MANU/SC/1043/2024

Equivalent/Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 719

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 3593-3594 of 2024
Decided On: 20.09.2024
Rajesh Mitra and Ors. Vs. Karnani Properties Ltd.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sudhanshu Dhulia and P.B. Varale, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Rashi Bansal, AOR
For Respondents/Defendant: Sabyasachi Chowdhary, Neelesh Choudhary, Advs., Partha
Sil, AOR, Sayani Bhattacharya, Abhiraj Choudhary, Chirag Joshi and Srijit Datta, Advs.
Case Category:
RENT ACT MATTERS
Case Note:
Tenancy - Eviction - Heritable right - Section 2(h) of West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1956, Sections 2(g) and 45 of West Bengal Tenancy Premises
Act, 1997, Section 8(c) of Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899and Order 12 Rule
6 of Code of Civil procedure, 1908 - Respondent filed suit before High
Courtpraying for eviction of Appellants - Even before Appellants could file
Written Statemen, Plaintiff, without loosing any time, filed application under
Order 12 Rule 6 of Code seeking judgment on admission by relying on
deposition of Defendant no.1 in another case where Defendant had admitted
that tenancy was in his mother's name - Single judge benchwhile decreeing
suit, had directed Appellants (tenant) to vacate suit property and handover
vacant possession to Respondent-Plaintiffon basis of alleged admission by
Appellant no.1 - Aggrieved, Appellants filed appeal before Division Bench of
High Court which stand dismissed - Hence, present appeal - Whether
Appellants had also became tenants upon death of original tenant by virtue of
Section 2(h) of old Act andwhat effect would enforcement of new Act had on
their tenancy.
Facts:
The Respondent filed suit before the High Court praying for eviction of
Appellants. Even before the Appellants could file a written statement, the
Plaintiff, without loosing any time, filed an application under Order 12 Rule 6
Code of Civil Procedure seeking a judgment on admission by relying on the
deposition of Defendant no.1 in another case where the Defendant had
admitted that the tenancy was in his mother's name. According to the
Plaintiff/Respondent, since the mother of the Defendants/Appellants had
admittedly died way back, they were not entitled to stay in the premises in
terms of Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act, which protects the rights of the
children and dependents of a tenant only for a limited period of five years.

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The Single judge benchwhile decreeing the suit, had directed the Appellants
(tenant) to vacate the suit property and handover the vacant possession to
the Respondent-Plaintiffon the basis of alleged admission by the Appellant
no.1. Aggrieved by the order passed by Single Judge, Appellants filed appeal
before Division Bench of High Court which stand dismissed.
Held, while allowing the appeal:
(i) Undisputedly, mother of Appellant had become a tenant under Section 2(h)
of the 1956 Act. However, when these facts were considered along with the
deposition of Appellant no. 1, it was held by the Single Judge of the High
Court that after the death of his mother, the Appellants would be tenants
under Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act only for a period of five years which would
be calculated from the date of Appellant mother's death due to the words
whichever is later appearing in Section 2(g). Five years got completed after
which the Appellants had no right to remain on the premises. The Single
Judge was not correct in decreeing the suit on this so called admission.
Looking at the facts of the case and the position of law, it was not proper for
the Court to give a judgment on admission simply because there could not be
an admission against law and in any case, it was not an unambiguous
admission as was being made out. The single Judge erred in passing the
judgment under Order 12 Rule 6. What had been given to the Appellants
under law could not be taken away on the basis of an unclear deposition. In
short, there could not be an admission against law. Whether a particular
statement amounts to an admission would depend on the fact of each case. In
the case at hand, it was not an admission as visualised under Order 12 Rule
6. [6]
(ii) The High Court in the case of Goutam Dey had held that the new statute
which touches upon the existing rights cannot be retrospective, without an
express provision or necessary implication expressing the clear intent of the
Legislature. Goutam Dey relied upon Section 8(c) of the West Bengal General
Clauses Act to say that a new statute does not affect existing rights. Section
45 of the 1997 Act repealed the 1956 Act but that could not mean that rights
accrued under the old Act were extinguished altogether with the enforcement
of the new Act.[17]
(iii) It was true that legislature can restrict heritability by amending or
repealing the law, as the case might be. The Division Bench's finding was that
since legislature could restrict the heritability it had done precisely that in the
1997 Act, by adding the words five years from the date of death of such
tenant or from the date of coming into force of this Act, whichever is later.
