Classification of Administrative Actions
(a) Legislative Functions- Rule making action or quasi-legislative actionLegislative power
which in administrative law parlance is known as Delegated Legislation.
(b) Rule decision action or quasi- judicial action- Adjudicative power
(c) Rule-application action or administrative action.
(d) Ministerial action or pure administrative action- Administrative power which is non -
legislative and non-adjudicative power
(a). Legislative Functions Legislative functions of the executive consist of making rules,
regulations, bye-laws, etc. It is, no doubt, true that any attempt to draw a distinct line between
legislative and administrative functions is difficult in theory and impossible in practice.
Though difficult, it is necessary that the line must be drawn as different legal rights and
consequences ensue. As Schwartz said, “If a particular function is termed ‘legislative’ or
‘rule-making’ rather than ‘judicial’ or ‘adjudication’, it may have substantial effects upon the
parties concerned. If the function is treated as legislative in nature, there is no right to a notice
and hearing unless a statute expressly requires them.”
In the leading case of Bates v. Lord Hailsham, Megarry, J. observed that “the rules of natural
justice do not run in the sphere of legislation, primary or delegated.” Wade also said, “There
is no right to be heard before the making of legislation, whether primary or delegated, unless
it is provided by statute.” Fixation of price, declaration of a place to be a market yard,
imposition tax, establishment of Municipal Corporation under the statutory provision,
extension of limits of a town area committee, etc. are held to be legislative functions.
Rulemaking action of the administration partakes all the characteristics which in normal
legislative action processes. Such characteristics maybe generality, prospectivity, and a
behaviour which basis action on policy consideration and gives a right or a disability. These
characteristics are not without exception.
JUDICIAL FUNCTION
According to the Committee on Ministers’ Powers, a pure judicial function presupposes an
existing dispute between two or more parties and it involves four requisites
1. The presentation (not necessarily oral) of their case by the parties to the dispute;
2. If the dispute is a question of fact, the ascertainment of fact by means of evidence adduced
by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the
parties, on evidence;
3. If the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal argument by the
parties; and
4. A decision which disposes of the whole matter by finding upon the facts in dispute and ‘an
application of the law of the land to the facts found, including, where required, a ruling upon
any disputed question of law.’
Thus, these elements are present, the decision is a judicial decision even though it might have
been made by any authority other than a court, e.g. by Minister, Board, Executive Authority,
Administrative Officer or Administrative Tribunal.
The word ‘quasi’ means ‘not exactly.’ Generally, an authority is described as ‘quasi- judicial’
when it has some of the attributes or trappings of judicial functions, but not all. In the words
of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers, “the word ‘quasi’, when prefixed to a legal term,
generally means that the thing, which is described by the word, has some of the legal
attributes denoted and connoted by the legal term, but that it has not all of them” e.g. if a
transaction is described as a quasi-contract, it means that the transaction in question has some
but not all the attributes of a contract.
According to the Committee, a quasi-judicial decision equally presupposes an existing
dispute between two or more parties and involves (1) and (2) above but does not necessarily
nvolve (3) and never involves (4). The place of (4) is, in fact, taken by administrative action,
the character of which is determined the Minister's choice.
For instance, suppose a statute empowers a Minister to take action if certain facts are proved,
and in that event gives him an absolute discretion whether or not to take action. In such a
case, he must consider the representations of parties and ascertain the facts – to that extent the
decision contains a judicial element. But, the facts once ascertained, his decision does not
depend on any legal or statutory direction, for ex hypothesis is he is left free within the
statutory boundaries to take such administrative action as he may think fit: that is to say that
the matter is not finally disposed of by the process of (4) This test has, however, been subject
to criticism by jurists. It does not give a complete and true picture. It is based on a wrong
hypothesis.
