Garcia v. Drilon [G.R. No.

179267 | June 25, 2013]

DOCTRINE : the VAWC law is constitutional because there is a substantial distinction between
men and women as well as children

FACTS :
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of
her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband,
Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.

BACKGROUND :
Rosalie and Jesus are married and have 3 children. Rosalie alleged that Jesus is dominant,
controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade Rosalie to
pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends

Things turned for the worse when Jesus took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson’s
Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Jesus’ infidelity spawned a series
of fights that left Rosalie physically and emotionally wounded.

In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with
such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent
forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their
daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed
for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. -Rosalie then
filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod
City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner,
with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO on March 24, 2006
effective for thirty (30) days.

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent ExParte Motion
for Renewal of the TPO seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did
not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing.

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition for prohibition, with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1)
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection
clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being “an unwanted
product of an invalid law.”

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed the petition for
failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the
civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the
validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders
issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution
dated August 14, 2007 , petitioner is now the Supreme Court.

ISSUES :
WON :

1. THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE VAWC LAW WAS PROPERLY RAISED

RULINGS :
ISSUE 1 :
NO. The issue on the constitutionality of the VAWC should have been raised at the Family Court
level. Jesus explained that he did not do so because the issue on constitutionality was too
complex for the Family Court to resolve. Besides, in a petition for protection order, counterclaims
are not allowed. Jesus considered the issue on constitutionality as a counterclaim hence he did
not raise the same in the Family Court. These arguments are wrong. The Family Court is a
Regional Trial Court which under the law is clothed with authority to decide on the
constitutionality of laws. The issue on constitutionality is not a counterclaim. Hence, it is not
barred from being raised in a Petition for PPO. (Note however that in this case, the
constitutionality of RA 9262 has been settled once and for all so it is unlikely that a similar
question will be raised in subsequent cases).

ISSUE 2 :
No, R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the Constitution. Since, the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Hence, it guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The equal protection
clause simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, and the enactment of the RA 9262 aims to
address discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women, because there
have been unequal power relations between men and women which led to domination over
discrimination against women by men. Hence, the equal protection of the laws clause of the
constitution through a gender-based classification and special remedies provided by law under
RA 9262 should be sustained.

ISSUE 3 :
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to
dueprocess. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests,among which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte , the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5)
days from service.

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should
be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus,
the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money,children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a
mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings,
is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process

ISSUE 4 :
There is no undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials. As clearly delimited by the
aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the PunongBarangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad , merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical
harm to the woman or her child; and (2)threatening to cause the woman or her child physical
harm. Such function of the PunongBarangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of
his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain
public order in the barangay."

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence
of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall
be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers."

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed
and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable
ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists
or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds
true with the issuance of a BPO.