.g. bodily assaults and
other related forms of coercion such as imprisonment and
enforced exile) and economic (e.g. threat of unemployment,
fines) sanctions have also been, and continue to be, used for the
purpose of maintaining social control in society. Indeed, in some
instances, more than one type of sanction has been used for the
purpose of social control. For example, many of the punishments
meted out to the ‘undeserving’ poor in the sixteenth century (see
p. 25) were intended to be both physically and psychologically
painful (see Figure 4.1).

Predominantly Predominantly
physical <---------------------------------------------psychological
Whipping Amputation Ear-boring Stocking
Branding Public humiliation
Figure 4.1 An example of combined physical and psychological
sanctions: the punishment of the ‘undeserving’ poor in the
sixteenth century
Psychological sanctions are also frequently used in conjunction
with physical and/or economic penalties in contemporary society.
For instance, in the field of international relations, a government
in one country may decide to use physical (armed aggression),
economic (trade embargo) and psychological (cutting of diplo­
matic ties) sanctions in order to exert control over another nation
state. Similarly, in the area of criminal justice psychological
sanctions (official labelling disseminated via the media) will often
be combined with either economic (fines) or physical (imprison­
ment) penalties.
154 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
Finally, although the term stigmatization has generally come to
be associated with negative forms of psychological sanctioning, it
should be remembered that the term can also be used in a much
broader way. For example, any discussion of the stigmatization of
ethnic minorities would necessitate consideration being given to
the use of economic (e.g. the discriminatory recruitment policies
of some employers) and physical (e.g. police harassment of black
youths) as well as psychological (e.g. verbal insults, snubs)
sanctions.
As was mentioned earlier (see the relevant sections in chapters
2 and 3) an appreciation of this wider perspective (i.e. the
inclusion of physical and economic forms of discrimination) is
useful when analysing welfare stigmatization. Consider, for
instance, the case of local authority housing. Although the
harsher aspects of the tenancy agreements imposed by the early
‘philanthropists’ have all but withered away, contemporary council
tenants continue to be subjected to quite stringent forms of
control. As Ginsburg argues:
The local housing authority . . . manages tenants in accord­
ance with the dictates of landlordism, and council housing
management has acted as a form of social control of the
working class in the hope that ‘order in the home’ will generate
social order and respect for property in general, and the
prompt payment of rent and respect for the council’s property
in particular.56
The furtherance of these aims has almost inevitably resulted in the
adoption of stigmatizing administrative procedures. For example,
in terms of allocation decisions, emphasis may be placed on the
‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ qualities of prospective tenants.
Applicants who are assessed as being clean, quiet, respectable
and improbable rent defaulters are likely to receive preferential
treatment, at least in terms of the accommodation they are
offered, than those with ‘less eligible’ characteristics. In addition,
tenants who incur the displeasure of their local housing
department by falling behind with their rent payments without
‘good cause’ or by behaving in an ‘anti-social’ way are likely to be
stigmatized in a quite explicit way (e.g. forcible eviction).
The social control function of welfare stigmatization will be
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 155
given further attention in the final section of this chapter which
will, by way of conclusion, be concerned with the question of
whether or not stigma should be regarded as a key social policy
concept.

Stigma: a key concept in social policy?

One of the main aims of this book has been to challenge the
assumption that stigma is some kind of ‘natural’ entity which can
be examined in isolation from the economic and social structure
of a given society. The fact that the concept of stigma has rarely
been subjected to critical appraisal in its own right has tended to
perpetuate the idea that the reasons for, and the effects of,
stigma are self-evident.
Any attempt to link a society’s prevailing pattern of stigmatiz­
ation with its underlying economic and social structure necessi­
tates some initial attention being given to the various aspects of
stigma. Accordingly, in chapter 1 distinctions were made between
stigmas, stigma recognition, stigmatization, felt stigma, responses
to stigma acknowledgment, stigma disavowal and stigma
management. A number of important issues were highlighted in
this chapter. For example, it was argued that the process of
stigmatization need not necessarily involve overt forms of
hostility. In contrast to those with conduct stigmas (who are
likely to be subjected to harassment and verbal abuse because of
the ‘blameworthy’ nature of their ‘failings’), the ‘physically’
stigmatized are unlikely (in general) to be treated in such an
overtly hostile manner. However, they are likely to be stigma­
tized in other ways (e.g. over-sympathetic or inhibited responses
from normals; denial of adequate educational and employment
opportunities). In addition, it was pointed out that it should not
be assumed that all individuals who possess a stigma will
automatically feel stigmatized. Many stigmatized individuals are
likely, for example, to ‘reject’ (and resent) any suggestion that
they should be denied full social acceptance. Indeed, in recent
years collective forms of rejection have become commonplace.
For instance (to cite just one case), people with physical
impairments have formed pressure groups in an effort to
publicize the various ways in which they are systematically
156 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
‘disabled’ by the very way in which economic and social activity is
organized in society. The possibility of serious conflict between
stigmatizers and the stigmatized serves to underlie the fact that
any pattern of stigmatization is likely to further or sustain the
interests of certain groups and classes at the expense of others.
The wider functions of stigma (i.e. its potential for bolstering
the prevailing economic and social order) have tended to be
somewhat neglected in the social administration literature (see
chapter 2). This is not altogether surprising given the dominance
of a problem-solving ethos within this field of study (i.e. attention
has tended to be given to the notion of stigma for practical - e.g.
the adverse effect that this phenomenon can have upon the take-
up rate for various means-tested, state welfare benefits and
services - as opposed to theoretical reasons). Indeed, the concern
which has been expressed by some commentators about the
theoretical relevance, and the practical applicability, of the
concept of stigma for the study of social policy can be linked to
the ‘problem-orientated’ nature of the social administration
approach to this phenomenon (i.e. failure to appreciate the wider
dimensions of stigma).
It is important, however, to give due credit to the strengths of
the ‘social administration’ approach to stigma. By highlighting
the stigmatizing propensities of social service provision, social
administrators have played a major role in various campaigns for
welfare reforms. At the heart of this approach has been a
genuine commitment to the needs and aspirations of the various
underprivileged members of society. By pressing for the intro­
duction of more enlightened forms of social policy provision (e.g.
improved levels of benefits, non-stigmatized administrative
procedures), ‘traditional’ social administrators have shown a
commendable desire to create a more humane type of society.
In order to emphasize the importance of linking welfare
stigmatization with the economic and social structure of society,
attention was given (in chapter 3) to some of the reasons why,
and the various ways in which, one particular ‘welfare’ group -
unmarried mothers - has been stigmatized over the centuries. It
was argued that stigma has tended to attach to the unmarried
mother for two main reasons:
(i) The challenge they present to Christian teaching on
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 157
marriage and family life.
(ii) The ‘blameworthy’ nature of their dependency on public
aid (this was identified as the most important reason as to
why stigma has attached to the unmarried mother,
especially since 1500).
Although twentieth century unmarried mothers have not been
subjected to the harsher forms of secular stigmatization which
were all too familiar to their predecessors, it would be
premature, it was contended, to claim that this group had
achieved anything approaching full social acceptance. Indeed, the
fact that unmarried motherhood continues to be regarded as a
social problem (a view which has been reinforced, either
intentionally or unintentionally, by a number of researchers
workingin the fields of sociology, psychology and social
administration - see pp. 100-22) has tended to perpetuate the
stigmatization of this group.
It is important to note that the continued stigmatization of
unmarried mothers (and other welfare groups) is unlikely to elicit
universal condemnation. On the contrary, there is likely to be
considerable support amongst certain sections of the community
for the introduction of more extensive forms of welfare
stigmatization. With this in mind, it is useful to consider the
question of welfare stigmatization from three divergent theor­
etical perspectives - namely - the anti-collectivist, the Fabian
socialist (social democratic) and the Marxist.
The anti-collectivists (e.g. Hayek, Friedman and Seldon)57 do
not believe that there is any need for extensive institutional forms
of state welfare provision. Instead, they contend that citizens’
welfare needs can best be met by the free market and the family
unit. It is acknowledged, however, that a minority of citizens will
be unable to obtain support from these two sources. Accordingly,
it is accepted that state welfare services, of a strictly residual