Hence, as per the Division Bench of the High Court, the death of father of
Appellant also stands covered under new Act. In other words, the 1997 Act
changes heritable rights retrospectively according to the Division Bench of the
High Court. Although, the actual date when eviction would happen was post
the new Act but it did have a retrospective application as well in as much as it
is applicable retrospectively to an earlier date and had taken away a right of
the Appellants, given to them under the old statute.Statutory laws operate
from the date of their enforcement i.e., prospectively. In case the legislature
intends to make a law retrospective then such an intention of the legislature
must be shown clearly and unambiguously in the statute itself. The Division

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Bench's mere interpretation of a statutory provision will not make the law
retrospective and take away the heritable rights of a tenant.[21]
(iv) The Appellant's mother and the Appellants jointly inherited the tenancy
from original tenant. Thus, the impugned judgment was liable to be set aside
as Appellants' tenancy did not expire by the introduction of 1997 Act, in the
absence of a clear and unequivocal intention in the 1997 Act to have a
retrospective operation.[22]
JUDGMENT
Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
1 . The Appellants (the Defendants in the suit), are here in challenge to the judgment
dated 08.12.2022 whereby their Appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench of Calcutta
High Court, upholding the judgment of the learned Single Judge (which was a judgment
on admission), dated 29.06.2022. While decreeing the suit, the Court had directed the
Appellants (tenant) to vacate the suit property and handover the vacant possession to
the Respondent-Plaintiff, within sixty days!
2 . This is a landlord-tenant matter arising out of an eviction suit filed by the
Respondent before the Calcutta High Court, inter alia, praying for eviction of Appellants
from Room No.208, 2nd Floor, 25-A Park Street, Kolkata (hereafter referred as the
"premises"). Even before the Appellants could file a Written Statement, the Plaintiff,
without loosing any time, filed an application Under Order XII Rule 61 Code of Civil
Procedure ("CPC") seeking a 'judgment on admission' by relying on the deposition of
Defendant no.1 in another case where the Defendant had admitted that the tenancy was
in his mother's name. According to the Plaintiff/Respondent, since the mother of the
Defendants/Appellants had admittedly died way back in the year 2009, they are not
entitled to stay in the premises beyond the year 2014 in terms of section 2(g) of the
1997 Act, which protects the rights of the children and dependents of a tenant only for a
limited period of five years.
3. At the outset, we must state that both, the learned single- judge bench and to some
extent even the Division Bench of the High Court, in the present case, ought not to have
decreed the suit of the landlord on the basis of alleged "admission" by the Appellant
no.1 which was made in another unconnected matter, as to our mind, it does not pass
muster the test of "admission" visualised in Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure. It
is not that a court cannot pass a judgment on the basis of an admission made in some
other case. All the same, what has to be kept in mind is that Order XII Rule 6 is an
enabling provision conferring wide discretionary powers on the courts which cannot be
claimed by any party as a matter of right. Courts can invoke Order XII Rule 6 only in
cases where admissions are unconditional, unequivocal and unambiguous or when
admission is based upon undisputed inferences. (See: Charanjit Lal Mehra & Ors. v.
Kamal Saroj Mahajan (Smt) and Anr. MANU/SC/0191/2005 : 2005:INSC:134 : (2005)
11 SCC 279, Raveesh Chand Jain v. Raj Rani Jain MANU/SC/0129/2015 :
2015:INSC:111 : (2015) 8 SCC 428, Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of
India And Ors. MANU/SC/0485/2000 : 2000:INSC:380 : (2000) 7 SCC 120)
Here, we would like to reproduce that portion of the cross- examination of Appellant no.
1, as quoted by the Single Judge of the High Court, which is alleged to be an admission
on part of the Appellant no.1 to deny him the right of occupying the disputed premises.
It is as follows:

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 33. Flat No.208 in respect whereof you are an occupant- is it a tenancy?
Yes, it is in my mother's name.
34. Your mother is Usha Mitra- am I right?
Yes, Late Usha Mitra.
35. When did Usha Mitra expire?
On 3rd November, 2009
This deposition is the so called 'admission' on which the Respondent-landlord relies to
claim that only the mother (Usha Mitra) of the Appellants was the tenant and not the
Appellants. The Appellant no.1 had admitted that the tenancy was in the name of his
mother.
We have perused the examination-in-chief and cross- examination of Appellant no.1
made in that 'other case' where this statement was made. Such questions and their
answers are common place in depositions before courts, but every such statement
cannot be considered as an 'admission' to invoke Order XII Rule 6 of Code of Civil
Procedure. It is for the courts to see whether any statement in the pleadings or
otherwise amounts to an admission of such a nature as to inspire the confidence of the
court to pass judgment on admission Under Order XII Rule 6 of Code of Civil Procedure.
It will depend upon the content and kind of statement/admission which may vary from
case to case. In other words, it would depend upon the totality of facts and
circumstances of a particular given case. In the present case, here, it is not a 'clear
admission' as is being made out. Moreover, where the question and its answer are both
a mixed question of fact and law, as in the present case, a so called 'admission' against
the law can never be an "admission" as visualised Under Order XII Rule 6. However,
more on this later.
Order XII Rule 6 is meant for speedy disposal of the suits in some cases but on the risk
of repetition, we would like to caution that unless there is a clear, unambiguous,
unequivocal and unconditional admission, courts should not exercise their discretion
under the Rule because judgment on admissions is without a trial which may even
preclude a party to challenge the matter on merits in the court of appeal. The provision
of law, which is meant for the expeditious disposal of appropriate cases, should
therefore be cautiously exercised and it should never come in the way of any Defendant
denying him the valuable right of contesting the claim. (See: Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata
Steel Ltd. MANU/SC/0817/2011 : 2011:INSC:457 : (2011) 15 SCC 273, Hari Steel &
General Industries Ltd. v. Diljit Singh MANU/SC/0679/2019 : 2019:INSC:569 : (2019)
20 SCC 425)
4. We will have to go briefly on the facts of the case in order to have a perspective of
what we have before us. The premises was originally let out to one Sri S.K. Mitra.
