Source:

South African Law Reports, The (1947 to date)/CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF CASES – January 1947 to February 2020/1994/Volume 1: 1 ­ 332 (January)/STEYN v
LSA MOTORS LTD 1994 (1) SA 49 (A)

URL:
http://jutastat.juta.co.za/nxt/gateway.dll/salr/3/7451/7452/7456?f=templates$fn=default.htm

STEYN v LSA MOTORS LTD 1994 (1) SA 49 (A) A

1994 (1) SA p49

Citation 1994 (1) SA 49 (A)

Case No 207/92 B

Court Appellate Division

Judge Botha JA, HEFER JA, VIVIER JA, EKSTEEN JA and KRIEGLER AJA

Heard September 3, 1993

Judgment September 30, 1993

Annotations Link to Case Annotations

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde
Contract ­ Formation of ­ Offer and acceptance ­ Amateur golfer participating in pro­am tournament ­ Car valued at R50 000 on offer to golfer
scoring hole­in­one on 17th hole ­ Offer having been restricted to professional golfers ­ On display at 17th hole was car and advertising C board
proclaiming that car 'hole­in­one prize sponsored by (respondent)' ­ No mention made on board of fact that prize restricted to professional golfers ­
Appellant having hit hole­in­one on 17th hole and claimed prize ­ Crucial whether reasonable man in position of appellant would have considered
words on board to be offer open to him to accept ­ Appellant experienced amateur golfer and aware that as amateur he could not be D awarded
prize of more than a few hundred rand ­ Action dismissed for lack of consensus ­ Appellant not reasonable in assuming that advertising board
constituted offer to amateur golfers.
Contract ­ Formation of ­ Offer and acceptance ­ Where offeror's true intention differing from expressed intention, outward appearance of E
agreement flowing from offeree's acceptance not in itself or necessarily resulting in contractual liability ­ Also not per se decisive that offeree
accepted offer in reliance upon offeror's implicit representation that offer correctly reflected his intention ­ Crucial question being whether F
reasonable man in position of offeree would have accepted offer in belief that it represented true intention of offeror.
Headnote : Kopnota
In September 1989 the appellant, an amateur golfer with a low handicap, had taken part in a 'pro­am' golf tournament (ie one open to both
professional and amateur players) and had hit a hole­in­one at the 17th hole. Next to the 17th green there had been on display a motor car and
an G advertising board proclaiming 'Hole­in­one prize sponsored by (the respondent)'. The appellant had been alerted to the possibility of
winning the prize, he claimed, by a newspaper report which had not stated that the prize was available only to professional golfers. The car had
been made available on behalf of the respondent company by S, one of its directors, who was also the vice­chairman of the club at which the
tournament had been held. When the appellant subsequently claimed the car, the respondent refused to deliver on the ground that only
professional players qualified H for the prize. The appellant's action in a Provincial Division for the delivery of the car or payment of its value
(R50 000) was dismissed. The appellant's case was that the board at the 17th green had been an offer by the respondent of the motor car as a
prize for a hole­in­one; that the offer had been addressed to all players in the competition; that any player could have accepted the offer by
scoring a hole­in­one; that by doing so the appellant had accepted the offer; and that a binding contract I had thus been brought into being.
The respondent's defence was that the board had not been an offer, but a statement advertising an offer previously made; that that offer had
been limited to professional golfers only; that the appellant, an amateur, had not been entitled to accept it; and that consequently there had
been no contract. It was common cause that in terms of the rules governing amateur status in golf, amateurs could not be awarded prizes
worth more than about R600. The appellant in his evidence acknowledged that he was aware of the rules relating to his J amateur status and
that he could not have

1994 (1) SA p50

A claimed the car without forfeiting such status, and claimed that he was prepared to do so for the sake of getting the car.
Held, that it was implicit in the appellant's evidence that he had regarded the board as an offer by the respondent to all players taking part in
the competition, including himself, while it was at the same time clear that the respondent, through S, had had no intention of making an offer
to the appellant. (At 60D, 60I/J.)
Held, further, that, although it was thus clear that there had been no B consensus, it was the whole thrust of the appellant's argument to brush
this plain truth aside by fastening onto the wording of the advertising board at the 17th hole. (At 60J­61A.)
Held, further, that this argument was fundamentally fallacious inasmuch as it treated S's subjective intention as irrelevant and postulated the
outward manifestation of his intention as the sole and conclusive touchstone of the respondent's contractual liability; and this was contrary to
legal principle: where it was shown that the offeror's true intention differed from his expressed intention, the outward appearance of C
agreement flowing from the offeree's acceptance of the offer as it stood did not in itself or necessarily result in contractual liability. (At 61B/C­
D.)
Held, further, that it was also not in itself decisive that the offeree had accepted the offer in reliance upon the offeror's implicit representation
that the offer correctly reflected his intention. (At 61D.)
Held, further, that the crucial question was whether a reasonable man in D the position of the offeree would have accepted the offer in the
belief that it represented the true intention of the offeror, or in the context of the present case, whether the appellant would have considered
the words on the board to be an offer which it had been open to him to accept. (At 61D/E, 62D.)
Held, further, that in order to answer this question it was necessary to examine the appellant's conduct and test it against the objective
criterion of reasonableness. (At 62E/F.)
Held, further, that the appellant had had no reasonable ground for believing on the basis of the newspaper report which he had read that he E
also qualified for the prize: the report, not having emanated from the respondent, had been no representation by it as to its intention; and,
furthermore, the report had not stated that the ordinary prize money offered by the sponsors was for professional golfers only, which was
something the appellant acknowledged he had known full well, so that it could not reasonably have caused him to think that the hole­in­one
prize stood on a different footing. (At 62F, H­J.)
Held, further, that the appellant, having made no further effort to find F out what his position was, had still had no reasonable ground for
believing that he qualified for the prize when he had set off on his first round on the day of the tournament. (At 62J­63A.)
Held, further, that the appellant's state of mind when he had subsequently seen the message on the advertising board at the 17th hole had to
be tested against the background of his status as a competitive amateur golfer: he had been aware of the provisions of the rules of the game
relating to amateur status and that he as amateur was not entitled to a prize worth more than a few hundred rand. (At 63E­F.) G
Held, further, that there was, in view of the facts of the case, no doubt that it had been manifestly unreasonable for the appellant to have
concluded, from the mere fact that the wording on the board had not expressly limited the prize to be won to professional golfers, that it had
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Held, further, as to the appellant's avowed preparedness to sacrifice his amateur status for the sake of winning the prize, that the point here
 Held, further, that the appellant's state of mind when he had subsequently seen the message on the advertising board at the 17th hole had to
be tested against the background of his status as a competitive amateur golfer: he had been aware of the provisions of the rules of the game
relating to amateur status and that he as amateur was not entitled to a prize worth more than a few hundred rand. (At 63E­F.) G
Held, further, that there was, in view of the facts of the case, no doubt that it had been manifestly unreasonable for the appellant to have
concluded, from the mere fact that the wording on the board had not expressly limited the prize to be won to professional golfers, that it had
been an offer addressed to amateur players as well. (At 64C.)
Held, further, as to the appellant's avowed preparedness to sacrifice his amateur status for the sake of winning the prize, that the point here
was whether it was reasonable to believe that the respondent had intended to H create an opportunity for an amateur player to collect the
prize by forfeiting his amateur status. (At 64C/D, F.)
Held, further, that the appellant had had no reason to deduce from the wording of the board that the respondent had shared his preparedness
to brush aside the dichotomy between professional and amateur players which pervaded the golfing world. (At 64F­G.)
Held, accordingly, that a reasonable man in the position of the appellant would not have believed that the respondent had intended the board at
the 17th hole to constitute an offer open for acceptance by the appellant. (At I 64G.) Appeal dismissed.
The decision in the Cape Provincial Division in Steyn v LSA Motors Ltd confirmed.
Case Information
Appeal from a decision in the Cape Provincial Division (Scott J). The facts appear from the judgment of Botha JA.
J D A Lenhoff for the appellant: A survey of the authorities, both local