kind, should be provided. (Such provision is advocated on the
grounds of: (i) humanitarianism; (ii) neighbourhood effects -
situations in which it is inappropriate or impossible for market
forces to operate;58 (iii) political stability - the prevention of civil
disorder).
Not surprisingly (given their belief that state welfare services
should only be provided for those in ‘genuine’ need), the anti­
158 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
collectivists are firmly convinced that potential recipients of state
support should be required to undergo stringent eligibility tests.
For example, in the absence of a negative income tax scheme, the
anti-collectivists believe that certain forms of means-testing are
necessary in order to minimize the possibility of abuse in state
social security programmes. However, the stigmatizing potential
of such procedures tend to be ignored by free market advocates.
Indeed, as was pointed out earlier (see p. 41), a number of anti­
collectivists tend to favour the use of explicit forms of welfare
stigmatization in certain cases (e.g. the voluntary unemployed).
The fact that the anti-collectivists tend (either explicitly or
implicitly) to accept the need for potentially stigmatizing forms of
state welfare provision reflects their generally favourable opinion
of the existing economic and social order (though it should be
remembered that they would like to see a substantial reduction in
the level of public expenditure and an end to what they regard as
completely unnecessary governmental regulation of commercial
activity). In particular, the anti-collectivists believe that public
commitment towards the dominant value system (with its stress
on independence, self-help and competition) must be maintained
if economic objectives such as high levels of growth (which, it is
alleged, will benefit all members of society) are to be achieved.
As such, the anti-collectivists tend to regard the existing pattern
of welfare stigmatization (which is designed to limit the demand
for public aid) as both necessary and just.
Unlike the anti-collectivists, the Fabian socialists (e.g. Tawney,
Crosland and Titmuss)59 do not believe that welfare stigmatiza­
tion is either necessary or desirable. According to advocates of
this latter perspective, the existence of welfare stigmatization can
be directly linked to the primacy that has continually been given
to economic as opposed to social values (e.g. equality, co­
operation and fellowship). Importantly, though, the Fabian
socialists contend that it is possible to redress the balance in
favour of social imperatives. The state is seen as having a crucial
role to play in this process. For example, Crosland contends that:
the state and the political authority have removed a wide, and
strategically decisive, segment of economic decisions out of the
sphere of purely market influences, and made them subject to
deliberate political control. Through fiscal policy, and a variety
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 159
of physical, legislative, and financial controls, the state now
consciously regulates (or seeks to regulate) the level of
employment, the distribution of income, the rate of accumula­
tion, and the balance of payments; and its actions heavily
influence the size of industries, the pattern of output, and the
direction of investment-decisions. The passive state has given
way to the active, or at least the ultimately responsible, state;
the political authority has emerged as the final arbiter of
economic life. . . -60
This belief in the benevolent potential of state intervention has
led the Fabian socialists to press for the introduction of universal,
socially integrative, need-based, public welfare services (com­
plemented where necessary by positive forms of discrimination).
It is contended that reformist measures of this kind can
effectively counter the stigma that continues to attach to the
recipients of state welfare provision.
The Marxists (e.g. Ginsburg, Gough and Navarro),61 by way of
contrast, reject the assertion that welfare stigmatization can be
eradicated by the introduction of social reforms. Unlike the
Fabian socialists, they do not believe that the ‘state machine’ can
be used to challenge the long-term economic interests of the
capitalist class.62 As Gough points out:
The common element in all Marxist theories of the state, which
distinguishes them from all other theories, is the subordination
of the state to the particular mode of production and to the
dominant class or classes within that mode. In other words, the
economically dominant class is also the politically dominant or
ruling class.63
Accordingly, the Marxists (although they would be the first to
acknowledge the part played by the working class in terms of
securing welfare reforms) contend that state welfare services have
tended (in terms of their implementation and administration) to
reflect the interests of the dominant economic class. Welfare
stigmatization is thus seen as helping to sustain and reinforce the
individualistic and competitive ethos of capitalist society. For
example, the Marxists claim that stigmatizing, social security
administrative procedures are designed not only to deter those in
160 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
need from seeking public aid but also to reinforce the association
between public dependency and inferiority. As Ginsburg states:
Claimants are subject to expectations which stigmatize them as
poor whatever they do, although the stigma is not as strong
perhaps as in the days of the poor law. It is not an anachronism
nor a vestige of the poor law which can be eradicated by
administrative reform and repackaging. The stigma of being a
claimant is an essential ingredient in a system designed to
discipline claimants and to promote the values of insurance and
individual and family self-help.64
The dispute between the Fabian socialists and the Marxists
over the question of whether welfare stigmatization can be
eradicated by means of social reform can be linked quite neatly
to the earlier discussion on the unmarried mother. The Fabian
socialists would argue that the stigma which has attached to this
group (because of their ‘blameworthy’ public dependency) can be
countered by well-formulated and skilfully executed social
policies. A good deal of evidence can be cited in support of this
assertion. For instance, a number of social policy initiatives
during this century have done much to improve the life chances
and, one would assume, the self-esteem of unmarried mothers
(see pp. 89-98). However, the fact that the vast majority of
unmarried mothers have continued to experience severe forms of
economic and social deprivation tends to suggest that the stigma-
reducing potential of welfare reforms may be seriously limited. If
this is indeed the case then the Marxist approach to welfare
stigmatization would appear to be particularly worthy of
consideration. From this perspective, the stigmatization of any
group would be expected to continue if it could be said to serve
the interests of the dominant economic class. Certainly, it seems
quite plausible to argue that the continued stigmatization of the
unmarried mother would benefit the capitalist class to some
degree (i.e. from the viewpoint of the capitalist class, unmarried
mothers are likely to be regarded - because of their inability, in
general, to remain economically independent - as an unnecessary
burden on the productive sector of society). Accordingly, the
continued stigmatization of unmarried mothers (an eventuality
which would help to sustain the impression that such women are
 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions 161
not only socially unacceptable but also undeserving of public
support) is likely to be welcomed by members of the capitalist
class on the grounds that such action is likely to ensure that only
minimal forms of ‘scarce’ resources are devoted to the needs of
this economically ‘unproductive’ group. Indeed, members of this
class are likely to oppose any attempts to eradicate such
stigmatization. For example, if it became widely accepted that
unmarried mothers have a right to enjoy a standard of living
which compares favourably with other, more affluent, sections of
the community, it seems likely that attention would eventually
have to be focused on the very way in which the organization of
contemporary society militates against this group’s interests (i.e.
the mode of production, the position of women in society, the
role of the family and so forth). It can be argued, therefore, that
the stigmatization of unmarried mothers (and other negatively
regarded groups) can help to forestall meaningful debate about
the distribution of economic and social power in society.
The great strength of the Marxist approach is that it serves to
highlight the importance of examining the link between welfare
(and all other forms of) stigmatization and the mode of
production. For instance, it seems likely, at least in theory, that
there will be a significant difference in the pattern of stigmatiza­
tion which prevails in a capitalist as opposed to a socialist society
(i.e. groups which are prone to stigmatization in the former, such
as the disabled and the unemployed, are likely to be treated far
more favourably in the latter). Clearly, further research is needed
in order to establish the strength, or otherwise, of this potential
link between patterns of stigmatization and the mode of
production. For example, such an association would appear to be
far more easy to establish in the case of disability or race65 than
in the case of either homosexuality66 or prostitution.
In conclusion, then, the concept of stigma (provided that it is
not simply regarded as a ‘technical’ problem which can be
resolved by a few administrative reforms) is likely to remain a
key concept for both students and practitioners in the field of
social policy. Indeed, an appreciation of the concept of stigma is
essential if one wishes to examine, in a critical fashion, the
frequently voiced claims about the establishment of a welfare
state or a welfare society. For example, a society which permits
the widespread stigmatization of groups such as ethnic minorities,
162 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
the unemployed or single parents can hardly be said to be one in
which the ‘welfare ethic’ predominates.
Notes

