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SPRINGER BRIEFS ON
C YBER SECURIT Y SYSTEMS AND NET WORKS
Honeypot
Frameworks and
their Applications:
A New Framework
SpringerBriefs on Cyber Security Systems
and Networks
Editor-in-Chief
Yang Xiang, Digital Research and Innovation Capability, Swinburne University of
Technology, Hawthorn, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
Series editors
Liqun Chen, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio,
TX, USA
Sherman S. M. Chow, Department of Information Engineering, The Chinese
University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong
Robert H. Deng, School of Information Systems, Singapore Management
University, Singapore, Singapore
Dieter Gollmann, Hamburg University of Technology, Hamburg, Germany
Javier Lopez, University of Málaga, Málaga, Spain
Kui Ren, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, USA
Jianying Zhou, Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore,
Singapore
The series aims to develop and disseminate an understanding of innovations,
paradigms, techniques, and technologies in the contexts of cyber security systems
and networks related research and studies. It publishes thorough and cohesive
overviews of state-of-the-art topics in cyber security, as well as sophisticated
techniques, original research presentations and in-depth case studies in cyber
systems and networks. The series also provides a single point of coverage of
advanced and timely emerging topics as well as a forum for core concepts that may
not have reached a level of maturity to warrant a comprehensive textbook. It
addresses security, privacy, availability, and dependability issues for cyber systems
and networks, and welcomes emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence,
cloud computing, cyber physical systems, and big data analytics related to cyber
security research. The mainly focuses on the following research topics:
Yang Xiang
Honeypot Frameworks
and their Applications:
A New Framework
123
Chee Keong Ng Yang Xiang
School of Information Digital Research and Innovation Capability
Deakin University Swinburne University of Technology
Burwood, Melbourne, VIC Hawthorn, Melbourne, VIC
Australia Australia
Lei Pan
School of Information
Deakin University
Burwood, Melbourne, VIC
Australia
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
part of Springer Nature
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721,
Singapore
This book is dedicated to those who are
interested to know more about honeypots. It
does not matter whether you are an expert or
novice, this book is for you.
Preface
Most people understand honeypots as systems sit in an isolated corner of the net-
work waiting for attacker to discover and compromise them. This is often untrue, in
fact, in some frameworks, honeypots have enjoyed the prime spot in an organisa-
tional network to lure potential hacker. As new instances of malware appear so
rapidly that more spotlight has been placed in honeypot technology.
This book gives a detailed description of honeypots including their forms,
purposes, natures and interaction. It also gives an in-depth introduction of different
types of honeypot, their applications in monitoring and capturing of malware and
adversary tactic to detect honeypot.
The main role of honeypot which effectively assists the researcher to derive
solutions for the deadly malware attack has been outlined in the book. This book
also gives rich information of other roles and uses of honeypot not only in the area
of cyber and network security, but also in collecting proof for forensic investigation.
Finally, this book addresses the importance of honeypot as a learning tool for
detecting future malware such as ransomware.
vii
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Almighty God for enabling and helping me to complete this book.
I would like to first express my appreciation to my family, especially my wife,
Xinying Liu, for her support and love. I would like to also express my most sincere
gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Xiang Yang, and Dr. Lei Pan for their wisdom and
advice which is essential for the completion of this book.
Next, I would like to also express my token of appreciation to NSCLab, espe-
cially Dr. Jun Zhang for their moral support.
Lastly, I would like to thank Springer Publication for giving me this opportunity
to spare my knowledge and finding in their book. I would also like to express my
thanks to the editor, Dr. Xiaolan Yao, for her patient and assistance.
ix
Contents
1 Introduction to Honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Design Honeypots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 The Concept of Honeypot (Basic Taxonomy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Advanced Taxonomy of Honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Roadmap of the Honeypot Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Challenges in Designing Honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Specialized Honeypot Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1 Web-Server Based Honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 Web Client-Based Honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3 Worm Detection Honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4 Bot Detection Honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.5 Honeytoken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.5.1 Anti-phishing Honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.5.2 Insider Detection Honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.6 Advanced Persistent Threat Honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4 General Purposed Honeypot Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1 Dynamic Honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Artificial Intelligent Honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3 Shadow Honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
xi
xii Contents
1.1 Introduction
When honeypot was introduced by Fred Cohen in 1998 [1], it was known as a decep-
tion toolkit which is used to trap attacker with a large number of widely known
vulnerabilities. The term “honeypot” was first used by Lance Spitzer in 2002 to
describe how attacker is lurked toward a system perceive to possess valuable infor-
mation similar to the scenario when a bee is attracted to the honey in the honeypot [2].
The initial intention of honeypot is for research purpose. It is used to capture, ana-
lyze, and derive the motivation behind an attack. Different types of honeypots, such
as honeyd [3] a limited interactive honeypot and Sebek [4] real system with real
operating system honeypot, are created by researchers which enables honeypots to
interact with the attacker to improve the concealment of the honeypot. Honeypot has
evolved from merely a toolkit into a real system equipped with “real” data.
Honeypots have been divided into different categories. Most people understand
the difference of honeypot based on their capability of interaction such as the low
References
1. F. Cohen et al., The deception toolkit. Risks Digest 19, 1998 (1998)
2. L. Spitzner, Honeypots: catching the insider threat, in 19th Annual on Computer Security
Applications Conference, 2003. Proceedings (IEEE, 2003), pp. 170–179
4 1 Introduction to Honeypot
3. N. Provos, Honeyd-a virtual honeypot daemon, in 10th DFN-CERT Workshop, vol. 2 (Hamburg,
Germany, 2003), p. 4
4. K.Y. Enemy, Sebek, a kernel based data capture tool, the honeynet project (2003)
5. M.K. Daly, Advanced persistent threat, vol. 4 (Usenix, 2009). (Nov)
6. J. Mirkovic, P. Reiher, A taxonomy of ddos attack and ddos defense mechanisms. ACM SIG-
COMM Comput. Commun. Rev. 34(2), 39–53 (2004)
7. R. Chinchani, A. Iyer, H. Q. Ngo, S. Upadhyaya, Towards a theory of insider threat assessment,
in 2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN’05) (IEEE,
2005), pp. 108–117
8. A.N.A. AlFraih, W. Chen, Design of a worm isolation and unknown worm monitoring system
based on honeypot, in International Conference on Logistics Engineering, Management and
Computer Science (LEMCS 2014) (Atlantis Press, 2014)
9. S. Paul, B.K. Mishra, Honeypot-based signature generation for polymorphic worms. Int. J.
Secur. Appl. 8(6), 101–114 (2014)
10. M.M. Mohammed, E. Aleisa, N. Ventura, Zero-day polymorphic worms detection using aho-
corasick algorithm
11. P. Jain, A. Sardana, Defending against internet worms using honeyfarm, in Proceedings of the
CUBE International Information Technology Conference (ACM, 2012), pp. 795–800
12. L. Vokorokos, P. Fanfara, J. Radusovsky, P. Poor, Sophisticated honeypot mechanism-the
autonomous hybrid solution for enhancing computer system security, in 2013 IEEE 11th Inter-
national Symposium on Applied Machine Intelligence and Informatics (SAMI) (IEEE, 2013),
pp. 41–46
13. K. Chawda, A.D. Patel Dynamic & hybrid honeypot model for scalable network monitoring,
in 2014 International Conference on Information Communication and Embedded Systems
(ICICES) (IEEE, 2014), pp. 1–5
14. I. Alberdi, E. Alata, V. Nicomette, P. Owezarski, M. Kaâniche, Shark: Spy honeypot with
advanced redirection kit, in IEEE Workshop on Monitoring, Attack Detection and Mitigation
(MonAM07) (2007), pp. 47–52. (ps approach for preventing, detecting, and responding to ddos
attacks. Br. J. Appl. Sci. Technol. 5(5), 500 (2015))
15. R. Selvaraj, V.M. Kuthadi, T. Marwala, An effective odaids-hps approach for preventing, detect-
ing, and responding to ddos attacks. Br. J. Appl. Sci. Technol. 5(5), 500 (2015)
16. S.S. Sadamate, V. Nandedkar, Advance honeypot mechanism-the hybrid solution for enhancing
computer system security with DoS, vol. 4 (2015)
