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Contributions to Hermeneutics 3

Vinicio Busacchi

Habermas and
Ricoeur’s Depth
Hermeneutics
From Psychoanalysis to a Critical Human
Science
Contributions to Hermeneutics

Volume 3

Series editors
Jeffery Malpas, University of Tasmania, Tasmania, Australia
Claude Romano, Université Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, France

Editorial board
Jean Grondin, University of Montréal, Canada
Robert Dostal, Bryn Mawr College, USA
Andrew Bowie, Royal Holloway, UK
Françoise Dastur, Nice, France
Kevin Hart, University of Virginia, USA
David Tracy, Univeristy of Chicago, USA
Jean-Claude Gens, University of Bourgogne, France
Richard Kearney, Boston College, USA
Gianni Vattimo, University of Turin, Italy
Carmine di Martino, University of Milan, Italy
Luis Umbellino, University of Coimbra, Portugal
Kwok-Ying Lau, Chinese University of Hong Kong, HK
Marc-Antoine Vallée, Fonds Ricoeur, Paris, France
Gonçalo Marcelo, University of Lisbon, Portugal
Csaba Olay, University of Budapest, Hungary
Patricio Mena-Malet, University Alberto Hurtado, Santiago, Chile
Andrea Bellantone, Catholic Institute of Toulouse, France
Hans-Helmuth Gander, University of Freiburg, Germany
Gaetano Chiurazzi, University of Turin, Italy
Anibal Fornari, Catholic University of Santa Fe, Argentina
Hermeneutics is one of the main traditions within recent and contemporary European
philosophy, and yet, as a distinctive mode of philosophising, it has often received
much less attention than other similar traditions such as phenomenology,
deconstruction or even critical theory. This series aims to rectify this relative neglect
and to reaffirm the character of hermeneutics as a cohesive, distinctive and rigorous
stream within contemporary philosophy. The series will encourage works that focus
on the history of hermeneutics prior to the twentieth century, that take up figures
from the classical twentieth-century hermeneutic canon (including Heidegger,
Gadamer and Riceur, but also such as Strauss, Pareyson, Taylor and Rorty), that
engage with key hermeneutic questions and themes (especially those relating to
language, history, aesthetics and truth), that explore the cross-cultural relevance and
spread of hermeneutic concerns, and that also address hermeneutics in its
interconnection with, and involvement in, other disciplines from architecture to
theology. A key task of the series will be to bring into English the work of hermeneutic
scholars working outside of the English-speaking world, while also demonstrating
the relevance of hermeneutics to key contemporary debates. Since hermeneutics can
itself be seen to stand between, and often to overlap with, many different contemporary
philosophical traditions, the series will also aim at stimulating and supporting
philosophical dialogue through hermeneutical engagement. Contributions to
Hermeneutics aims to draw together the diverse field of contemporary philosophical
hermeneutics through a series of volumes that will give an increased focus to
hermeneutics as a discipline while also reflecting the interdisciplinary and truly
international scope of hermeneutic inquiry. The series will encourage works that
focus on both contemporary hermeneutics as well as its history, on specific
hermeneutic themes and areas of inquiry (including theological and religious
hermeneutics), and on hermeneutic dialogue across cultures and disciplines. All
books to be published in this series will be fully peer-reviewed before final acceptance.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/13358

Vinicio Busacchi

Habermas and Ricoeur’s

Depth Hermeneutics
From Psychoanalysis to a Critical
Human Science
Vinicio Busacchi
University of Cagliari
Cagliari, Italy

ISSN 2509-6087 ISSN 2509-6095 (electronic)

Contributions to Hermeneutics
ISBN 978-3-319-39009-3 ISBN 978-3-319-39010-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-39010-9

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016941949

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
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protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
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The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland
Deuten! Das ist ein garstiges Wort!
S. Freud
Preface

This research – which re-actualises my previous research on Jürgen Habermas

(Busacchi 2009)1 and Paul Ricoeur (Busacchi 2010)2 – is aimed at contributing to
the study of the possibilities of interpreting psychoanalysis in a hermeneutical key.
I write “possibilities” in the plural to indicate the double meaning inherent in this
concept: the feasibility, sustainability and eligibility of a theory or hypothesis on the
one hand, and the potential and applicability of it on the other. If the first meaning
refers to an epistemological analysis (theory of science), the second denotes the
wider sphere of the speculative (philosophically interesting, in the case of psycho-
analysis, under different thematic/disciplinary levels) and indicates, above all, the
sphere of speculation that affects therapeutic work (not strictly psychoanalytical).
The latter is certainly the most relevant in the current debate on psychoanalysis and
hermeneutics. Indeed, it goes on to produce scientific material around the problem
of the epistemological status of psychoanalysis, and the preferred approach contin-
ues to be the model developed by Sigmund Freud. Freud’s attempt to place psycho-
analysis among the sciences, suggesting that it should be accorded equal dignity
with the exact sciences, has been and still is a real challenge for theorists and epis-
temologists, and a formidable terrain of analysis, reflection and theorisation. In this
sense, the most famous example is no doubt that of Karl Popper, and the tradition
that is to a greater or lesser extent connected to him. As is known, his criticism of
the inductive method – his epistemological falsificationist model – comes from a
critical comparison between the scientific parameters offered by the relativistic
physics of Einstein on the one hand, and the claim of scientific doctrines such as
Marxism and, indeed, psychoanalysis, on the other (Parrini 2002, 147 ff). As vari-
ous experts have explained, this case can be inserted into a branch of the philosophy
of science that is attentive to psychoanalysis because it has effected a rethinking of

1
This book forms the first part of the present research.
2
The essential findings of this large research project on Ricoeur’s interpretation of psychoanalysis
and its theoretical role in his philosophy are re-considered and re-actualised in the second part of
this book.

vii
viii Preface

epistemology. In fact, the “psychoanalytical question” is counted among the high-

lights of the evolution of the philosophy of science in the twentieth century.
The situation is different for Jürgen Habermas – different, but not entirely sepa-
rate. As we will see in this book, in fact, in Erkenntnis und Interesse (1968) he finds
in psychoanalysis not only the possibility of founding the humanities and social
sciences, but a real analogon of his critical philosophy. Therefore, even in his case,
we can speak of epistemological interest (characterised “instrumentally”, because it
does not directly and exclusively address the clarification of the status of psycho-
analysis, but it is useful for other things).
The most recent collapse of the neo-empiricist conception of scientific theories
has only consolidated, broadened and further articulated this orientation of interest
(Parrini 1998, 7).3 (It has been a collapse that has forced the theoreticians and epis-
temologists of science to reconsider the relationship among the natural sciences,
humanities and social sciences, and to rethink the criteria of knowledge and cer-
tainty for a scientificity without foundation).
In this regard, we can bring Paolo Parrini into the discussion. Introducing the
chapter entitled “Psychoanalysis in philosophy of science” in his book Sapere e
interpretare (Know and Interpret), he writes:
I will discuss only the epistemological assessments relating to the scientificity of the psy-
choanalytical theory. And I’ll do it in order not to offer a comprehensive historical recon-
struction, but to draw some general theoretical understandings about the nature and the
tasks of the epistemological analysis of scientific theories. In short, my interest goes more
to the philosophy of science than to the question of the scientific nature of psychoanalysis
as such (Ibidem).

Here, too, then, we identify the reason for a kind of involvement we can define
as “instrumental”. It is precisely on this most recent epistemological horizon that we
find an explanation for the continuation of the debate on the relationship between
depth psychology and hermeneutics. (Which horizon? A horizon characterised by a
crisis of foundations, of the certainty of knowledge about the classical conception
of scientific theories, a crisis that induces analytical philosophers to rethink the
models and scientific criteria on which the relationship between hermeneutics and
epistemology is based). It is a theoretical disposition that is surprising in many ways
considering that the hermeneutical line follows a centuries-old debate (and is part of
the wider controversy on the epistemology of psychoanalysis intertwined with the
so-called Methodenstreit).
As mentioned, a different discourse is developed if we move from the philo-
sophical terrain to the ground of psychoanalysis (of the praxis of psychoanalysis, or
of psychotherapy in general), or if we look at psychoanalysis from a different philo-
sophical perspective than the strictly epistemological or theoretical/scientific (from
the perspective of a hermeneutical philosophy). I believe that not only will the full
force be proved, but the full problematic potential inherent in the relationship(s)
between hermeneutics and psychoanalysis will also become clear. In fact, the (expo-
nential) increase in attention given to neuroscience these days – which in fact has

3
For an insight into Parrini’s research, see Lanfredini, Peruzzi 2013.
Preface ix

catalysed a series of questions that in the last century were basically triangulated
among Cartesianism (or, rather, the philosophies of the subject), phenomenology
and psychoanalysis (or, more specifically, Freudianism) – has only marginally
affected the sphere of therapeutic practice. More than is the case with neuroscience,
the territorium here is disputed between psychoanalysis and an increasing number
of new forms of psychotherapies, and psychological in addition to psychiatric
approaches. In this regard, the advances of pharmacology in psychiatry are consid-
erable and respectable, although they are accompanied by a widespread – and
undoubtedly alarming – ideological drug culture.
Today, apart from a few nations (France and Argentina, for example), the popu-
larity of psychoanalysis can be considered to be waning. However, this does not
diminish its importance in relation to research on the hermeneutical interpretation
of psychoanalysis, for this (as is pointed out here) is conducted mainly by taking
into account the practical implications of the question. Psychoanalytical practice, in
fact, continues to work as a laboratory for the development of therapeutic strategies
and/or for the discussion of issues widely connected to proceedings focused on
word, behaviour and relation. To this discourse we must add the datum of the latest
generation of psychoanalysts to hermeneutical interpretation, following the approx-
imations and “looting” of the 1970s, especially by the North American analytical
world.
This research does not seek to make a ruling on the epistemological status of
psychoanalysis, to be a “defence” of Freudianism, or even to be understood as a
“simple” philosophical work on Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas, the two authors
on whom this text will mostly be focused. My intention is to contribute to an evalu-
ation of the possibility of a hermeneutical interpretation of psychoanalysis, particu-
larly with regard to therapeutic practice. This book is also an investigation into the
philosophical implications of a hermeneutical re-reading of psychoanalysis. My
belief is that it has had a major impact on the philosophy of the human being: from
the question of the formation of personal identity to that of inter-subjectivity; from
the constitution of a new characterisation of the reality of the subjective human life
to a new questioning of the classic dilemmas related to individual, social and moral
emancipation; and thence to the mind–body problem and the dilemmas related to
the formation of a sense of the other and of moral sensibility in general.
In comparison with philosophy (more precisely, with contemporary Continental
philosophy) with interpretation in the hermeneutical key, psychoanalysis has ended
up assuming a position of ponderous debt. On the theoretical level, the work of
Ricoeur and Habermas has been fundamental, additionally for their subsequent
application and basic insight into the practical/clinical field (to be clear, insights and
applications not immediately made cum grano salis, as they say…). In fact, it is on
the basis of their studies that a hermeneutical perspective of psychoanalysis was
developed in the early 1970s. In distinct yet similar ways, these two thinkers lead to
the maturation and synthesis of those countless interpretative elements dispersed
and largely fragmented around the areas of concern regarding Freudian methodol-
ogy and epistemology. The epistemological difficulties of psychoanalysis, along
with the new epistemological and methodological perspectives opened up by
x Preface