1994 (1) SA p51

A and from other jurisdictions, reveals that there is no consensus about the exact nature of an offer of reward or the manner in which it can
be accepted. See Corbin on Contracts vol I para 70 at 291. In footnote 6 at 291 it is stated that where a contestant has complied fully with
the conditions on which a prize was promised, an enforceable contract has been made, even though the contestant made no promise. See also
Williston on B Contracts 4th ed vol I para 4:12 at 356, 360; W W McBryde Contract at 60; 1989 Supplement to Corbin on Contracts para 64 at
135; Treitel The Law of Contract 7th ed at 10, 30. Most authors are of the opinion (correctly) that acceptance of offers in reward cases takes
place pari passu with performance. D W Greig and J L R Davis The Law of Contract at 281; Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract 10th ed at 63;
W H O Mueller Contracts C para 97 at 158; F R Davies Contracts 5th ed at 14. The fact that acceptance of offers of reward takes place pari
passu with performance is also part of the case law of several jurisdictions, including South Africa. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB
256 at 262; The Crown v Evan Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 227 at 233; Australian Woollen Mills (Pty) Ltd v The Commonwealth (1953­1954) 92 CLR
424 at 456. In the latter case the D notion that contracts such as those of reward should be described as 'unilateral' contracts was attacked
because it was held (at 456) that '. . . the term is open to criticism on the ground that it is unscientific and misleading. There must of necessity
be two parties to a contractual E obligation. The position in such cases is simply that the consideration on the part of the offeree is completely
executed by the doing of the very thing which constitutes acceptance of the offer.' See also The New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M
Satterthwaite & Co Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 1015 (PC). It is also part of our law that in, inter alia, offers of reward, acceptance is effected by
performance and need not be communicated to the mind of the F offeror. The rationale for this proposition appears to be that an offeror can
stipulate any method of acceptance and can expressly, or by necessary implication, dispense with the general requirement of ascertainment.
Bloom v The American Swiss Watch Company 1915 AD 100 at 105. See also R v Nel G 1921 AD 339 at 344; McKenzie v Farmers' Co­operative
Meat Industries Ltd 1922 AD 16 at 22; Wessels Law of Contract in South Africa 2nd ed vol I para 122 et seq.
The question which arises for consideration is whether a contractual relationship came into existence between appellant and respondent when
appellant became the first competitor to score a hole­in­one at the 17th hole on the day of the competition. When appellant scored the hole­
in­one H as he did, respondent became obliged to perform in terms of its offer and to deliver the vehicle to appellant, for the following reasons:
(1) Although the precise juridical nature of the reports which appeared in the press prior to the competition is not clear, they were the medium
used to convey respondent's offer to the world at large generally and, in I particular, to competitors who intended taking part in the
competition on the day in question. Apart from the article which appeared in the Tygerberger (which was not seen by appellant), the articles
published by the three major newspapers circulating in the Cape Peninsula all stated that the vehicle was available as a prize for a hole­in­one.
In none of these articles was respondent's offer qualified by the statement that the J vehicle could only be

1994 (1) SA p52

A won by professional golfers. (2) The banner which was erected at the 17th tee, whatever its wording may have been, also conveyed
respondent's offer, from which it was clear that whoever scored a hole­in­one was entitled to the prize of the vehicle. Even the wording
contended for by respondent B makes this clear. In any event, respondent's director, Mr E Smal, did not deem it necessary to qualify the
wording of the banner in any way. Therefore the learned Judge in the Court a quo was incorrect in holding that 'in all the circumstances the
inference that it (the banner) was intended to be merely an advertisement is overwhelming'. Surely if the banner had been intended as an
advertisement, it would have been placed at C the clubhouse in full view of everyone, not next to the green of the 17th tee. (3) In addition
(insofar as this may be necessary), by necessary implication the following must have been terms of the offer: (a) there being only one vehicle
next to the green, it could obviously only be won by the first person who managed to score a hole­in­one; (b) only lawful competitors taking
part in the competition on the day were eligible to win D the vehicle. Both these implied terms are in any event admitted by respondent in para
4 of its plea. (4) On the probabilities neither appellant nor any of his witnesses heard any announcements at the competition to the effect that
the vehicle could only be won by professional golfers. This was found as a fact by the learned trial Judge E in his judgment. (5) Appellant and
his witnesses regarded the prize of the vehicle as being on a completely different footing to the other prizes on offer at the competition. The
distinction drawn by appellant was a valid one, in that the vehicle was offered as a one­off prize for scoring a hole­in­one at one particular
hole, whereas the winners of the other prizes depended upon the overall scores after holes of golf had been F played. Consequently, the
learned trial Judge was incorrect in holding, as he did, that appellant '. . . by entering and proceeding to compete in the tournament signified his
acceptance of the offer of all the prizes for which he was eligible and to which he might become entitled. Those prizes, as I have already found,
did not include the motor car for a hole­in­one G at the 17th hole. That prize was open only to the professional players.' Therefore whatever
respondent's mental reservations (as evidenced by the insurance it effected prior to the competition and the Afrikaans press release) may have
been, the offer as communicated to appellant (and the world at large) was to the effect that the vehicle could be won as a prize by any of the
competitors taking part in the competition. H
'It seems to me that in order to arrive at a right conclusion we must read this advertisement in its plain meaning, as the public would understand it.'

Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (supra at 266). See also Efroiken v Simon 1921 CPD 367 at 370; Wasmuth v Jacobs 1987 (3) SA 629 (SWA) at
633D; Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 2nd ed at 41. I
As to whether defendant can escape liability on the grounds that in making the offer it lacked animus contrahendi: According to Christie (at
31), '(i)f the intention to be bound by mere acceptance is lacking, the offeror can be said to lack animus contrahendi. In this context the
phrase "lack of animus contrahendi" is appropriate to describe those cases in which J from the surrounding circumstances or the manner in
which the "offer" was

1994 (1) SA p53

A made, or both, it is clear to the Court and was or ought to have been clear to the offeree that the "offer" was not intended to be taken
seriously.' (My emphasis.) See also Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 4th ed at 33. From the aforegoing it is clear that respondent can
only escape liability if it was clear to appellant that respondent was not seriously offering the vehicle as a prize for a hole­in­one. Having
regard B to the fact that appellant (and his witnesses) were not, in any way, notified of the fact that the offer was only open to professionals,
there was no reason for appellant to suppose that respondent was not serious about its offer. In particular, the failure by respondent to make it
clear on the board at the 17th hole that the offer was only open to professionals, entitled appellant to assume that the offer was open to all C
the competitors in the competition. This certainly was the impression gained by appellant, his wife and the witnesses called on his behalf at
trial. The test appears to be an objective one. I Pieters & Co v Salomon 1911 AD 121 at 137, 138; South African Railways & Harbours v National
Bank of South Africa Ltd 1924 AD 704 at 715­6. See also Stirling and Others v Federated Insurance Co Ltd 1983 (1) SA 897 (W) at 910D; Usher
v A W S Louw D Elektriese Kontrakteurs 1979 (2) SA 1059 (O) at 1064C; Springvale Ltd v Edwards 1969 (1) SA 464 (RA) at 469B; Collen v
Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 (1) SA 413 (A) at 430. After referring to the decision of Wessels JA in the South African Railways & Harbours
case
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'If it were not so, it is difficult to see how commerce could proceed at all. All kinds of mental reservations, of careless unilateral mistakes, of unexpressed
 trial. The test appears to be an objective one. I Pieters & Co v Salomon 1911 AD 121 at 137, 138; South African Railways & Harbours v National
Bank of South Africa Ltd 1924 AD 704 at 715­6. See also Stirling and Others v Federated Insurance Co Ltd 1983 (1) SA 897 (W) at 910D; Usher
v A W S Louw D Elektriese Kontrakteurs 1979 (2) SA 1059 (O) at 1064C; Springvale Ltd v Edwards 1969 (1) SA 464 (RA) at 469B; Collen v
Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 (1) SA 413 (A) at 430. After referring to the decision of Wessels JA in the South African Railways & Harbours
case supra, Davis J, in the case of Irvin & Johnson (SA) Ltd v Kaplan 1940 CPD 647 at 651, E stated as follows:
'If it were not so, it is difficult to see how commerce could proceed at all. All kinds of mental reservations, of careless unilateral mistakes, of unexpressed
conditions and the like, would become relevant and no party to any contract would be safe; the door would be open wide to uncertainty and even to fraud. For
this reason, in the case of contracts, in the absence F of fraud of the other party, we are only concerned with the intention of the party as shown by his conduct,
by the words which he has used or to which he appears to have assented.'

Therefore whatever mental reservations or unexpressed conditions respondent may have had as regards his offer, these were never conveyed
to appellant and consequently respondent should be bound by its offer as G stated, ie that the first competitor (whether professional or
amateur) who scored a hole­in­one on the 17th hole on the day of the competition was entitled to claim the vehicle as a prize. Furthermore,
the learned trial Judge in the Court a quo was wrong in holding that '. . . the mere absence of some qualification with regard to who could win
the prize on the H signboard of that nature could hardly justify the inference that the prize was open to all'. Insofar as it may be necessary to
construe the wording of the offer, then the so­called golden rule of interpretation is to be applied, namely '. . . to ascertain from the language,
if it is possible to do so, not what either of the parties may have had in mind but what the language used in the contract means, ie the
expressed intention'. I Blaikie­Johnstone v Holliman 1971 (4) SA 108 (D) at 114C. See also Worman v Hughes and Others 1948 (3) SA 495 (A)
at 505; Van Pletsen v Henning 1913 AD 82 at 99; I Pieters & Co v Salomon (supra at 137); Lewis v Elske 1921 AD 36 at 45; Robb NO v Standard
Bank and Another 1979 (2) SA 420 (R) at 424B. Upon a proper construction, therefore, of the language used in the offer, notwithstanding any
mental reservations on respondent's part, it is J clear