Subsequent to his death in 1970, as per section 2(h) of the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereafter referred to as "1956 Act" or the "old Act"), the tenancy
devolved on his legal heirs who were ordinarily residing with him. Section 2(h) of the
old Act defined the 'tenant' as follows:
"(h) "tenant" [means any person] by whom or on whose account or behalf, the
rent of any premises is, or but for a special contract would be, payable and
[includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his

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 tenancy or in the event or such person's death, such of his heirs as were
ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death,] but shall not include any
person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made by a Court
of competent jurisdiction."
(emphasis supplied)
In other words, in the event of the death of the tenant the tenancy devolved on the legal
heirs of the tenant 'who ordinarily resided with him'. In the case at hand, therefore, the
tenancy devolved on S.K. Mitra's widow and the Appellants, who were his children aged
2 and 5 years, at the time of his death.
Subsequently, the new act, i.e., the West Bengal Tenancy Premises Act, 1997 (hereafter
"1997 Act") came into force with effect from 10.07.2001. Under the 1997 Act, the
tenancy would devolve to the legal heirs of the tenant as specified Under Section 2(g),
but for a limited period of five years. The spouse of the tenant though is excluded from
the time limit provided she meets the criteria as laid therein. Section 2(g) of the 1997
Act reads as follows:
"(g) "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the
rent of any premises is or, but for a special contract, would be payable, and
includes any person continuing in possession after termination of his tenancy
and, in the event of death of any tenant, also includes, for a period not
exceeding five years from the date of death of such tenant or from the date of
coming into force of this Act, whichever is later, his spouse, son, daughter,
parent and the widow of his predeceased son, who were ordinarily living with
the tenant up to the date of death of the tenant as the members of his family
and were dependent on him and who do not own or occupy any residential
premises, and [in respect of premises let out for non-residential purpose his
spouse, son, daughter and parent who were ordinarily living with the tenant up
to the date of his death as members of his family, and were dependant on him
or a person authorised by the tenant who is in possession of such premises] but
shall not include any person against whom any decree or order for eviction has
been made by a Court of competent jurisdiction:
Provided that the time-limit of five years shall not apply to the spouse of
the tenant who was ordinarily living with the tenant up to his death as a
member of his family and was dependent on him and who does not own
or occupy any residential premises,
Provided further that the son, daughter parent or the widow of the
predeceased son of the tenant who was ordinarily residing with the
tenant in the said premises up to the date of death of the tenant as a
member of his family and was dependent on him and who does not own
or occupy any residential premises, shall have a right of preference for
tenancy in a fresh agreement in respect of such premises [on condition
of payment of fair rent]. This proviso shall apply mutatis mutandis to
premises let out for non-residential purpose."
(emphasis supplied)
5 . The landlord's case is that after the death of Sh. S.K. Mitra in 1970 his wife Smt.
Usha Mitra had become the tenant as per section 2(h) of the 1956 Act. There is also a
mention that she gave an undertaking to the landlord that only she succeeds on the

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property as a tenant and it was her who continued to pay rent after the death of her
husband. When Smt. Usha Mitra died in 2009, the Appellants would be considered
tenants only till 03.11.2014 (five years after the death of Usha Mitra on 03.11.2009), as
per section 2(g) of the 1997 Act. As we have already referred earlier, the main thrust of
the landlord's case was that the Appellant/Defendant had admitted, in his deposition in
a different matter, that his mother was the tenant on the property who had passed away
in 2009. Hence, their tenancy had expired long back in 2014 as per his own admission.
In their Written Statements, Appellants did not deny the deposition made by Appellant
no.1 as a "witness" in another case but submitted that this cannot be used as an
admission Under Order XII Rule 6. Further, it was asserted that it was not just their
mother who had become a tenant after the death of his father in the year 1970, but both
Appellants had also become tenants as the tenancy was heritable as per section 2(h) of
the 1956 Act, which was then in force.
6 . The Single Judge of the High Court, however, did not accept this contention. What
was relied upon were the rent receipts in the name of Smt. Usha Mitra (the mother of
the present Appellant), for the period between 1970 and 2009 and an affidavit attested
by Smt. Usha Mitra, showing that she was the sole tenant of the premises while
dismissing the claim of the Defendants.
Undisputedly, Smt. Usha Mitra had become a tenant Under Section 2(h) of the 1956 Act.
However, when these facts were considered along with the deposition of Appellant no.
1, it was held by the Single Judge of the High Court that after the death of Smt. Usha
Mitra in 2009, the Appellants would be tenants Under Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act only
for a period of five years which would be calculated from the date of Usha Mitra's death
due to the words "whichever is later" appearing in section 2(g). Five years got
completed on 02.11.2014, after which the Appellants had no right to remain on the
premises. As we have already stated above, the learned Single Judge was not correct in
decreeing the suit on this so called "admission". Looking at the facts of the case and the
position of law, it was not proper for the Court to give a judgment on admission simply
because there cannot be an admission against law and in any case, it is not an
unambiguous admission as is being made out.