Gadamer’s hermeneutics (considered by both Ricoeur and Habermas), present tout

de suite optimal conditions for a new reading and a new synthesis. However, it
should be a synthesis that, while remaining anchored to the epistemological dis-
course, intercepts the themes of ancient Methodenstreit that both dispute the status
of psychoanalysis, which ends up further complicating and confusing the picture.
However, this occurs only within the boundaries of the Continental area. Overseas,
in fact, the hermeneutical perspective penetrates directly to the ground of theoretical
and analytical practice, no doubt bolstered by the repeated failed attempts at a sys-
tematisation of Freudian metapsychology.
The hermeneutic paradigm seems capable of replacing the biologistic conception
underlying Freud’s theorisations. The year 1970 can be marked as the starting point
of this change – certainly, partly symbolic – the year of publication of Ricoeur’s De
l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud in English. The work appears with an inversion
between the title and subtitle, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, a
distortion that from the start prompts a misunderstanding of the original intent of the
French philosopher, which was primarily to develop a philosophical study of inter-
pretation. Thus began the legacy of misunderstanding of Ricoeur’s reading – which
does not defend the thesis of a hermeneutical psychoanalysis, but a double and
irreducible epistemological register from psychoanalysis (including energetics and
hermeneutics) – that inaugurated, however, the success of the book and its herme-
neutical orientation.
Something similar happened to Habermas’ Erkenntnis und Interesse. Published
in Boston in 1971 under the title Knowledge and Human Interests, it was immedi-
ately taken up in the analytical arenas by virtue of its psychoanalytical reading of
depth hermeneutics. However, the work does not engage psychoanalysis simply as
an example of self-reflection in a methodologically critical science – an example
similar to Marxism, and used by Habermas to illustrate his critical philosophy. But,
to further support this thesis, Habermas develops an interpretation of psychoanaly-
sis as Reflexionswissenschaft rather than as Tiefenhermeneutik, the latter interpreta-
tion being closer to Alfred Lorenzer’s conception. (It should be noted, however,
that, at the same time, Habermas contributes to the construction of the concept of
depth hermeneutics, and that, beyond their differences, both Ricoeur and Habermas
essentially characterise psychoanalysis as Sprachanalyse). Such a misunderstand-
ing, even in this case, constitutes a betrayal of the author’s intent. In fact, from his
perspective, which largely reflects the influence of the Frankfurt School, psycho-
analysis should not so much operate under the influence of a psychologistic concep-
tion centred on the individual, precisely as depth hermeneutics, but rather under the
imprint of a sociological conception of a critical theory of society, as a hermeneutics
of emancipation or a critical philosophy.
It must be said that, unlike Ricoeur,4 the Habermasian text clearly lends itself to
an ambiguous reading. Not only does it appeal to the concept of Tiefenhermeneutik –

4
Ricoeur keeps the thesis of an irreducible double epistemology in Freudianism, as a specific con-
figuration of psychoanalysis. He is misunderstood because this interpretation is entirely seen from
a philosophical/hermeneutical perspective. His interest and philosophical orientation provoke a
basically distorted analysis of Freud’s psychoanalysis.
Preface xi

betraying the epistemological approach given in the essay – but it is also strongly
connected, without distinction, to the point of view developed by Lorenzer. In fact,
Habermas begins his reading of psychoanalysis in terms of the Lorenzer’s linguistic
theory, eschewing the Freudian texts without examining the possible theoretical and
practical connections of an interpretation of Freud in the hermeneutical key.
Excluding the issue of interpretation (on which my considerations are focused, and
coming to a substantively opposite judgement), the whole Habermasian reconstruc-
tion remains on the “surface” of the hermeneutical hypothesis. Although this may
be, in part, justified by the above argument – that the intent of Habermas is not so
much to advance and sustain a hermeneutical interpretation of psychoanalysis as to
illustrate an example of a reflexive science comparable with his critical philoso-
phy – still, nothing in his exegesis seems to favour a hermeneutical perspective on
Freudianism.
Of course, it would be different if the discourse were to abandon the Freudian
perspective, even in the context of critical analysis. However, it is the same
Habermasian setting, explicitly focused on the Freudian work, that imposes the
methodological procedure of subjecting the text of Habermas to the screening of
Freud. This is precisely what I intend to do in this book: to demonstrate that an
interpretation of psychoanalysis in a hermeneutical key, developed by looking on
the one hand at the concept of interpretation and on the other at Freud’s work (as in
the case of Habermas), is unsustainable reading.
The hermeneutical hypothesis can be embraced in Freudianism only in a frag-
mentary and restricted manner – for example, in comparison with the interpretation
of dreams or symbols, or with the first theoretical and technical conceptions of the
analysis, or even with the application of the psychoanalytical interpretation in the
cultural field. However, this should not and cannot be read as a condemnation of
some hermeneutical approach or hypothesis in the field of depth psychology.
Psychoanalysis is, in fact, a vast and varied domain, apart from hermeneutics. The
Habermasian reading is a linguistic interpretation centred on a specific conception
of hermeneutics, essentially considered as an interpretation of symbols (a reading in
vogue in the 1960s, an additional element that is similar to Ricoeur’s philosophy of
psychoanalysis). Moreover, Habermas’ interpretation lies, as previously mentioned,
within the confines of Freudian psychoanalysis, always considering the theoretical
and textual spheres (just one secondary level discourse of his touches on the field of
praxis). In light of this, the hermeneutical “gamble”, so to speak, remains open on
several fronts.
First, consider the schools that succeeded the Freudian school. It is quite surpris-
ing to find that hermeneutics as an interpretation of symbols has led neither
Habermas nor Ricoeur to the study of Jungian concepts, such as, for example, one
famously centred on a conception of mental life as being symbolic, which is much
closer to the idea of psychoanalysis as depth hermeneutics. Here, one of the para-
doxes of the history of hermeneutical interpretations of psychoanalysis, or rather, of
the dialectic between Freudianism and hermeneutics, comes to light. The Freudian
source of the paradox is undoubtedly found in the epistemological problematic
inherent in psychoanalysis, combined with the character of the talking cure of ana-
xii Preface

lytical technique. To this we can add, the contradictions of Freud as scientist and
psychoanalyst, divided between the purely scientific orientation of the positivist
neurobiology of the late 19th century, and the psychological vocation, anchored in
the literary and philosophical culture of his time. In Freud’s view, psychological and
linguistic perspectives should apply in psychoanalysis only provisionally, as a kind
of substitute formation, pending the development of neurobiological knowledge and
an appropriate explanatory apparatus capable of establishing precise causal links
and physiological relationships between mental life and cerebral structure.
For 30 years, E.-J. Sulloway’s research has highlighted how Freud’s conception
of the mind has been largely conditioned by his culture and by his professional
training in biological studies, as encapsulated, particularly, in his text Freud,
Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend (1979). Both Freud’s edu-
cation and his early career were grounded in the medical/biological sciences, par-
ticularly in neuroanatomy (a discipline in which his name was already known before
the spread of psychoanalysis). This marks a period and an aspect of his work life
that many generations of experts on Freud, even psychoanalysts, have considered
“wasted” or “useless”, or at least, not relevant to the history of the creation of his
new discipline. Yet, beyond Sulloway’s work, which portrays the father of psycho-
analysis as maintaining a fundamentally biologistic conception of the mind and
therefore a scientific conception of depth psychology, it seems important to under-
line that, precisely from this scientific approach (combined with the character of the
psychoanalytical object, and the novelty of the analytical technique), Freud has pro-
duced an epistemologically problematic and ambiguous discipline.
From one angle, it is this problematic space (amplified by the Methodenstreit)
that the hermeneutical hypothesis has entered. From another, it is the metaphorical
and narrative language used by Freud to illustrate the technique, and to reconstruct
and analyse cases, that still animates such an approach. If Freudianism finds this
approach different by defining and limiting the attachment points, in later psycho-
analytical schools and perspectives it is revealed to be more compatible.
Thanks to a circular mechanism of theoretical legitimation/justification between
psychoanalysis and philosophy, the hermeneutical interpretation paradoxically ends
up working as a cornerstone of Freudianism. This is precisely the critical point,
because “if Freud were alive today” – an argumentative game of Sulloway’s – not
only would the formation of the analysts remain closed to the medical/psychiatric
sphere, but psychoanalysis would also probably work more closely with neurosci-
ence than with psychology and philosophy. How can we deny that much sustain-
ability, in addition to the interest of hermeneutical interpretation, is grounded in the
psychological/dynamic orientation, which evolved from psychoanalysis after
Freud?
My research endorses the inadmissibility of an entirely hermeneutic reading of
Freudianism, but leaves open the post-Freudian psychoanalytical schools – except
for those that historically have been configured hermeneutically, because, as men-
tioned, this configuration would perhaps be expected to confer upon itself a
theoretical legitimisation on the basis of Freudianism under a “philosophical short-
circuit”. These schools must be re-examined using the same process of radical
Preface xiii

analysis that I have tried to put into practice in this work to test the sustainability of
the Habermasian interpretation.
A second front that has remained open to the scrutiny of hermeneutics invests in
the more practical plane of analytical over theoretical experience, and concerns a
conception of hermeneutics in the narrative key (a dominant conception between
the 1970s and 1980s). It seems that psychoanalysis, in its dimension as therapeutic
practice, generally takes much more favourably to a similar hermeneutical setting,
rather than the narrow interpretation of symbols. Moreover, such an approach seems
to concretely answer the most current and active philosophical and scientific ques-
tions, interests and orientations addressing the contemporary psychoanalytical
world. From this point of view, the theme of psychoanalysis/hermeneutics remains
of the first order.
In the light of developments in the field of psychoanalysis, the dialectic between
psychoanalysis and hermeneutics constitutes a formidable field in the study of nar-
ratives of identity. Equally essential is Habermas’ concept of emancipation – also
developed in connection with the interpretation of depth psychology – which is key
not only in terms of psychology and psychotherapy, but also pedagogy and sociol-
ogy, in addition to political philosophy, moral philosophy etc. In this regard, I do not
hide a sense of impression and concern for the rationalist optimism expressed by
Habermas’ interpretation of psychoanalysis as Reflexionswissenschaft, which
clearly reverberates in the idea of emancipation. Such an interpretation is bound to
a specific philosophical line, one that, as known, entails a rich and complex concep-
tion built around the notion of communicative action. In reference to this, we notice
that the reading of Habermas softens, absorbing into the circle of critical reflection
that deep and powerful dimension unveiled by psychoanalysis: the uncontrollable
and irrational, impulsive and pre-symbolical dimension of the self; the subjective
dimension that often dominates, overhangs and subverts the ego. We read in the
teachings of Freud: “Das Ich ist nicht Herr im eigenen Haus”. (The history of the
1900s, and the most recent, has shown all too clearly that barbarity in size can throw
a man off course, despite his sense of civility, rationality, moral and legal order, and
democracy).
Another paradox of Freudianism can reduce the tension with the position of
Habermas. This paradox was revealed for the first time in 1936 by Ludwig
Binswanger, and concerns Freud’s anthropological conception: on the one hand, the
pessimism inherent in his naturalistic idea of man, and on the other, an extraordi-
nary confidence in the primacy of rational consciousness, which comprises the
investigation. The “I” that is the subject of psychoanalytical discourse is presented
to us as strong and auto-assertive, as a whole, unlike the “I” as object, which is
ontologically fragile.
There is an Illuminist side of Freud’s psychoanalysis: that of the analyst, to
whom Habermas evidently looks. This represents a perfectly coherent perspective
within the meaning of his own interpretation, that the figure of the analyst precisely
creates the figure of his critical philosopher.
It is on this point that the “superficiality” of the hermeneutic proposal really finds
justification. It is a criticism that Habermas can reject through the argument that the
xiv Preface