1994 (1) SA p54

A that the offer was open to all competitors who took part in the competition, whether amateur or professional.
R S van Riet SC for the respondent: Die Hof a quo het bevind dat: (1) Verweerder se bedoeling met sy aanbod van die motor as prys was dat dit
beperk sou wees tot beroepspelers en dit is ook so aan die organiseerders B oorgedra. (2) Wat betref appellant se bewering in sy besonderhede
van eis dat die aanbod aan hom oorgedra is deur middel van persberigte, aankondigings op die dag van die toernooi, asook 'n advertensiebord
agter die 17de putjie (langs die betrokke motor) as volg: (a) dat die persberigte niks meer as blote berigte was wat deur verslaggewers geskryf
is op grond van inligting deur hulle vanaf 'n onvermelde bron verkry; (b) C dat die aankondigings wat die betrokke dag gemaak is, dit inderdaad
duidelik gemaak het dat die prys beperk was tot beroepspelers, maar dat appellant nie die aankondigings gehoor het nie; (c) dat die bewoording
van die advertensiebord as volg was: 'Hole­in­one prize sponsored by the Delta' en dat die bord met sy bewoording 'n blote advertensie, in D
teenstelling met 'n aanbod om te kontrakteer, was; (d) dat in elk geval, wat laasgenoemde aspek betref, gesien die feit dat voornemende spelers
(insluitend die appellant) bewus was daarvan dat daar pryse was waarvoor slegs beroepspelers sou kwalifiseer, die woorde op die
advertensiebord geen aanduiding bevat het dat die aanbod ook aan amateurs gemaak word nie. (3) In argument tydens die verhoor het
appellant slegs op die E advertensiebord agter die 17de putjie as synde 'n aanbod deur respondent gesteun. In sy hoofde van betoog steun
appellant egter ook op die persberigte, maar steeds nie op aankondigings gemaak op die betrokke dag nie. (4) Die bevinding van die Regter a
quo dat respondent die motor slegs vir beroepspelers beskikbaar gestel het en die bewoording van die F advertensiebord (wat tydens die
verhoor in geskil was) word nie op appèl in twyfel getrek nie. (5) Appellant se eis was en is steeds gegrond op kontrak. Vergelyk Bloom v The
American Swiss Watch Co 1915 AD 100 op 107. Die eerste geskilpunt wat derhalwe beslis moet word is of the persberigte en/of die
advertensiebord waarop appellant steun 'n kontraktuele aanbod deur respondent was. Slegs indien dié vraag bevestigend beantwoord word G
sou dit nodig wees om die bewoording daarvan teen die agtergrond van die omringende omstandighede te ontleed en te bepaal of gemelde
aanbod ook aan amateurs (insluitend appellant) gerig was al dan nie. Die vraag of 'n publikasie 'n aanbod is al dan nie is 'n feitevraag waarby die
aard van die publikasie, sy terme en die omringende omstandighede ter sprake kom. H Vergelyk Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 2de
uitg op 41. Een van die vrae wat beslis moet word is of die aanbod gemaak is met die nodige animus contrahendi. Vergelyk Robinson v
Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co 1921 AD 168 op 189. In appellant se hoofde van betoog word eenvoudig voorveronderstel dat die
persberigte 'n aanbod van respondent I bevat het en slegs met die uitleg daarvan gehandel het. Hierdie uitgangspunt is heeltemal verkeerd en
die Hof a quo was korrek met sy bevinding dat die koerantpublikasies nie 'n aanbod deur die respondent was nie, maar slegs gewone persberigte.
Die betrokke berigte laat geen ruimte hoegenaamd vir 'n argument tot die teendeel nie. Daar is byvoorbeeld geen aanduiding in die berig te vinde
dat die inligting van respondent J afkomstig is of dat dit 'n berig of advertensie was wat namens respondent

1994 (1) SA p55

BOTHA JA
A geplaas is nie. Die feite is gevolglik geheel en al onderskeibaar van die gesag waarop appellant steun. Appellant gaan ook wat betref die bord
te die 17de putjie van dieselfde standpunt uit, naamlik dat dit as 'n vertrekpunt aanvaar moet word dat dit 'n aanbod van respondent bevat, die
bewoording waarvan dan, aldus appellant, nie tot slegs beroepspelers beperk is nie en derhalwe ook aan appellant gerig was. Dieselfde denkfout
B word hier gemaak en die Verhoorhof se bevinding, naamlik dat die betrokke bord bloot as advertensie bedoel is, is korrek. Die plasing van die
bord asook sy bewoording inaggenome die omringende omstandighede regverdig geen ander afleiding nie. Appellant se betoog dat respondent nie
kan steun op enige 'mental reservation' nie is gevolglik misplaas aangesien dit hier in C die eerste plek gaan oor die vraag of 'n aanbod
hoegenaamd gemaak is. Alternatiewelik, en in elk geval, selfs al sou óf die persberigte óf die advertensiebord uitgelê word as synde 'n aanbod
deur respondent, is daar nie bewys dat die aanbod aan appellant gerig is nie of dat appellant dit redelikerwys so kon uitlê nie. Inaggenome die
algemeen bekende beperkinge D op pryse wat deur amateurs gewen kan word en eiser se kennis daarvan, is daar geen aanduiding dat die
aanbod ook aan amateurs gerig is nie.
Lenhoff in reply.
E Cur adv vult.
Postea (September 30).
Judgment
Botha JA: A hole­in­one is the cause of this litigation. The feat was F achieved by the appellant, an amateur golfer with a low handicap, at the
17th hole of the Durbanville Golf Club, on Saturday 9 December 1989. He was taking part in a championship which was called the Helios Minolta
Durbanville Open, after the sponsors of the tournament. The competition was one in which both professional and amateur players participated,
commonly known as a 'pro­am' event. Next to the 17th green there was on G display a brand new 5 speed 2 litre Opel GSI motor car together
with a board proclaiming:
'Hole­in­one prize sponsored by Reeds Delta.'

Reeds Delta is the trade name of the respondent. The appellant claimed the H car. The respondent refused to deliver, on the ground that only
professional players qualified for the prize.
The appellant brought an action in the Cape Provincial Division for delivery of the car or payment of its value, being R50 000. The respondent
defended. The trial Judge (Scott J) dismissed the action with costs. The appellant appeals with leave granted pursuant to a petition to the
Chief I Justice.
The appellant's claim is founded in contract. The pleadings need not be analysed; they tend to obfuscate rather than clarify the true issues in
the case as they emerged in evidence and in argument, both in the Court a quo and in this Court. In essence the appellant's case is this: the
board at the 17th green was an offer by the respondent of the motor car as a J prize for

1994 (1) SA p56

BOTHA JA
A a hole­in­one; the offer was addressed to all the players in the competition; any player could accept the offer by scoring a hole­in­one; the
appellant, by doing so, accepted the offer; and thus a binding contract was brought into being. The respondent's defence is as follows: the
board was not an offer, but a statement advertising an offer B previously made; that offer was limited to professional players only; the
© 2018 Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd. Downloaded : Mon Feb 24 2020 21:57:50 GMT+0200 (South Africa Standard Time)
appellant, being an amateur, was not entitled to accept it; and consequently there was no contract.
 1994 (1) SA p56

BOTHA JA
A a hole­in­one; the offer was addressed to all the players in the competition; any player could accept the offer by scoring a hole­in­one; the
appellant, by doing so, accepted the offer; and thus a binding contract was brought into being. The respondent's defence is as follows: the
board was not an offer, but a statement advertising an offer B previously made; that offer was limited to professional players only; the
appellant, being an amateur, was not entitled to accept it; and consequently there was no contract.
An amateur golfer is 'one who plays the game as a non­remunerative or non­profit­making sport'. This definition one finds in the 'Rules of
Amateur Status as approved by the Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St C Andrews'. A copy of a document bearing that title (1987 edition) was
put in as evidence by consent at the trial. In terms of the minute of a pre­trial conference it was common cause that the appellant as an
amateur golfer was subject to the rules. The definition I have quoted appears in the preamble to the rules. Rule 1 deals with the forfeiture of
amateur status and rule 2 with the procedure for enforcement and reinstatement. In D both instances the provisions are detailed and lengthy.
For present purposes we are concerned only with the opening part and clause 4(a) of rule 1. They read as follows:
'Rule 1
Forfeiture of amateur status at any age.