17. B.-X. Jia, S.-X. Xie, Dynamic forensics model based on ontology and context information.
Netinfo Secur. 1, 026 (2012)
18. T.H. Project, www.honeynet.org
19. O. Hayatle, A. Youssef, H. Otrok, Dempster-shafer evidence combining for (anti)-honeypot
technologies. Inf. Secur. J. Glob. Perspect. 21(6), 306–316 (2012)
20. S. Mukkamala, K. Yendrapalli, R. Basnet, M. Shankarapani, A. Sung, Detection of virtual
environments and low interaction honeypots, in Information Assurance and Security Workshop,
2007. IAW’07. IEEE SMC (IEEE, 2007), pp. 92–98
21. X. Fu, W. Yu, D. Cheng, X. Tan, K. Streff, S. Graham, On recognizing virtual honeypots
and countermeasures, in 2nd IEEE International Symposium on Dependable, Autonomic and
Secure Computing (IEEE, 2006), pp. 211–218
22. C.C. Zou, R. Cunningham, Honeypot-aware advanced botnet construction and maintenance,
in International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2006. DSN 2006 (IEEE,
2006), pp. 199–208
23. A. Nicholson, H. Janicke, T. Watson, R. Smith, Rolling the dice-deceptive authen-
tication for attack attribution, in Reading: Academic Conferences International Lim-
ited (2015), pp. 223–XI, http://ezproxy.deakin.edu.au/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/
docview/1781336066?accountid=10445
24. G. O’Gorman, G. McDonald, Ransomware: a growing menace, (Symantec Corporation, 2012)
25. C. Seifert, R. Steenson, I. Welch, P. Komisarczuk, B. Endicott-Popovsky, Capture-a behavioral
analysis tool for applications and documents. Digit. Investig. 4(Suppl), 23–30 (2007)
References 5
Any movement found in the honeypot is deemed to be malicious and will be treated
as an intrusion. The data set collected by honeypot is small and has high value in
its content. According to the Lance Spitzner, “A honeypot is an information system
resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource” [1]. It simply
means the honeypot is deemed useless if it is not been probed. The unprobed honeypot
may reveal other useful information which contradicts to the above definition, they
are:
1. The current honeypot technology has exposed itself as a trap
2. The attackers have loss their interest in the current honeypot setup
Figure 2.1 shows the different categories of honeypot in layers in ascending order.
Each layer requires decision making before moving down to the next layer.
Honeypots are used for different purposes. They are divided into two main cate-
gories, namely for research and production.
The research honeypot is used to collect, monitor and analyze the activities of
attacker and the tools used to hack into the honeypot. It is used to discover an
unknown vulnerability and attack.
© The Author(s) 2018 7
C. K. NG et al., Honeypot Frameworks and their Applications:
A New Framework, SpringerBriefs on Cyber Security Systems and Networks,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7739-5_2
8 2 Design Honeypots
The honeypot can be setup as just a simple standalone honeypot, like the frame-
work used in insider detection honeypot [4] or a network of honeypots with a more
complex setup, such as multiple worm detection honeynet framework [5]. This com-
plex setup is usually refers to a honeynet or a honeyfarm. The honeynet implemen-
tation can also be further classified according to its variety. It can be implemented
as a network of single type of interactive honeypot or comprising of severe different
interactive honeypots.
Honeypots can also be differentiated by their form. There are two different form
namely the virtual honeypot and physical honeypot. Physical honeypots use dedicated
host for each honeypot. It is more costly when compare to honeypot which is virtually
setup. Virtual honeypot is setup on a single computer with shared resource [6].
These honeypots can be used to imitate a real production network with real working
servers and other resources that can produce the same result as of the physically
implemented honeypot. The virtually implemented honeypot can be high-interactive
honeypot (real operating system with real vulnerabilities) or low-interactive honeypot
(emulate service) or a group of honeypots which is also refer to as honeynet.
Xuxian Jiang proposes an interesting “out of box” concept for the virtual honeypot.
The “out of box” is fulfilled by moving the anti-virus security suite or monitoring
software out of the virtual machine to the host [7]. The author pointed out some of
the blind spot and the danger of being detected by anti-malware software and IDS
which are implemented in the honeypot with the “in the box” concept. However, the
“out of box” concept is not a flawless concept, the semantic view which the “in the
box” approach enjoy is lost as only the memory pages, register and disk block can
be seen.
This issue can be resolved by using a third party application namely Vmwatcher to
provide a non-intrusive virtual machine introspection that will not disturb the system
state of the virtual machine being monitored. The guest view casting application
reconstruct the semantic-level view of the VM, which bridges the semantic gap which
mentioned earlier. The guest view casting also allows the anti-malware software to
perform an equivalent “in the box” scanning for virus and malware without the host
being affected.
Honeypots themselves, in principle, is classified into two main different types,
low-interactive and high-interactive honeypots [1]. The low-interactive honeypot is
typically an emulation software tool used to imitate the network services and host
systems. It provides limited interaction with the attacker and is generally use to trap
and monitor attacker using known attack [8].
Jungsuk Song has include a low-interactive honeypot into his proposed active
cooperate-based honeypot to detect the attack [9]. The proposal consists of two
parts, a set of low-interactive honeypot and the control server. The honeypot is fur-
ther broken down into three components, there are the monitoring system (TAP)
which is responsible for the communication between attacker and honeypot, hon-
eypot (Nepenthes) that response to the attacker’s request and firewall (FW) which
allows the communication of the honeypot and control server. The responsibility of
the honeypot is to contain the attack as long as possible and the decision of which
port to be opened in the honeypot is made by the control server by sending instruction
10 2 Design Honeypots
to the FW and the FW will act accordingly. Another function of the control server is
to collect and analyze the data from the honeypot.
High-interactive honeypots use systems with real operating system and service
virtually or physically for the attacker to compromise it. It provides a lot of interaction
between the system and attacker. It allows researcher to discover new kind of attack.
Both high-interactive and low-interactive honeypot do have certain advantages
and disadvantages. The advantage of low-interactive honeypot is easy to setup and
configure, and its disadvantage is the limitation detect to known threat. As mentioned
above, high-interactive honeypot can discover new threat and malware, but it is more
complex to setup. Unlike low-interactive honeypot which the monitoring and logging
function are include in the emulation software itself; the monitoring software, event
logging software, firewall and IDS need to be carefully planned, considered and
configured to prevent attacker to use the honeypot for their advantage.
Figure 2.1 provides a hierarchical flow for honeypot decision making. The choice
of which interactive type, form, variety and setup are influenced by their purpose
and nature. The decision of honeypots may also be guided by the budget and expert
available which are not relevant and will not be discussed in this survey.
In the attack type, the honeytoken has been included as a class of its own. Hon-
eytoken can be passive or active in nature and this will be elaborated further in the
next section.
The attack type is expanded and a new category is added called specialization.
The specialization class describes the honeypot application for specified attack and
the honeypot technique used. This includes:
1. Web server-based honeypot
2. Web client-based honeypot
3. Worm detection honeypot
4. Bot detection honeypot
5. APT detection honeypot
6. General purpose honeypot
The general purpose of honeypot aims to detect more than one type of attack and
it can be further expand based on its framework. Thus, framework class is created.
These include:
1. Shadow honeypot
2. Dynamic honeypot
3. Artificial intelligence honeypot
Figure 2.2 shows a roadmap of the honeypot and the proposed framework to be dis-
cussed. The articles are grouped according to their functionalities. There are ten main
groups namely, web-based honeypot, worm detection honeypot, bot detection hon-
eypot, dynamic honeypot, shadow honeypot, honeytoken, advance persistent threat
detection honeypot and production honeypot.
Honeypots provide us a rich and relevant information about the intruder and his/
her attack. This can only be fulfilled when the honeypot is set up appropriately with
certain properties attracting the attacker. Researchers face enormous challenges in
the initial setup. Questions such as:
1. What type of honeypot should be used?
2. Which IDS to be included in the research?
3. What kind of attack to be capture?
4. What vulnerability should the honeypot emit?
12 2 Design Honeypots
Often, researchers are able to capture great amount of attack from the “wild”.
Those attacks does provide good research value but to a limited extent. This is because
most of the attack capture are from script kiddies who take hacking as merely an
interest.
Researcher fails to consider serious hacker like the black hat professionals and
organized cyber criminal gangs. The use of popular vulnerabilities allow the hon-
eypot to be compromised easily. Thus, the level of challenges to compromise it is
relatively low which will fan those people away. What is level of immersion in the
honeypot should be? The honeypot owner should also consider making the process
of compromission challenging and “interesting” to the expert hacker?