The Committee characterized the judicial function as being devoid of any discretionary
power but obliged to merely apply the law to the proved facts. In reality, it is not so. The
courts of law also exercise discretion. It may be more persuasive in administrative actions
than in judicial functions but the difference is of degree only. A quasi-judicial function stands
mid-way between a judicial function and an administrative function. A quasi-judicial decision
is nearer the administrative decision in terms of its discretionary element and nearer the
judicial decision in terms of procedure and objectivity of its end-product. It is also not true
that in all quasi-judicial decisions, two characteristics are common
1. Presentation of their case by the parties; and
2. The decision on questions of fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties.
Firstly, in many cases, the first characteristic is absent and the authority may decide a matter
not between two or more contesting parties but between itself and another party, e.g. an
authority effecting compulsory acquisition of land. Here the authority itself is one of the
parties and yet it decides the matter. It does not represent its case to any court or authority.
Secondly, there may be cases in which no evidence is required to be taken and yet the
authority has to determine the questions of fact after hearing the parties, e.g. ratemaking or
price- fixing.
Thirdly, after ascertainment of facts, unlike a regular court, an authority is not bound to apply
the law to the facts so ascertained, and the decision can be arrived at according to
considerations of public policy or administrative discretion, which factors are unknown to an
ordinary court of law.
Today the bulk of decisions which affect a private individual come not from courts but from
administrative agencies exercising adjudicatory powers. The reason seems to be that since
administrative decision-making is also a by-product of the intensive form of government, the
traditional judicial system cannot give to the people that quantity and quality of justice which
is required in a welfare state. Administrative decision making may be defined as a power to
perform acts administrative in character comma but requiring incidentally some
characteristics of judicial traditions.
In Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court observed, “It may not be possible to
frame an exhaustive definition of what executive function means and implies. Ordinarily the
executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative
and judicial functions are taken away."
Thus, administrative functions are those functions which are neither legislative nor judicial in
character. Generally, the following ingredients are present in administrative functions:
1. An administrative order is generally based on governmental policy or expediency.
2. In administrative decisions, there is no legal obligation to adopt a judicial approach to the
questions to be decided, and the decisions are usually subjective rather than objective.
3. An administrative authority is not bound by the rules of evidence and procedure unless the
relevant statute specifically imposes such an obligation.
4. An administrative authority can take a decision in exercise of a statutory power or even in
the absence of a statutory provision, provided such decision or act does not contravene
provision of any law.
5. Administrative functions may be delegated and sub-delegated unless there is a specific bar
or prohibition in the statute.
6. While taking a decision, an administrative authority may not only consider the evidence
adduced by the parties to the dispute, but may also use its discretion.
7. An administrative authority is not always bound by the principles of natural justice unless
the statute casts such duty on the authority, either expressly or by necessary implication or it
is required to act judicially or fairly.
8. An administrative order may be held to be invalid on the ground of unreasonableness.
9. An administrative action will not become a quasi-judicial action merely because it has to
be performed after forming an opinion as to the existence of any objective fact.
10. The prerogative writs of certiorari and prohibition are not always available against
administrative actions.
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN JUDICIAL AND QUASI JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
A quasi-judicial function differs from a purely judicial function in the following respects
(1) A quasi-judicial authority has some of the trappings of a court, but not all of them;
nevertheless, there is an obligation to act judicially.
(2) A lis inter parties is an essential characteristic of a judicial function, but this may not be
true of a quasi-judicial function.
(3) A court is bound by the rules of evidence and procedure while a quasi-judicial authority is
not.
(4) While a court is bound by precedents, a quasi-judicial authority is not.
(5) A court cannot be a judge in its own cause (except in contempt cases), while an
administrative authority vested with quasi-judicial powers may be a party to the controversy
but can still decide it.
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE AND QUADI JUDICIAL
FUNCTIONS
Actions of an administrative authority may be purely administrative or may be legislative or
judicial in nature. Decisions which are purely administrative stand on a wholly different
footing from judicial as well as quasi-judicial decisions and they must be distinguished. This
is a very difficult task. “Where does the administrative end and the judicial begin The
problem here is one of demarcation and the courts are still in the process of working it out.
To appreciate the distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial functions, we have to
understand two expressions ‘lis’, and‘quasi-Lis’
One of the major grounds on which a function can be called ‘quasi-judicial’ as distinguished
from pure ‘administrative’ is when there is a lis inter parte and an administrative authority is
required to decide the dispute between the parties and to adjudicate upon the lis. Prima facie,
in such cases the authority will regarded as acting in a quasi-judicial manner.