Chapter 1 The anatomy of stigma

1 My thanks to Bleddyn Davies for suggesting this title.
2 See C. Saunders, Social Stigma of Occupations.
3 R.M. Titmuss, Social Policy: An Introduction, p. 44.
4 J. Cumming and E. Cumming, ‘On the stigma of mental illness’, in
S. Palmer and A.S. Linsky (eds), Rebellion and Retreat, pp. 449-50.
5 R.W. English, ‘Correlates of stigma towards physically disabled
persons’, in R.P. Marinelli and A.E. Dell Orto (eds), The
Psychological and Social Impact of Physical Disability, p. 162.
6 T. Kando, ‘Passing and stigma management: the case of the trans­
sexual’, in C.D. Bryant (ed.), Sexual Deviancy in Social Context, p.
150.
7 L. Osborne, ‘Beyond stigma theory: a literary approach’, p. 72.
8 Though note the esteemed nature of this term in Christian teaching.
See J. McCaffery, The Friar of San Giovanni, p. 142.
9 See, for example: N.J. Davies, ‘Labeling theory in deviance
research: a critique and reconsideration’; S. Dinitz et al., Deviance:
Studies in the Process of Stigmatization and Societal Reaction; J.P.
Gibbs, ‘Issues in defining deviant behavior’, in R.A. Scott and J.D.
Douglas (eds), Theoretical Perspectives on Deviance.
10 R.K Merton and R. Nisbet (eds), Contemporary Social Problems.
pp. 833-4.
11 K. Plummer, Sexual Stigma, p.26.
12 Ibid., p. 26.
13 S. Cohen (ed.), Images of Deviance, p. 11.
14 See G. Christensen, ‘A test of the labelling approach to deviance:
the case of the disabled’; C. Haffter, ‘The changeling: history and
psychodynamics of attitudes to handicapped children in European
folklore’.
15 See, for example, G.E. Markle and R.J. Troyer, ‘Smoke gets in
your eyes: cigarette smoking as deviant behaviour’.
16 E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 163; editorial in the DailyMirror, 11.5.78.
17 E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 14.
18 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
163
164 Notes
19 See T. Kando, op. cit, p. 151.
20 E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 14.
21 F. Davis, ‘Deviance disavowal: the management of strained
interaction by the visibly handicapped’, in W.J. Filstead (ed.), An
Introduction to Deviance: Readings in the Process of Making
Deviants, p. 149.
22 W.J. Cahnman, ‘The stigma of obesity’, p. 294. See also, W.
Dejong, ‘The stigma of obesity: the consequences of naive
assumptions concerning the causes of physical deviance’.
23 L.E. Pardo, ‘Stigma and social justice. The effects of physical
disability vis a vis moral turpitude’.
24 Ibid., p. 70.
25 Ibid., p. 71.
26 Ibid., p. 71.
27 Ibid., pp. 108-9.
28 E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 14.
29 Ibid., p. 13.
30 D.A. Reisman, Richard Titmuss: Welfare and Society, p. 128.
31 A. Raphael, ‘Messiah of the militant left’.
32 J. Posner, ‘The stigma of excellence: on being just right’. See also,
J. Kwasniewski, ‘Positive social deviancy’.
33 J. Posner, op. cit., p. 144.
34 Ibid., p. 143.
35 S. Dinitz et al., op. cit., p. 14.
36 E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 154.
37 K. Plummer, op. cit., p. 21. See also, M. Rotenberg, ‘Self-labelling:
a missing link in the “societal reaction” theory of deviance’.
38 E. Goffman, Stigma, pp. 45-6.
39 H. Beks, ‘Learning to say “I am a homosexual” ’, p. 58.
40 C.S. Suchar, Social Deviance Perspectives and Prospects, pp. 189-90.
See also, H.S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance,
pp. 32-4; E.C. Hughes, ‘Dilemmas and contradictions of status’.
41 See, for example, E. Goffman, Asylums', T.J. Scheff, Being
Mentally 111: A Sociological Theory', T.J. Scheff, ‘The labelling
theory of mental illness’; T.S. Szasz, The Manufacture of Madness,
ch. 12.
42 See, for example, J.P. Gibbs, op. cit.; W.R. Grove (ed.), The
Labelling of Deviance', E.M. Lemert, Human Deviance, Social
Problems, and Social Control.
43 H.J. Parker, View from the Boys, p. 162.
44 See C.A.B. Warren and J.M. Johnson, ‘A critique of labeling
theory from the phenomenological perspective’, in R. A. Scott and
J.D. Douglas (eds), op. cit., ch. 3.
45 See, for example, A.N. Doob and B.P. Ecker, ‘Stigma and
compliance’; R. Kleck et al., ‘The effects of physical deviance upon
face-to-face interaction’; R. Kleck, ‘Physical stigma and nonverbal
clues emitted in face-to-face interaction’; L. Levitt and R.C.
Kornhaber, ‘Stigma and compliance: a re-examination’.
 Notes 165
46 R. Kleck et al., The effects of physical deviance. .
47 See, for example, R.A. Scott, The Making of Blind Men; R.B.
Edgerton, The Cloak of Competence: Stigma in the Lives of the
Mentally Retarded; R.B. Edgerton and S.M. Bercovici, ‘The cloak
of competence: years later’.
48 Quoted in E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 51.
49 See, E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 67.
50 F. Davis, op. cit., p. 149.
51 B. Berk, ‘Face-saving at the singles dance’, p. 538.
52 See, for example, S. Box, Deviance, Reality and Society, p. 243.
53 S. Sutherland, Breakdown, p. 35.
54 Quoted in E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 107.
55 F. Davis, op. cit., p. 145.
56 Quoted in E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 27.
57 See the Evening News (London), 11.9.78.
58 Quoted in E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 25.
59 M.S. Weinberg and C.J. Williams, Male Homosexuals - Their
Problems and Adaptions, p. 154.
60 See, for example, R. Belson, ‘Shame in Pregnancy’; S.E. Taylor
and E.J. Langer, ‘Pregnancy: a social stigma?’
61 J. Brundin, ‘My special shame’.
62 Quoted in E. Goffman, Stigma, pp. 103-4.
63 See, on this subject, A. Birenbaum, ‘On managing a courtesy
stigma’; C.S. Suchar, ‘The institutional reaction to child mental
illness: co-deviant labelling’.
64 Quoted in E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 43.
65 Letters column, the Evening News (London), 18.12.79.
66 A. Modigliani, ‘Embarrassment and embarrassability’, p. 313. See
also, E. Goffman, Interaction Ritual, pp. 97-112.
67 See, for example, K. Riezler, ‘Comment on the social psychology of
shame’.
68 F. Flynn, ‘People like you should know better’, p. 346.
69 See, for example, E. Goffman, Interaction Ritual, pp. 97-112; J.
Miller, ‘Exploring the inner man’.
70 D.W. Ball, ‘The problem of respectability’, in J.D. Douglas (ed.),
Deviance and Respectability: The Social Construction of Moral
Meanings, p. 334. See also on this issue, E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 18;
L. Humphreys, Out of the Closets, pp. 136-7; J.W. Rogers and
M.D. Buffalo, ‘Fighting back: nine modes of adaption to a deviant
label’, p. 105.
71 See F. Flynn, op. cit., p. 346; J.W. Rogers and M.D. Buffalo, op.
cit., p. 108.
72 See L. Humphreys, op. cit., p. 137.
73 R.H. Turner, ‘Deviance avowal as neutralization of commitment’,
p. 316.
74 E. Goffman, Stigma, pp. 19-20.
75 See E. Sagarin and R.J. Kelly, ‘Sexual deviance and labelling
perspectives’, in W.R. Gove (ed.), op. cit., p. 248 (Group 3).
166 Notes
76 See E. Goffman, Stigma, pp. 19-20.
77 See R.R. Anspach, ‘From stigma to identity politics: political
activism among the physically disabled and former mental patients’;
L. Humphreys, op. cit., ch. 8; J. Weeks, Coming Out, ch. 16.
78 E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 139.
79 See M. Brake, The Sociology of Youth Culture and Youth Sub­
cultures, ch. 3.
80 See D.W. Ball, op. cit.; E. Sagarin and R.J. Kelly, op. cit, p. 250;
G.M. Sykes and D. Matza, ‘Techniques of neutralization: a theory
of delinquency’.
81 See, for example, S. Box, op. cit., pp. 189-97; T.J. Scheff,
‘Negotiating reality: notes on power in the assessment of respon­
sibility’; E.M. Schurr, Labelling Deviant Behaviour: Its Sociological
Implications.
82 See E. Goffman, Stigma, ch. 2.
83 Quoted in E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 110.
84 See E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 98 and p. 117. See also, R.M. Harrison,
‘Epilepsy and stigma’. Note also that a ‘cycle’ of passing maybe
adopted by certain individuals - see E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 100.
85 J. Miller, ‘Jonathan Miller: the director’s not for blocking’, p. 175.
86 Quoted in E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 109.
87 Though we may all enjoy such experiences which have a habit of
being associated with coach or railway journeys.
88 See E. Goffman, Stigma, p. 125.
89 Ibid., pp. 126-7.
90 See ibid., pp. 126-8.
91 See ibid., pp. 146-7.
92 See, for example, A. Birenbaum, op. cit.; J. Cumming and E.
Cumming, op. cit.
93 See B. Berk, op. cit.; E. Goffman, Interaction Ritual, pp. 5-45.