orientation of his research is not psychological or metapsychological but philosoph-

ical. In other words, the abiding interest guiding the Habermasian reading is basi-
cally the use of psychoanalysis in terms of social criticism, and not the real
determination of the content of psychoanalysis as a psychological discipline.
I agree with Habermas here; and, although his work has contributed heavily to
the spread of the hermeneutic perspective of psychoanalysis, the determination of
the effective validity and of the possibilities inherent in a depth hermeneutics must
still traverse the analysis of other texts. Take, for example, Lorenzer. However, if I
am indicating an additional element to make my judgement relative, or at least par-
tial, considering Erkenntnis und Interesse, the outcome is clear and remains stead-
fast: nothing contained in this work makes a hermeneutical conception of Freud’s
psychoanalysis sustainable. Furthermore, the close connection of the psychoana-
lytical interpretation to Habermas’ ideas inevitably produces a philosophical result
from my criticism of his conception.
What is the outcome, therefore? The presence in the therapeutic process of dif-
ferent forces from those of rationality, and the presence of different dynamics from
those of reflexive communication hinder the full connection between the psycho-
analytical work and the critical philosopher, suggesting a less enlightened concep-
tion of human emancipation. The rationalist optimism of Habermas is compatible
with psychoanalysis maintaining the look of the analyst, the subject of psychoana-
lytical discourse. The attempt to extend this look to the object can be defined as an
attempt at rationalisation: on the one hand, it makes the linguistic and hermeneutical
hypothesis of depth psychology sustainable, but on the other it cancels and denies
that which by its nature is trapped outside the sphere of language and rationality –
the instinctual, the irrational, the pre-symbolic, the emotional, the passionate and
the affective. Thus, although it is true that the essential condition of emancipation is
the work of reflection (into critical communication, into auto-reflection), on the
other side, precisely in light of psychoanalysis, we know that there can be no true
emancipation if the meeting is not powered by a genuine human interest, and if the
exchange is not likely to traverse the deep emotional and instinctual sphere. That is
to say, everything that makes a human being a human being. The look from the I as
the object of psychoanalytical discourse evaluates the Habermasian proposal as a
diminished perspective of psychoanalysis, if not as anti-psychoanalysis.
In conclusion, after revising the psychoanalytical hermeneutics of Habermas and
Ricoeur, we find two perspectives on the human being, which, beyond the partial
elements of conflict, seem to justify, prove and demonstrate the speculative fertility
of a hermeneutical psychoanalysis, and, above all, the domain of their philosophical
anthropology.
Contents

1 Introduction: Methodenstreit and Psychoanalysis

as Hermeneutics ........................................................................................ 1
1.1 Methodenstreit and Psychoanalysis .................................................... 1
1.2 The Hermeneutical Perspective .......................................................... 4
1.3 The Scientific Debate on Psychoanalysis: A Look ............................. 8

Part I Habermas’ Interpretation of Freud

2 From the Kritische Theorie to the Tiefenhermeneutik ............................ 13
2.1 The Frankfurt School: A Theoretical Body Without Praxis ............... 13
2.1.1 The Passage Through Frankfurt .............................................. 13
2.1.2 Psychoanalysis in the Frankfurt School .................................. 15
2.1.3 The Characters of Kritische Theorie ....................................... 18
2.1.4 A Theory Without Praxis ........................................................ 20
2.2 Habermas’ First Critical Philosophy................................................... 23
2.2.1 The Opening Lesson of 1965 (Frankfurt) ............................... 23
2.2.2 Knowledge and Interest: Psychoanalysis
as Critical Philosophy ............................................................. 25
3 Reflexionswissenschaft versus Tiefenhermeneutik .................................. 31
3.1 Psychoanalysis as Auto-Reflection ..................................................... 31
3.2 Interpretation in Psychoanalysis ......................................................... 39
3.2.1 Theory and Practice in Psychoanalysis ................................... 40
3.2.2 The Relationship Between Analyst and Patient ...................... 42
3.2.3 Rationality and Irrationality in Interpretation ......................... 43
3.2.4 Interpretation and Transference .............................................. 44
3.2.5 Psychoanalysis of Culture, Therapeutic Interpretation,
and The “Wild” Exercise......................................................... 45

xv
xvi Contents

Part II Ricoeur’s Interpretation of Freud

4 Ricoeur: The Encounter with Psychoanalysis
and His First Philosophical Research ..................................................... 51
4.1 Psychoanalysis Interpreted by Ricoeur’s First Masters ...................... 51
4.2 Husserl and Merleau-Ponty ................................................................ 56
5 The Unconscious as a Principally Affective Matter ............................... 59
5.1 A Phenomenology of the Voluntary and the Involuntary ................... 59
5.2 The Unconscious and the Hidden ....................................................... 62
5.3 The Unconscious ................................................................................ 66
6 The Hermeneutics of Psychoanalysis of Freud
and Philosophy (1965) ............................................................................... 73
6.1 The Graft of Hermeneutics to Phenomenology
as an Alternative to Structuralism ....................................................... 73
6.2 Freud and Philosophy: Critique of the Analytic ................................. 78
6.3 Freud and Philosophy: Critique of the Dialectic................................ 89
7 The Philosophy of Psychoanalysis After Freud and Philosophy............ 97
7.1 From a Philosophy of Psychoanalysis
to a Critical Hermeneutics .................................................................. 97
7.2 From “The Question of Proof” and “Image and Language
in Psychoanalysis” to Oneself as Another .......................................... 103
7.3 The Narrative Identity and the Dialectics of Recognition .................. 108
8 Conclusion: A Productive Distortion....................................................... 111
8.1 Around the Construction of a Procedural Model ............................... 112
8.2 A Comprehensive Philosophy of the Human Being ........................... 115

References ........................................................................................................ 117

Chapter 1
Introduction: Methodenstreit
and Psychoanalysis as Hermeneutics

1.1 Methodenstreit and Psychoanalysis

The idea of psychoanalysis as a hermeneutical practice is attributed to Imre

Hermann, who, in Die Psychoanalyse als Methode (1934), argues in favour of the
merging of the concept of meaning onto the concept of cause and the centrality of
the exegetical method onto the positivist method embraced by Freud (which is
essentially because of John Stuart Mill’s classic eliminative inductivist model; see
Grünbaum 1984).1 Hermann legitimatises it through the idea of causal psychic
occurrences and through the notion of the deterministic and pervasive nature of this
causalism. However, the rise of the hermeneutical perspective in the debate, as both
an epistemic stance and a theoretical–clinical praxis, dates only to the second half
of the 1960s. In fact, the contributions of Ricoeur, Lorenzer, and Habermas came
about during these years.
An element that characterises this hermeneutical application is, as mentioned
above, its connection with epistemology. It is a strong connection that arises from
the querelle on the status of psychoanalysis, which is connected to contemporary
philosophical hermeneutics. Epistemology (and ontology) is one of its main the-
matic/problematic areas. In Wilhelm Dilthey, in particular, we can identify the most
remote and fertile roots of the epistemological interest of hermeneutics in psycho-
analysis. We see it taking cues from Entwurf einer Psychologie (1895), Sigmund
Freud’s forgotten project.
The Entwurf constitutes Freud’s attempt to place psychoanalysis – and, with it,
psychology – among the natural sciences by introducing the quantitative criteria of
experimental physiology into the representation and explanation framework of
mental processes. With this, he re-proposes the relationship of the subordination of

1
It is perhaps useful to remember that Freud translated into German a volume of essays by Mill,
for the Complete Works edited by Theodor Gomperz. He certainly knew the model proposed by the
English philosopher, integrating it into his naturalism, where idealistic morphology and vitalism,
evolutionism and determinism converged. See Assoun 1981.

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 1

V. Busacchi, Habermas and Ricoeur’s Depth Hermeneutics,
Contributions to Hermeneutics 3, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-39010-9_1
2 1 Introduction: Methodenstreit and Psychoanalysis as Hermeneutics

psychopathology to physiology established by Theodor Meynert, embracing the

thesis of substantial identity between the psychological and the physiological at the
neuronal level. The attempt failed, but Freud did not abandon the idea that psycho-
analysis could be analysed scientifically, like chemistry and physics (see, for exam-
ple, Freud 1955c).
Nonetheless, since its initial rise, psychoanalysis has been situated in the episte-
mologically problematic context of psychology. Freud was immediately aware of
this predicament. In fact, it is from this awareness – and from the needs intrinsic to
the new psychology – that his commitment to ground the discipline in theoretical/
scientific and methodologically solid bases originates. He continued along this path
opened up by psychological positivism, accepting the ideas of strict determinism
and mechanism inherent in the processes of the psychic life of Wilhelm Wundt’s
experimental psychology. From his point of view, the same determinism is at work
in the new reality (the unconscious) that he discovered. (This reality, however,
requires an interpretative rather than a descriptive approach, because it does not
offer a direct mode of observation and analysis; besides, it requires the substitution
of introspection for the experimental regulations of free association).
The naturalistic and scientistic orientation given to psychology from positivism
exists in contrast to the Geisteswissenschaften orientation conceived by Dilthey’s
school, which locates in psychology the unifying moment of the human sciences
(just when Freud was working on the Entwurf). His Ideas for a Descriptive and
Analytic Psychology (1894) and Contributions to the Study of Individuality (1895–
1896) correspond to this period. In 1883, with Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften
(Introduction to the Human Sciences) – at a time when Freud is taking his first steps
with the physiologist Joseph Breuer, treating hysteria through hypnosis – Dilthey is
laying the basis for a systematic opposition between Naturwissenschaften and
Geisteswissenschaften, equipping the latter with a precise and distinct theoretical
status. Certainly, the idea of hermeneutics as a specific type of knowledge can be
traced back to Johann Gustav Droysen, who, as early as 1854, distinguished between
the “explaining” (erklären) of the natural sciences and the “understanding” (verste-
hen) of the historical sciences. However, it is only from Dilthey that we know
hermeneutics as a discipline with a defined epistemological status, and as one of the
founding human sciences. In fact, he abandons his first position, a position that, as
we said, considered psychology to be the keystone of the human sciences, to
embrace the idea of the centrality of hermeneutics. The institutionalisation of the
division (in the foundational sense) between the natural sciences and humanities
occurs with Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband. The latter reconsiders the
antithesis between the sciences on the basis of a difference in methods. He estab-
lishes the distinction between nomothetic and idiographic sciences2 prompted by:

2
The first group pertains to those sciences oriented toward the identification and description of
laws governing facts (science of laws). They are natural sciences based on a judgement of facts,
and, according to Rickert, characterised by a generalising methodological approach. The second
group pertains to those sciences that address singularity, as in individual, historically determined
objects (historical sciences). They are the cultural sciences related to a judgement of values, and
1.1 Methodenstreit and psychoanalysis 3