In view of the discussion above, the legal question to be determined by us is whether
the Appellants had also became tenants upon the death of their father, by virtue of
section 2(h) of the old Act. Further, what effect would the enforcement of the new Act
have on their tenancy.
This goes to the root of the controversy and involves a question of law and thus, the
learned single Judge erred in passing the judgment Under Order XII Rule 6. What has
been given to the Appellants under law cannot be taken away on the basis of an unclear
deposition. In short, there cannot be an admission against law. Whether a particular
statement amounts to an "admission" will depend on the fact of each case. In the case
at hand, we are of the opinion that it is not an admission as visualised Under Order XII
Rule 6.
7 . The Appellants filed an appeal against this order before the Division Bench of the
High Court which was dismissed, vide order dated 08.12.2022, which is presently under
challenge before us. The Division Bench held that Under Section 2(g), the legislature
intended that where the original tenant has died before the coming into force of the
1997 Act, his legal heirs would be protected for five years from the date of coming into
force of the act. Otherwise, the latter phrase in section 2(g) "from the date of coming

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into force of this Act, whichever is later" would stand frustrated. This is what the High
Court held:
What can be logically deduced therefrom that the heritability of the estate of the
tenant was restricted for a period of five years from the date of the death in
case the tenant died after promulgation of the said Act to the other heirs
excluding the spouse who have been kept in the exception (provided the
conditions imposed therein are duly fulfilled and/or satisfied). A striking feature
may further be noticed from the definition of tenant under 1997 Act in relation
to the fixation of the time limit fixed therein which, if lost sight of, shall
frustrate the legislative intent. The son, daughter and parents shall not be
entitled to take protection under the aforesaid definition, if the tenant dies prior
to the promulgation of the said Act and the aforesaid period would be reckoned
from the date of coming into force of the said Act. Otherwise, the expression
"from the date of coming into force of this Act, whichever is later" shall be
redundant and meaningless. What can be legally deduced therefrom is that even
if the tenant dies when the Act of 1956 was in vogue, yet the heirs other than
the spouse would not get any protection in relation to a time limit under the
definition of the tenant in the Act of 1997 and, therefore, the concept of
"devolution" of the tenancy right under the 1956 Act cannot be said to be
inflexible. The legislatures can restrict the heritability of the tenanted estate
which does not offend the constitutional ethos nor can be impinge (sic:
impinged) on the ground of restricting the succession in relation to our
tenanted property. What can be culled out from the aforesaid discussion that
the heirs other than the spouse, even if they satisfy the other conditions laid
down in the definition provision, loses their right as a tenant nor protected
under the provisions thereof after the expiration of five years from the date of
death and in the event the death occurs after coming into force of the said Act
or upon expiration of five years from the date of coming into force of the Act or
1997, whichever is later.
The entire case here rests upon the interpretation of "tenant" as defined in the new Act.
In case, the Defendants i.e., the present Appellants come under the definition of
"tenant" the order impugned has to be set aside. However, if the case is that the
Appellant does not come under the definition of "tenant" as referred above, this appeal
would fail.
8. On behalf of the Appellants, we have heard learned Counsel Ms. Rashi Bansal, who
relies on the decision of the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court (Goutam Dey v.
Jyotsna Chatterjee reported in MANU/WB/1243/2012). In the above cited case, the
original tenant had died prior to the enforcement of the 1997 Act. He was survived by
his daughter and her husband, Goutam Dey. Subsequently, the daughter of the original
tenant also died in 2011, after which the Respondent-landlord filed a suit for eviction
against Goutam which was decreed. By virtue of section 2(h) of the 1956 Act, it was
held that a vested right had accrued in favour of the daughter of the original tenant,
which could not be abrogated by the enactment of the 1997 Act. It was further held that
if section 2(g) of the 1997 Act was interpreted literally, it would mean that all inherited
tenancies under the 1956 Act would expire on 09.07.2006 (five years after the coming
into force of the 1997 Act). This is a position which cannot be tenable in law according
to the learned Single Judge in the above case. It was held that the phrase "or from the
date of coming into force of the act, whichever is later" was wrongly drafted by the
legislature, and it is in fact redundant. This is what was said:

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 19. Even otherwise, I am of the further view that portion of section 2(g), as
extracted in the preceding paragraph starting from "or" and ending with "later",
and on which Mr. Bhattacharya laid emphasis, if read literally would produce
absurd results and, therefore, the provision must be so read so as to make it
meaningful. Law is well settled that in exceptional circumstances, it would be
proper for the Court to depart from the literal rule and such rule of
interpretation could be adopted that is just, reasonable and sensible, and does
not offend the sense of justice. In the context, one may possibly conceive either