Chapter 2 Stigma: the social administration approach

1 See K. de Schweinitz, England's Road to Social Security, chap. 3.
2 See A.L. Beier, ‘Vagrants and the social order in Elizabethan
England’; F. Fox-Piven and R. A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor:
The Functions of Public Welfare, pp. 15-16; E.M. Leonard, The
Early History of English Poor Relief, pp. 25-6; K. de Schweinitz,
op. cit., ch. 3.
3 See D. Marshall, The English Poor in the Eighteenth Century, pp.
102-3; G.W. Oxley, Poor Relief in England and Wales 1601-1834,
pp. 54-5.
4 See J.R. Poynter, Society and Pauperism, pp. 125-6; K. de
Schweinitz, op. cit., ch. 13.
5 R.A Pinker, Social Theory and Social Policy, p. 58.
6 See M.E. Rose, The English Poor Law 1780-1930, pp. 145-6.
7 See S. and B. Webb, English Local Government: English Poor
 Notes 167
Law History: Part II: The Last Hundred Years. Vol. I, pp. 378-81.
8 See R.A. Pinker, Social Theory, pp. 77-8; S. and B. Webb, Vol. I,
pp. 316-47.
9 See M.E. Rose, op. cit., pp. 238, 252-4; S. and B. Webb, Vol. I,
pp. 357-64.
10 See J.S. Heywood, Children in Care, ch. 5; I. Pinchbeck and M.
Hewitt, Children in English Society, volume II, ch. 17.
11 See S. and B. Webb, vol. II, pp. 474-6.
12 See M. Bruce, The Coming of the Welfare State, pp. 203-4.
13 See B. Watkin, Documents on Health and Social Services 1834 to
the Present Day, pp. 26-8.
14 See R.A. Pinker, Social Theory, pp. 82-3.
15 See D. Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State, p. 149.
16 See, for example, W. Hannington, Unemployed Struggles 1919-
1936, chs 2 and 3.
17 See A. Deacon, In Search of the Scrounger, A. Deacon, ‘Conces­
sion and coercion: the politics of unemployment insurance in the
twenties’ in A. Briggs and J. Saville (eds), Essays in Labour
History, 1918-1939, Vol. 3, ch. 3.
18 See A. Deacon, In Search; N. Ginsburg, Class, Capital and Social
Policy, pp. 58-68.
19 See R.M. Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy, p. 515, note 1.
20 See B. Watkin, op. cit., pp. 94-6. See also, A. Deacon,
‘Thankyou, God, for the means-test man’.
21 Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services {Beveridge Report),
para. 369, p. 141.
22 See V. George and P. Wilding, Ideology and Social Welfare, ch. 4.
23 See G. Room, The Sociology of Welfare, ch. 3, part IV.
24 See V. George and P. Wilding, op. cit., ch. 4.
25 See R.M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, ch. 1.
26 R.M. Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare, p. 191.
27 See R.M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship.
28 Ibid., p. 269.
29 For useful discussions of the notion of social exchange see, P.
Ekeh, Social Exchange Theory: The Two Traditions; A. Heath,
Rational Choice and Social Exchange; G. MacCormack,
‘Reciprocity’.
30 See A.W. Gouldner, For Sociology, ch. 9.
31 Ibid., p. 266.
32 For useful discussions of the anti-collectivist approach to welfare
see, M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom; M. Friedman and R.
Friedman, Free to Choose; F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom; A.
Seldon, Charge. See also, commentaries by V. George and P.
Wilding, op. cit., ch. 2; G. Room, op. cit, ch. 3, part III; P.F.
Taylor-Gooby and J. Dale, Social Theory and Social Welfare, pp.
58-69.
33 R.M. Titmuss, ‘Introduction’ in R.H. Tawney, Equality, p. 24.
34 R.M. Titmuss, Social Policy: An Introduction, pp. 42-3.
168 Notes
35 R.M. Titmuss, Essays On The Welfare State, pp. 216-17.
36 Ibid., p. 236.
37 R.M. Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare, p.142.
38 Ibid., p. 134.
39 Ibid., p. 143.
40 Ibid., p. 134.
41 Ibid., p. 129.
42 See ibid., pp. 190-1.
43 See ibid., pp. 195-6.
44 R.M. Titmuss,The Gift Relationship, pp. 254-5.
45 R.M. Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare, pp. 196-7.
46 Ibid., p. 196.
47 See on this issue, P. Townsend, ‘Introduction: does selectivity
mean a nation divided’ in Fabian Society, Social Services For All?
ch. 1.
48 R.M. Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare, op. cit, p. 135.
49 See C. Clark, Poverty Before Politics; A. Seldon, op. cit.; A.
Seldon and H. Gray, Universal or Selective Benefits?
50 R. Klein (ed.), Inflation and Priorities, p. 5.
51 See G. Rose, ‘Stigma, illusion and means testing’.
52 G. Room, op. cit., p. 201.
53 M. Reddin, ‘Local authority means-tested services’ in Fabian
Society, Social Services for All? p. 7.
54 R.A. Pinker, Social Theory, p. 141.
55 Ibid., p. 141.
56 See M.H. Cooper, Rationing Health Care, chs 7 and 8; L. Doyal
with I. Pennell, The Political Economy of Health, pp. 195-7.
57 See, e.g. P. Morris, Put Away; Report of the Committee of Enquiry
into Allegations of Ill-Treatment at the Ely Hospital Cardiff.
58 D.A. Reisman, Richard Titmuss: Welfare and Society, p. 54.
59 R.A. Pinker, Social Theory, p. 143.
60 Ibid., p. 170.
61 See ibid., p. 171. See also, A. Heath, op. cit., p. 154; R. Pruger,
‘Social policy: unilateral transfer or reciprocal exchange’.
62 R.A. Pinker, Social Theory, p. 173.
63 See ibid., pp. 173-4.
64 See ibid., p. 174.
65 Ibid., p. 151.
66 See ibid., p. 143.
67 Ibid., p. 151.
68 Ibid., p. 160. See also, R. Pruger, op. cit., p. 295.
69 See R.M. Titmuss, Social Policy, p. 26.
70 R.A. Pinker, Social Theory, p. 139.
71 See DHSS, Supplementary Benefits Handbook, ch. 3; M. Hill,
Policies for the Unemployed: Help or Coercion?
72 See for example, D. Marsden, Mothers Alone, ch. 12; J. Streather
and S. Weir, Social Insecurity: Single Mothers on Benefit.
73 See, for example, R. Lister, The Administration of the Wage Stop;
 Notes 169
D. Marsden, Workless, ch. 5.
74 B. Jordan, Poor Parents, p. 114.
75 R.A. Pinker, Social Theory, p. 201.
76 D. Donnison, ‘Supplementary benefits: dilemmas and priorities’,
p. 358.
77 See ibid., p. 358.
78 See G. Rose, op cit. (Supplementary benefits) and B. Jordan, Poor
Parents, p. 72. (Social work.)
79 R.A. Pinker, Social Theory, p. 206.
80 See P. Golding and S. Middleton, Images of Welfare.
81 See, for example, Report of the Committee on Abuse of Social
Security Benefits (Fisher Report) ; F. Field (ed.), The Conscript
Army, ch. 4; F. Field, ‘Scroungers: crushing the invisible’.
82 P. Golding and S. Middleton, ‘Why is the press so obsessed with
welfare scroungers?’, p. 195.
83 News Of The World, editorial, 24.9.78.
84 See D.A. Reisman, op. cit., pp. 100-1.
85 R. Page, The Benefits Racket, p. 113.
86 R. Boyson, Centre Forward, p. 121.
87 P. Townsend, The Family Life of Old People, pp. 183-5.
88 See D. Cole with J.E.G. Utting, The Economic Circumstances of
Old People, p. 10.
89 See ibid., ch. 8.
90 Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, Financial and Other
Circumstances of Retirement Pensioners.
91 V. George, Social Security and Society, pp. 115-16.
92 A.B. Atkinson, Poverty in Britain and the Reform of Social
Security, p. 58.
93 See for example, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the
Impact of Rates on Households (The Allen Report).
94 See V. George, Social Security: Beveridge and After, pp. 75-6.
95 J.C. Kincaid, Poverty and Equality in Britain, p. 64.
96 See P. Hall et al., Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy,
pp. 457-60; J.C. Kincaid, op. cit., pp. 65-7.
97 See A.B. Atkinson, op. cit., pp. 75-6.
98 See for example, P. Moss, Welfare Rights Project ‘68;?. Moss,
Welfare Rights Project Two ; Coventry Social Services, Looking for
Trouble among the Elderly ; R. Cohen and M. Tarpey, The Trouble
with Take-up.
99 P.J. Hennessey, Families, Funerals and Finances. A Study of
Funeral Expenses and How They are Paid.
100 M. Meacher, Rate Rebates: A Study of the Effectiveness of Means
Tests.
101 Ibid., p. 41.
102 Ibid., p. 41.
103 See Batley Community Development Project, Welfare Rights
Campaign Interim Report; P.F. Taylor-Gooby, ‘Rent benefits and
tenants’ attitudes. The Batley rent rebate and allowance study’.
170 Notes
104 P.F. Taylor-Gooby, ‘Rent benefits’, p. 44.
105 Ibid., pp. 44-5. See also, D. Page and B. Weinberger, Birmingham
Rent Rebate and Allowance Study, pp. 38-9.
106 See M. Blaxter, ‘Health “on the welfare” - a case study’.
107 Ibid., p. 48.
108 Ibid., pp. 48-9.
109 See ibid., p. 50.
110 See J. Nixon, Fatherless Families on FIS.
111 See, for example, N. Bond, Knowledge of Rights and Extent of
Unmet Need Amongst Recipients of Supplementary Benefit; T.
Lynes, ‘The dinner money problem’; North Tyneside CDP, In and
Out of Work.
112 See F. Field, The Stigma of Free School Meals. See also, F. Field,
Free School Meals: The Humiliation Continues.
113 B. Davies in association with M. Reddin, Universality, Selectivity
and Effectiveness in Social Policy.
114 See ibid., pp. 68-9.
115 See ibid., pp. 126-7.
116 Ibid., p. 127.
117 See D. Marsden, Mothers Alone, p. 238.
118 See P. Townsend, Poverty in the United Kingdom, pp. 842-7.
119 See R. Marshall, Families Receiving Supplementary Benefit, ch. 7.
See also on the subject of felt sigma and the receipt of means-
tested social security benefits: L. Burghes, Living from Hand to
Mouth, ch. 2; H. Land, Large Families in London, ch. 7; P.
Marris, Widows and Their Families, ch. 8; D. Marsden, Workless,
pp. 93-5; J. Ritchie and P. Wilson, Social Security Claimants, ch. 3.
120 See, for example: F. Field and M. Grieve, Abuse and the Abused',
Gingerbread, As We See It, ch. 1; H. Land, op. cit.; R. Marshall,
op. cit.
121 See North Tyneside CDP, op. cit., pp. 149-57.
122 Ibid., p. 151.
123 See R. Lister, Administration.
124 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
125 See, for example, R. Lister, As Man and Wife? A Study of the
Cohabitation Rule, pp. 18-19; D. Marsden, Mothers Alone, pp.
252-9; J. Streather and S. Weir, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
126 D. Marsden, Mothers Alone, p. 256.
127 See, for example, D. Marsden, Mothers Alone, pp. 247-51; J.
Streather and S. Weir, op. cit., pp. 24-7.
128 See, for example, A. Hopkinson, Single Mothers: The First Year,
p. 55.
129 See, for example, S. Jacobs, ‘Rehousing in Glasgow: reform
through community action’ in D. Jones and M. Mayo (eds),
Community Work 2; J. Lambert et al., Housing Policy and the
State, ch. 3.
130 See, e.g., S. Rees, Social Work Face to Face, chs 2, 4, and 5.
131 See ibid, p. 21.
 Notes 171
132 See E. Briggs and A.M. Rees, Supplementary Benefits and the
Consumer.
133 Ibid, p. 73.
134 P.M. Horan and P.L. Austin, The social bases of welfare stigma’.
135 Ibid., p. 655.
136 See J.F. Handler and E.J. Hollingsworth, The ‘Deserving Poor\
137 Ibid., p. 169.
138 See H.R. Kerbo, The stigma of welfare and a passive poor’.
139 See ibid., p. 179.
140 See J.F. Handler and E.J. Hollingsworth, op. cit., p. 175.
141 H.R. Kerbo, op. cit., p. 182. See also on the question of possible
causes of felt stigma, B. Davies in association with M. Reddin, op.
cit., chs 4 and 5.
142 See R.A. Pinker, Dependency and Social Welfare.
143 See ibid., pp. 60-1.
144 See P. Golding and S. Middleton, Images of Welfare, chs 6 and 7.
145 See ibid., p. 172.
146 See ibid., p. 172.
147 See B. Glastonbury et al., ‘Community perceptions and the
personal social services’.
148 See D. Clifford, ‘Stigma and the perception of social security
services’.
149 See ibid., p. 49.
150 See ibid., pp. 49-50.
151 See J.B. Williamson, The stigma of public dependency: a
comparison of alternative forms of public aid to the poor’.
152 See ibid., p. 222.
153 See ibid., p. 222.
154 See ibid., p. 220 (see p. 221 for ‘General Relief reasons).
155 See ibid., pp. 222-5.
156 See J.R. Feagin, ‘America’s welfare stereotypes’.
157 See J.P. Alston and K.I. Dean, ‘Socioeconomic factors associated
with attitudes toward welfare recipients and the causes of poverty’
(see in particular Table 1, p. 15).
158 See ibid., pp. 14-16.
159 See P. Golding and S. Middleton, Images of Welfare, p. 195.
160 See ibid., p. 198.
161 See R.H. Lauer, The middle class looks at poverty’.
162 See L. Goodwin, ‘How suburban families view the work orienta­
tions of the welfare poor: problems in social stratification and
social policy’.
163 See J. B. Williamson, ‘Beliefs about the motivation of the poor
and attitudes toward poverty policy’. See also, J.B. Williamson,
‘Beliefs about the welfare poor’.
164 See Commission Of The European Communities, The Perception
of Poverty in Europe.
165 See ibid., p. 72.
166 See P. Golding and S. Middleton, Images of Welfare, p. 198.
172 Notes
167 See B. Glastonbury et al., op. cit., p. 196.
168 See ibid., p. 196.
169 See D. Clifford, op. cit., p. 43.
170 See ibid., p. 42.
171 See R.A. Pinker, Dependency.
172 See J.F. Handler and E.J. Hollingsworth, op. cit.
173 See P.M. Horan and P.L. Austin, op. cit.
174 See J.F. Handler and E.J. Hollingsworth, op. cit.,p.166.
175 See P.M. Horan and P.L. Austin, op. cit., p. 652.
176 See B. Davies in association with M. Reddin, op. cit.,p. 81.
177 See E. Briggs and A.M. Rees, op. cit., pp. 41-2; B. Davies in
association with M. Reddin, op. cit., p. 104, note 25; R. Klein, op.
cit., p. 5.