E The following are examples of acts which are contrary to the definition of an amateur golfer and cause forfeiture of amateur status:
. . .
4. Prizes and Testimonials

(a) Acceptance of a prize or prize voucher of retail value exceeding as follows:

In GB and I Elsewhere

F For an event of more than 2 rounds £170 £400 US or the equivalent

For an event of 2 rounds or less £110 £260 US or the equivalent

or any such lesser figure, if any, as may be decided by the Governing Body of golf in any country.'

It is common cause that in this country the equivalent amount which was G operative for the purposes of clause 4(a) at the relevant time was
R600 (or thereabouts).
In evidence the appellant acknowledged that he was aware of the rules relating to his amateur status; he knew that if he played a hole­in­one
at the 17th he could not claim the car without forfeiting his amateur status. His stance was that there was nothing in the rules to prevent him
from H claiming the car and taking delivery of it, as long as he was prepared to forfeit his amateur status by taking the prize; and he testified
that he was content to suffer such forfeiture for the sake of getting the car. This had been his attitude, he said, even at the time when he
played his shot at the 17th. He explained that he had been alerted to the possibility I of winning the prize a week before the tournament, when
he read a report about it in a newspaper. At that time he had already entered for the
competition; he had done so as a result of seeing a notice advertising the event and inviting entries which had been posted up at the Porterville
Golf Club, of which he was a member. In that notice it was said that the competition carried prizes worth more than R30 000, but no mention
was made of a prize for a hole­in­one. The press report which he saw did, J however, mention that an

1994 (1) SA p57

BOTHA JA
A Opel motor car worth R52 000 was on offer as a prize for a hole­in­one at the 17th, and it did so in unqualified terms, ie without any
intimation that the prize would be available to professional players only. Having read the report he concluded that as an amateur competitor he
also qualified for the chance of winning the prize.
On the day of the event announcements were made over loudspeakers at the B clubhouse, particularly in the initial stages when competitors
were being called upon to tee off at the appointed times. The appellant testified that no announcements were made relating to the prize for a
hole­in­one at the 17th, and he called three other amateur players as witnesses to depose to the same effect. The appellant said that on his
first round around the C course (this was a 36 hole strokeplay championship) he observed the car and the board at the 17th green. There was
then a discussion between him and his wife, who was his caddy for the day, about the fact that the board did not limit the prize to
professionals. The unqualified wording of the legend on the board confirmed his belief, the appellant said, that he would be entitled to claim the
prize if he achieved a hole­in­one. That D was his state of mind when he again reached the 17th hole on his second round and when he struck
his lucky shot. He was surprised and disappointed, he says, when he was told at the subsequent prize­giving ceremony that his amateur status
disqualified him from taking the prize.
In cross­examination it emerged that the appellant had not taken part in a E 'pro­am' competition before, although he was a golfer with
considerable experience. He had taken part in a large number of amateur tournaments and had assisted in the organisation of such tournaments
at his Club in Porterville. He admitted that he had never competed for any prize in excess of the R600 limit laid down by the rules relating to
amateur status, and that in the competitions which he had helped to organise the
F prizes had always been fixed below that limit. He claimed to have had knowledge of one instance where 'a blind eye was turned' on amateurs
receiving 'gifts' worth more than the permitted limit, and of another where a car had been offered as a prize to both professionals and amateurs,
but on further enquiry it transpired that this was purely hearsay information, acquired by him subsequent to the event in question G here.
Regarding the prize money of R30 000 which had been mentioned in the notice advertising the event, he conceded that no amateur would have
been entitled to claim a share in it in excess of the prescribed limit, even if he had made the best score of the day, and even though the notice
did not differentiate in this respect between professionals and amateurs. In H response to an invitation to explain the difference between that
kind of prize money and the prize of a motor car, he said that in the former case the prizes related to the best scores for the tournament as a
whole, and that they had already been allocated to professionals and amateurs separately before the commencement of the competition,
whereas in the latter case the prize was a 'one­off' affair related to one shot at one I hole, which entitled an amateur to claim it if he was
prepared to sacrifice his amateur status. Concerning the announcements at the commencement of play he said that he had not listened to them
with particular care, even though he knew that such announcements often related to local rules or rules of the day that would apply in the
particular J tournament. He admitted that he could have made