1. The opposition between nature and spirit

2. The lack of a corresponding contrast between the modalities of knowledge
3. The impossibility of the human sciences deriving facts solely from internal
perception
4. The impossibility of placing psychology between the natural and the human
sciences
Rickert, Windelband’s successor, returns to this distinction between the nomo-
thetic and the idiographic, attempting, in the essay Kulturwissenschaft und
Naturwissenschaft (1899), to develop some philosophical implications for this dis-
tinction beyond the methodological.
Windelband and Rickert establish a determinate and clear distinction between
the characters and components of the cultural sciences and the natural sciences,
between the nomothetic sciences and the idiographic sciences, marking a moment
of “equilibrium” in the Methodenstreit (“dispute over methods”). Thus, the epis-
temic alternative had already been outlined when Freud laid the foundations of his
discipline; thus, trying to place it among the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften)
actually exacerbated the problematic of this operation. Freud stubbornly continued
to pursue the direction of scientific placement, despite the failure of his Entwurf,
and the epistemological turning point occurred within the Methodenstreit. He never
allows for the possibility of the methodological dualism inherent in psychoanalysis,
or even the possibility of it being of a different “scientific nature”. Moreover, he
continues to follow the line of a positivist naturwissenschaftliche Psychologie.
In fact, the innovations made in epistemology by the historicists and neo-criticists
of the Baden School still do not resolve the question of the status of psychology. In
this context, the Methodenstreit is not minimalised. Despite its aporetic condition,
the “naturalistic” position gains ground thanks to Freudian psychoanalysis.
Nevertheless, this epistemological revolution portends significant consequences,
provoking the secular querelle on the status of psychoanalysis. In fact, if those
schools worsened the aporetic nature of the position of psychology among the natu-
ral sciences, then, gradually for psychology, a clear and distinct alternative between
Kulturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften emerges.
The first important step in this direction comes from Karl Jaspers’ Allgemeine
Psychopathologie (1913). He applies to psychopathology the double explanation/
understanding model, establishing not only a linguistic but also a methodological
duality, thereby establishing comprehensive psychology (Jaspers 1997).
In Jaspers, two different methods of investigation for Verstehen and Erklären are
to be found. Alongside objective and naturalistic psychopathology, Jaspers posits a
subjective and phenomenological psychopathology: comprehensive psychology,
based on the assumption that the psychic “arises from the psychic in an understand-
able way for us”. This understanding is articulated in different ways: there is static
understanding and then genetic understanding. To understand someone means both

are distinct from the first because of their individualising approach (see Windelband 1907).
Regarding the distinctive couple generalising/individualising, see Rickert 1902, 236 f.
4 1 Introduction: Methodenstreit and Psychoanalysis as Hermeneutics

to know the objective contents of his psyche (seizing what he knows and the actuali-
sation of his mental states) and to intuitively grasp the relations among the happen-
ings penetrating his mental life through mental life. Therefore, in Jaspers, verstehen
essentially constitutes a dual understanding: rational and empathetic, where the
empathetic element (Einfühlung) enjoys a fundamental position. (In his work,
Jaspers uses the expression “empathic understanding”3). Moreover, verstehen
denotes an “understanding” that as static understanding is sometimes connected to
“interpretation”, but interpretation in a specific sense.
This is the central idea through which Jaspers builds his most important critique
of Freud’s psychoanalysis. First of all, one of the main merits of psychoanalysis
would be identified in the method of comprehensive observation as the ultimate
source of knowledge, i.e. the means by which to achieve the original content of
psychopathology. However, Freud turned the task of understanding into an interpre-
tive operation (subordinating the verstehen to the deuten), thus rendering it an end-
less and all-encompassing procedure. Methodologically, he centralised static
understanding and freed it from all limitations. Moreover, Freud’s interpretation
presupposes a specific way of interpreting that determines a specific way of under-
standing: the als-ob (as-if) understanding, which always maintains doubt regarding
the reality of what has been understood. In fact, as Paul Natorp observed, the als-ob
understanding lies in the domain of the art: it is a sort of hermeneutical allegory.
However, this negative evaluation somehow opens the way to the hermeneutical
interpretation of psychoanalysis. This is the path followed by Jaspers in his 1913
work on schizophrenia, in which he bluntly affirms that Freudian psychoanalysis
has nothing to do with causal explanation, because it concerns the psychology of
meaning (Jaspers 1974).4 Thus, it is with Jaspers, as before with Hermann, that the
perspective later called hermeneutical is entered into the debate on the epistemo-
logical status of depth psychology.

1.2 The Hermeneutical Perspective

Generally speaking, hermeneutics characterises the European epistemic position, as

opposed to the scientific position privileged in the USA and the UK. In France,
Jacques Lacan’s work is a special case, because it finds a middle ground between
the two alternatives. Lacan rereads psychoanalysis through the structural linguistic

3
“Rational understanding always leads to a statement that the psychic content was simply a ratio-
nal connection, understandable without the help of any psychology. Empathic understanding, on
the other hand, always leads directly into the psychic connection itself. Rational understanding is
merely an aid to psychology, empathic understanding brings us to psychology itself” (Jaspers
1997, 304).
4
To Jaspers’ interpretation we can connect Jean Hyppolite’s psychoanalytical interpretation. In
France, around the mid-1950s, Jean Hyppolite noted a striking contrast between Freud’s positivist
language and the character of his discovery; thus, he too began promoting psychoanalysis as
hermeneutics.
1.2 The Hermeneutical Perspective 5

perspective of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakobson. Despite an explicit

intention of returning to the true Freud, Lacan rejects the thesis of scientific psycho-
analysis (see Simms 2007, 165n). Effectively, Lacan offers new possibilities for
hermeneutical psychoanalysis, both theoretically and clinically, with his linguistic
conception of the unconscious and the idea that “interpretation is nothing but the
unconscious itself”.5
In Germany, the whole picture is considerably different, compared with the dom-
inant trend in France. In fact, despite the predominance of the hermeneutical per-
spective, German thought has developed a strong interest in connection with the
problem of determining the nature and value of Freudian knowledge. (In this regard,
Ludwig Binswanger represents a particularly significant case; see Binswanger
1963).
The epistemological component clearly emerges with a multi-level articulation
in Habermas’ philosophy of psychoanalysis. In Erkenntnis und Interesse, Habermas
deems Freud’s scientific placement of psychoanalysis to be wrong. Any scientific
debate on the epistemology of psychoanalysis is rendered meaningless: Freud has
fallen into a “scientistic self-misunderstanding”.6
Habermas’ hermeneutical orientation is “dialectically” founded in Lorenzer’s
work, which took advantage of Habermas’ lesson. However, he later came to polem-
icise the philosopher, rejecting the hermeneutical/linguistic hypothesis. Lorenzer
criticises the linguistic focus of Habermas and Lacan, namely the excessive impor-
tance given to language and symbols in both the psychological analysis of the sub-
ject and the social dynamic study of relationships. Furthermore, he criticises the
pre-eminence of language compared with practice. For him, it would be the latter
that determines the former through its pre-linguistic forms of socialisation and
interaction.7
Despite these criticisms, Lorenzer’s position is still set within hermeneutics, as
an epistemic perspective and interpretative psychoanalysis, and as clinical rethink-
ing. Lorenzer interprets psychoanalysis from the same perspective as hermeneutics
and its critique of ideology, which characterises Habermas’ philosophy of psycho-
analysis. Nevertheless, whereas the latter points psychoanalysis in the direction of

5
It is a perspective today that balances between abandoning and overcoming interpretation, yet it
remains dialectically anchored to the hermeneutical perspective. As Jacques-Alain Miller says,
Lacan’s era is over: the interpretation era is behind us (see Miller 1996). Some analysts are trying
to leave the interpretative paradigm behind (see Pancheri 1998; Benvenuto 1988). Jean Laplanche’s
case is famous: borrowing from Jacques Derrida’s deconstructionist paradigm, he tries to profile
an anti-hermeneutical methodology, with its free-dissociation technique, for deconstructive psy-
choanalysis (Laplanche 1995, 1997).
6
“The scientific self-misunderstanding of psychoanalysis (das szientistische Selbstmißverständnis
der Psychoanalyse) inaugurated by Freud himself, as the physiologist that he originally was […]”
(Habermas 1972, 214). In the essay he says, “Freud did not take methodological cognizance of the
characteristic that distinguishes psychoanalysis from both the empirical-analytic and exclusively
hermeneutic sciences. Instead, he attributed it to the peculiarity of analytic technique” (189).
7
In Germany, even W. Loch (1967), M. Perrez (1972) and H.J. Möller (1978) have worked against
the hermeneutical perspective.
6 1 Introduction: Methodenstreit and Psychoanalysis as Hermeneutics

critical hermeneutics, the former tries to steer it on and translate it into a materialis-
tic hermeneutical course. Lorenzer’s proposal in particular tries to develop a real
clinical hermeneutics based on a metapsychology anchored in the concept of
symbols.
Something similar had been outlined outside of Europe in the early 1970s, with
a series of interpretative orientations to psychoanalysis in terms of hermeneutics
that had important implications for clinical praxis. Reference can be given to Roy
Schafer (A New Language for Psychoanalysis, 1976), George S. Klein
(Psychoanalytic Theory, 1976), and R.S. Steele (Psychoanalysis & Hermeneutics,
1979). The European influence should be noted, specifically the German influence.
However, to grasp the specific turn of American hermeneutics, it is necessary to bear
in mind the cultural context of the late 1930s in the USA. It was during this period
that a group of Freudian analysts from various European countries settled in the
USA and formed an important variant of psychoanalysis called ego psychology.
This denomination embraces the work of Heinz Hartmann, Rudolf Loewenstein,
Ernst Kris and David Rapaport. Although their research and contributions are not
reducible to a unified project, they show the kinds of correlations typical in such
schools of thought. The passage of this brand of psychoanalysis throughout
American culture with its corresponding mentality, which is geared towards sci-
entism and experimentalism, leads to the biological point of view. The consequence
of this is the enhancement of a natural and scientific component of psychoanalysis.
Analysis of the mental life from the ego’s perspective and a focus on its functions,
especially compared with instinctual dynamics and external world relations, imme-
diately characterise this school. On the one hand, such polarised research on ego-
instances connects the school to the latest developments of Freud’s psychoanalysis,
in particular to Abriss der Psychoanalyse (1938) and to Anna Freud’s Das Ich und
die Abwehrmechanismen (1936) on the defensive functions of the ego. On the other
hand, it recaptures the naturalistic and biologistic approach of Freud’s first Project,
of “Freud, Biologist of the Mind”. Hartmann’s Ego Psychology and the Problem of
Adaptation, published in 1939, became the school’s manifesto; it attempts a return
to the metapsychology project, moving past these latest psychoanalytical develop-
ments. It also refers to specific theoretical content drawn from genetic and experi-
mental psychology, through which the comprehensive psychoanalytical apparatus is
dismantled and an explanatory biologistic approach is introduced. The psychoana-
lytic theory of the ego is re-interpreted in terms of an evolutionary biological organ-
icism, which is conceptualised in terms of the environmental adaptation of the
organism and its neurobiology (terms already adopted by Freud in his Project), such
as an energetic dynamics of instinctual drives and unconscious investments. For
Hartmann, psychoanalysis is a science like the natural sciences, and is founded on
the inductive method. It is a natural science of the mind, and as such, is firmly
anchored in biology.
Rapaport’s The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory: A Systematizing Attempt
(1960) represents the most significant attempt to scientifically articulate and make a
foundation for psychoanalysis. In this work, Rapaport attempts a systematic recon-
struction of psychoanalytical theory based on the concept of psychic energy. He
1.2 The Hermeneutical Perspective 7