References 13
References
1. L. Spitzner, Honeypots: catching the insider threat, in 19th Annual on Computer Security Appli-
cations Conference, 2003. Proceedings (IEEE, 2003), pp. 170–179
2. G. Feng, C. Zhang, Q. Zhang, A design of linkage security defense system based on honeypot,
in Trustworthy Computing and Services (Springer, 2014), pp. 70–77
3. R. Hes, P. Komisarczuk, R. Steenson, C. Seifert, The capture-hpc client architecture, Technical
Report (Victoria University of Wellington, 2009)
4. B.M. Bowen, M.B. Salem, A.D. Keromytis, S.J. Stolfo, Monitoring technologies for mitigating
insider threats, in Insider Threats in Cyber Security (Springer, 2010), pp. 197–217
5. B.K. Mirsha, U. Kumar, G. Sahoo, in Double-Sticky-Honeynet for Defending Viruses in Com-
puter Network, vol. 7 (2012), pp. 131–134
6. L. Spitzner, Dynamic honeypots (2003)
7. X. Jiang, X. Wang, D. Xu, Stealthy malware detection through vmm-based out-of-the-box
semantic view reconstruction, in Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and
communications security (ACM, 2007), pp. 128–138
8. D. Dagon, X. Qin, G. Gu, W. Lee, J. Grizzard, J. Levine, H. Owen, Honeystat: local worm
detection using honeypots, in Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (Springer, 2004), pp.
39–58
9. J. Song, H. Takakura, Y. Okabe, Cooperation of intelligent honeypots to detect unknown mali-
cious codes, in WOMBAT Workshop on Information Security Threats Data Collection and Shar-
ing, 2008. WISTDCS’08 (IEEE, 2008), pp. 31–39
Chapter 3
Specialized Honeypot Applications
Web-server based honeypot is a honeypot which is used to act as a web server. This
server, an emulated service or actual server physically or virtually, use to probe
the attack. Honeypot often refers to server-based honeypot. The web-server based
honeypot waits for attacker to discover its vulnerability and to compromise it. The
main purpose of this honeypot is to attract attacks so as to collect information about
the malicious activities. Table 3.1 reveals a summary of web server-based honeypot
which will be discussed in detail.
When the first web server was introduced in the late 1970s, it is limited to hyper-
text markup language which is also called html in short. The purpose of the web
server is for browsing and provides no interaction between the user and the server.
The technology in software and hardware available during that time do have some
contribution to this limitation. Then in the late ninetieth, functions such as search,
posting and uploading are made available for internet user to interact with the server
through the introduction of common gateway interface (CGI). It is well said in the
Chinese idiom, “Water can float a boat, but it can also sink a boat”, suggests that
CGI can be used for good cause and it can be used to conflict damage to the server.
Flooding the server through the use of CGI becomes the first web application attack
known [4].
New frameworks such as PHP, ASP.NET, AJAX and so on are used to replace CGI,
as the technology continue to advances rapidly from the early twentieth-first century
up to this present day. The new frameworks provides more interactive features which
allow users more flexibility and power to manage data within the web application.
© The Author(s) 2018 15
C. K. NG et al., Honeypot Frameworks and their Applications:
A New Framework, SpringerBriefs on Cyber Security Systems and Networks,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7739-5_3
16 3 Specialized Honeypot Applications
The great flexibilities exposes various system vulnerabilities and loopholes. The
server becomes vulnerable to attack such as XSS attack, RFI, SQL injection and DT.
Even though patch and new version of the frameworks have released to patch the
vulnerable, the blackhat community is still able to find and exploit new vulnerabilities
in the server. Honeypot developer has put in tremendous amount of effort to detect
and study such attack in order to derive new solution to the problem. Honeypot such
as honeyd and high interaction honeypot analysis toolkit (HIHAT) are introduced in
the early twentieth century to capture and monitor these attacks.
Table 3.2 reveals number of attack initiated in descending order by countries. The
figure is alarming and requires immediate attention.
John P. John in his article has proposed a heat seeking passive web-based hon-
eypot to capture attacker who targets compromised web server with the common
server attack. The proposed framework emulates the most popular vulnerability and
construct the page which is most probable be attacked by the attacker [1].
The web server-based honeypot is comprised of four components. First, it has a
module that identifies the web pages that are targeted by attacker and automatically
generate the web page. Second, the web pages are query based and there are no
software involved. Third, link is advertised on the search page and all interaction
3.1 Web-Server Based Honeypot 17
between server and attacker are logged. Lastly, filter is used to separate the attacker
traffic and the legitimate user traffic.
This honeypot is easy to implement as it utilizes the advantage of low-interactive
honeypot. There are examples to emulate the vulnerability of the software and to
interact with the attacker. The low-interaction honeypot implemented gives great
flexibility to add new high-interactive honeypot to provide a more realistic environ-
ment for the attacker.
Web server-honeypot not only able to provides a decoy environment for the
attacker, it helps to consolidate useful information for the filter and firewall to provide
more efficient detection of malicious traffic.
Researcher such as Adam Schoeman proposes a zero-interaction honeypot-web
server to create a blacklist of source IP address. This honeypot combined the best
of the two concepts namely decision through detect (DtD) and decision through
presence which are adopted by the traditional security system and honeypot for its
discovery phase and action phase [2]. The honeypot is assigned to the unused IP
address within the web server domain.
In discovery phase, the honeypot spawn a set of common TCP/IP ports on the
listener interface and record the source IP address. The record is then compared
with the packet collected using a packet sniffing application such as tcpdump. The
upstream network enforcer labelled the packet as malicious by checking if the source
IP address attempted to connect to other host within the same domain. This web
server based honeypot allows itself to be attracted and attacked through DDoS as it
is non-productive in nature.
The proposed frameworks in [1, 2] emit the popular web vulnerability to capture
the common attacks on server, it does not give reference of which attack it is capable
or incapable of capture. In Table 3.2, XSS attack is omitted due to the fact of the
difficulty to determine its attack source of origin.
Supeno Djanali has proposed a low-interaction web honeypot equipped with
obfuscated javascript code to detect cross-site scripting and SQL injection. The pro-
posed framework is able to complement the limitation in the existing honeypot such
as Glastopf, a low-interactive honeypot and HIHAT, a high-interactive honeypot [3].
The web honeypot, consists of three different web pages, is implemented using the
likejacking technique and the hardcoded script of the commonly used SQL injection
attack.
The web honeypot main page portraits an institutional web site to lust the attacker
preform XSS or SQL injection to compromise the web site. The obfuscated javascript
analyzes and redirected the request to the appropriate page (XSS page or SQL inject-
ing page) according to the nature of the request. The requested page will emulate the
vulnerability anticipated and respond to the attacker. It also records the information
of the attacker such as identity, browser, agent information and operating system
fingerprint.
Summary for web server-based honeypot: Table 3.3 reveals the number of attacker
IP detected visiting the honeypot. This result exclude the number of repeated IP
occurrence. The variation in the figure is affected by several factors such as:
18 3 Specialized Honeypot Applications
remedial action and also have a deep understanding of client-side attack. Generally,
client honeypot is made up of three components, queuer, client and analysis engine.
The queuer consolidates all malicious web site and create a list of server for the
client to visit. The initial consolidation process plays an important roles here. It
is the eye that pin point the client to the correct malicious web site. It will cause
the honeypot to be deemed useless if it does not perform its task correctly. Rohit
Shukla proposed malicious internet web site collection system which is similar to
honeymonkey introduce by Microsoft [9]. The proposed system is used to collect
and analyze the information of the malicious web site. It comprised of four virtual
client high-interactive honeypots of various operating system [7]. The master system
is setup in isolation to other network rather than the one connected to the client. The
master system control the slave/client system and it also hosts database log server.
The honeypot consists of a snort IDS running at the background and web clawer.
The web crawler which is the focus, act as a queuer, takes in the web parameter,
extracts all the links and URLs, and stores in the database in the master system. Based
on the information collected, the master system issues command via the secure shell
process for the honeypot browser to visit the URL link. The IDS in the honeypot
record and store the data for event occur and IP address which match the signature
into an external database. A list of blacklisted web site is compiled into a file.