Chapter 3 Stigma and the unmarried mother

1 1 Corinthians, 7, w . 32-4. (This and all other biblical references
are taken from The New English Bible, 1970, Oxford and
Cambridge University Presses.)
2 D.S. Bailey, The Man-Woman Relation in Christian Thought, p.
55.
3 See ibid., p. 43.
4 See P. Sherard, Christianity and Eros, pp. 3-4. See also,
Ephesians, 5, v. 32.
5 See P. Sherard, op. cit., p. 4. See also, Genesis, 1, v. 28.
6 E. Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches,
volume 1, p. 61.
7 1 Timothy, 2, w . 11-14.
8 B. Russell, Marriage and Morals, pp. 45-6.
9 K. Wrightson, ‘The nadir of English illegitimacy in the seventeenth
century’, in P. Laslett et al. (eds), Bastardy and its Comparative
History, p. 178.
10 See on this subject, G. May, Social Control of Sex Expression, pp.
80-1.
11 See R.M. Helmholz, ‘Infanticide in the province of Canterbury
during the fifteenth century’, pp. 383-4.
12 F.G. Emmison, Elizabethan Life: Morals and the Church Courts,
pp. 283-4.
13 P.E.H. Hair, ‘Bridal pregnancy in earlier rural England further
examined’, pp. 68-9.
14 P.E.H. Hair, ‘Bridal pregnancy in rural England in earlier
centuries’, p. 239.
15 See K. Wrightson, ‘The nadir of English illegitimacy’, p. 178.
16 See ibid., pp. 178-9.
17 See A. Macfarlane, ‘Illegitimacy and illegitimates in English
history’, in P. Laslett et al. (eds), op. cit., pp. 76-8
18 See F.G. Emmison, op. cit., pp. 25-30.
 Notes 173
19 Ibid., p. 25.
20 Ibid., p. 27.
21 See L. Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800,
p. 502.
22 See Ibid., pp. 531-2; J. Teichman, The Meaning of Illegitimacy, pp.
20- 2 .
23 See M. Hopkirk, Nobody Wanted Sam, p. 11.
24 See G. May, op. cit., Ch. 8.
25 See J.W. Legg, English Church Life from the Restoration to the
Tractarial Movement, ch. 8; L. Stone, op. cit., p. 633.
26 See L. Stone, op. cit., p. 633; A. Warne, Church and Society in
Eighteenth-Century Devon, pp. 78-9.
27 See G. May, op. cit., p. 170.
28 O. Chadwick, The Reformation, p. 379.
29 See I. Pinchbeck and M. Hewitt, Children in English Society, vol.
l,p . 209.
30 See K. Wrightson, ‘Infanticide in earlier seventeenth-century
England’.
31 See G. May, op. cit., ch. 10; L. Stone, op. cit., p. 632.
32 See G. May, op. cit., pp. 128-30; B.A. Kellum, ‘Infanticide in
England in the later middle ages’, p. 378.
33 W.K. Jordan, Philanthropy in England 1480-1660, p. 66.
34 See E.M. Leonard, The Early History of English Poor Relief, pp.
53-4.
35 See ibid., pp. 58-9.
36 See D. Gill, Illegitimacy, Sexuality and the Status of Women, p.
206.
37 See I. Pinchbeck and M. Hewitt, vol. 1, p. 207.
38 D. Gill, op. cit., p. 208.
39 See I. Pinchbeck and M. Hewitt, vol. 1, p. 207.
40 See ibid, p. 96.
41 See ibid., p. 208.
42 See K. Wrightson, ‘The nadir of English illegitimacy’, p. 181.
43 S.C. Ratcliff and H.C. Johnson (eds), Warwick County Records
vol. 1, p. 46.
44 S.C. Ratcliff and H.C. Johnson (eds), Warwick County Records
vol. 2, p. 247.
45 See ibid., pp. 114-15.
46 S.C. Ratcliff and H.C. Johnson (eds), vol. 1, p. 251.
47 Ibid., p. 243.
48 See I. Pinchbeck and M. Hewitt, vol. 1, p. 208.
49 S.C. Ratcliff and H.C. Johnson (eds), vol. 1, p. 117.
50 See E. Melling (ed.), Kentish Sources: IV The Poor, p. 35.
51 See K. de Schweinitz, England's Road to Social Security, ch. 5.
52 See K. Wrightson, ‘Infanticide’, p. 13; L. Stone, op. cit., p. 635.
53 See E. Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family, pp. 87-103.
54 See P. Laslett, ‘Introduction: comparing illegitimacy over time and
between cultures’, in P. Laslett et al. (eds), op. cit., p. 27.
174 Notes
55 See I. Pinchbeck and M. Hewitt, vol. 1, pp. 208-9.
56 See G.W. Oxley, Poor Relief in England and Wales 1601-1834, p.
91.
57 Ibid., p. 90.
58 See M. Hopkirk, op. cit., pp. 31-3.
59 See ibid., p. 38; M.P. Hall and I.V. Howes, The Church in Social
Work, p. 14.
60 Royal Commission on the Administration and Practical Operation
of the Poor Laws, p. 347. See also, U.R.Q. Henriques, ‘Bastardy
and the new poor law’.
61 Royal Commission on the Administration and Practical Operation
of the Poor Laws, p. 349.
62 Ibid., p. 347.
63 U.R.Q. Henriques, Before The Welfare State, p. 55.
64 See ibid., p. 55.
65 See P. Laslett, op. cit., p. 13.
66 See M. Finer and O.R. McGregor, ‘The history of the obligation
to maintain’, in Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families
Volume 2, Appendices (Finer Report), Appendix, 5, Para. 62, p.
119.
67 N. Longmate, The Workhouse, p. 157. See also, A. Digby, Pauper
Palaces, p. 152.
68 I. Anstruther, The Scandal of the Andover Workhouse, p. 113.
69 See J.S. Heywood, Children in Care, ch. 5; I. Pinchbeck and M.
Hewitt, vol. 2, ch. 17.
70 See J.S. Heywood, op. cit., pp. 95-6; I. Pinchbeck and M. Hewitt,
vol. 2, pp. 612-13.
71 See J.S. Heywood, op. cit., p. 99.
72 See ibid., p. 116.
73 See S. and B. Webb, vol. 1, p. 357.
74 See E.H. Hunt, British Labour History 1815-1914, pp. 120-5.
75 See J.S. Heywood, op. cit., pp. 157-8.
76 See S. Graham-Dixon, Never Darken My Door.
11 See H. A.L. Fisher. ‘The unmarried mother and her child’.
78 See H. Bosanquet, The Poor Law Report of 1909, p. 246.
79 Ibid., p. 246.
80 See ibid., p. 246.
81 N. Middleton, When Family Failed, p. 279.
82 Quoted in H. Bosanquet, op. cit., p. 254.
83 See, for example, Local Government Board circular to Boards of
Guardians (8.10.1914) in Survey of Relief to Widows and Children.
84 See Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief
of Distress, Minority Report, p. 788.
85 See M. Finer and O.R. McGregor, op. cit., paras 78-82, pp. 129-
32.
86 See ibid., para. 80, p. 131.
87 See ibid., para. 83, p. 133.
88 See ibid., para. 84, p. 134.
 Notes 175
89 See ibid., para. 85, p. 134.
90 Ibid., para. 86, p. 135.
91 See S.M. Ferguson and H. Fitzgerald, Studies in the Social
Services, p. 85.
92 See M.P. Hall and I.V. Howes, op. cit., p. 33.
93 See on this subject, N. Middleton, op. cit., p. 285; R. Sauer
‘Infanticide and abortion in nineteenth-century Britain’.
94 See N. Middleton, op. cit., p. 285; I. Pinchbeck and M. Hewitt,
vol II, pp. 604-10.
95 See N. Middleton, op. cit., pp. 287-8.
96 Ibid, p. 279.
97 See S.M. Ferguson and H. Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 103.
98 Ibid., p 103.
99 See ibid., ch. 4.
100 See ibid., pp. 127-9.
101 See ibid., p. 140.
102 See Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services (Beveridge
Report), para. 371, p. 142.
103 M. Finer and O.R. McGregor, op. cit., para. I ll, p. 148.
104 See for example, R. Lister, As Man and Wife? A Study of the
Cohabitation Rule; D. Marsden, Mothers Alone, ch. 12; O.
Stevenson, Claimant or Client? ch. 6; J. Streather and S. Weir,
Social Insecurity: Single Mothers on Benefit.
105 See DHSS, Supplementary Benefits Handbook, chs 13 and 14.
106 See A. Hopkinson, Single Mothers:The First Year, pp.116-20; D.
Marsden, Mothers Alone, pp. 253-4.
107 See, for example, R. Lister, As Man and Wife? A Study of the
Cohabitation Rule; J. Streather and S. Weir, op. cit.
108 D. Marsden, Mothers Alone, p. 247.
109 See Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families (Finer
Report), volume 1.
110 Ibid., para. 2.6, p. 7.
111 See ibid., part 4.
112 See ibid., paras 5.251-5.276, pp. 335-43.
113 See ibid., para. 5.56, p. 269.
114 M.A. Murch, ‘One-parent families’, p. 175.
115 See J.C. Kincaid, Poverty and Equality in Britain, pp. 197-9.
116 See P. Townsend, ‘Problems of introducing a Guaranteed Main­
tenance Allowance for one parent families’.
117 See Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families (Finer
Report), part 6.
118 See ibid., part 7.
119 See ibid., part 8, section 4.
120 See ibid., part 8, sections 1-3 and 6.
121 See ibid., part 8, section 5.
122 See ibid., part 8, section 8.
123 See ibid., paras 8.75-8.78, p. 448. Note that the Seebohm
Committee also referred to the needs of unmarried mothers. See
176 Notes
Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal
Social Services (Seebohm Report), para. 211, pp. 62-3.
124 See Report of the Committee on One-Parent Familes (Finer
Report), paras 8.78-8.92, pp. 448-53.
125 Ibid., para. 8.76, p. 448.
126 See, for example, M. Bramall, The Finer committee report’;
National Council For One Parent Families, Annual Reports, 1974/5
to 1981/2.
127 See, for example, DHSS, Social Assistance, para. 2.16, p. 17.
128 See DHSS, Social Security Statistics 1982, Table 34.32, p. 187.
129 See ibid., Table 32.10, p. 174.
130 See DHSS, Social Security Statistics 1980, Table 34.28, p. 158.
131 See National Council For One Parent Families, Annual Report
1980-81, p. 2.
132 See DHSS, Social Security Statistics, 1982, p. 261.
133 See National Council For One Parent Families, Annual Report,
1975-76, p. 3.
134 See One Parent Times, 5.2.81, p. 3.
135 See Family Welfare Association, Guide to the Social Services 1978,
pp. 134-6. See also Department Of The Environment, ‘Housing
For One-Parent Families’.
136 See R. Leete, ‘One-parent families: numbers and characteristics’,
p.7.
137 H.H. Perlman, ‘Unmarried mothers’, in N.E. Cohen (ed.), Social
Work and Social Problems, p. 279.
138 See, for example, DHSS, Children in Care.
139 J. Bowlby, Child Care and the Growth of Love, p. 115.
140 See, for example, S. Freud, New Introductory Lectures in
Psychoanalysis.
141 L. Young, Out of Wedlock, p. 22.
142 See, for example, H.J. Eysenck, Sense and Nonsense in