embraces the ambitious project of a general psychology founded on

psychoanalysis.
Rapaport’s work is certainly not devoid of weaknesses and problems. In particu-
lar, this concept of “psychic energy” immediately attracts criticism from theorists
and clinical professionals. Even within Rapaport’s school and among the Ego
Psychology pioneers, concerns about a radical biologistic approach are raised. The
point is that not only is the school ultimately destroyed, but some of its followers
elaborate new theoretical models in which even a moderate biologistic approach is
rejected. Klein and, later, Schafer fundamentally re-tuned their hermeneutical mod-
els in ways radically dissonant to those traditionally conceived by the old school.
Pure hermeneuticism characterises their particular orientation, despite the obvious
respective differences. This is revealed in several ways: by almost total detachment
from the scientific question of the status of psychoanalysis; by abandonment of the
theory of psychoanalytical instincts and its corresponding analytical/explanatory
language; by the development of a hermeneutic model focused on meaning and
interpretation, which is radically opposed to the naturalistic model that focuses on
cause and determination; and, finally, by the abandonment of every metapsychology
and meta-theorisation of clinical theory, which, by its nature, adheres to experience
and praxis.8
The distancing of this hermeneutics from the European trend can be observed in
the different way in which it enters the debate on the epistemology of psychoanaly-
sis. Even Lorenzer’s clinical hermeneutics, where the “clinical” contains the funda-
mental point, seems to distance itself from these other clinical theories, owing to
Lorenzer’s speculative and ideological connection to philosophy. On the other hand,
we cannot ignore the fact that these perspectives are derived from European herme-
neutics, particularly from the philosophical line applied to psychoanalysis in the
1960s, at the heart of which, essentially, lay the works of Habermas and Ricoeur.
In De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud (1965) Ricoeur attempts to forge a recon-
ciliation between the hermeneutical registers of meaning and interpretation, and the
energetic registers of instinct and causal explanation, which is in effect a mediation
between the hermeneutical and the scientific/biological characteristics of psycho-
analysis. According to Ricoeur, this possibility is manifested through Freud’s inter-
pretation of dreams theory and praxis. In fact, he showed how dreams encompass
symbolic meanings that are interpretable and that are at the same time the “effect”
of impulses from the deep life. In his Introduction à l’épistémologie freudienne
(1981), Paul L. Assoun observes that Ricoeur’s mediatory pretence does not achieve
its purpose because De l’interprétation is basically dominated by Ricoeur’s critical
interest in language to the detriment of the instinctive biological sphere. It should be
noted that, in Ricoeur, the relationship between language and psychoanalysis has
little to do with Lacanian linguistics (despite common references, in addition to the
long trail of controversy). Ricoeur’s psychoanalysis is in fact a hermeneutics,

8
This approach connects Klein and Schafer to the two other important dissidents: Holt and Gill. In
reference to the dismissal of metapsychology and the critical hermeneutic interpretation, see Holt
1989, 324–344.
8 1 Introduction: Methodenstreit and Psychoanalysis as Hermeneutics

whereas Lacan’s not. For him, psychoanalysis is not always about to reveal a hidden
knowledge, but rather stands as a kind of ascetic practice to bring out the uncon-
scious truth from a diachronic interior reality that knows no regularity or accumula-
tion (see Vegetti Finzi 1990, 392). Ricoeur’s interpretation has evolved over time,
particularly in connection with the narrative developments of his philosophy. The
transition from a symbolic to a narrative hermeneutics coincided with a shift in
focus from Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis (in the 1960s) to clinical psychoanaly-
sis and clinical experiences and works of other non-Freudian schools (1980s).
In contrast to Ricoeur’s “Freud”, Adolf Grünbaum, one of the most famous con-
temporary epistemologists, stakes his objections. In fact, he demolishes the entire
hermeneutic perspective. According to Grünbaum, Ricoeur
…sets the stage for his proposed hermeneutic reconstruction by truncating the domain of
occurrences to which psychoanalytic theory is to be deemed relevant. For he immures its
substantive purview within the verbal productions of the clinical transaction between the
analyst and the patient. Its subject matter, we are told, is “analytic experience [in that dyadic
transaction], insofar as the latter operates in the field of speech” […]. And, thus, he stipu-
lates at the outset that “the ultimate truth claim [of psychoanalytic theory] resides in the
case histories”, such that “all truth claims of psychoanalysis are ultimately summed up in
the narrative structure of psychoanalytic fact” (Grünbaum 1984, 43).

According to Grünbaum, in Ricoeur’s work, the whole treatment is carried out in

a crude dichotomy – observation/theory – in which a reductive behavioural psychol-
ogy acts as a paradigm for a “scientific psychology”. In response to this criticism,
we recall that Ricoeur’s work does not intend to posit a reading of Freud, but essen-
tially a philosophical interpretation. Actually, Grünbaum re-reads Ricoeur under the
influence of the reception of Ricoeur’s work in the USA. If the 1965 essay provides
considerable material for a hermeneutical interpretation of psychoanalysis, careful
examination of his book clearly reveals that Ricoeur takes forward the thesis of a
double, irreducible, epistemological register of psychoanalysis, both energetic and
hermeneutic.
Grünbaum’s critical gaze even targets Habermas, with the same argumentative
orientation and intent: to destroy any hermeneutical possibility for psychoanalysis.
Contrary to Habermas’ re-reading he argues
…that it was not Freud but Habermas himself who strapped the clinical theory of psycho-
analysis to the Procrustean bed of a philosophical ideology alien to it. Indeed, the relevant
point is not that Freud idolizes the natural sciences (“scientism”), but that Habermas mis-
conceives them. Thus, far from giving a philosophical elucidation of the clinical theory,
Habermas obfuscates and misdepicts it in an exasperatingly undisciplined way (Grünbaum
1984, 42).

1.3 The Scientific Debate on Psychoanalysis: A Look

This synthesis cannot be concluded without expanding the broader perspective of

the scientific debate on psychoanalysis. As previously mentioned, the premise of
this debate has already been established through the Methodenstreit, thus in
1.3 The Scientific Debate on Psychoanalysis: A Look 9

continental Europe. Yet, the question of the scientific nature of psychoanalysis

exploded in the USA in the 1950s. Immediately, it was problematised, unlike the
hermeneutic proposal, which only reached maturity in the mid-1960s with Ricoeur’s
Freud and Philosophy. In the third part of his book, Ricoeur refers to the New York
symposium of 1958, viewing it as a critical step in the process of introducing herme-
neutics into the epistemological debate on psychoanalysis.
By 1957, Hall and Lindzey (1957) emphasise that Freud’s writings contain his
conclusions but not the data on which these conclusions are based: neither an indi-
cation of methodology or data analysis, nor a systematic exposition of the empirical
results of his research. In addition, because Freud made no attempt to quantify the
data he collected, it is impossible to determine the statistical significance of his
conclusions (Schultz 1969). The symposium, which presented a varied programme
of operationalists, physicalists and behaviourists (Pumpian-Mindlin 1950; Feigl and
Scriven 1956; Frank 1961), included, among others, the philosopher Sidney Hook,
the psychoanalyst Heinz Hartmann, the anthropologist Abram Kardiner, and phi-
losophers of science Ernest Nagel, Wesley C. Salmon, Arthur Pap and Michael
Scriven.9 Nagel, in particular, argues that the Freudian psychoanalytical concepts
are vague, metaphorical, and not empirically verifiable, and that they do not offer
the objective criteria to validate an interpretation of the phenomena studied. His
contribution (rightly or wrongly) made a strong impression, becoming representa-
tive of one of the two major epistemological lines of the conference, contrary to
Hartmann’s position.
The New York symposium influenced the beginning of a series of attempts to
rethink Freudianism. Although much time has passed, several important works from
the 1970s and 1980s can be traced to this debate: works that try to reformulate psy-
choanalytical principles biologically (B. Rubinstein), that follow the informational
approach (Peterfreund 1971), that are based on a cognitivist orientation (Schafer
1982), or that pursue a learning approach (Gedo and Migone).10 Altogether, this
represents a positive dialectical moment, even for the hermeneutical proposal,
unlike Grünbaum’s work 20 years later. In fact, his strong attack in The Foundations
of Psychoanalysis and in other essays represents a radical refutation of the herme-
neutical perspective. In this book, he pursues three different objectives: to demon-
strate the unacceptability of the idea of psychoanalysis as a hermeneutics through
the confutation of the interpretations of Habermas, Ricoeur and Klein (a criticism
that affects Schafer and Spence, and other narrative perspectives too); to demonstrate
that psychoanalysis as a science can be submitted to Popper’s falsificationist crite-
rion; and to demonstrate the weakness of psychoanalysis as a science through the
falsificationist methodology and from the point of view of John Stuart Mill’s induc-
tivist approach. In the 1980s, this book reopened the debate on the epistemological
status of depth psychology provoking polemical reactions in the Anglo-Saxon
world: in particular, we recall Marshall Edelson’s Hypotheses and Evidence in

9
The conference proceedings are published under the direction of Sidney Hook (1959).
10
Works directly or indirectly connected to the symposium are considerable; in particular,
Sherwood 1969, and Rubinstein 1975.
10 1 Introduction: Methodenstreit and Psychoanalysis as Hermeneutics

Psychoanalysis (Edelson 1984) and Laudan’s Mind and Medicine (Laudan 1983).
In his “La question de la preuve dans les écrits psychanalytiques de Freud” (1982
[1977]), Ricoeur quotes Grünbaum as an example of epistemological confusion
about the status of psychoanalysis. He examines the question from the proof per-
spective. In “La psychanalyse confrontée à l’épistémologie” (1986), he writes:
Le récent livre d’[Adolf] Grünbaum Foundations of Psychoanalysis confirme le malen-
tendu qui règne entre psychanalystes et épistémologues formés à l’école du Cercle de
Vienne, prolongée par le positivisme logique. Ce relatif insuccès de la psychanalyse à se
faire reconnaitre pour science résulte de la négligence de tous, dans les deux camps égale-
ment, à poser certaines questions préliminaires (Ricœur 1986, 211).

Within this introduction only a summary sketch has been proposed about a huge
and complex hundred-year old debate. The inner “logic” has been to present the
general context or setting as a reference point for the critical study of Habermas’ and
Ricoeur’s interpretation of psychoanalysis, which now follows as the first part of
this book.
 Part I
Habermas’ Interpretation of Freud
Chapter 2
From the Kritische Theorie
to the Tiefenhermeneutik

2.1 The Frankfurt School: A Theoretical Body

Without Praxis

2.1.1 The Passage Through Frankfurt

Habermas has always shown a certain resistance, when his earliest philosophical
work (up to about 1970) is considered within the tradition of the Frankfurt School,
even though he is undeniably a prominent representative of its “second generation”
(see Wiggershaus 1994).1 In a 1981 interview, he stressed that a personal path had
brought him close to the philosophical and political positions of the Institut für
Sozialforschung (Habermas 1981, 126–155). Speaking with Honneth, he observes:
In retrospect, I sometimes get the impression that a student, who had worked his way with
systematic interest between Kant and Hegel, Schelling included, and then continued
through Lukács, up to Marx, could rediscover the Critical Theory of the thirties (Ibidem).2

Habermas approached those positions and themes gathered under the heading
Kritische Theorie during a period when the Institute was shedding its intellectual
past, specifically its “Marxist radicalism” (Petrucciani 2000, 10–11). Max
Horkheimer, who was the chief representative of the Institute, together with Theodor
W. Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, was concerned that, in anti-Communist post-war
Germany, the studies collected in the journal of the Institute (the Zeitschrift für

1
In 1956, Habermas became Adorno’s Forschungsassistent of social philosophy and collaborator
at the Institute. He remained there until 1961. The protagonists of the early history of the Institute
were C. Grünberg, F. Weil, F. Borkenau, K.A. Wittfogel, H. Grossmann, F. Pollock, M. Horkheimer.
L. Lowenthal, T. Adorno, E. Fromm, H. Marcuse and W. Benjamin, who came later during the
1920s and the 1930s.
2
Later, he declares that his philosophical work was already focused on the search for a “ theory of
modernity” and the problem “of the distorted realisation of reason in history”. Evidently, it was a
matter that grew in the same soil that nourished Marxist thought.