of three inevitable situations, - death of a tenant (i) before July 10, 2001; (ii)
after July 10, 2001; and (iii) on July 10, 2001. Regarding situation (i) i.e. death
of a tenant before July 10, 2001 and the case with which I am concerned (Sunil
died on May 4, 1997), undoubtedly it was the Act of 1956 that was in force and
had a tenant governed by the provisions of the Act of 1956 died on July 9, 2001
or even previous to that date, the tenancy would be governed by that Act
meaning thereby that the tenancy being heritable, the heirs would be justified
in claiming tenancy right subject to fulfilment of the residence requirement in
section 2(h) of the Act of 1956 but unfettered by the other two conditions
newly inserted and the stipulation of five years in section 2(g) of the Act of
1997. Law appears to be settled that provisions of a new statute which touch a
right in existence at the date it is enforced are not to be applied retrospectively
in the absence of express provision or necessary intendment. The Act of 1997
has not been given retrospective effect so as to bring within its coverage death
of tenants occurring prior to July 10, 2001 and a different intention does not
appear on a reading of the Act of 1997 so as to affect any right or privilege that
has been acquired or has accrued in favour of the specified heirs of the
deceased tenant under the Act of 1956, since repealed. Having regard to section
8(c) of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899, a vested right that accrued in
favour of an heir like Subhra on the death of the tenant i.e. Sunil cannot be
abrogated. There is a presumption against curtailment of or washing away a
vested right by a repealing legislation, and a construction involving such
curtailment of or washing away the right accrued ought not to be adopted
unless a contrary intention clearly appears in the repealing legislation. It could
not have been and it does not seem to be the intention of the legislature to fix
July 9, 2006 as the last date fill which tenancy of an heir of a deceased tenant
would continue (assuming all the other conditions were fulfilled), no matter
when he died prior to July 10, 2001. The absurd result that the aforesaid
extract of section 2(g) of the Act of 1997 has the potential of producing is best
illustrated by the facts of the present case and needs no further elaboration.
Insofar as situations (ii) and (iii) are concerned, it is obvious that the definition
of tenant in section 2(g) of the Act of 1997 shall apply and for achieving the
purpose that it seeks to achieve, it was not necessary to insert the phrase "or
from the date of coming into force of this Act, whichever is later". The period of
five years mentioned in section 2(g) automatically would have application only
in respect of death of tenants occurring on and from July 10, 2001 and in such
case the portion extracted above, is in my considered view, a piece of loose
drafting and ought to be considered redundant unless in a given case, which I
have been unable to perceive, the same is shown to have application. I hasten
to record here that the above observation regarding redundancy has been made
by me despite my best effort to make the statute effective with all the words
that have been used by the legislature and conscious of the principle that
legislature is presumed not to waste words.
Relying upon the above Judgment of Calcutta High Court, the counsel for the Appellants
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would submit that similarly the tenancy in the present case had in fact devolved in
favour of the present Appellants way back in the year 1970 on the death of their father,
who was the original tenant. This could not be undone by applying the provisions of the
1997 Act which was a subsequent legislation. In other words, in 1970, the tenancy was
heritable and thus the Appellants along with their mother had become tenants on the
property/premises.
9. On the other hand, learned Counsel Mr. Sabyasachi Chowdhary appearing on behalf
of the Respondent-landlord would rely on the findings given by the High Court, in the
present case, and in addition, he would rely upon two judgments of the Calcutta High
Court Sri. Sushil Kumar Jain & Ors. v. Pilani Properties Limited, MANU/WB/0982/2017
and Satyanarayana More v. Milagrina Rose Correia, MANU/WB/0519/2020, which are
both Division Bench judgments laying down a law contrary to the judgment in Goutam
Dey (supra).
The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Sushil Kumar (supra) had in fact
overruled the judgment of the Single Judge in Goutam Dey (supra). It relied on the
statement of objects and reasons of the 1997 Act and its purpose which was to do away
with the heritability of tenancy. The relevant paragraphs have been reproduced below:
20. The underlying logic of the judgment in Goutam Dey is that if a right vests
in a person under a statute, the same cannot be undone. As a proposition of
law it may sound attractive, but it will not hold good in all cases. While it is
true that certain rights if they vest under a predecessor statute cannot be
undone by a successor statute, the purpose of the statutes, the nature of the
rights and the extent of the vesting of such rights are relevant considerations.
2 1 . The 1956 Act provided for a degree of protection to certain classes of
tenants in this State. In course of time, the legislative wisdom provided for a
relaxation in the norms such that the protection was limited to a smaller class
of persons and in certain specified situations by the Act of 1997. It cannot be
said, for instance, that merely because a tenancy had been created prior to the
1997 Act, the protection enjoyed under the 1956 Act would continue even after
the 1997 Act has come into operation. The 1997 Act does not admit of such a
situation...