The client visits the web site and contain the attack. The client is the actual
honeypot that collect important information about the attacker. It is required to collect
as much information as possible about the attack. Any misinformation can affect the
level of accuracy in the next component. Mitsuaki has proposed a client honeypot
system that uses multi-operating systems and multi-process honeypot multiplication
approaches using the web browser to provide high scalability and performance-
efficiency. The purpose of this proposed honeypot architecture is to detect drive-by
20 3 Specialized Honeypot Applications
download from the malicious web site. Multiple honeypot instances are created in a
single physical machine or virtual machine [6]. The increasing instances of honeypots
require many OS instance in a physical machine or virtual machine to improve the
inspection performance. According to the article, there are two processes proposed,
namely multi-OS and multiple processes, which make the high interaction honeypot
system to be scalable and efficient.
The multiple-operating system process is made up of three components. They
are honeypot-agent which is a parent program of the web browser on the honeypot
instance, honeypot-manager a controller used to provide instruction to the agent via
agent processes and, virtual machine monitor that use for each honeypot operation
and also provides virtual space for each OS. Thus, this allows multiple OS to be ran
on a single physical system. The multiple process concept in the web-based honeypot
allows the OS to launch other browser processes when the current browser is idle.
This reduces the OS overhead and improve the inspection efficiency. Process isolation
mechanism such as process sandbox is implemented in the process multiplication
solve the issue of not able to determine the cause of exploitation in the event of
anomaly occurred.
The analysis engine analyses and determines whether an attack has occurred on
the client honeypot. For better detection of the latest client-side malware, researcher
[8] has focused on creating a better analysis engine of the client honeypot. Tung-Ming
Koo proposed to use client honeypot with custom static and dynamic analysis engine
to detect malicious website that download malware stealthy via drive-by method into
the client [8]. The system consists of four modules. They are the proxy module, source
code analysis module, behavior recording module and behavior analysis module. The
proxy module record the address, save the web page and send it to the source code
analysis module. It then waits for the result before decide whether to allow the web
page to be sent to the client.
The other three components made up the analysis engine. The source code analysis
module based on the static content analysis to test the web under those assumptions.
The first is the obfuscation coding in the webpage script, application attack or leakage
attack by redirect user to malicious image files and second is the present of abnormal
semantics in the source code. After testing using the above mentioned assumption and
the web page is yet to be deemed to be safe, will be passed to the next module record
behavior module. This module is operated on the captureBAT, a client honeypot.
In this module, the web page is executed on a simulated windows environment to
capture the event such as changes done to the registry, I/O and the construction
and destruction of processes. The captured information is passed to the last module
for analysis. The last module analyzes each event and identifies the severity level of
damage. The level of damage is determined by analyze three major events namely I/O
event, registry event and process event. The web page will be considered malicious
if the signature of any the event response negatively. Thus, the user will be prevented
to open the web page.
Difference measuring method has been used to determine the level of effectiveness
for different proposed honeypot framework. As each author uses the dataset that
flavor his/her architecture, the result of each framework is extracted and formulated in
3.2 Web Client-Based Honeypot 21
Table 3.6. The ability to detect malicious web site is selected as a form of measurement
to determine the efficiency of the framework.
Summary for web client honeypot: Although each framework using their own
dataset shows an above average result, this result does not give a full picture to
justify the effectiveness of the honeypot. This is due to the different in number of
dataset used. Example framework two uses only a web with hundred link which
twenty-seven of them is deemed to be malicious. If the data-sets which are used in
the other two frameworks is considered in former framework, the outcome might
only render not more than 85% effectiveness.
In Table 3.6, framework in [6] uses the hooked API to monitor the changes take
place in the honeypot, whether the attack is known or unknown is no longer relevant.
As all attack is detected and monitored once modification occurs. The framework
in [7] is limited to detect known attack which is made up a major portion of the
attack. It does not have the ability to detect on unknown attack. Framework in [8]
uses the static detection method to detect the known attack and dynamic detection
method to detect the unknown attack. It basically provides detection for all attacks.
The framework in [6, 8] are equally effective when detecting unknown attack.
The only issue is that both framework rely on the ability to detect anomaly signal
from the traffic which do require time consuming learning process.
Worm attack has and will always be one of the top focus by the system administrator
and security software developer. Over the years, worm has done some of the most
devastating damage that caused the loss of billions of dollar economically. The worm
detection honeypot helps researcher to study the worm and also to derive a better
solution to solve the new strand worm virus.
The term “worm” has gained its notorious reputation over the pass decade for its
ability to self-replicate and spread without aid from any form of applications. Worm
was first appeared in a 1975 novel called Shockwave Rider where the leading actor
designs and sets off worm in the act of revenge against the powerful man who own
an electronic information web site. The initial intention and use of worm were for
Table 3.7 Summary of polymorphic worm detection honeypot
22
S/No Ref No Author Year Framework Multiple Type of Form of Detector Signature
honeypot honeypot honeypot generating
concept
3.3.1 [10] Upendra 2012 Double sticky Yes High Physical Gate Position-
Kumar honeynet translator aware
distribution
signature
algorithm
3.3.2 [11] Sounak Paul 2014 Honeypot Yes Low Physical Signature- Probability
based on fast based calculation of
signature detection and the multiple
generation anomaly- invariant
system based strings
detection present in a
polymorphic
worm
3.3.3 [12] Mohssen 2014 Zero-day Yes High Physical Gate Aho-Corasick
polymorphic translator Algorithm
worms string
honeypot matching
algorithm
3.3.4 [13] AlFraih 2014 Worm Yes High Virtual Anomaly- Auto
Abdul isolation based signature
honeypot detection generation
3.3.5 [14] Pragya Jainc 2012 Three layer Yes High and Low Physical Signature- Netbeans 7.0
honeypot based
detection and
anomaly-
based
detection
3 Specialized Honeypot Applications
3.3 Worm Detection Honeypot 23
good cause such as network worm created by John Shoch in Xerox PARC in 1982
to monitor the performance of the ethernet principle in the network.
Unfortunately, most of the later development of worm move to join the dark side
such as the first worm by Robert Morris which infected a tenth of the computer online
and the latest worm such as NGRBot worm which help bot master to build up the
botnet using the IRC channel. Worm can be used to convey message from the social
hatred to the CEO of mega software company such as message to Bill Gate, CEO
of Microsoft Enterprise, embedded in the string of Blaster worm serve as a wake up
call.
The use of worms have gave security researcher a hard time looking for alternative
way to detect and study them. Current security system such as anti-virus software
and firewall provides good protection to keep the worm away. It does not provide a
‘space’ for the worm to mingle with the system so that researcher can do more studies
to understand them. Honeypot answers this call. Multiple honeypots [11–15], which
can also refer to honeynet, provide a playground for the worm to mingle with severe
hosts. All activities occur in the honeypot and within its network are logged.
Upendra Kumar in his articles has proposed a framework with multiple honeypot
concepts to capture the polymorphic worm [10]. The framework consists of three
honeypots, gate translator and router. The gate translator separates and redirects the
infectious packet to the inbound honeypot. The honeypot with the signature-based
intrusion detection algorithm detect the old virus and its packets. The outbound
honeypot with the Position-Aware Distribution Signature algorithm verifies, records
and analyses the new evolved worm virus. Lastly, the worm is transferred to the
sticky-honeypot. The activities of the worm virus halt once it is being redirected into
the unused IP address system which is equipped with the updated anti-virus software.
Upendra Kumar, later, introduces a similar framework as the first concept in his
second article, the major difference is that it is using two honeynets to capture the
worm [15]. Both concepts provide room for the worm virus to manoeuvre and evolve
within the space specified. The second concept has the abilities to generate more
signature of the polymorphic by allowing the worm to roam within the honeynet.
Sounak Paul proposes the use of multiple low-interactive honeypots to capture
polymorphic worms. The proposed framework is less complex in setting up than
[15]. It adopts the fast signature generation scheme which is based on the proba-
bilistic approach considering its abilities to generate an accurate polymorphic worm
signature even noise exist [11].
The framework makes room for the worm to roam between the two sets of low-
interactive honeypots which emulate different types of commonly used services such
as DHCP, FTP, HTTP and POP3. The information of the worm is collected using the
multi-layer data capturing system. The first layer is the entry layer where the firewall
logs the packet header once the worm enters the network. The second layer is the
layer between the router and the honeypot sensor, full packets are capture and saved.