Certain administrative authorities have been held to be quasi-judicial authorities and their
decisions regarded as quasi-judicial decisions, wherein such lis was present, e.g. a Rent
Tribunal determining ‘fair rent’ between a landlord and tenant, an Election Tribunal deciding
an election dispute between rival candidates, an Industrial Tribunal deciding an industrial
dispute, a Licensing Tribunal granting a licence or permit to one of the applicants.
But it is not in all cases that the administrative authority is to decide a lis inter partes. There
may be cases in which an administrative authority decides a lis not between two or more
contesting parties but between itself and another party. But there also, if the authority is
empowered to take any decision which will prejudicially affect any person, such decision
would be a quasi-judicial decision provided the authority is required to act judicially.
Thus, where an authority makes an order granting legal aid, dismissing an employee, refusing
to grant, revoking, suspending or cancelling a licence, cancelling an examination result of a
student for using unfair means, rusticating of a pupil, etc. such decisions are quasi-judicial in
character.
In all these cases there are no two parties before the administrative authority, ‘and the other
party to the dispute, if any, is the authority’ itself. Yet, as the decision given by such authority
adversely affects the rights of a person there is a situation resembling a lis. In such cases, the
administrative authority has to decide the matter objectively after taking into account the
objections of the party before it, and if such authority exceeds or abuses its powers, a writ of
certiorari can be issued against it. Therefore, Lord Greene, M.R. rightly calls it a ‘quasi-lis.’
Duty to act judicially The real test which distinguishes a quasi-judicial act from an
administrative act is the duty to act judicially, and therefore, in considering whether a
particular statutory authority is a quasi-judicial body or merely an administrative body, what
has to be ascertained is whether the statutory authority has the duty to act judicially.
The question which may arise for our consideration is as to when this duty to act judicially
arises. As observed by Parker, J. “the duty to act judicially may arise in widely different
circumstances which it would be impossible, and indeed, inadvisable, to attempt to define
exhaustively.”
Whenever there is an express provision in the statute itself which requires the administrative
authority to act judicially, the action of such authority would necessarily be a quasi-judicial
function. But this proposition does not say much, for it is to some extent a tautology to say
that the function is quasi-judicial (or judicial) if it is to be done judicially.
Generally, statutes do not expressly provide for the duty to act judicially and, therefore, even
in the absence of express provisions in the statutes the duty to act judicially should be
inferred from ‘the cumulative effect of the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the
disposal provided, the objective criterion to be adopted, the phraseology used, the nature of
the power conferred, of the duty imposed on the authority and the other indicia afforded by
the statute.
Since ‘fairness in action’ is required from Government and all its agencies, the recent trend is
from ‘duty to act judicially’ to ‘duty to act fairly.’ ‘Duty to act fairly’ is indeed a broader
notion and can be applied even in those cases where there is no lis. It is this concept (‘duty to
act fairly’), which has given rise to certain new doctrines, e.g. ‘fair play in action’, legitimate
expectations, proportionality etc.
Test
No ‘cut and dried’ formula to distinguish quasi-judicial functions from administrative
functions can be laid down. The dividing line between the two powers is quite thin and being
gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a
quasijudicial power, one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or
persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the
consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is
expected to be exercised.
The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and
fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the
exercise of quasi-judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair
decision. In recent years, the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical
change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being
considered as a quasi-judicial power. Whether a particular function is administrative or
quasijudicial must be determined in each case on an examination of the relevant statute and
the rules framed thereunder and the decision depends upon the facts and circumstances of the
case.
At one time prerogative remedies of certiorari and prohibition were confined to ‘judicial’
functions pure and simple of public bodies. They both are now available in relation to
functions which may be regarded as ‘administrative’ or even ‘legislative.’ As it is said, it is
not the label that determines the exercise of jurisdiction of the court but the quality and
attributes of the decision. "On the whole the test of justiciability has replaced that of
classification of function as a determinant of the appropriateness of a decision for judicial
review.”