***
23. It must also be added that courts ought to be very cautious before finding
words used in the statute to be otiose or meaningless. The intention of Section
2(g) of the 1997 Act is to regard heirs of the original tenant who were
dependent on him and were residing with him at the time of his death as
tenants for a period of five years. That would imply that for a period of five
years from the death of the original tenant, the heirs of the original tenant who
were dependent on the original tenant and were residing with him will be
entitled to the same protection Under Section 6 of the 1997 Act as the original
tenant. However, such umbrella of protection is removed upon the conclusion
of the fifth year from the date of death of the original tenant, in case the
original tenant died after the 1997 Act came into effect. For the similar heirs of
the original tenants who had died prior to the 1997 Act coming into force, a
period of five years was counted from the date of the 1997 Act coming into
operation.
24. It was a policy decision taken by the legislature to afford a five-year period
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 for the dependents of the original tenant who ordinarily resided with him at the
time of his death to make alternative arrangements. To ensure that all such
heirs of the original tenant had the same time period to make alternative
arrangements, the clause "whichever is later" was introduced in Section 2(g) of
the 1997 Act so that the heirs of the original tenant who had died prior to the
1997 Act coming into force did not have a shorter time to make such alternative
arrangements. That is the meaning and purpose of the expression, "whichever
is later", in Section 2(g) of the Act.
Thus, the counsel for the Respondent/landlord would argue that even if the Appellants
claim tenancy under the 1956 Act, then also their tenancy would expire on 09.07.2006,
i.e., five years after the 1997 Act came into force. This logic is based on the
interpretation of the term "whichever is later". In other words, protection is only for five
years, even for the one who had inherited 'tenancy' when the old Act was in force, as it
say five years from the death of the tenant or five years from the enforcement of the
Act, "whichever is later". Since the new Act came into force in 2001, therefore, although
the tenant (and in this case it would be the father of the Appellant i.e., the original
tenant) died in the year 1970 but five years will be counted from 2001. In other words,
the language of the statute suggests that its purpose was to cover even the death of a
tenant which occurred during the subsistence of the old Act. But such an interpretation
would depend upon whether the new Act has a retrospective application!
10. Whether the 1997 Act would cover such tenants who were protected under the 1956
Act is the question? The High Court has held that the legislature by virtue of section
2(g) of the 1997 Act, intended to extinguish the tenancy of all such legal heirs, who
inherited it on the death of their predecessor-in-interest before the enforcement of the
1997 Act. Such rights would expire after five years from the commencement of Act.
To understand the intention of the legislature, we will have to examine the provisions of
the 1956 Act and also the 1997 Act.
11. The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 received assent from the President of
India on 28.11.1998 and as per notification dated 09.07.2001, the provisions of the
1997 Act came into force on 10.07.2001. The Object and Reasons of the 1997 Act are
also important, the portion relevant for our examination is reproduced below:
The National Housing Policy approved by the Central Government recommended
that appropriate amendment in existing laws and regulations be carried out for
creating enabling atmosphere for housing activities in the country. A number of
export bodies such as the Economic Administration Reform Commission and the
National Commission on Urbanisation have recommended reforming the rent
legislation in a way that balances the interests of both the landlords and the
tenants and also that stimulates future construction to meet the growing
demands for housing.
On the basis of the various recommendations of the experts and also after a
series of consultations with the State Governments, the Ministry of Urban
Development of India prepared a Model Rent Control Legislation, and sent to
the States for consideration.
12. The entire issue revolves around the interpretation of the phrase "for a period not
exceeding five years from the date of death of such tenant or from the date of coming
into force of this Act, whichever is later" used in section 2(g) of the 1997 Act. There is
no ambiguity in case the original tenant passes away after the commencement of 1997
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Act, as in such a case, it is clear that the specified heirs will get a limited protection of
five years only. The difficulty is in enforcing the above provision of section 2(g) of 1997
Act in a situation where the original tenant had died before the commencement of 1997
Act i.e., prior to July 10, 2001. The matter at hand falls in the latter.
The Single Judge in Goutam Dey (supra) observed that a literal reading of 'or from the
date of coming into force of this Act, whichever is later' would lead to absurd results as
all tenancies devolved under the 1956 Act, would end together on the same day (July 9,
2006), i.e., five years after the enforcement of the 1997 Act! Thus, the Single Judge
held the aforesaid phrase to be redundant and a piece of loose drafting by the State
Legislature.
13. Subsequently, the Calcutta High Court considered this issue in Prabir Kumar Jalan
v. Laxmi Narayan Jalan, MANU/WB/0836/2012 where another Bench of a learned
Single Judge did assign meaning to the phrase, which was referred to as a piece of
loose drafting in Gautam Dey (supra). In Prabir Kumar (supra), the High Court decreed
the suit for eviction against the Respondent- Defendant therein and observed that if the
Legislature intended to apply section 2(g) of 1997 Act only to the deaths which would
have occurred after the commencement of the new Act, then legislature was not
required to use the phrase "or from the date of coming into force of this Act, whichever
is later". This is what was said:
21. Now, if Ms. Doshi's argument that the rights of the original tenant vested in
the Defendants on his death on 25th December, 1999 was true, then there
would be no occasion for the legislature to enact that the status of a tenant
would cease on expiry of five years from the date of the Act or five years after
the death whichever was later. If the legislature had intended to protect the
heirs of a tenant under the 1956 Rent Act, the tenant having died before coming
into force of the new Rent Act, the legislature would have only prescribed five
years from the date of death which must occur on or after coming into force of
the new Act. Or better still it could have said five years from the death and no
more. The legislature need not have said any more...