The last layer is the honeypot which records the activities of the attacker.
A restrictive path method can be applied in the honeypot framework to limit the
movement of the worm so that the worm will not move beyond the boundary. This
allows the researcher to manipulate the worm towards his/her desire direction and an
24 3 Specialized Honeypot Applications
extra precautious step to reduce the probability of out of control. Mohssen proposes
to capture of the variant of polymorphic worm by allowing it to interact with two set
of honeypot in the planned fashion. The major distinctions between [11, 12, 15] are
the algorithm used for signature generating and the degree of roaming freedom for
the worm.
In this honeypot structure, the worm was given limited freewill to roam freely
within the honeypots [12]. Every movement of the worm is directed by the internal
translator one and two which act as the door for the honeypots. The worm is redirected
from honeypot group one to group two by the internal translator one and via visa.
The signature generator adopts a dictionary matching algorithm to match the worm
instant and accurately create the signature for the worm.
Honeypot, in all instant, provides an environment to monitor the worm evolution
and it relies on the intruder prevention system and intruder prevention system to
detect and notify its user about the intrusion. One of the great skill of polymorphic
worm is its ability to replicate and create another variant of itself through the process
like obfuscation etc. Signature-based IDS may not be able to detect all of its variants.
Anomaly-based IDS can be used to resolve such problem.
AlFraih Abdul proposes a system that combine idea used in sweetbait [16] and
Honeystat [17] to setup a production honeypot against polymorphic worm [13].
The burden of detecting the new bleed of worm relay on the network gateway. The
gateway adopts anomaly detection method to detect the new unfamiliar data flow
by comparing the data against the whitelist. The traffic is then redirect towards
the honeypot group. The honeypot group is made up of several virtual honeystat
honeypots which collect memory, disk write and network event [17] and store them
in the security management center [16]. The honeypot is also equipped with the
automated worm signature generation to create the new signature and store them in
the security center. The security center updates the signature to the NIDS and NIPS
once it is created.
Single IDS reduces the chance of worm detection. For example, using merely
signature-based IDS can detect the known worm but not the unknown. Both types
of IDS can be used together to ensure the known and unknown worm do not slip
through the check.
Pragya Jainc proposes the use of three layers concept with the honeyfarm to help
to detect new unknown worm with polymorphic, monomorphic and metamorphic in
nature [14]. The first layer of defend consists of signature-based intrusion detection
system to detect the known danger based on the signature comparison. The second
layer used anomaly-based intrusion detection system to detect the unknown worm
by detecting the abnormal behavior. The last layer is made up of a group of high and
low interactive honeypot. The proposed system uses a roaming method to randomly
select a honeypot to play the role of control center for security purpose.
The proposed system filters the known threat and redirect the unknown threat to
the honeyfarm so that the activity can be analyze and new signature can be created
accurately to reduce the false positive in the signature-based IDS.
Summary for worm detection honeypot: The initial detection of polymorphic worm
plays a very vital role in worm detection honeypot. According to the Table 3.7,
3.3 Worm Detection Honeypot 25
signature-based IDS is commonly include either as the main IDS or part of the IDS
system. The framework proposed by [10] configures the edge router to recognize the
list of unused port in the process of data accession. The framework proposed by [11,
14] use two different type of IDSs to detect the worm attack. Reference [12] uses
only signature-based IDS.
Table 3.7 shows framework proposed by Upendra [10] and Mohssen [12] are
useful for generating the variant of the known polymorphic worm. They are limited
in capacity to deal with the known polymorphic worm due to the nature of IDS
used. The focus is to collect as much variant as possible for the known polymorphic
worm. The framework proposed by [11, 13, 14] use anomaly-based IDS for the
detection which is able to detect the unknown and also the known worm. Anomaly-
based detection does have disadvantage, it can result high false positive if insufficient
training is provided for the IDS or the IDS is not tunes to the appropriate level.
In all frameworks, signature generator is adopted to create the signature for the
polymorphic worm. References [10, 13, 14] focus on how the worm is trapped in
the honeypot and collect as much as possible of the variant of the worm. References
[11, 12] frameworks have given a considerable amount of detail on their proposed
frameworks, algorithm for extracting the variant and test result base on the dataset
used.
Reference [12] does mentioned about how the worm can be capture and explain
how Aho-Corasick Algorithm can be used to generate the obfuscation. This algorithm
uses the string searching method to locate a finite set of string in the dictionary to
match all patterns. The [11] treats all string as token and a token can be presented
in a significant number of flow. Signature is a set of tokens with their occurrence
number in suspicious flows.
To conclude, the proposed architecture in [10–14] adopt a fairly similar idea with
multiple honeypots to capture the signature of the worm. The ability to capture all the
variant using honeypot or generate signatures to accurately represent all the variant
of the polymorphic worm is vital. The first, forth and fifth framework use generator
that is limited to generate variant only collected from the honeypot. Comparing the
algorithms in [11, 12], there seem to have a gap in the level of algorithm advancement
even though both articles are published very recently. The Aho-Corasick algorithm
which is implemented in the architecture of [12] stand out. The Aho-Corasick Algo-
rithm is able to generates signature even if not all the variant of the polymorphic
worm is capture.
Bot is also called zombie host and botnet is a network of zombie hosts. Botnet can be
used for many malicious acts such as sending perishing mail, launching Distributed
Denial of Service attack and collecting user information. Among all, DDoS attack
has the most devastating effect. The DDoS attack can be used to paralyze the set of
servers or single server to affect their abilities to perform the normal daily tasks.
26 3 Specialized Honeypot Applications
is install with sebek to record attacker behavior, dionaea to collect the malware
information and snort in the verification process to collect and analyse the packet
received. The server receives all the data from the honeypot and stores them in a
database. The web-management interface allows the data to be presented visually.
The proposed system use the threshold-based anomaly IDS to detect and identify
the attack by comparing the incoming traffic with the legitimate traffic records [21].
The result in the differences is examined against the predetermined threshold to
determine whether the packet is a DDoS attack or not.
Rajalakshmi Selvaraj implemented an outlier IDS in the honeypot framework to
detect the DoS packet. The IDS adopts distance of the nearest neighbor method and
requires a set of pure normal data to train the system [20]. The system consists of
outlier IDS, attack classifier and honeypot.
The packet is checked and valued by the outlier based IDS. The IDS also outlines
the feature of the packet such as percentage of connection having the same destination
and same service and percentage of packet with error. The attack classifier will
compare the packet outlier value with the threshold to determine whether the packet
is DoS packet. The malicious packet is redirected to the honeypot. The honeypot will
respond to the packet with the relevant error message to the sender.
Unlike other security method, the activity, such as outgoing traffic, of honeypot is
restricted by law in most countries. This makes honeypot a less favour method in the
area of research. However, this does not prevent [18] to propose honeypot framework
to detect bot.
Ion Alberdi has proposed a system that first use passive network monitoring tech-
niques for observing and analyzing attacks and the spread of bot via malware. The
purpose was to discover the behavior of malware which drive the bot [18]. The
spreading of the bot is then halted by redirecting the packet to another honeypot
within the network using the advanced redirection kit.
The redirection functionality creates an illusion to the attacker that they are able
to connect to the internet and the bot is communicating with each other within the
botnet. This will also to deduce the possibility of the honeypot to be exposed.
Honeypot can also be used to prevent the actual server from falling victim under
DDoS attack, especially, in the commercial environment such as stock market where
millions of dollar may be lost even the server is down for a few minutes.
Sherif Khattab has proposed the use of roaming honeypot with back-propagation
ability to prevent non-spoofed service-level DoS attack [19]. The honeypot is hidden
within the pool of server replicas. The set of server replicas will be selected to become
active for a duration of time while the remaining idle servers will act as honeypot. The
active server replicas will coordinate with legitimate user. This makes it very tedious
to identify the real server and thus trap DoS attack in a honeypot. The proposed
framework is based on the assumption that even if the attacker knows all the server
and honeypot at time t, he will still not be able to differentiate the honeypot from the
real server at time t+1 [23]. The honeypot also have the ability to drop all attacks
once it changes from idle to active state.