Psychology, B.A. Farrell, ‘Psychoanalystic theory’; B.A. Farrell,
‘Psychoanalysis - the method’.
143 See J. Kasanin and S. Handschin, ‘Psychodynamic factors in
illegitimacy’.
144 See V.W. Bernard, ‘Psychodynamics of unmarried motherhood in
early adolescence’.
145 Ibid., p. 44.
146 See L. Young, ‘Personality patterns in unmarried mothers’ in
R.W. Roberts (ed.), The Unwed Mother.
147 Ibid., p. 92.
148 Ibid., p. 93.
149 See J.S. Pearson and P.L. Amacher, ‘Intelligence test results and
observations of personality disorder among 3594 unwed mothers in
Minnesota’.
150 Ibid., p.20.
151 See J.P. Cattell, ‘Psychodynamic and clinical observations in a group
of unmarried mothers’ in R.W. Roberts (ed.) The Unwed Mother.
 Notes 111
152 See N.H. Greenberg et al., ‘Life situations associated with the
onset of pregnancy’.
153 Ibid., p. 298.
154 J.G. Loesch and N.H. Greenberg, ‘Some specific areas of conflicts
observed during pregnancy : a comparative study of married and
unmarried pregnant women’, p. 634.
155 See S.B.G. Eysenck, ‘Personality, and pain assessment in
childbirth of married and unmarried mothers’.
156 Ibid., p. 425.
157 See A.F. Bonan, ‘Psychoanalytic implications in treating un­
married mothers with narcissistic character structures’.
158 Ibid., p. 324.
159 See H. Kravitz, ‘Unwed mothers practical and theoretical
considerations’.
160 Ibid., p. 462.
161 See J. Naiman, ‘A comparative study of unmarried and married
mothers’; J. Naiman, ‘A comparison between unmarried women
seeking therapeutic abortion and unmarried mothers’.
162 J. Naiman, ‘A comparative study . . .’, p. 468.
163 J. Naiman, ‘A comparison between unmarried women seeking
therapeutic abortion and unmarried mothers’, p. 1088.
164 See J. Floyd and B.L Viney, ‘Ego identity and ego ideal in the
unwed mother.’
165 See ibid., p. 280.
166 See C.E. Vincent, Unmarried Mothers.
167 See ibid., pp. 179-97.
168 See W.C. Jones et al., ‘Social and psychological factors in status
decisions of unmarried mothers’.
169 See ibid., p. 277.
170 See M. A. Yelloly, ‘Factors relating to an adoption decision by the
mothers of illegitimate children’.
171 Ibid., p. 12.
172 See, for example, P.M. Rains, Becoming an Unwed Mother.
173 M. Croxen, ‘Psychological theories of social problem causation’, in
Open University, Social Work, Community Work and Society,
units 7-9, Part I, p. 26.
174 D. Gill, op. cit., p. 241.
175 See for example, V. Abernethy, ‘Illegitimate conception among
teenagers’; H.M. Adams and U.M. Gallagher, ‘Some facts and
observations about illegitimacy’; W.S. Kogan et al., ‘Changes in
the self-concept of unwed mothers’; W.S. Kogan et al., ‘Person­
ality changes in unwed mothers following parturition’; D. Levy, ‘A
follow-up study of unmarried mothers’; M. Schmideberg,
‘Psychiatric-social factors in young unmarried mothers’.
176 J. Cheetham, Unwanted Pregnancy and Counselling, p. 62.
177 Ibid., pp. 63-4.
178 See D. Gill, op. cit., pp. 238-9 and 255-6.
179 See for example, E. Goffman, Asylums; E.M. Schurr, The Politics
178 Notes
of Deviance, pp. 29-45; T.S. Szasz, The Manufacture of Madness.
180 See, for example, National Council For Civil Liberties, 50,000
Outside the Law, Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental
Illness and Mental Deficiency, Minutes of evidence - 22nd day,
16.3.55, pp. 840-54.
181 The findings from this survey are presented in V. Wimperis, The
Unmarried Mother and her Child, ch. 2.
182 See B. Thompson, ‘Social study of illegitimate maternities’.
183 Ibid., p. 77.
184 See D. Gill, op. cit., ch. 1.
185 See A. Yarrow, ‘Illegitimacy in south-east Essex’.
186 See A. Hopkinson, op. cit., pp. 23-5.
187 See M.A. Yelloly, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
188 See S. Weir, A Study of Unmarried Mothers and their Children in
Scotland, pp. 65-6 and para. 9.9, p. 86.
189 See ibid., para. 9.3, p. 85.
190 See E. Crellin et al., Born Illegitimate, pp. 40-1.
191 Note, however, that the findings of E. Crellin et al., have been
challenged by Gill. See D. Gill, op. cit., p. 137.
192 B. Thompson, op. cit., p. 86.
193 See on this issue, S. Macintyre, Single and Pregnant, ch. 8.
194 Ibid., p. 24.
195 See O. Lewis, The Children of Sanchez; O. Lewis, La Vida.
196 See O. Lewis, The Children of Sanchez, pp. xi-xxxi.
197 O. Lewis, La Vida, p. xiv.
198 See for example, N.J. Davies, Sociological Constructions of
Deviance, pp. 116-18; P. Townsend, Poverty in the United
Kingdom, pp. 65-70; C.A. Valentine, Culture and Poverty, ch. 3.
199 In the case of the United States see, L. Rainwater, ‘The problem
of lower-class culture and poverty - war strategy’ in D.P.
Moynihan (ed.), On Understanding Poverty, ch. 9; C.A. Valentine,
op. cit., chs 3 and 4.
200 See O. Lewis, La Vida, p. xiv; B. Jordan, Poor Parents, p. 124.
201 R. Holman, ‘Poverty: consensus and alternatives’ in E.
Butterworth and R. Holman (eds), Social Welfare in Modern
Britain, p. 404. See also on this subject, K. Joseph, ‘The cycle of
deprivation’, in ibid., pp. 387-93.
202 See K. Joseph, ‘Speech in Birmingham’, 19.10.74, op. cit.
203 In terms of general texts see, for example, P. A. Bruce, The
Plantation Negro as a Freeman; E.F. Frazier, The Negro Family in
the United States; G. Myrdal, An American Dilemma.
204 See, for example, H.G. Gutman, The Black Family in Slavery and
Freedom 1750-1925.
205 Ibid., p. 532.
206 See H. Hertz and S.W. Little, ‘Unmarried negro mothers in a
southern urban community’.
207 Ibid., p. 79.
208 See P. Knapp and S.T. Cambria, ‘The attitudes of negro
 Notes 179
unmarried mothers toward illegitimacy’.
209 See Department of Labor, The Negro Family: The Case for
National Action.
210 See, for example, F. Fox-Piven and R. A. Cloward, Regulating the
Poor, pp. 192-6; L.H. Gutman, op. cit., pp. 461-8; C.A.
Valentine, op. cit., ch. 2.
211 W. Ryan, ‘Blaming the victim: ideology serves the establishment’,
in P. Wickman (ed.), Readings in Social Problems: Contemporary
Perspectives, p. 65.
212 A. Billingsley and A.T. Billingsley, ‘Illegitimacy and negro family
life’ in R.W. Roberts (ed.), op. cit., p. 145.
213 See ibid., p. 145.
214 For a general discussion of this subject see J. Cheetham, Social
Work with Immigrants, pp. 119-35.
215 See P. Johnson, ‘Family reunion’, in The Observer (10.10.82).
216 See E. Crellin et al.; op. cit.
217 See ibid., chs 6 and 7.
218 See ibid., ch. 9.
219 See ibid., ch. 10.
220 See ibid., ch. 11.
221 Ibid., p. 67.
222 Ibid., p. 112.
223 See E. Ferri, Growing up in a One-Parent Family.
224 See L. Lambert and J. Streather, Children in Changing Families.
225 See for example, J. Spence et al., A Thousand Families in
Newcastle upon Tyne, ch. 23.
226 See E.M. Steel, ‘What happens afterwards: a survey of unmarried
mothers and their children after three years’.
227 Ibid., p. 15.
228 See A. Hunt et al., Families and their Needs with Particular
Reference to One-Parent Families.
229 See M.L.K. Pringle, ‘The incidence of some supposedly adverse
family conditions and of left-handedness in schools for maladjusted
children’.
230 See Report of a Working Party on the Ascertainment of Maladjusted
Children.
231 See N. Murchison, ‘Illustrations of the difficulties of some children
in one-parent families’, in Report of the Committee on One-Parent
Families, volume 2, Appendices (Finer Report), Appendix 12.
232 Ibid., para. 29, p. 372.
233 See ibid., para. 23, p. 370
234 See ibid., para. 24, p. 370.
235 See D. Gill, op. cit., Ch. 5.
236 Ibid., p. 147
237 See J. Packman, Child Care:Needsand Numbers.
238 See J. Rowe and L. Lambert,Children Who Wait.
239 For the background to this association see, for example, J.
Bowlby, op. cit., ch. 10; J. Packman, The Child's Generation, ch. 6.
180 Notes
See also, T. Morris, ‘The crooked way to the top: crime and
acquisitive mobility’, p. 232.
240 See J. Bowlby, op. cit., pp. 118-19.
241 See D.J. West, Present Conduct and Future Delinquency.
242 N. Murchison, op. cit., para. 52, p. 379.
243 See E.K. Macdonald, ‘Follow-up of illegitimate children’.
244 Ibid., p. 363.
245 See E.M. Steel, ‘A final study of unmarried mothers and their
children’.
246 See E.F. Reed, ‘Unmarried mothers who kept their babies’.
247 See H.R. Wright, 80 Unmarried Mothers who kept their Babies.
248 See W.C. Oppel ‘Illegitimacy. A comparative follow-up study’.
249 See L.G. Burchinal, ‘Characteristics of adolescents from un­
broken, broken, and reconstituted families’.
250 See H. Feldman and M. Feldman, ‘The effect of father absence on
adolescents’.
251 See H.J. Raschke and V.J. Raschke, ‘Family conflicts and
children’s self-concepts: a comparison of intact and single-parent
families’.
252 See, for example, A. Hunt et al., op. cit., sections 12.1 -12.3, pp.
62-4; L. Lambert and J. Streather, op. cit., ch. 16.
253 See, for example, E.K. Macdonald, op. cit., p. 364; E. M. Steel,
‘What happens afterwards’, p. 16.
254 See E. Crellin et al., op. cit., p. 110.
255 M.L.K. Pringle, The Needs ofChldren, p. 157.
256 Ibid., p. 157.
257 Ibid., p. 160.
258 A more detailed examination of the results which were obtained in
this survey can be found in R.M. Page, ‘The Concept of Stigma
with Special Reference to the Unmarried Mother: A Social Policy
and Administration Approach’.
259 Note that this subject was only applicable to 32 respondents.
260 See J.W. Rogers and M.D. Buffalo, ‘Fighting back: nine modes of
adaption to a deviant label’; E.M Schurr, The Politics of Deviance.