But to our mind, the Single Judge bench while deciding this case did not consider the
observations made in Goutam Dey (supra). Eventually, this issue came before a
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court.
14. In Sushil Kumar Jain (supra), the Division Bench, in its effort to give meaning to
the words of Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act, held that there appears to be 'a different
intention' on the part of the legislature, which was to dilute the rights of the tenant
given under the old Act. A challenge against this decision was also made before this
Court, which came to be dismissed without issuance of notice at the admission stage
itself with the following order:2
We see no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High
Court at Calcutta.
The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
However, as prayed for, one month's time is granted to vacate the suit premises
subject to filing usual undertaking in the Registry of this Court within two
weeks from today, stating that the Petitioners shall not create any third party
rights, will clear all the rent/dues/occupational charges in the meanwhile and
will peacefully vacate the suit premises concerned at the end of one month
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 positively.
Here, we want to pause for a while to note that this dismissal of SLP is no bar on us to
decide the issue at hand. The dismissal of an SLP at the admission stage before
issuance of notice, with a non-speaking order, does not mean that this Court has
affirmed the law laid down by impugned order. [See: P.Singaravelan v. District
Collector, Tiruppur MANU/SC/1769/2019 : (2020) 1 SCC (L&S) 453; Palam Gas Service
v. CIT MANU/SC/0571/2017 : 2017:INSC:432 : (2017) 7 SCC 613; Kunhayammed v.
State of Kerala MANU/SC/0432/2000 : 2000:INSC:339 : (2000) 6 SCC 359]
15. Subsequently, the view taken in Sushil Kumar Jain (supra) by the Calcutta High
Court, was reiterated by another Division Bench in Satyanarayan More v. Milagrina Rose
Correia, MANU/WB/0519/2020. Both these judgments have put much emphasis on the
object behind the promulgation of the 1997 Act. According to them, the new Act aims to
free the landlords from the clutches of the 1956 Act by creating a balance between the
rights of tenants and interest of the landlord. We agree with the view so far as it says
that the purpose of the 1997 Act was to create a balance between the interests of
tenants and landlords but we doubt that it can be extended to say that legislature
intended to extinguish the rights of legal heirs (who had become tenants under the old
Act after the death of their predecessor-in-interest) on a particular date.
16. The current position of law as it seems from the decision of the Calcutta High Court
is that the 1997 Act represents a shift of legislative intent. While the 1956 Act
approached tenancy as a heritable right that can be claimed by legal heirs of an original
tenant, this position was changed by the 1997 Act, to provide a limited protection of
five years to the specific heirs of an original tenant and, as per the High Court, in cases
where original tenant had died during the existence of old Act, five years shall be
counted from the commencement of the new Act.
17. In our considered opinion, the above view of the Calcutta High Court cannot be
sustained. The High Court in the case of Goutam Dey (supra) has held that the new
statute which touches upon the existing rights cannot be retrospective, without an
express provision or necessary implication expressing the clear intent of the Legislature.
Goutam Dey (supra) relied upon Section 8(c) of the West Bengal General Clauses Act to
say that a new statute does not affect existing rights. Section 45 of the 1997 Act
repealed the 1956 Act but that cannot mean that rights accrued under the old Act are
extinguished altogether with the enforcement of the new Act.
The enforcement of a new statute ipso facto will not take away the rights already
accrued under a repealed statute, unless this intention is reflected in the new statute.
This Court in CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd., MANU/SC/0810/2014 : 2014:INSC:629
: (2015) 1 SCC 1 reiterated the general principles concerning retrospectivity of statutes.
This is what was said:
"28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one
established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is
presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind
the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today
cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do something today, we do it
keeping in view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow's backward
adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the bedrock
that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the
existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset.
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 This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit: law looks forward not
backward. As was observed in Phillips v. Eyre [(1870) LR 6 QB 1], a
retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation by
which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first
time to deal with future acts ought not to change the character of past
transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.
29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of
"fairness", which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in
L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita- Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd.
[MANU/UKHL/0046/1993 : (1994) 1 AC 486 : (1994) 2 WLR 39 : (1994) 1 All
ER 20 (HL)] Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose
obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as
prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a
retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious
omission in a former legislation or to explain a former legislation."
(emphasis supplied)
18. It is to be kept in mind that Courts can, and must, differ from the literal meaning of
words if the reading of any provision provides absurd results.
There are specific grounds under which a landlord can seek eviction of the tenant. There
are provisions as well for immediate recovery of possession for certain classes of
landlords. But Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act cannot be interpreted in the manner it has
been done by the Calcutta High Court in Sushil Kumar (supra) and Satyanarayan More
(supra).
19. We are of the view that the phrase "or from the date of coming into force of this
Act, whichever is later", used in section 2(g) of 1997 Act, was rightly held to be
superfluous in Goutam Dey (supra). We do not doubt the wisdom of the legislature but
we are constrained to hold that the case at hand reflects loose drafting, as it seems to
have created more problems than it sought to resolve.