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 13

V. Busacchi, Habermas and Ricoeur’s Depth Hermeneutics,
Contributions to Hermeneutics 3, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-39010-9_2
Discovering Diverse Content Through
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 Eh bien, le croirais-tu, ce qui dominait en moi ce n’était pas la
colère d’avoir été jouée ainsi, trompée et ridiculisée; ce n’était pas la
honte d’avoir été ainsi habillée, déshabillée, maniée et touchée par
cet homme... mais une... humiliation profonde... une humiliation de
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Et Mme Margot ne répondit pas. Elle regardait droit devant elle,

d’un œil fixe et singulier, les deux boutons luisants de la livrée, avec
ce sourire de sphinx qu’ont parfois les femmes.

Rose a paru dans le Gil-Blas du mardi 29 janvier

1884, sous la signature: Maufrigneuse.
 LE PÈRE.

C
OMME il habitait les Batignolles, étant employé au Ministère de
l’instruction publique, il prenait chaque matin l’omnibus, pour
se rendre à son bureau. Et chaque matin il voyageait jusqu’au
centre de Paris, en face d’une jeune fille dont il devint amoureux.
Elle allait à son magasin, tous les jours, à la même heure. C’était
une petite brunette, de ces brunes dont les yeux sont si noirs qu’ils
ont l’air de taches, et dont le teint a des reflets d’ivoire. Il la voyait
apparaître toujours au coin de la même rue; et elle se mettait à
courir pour rattraper la lourde voiture. Elle courait d’un petit air
pressé, souple et gracieux; et elle sautait sur le marchepied avant
que les chevaux fussent tout à fait arrêtés. Puis elle pénétrait dans
l’intérieur en soufflant un peu, et, s’étant assise, jetait un regard
autour d’elle.
La première fois qu’il la vit, François Tessier sentit que cette
figure-là lui plaisait infiniment. On rencontre parfois de ces femmes
qu’on a envie de serrer éperdument dans ses bras, tout de suite,
sans les connaître. Elle répondait, cette jeune fille, à ses désirs
intimes, à ses attentes secrètes, à cette sorte d’idéal d’amour qu’on
porte, sans le savoir, au fond du cœur.
Il la regardait obstinément, malgré lui. Gênée par cette
contemplation, elle rougit. Il s’en aperçut et voulut détourner les
yeux; mais il les ramenait à tout moment sur elle, quoiqu’il s’efforçât
de les fixer ailleurs.
Au bout de quelques jours, ils se connurent sans s’être parlé. Il
lui cédait sa place quand la voiture était pleine et montait sur
l’impériale, bien que cela le désolât. Elle le saluait maintenant d’un
petit sourire; et, quoiqu’elle baissât toujours les yeux sous son
regard qu’elle sentait trop vif, elle ne semblait plus fâchée d’être
contemplée ainsi.
Ils finirent par causer. Une sorte d’intimité rapide s’établit entre
eux, une intimité d’une demi-heure par jour. Et c’était là, certes, la
plus charmante demi-heure de sa vie à lui. Il pensait à elle tout le
reste du temps, la revoyait sans cesse pendant les longues séances
du bureau, hanté, possédé, envahi par cette image flottante et
tenace qu’un visage de femme aimée laisse en nous. Il lui semblait
que la possession entière de cette petite personne serait pour lui un
bonheur fou, presque au-dessus des réalisations humaines.
Chaque matin maintenant elle lui donnait une poignée de main,
et il gardait jusqu’au soir la sensation de ce contact, le souvenir dans
sa chair de la faible pression de ces petits doigts; il lui semblait qu’il
en avait conservé l’empreinte sur sa peau.
Il attendait anxieusement pendant tout le reste du temps ce
court voyage en omnibus. Et les dimanches lui semblaient navrants.
Elle aussi l’aimait, sans doute, car elle accepta, un samedi de
printemps, d’aller déjeuner avec lui, à Maisons-Laffitte, le lendemain.

Elle était la première à l’attendre à la gare. Il fut surpris; mais

elle lui dit:
—Avant de partir, j’ai à vous parler. Nous avons vingt minutes:
c’est plus qu’il ne faut.
Elle tremblait, appuyée à son bras, les yeux baissés et les joues
pâles. Elle reprit:
—Il ne faut pas que vous vous trompiez sur moi. Je suis une
honnête fille, et je n’irai là-bas avec vous que si vous me promettez,
si vous me jurez de ne rien... de ne rien faire... qui soit... qui ne soit
pas... convenable...
 Elle était devenue soudain plus rouge qu’un coquelicot. Elle se
tut. Il ne savait que répondre, heureux et désappointé en même
temps. Au fond du cœur, il préférait peut-être que ce fût ainsi; et
pourtant... pourtant il s’était laissé bercer, cette nuit, par des rêves
qui lui avaient mis le feu dans les veines. Il l’aimerait moins
assurément s’il la savait de conduite légère; mais alors ce serait si
charmant, si délicieux pour lui! Et tous les calculs égoïstes des
hommes en matière d’amour lui travaillaient l’esprit.
Comme il ne disait rien, elle se remit à parler d’une voix émue,
avec des larmes au coin des paupières:
—Si vous ne me promettez pas de me respecter tout à fait, je
m’en retourne à la maison.
Il lui serra le bras tendrement et répondit:
—Je vous le promets; vous ne ferez que ce que vous voudrez.
Elle parut soulagée et demanda en souriant:
—C’est bien vrai, ça?
Il la regarda au fond des yeux.
—Je vous le jure!
—Prenons les billets, dit-elle.
Ils ne purent guère parler en route, le wagon étant au complet.
Arrivés à Maisons-Laffitte, ils se dirigèrent vers la Seine.
L’air tiède amollissait la chair et l’âme. Le soleil tombant en plein
sur le fleuve, sur les feuilles et les gazons, jetait mille reflets de
gaieté dans les corps et dans les esprits. Ils allaient, la main dans la
main, le long de la berge, en regardant les petits poissons qui
glissaient, par troupes, entre deux eaux. Ils allaient, inondés de
bonheur, comme soulevés de terre dans une félicité éperdue.
 Elle dit enfin:
—Comme vous devez me trouver folle.
Il demanda:
—Pourquoi ça?
Elle reprit:
—N’est-ce pas une folie de venir comme ça toute seule avec
vous?
—Mais non! c’est bien naturel.
—Non! non! ce n’est pas naturel—pour moi,—parce que je ne
veux pas fauter,—et c’est comme ça qu’on faute, cependant. Mais si
vous saviez! c’est si triste, tous les jours la même chose, tous les
jours du mois et tous les mois de l’année. Je suis toute seule avec
maman. Et comme elle a eu bien des chagrins, elle n’est pas gaie.
Moi, je fais comme je peux. Je tâche de rire quand même; mais je
ne réussis pas toujours. C’est égal, c’est mal d’être venue. Vous ne
m’en voudrez pas, au moins.
Pour répondre, il l’embrassa vivement dans l’oreille. Mais elle se
sépara de lui, d’un mouvement brusque; et, fâchée soudain:
—Oh! monsieur François! après ce que vous m’avez juré.
Et ils revinrent vers Maisons-Laffitte.
Ils déjeunèrent au Petit-Havre, maison basse, ensevelie sous
quatre peupliers énormes, au bord de l’eau.
Le grand air, la chaleur, le petit vin blanc et le trouble de se sentir
l’un près de l’autre les rendaient rouges, oppressés et silencieux.
Mais après le café une joie brusque les envahit, et, ayant traversé
la Seine, ils repartirent le long de la rive, vers le village de La Frette.
Tout à coup il demanda:
 —Comment vous appelez-vous?
—Louise.
Il répéta: Louise; et il ne dit plus rien.
La rivière, décrivant une longue courbe, allait baigner au loin une
rangée de maisons blanches qui se miraient dans l’eau, la tête en
bas. La jeune fille cueillait des marguerites, faisait une grosse gerbe
champêtre, et lui, il chantait à pleine bouche, gris comme un jeune
cheval qu’on vient de mettre à l’herbe.
A leur gauche, un coteau planté de vignes suivait la rivière. Mais
François soudain s’arrêta et demeurant immobile d’étonnement:
—Oh! regardez, dit-il.
Les vignes avaient cessé, et toute la côte maintenant était
couverte de lilas en fleurs. C’était un bois violet! une sorte de grand
tapis étendu sur la terre, allant jusqu’au village, là-bas, à deux ou
trois kilomètres.
Elle restait aussi saisie, émue. Elle murmura:
—Oh! que c’est joli!
Et, traversant un champ, ils allèrent, en courant, vers cette
étrange colline, qui fournit, chaque année, tous les lilas traînés à
travers Paris, dans les petites voitures des marchandes ambulantes.
Un étroit sentier se perdait sous les arbustes. Ils le prirent et,
ayant rencontré une petite clairière, ils s’assirent.
Des légions de mouches bourdonnaient au-dessus d’eux, jetaient
dans l’air un ronflement doux et continu. Et le soleil, le grand soleil
d’un jour sans brise, s’abattait sur le long coteau épanoui, faisait
sortir de ce bois de bouquets un arôme puissant, un immense
souffle de parfums, cette sueur des fleurs.
Une cloche d’église sonnait au loin.
 Et, tout doucement, ils s’embrassèrent, puis s’étreignirent,
étendus sur l’herbe, sans conscience de rien que de leur baiser. Elle
avait fermé les yeux et le tenait à pleins bras, le serrant éperdument,
sans une pensée, la raison perdue, engourdie de la tête aux pieds
dans une attente passionnée. Et elle se donna tout entière, sans
savoir ce qu’elle faisait, sans comprendre même qu’elle s’était livrée
à lui.
Elle se réveilla dans l’affolement des grands malheurs et elle se
mit à pleurer, gémissant de douleur, la figure cachée sous ses mains.
Il essayait de la consoler. Mais elle voulut repartir, revenir, rentrer
tout de suite. Elle répétait sans cesse, en marchant à grands pas:
—Mon Dieu! mon Dieu!
Il lui disait:
—Louise! Louise! restons, je vous en prie.
Elle avait maintenant les pommettes rouges et les yeux caves.
Dès qu’ils furent dans la gare de Paris, elle le quitta sans même lui
dire adieu.

