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Week 14 CL FA24

The document presents a series of questions related to a prisoner's dilemma and an extended form game involving two players. It asks for the dominant and dominated strategies for both players, as well as the Nash Equilibria for each scenario. Additionally, it discusses the outcomes of the game using backward induction to determine the final choices and payoffs for both players.

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Chinh Minh Phan
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7 views

Week 14 CL FA24

The document presents a series of questions related to a prisoner's dilemma and an extended form game involving two players. It asks for the dominant and dominated strategies for both players, as well as the Nash Equilibria for each scenario. Additionally, it discusses the outcomes of the game using backward induction to determine the final choices and payoffs for both players.

Uploaded by

Chinh Minh Phan
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Consider the following prisoner's dilemma with the payoff matrix (Numbers represents years in

prison):

1. What is the dominant strategy for player A?


a. Remain silent.
b. There is no dominant strategy.
c. Confess.

2. What is the dominated strategy for player B?


a. Remain silent.
b. There is no dominated strategy.
c. Confess.

3. What is the Nash Equilibrium (in pure strategy)?


a. 25, 25
b. 40, 5
c. 10, 10
d. 5, 40
e. There is no Nash equilibrium.
Right Left
Right 10, 5 7,3
Left 12,7 8,5

3. What is the dominant strategy for player 1?


a. Right
b. There is no dominant strategy.
c. Left

4. What is the dominated strategy for player 2?


a. Right
b. There is no dominated strategy.
c. Left

5. What is the Nash Equilibrium (in pure strategy)?


d. 12,7
e. 10,5
f. 8,5
g. 7,3
h. There is no Nash equilibrium.

Consider the following extended form game in which Player 1 moves and then Player 2 moves.
Player 1 can chose to move left or right, then Player 2 can choose to move up or down.
a) If Player 1 chooses Left and Player 2 choses up, Player 1 will lose $10 and Player 2 will receive
$40.
b) If Player 1 chooses Left and Player 2 choses down, Player 1 will receive $0 and Player 2 will
receive $0.
c) If Player 1 chooses Right and Player 2 choses up, Player 1 will receive $20 and Player 2 will
receive $20.
d) If Player 1 chooses Right and Player 2 choses down, Player 1 will receive $40 and Player 2 will
lose $10.

6. Draw a game tree representing this game

7. Using backwards induction, how will this game end? What choice will Player 1 make, what
choice will Player 2 make, what payoffs will each player receive?

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