Francis Bennion, who has been quoted by Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Karnataka v.
Ranganatha Reddy MANU/SC/0062/1977 : 1977:INSC:196 : (1977) 4 SCC 471 while
dealing with Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, had said the
following words about the Renton Committee Report (Report on Preparation of
Legislation):
The Renton Committee points out that the problem of obscure statute law is
important to every citizen.
There is hardly any part of our national life or of our personal lives that is not
affected by one statute or another. The affairs of local authorities, nationalised
industries, public corporations and private commerce are regulated by
legislation. The life of the ordinary citizen is affected by various provisions of
the statute book from cradle to grave.
The committee might have added that the rule of law and parliamentary
democracy itself are imperilled if laws are incomprehensible. They did say that
it is of fundamental importance in a free society that the law should be readily
ascertainable and reasonably clear, and that otherwise it is oppressive and
deprives the citizen of one of his basic rights. It is also needlessly expensive

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 and wasteful. Reed Dicerson, the famous American draftsman, said it cost the
Government and the public 'many millions of dollars annually.
Justice Iyer in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, MANU/SC/0062/1977 :
1977:INSC:196 : (1977) 4 SCC 471 further observes that "our draftsmen handle foreign
know-how meant for different circumstances, and without full grasp of the economic
regulation or the leisure and facilities for such study". He went on to further state that:
In a country where the people are, by and large, illiterate, where a social
revolution is being pushed through by enormous volume and variety of
legislation and where new economic adventures requiring unorthodox jural
techniques are necessitous, if legal drafting is to be equal to the challenge of
change, a radicalisation of its methodology and philosophy and an ability for
the legislative manpower to express themselves in streamlined, simple, project-
oriented fashion is essential. In the hope that a role- conscious court
communicates to a responsive Cabinet, we make this observation."
(Para 49)
Ambiguous drafting leads to manifold problems and generates lengthy litigations, as it
has evidently done in the case at hand. There is no clarity in the 1997 Act to suggest
that it extinguishes the rights of all tenants (who inherited tenancy rights under Old Act)
retrospectively.
20. This is also not the first occasion where Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act has been
under consideration by this Court. In Nasimi Naqi v. Todi Tea Co. Ltd. & Ors. (CA
No.9052/2019, decided on 26.11.2019) the second proviso to the same section was
held to contain an inadvertent omission as the spouse was not given the right of
preference for tenancy in case of a fresh agreement, which was given to certain other
specified heirs. This is what was said:
The exclusion of a spouse of a deceased tenant is without rationale,
discriminatory and deprives the surviving spouse of a valuable entitlement
granted to the other heirs. There is a valid justification for amending the
provision so as to bring the widow within the ambit of the second proviso. This
is a matter which, in our view, deserves to be considered by the legislature.
Having due regard to the object and purpose underlying the recognition of a
right of preference under the second proviso and the social welfare purpose
underlying the enactment of the legislation, it would be appropriate if this
aspect is considered... There would appear to be no justification for not
considering the grant of such a protection on the spouse of the original tenant.
We hope and trust that this aspect of the omission in the second proviso will
engage the attention of the law makers so as to fulfill the salutary purpose of
the provision.
21. It is true that legislature can restrict heritability by amending or repealing the law,
as the case might be. The Division Bench's finding (in the impugned judgment dated
08.12.2022), is that since legislature can restrict the heritability it has done precisely
that in the 1997 Act, by adding the words "five years from the date of death of such
tenant or from the date of coming into force of this Act, whichever is later". Hence, as
per the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, the death of S.K. Mitra in 1970 also
stands covered under new Act. In other words, the 1997 Act changes "heritable rights"
retrospectively according to the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. Although, the
actual date when eviction would happen is post the new Act but it does have a
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retrospective application as well in as much as it is applicable retrospectively to an
earlier date (1970 in the present case) and had taken away a right of the Appellants,
given to them under the old statute.
Statutory laws operate from the date of their enforcement i.e., prospectively. In case
the legislature intends to make a law retrospective then such an intention of the
legislature must be shown clearly and unambiguously in the statute itself. The Division
Bench's mere interpretation of a statutory provision will not make the law retrospective
and take away the heritable rights of a tenant.
2 2 . In view of the above, we hold that Smt. Usha Mitra and the Appellants jointly
inherited the tenancy from Sh. S.K. Mitra, in the year 1970. Thus, the impugned
judgment is liable to be set aside as Appellants' tenancy did not expire in the year 2006,
by the introduction of 1997 Act, in the absence of a clear and unequivocal intention in
the 1997 Act to have a retrospective operation.
23. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed. Orders dated 29.06.2022 and 08.12.2022
of the Single Judge and the Division Bench respectively are set aside.
24. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
25. Interim order(s), if any, shall stand vacated.

1 6.Judgment on admissions.- (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in
the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of
the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting
for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or
give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.
(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced Under Sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up
in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the
judgment was pronounced.
2 SLP (C) No. 2750/2018, decided on 07.02.2018.

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