Chapter

Reliability Analysis of
Instrumentation and Control
System: A Case Study of Nuclear
Power Plant
Mohan Rao Mamdikar, Vinay Kumar and Pooja Singh

Abstract

Instrumentation and control system (I&Cs) plays a key role in nuclear power
plants (NPP) whose failure may cause the major issue in a form of accidents,
hazardous radiations, and environmental loss. That is why importantly ensure the
reliability of such system in NPP. In this proposed method, we effectively analyze
the reliability of the instrumentation and control system. An isolation condenser
system of nuclear power plant is taken as a case study to show the analysis. The
methodology includes the dynamic behavior of the system using Petri net. The
proposed method is validated on operation data of NPP.

Keywords: reliability, control system, nuclear power plant, isolation condenser

system

1. Introduction

Instrumentation and control system (I&C) plays a vital role in the field of the
nuclear industry. Nowadays I&C systems are embedded into the nuclear power
plant (NPP) operation and reliability. Each component of NPP, such as trans-
formers, valves, circuit breakers, heat exchangers. is equipped with digital I&C
system whose reliability plays a vital role to avoid any accidents. Because these
components are safety-critical systems (SCS) whose failure may cause huge losses
in the form of economic loss, human resource damage, and environmental loss. As
instrumentation and control systems are the important and first layer of safety,
reliability, and stability in the NPP [1] that is the reason, it is essential to ensure the
reliability of such a safety system. With, the introduction of digital control systems
in the last few decades where the reliability of digital I&C must not be degraded.
Therefore, researchers are rigorously working to address the dependability of the
system. The dependability includes reliability, safety analysis, performance, and
availability attributes that are ultimately related to security. The model checking
may be used to various issues, which can lead to spurious actuation of the I&C
system [2]. The transformation from analog to digital I&C safety systems added
new challenges for researchers as well as software developers to deliver correct
software reliability [3]. Based on this software experts could take essential steps
early in the design phase of software by avoiding failures in I&C of NPP. The
cyberattack occurred in the I&C system in the Iranian Bushehr nuclear power plant,

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where configure was destroyed by malicious code [4]. Therefore, it is essential to

I&C systems required having secure and reliable to avoid any kind of attacks
causing major accidents. Many researchers have put efforts to address the reliability
analysis on such systems using various techniques, such as fault tree analysis (FTA),
reliability block diagram (RBD), Bayesian network, etc.
This work proposes the reliability analysis of instrumentation and control sys-
tem (I&C) of NPP using stochastic Petri net (SPN).
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, our focus is on the
related work of the proposed work. In Section 3, we discuss the background and
mathematical fundamentals. In Section 4, proposes the framework of the proposed
method. In Section 5, the case study of the proposed work. In Section 6, reliability
analysis of the proposed work. In Section 7, the validation part is covered. In Section
8, the conclusion is made with future work.