The back-propagation function of the honeypot allows the server to send out a
recursive trace back process by alerting the Autonomous System across the path
28 3 Specialized Honeypot Applications
towards the bot. The alert triggered the AS-level input debugging process traffic
that are for the honeypot. Access routers of attack hosts or bots are identified and
filtering rules are installed to drop all traffic destined to the honeypot. The back-
propagation function also help the router to distinguish the attack packet from the
legitimate packet so that the attack packet will be dropped to prevent the network to
be over-congested.
Summary for bot detection honeypot: As shown in the Table 3.9, most of the
proposed frameworks, except [18], focus on detecting DDoS attack on the server.
Reference [18] uses a very primitive approach to detect bot by detect and redirect
its out-going packet. Reference [19] uses roaming method so that the attacker will
not be able to distinguish which is the real server while performing a DDoS attack.
Lastly, [20, 21] uses an anomaly-based IDS to identify the DDoS attack and redirect
them to a honeypot.
However, all proposed methods do post unsolved question. For [18], question
likes what is the probability that the attacker will fall into such illusion that the bot
(honeypot) is communicating with each other and will not suspect that he/she is
communicating with a honeypot should be carefully considered. For [19], it is just
like throwing a dice, the attacker have 50% chance to accurately get the server if
he does a DDoS attack at random. The detection of the DDoS attack occurs only
after the event happens. For [20], the nearest neighbour method for the IDS do have
downside such as high resource consumption and long processing time. Reference
[21] seems to have an excellence setup for bot detection, only under one condition.
That is no outgoing traffic restriction imposed on the honeypot. The intend setup
of the honeypot seems to be redundant if it is only used to contain DDoS attack.
DDoS attack is the one of the final products create by botnet and it has little value
for research purpose. The initial exploitation is the real juice for the research. It
provides information such as method, malware used in the exploitation and also the
new vulnerability in the existing system.
3.5 Honeytoken 29
3.5 Honeytoken
The concept of honeytoken is as old as the security itself. Honeytoken has the same
properties of that of the honepot except that it is not a computer [24]. A honeytoken
is digital entity perceive to be valuable by the ignorance attacker. It can be as simple
as an ID with the password and also as complex as the spreadsheet with customer
information. Honeytoken does, however, face several difficulties in creating espe-
cially to generate those spreadsheet with fake customer details. Before generating
the honeytoken, there are three main questions that should be answered. They are:
1. How it should be constructed?
2. Who is the honeytoken for?
3. What information should be changed or unchanged?
The knowledge to generate the honeytoken is vital and the honeytoken may be
manually generated. The whole process is tedious and time consuming.
Maya Bercovitch et al. has solved the process issue by introducing honeygen, an
automated honeytoken generation software that automatically create the complex
honeytoken. The honeytoken generation adopts the constrict satisfaction problem
approach to generate a honeytoken [25].
The application has two difference modes which can be used to create the honey-
token. The first mode is the obfuscation mode where the real data is used as input.
This mode only changes the more sensitive value. The second mode is the generation
mode. This mode creates the honeytoken from scratch based on the given rules. The
rules is a set of predefined attributes by its user. The information in this mode of
honeytoken is artificial and the amount of records is rely on the definition of its user.
The advantage of honeytoken can be best demonstrated in the area of anti-phishing
and insider threat which will be discussed.
in America Online (AOL). Hacker imposes as AOL employee and request users to
verify their account or billing information via AIM accounts. Such account cannot
be punished by AOL TOS department and eventually force the company to include
warming, which is the first security measure against phishing, in its email and mes-
senger (Table 3.10).
The technique for phishing attack has not change much, but its target has shifted
from email and communication software to financial institution and online payment
system in the early of second millennium. Email worm program is used to send
spoofed email to paypal which will direct those customer to a spoofed site for them
to update their credit card detail and other sensitive information.
Different types of phishing attack, such as phishing, spear phishing, clone phishing
and whaling, have been used to cause damage economically. Some of the attack are
group focused such spear phishing which directed at specific organisation and whal-
ing which only focus on higher management personnel in an organisation. Phishing
attack like clone focuses on the technique used to create an indistinguishable fake
email to lure user to believe its legitimacy.
Large organisation and institution have setup anti-phishing detection software in
their mail server to detect spam mail. Such technique is not 100% foolproof as small
percentage of the spam mail manage to get pass the check. Staff training do help to
prevent phishing as well. This, however, is not enough, phishing technique such as
clone phishing can confused user who fail to distinguish fake email.
Honeytoken and honeypot, in this case, can be setup to attact the phisher to steal
from it so as to keep the real system secures. Shubhika Chauhan has proposed the
use of honeytoken to capture the phisher activities. Shubhika also mentioned the
issue with the accessibility of the fake credential and, honeypot vs real online system
[26]. In order to overcome such issue, the proposed framework involves part of the
legitimate banking system and the system administrator of the bank. The framework
consists of honeytoken (phoneytoken), honeypot (honeyed) and spamtrap.
The spamtrap is used to detect the spams and phishing email. The honeytoken
generates the fake user credential that is accessible to the real online system. The real
system with the knowledge of the honeytoken redirects the phisher to the honeypot.
The honeypot used is not a real honeypot. It is a topped-up online banking system
with additional features where the bank administrator has a fair share of control
over it. To avoid being detected by the phisher, he is allowed limited access to some
banking feature such as transferring a limited fund and viewing bank statement.
Honeytoken allows phisher to use the fake credential to log into the intended
system so that researcher can monitor and track him/her down. Honeypot can be
used to contain the phishing email to assess its level of damage to the system. Martin
Husak has introduced the use of honeypot as part of the automated detection process
for spam and phishing email. The author stated the tedious process for manually
process each email to detect phishing and also the report from user does not reliably
capture all the phishing email in the network [27].
The proposed framework consist of two parts namely phishing detection and
phishing incident processing. The phishing detection unit is made up of a high-
interactive honeypot mail server with specify filtering rule suite for phishing detection
3.5 Honeytoken
and the spamtrap installed. The email address of the honeypot or honeytoken is made
known to the phisher via active and passive propagation. The honeypot accepts all
incoming email and does not forward or send message. The report of phishing email
is then reported to the incident processing unit. The phishing incident processing
is taken care by PhiGARo which automatically handle the phishing incident when
any phishing is reported to the system. The phishing incident process first start
by determine whether is the phishing material a URL or an email. Then it checks
the material with its database. Lastly, it interprets the result. The phishing incident
processing unit too accepts report from human. The process includes blocking the
malicious web site, update the phishing filter and inform the victim.
Summary for phishing detection honeypot: The two authors are engaging the issue
of phishing in a different manner. Table 3.11 shows framework in [26] focuses on
capturing and monitoring the activities of the phisher while the framework in [27] is
more on how to detect and prevent phishing. The honeytoken in both architectures
is used for different purposes. In [26], it is used to propagate the fake credential to
the phisher. In [27], it is used to propagate the existent of the mail server honeypot to
the phisher so as to receive phishing email. Both architectures have similarity such
as using spamtrap to detect the phishing email. The study of phishing does come
with a price, example phisher logs into the bank account and does a bank transfer.
Reference [26] has included this as the disadvantage of the proposed framework and
he also stresses that the bank should absorb all the expense.
The framework in [26] does have other setback which is not with the concept
introduced but with the willingness issue. The bank may refuse to cooperate with the
researcher to share its technology and the cost which is mentioned earlier on.
The framework in [27] does also have setback in regards to the detection of the
phishing email. It relies on two sources to detect phishing email, one is the email
received in the spamtrap and the report of phishing email from the legitimate user.
There is no mentioned about the detection of the phishing email from the mail server,
where the phishing email may slip through the eye of the ignorance user.
Insider attack can be differentiated into two categories. One is the masqueraders
who pretend to be another system user and the other is traitor who has his/ her own
legitimate system credentials [28]. The motive of insider attack can also be classified
into two difference types namely, inadvertent (unintentional) and intentional.
Unlike external intrusion, internal intrusions are most likely done by trusted
employee or member in the management who may know the system well. Their
objective is not to destroy the system but after some information of high value which
is not available to the public for personal gain [29]. This act can be more devastating
than the damage done from the outside.
The current insider detection system can only detect the threat post-incidentally
and by then it will be too late as damage has taken place. Honeypot adopts the pre-
incident approach which can be uses to attract insider attack. This helps to ensure the
safeguard of the real system. One of the benefits of honeypot is it helps to improve
the management function in an organization system by revealing its problems via
compromised. Li Hong-Xia has proposed a management honeypot which used to
collect, detect and record the attack on management system. The management hon-
eypot borrows the idea of the network honeypot to reduce the deficient and patch
loophole of the management system.