1994 (1) SA p58

BOTHA JA
A enquiries, before he teed off, from the officials in charge of organising the tournament, as to exactly what prizes were available to be won by
the amateur competitors, both generally and specifically in relation to the motor car on offer at the 17th hole.
I turn to the other side of the story. It was told by a director of the B respondent company, Mr Smal, who was also the vice­chairman of the
Durbanville Golf Club at the relevant time. His evidence may be summarised as follows. Some time before the event, he was approached by a
representative of the sponsors of the tournament (Helios Minolta) with a proposal that the respondent provide an additional attraction for the
tournament in the form of sponsoring a motor car as a prize for a C hole­in­one, with a view to attracting more professional players to take
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available only to professional players. He then instructed the respondent's insurance brokers to procure insurance covering the respondent
 the amateur competitors, both generally and specifically in relation to the motor car on offer at the 17th hole.
I turn to the other side of the story. It was told by a director of the B respondent company, Mr Smal, who was also the vice­chairman of the
Durbanville Golf Club at the relevant time. His evidence may be summarised as follows. Some time before the event, he was approached by a
representative of the sponsors of the tournament (Helios Minolta) with a proposal that the respondent provide an additional attraction for the
tournament in the form of sponsoring a motor car as a prize for a C hole­in­one, with a view to attracting more professional players to take
part. After consideration Smal agreed to the proposal, on behalf of the respondent, and in doing so he stipulated that the prize would be
available only to professional players. He then instructed the respondent's insurance brokers to procure insurance covering the respondent
against the risk of any of the professional participants in the D competition scoring a hole­in­one at the 17th. The insurance was duly effected
and the respondent received a cover note issued on behalf of the insurance companies which jointly assumed the risk. By that time it was
known that 15 professional players had entered for the tournament, and the cover note in express terms limited the risk insured against to any
one of E those players scoring a hole­in­one.
Smal testified that no golf club is allowed under any circumstances to offer prizes to amateur players which exceeded the limit of a few hundred
rand specified in the rules relating to amateur status. He knew this to be the case because of his long association with the Durbanville Golf
Club. F The Club is affiliated to the Western Province Golf Union, the constitution of which provides that any affiliated club is liable to
suspension or forfeiture of its affiliation if it holds any competition, or allows any competition to be held on its course, the conditions of which
are in breach of the rules of amateur status. Smal knew from personal experience that the governing body insisted on compliance with G the
rules and he would not, he said, have done anything which could have placed his Club's continued affiliation in jeopardy. He had read press
reports before the event in which it had not been stated that the prize for a hole­in­one was limited to professionals, but this did not trouble
him because he knew that the reports had not emanated from the respondent and that its agreement with the main sponsors was that only
professionals H would qualify for the prize (in fact the press reports had resulted from a press release issued by Helios Minolta); and, in addition,
he expected every amateur player with a reasonable handicap to be conversant with the rules.
With regard to the board which was on display with the car on the 17th I green, Smal said that he had been responsible for the wording of the
legend on it. He had not considered it necessary to add words to the message, indicating that only professional players qualified for the prize,
because he believed that the board was merely an advertisement publicising the fact that the respondent had sponsored the prize. From the
point of view of the respondent as a business concern, beneficial publicity was the whole object of the exercise. Smal's view was that the J
respondent's

1994 (1) SA p59

BOTHA JA
A offer of the prize had been made prior to the event, and that it had been made to the main sponsors, Helios Minolta, when the respondent
accepted their proposal to sponsor the car as an additional prize. Smal stressed that at the time he had made it clear, on behalf of the
respondent, that the respondent's offer was subject to the condition that only professional players would qualify for the prize. On the day of
the event, Smal B thought, there was nothing further to be done by the respondent in connection with the making of any offer, because, as he
put it, 'die dag was nie ons s'n nie'. He added, however, that the respondent did see to it that the announcements which were made before the
commencement of play and during the period of the initial tee offs, insofar as they related to prizes, specified that the prize of a motor car at
the 17th was for the C first professional to score a hole­in­one. To confirm this the respondent called as a witness the man who made the
announcements, Mr Venter. He was an employee of the respondent who worked under Smal, but he acted as announcer at the request of the
Club, of which he was a member. He knew that the respondent had confined its offer of the prize, as well as the D insurance cover obtained in
respect of it, to professional players. His evidence was that in between calling up players to tee off he from time to time made announcements
relating to the main sponsors and to the respondent's sponsorship of the prize for a hole­in­one, for purposes of publicity and prestige. He said
that in every reference to the prize for a hole­in­one he specifically mentioned that only professional competitors E qualified for it. He remained
adamant on this point, despite challenging cross­examination.
The above survey of the evidence reveals only one conflict of fact arising from directly contradictory evidence, viz whether it was said in the
announcements over the public address system that the prize for a hole­in­one on the 17th was for professionals only. This issue can be F
disposed of briefly. In dealing with the evidence on this point in his judgment, the trial Judge observed that the appellant and his witnesses, on
their own evidence, were practising their chipping and putting while waiting to tee off, and that it was not unlikely that their attention was
directed to what they were doing rather than the public announcements G which must have been almost continuous as the players were being
called to tee off. On the other hand Venter had good reason, as he explained in his evidence, for making it clear in his announcements that the
prize at the 17th hole was open only to professionals. Accordingly the trial Judge resolved the issue by accepting that such announcements
were made but were H not heard by the appellant. Counsel for the appellant sought belatedly to argue that the trial Judge had erred in
accepting Venter's evidence. The argument is wholly without merit. On the record there is no reason to doubt the truth of Venter's evidence,
while the evidence of the appellant and his witnesses on this particular point discloses a number of I unsatisfactory features. I do not propose
to go into the details. It suffices to say that no grounds have been shown for differing from the trial Judge's acceptance of Venter's evidence.
Counsel for the respondent did not seek to challenge the trial Judge's acceptance of the appellant's evidence that he had not heard the
announcements.
The major divergences in the evidence of the two protagonists, the J appellant and Smal, relate to the subjective perceptions and intention of

1994 (1) SA p60

BOTHA JA
A each of them in regard to objective facts which are not in dispute. Each could only testify to his own state of mind; neither could directly
challenge the evidence of the other. But it is still necessary, of course, to consider whether the evidence of each of them is acceptable. For
convenience, I take Smal's evidence first. The gist of it was that he, B representing the respondent, never intended to make an offer to the
appellant at all. The trial Judge found that the probabilities favoured the conclusion that, as far as the respondent was concerned, the prize
which it had sponsored was available only to professional players, and that the respondent's refusal to deliver the motor car to the appellant
was in good faith and not merely an attempt to renege on an undertaking it C had given. The correctness of this finding is not open to doubt.
Indeed, counsel for the appellant in argument before this Court (as in the Court a quo) did not dispute that the respondent had intended its
offer of a prize to be limited to professional golfers only.
Turning to the evidence of the appellant, the gist of it was that he D believed that he could claim the car if he played a hole­in­one. It is
implicit in his evidence that he regarded the board at the 17th hole as an offer of a prize by the respondent to all the players taking part in the
competition and that he believed that the offer was open to be accepted by him. The trial Judge did not comment on this evidence in his
judgment, except perhaps obliquely to the extent of remarking, with reference to the E appellant's avowed disappointment at being told at the
prize­giving ceremony that he had not qualified for the prize, that 'his disappointment is understandable'. However, the appellant's evidence on
the record is not without blemish. In particular there are passages in it suggesting, perhaps even strongly, that the idea of claiming the car by
forfeiting his F amateur status had first occurred to him only after he had played the fluke at the 17th hole. It appears, for instance, that after
the shot had been played he was advised by an official and by some of the other amateur players: 'Turn pro and claim the car'; that he had not
asserted a right to claim the prize until days after the event; and that he had G approached Smal after the prize­giving ceremony with a
tentative enquiry as to whether it would be possible for him to obtain the car if he was prepared to relinquish his amateur status. I do not
propose, however, to pursue the question whether the appellant's evidence about his state of mind is acceptable. It would be invidious to do so
in the absence of any finding by the trial Judge as to the demeanour of the appellant when H testifying or the impression created by him as a
witness; counsel for the respondent did not argue that the appellant's evidence should have been rejected by the Court a quo or was to be
rejected by this Court; and it is not necessary to come to a conclusion on the question for the purposes of deciding the appeal, as will appear
presently. In the circumstances I shall simply assume, in what follows, that the appellant's evidence as to I his state of mind and his intention
at the relevant time is credible and acceptable.
On this footing the appellant's intention was to accept what he believed to be an offer by the respondent to him, while the respondent through
Smal had no intention of making any offer to the appellant. The minds of the parties never met; there was not consensus, but dissensus. The
whole J thrust of the argument for the appellant was in effect to brush this plain