2. Related work

Zeller et al. [5] proposed a combined approach of Markov chain and component fault
tree to analyze the complex software-controlled system in the automotive domain. The
authors have addressed safety and reliability in modular form. However, authors have
missed to validate the result and failed to express reliability accuracy in percentage.
Nidhin et al. [6] presented a survey for understanding radiation effects in
SRAM-based FPGAs for implementing I&C of NPP. Authors have found that for
implementing NPP with I&C in SRAM-based FPGAs, the effect of radiation issue is
a major concern. To reduce radiation-related issues some components, which have
SRAM-based FPGAs, must keep outside of reactor containment building (RCB).
However, the authors have failed to discuss the case study.
Jia et al. [7] proposed an approach for the identification of vulnerabilities present
in elements that affect the reliability of digital instrumentation and control system
(DI&C) software life cycle using Bayesian network. A reliability demonstration of
safety-critical software (RDSS) integrates the claim-argument-evidence (CAE) and
sensitivity to estimate the reliability of the system. However, there is a limitation
with BN that has no time constraints and dynamic property. Authors have missed
addressing the reliability with validation from the real-time dataset.
Rejzek and Hilbes [8] proposed system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) for
design verification and risk analysis of digital I&C of NPP. This method is considered
as a prominent approach for analysis of the I&C system theoretically as the authors
claim. However, the authors are not very much sure, that method correct result.
Torkey et al. [9] proposed a reliability improvement framework of the digital
reactor protection system by transforming reliability block diagram to Bayesian belief
network (BBN). The proposed method gives the highest availability as a result and
found some modules are riskier than others of I&C. However, authors claim that it
gives the highest availability but missed to validate the result with real-time data.
Kumar et al. [3] proposed a framework for predicting the reliability of the
safety-critical and control system using the Bayesian update methodology. The
authors have validated the result with real-time data of 12 safety-critical control
systems of NPP. However, the result obtained is purely based on the failure data, if
failure data is unavailable then it is difficult to predict the reliability.
Mamdikar et al. [10] devise a framework for reliability analysis, performance
analysis that maps unified modified language (UML) to Petri net. The proposed
framework is validated with 32 safety-critical systems of NPP. However, Petri net
has a state space explosion problem as a system grows gradually, so it is not a
generalized approach.

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Nayak et al. [11] proposed a methodology called assessment of passive system

reliability (APSRA) is used to estimate the reliability of the passive isolation condenser
system of the Indian advanced heavy water reactor (AHWR). In this methodology,
reliability is estimated through PSA treatment using generic data of the component. A
classical fault tree analysis is used to find the root cause of the critical parameter, which
leads to failure. However, the authors have failed to validate the result.
Kumar et al. [12] proposed a safety analysis framework that maps UML into the
state-space model as Petri net of the safety-critical system of NPP. In this method-
ology, the result is validated on 29 different safety-critical systems of NPP. How-
ever, the authors have used Petri net that has a state space explosion problem.
Tripathi et al. [13] proposed a noble methodology dynamic reliability analysis of
the passive decay heat removal system of NPP using Petri net. The authors have
validated the estimated reliability based on the data available using fault tree anal-
ysis. Most of the system does not have such type data, and then it is difficult to
validate the result with missing failure data. Therefore, this methodology may not
applicable for every safety-critical system of NPP.
Buzhinsky and Pakonen [14] proposed an automated symmetry breaking approach
for checking failure tolerance of I&C system. With this method a fewer failure com-
bination has to be checked. The complex structure paired with various specifications
has to be checked under failure assumptions, which is the limitation of this work.
Singh et al. [15] proposed a system modeling strategy for design verification of
I&C of nuclear power plant using Petri net and converting PN into Markov chain.
In this approach, verification is validated on real-time data. However, Petri net has
a state-space explosion problem, in such circumstances, it is difficult to handle
complex systems, which is the limitation of the work.
Xi et al. [16] proposed a test strategy based on the random selection of logic path
by which provides reliability estimation and is used for control system testing in
digital control software systems in the NPP. However, the authors have not been
addressed and validated the reliability evaluation.
Bao et al. [17] proposed hazard analysis for identifying common cause failure of
digital I&C using redundancy guided system in NPP. To conduct using redundancy
guided systems, theoretic hazard analysis a modularized approach was applied. This
method is helpful to remove casual effects of potential single points of failure that
exist in I&C. However, authors have missed addressing the reliability analysis using
this methodology in NPP.
Gupta et al. [1] proposed a method for stability analysis and steady-state analysis
of the safety system of NPP using Petri net. The stability and steady-state were
estimated and validated, however, authors have missed estimating reliability. The
authors have to correlate stability with reliability. Further, this methodology is
applicable only for discrete-time systems.

3. Background and mathematical fundamentals

This section consists of background and mathematical fundamentals to carry out

reliability analysis of instrumentation and control system: a case study of nuclear
power plant.