Chapter 4 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions

1 See R.A. Pinker, Social Theory and Social Policy, ch. 2; P. Taylor-
Gooby, ‘The empiricist tradition in social administration’.
2 R. Mishra, Society and Social Policy, pp. 3-4.
3 See, for example, J. Bradshaw, ‘The concept of social need’ in M.
Fitzgerald et al. (eds), Welfare in Action; A. Forder, Concepts in
Social Administration, ch. 3; R. Plant, ‘Needs and welfare’ inN.
Timms (ed.), Social Welfare: Why and How? ch. 6; P. Taylor-Gooby
and J. Dale, Social Theory and Social Welfare, ch. 8.
4 See, for example, J. Le. Grand, The Strategy of Equality ; A. Weale,
 Notes 181
Equality and Social Policy.
5 See, for example, V. George and P. Wilding, Ideology and Social
Welfare; R. Mishra, op. cit.; G. Room, The Sociology of Welfare; P.
Taylor-Gooby and J. Dale, op. cit.
6 See, for example, N. Ginsburg, Class, Capital and Social Policy ; I.
Gough, The Political Economy of the Welfare State; L. Harris, ‘The
state and the economy: some theoretical problems’ in R. Miliband
and J. Saville (eds), The Socialist Register 1980; London Edinburgh
Weekend Return Group, In and Against the State.
7 R.H. Tawney, The Radical Tradition, p. 180.
8 Ibid., p. 155.
9 R.M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, p. 253.
10 See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
11 See ibid., pp. 136-42.
12 See ibid., p. 302.
13 See ibid., pp. 90-5.
14 Ibid., p. 440.
15 See D. Miller, Social Justice.
16 See K. Jones et al., Issues in Social Policy, p. 140.
17 K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, p. 4.
18 See, for example, M. Adler and S. Asquith (eds), Discretion and
Welfare; H. Hodge, ‘Discretion in reality’, in M. Adler and A.
Bradley (eds), Justice, Discretion and Poverty, ch. 5; O. Stevenson,
Claimant or Client?, pp. 43-5; R. Wilding, ‘Discretionary benefits’ in
M. Adler and A. Bradley (eds), op. cit., ch. 4.
19 See on this issue, Supplementary Benefits Commission, Exceptional
Needs Payments, p. 12.
20 See pp. 65-8.
21 See J.F. Handler, The Coercive Social Worker, ch. 7; B. Jordan,
Poor Parents, ch. 6.
22 See on this issue, D. Donnison, The Politics of Poverty, pp. 93-4.
23 See, for example, T. Lynes, Welfare Rights; H. Rose, ‘Who can de­
label the claimant?’ in M. Adler and A. Bradley (eds), op. cit., ch.
11.
24 P. Jones, ‘Rights, welfare and stigma’, p. 140.
25 Ibid., p. 141.
26 M. Adler and S. Asquith, ‘Discretion and Power’, in M. Adler and S.
Asquith (eds), op. cit., p. 17.
27 See P. Jones, op. cit., pp. 140-1.
28 Ibid., p. 142.
29 R.M. Titmuss, ‘Welfare “rights”, law and discretion’, p. 131.
30 See D. Donnison, The Politics of Poverty, p. 94.
31 T.H. Marshall, The Right to Welfare and other Essays, p. 88.
32 E. Scrivens, ‘Towards a theory of rationing’, p. 53.
33 See, for example, K. Judge, Rationing Social Services; R. Parker
‘Social administration and scarcity’ in E. Butterworth and R. Holmes
(eds), Social Welfare in Modern Britain; A. Rees, ‘Access to the
personal, health and welfare services’; E. Scrivens, op. cit.; A.G.
182 Notes
Stevens, ‘Rationing in the social services’.
34 See in particular on this issue, K. Judge and J. Matthews, Charging
for Social Care, ch. 6.
35 R. Parker, op. cit., p. 208.
36 Ibid., p. 206.
37 See DHSS, Social Security Statistics 1982, p. 261.
38 Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal
Social Services (Seebohm Report), para. 491, p. 151.
39 M.H. Cooper, Rationing Health Care. See also on this subject, J.
Hallas, CHC’s in Action; R. Klein and J. Lewis, The Politics of
Consumer Representatives. A Study of Community Health Councils;
D. Phillips, ‘The creation of consultative councils in the N.H.S.’.
40 See S.R. Arnstein, ‘A ladder of citizen participation’.
41 See N. Boaden et al., Public Participation in Local Services, ch. 6.
42 R. Plant et al., Political Philosophy and Social Welfare, p. 112.
43 See E. A. Ross, Social Control. (This book was based on a series of
articles which were published in the American Journal of Sociology in
the late 1890s.)
44 See, for example, L.L. Bernard, Social Control in its Sociological
Aspects; A.B. Hollingshead, ‘The concept of social control’; P.H.
Landis, Social Control, Social Organisation and Disorganisation in
Process; R.T. LaPiere, Theory of Social Control; J.S. Roucek and
associates, Social Control; C.K. Watkins, Social Control.
45 See, e.g., P.R. Day, Social Work and Social Control; J. Higgins,
‘Social control theories of social policy ’; B. Jordan, Freedom and the
Welfare State, chs 5 and 11; D. Watson, Caring for Strangers, part III.
46 A.P. Donajgrodzki (ed.), Social Control in Nineteenth Century
Britain, p. 10.
47 R.A. Pinker, Social Theory, p. 175.
48 R.T. Roucek and associates, op. cit., p. 321.
49 See R.D. Schwartz and J.H. Skolnick, ‘Two studies of legal stigma’.
50 See H. Garfinkel, ‘Conditions of successful degradation ceremonies’.
51 D. Matza, Becoming Deviant, p. 156.
52 N. Walker, Punishment, Danger and Stigma, p. 149.
53 See ibid., pp. 150-1.
54 E.M. Schurr, The Politics of Deviance, p. 30.
55 See for example, M. Rayman, ‘My stigma - a care order’.
56 N. Ginsburg, op. cit., p. 156.
57 See, for example, F.A. Hayek, The Road To Serfdom; M. Friedman
Capitalism and Freedom; A. Seldon, Whither the Welfare State?
58 See M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, pp. 30-2.
59 See, for example, R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society ; C.A.R.
Crosland, The Future of Socialism; R.M. Titmuss, Commitment to
Welfare.
60 C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, pp. 229-30.
61 See, for example, N. Ginsburg, op. cit.; I. Gough, The Political
Economy of the Welfare State; V. Navarro, ‘The crisis of the
international capitalist order and its implications for the welfare
state’.
 Notes 183
62 Though there is considerable disagreement over the question of
whether the state can be used in some way to undermine capitalism.
See, for example, F. Block, ‘Beyond relative autonomy: state
managers as historical subjects’ in R. Miliband and J. Saville (eds),
op. cit.; L. Harris, op. cit.; R. Miliband, Marxism and Politics,
chs. 3 and 4.
63 I. Gough, op. cit., p. 39.
64 N. Ginsburg, op. cit., p. 104.
65 See G.W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, ch. 13; O.C. Cox, Caste,
Class and Race; J. Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town.
66 Though see J. Weeks, ‘Discourse, desire and sexual deviance: some
problems in a history of homosexuality’ in K. Plummer, The Making
of the Modern Homosexual, ch. 4.
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Index of authors

Adler, M. (and Asquith, S.), 138 Dinitz, S. et al., 8-9

Amacher, P.L., 102-3 Donajgrodzki, A .P., 146
Arnstein, S.R., 145 Donnison, D ., 39-40
Asquith, S., 138
Atkinson, A .B ., 43-4 English, R.W ., 1
Austin, P.L., 57, 69-70 Eysenck, S.B.G., 103
Bailey, D.S., 73 Feagin, J.R., 62
Berk, B., 12 Feldman, H, (and Feldman, M .), 119
Bernard, V.W ., 102 Ferguson, S.M. (and Fitzgerald, H .),
Beveridge, W .H., 28, 93 92
Billingsley, A. (and Billingsley, A .T .), Ferri, E., 116
114 Field, F., 50
Blaxter, M., 48-9 Finer, M. (and McGregor, O .R .), 91
Bonan, A .F., 103-4 Fitzgerald, H., 92
Bowlby, J., 100 Floyd, J. (and Viney, L.L.), 105
Boyson, R., 41 Freud, S., 100
Briggs, E. (and Rees, A.M .), 57 Friedman, M., 157
Burchinal, L.G., 119
George, V., 43
Cahnman, W.J., 6 Gill, D ., 81,108-9,117
Cambria, S.T., 113 Ginsburg, N., 154,159-60
Cattell, J.P., 103 Glastonbury, B. et al., 59, 63-5
Chadwick, O., 78 Goffman, E., 4-10,12,19
Cheetham, J., 107 Golding, P. (and Middleton, S.), 40,
Clifford, D ., 59-61, 65-7 58-9, 62-3
Cohen, S., 3-4 Goodwin, L., 62
Cole, D. (with Utting, J.E.G .), 42 Gough, I., 159
Crellin, E. et al., 109-10,115-16,120 Gouldner, A.W ., 29-30
Crosland, C.A .R ., 158-9 Greenberg, N.H. et al., 103; (and
Croxen, M., 106 Loesch, J.G.), 154
Cumming, J. (and Cumming, E .), 1 Gutman, H .G ., 113
Davies, B. (in association with Reddin, Hair, P.E.H., 76
M .), 50-3, 70 Handler, J. (and Hollingsworth, E.J.),
Davis, F., 6 57-8, 69-70
Davis, K.C., 134 Handschin, S., 102
Dell, G .A ., 117 Hayek, F.A ., 157