Quand il la rencontra, le lendemain, dans l’omnibus, elle lui parut

changée, amaigrie. Elle lui dit:
—Il faut que je vous parle; nous allons descendre au boulevard.
Dès qu’ils furent seuls sur le trottoir:
—Il faut nous dire adieu, dit-elle. Je ne peux pas vous revoir
après ce qui s’est passé.
Il balbutia:
—Mais, pourquoi?
—Parce que je ne peux pas. J’ai été coupable. Je ne le serai plus.
 Alors il l’implora, la supplia, torturé de désirs, affolé du besoin de
l’avoir tout entière, dans l’abandon absolu des nuits d’amour.
Elle répondait obstinément:
—Non, je ne peux pas. Non, je ne peux pas.
Mais il s’animait, s’excitait davantage. Il promit de l’épouser. Elle
dit encore:
—Non.
Et le quitta.
Pendant huit jours, il ne la vit pas. Il ne la put rencontrer, et,
comme il ne savait point son adresse, il la croyait perdue pour
toujours.
Le neuvième, au soir, on sonna chez lui. Il alla ouvrir. C’était elle.
Elle se jeta dans ses bras, et ne résista plus.
Pendant trois mois elle fut sa maîtresse. Il commençait à se
lasser d’elle, quand elle lui apprit qu’elle était grosse. Alors, il n’eut
plus qu’une idée en tête: rompre à tout prix.
Comme il n’y pouvait parvenir, ne sachant s’y prendre, ne
sachant que dire, affolé d’inquiétudes, avec la peur de cet enfant qui
grandissait, il prit un parti suprême. Il déménagea, une nuit, et
disparut.
Le coup fut si rude qu’elle ne chercha pas celui qui l’avait ainsi
abandonnée. Elle se jeta aux genoux de sa mère en lui confessant
son malheur; et, quelques mois plus tard, elle accoucha d’un garçon.

Des années s’écoulèrent. François Tessier vieillissait sans

qu’aucun changement se fît en sa vie. Il menait l’existence
monotone et morne des bureaucrates, sans espoirs et sans attentes.
Chaque jour, il se levait à la même heure, suivait les mêmes rues,
passait par la même porte devant le même concierge, entrait dans le
même bureau, s’asseyait sur le même siège, et accomplissait la
même besogne. Il était seul au monde, seul, le jour, au milieu de ses
collègues indifférents, seul, la nuit, dans son logement de garçon. Il
économisait cent francs par mois pour la vieillesse.
Chaque dimanche, il faisait un tour aux Champs-Élysées, afin de
regarder passer le monde élégant, les équipages et les jolies
femmes.
Il disait le lendemain, à son compagnon de peine:
—Le retour du bois était fort brillant, hier.
Or, un dimanche, par hasard, ayant suivi des rues nouvelles, il
entra au parc Monceau. C’était par un clair matin d’été.
Les bonnes et les mamans, assises le long des allées, regardaient
les enfants jouer devant elles.
Mais soudain François Tessier frissonna. Une femme passait,
tenant par la main deux enfants: un petit garçon d’environ dix ans,
et une petite fille de quatre ans. C’était elle.
Il fit encore une centaine de pas, puis s’affaissa sur une chaise,
suffoqué par l’émotion. Elle ne l’avait pas reconnu. Alors il revint,
cherchant à la voir encore. Elle s’était assise, maintenant. Le garçon
demeurait très sage, à son côté, tandis que la fillette faisait des
pâtés de terre. C’était elle, c’était bien elle. Elle avait un air sérieux
de dame, une toilette simple, une allure assurée et digne.
Il la regardait de loin, n’osant pas approcher. Le petit garçon leva
la tête. François Tessier se sentit trembler. C’était son fils, sans
doute. Et il le considéra, et il crut se reconnaître lui-même tel qu’il
était sur une photographie faite autrefois.
Et il demeura caché derrière un arbre, attendant qu’elle s’en allât,
pour la suivre.
 Il n’en dormit pas la nuit suivante. L’idée de l’enfant surtout le
harcelait. Son fils! Oh! s’il avait pu savoir, être sûr? Mais qu’aurait-il
fait?
Il avait vu sa maison; il s’informa. Il apprit qu’elle avait été
épousée par un voisin, un honnête homme de mœurs graves, touché
par sa détresse. Cet homme, sachant la faute et la pardonnant, avait
même reconnu l’enfant, son enfant à lui, François Tessier.
Il revint au parc Monceau chaque dimanche. Chaque dimanche il
la voyait, et chaque fois une envie folle, irrésistible, l’envahissait, de
prendre son fils dans ses bras, de le couvrir de baisers, de
l’emporter, de le voler.
Il souffrait affreusement dans son isolement misérable de vieux
garçon sans affections; il souffrait une torture atroce, déchiré par
une tendresse paternelle faite de remords, d’envie, de jalousie, et de
ce besoin d’aimer ses petits que la nature a mis aux entrailles des
êtres.
Il voulut enfin faire une tentative désespérée, et, s’approchant
d’elle, un jour, comme elle entrait au parc, il lui dit, planté au milieu
du chemin, livide, les lèvres secouées de frissons:
—Vous ne me reconnaissez pas?
Elle leva les yeux, le regarda, poussa un cri d’effroi, un cri
d’horreur, et, saisissant par les mains ses deux enfants, elle s’enfuit,
en les traînant derrière elle.
Il rentra chez lui pour pleurer.
Des mois encore passèrent. Il ne la voyait plus. Mais il souffrait
jour et nuit, rongé, dévoré par sa tendresse de père.
Pour embrasser son fils, il serait mort, il aurait tué, il aurait
accompli toutes les besognes, bravé tous les dangers, tenté toutes
les audaces.
 Il lui écrivit à elle. Elle ne répondit pas. Après vingt lettres, il
comprit qu’il ne devait point espérer la fléchir. Alors il prit une
résolution désespérée, et prêt à recevoir dans le cœur une balle de
revolver s’il le fallait, il adressa à son mari un billet de quelques
mots:

«Monsieur,
«Mon nom doit être pour vous un sujet d’horreur. Mais je
suis si misérable, si torturé par le chagrin, que je n’ai plus
d’espoir qu’en vous.
«Je viens vous demander seulement un entretien de dix
minutes.
«J’ai l’honneur, etc.»

Il reçut le lendemain la réponse:

«Monsieur,
«Je vous attends mardi à cinq heures.»

En gravissant l’escalier, François Tessier s’arrêtait de marche en

marche, tant son cœur battait. C’était dans sa poitrine un bruit
précipité, comme un galop de bête, un bruit sourd et violent. Et il ne
respirait plus qu’avec effort, tenant la rampe pour ne pas tomber.
Au troisième étage, il sonna. Une bonne vint ouvrir. Il demanda:
—Monsieur Flamel.
—C’est ici, monsieur. Entrez.
Et il pénétra dans un salon bourgeois. Il était seul, il attendit
éperdu, comme au milieu d’une catastrophe.
Une porte s’ouvrit. Un homme parut. Il était grand, grave, un peu
gros, en redingote noire. Il montra un siège de la main.
 François Tessier s’assit, puis, d’une voix haletante:
—Monsieur... monsieur... je ne sais pas si vous connaissez mon
nom... si vous savez...
M. Flamel l’interrompit:
—C’est inutile, monsieur, je sais. Ma femme m’a parlé de vous.
Il avait le ton digne d’un homme bon qui veut être sévère, et une
majesté bourgeoise d’honnête homme.
François Tessier reprit:
—Eh bien, monsieur, voilà. Je meurs de chagrin, de remords, de
honte. Et je voudrais une fois, rien qu’une fois, embrasser...
l’enfant...
M. Flamel se leva, s’approcha de la cheminée, sonna. La bonne
parut. Il dit:
—Allez me chercher Louis.
Elle sortit. Ils restèrent face à face, muets, n’ayant plus rien à se
dire, attendant.
Et, tout à coup, un petit garçon de dix ans se précipita dans le
salon, et courut à celui qu’il croyait son père. Mais il s’arrêta, confus,
en apercevant un étranger.
M. Flamel le baisa sur le front, puis lui dit:
—Maintenant, embrasse monsieur, mon chéri.
Et l’enfant s’en vint gentiment, en regardant cet inconnu.
François Tessier s’était levé. Il laissa tomber son chapeau, prêt à
choir lui-même. Et il contemplait son fils.
M. Flamel, par délicatesse, s’était détourné et il regardait par la
fenêtre, dans la rue.
 L’enfant attendait, tout surpris. Il ramassa le chapeau et le remit
à l’étranger. Alors François, saisissant le petit dans ses bras, se mit à
l’embrasser follement à travers tout son visage, sur les yeux, sur les
joues, sur la bouche, sur les cheveux.
Le gamin, effaré par cette grêle de baisers, cherchait à les éviter,
détournait la tête, écartait de ses petites mains les lèvres goulues de
cet homme.
Mais François Tessier, brusquement, le remit à terre. Il cria:
—Adieu! adieu!
Et il s’enfuit comme un voleur.

Le Père a paru dans le Gil-Blas du mardi 20

novembre 1883, sous la signature: Maufrigneuse.
 L’AVEU.

L
E soleil de midi tombe en large pluie sur les champs. Ils
s’étendent, onduleux, entre les bouquets d’arbres des fermes,
et les récoltes diverses, les seigles mûrs et les blés jaunissants,
les avoines d’un vert clair, les trèfles d’un vert sombre, étalent un
grand manteau rayé, remuant et doux sur le ventre nu de la terre.
Là-bas, au sommet d’une ondulation, en rangée comme des
soldats, une interminable ligne de vaches, les unes couchées, les
autres debout, clignant leurs gros yeux sous l’ardente lumière,
ruminent et pâturent un trèfle aussi vaste qu’un lac.
Et deux femmes, la mère et la fille, vont, d’une allure balancée
l’une devant l’autre, par un étroit sentier creusé dans les récoltes,
vers ce régiment de bêtes.
Elles portent chacune deux seaux de zinc maintenus loin du corps
par un cerceau de barrique; et le métal, à chaque pas qu’elles font,
jette une flamme éblouissante et blanche sous le soleil qui le frappe.
Elles ne parlent point. Elles vont traire les vaches. Elles arrivent,
posent à terre un seau, et s’approchent des deux premières bêtes,
qu’elles font lever d’un coup de sabot dans les côtes. L’animal se
dresse, lentement, d’abord sur ses jambes de devant, puis soulève
avec plus de peine sa large croupe, qui semble alourdie par l’énorme
mamelle de chair blonde et pendante.
Et les deux Malivoire, mère et fille, à genoux sous le ventre de la
vache, tirent par un vif mouvement des mains sur le pis gonflé, qui
jette, à chaque pression, un mince fil de lait dans le seau. La mousse
un peu jaune monte aux bords et les femmes vont de bête en bête
jusqu’au bout de la longue file.
Dès qu’elles ont fini d’en traire une, elles la déplacent, lui
donnant à pâturer un bout de verdure intacte.
Puis elles repartent, plus lentement, alourdies par la charge du
lait, la mère devant, la fille derrière.
Mais celle-ci brusquement s’arrête, pose son fardeau, s’assied et
se met à pleurer.
La mère Malivoire, n’entendant plus marcher, se retourne et
demeure stupéfaite.
—Qué qu’ tas, dit-elle?
Et la fille, Céleste, une grande rousse aux cheveux brûlés, aux
joues brûlées, tachées de son comme si des gouttes de feu lui
étaient tombées sur le visage, un jour qu’elle peinait au soleil,
murmura en geignant doucement comme font les enfants battus:
—Je n’ peux pu porter mon lait!
La mère la regardait d’un air soupçonneux. Elle répéta:
—Qué qu’ tas?
Céleste reprit, écroulée par terre entre ses deux seaux, et se
cachant les yeux avec son tablier:
—Ça me tire trop. Je ne peux pas.
La mère, pour la troisième fois, reprit:
—Qué que t’as donc?
Et la fille gémit:
—Je crois ben que me v’la grosse.
Et elle sanglota.
 La vieille à son tour posa son fardeau, tellement interdite qu’elle
ne trouvait rien. Enfin elle balbutia:
—Te... te... te v’la grosse, manante, c’est-il ben possible?
C’étaient de riches fermiers, les Malivoire, des gens cossus,
posés, respectés, malins et puissants.
Céleste bégaya:
—J’ crais ben que oui, tout de même.
La mère effarée regardait sa fille abattue devant elle et
larmoyant. Au bout de quelques secondes elle cria:
—Te v’la grosse! Te v’la grosse! Ou qu’ t’as attrapé ça, roulure?
Et Céleste, toute secouée par l’émotion, murmura:
—J’ crais ben que c’est dans la voiture à Polyte.
La vieille cherchait à comprendre, cherchait à deviner, cherchait à
savoir qui avait pu faire ce malheur à sa fille. Si c’était un gars bien
riche et bien vu, on verrait à s’arranger. Il n’y aurait encore que
demi-mal; Céleste n’était pas la première à qui pareille chose
arrivait; mais ça la contrariait tout de même, vu les propos et leur
position.
Elle reprit:
—Et qué que c’est qui t’a fait ça, salope?
Et Céleste, résolue à tout dire, balbutia:
—J’ crais ben qu’ c’est Polyte.
Alors la mère Malivoire, affolée de colère, se rua sur sa fille et se
mit à la battre avec une telle frénésie qu’elle en perdit son bonnet.
Elle tapait à grands coups de poing sur la tête, sur le dos,
partout; et Céleste, tout à fait allongée entre les deux seaux, qui la
protégeaient un peu, cachait seulement sa figure entre ses mains.
Toutes les vaches, surprises, avaient cessé de pâturer, et, s’étant
retournées, regardaient de leurs gros yeux. La dernière meugla, le
mufle tendu vers les femmes.
Après avoir tapé jusqu’à perdre haleine, la mère Malivoire,
essoufflée, s’arrêta; et reprenant un peu ses esprits, elle voulut se
rendre tout à fait compte de la situation:
—Polyte! Si c’est Dieu possible! Comment que t’as pu, avec un
cocher de diligence. T’avais ti perdu les sens. Faut qu’i t’ait jeté un
sort, pour sûr, un propre à rien?
Et Céleste, toujours allongée, murmura dans la poussière:
—J’y payais point la voiture!
Et la vieille normande comprit.