The honeypot uses the game theory of the management, relevant mathematical
model and other management technologies [31]. The author defines the desire of
power and distribution of benefit as honey and the management system with loophole
as container fill with honey. As long as there are people try to pass through the
loophole for the honey, the game exists. The management honeypot is used to serve
as an early warning and is effective in capturing intruder internally.
Most researchers [24, 28, 32] propose the use of honeytoken with honeypot to
trap the insider by placing the token in an easily accessible location in the system.
This can be within the document folder, in an email application or within a honeypot.
Lance Spitzner presumes that the insider possess the knowledge of obtaining a
very specific information. He proposed the combined use of honeytoken and the
honeypot to detect insider attack. Three different honeytoken setups are proposed
that will trigger the alarm once insider is detected [24]. First, the honeytoken will
be triggered when the insider acts inappropriately. The honeytoken in this example
contains the user ID, password and the location of the fake server. Second, honeytoken
can be concealed in the file and email environment to be perceived as information of
high value to attract insider. Lastly, the honeytoken can also be implemented as part
of the organization search engine. It will be triggered when the insider perform an
unauthorized search or input highly sensitive keyword into the search engine.
The purpose of the honeytoken is to provide user ID and password that allow the
insider to use them to gain access to the server (honeypot) to retrieve a particular
piece of information which is believed to be of high value for personal gain.
Honeytoken can come in a more complex form such as document. A fake doc-
ument can be used to attract insider. Unlike the above mentioned, this document
contains hundreds of fake customer detail which is very tedious and time consuming
to create. Honeytoken generator has been introduced to assist security personnel to
34
create such document. Before creating this document, several questions need to be
considered:
1. Who is this honeytoken targeting?
2. Can the insider easily distinguish between the real and the fake document?
3. How much fake information shall the document contains?
4. Which column of information should be changed or unchanged?
Brain Bowen has proposed the use of decoy document distributor (D3) system and
other sensors to detect and monitor the insider attack. The D3 system is a web-based
honeypot for generating and distributing decoys document or honeytoken. The whole
architecture includes decoy document distributor system which is the honeypot and,
sensor such as SONAR and host level sensor.
The decoy document distributor system automatically embeds multiple signal into
the decoy document to increase the probability of detection of document being misuse
[28]. The signals emitted, in case of decoy document being misused, is generated by
embedded honeytokens that are monitored, beacon that alert the SONAR sensor and
marker which enable detection at the host level sensor. Another functionality of host
level sensor is to monitor the anomalous user search action if the deviation of the file
search behavior protrude largely from the baseline of normal user search behavior.
Huseyin Ulusoy proposes a method to detect attacker by the use of honey data.
Honey data in reality is a form of honeytoken which is renamed by its author and is
part of the honeypot trap [32]. The system is composed of three phases. The first phase
is honey data generation and integration. In this phase, the honey data is generated
using the actual data by the data controller. The honey data and the actual data are
uploaded into the cloud. The honey data and the actual data are shuffled in such a
way that each data split is formed to contain at least one honey data instant. It is then
place in different position. Blacklist and whitelist are also created based upon the
position information (location of honey data). The second phase is trap setting. The
trap is running in kernel-mode and is used to monitor the file access system-calls.
The trap send an alert message to the data controller once the position information
and file request match the record in the blacklist. The last phase is map reduce job
tailoring. In this phase, the system is tailored to ensure that the legitimate user does
not access the honey data in the file system. Whitelist is used to ensure the above
requirement is met. The honey data comes in three scale levels. They are the honey
files, honey split and honey key-values.
The system ability to detect intruder by the probability of detecting an unautho-
rized data access which is set by the data controller and the amount of honey data
content in the files is dependent on the setting of the detection rate.
Anomaly-based filter can be used to detect insider attack by analysing the pattern
or flow. Such system will redirect the malicious user into a insider honeypot once
the IDS detects abnormal pattern or discover deviation excesses its threshold of the
normal flow. Praveen J U has proposed the use of misbehavior pattern detection
method for IDS to detect and redirect the intrusion packet to the honeypot. The
private/public keys are introduced in the proposed system to serve as a double security
measure alongside with the user name and password [30].
36 3 Specialized Honeypot Applications
The user has to first send an encrypted request for the ticket to a particular service
from the ticket generator. Upon received the encrypted service ticket from the ticket
generator, the user has to login and send the service ticket to the NIDS. The NIDS
will send the ticket to the ticket manager for verification. If the verification is pass,
the user will be directed to the file system else if the authentication failed, user will
be blacklisted and directed to the honeypot.
Summary for insider detection honeypot: Different authors has different opinion
on how to determine whether there is an insider attack. Table 3.12 reveals that frame-
work in [30, 32] are limited to masquerader insider attack whereas for framework in
[24, 28, 31] apply to both masquerader and traitor. Framework in [30, 32] assumes
that the intruder is not very familiar with the system and try to access to the system.
The whole concept is more efficient for detecting outsider attack rather than insider
attack. Using honeypot alone to detect insider attack provide limited information as
the attacker will not mingle in the honeypot for long period of time whether or not
he/she achieves his/her objective. The honeytoken proposes in [28, 32] allow admin-
istrator to continue to monitor even the intruder is no longer within the parameter of
the decoy system. Every action perform on the token will cause it to send feedback
back to the server.
The development of the insider detection has shifted from merely using the man-
ual honeytoken [24] to using IDS and honeypot [30] to the automated honeytoken
generator system and honeypot [32]. The development of the decoy file system (hon-
eypot) with the usage of the honeytoken file make the proposed framework in [28,
32] indistinct from the legitimate system. The concept proposed in [28, 32] make a
perfect solution; however, researchers still have to face the reality of the high level
of complexity in setting up the entire system.
All researchers who proposed the usage of honeytoken as part of the framework
face the great challenge in making the decision for proportion of ‘honeydata’ and
real data for the honeytoken needs to be established to prevent the trigger of the
suspicious alarm by the insider in regards to the data targeted. The proportion decides
is subjective and needs to rely extensively on the professional opinion on the higher
management of the organization who may be highly suspicious of insider.
Advanced persistent threat (APT) is a well-organized attack that try to gain control
of the system in an organization in order to gain information for personal benefit.
The attack can consists of the usage of several sophisticated attack vector or simple
malware attack. The tools used in the most attack are modern state-of-the-art hacking
application. It can be customized or of the shelf malware tool. The objective of APT
is to remain invisible for as long as possible, move quietly from one compromised
host to the next without generating regular network traffic and gain total control of
the host [33].
3.6 Advanced Persistent Threat Honeypot 37
The attack is a very low and slow process and also to ensure that the malicious
activities cannot be observed by legitimate user. The intension of the attacker is
similar to insider attack as not to do damage to the system but to gain unlimited
access to the confidential information of the organization.
The first warnings against targeted email containing trojans to steal sensitive
information are published by UK and US CERT organisation in 2005 [36]. During that
time, the term “Advance Persistent Threat” is not being used. APT was later widely
cited by Colonel Freg commander of the 23rd Information Operations Squadron in
US Air Force.
APT attack comes in seven stages. They are:
1. The first stage is the initial compromise stage. Methods such as social engineering,
spear phishing, zero-day virus and steady drive-by download from commonly
visit web site are used to infect the targeted employee computer.
2. Second stage establish foothold in the targeted network. This is fulfil by using
tunnelling to access the network infrastructure, install a remote administration
software and create a backdoor.
3. The third stage escalate privileges to gain full control rights of the network. This
is done by using exploitation and password cracking software.
4. The fourth stage is network information consolidation stage. Information such as
trust relation and windows domain are gathered.
5. The fifth stage is lateral movement stage. Attacker will begin to compromise
other system and server and perform data harvesting on them.
6. The sixth stage, attack requires to maintain the connection to ensure continuous
control over the channel.
7. The seventh stage is also the final stage. Attacker downloads valuable data from
the victim’s network
The attack is often performed as a continuous process and is sometime being
described using singular expression such as “the” APT attack. Current security tech-
niques and tools find challenging to detect such attack especially stealth technique
such as tunnelling is being used. Researchers in [34, 35] have proposed the use of
honeypot to capture this attack.