202
 Index 203
Hennessey, P.J., 45-6 Naiman, J., 104
Henriques, U .R .Q ., 86 Navarro, V., 159
Hertz, H. (and Little, S.W .), 113 Nisbet, R., 2
Hollingsworth, E.J., 57-8, 69-70 Nixon, J., 49-50
Hopkinson, A ., 109
Horan, P.M. (and Austin, P.L.), 57, Oppel, W.C., 119
69-70 Osborne, L., 2
Hughes, V., 109 Oxley , G.W., 84
Hunt, A. et al., 116
Packman, J., 117-18
Jones, P., 137-9 Page, R., 41
Jones, W.C. et al., 105 Page, R.M ., 123-8
Jordan, B., 39 Pardo, L.E., 6-7
Joseph, K., 112 Parker, R., 141-2
Pearson, J.S. (and Amacher, P.L.),
Kando, T., 1 102-3
Kasanin, J. (and Handschin, S.), 102 Perlman, H.H., 98
Kerbo, H.R., 58 Pinker, R.A ., 26, 35-9, 58-9, 67-8,139,
Kincaid, J.C., 44, 96 146-7
Kleck, R., 11 Plant, R. et al., 145-6
Klein, R., 34 Plummer, K., 3, 9
Knapp, P. (and Cambria, S.T.), 113 Posner, J., 8
Kravitz, H. et al., 104 Pringle, M.L.K., 117,120-1
Lambert, L. (and Rowe, J.) 117-18; Raschke, H.J. (and Raschke, V.J.),
(and Streather, J.), 116 119
Lauer, R.H., 62 Rawls, J., 132-3
Leete, R., 99 Reddin, M., 35; (in association with
Lewis, O., 111-12 Davies, B.), 50-3,70
Lister, R., 56 Reed, E.F., 119
Little, S.W., 113 Rees, A.M ., 57
Loesch, J.G. (and Greenberg, N.H.), Rees, S., 57
154 Reisman, D .A ., 36, 41
Longmate, N., 86 Room, G., 35
Rose, G., 35
Macdonald, E.K., 118-19 Ross, E .A ., 146
McGregor, O., 91 Roucek, J.S. (and associates), 148
Macintyre, S., I ll Rowe, J. (and Lambert, L.), 117-18
Marsden, D ., 54, 56, 94 Russell, B., 74
Marshall, R., 54-5 Ryan, W., 113
Marshall, T.H., 140
Matza, D ., 151 Schurr, E.M ., 152
Meacher, M., 45-7 Scrivens, E., 140
Merton, R.K. (and Nisbet, R.), 2 Seldon, A ., 157
Middleton, N., 90 Steel, E.M ., 116,119
Middleton, S., 40, 58-9, 62-3 Streather, J., 116
Miller, D ., 133 Suchar, C.S., 10
Mishra, R., 129
Modigliani, A ., 17 Tawney, R.H., 130-1, 158
Moynihan, D .P., 113 Taylor-Gooby, P.F., 47-8
Murch, M .A., 96 Thompson, B., 109-10
Murchison, N., 117 Titmuss, R.M ., 1, 29-34, 38, 71, 131,
139,158
204 Index
Townsend, P., 42, 54, 96 Weinberg, M.S. (and Williams, C.J.),
Troeltsch, E., 73-4 15
Weir, S., 109
Utting, J.E.G., 42 West, D.J., 118
Williams, C.J., 15
Williamson, J.B., 61-2
Vincent, C.E., 105 Wright, H .R., 119
Vincent, J.A., 101 Wrightson, K., 75
Viney, L.L., 105
Yarrow, A ., 109
Walker, N., 151 Yelloly, M .A., 105-6,109
Webb, S. and B., 88 Young, L., 100-2
Subject index

‘Acceptance’, 18-20, 22-3 Educational sub-normality, 152-3

Adoption, 87, 91-2, 105-6, 111 Embarrassment, 16-18, 54, 69-70
Alcoholism, 19 Epilepsy, 14, 23
Anti-collectivist approach to welfare, Ethnic minorities, 37, 154,161-2
157-8
Fabian Socialist approach to welfare,
‘Badging’, 25, 86 29, 130-2, 158-60
Bastardy laws, 78, 81-4, 87 Felt stigma, 13-18, 53-8, 69-70, 76-7,
Beveridge Report on Social Insurance, 122-8,153,155
28, 93 Financial and other Circumstances of
Blameless and Blameworthy stigmas, Retirement Pensioners, 42
6-7,14, 63-7, 79-100 Finer Report on One Parent Families,
Blindness, 7,12, 21, 23 94-7
Blood doning, 29, 32-3 Free prescriptions, 48-9
Free school meals, 50-3
Christian teaching and the unmarried
mother, 72-9, 122 Gingerbread, 128
Claimants, 39-41, 48-62,123-4,135-6, Guaranteed Maintenance Allowance,
160 95-7
‘Combined’ physical and psychological
sanctions, 153 Homosexuality, 5-6, 8-10,13,15, 20,
Community Health Councils, 145 22,161
Conduct stigmas, 4-7, 11, 13, 155 Houses of Correction, 81-2
Council tenants, 46-7, 57, 133, 154
Courtesy stigmas, 9, 16, 24, 150 Illegitimate children, 81, 91, 98,115-19
‘Covering’, 20, 23-4 Image of the social services, 39-40
Criminality, 7, 8 ,1 1 ,1 4 ,1 8 , 20-4, 39 Individualized justice, 139-40
Dependency, 36-8, 98 Less eligibility, 25-6, 93
Desert, 30,133
Deterrence, 27, 31,142-3 Marxist approach to welfare, 159-61
Discreditable and discredited stigmas, Means-tests, 28, 32, 34-5, 42-5, 96
5-6, 21,23 Media stigmatization, 40
Discretion, 133-7, 139-40 Mental Health Review Tribunals, 20
Divorce, 4 Mental illness, 10-11,13, 20, 39,152
Mothers’ Pension movement, 90-1
Ecclesiastical courts, 75, 77-8
Economic sanctions, 153-4 Nail-biting, 15

205
206 Index
National Assistance Board, 28, 44, 93- Shame, 16-18, 70,147-8
4 Snubbing, 148-9
National Council for One Parent Social administration approach to wel­
Families (formerly National Council fare, 67-71,129
for the Unmarried Mother and her Social control, 38-9, 69,146-55
Child), 89, 128 Social Democratic approach to wel­
Need, 30,129 fare: see Fabian Socialist approach
Negative social control, 149-50,152-4 to welfare
Non-stigmatized forms of welfare, 37-8 Social justice, 130-3
Norm of beneficence, 29-30 Social norms, 2-4, 7
Social policy research on stigma: an
Obesity, 6 assessment, 67-71
Old age pensioners, 42-5, 57, 67 Social work clients, 57, 59,137, 144
Societal and situational deviance, 3
Participation, 1, 143-6 Sociological studies of the unmarried
‘Passing’, 20-24 mother, 108-15
Passport benefits, 49-50 Stigma: acknowledgment, 18-20;
Penance, 75-6 definitions of, 1; disavowal, 20;
Personalized forms of welfare, 37 effect on take-up rate for: free
Physical handicap, 5, 6, 8,11-14, 20, prescriptions and passport benefits,
37,155-6 48-50, free school meals, 50-3,
Physical sanctions, 153-4 means-tested social security benefits,
Physical stigmas, 4-7,10-13,155 42-5, rent/rate rebates/allowances,
Poor law, 25-8, 80-6, 89-90, 92-3 45-8; extent of, 9; felt, 13-18, 52-8,
Positive discrimination, 33-4, 36,159 69-70, 76-7,122-8,153,155;
Positive social control, 149,151-3 management of, 20-4; recognition
Private welfare provision, 30-2, 71 of, 9-10,15; social control function
Procedural rights, 138 of, 146-55
Prostitution, 13,15-16,19, 21 Stigmas: blameless and blameworthy,
Psychological sanctions, 147-54 6-7,14, 63-7, 79-100; conduct, 4-7,
Psychological studies of unmarried 11,13,155; courtesy, 9,16, 24,150;
motherhood, 100-8 definition of, 2-9; discredited and
Public attitudes towards the poor and discreditable, 5-6, 21, 23; of excel­
welfare recipients, 62-7 lence, 8,16; physical, 4-7,10-13,
Public attitudes towards the social 155; tribal, 4-6,10-11,13
services, 58-61 Stigmatic situations, 15-16
Stigmatization, 4,10-14, 20, 25-7, 55-7,
Rationing, 140-3 71, 74-128,146-62
Reciprocity, 37 Stuttering, 21-2
‘Rejection’, 18, 20, 22-3, 37, 155-6 Substantive rights, 138-9
Rent/rate rebates/allowances, 45-8 Supplementary Benefits Commission,
Responses to stigma acknowledgment, 39, 44, 94,135-7
18-20
Ridicule, 148-9 Take-up of welfare benefits, 41-53, 97
Tribal stigmas, 4-6,10-11,13
Scroungers, 40, 58-9
Seebohm Report on Local Authority Unmarried motherhood, 4,14, 65-7,
and Allied Personal Social Services, ch.3 passim, 160-1
144-5 Universal public welfare services, 32-6,
Selectivist public welfare provision, 30- 159
3, 36, 71
Self-respect, 132-3 Victim blaming, 62-3,110-11,113,
Settlement laws, 83 120-1
 Index 207
Welfare labelling, 152-3 Workhouse system, 26,84, 86-7,142
Welfare rights, 41,57,137-40