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 at the relevant time is credible and acceptable.
On this footing the appellant's intention was to accept what he believed to be an offer by the respondent to him, while the respondent through
Smal had no intention of making any offer to the appellant. The minds of the parties never met; there was not consensus, but dissensus. The
whole J thrust of the argument for the appellant was in effect to brush this plain

1994 (1) SA p61

BOTHA JA
A truth aside by simply fastening onto the wording on the board at the 17th hole: whatever Smal's subjective intention was, it was urged, the
wording on the board conveyed an offer to all the players that any one of them, professional or amateur, who scored a hole­in­one qualified for
the prize; it constituted an offer in unqualified terms of a reward in the classic mould of cases such as Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1
QB 256 B and Bloom v The American Swiss Watch Company 1915 AD 100; and the respondent could not be heard to say that its offer of a
prize was available only to the professional players taking part in the competition. The argument is fundamentally fallacious inasmuch as it treats
Smal's subjective intention as irrelevant and postulates the outward manifestation of his intention as the sole and conclusive touchstone of C
the respondent's contractual liability. That is contrary to legal principle. Where it is shown that the offeror's true intention differed from his
expressed intention, the outward appearance of agreement flowing from the offeree's acceptance of the offer as it stands does not in itself or
necessarily result in contractual liability. Nor is it in itself D decisive that the offeree accepted the offer in reliance upon the offeror's implicit
representation that the offer correctly reflected his intention. Remaining for consideration is the further and crucial question whether a
reasonable man in the position of the offeree would have accepted the offer in the belief that it represented the true intention of the offeror, in
accordance with the objective criterion formulated long E ago in the classic dictum of Blackburn J in Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 at
607. Only if this test is satisfied can the offeror be held contractually liable.
There is no need to canvass authorities in support of the view just stated. In the recent case of Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd (formerly
known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A) Harms F AJA considered the leading cases and the opinions of academic
authors on the topic (at 238I­241D) and stated his conclusion as follows (at 239I­240B):
'In my view, therefore, the decisive question in a case like the present is this: did the party whose actual intention did not conform to the G common intention
expressed, lead the other party, as a reasonable man, to believe that his declared intention represented his actual intention? . . . To answer this question, a
three­fold enquiry is usually necessary, namely, firstly, was there a misrepresentation as to one party's intention; secondly, who made that representation; and
thirdly, was the other party misled thereby? . . . The last question postulates two H possibilities: Was he actually misled and would a reasonable man have been
misled?'

In that case the Court was concerned with dissensus relating to the terms of the contract proposed in the offer, but the test whether a
reasonable man in the position of the one party would have been misled applies also where it is shown that the other party's declaration was
not intended by I him to be an offer at all. This is exemplified by the facts and the decision in Spes Bona Bank Ltd v Portals Water Treatment
South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 978 (A) ­ see especially at 984D­985H. And in my view it must apply equally when the dissensus relates to
the addressee of the offer, ie where the offeror does not intend the offer to be open for acceptance by the other party, but the latter believes
that it is and in J that belief accepts it.

1994 (1) SA p62

BOTHA JA
A In the present case Smal did not intend the message on the board at the 17th hole to be an offer; nor did he intend the respondent's offer
of a prize for a hole­in­one on the 17th to be open for acceptance by any amateur player such as the appellant. The appellant (on the
assumption made earlier) believed that the message on the board was an offer and that B it was open to him to accept it. The dissensus
between the parties thus relates to both the offer and its addressees. Notionally the two aspects of dissensus are discrete, and logically the
second can arise for consideration only if the issue in respect of the first is resolved in favour of the appellant. They were argued separately.
So, there was much debate in argument as to whether the words on the board, objectively C speaking, and having regard to the surrounding
circumstances, constituted an offer or a mere advertisement of an offer previously made. I do not, however, consider it to be a profitable
exercise to pursue the question thus formulated as a separate issue, nor to dissect the dissensus in this case into its two aspects and to deal
with these separately. The decisive D question is this: would a reasonable man in the position of the appellant have considered the words on
the board to be an offer which it was open to him to accept? Posed in this way the question rolls the two aspects of dissensus into one
enquiry, but I can see no objection in principle to dealing with the particular facts of this case in this fashion. It is E certainly the most
convenient way of resolving the fundamental issue in the case, and it is on this basis that I proceed to consider the facts.
To answer the question I have posed, I shall examine the appellant's conduct and test it against the objective criterion of reasonableness.
It will be recalled that the appellant first became aware of the offer of a prize for a hole­in­one when he read a report about it in a newspaper
F and noticed that the prize was not stated in the report to be available only to professional golfers. His evidence was that he concluded that
as an amateur competitor he also qualified for a chance of winning the prize. In my opinion there can be no doubt that the appellant was
unreasonable in coming to that conclusion simply on the strength of the newspaper report. G The report, as the appellant admitted in cross­
examination, was no more than an ordinary reporter's comment contained in the sporting columns of the paper and it did not disclose the
reporter's source of information. Moreover, and more importantly, the report also mentioned the prize money put up by the sponsors of the
event, without stating that it would only be H available to the professional competitors. The appellant, as we have seen, knew full well when he
saw in the notice advertising the event that prize money of R30 000 was offered by the sponsors, that he could not qualify for those prizes (at
least not in excess of the prescribed limit). The report could not have caused him to think that the prize for a hole­in­one stood on a different
footing. It could not reasonably have induced in his I mind a belief that the sponsors of the motor car intended to put up that prize for
amateurs as well as professionals. Of course, since the report did not emanate from the respondent, it was in any event no representation by
the respondent as to its intention. But I have discussed the appellant's reaction to it in order to show that his belief as deposed to by him was
wholly unwarranted and unreasonable at its very inception.
J Accordingly, when the appellant arrived at the course on the day of the