Toutes les semaines, le mercredi et le samedi, Céleste allait

porter au bourg les produits de la ferme, la volaille, la crème et les
œufs.
Elle partait dès sept heures avec ses deux vastes paniers aux
bras, le laitage dans l’un, les poulets dans l’autre; et elle allait
attendre sur la grand’route la voiture de poste d’Yvetot.
Elle posait à terre ses marchandises et s’asseyait dans le fossé,
tandis que les poules au bec court et pointu, et les canards au bec
large et plat, passant la tête à travers les barreaux d’osier,
regardaient de leur œil rond, stupide et surpris.
Bientôt la guimbarde, sorte de coffre jaune coiffé d’une casquette
de cuir noir, arrivait, secouant son cul au trot saccadé d’une rosse
blanche.
Et Polyte le cocher, un gros garçon réjoui, ventru bien que jeune,
et tellement cuit par le soleil, brûlé par le vent, trempé par les
averses, et teinté par l’eau-de-vie qu’il avait la face et le cou couleur
de brique, criait de loin en faisant claquer son fouet:
—Bonjour Mam’zelle Céleste. La santé ça va-t-il?
Elle lui tendait, l’un après l’autre, ses paniers qu’il casait sur
l’impériale; puis elle montait en levant haut la jambe pour atteindre
le marche-pied, en montrant un fort mollet vêtu d’un bas bleu.
Et chaque fois Polyte répétait la même plaisanterie: «Mazette, il
n’a pas maigri.»
Et elle riait, trouvant ça drôle.
Puis il lançait un «Hue cocotte», qui remettait en route son
maigre cheval. Alors Céleste, atteignant son porte-monnaie dans le
fond de sa poche, en tirait lentement dix sous, six sous pour elle et
quatre pour les paniers, et les passait à Polyte par-dessus l’épaule. Il
les prenait en disant:
—C’est pas encore pour aujourd’hui, la rigolade?
Et il riait de tout son cœur en se retournant vers elle pour la
regarder à son aise.
Il lui en coûtait beaucoup, à elle, de donner chaque fois ce demi-
franc pour trois kilomètres de route. Et quand elle n’avait pas de
sous elle en souffrait davantage encore, ne pouvant se décider à
allonger une pièce d’argent.
Et un jour, au moment de payer, elle demanda:
—Pour une bonne pratique comme mé, vous devriez bien ne
prendre que six sous?
Il se mit à rire:
—Six sous, ma belle, vous valez mieux que ça, pour sûr.
Elle insistait:
 —Ça vous fait pas moins deux francs par mois.
Il cria en tapant sur sa rosse:
—T’nez, j’ suis coulant, j’ vous passerai ça pour une rigolade.
Elle demanda d’un air niais:
—Qué que c’est que vous dites?
Il s’amusait tellement qu’il toussait à force de rire.
—Une rigolade, c’est une rigolade, pardi, une rigolade fille et
garçon, en avant deux sans musique.
Elle comprit, rougit, et déclara:
—Je n’ suis pas de ce jeu-là, m’sieu Polyte.
Mais il ne s’intimida pas, et il répétait, s’amusant de plus en plus:
—Vous y viendrez, la belle, une rigolade fille et garçon!
Et depuis lors, chaque fois qu’elle le payait il avait pris l’usage de
demander:
—C’est pas encore pour aujourd’hui, la rigolade?
Elle plaisantait aussi là-dessus, maintenant, et elle répondait:
—Pas pour aujourd’hui, m’sieu Polyte, mais c’est pour samedi,
pour sûr alors!
Et il criait en riant toujours:
—Entendu pour samedi, ma belle.
Mais elle calculait en dedans que depuis deux ans que durait la
chose, elle avait bien payé quarante-huit francs à Polyte, et
quarante-huit francs à la campagne ne se trouvent pas dans une
ornière; et elle calculait aussi que dans deux années encore, elle
aurait payé près de cent francs.
 Si bien qu’un jour, un jour de printemps qu’ils étaient seuls,
comme il demandait selon sa coutume:
—C’est pas encore pour aujourd’hui, la rigolade?
Elle répondit:
—A vot’ désir m’sieu Polyte.
Il ne s’étonna pas du tout et enjamba la banquette de derrière en
murmurant d’un air content:
—Et allons donc. J’ savais ben qu’on y viendrait.
Et le vieux cheval blanc se mit à trottiner d’un train si doux qu’il
semblait danser sur place, sourd à la voix qui criait parfois du fond
de la voiture: «Hue donc, Cocotte. Hue donc, Cocotte.»
Trois mois plus tard Céleste s’aperçut qu’elle était grosse.

Elle avait dit tout cela d’une voix larmoyante, à sa mère. Et la

vieille, pâle de fureur, demanda:
—Combien que ça y a coûté, alors?
Céleste répondit:
—Quat’ mois, ça fait huit francs, pour sûr.
Alors la rage de la campagnarde se déchaîna éperdument, et
retombant sur sa fille elle la rebattit jusqu’à perdre le souffle. Puis,
s’étant relevée:
—Y as-tu dit, que t’étais grosse?
—Mais non, pour sûr.
—Pourqué que tu y as point dit?
—Parce qu’i m’aurait fait r’payer p’têtre ben!
 Et la vieille songea, puis, reprenant ses seaux:
—Allons, lève-té, et tâche à v’nir.
Puis, après un silence, elle reprit:
—Et pis n’ li dis rien tant qu’i n’ verra point; que j’y gagnions ben
six ou huit mois!
Et Céleste, s’étant redressée, pleurant encore, décoiffée et
bouffie, se remit en marche d’un pas lourd, en murmurant:
—Pour sûr que j’y dirai point.

L’Aveu a paru dans le Gil-Blas du mardi 22 juillet

1884.
 LA PARURE.

C
’ÉTAIT une de ces jolies et charmantes filles, nées, comme par
une erreur du destin, dans une famille d’employés. Elle n’avait
pas de dot, pas d’espérances, aucun moyen d’être connue,
comprise, aimée, épousée par un homme riche et distingué; et elle
se laissa marier avec un petit commis du Ministère de l’instruction
publique.
Elle fut simple ne pouvant être parée, mais malheureuse comme
une déclassée; car les femmes n’ont point de caste ni de race, leur
beauté, leur grâce et leur charme leur servant de naissance et de
famille. Leur finesse native, leur instinct d’élégance, leur souplesse
d’esprit, sont leur seule hiérarchie, et font des filles du peuple les
égales des plus grandes dames.
Elle souffrait sans cesse, se sentant née pour toutes les
délicatesses et tous les luxes. Elle souffrait de la pauvreté de son
logement, de la misère des murs, de l’usure des sièges, de la laideur
des étoffes. Toutes ces choses, dont une autre femme de sa caste
ne se serait même pas aperçue, la torturaient et l’indignaient. La vue
de la petite Bretonne qui faisait son humble ménage éveillait en elle
des regrets désolés et des rêves éperdus. Elle songeait aux
antichambres muettes, capitonnées avec des tentures orientales,
éclairées par de hautes torchères de bronze, et aux deux grands
valets en culotte courte qui dorment dans les larges fauteuils,
assoupis par la chaleur lourde du calorifère. Elle songeait aux grands
salons vêtus de soie ancienne, aux meubles fins portant des bibelots
inestimables, et aux petits salons coquets parfumés, faits pour la
causerie de cinq heures avec les amis les plus intimes, les hommes
connus et recherchés dont toutes les femmes envient et désirent
l’attention.
Quand elle s’asseyait, pour dîner, devant la table ronde couverte
d’une nappe de trois jours, en face de son mari qui découvrait la
soupière en déclarant d’un air enchanté: «Ah! le bon pot-au-feu! je
ne sais rien de meilleur que cela...» elle songeait aux dîners fins, aux
argenteries reluisantes, aux tapisseries peuplant les murailles de
personnages anciens et d’oiseaux étranges au milieu d’une forêt de
féerie; elle songeait aux plats exquis servis en des vaisselles
merveilleuses, aux galanteries chuchotées et écoutées avec un
sourire de sphinx, tout en mangeant la chair rose d’une truite ou des
ailes de gélinotte.
Elle n’avait pas de toilettes, pas de bijoux, rien. Et elle n’aimait
que cela; elle se sentait faite pour cela. Elle eût tant désiré plaire,
être enviée, être séduisante et recherchée.
Elle avait une amie riche, une camarade de couvent qu’elle ne
voulait plus aller voir, tant elle souffrait en revenant. Et elle pleurait
pendant des jours entiers, de chagrin, de regret, de désespoir et de
détresse.

Or, un soir, son mari rentra, l’air glorieux, et tenant à la main une
large enveloppe.
—Tiens, dit-il, voici quelque chose pour toi.
Elle déchira vivement le papier et en tira une carte imprimée qui
portait ces mots:

«Le Ministre de l’instruction publique et Mme Georges

Ramponneau prient M. et Mme Loisel de leur faire l’honneur
de venir passer la soirée à l’hôtel du Ministère, le lundi 18
janvier.»
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