Ramon Fabie et. al. v.
The City of Manila
G.R. No. 6583 (February 16, 1912)
CARSON, J.:
FACTS
Ordinance No. 124 of the city of Manila was enacted relating to the issuance of permits for the
erection of buildings. The appellees are the owners in common of a large tract of land which
forms a part of the estate known as the Hacienda de Santa Ana de Sapa located within Manila.
The plaintiffs and appellees sought to obtain from the city of Manila a building permit
authorizing the construction of a small nipa house upon the property in question. It was
claimed that the purpose of the building was to serve as a guard house in which watchmen
might be stationed in order to prevent the carrying away of zacate from the premises. The
permit was denied by the city authorities on the grounds that the site of the proposed building
did not conform to the requirements of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of
Manila, as amended by Ordinance No. 124, which provides: "That the building shall abut or face
upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially approved."
It is the contention of the appellees herein that this provision is unconstitutional and in
violation of the fundamental rights of the property owners of the city of Manila as guaranteed
by the established laws of these Islands and by the Constitution of the United States, in that it
constitutes an invasion of their property rights without due process of law. The appellant, the
city of Manila, insists that the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of the police power of
the city, in that its sole purpose and aim is to effect these ends by affording better sanitary
regulations as well as increased facilities for protection to property from loss by fire.
ISSUE
Is the provision requiring that buildings shall face upon a public street or private alley under
Ordinance No. 124 valid pursuant to police power?
RULING
YES. In the case of U. S. v. Toribio, to justify the State in the exercise of its police powers on
behalf of the public, it must appear:
"First, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting
the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual
and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.”
It is very clear that the ordinance, if it be held to be reasonable, prescribes a rule in the interest
of the public of the city of Manila generally, as distinguished from the interests of individuals or
of a particular class. In determining its validity, therefore, the only questions which need be
considered, are whether its provisions are or are not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of its purposes, and whether they are or are not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
There can be no question as to the intent and purpose of the provision of the ordinance under
discussion. It is manifestly intended to subserve the public health and safety of the citizens of
Manila generally, and was not conceived in favor of any class or of particular individuals. Those
charged with the public welfare and safety of the city deemed the enactment of the ordinance
necessary to secure these purposes, and it cannot be doubted that if its enactment was
reasonably necessary to that end it was and is a due and proper exercise of the police power.
We are of opinion that the enforcement of its provisions cannot fail to redound to the public
good, and that it should be sustained on the principle that "the welfare of the people is the
highest law" (salus populi suprema est lex). Indeed having in mind the controlling public
necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures to secure the ends sought to be
attained by the enactment of this provision of the ordinance; and the large discretion
necessarily vested in the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the
public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests; we are
satisfied that we would not be justified in an attempt to restrict or control the exercise of that
discretion even if the "reasonable necessity" for its exercise in the particular form actually
adopted were much less apparent than it is in this case.
We conclude that the proviso of the ordinance in question directing:
"That the building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private
street or alley which has been officially approved," is valid, and that the judgment of
the lower court should be reversed, without special condemnation of costs. So
ordered.