Roman Jasek has proposed the use of multiple honeypot in several location of the
network to capture APT attack [34]. The proposed system consists of high-interactive
honeypot, low-interactive honeypot, honeypot for production and honeypot agent.
The honeypot agent acts like a normal human user possess the behavior of igno-
rance user to attract the attack. The low-interactive honeypots emit the known vulner-
ability into the network. The high-interactive honeypots allows attacker to interact
and compromise. The act of compromising the honeypot in the honeyfarm is recorded
and monitored by the administrator. Safety rules derive from the compromising act
is applied to the production system.
Honeypot can be implemented next to the actual server. This creates a mirror image
which can be used as a bait to attract attacker. Zainab Saud focuses on implementing
the honeypot to protect the more important facilities such as server [35]. The proposed
architecture include NIDS as a gateway to the server and low-interactive honeypot
38
to emit signal to attract the attacker. The focus of this system is to ensure that the
administrator receive a timely information of the intrusion once the honeypot is being
compromised. The task of the NIDS is to provide a detailed picture of the attack, its
log and alerts assist the administrator to analyze and correlate different events.
Summary for APT detection honeypot: In Table 3.13, the two frameworks proposed
trying to solve the issue of APT in a different level. Equal scale is impossible in this
case to be used for comparing the result in technological level or empirically. The
framework in [34] is designed to capture a full APT attack and redirect this attack to
a honeyfarm for monitoring and analytical work. The information of whole attack is
being recorded and stored in a database. The framework in [35] focuses on protecting
the prime facilities such as the server. It is assumed that the APT attack has already
occurred and is undetected in the network.
Both frameworks adopt the passive approach to lure the attacker to the honeypot
and both authors in their articles stated the belief that an advance persistent threat
attack has the ability to slip through the eye of intrusion detection system and honey-
pot is a good solution to capture the signal of such threat [34, 35]. Both frameworks
use static honeypot to emulate the vulnerability to attract APT attacker and to my
dismay, there is no dynamic honeypot proposed so far to tackle APT issue.
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References 41
Abstract This chapter will discuss about the general-purposed honeypot concept.
Honeypot concept, such as the shadow honeypot, has incorporated into many hon-
eypot framework and being described as the norm for honeypot. There are also
sophisticated general purposed honeypot that can automatically adapt to the envi-
ronment in to monitor different attack or able to generate a response to a human
intruder. Such concept will also be discussed in-dept.
One of the biggest challenges for honeypot technology is that it requires manually
update and configure to adapt to the environment it is in. Configuration for honeypot
is a vital ingredient for the honeypot to be blended into the environment to lure
attacker towards it. Any misconfiguration will lead to the consequences such as
missed detection, fail to trap attacker or compromised honeypot be used as a launch
pad to launch attack on the network.
Over the years, researchers have proposed a concept called dynamic honeypot. The
different between dynamic honeypot and static honeypot is its ability to automatically
adapt to the environment it is in. Dynamic honeypot uses the plug-n-play concept
which user can just connect it to the network and use without any configuration [6].
Dynamic honeypot does have a competitive edge when compare with its prede-
cessor. It is able to create a honeypot which can blend very well with the environment
it is in. The question is how this honeypot get the information about the environment.
Researchers [1–5] use fingerprint method to collect information about its environ-
ment and the system information. Fingerprint method can be classified into two
categories, namely passive method and active method.
Active fingerprint method uses active techniques such as port scanning to collect
the information of the server. It sends out traffic packet to the targeted host and
through the response to identify the role of each host in the network.
Xuxian Jiang proposes a catering honeypot that will actively collect information
from current network traffic and dynamically create honeypots that are likely to be
VI.
L'histoire du geôlier peut servir encore à éclaircir celle du
prisonnier.
M. Saint-Mars, qui eut tour à tour la garde de Fouquet et du
Masque de Fer, s'appelait Bénigne d'Auvergne, seigneur de Saint-
Mars. C'était un petit gentilhomme champenois, des environs de
Montfort-l'Amaury, qui n'avait aucune ressource de patrimoine
lorsqu'il fut admis dans la première compagnie des mousquetaires
du roi. Son exactitude dans le service lui fit obtenir le grade de
maréchal-de-logis à l'âge de trente-quatre ans, et, en cette qualité, il
contribua avec son capitaine d'Artagnan à l'arrestation de Fouquet.
Durant tout le procès, il remplit rigoureusement l'emploi de
surveillant auprès de l'accusé, et l'ardeur avec laquelle il s'acquittait
de son devoir attira sur lui l'attention du roi, qui s'applaudit d'avoir
trouvé l'homme qu'il cherchait pour l'attacher irrévocablement à la
garde de Fouquet, condamné à une détention perpétuelle. On le
nomma, en décembre 1664, capitaine d'une compagnie-franche,
avec le titre de commandant de la prison de Pignerol et les
appointemens de gouverneur de place forte (6000 livres), pour
garder Fouquet. Son autorité, à peu près absolue dans le donjon, se
trouvait indépendante de celle du lieutenant du roi, M. Lamothe de
Rissan, comme de celle du gouverneur de la ville, M. d'Herleville.
A peine installé dans son commandement, Saint-Mars, qui ne
voulait pas s'arrêter au début de sa fortune, se mit en mesure de
poursuivre ce chemin, en épousant une demoiselle de Moresant, fille
d'un simple bourgeois de Paris, mais sœur du commissaire des
guerres de Pignerol, et de la belle Mme Dufresnoy, maîtresse du
marquis de Louvois, qui avait fait créer pour elle une charge de
dame du lit de la reine. Il gagna donc les bonnes grâces de Louvois
par l'entremise de M. Dufresnoy, premier commis au département de
la guerre; et l'appui de Mme Dufresnoy ne lui a pas nui dans
l'occasion.
Tant que dura ostensiblement la prison de Fouquet, Saint-Mars
jouit d'un crédit considérable à la cour: il procurait des places, des
grades et des pensions aux gens qu'il recommandait à Louvois; il
balançait sans cesse l'autorité du lieutenant du roi et du gouverneur
de Pignerol réunis; il recevait tous les ans d'énormes gratifications
sur la cassette du roi. Enfin la manière dont il avait gardé Fouquet,
malgré toutes les tentatives faites pour sa délivrance, invita le roi à
remettre dans les mains de ce geôlier infatigable un nouveau
prisonnier plus difficile à conserver. Les ruses du comte de Lauzun
échouèrent encore contre la vigilance de Saint-Mars, à qui la mort
enleva, dit-on, le malheureux Fouquet en 1680; un an après, Lauzun
lui fut enlevé aussi par des lettres de grâce [141] .
[141] Mémoires de M. d'Artagnan (par Sandras de
Courtilz), Cologne, 1701, 3 vol. in-12, t. 3, p. 222 et 385.
Annales de la cour et de Paris pour les années 1697 et
1698 (par le même), Cologne, 1701, 2 vol. in-18, t. 2, p.
380. Ces deux ouvrages nomment la Moresanne, la
famille à laquelle appartenait la femme de Saint-Mars. Ce
nom est écrit Damorezan dans les correspondances de
Louvois; Histoire de la détention des Philosophes, t. 1.
C'est d'après une lecture attentive de ces
correspondances, qu'on peut se fixer sur la nature des
pouvoirs confiés à Saint-Mars.
Quant à Reilh, qui signa l'acte de décès sur les registres de Saint-
Paul, ce chirurgien était entré à la Bastille par la recommandation de
l'abbé Giraut; et comme il avait été frater dans une compagnie
d'infanterie, on peut présumer que l'apprentissage de ce frater eut
lieu aux îles Sainte-Marguerite sous les yeux de Saint-Mars, qui
donnait ses vieilles perruques et ses vieux justaucorps à ce sinistre
opérateur, aussi mal famé que sa médecine parmi les pensionnaires
de la prison [151] . Abraham Reilh, complaisant du gouverneur, qui
ajouta pour lui le titre et les appointemens d'apothicaire à ceux de
chirurgien du château, devait peut-être cette faveur à sa discrétion,
en cas qu'il fût le même frater qui trouva au bord de la mer une
chemise couverte d'écriture, et l'apporta sur-le-champ à Saint-Mars,
sans avoir rien lu de ce qu'elle contenait. Mais alors il ne faudrait pas
admettre le reste de la tradition qui raconte que ce frater fut trouvé
mort dans son lit.
[151] Idem, t. 1, p. 79.
FIN.
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