1994 (1) SA p63

BOTHA JA
A event, he had no real ground for believing that he could qualify for the prize of the motor car. But he did nothing to find out what his position
was. He paid no particular attention to the announcements over the public address system, although he knew that they frequently related to
the rules of play for the day. Had he taken care to listen, he would have heard Venter's statements that only professionals qualified for the
hole­in­one B prize. He made no enquiries, although he knew that officials of the club, who were in charge of organising the event, were readily
available to answer any query about the prizes on offer in the tournament. So, when he set off on his first round he still had no valid reason for
believing that he could qualify for the prize. And at that stage he had no reason to C think that any further information would be forthcoming
along the course.
The next and crucial stage in the enquiry is the appellant's arrival at the 17th hole on his first round. His evidence, it will be recalled, was that
he read the words on the board at the green, saw that the words did not limit the prize to the professional players, and discussed the matter D
with his wife. His belief was confirmed that he could claim the prize if he succeeded in playing a hole­in­one. The fact that his existing belief,
which he says was confirmed, had been baseless, must necessarily have a negative impact on the assessment of the reasonableness of the
confirmation that he found in the words on the board. But for convenience I shall leave that consideration out of account in the further
examination E of the appellant's mental reaction to the message on the board.
That reaction must be tested against the background of the appellant's experience as a competitive amateur golfer. He knew the provisions of
the rules relating to amateur status. He knew that when clubs organised competitions for amateurs the prizes were invariably fixed at a level of
F value below the limit prescribed by the rules. By necessary inference from his evidence he had had no experience or knowledge prior to the
event in question of any instance where the rules had been breached. In regard to the hearsay information he obtained after the event, he
himself regarded the one instance to which he referred as a case where 'a blind eye was turned' to a moderate transgression of the prescribed
limitation on the G value of prizes. The fact that he had not previously participated in a 'pro­am' competition should have placed him on his
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control of the competition and that the role of the sponsors of the prizes was no more than to finance the prizes for the promotion of the
 the rules relating to amateur status. He knew that when clubs organised competitions for amateurs the prizes were invariably fixed at a level of
F value below the limit prescribed by the rules. By necessary inference from his evidence he had had no experience or knowledge prior to the
event in question of any instance where the rules had been breached. In regard to the hearsay information he obtained after the event, he
himself regarded the one instance to which he referred as a case where 'a blind eye was turned' to a moderate transgression of the prescribed
limitation on the G value of prizes. The fact that he had not previously participated in a 'pro­am' competition should have placed him on his
guard in considering his position as an amateur in relation to the prizes on offer. He knew that the Durbanville Golf Club had organised and was in
control of the competition and that the role of the sponsors of the prizes was no more than to finance the prizes for the promotion of the
prestige of the event H and of beneficial publicity for themselves. He must have known that the allocation of the prizes and any conditions
attached thereto had been negotiated between the club and the sponsors before the commencement of the event. As a reasonable man he
should have realised that the prizes on offer were not simply a matter between the competitors and the sponsors,
but that the club had a vital interest in the matter as well. I

Against this background there can be no doubt, in my judgment, that the appellant acted unreasonably in regarding the wording on the board at
the 17th hole as an offer by the respondent which was open to him, as an amateur competitor, to accept. Two aspects, in particular, of his
evidence J demonstrate the unreasonableness of his subjective belief. The first is his

1994 (1) SA p64

BOTHA JA
A inability to provide a sensible explanation for the distinction which he drew in his mind between the R30 000 prize money sponsored by the
main sponsors and the motor car sponsored by the respondent. He was compelled to acknowledge that he could not have claimed the first prize
for the best overall score of the day if he had achieved it, even if he were prepared B to sacrifice his amateur status. The reason is obvious: no
one could have believed that an amateur player qualified for that prize. And the reasons why no one could have believed that must surely apply
also to the prize of a motor car for a hole­in­one. The appellant's attempts to differentiate between the two situations, as described earlier, are
too irrational to C bear scrutiny. Accordingly it was manifestly unreasonable for the appellant to conclude, from the mere fact that the wording
on the board did not expressly limit the prize to be won to the professional players, that it was an offer addressed to the amateur players as
well.
The second aspect of the appellant's evidence relates to his avowed preparedness to sacrifice his amateur status for the sake of winning the D
prize. The appellant spoke so glibly of giving up his amateur status that it conjures up the picture of a man discarding an old worn­out jacket for
which he has no further use. But of course the forfeiture by an amateur golfer of his status as such is a matter of much greater gravity than
that. The appellant's attitude may have been in conformity with the letter of the Rules of the Royal and Ancient, but I have no doubt that it
flies E in the face of the spirit of those Rules. The point of these observations is not to criticise the appellant for his attitude. I am concerned
with the enquiry whether the appellant's belief that the respondent was extending an offer of a prize to him as an amateur was reasonable. The
point, then, is this: was it reasonable to believe that the respondent F intended to create an opportunity for an amateur player to collect the
prize of a car by forfeiting his amateur status? The answer, in my judgment, is clear. The appellant may have been prepared to brush aside the
dichotomy between professional and amateur players which pervades the golfing world, but he had no reason to deduce from the wording on
the board at the 17th hole that the respondent's intention was the same.
G In the final result my conclusion is that a reasonable man in the position of the appellant would not have believed that the respondent
intended the board at the 17th hole to constitute an offer by the respondent which was open for acceptance by the appellant. It follows that
the Court a quo's dismissal of the appellant's action was correct.
H The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Hefer JA, Vivier JA, Eksteen JA and Kriegler AJA concurred.
Appellant's Attorneys: Ince, Wood & Raubenheimer, Cape Town; Honey & Partners, Bloemfontein. Respondent's Attorneys: Van Niekerk,
Groenewoud & I Van Zyl, Parow; McIntyre & Van der Post, Bloemfontein.

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