3.1 Petri net

A Petri net (PN) is mathematically defined 5-tuple PN ¼ ðP, T, F, W, M0 Þ

where P the finite is set places, T is a finite set of transitions, F is a finite set of arcs
also referred to as flow relation, i.e., F ⊆ ðP  T Þ∪ðT  PÞ, W : F⟶f1, 2, 3, … :g is the

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weight function, and M0 is the initial marking M0 : P⟶f0, 1, 2, 3, … :g. P∩T ¼ ∅ and
P∩T 6¼ ∅. If the Petri net does not have an initial marking, it is denoted as N ¼
ðP, T, F, W Þ with an initial marking denoted by ðN, M0 Þ. A simple example of the
PN is shown in Figure 1.
The marking changes in the Petri net as per the transition firing are as follows:

i. A transition in the enable mode when each input place of p of t is marked

with at least wðp, t Þ tokens.

ii. An enabled transition is not necessarily fired.

iii. A firing of enabled transition removes tokens from the input place and
deposited in the output place.

3.2 Stochastic Petri net

A stochastic Petri net (SPN) is the extension of Petri net. In SPN, each transition
is associated with a time delay that is an exponentially distributed random variable
that expresses delay denoted by SPN ¼ ðP, T, F, W, M0 Þ.

3.3 Reachability

Reachability is the fundamental study of the dynamic property of the system. A

marking Mn is said to be reachable from another marking M1 if there exists a firing
sequence that transforms Mn to M1 such that∂ ¼ fM1 t 0 M2 t 1 M3 … :t n Mn g.

3.4 Reachability graph and Markov chain (MC)

A marking M is reachable from the initial marking M0 if there exists a firing ∂

that brings back from the initial state of PN to a state that corresponds to M0 .
The Markov chain (MC) is the Markov process with discrete state space. The MC
is obtained from the reachability graph of the SPN. Let SPN be the reversible, i.e.,
M0 ∈ RðMi Þ for every Mi in RðM0 Þ, then the SPN generates an ergodic continuous
time Markov chain (CTMC)Q and it is possible to compute the steady-state
probability distribution by solving the following (Eq. (1)) and (Eq. (2)).
XY
Q ¼1 (1)

Figure 1.
Simple Petri net.

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X
s
πi ¼ 1 (2)
i¼1

Q
Where, πi is the probability being in the state Mi and ¼ ðπ1 , π2 , … πs Þ.

4. Framework of the proposed method

The proposed framework has six steps shown in Figure 2. Step 1—based on the
system requirement we model the stochastic Petri net.
In step 2—by executing the PN model, we generate possible tangible states.
Based on the tangible states, we construct the reachability graph in step 3. In
step 4—obtained Markov chain form reachability, the graph of SPN. In step 5, we
estimate the reliability of the ISO system. In step 6, we validate the result with
real-time operation data of NPP.

5. Case study: Isolation condenser system (ISO)

The isolation condenser system simply referred to as ISO is a standby high-

pressure system that removes residual and decay heat from the reactor vessel in the
event of a scram signal in which the reactor becomes isolated from the main
condenser, or if any other high-pressure condition exists. The schematic diagram is
shown in Figure 3. The ISO system transfers residual and decays heat from the
reactor coolant to the water in the shell side of the isolation condenser resulting in
steam generation (SG). The steam generated in the shell side of the isolation con-
denser is then vented to the outside atmosphere. During the normal operation, the
ISO system is in standby mode. During the standby mode, the steam isolation valves
(VS1 and VS2) are open because the condenser tube bundles are at the reactor

Figure 2.
Proposed framework of the system.

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Nuclear Reactors - Spacecraft Propulsion, Research Reactors, and Reactor Analysis Topics

pressure. The condensate is built in the condenser and condensate by returning

pipe. The condensate is stopped from a return back to the reactor by closing the
condensate return valve (VC2). The condensate valve (VC1) is open at the stand-by
condition and vent valves (VV) at main steam lines normally open to vent
noncondensable gases from ISO. The makeup water must be provided to prevent
uncovering the condenser tubes that are the combination of firewater and conden-
sate using makeup water valve (VW) normally closed at standby mode. The water
inventory on the shell side of the condenser will provide heat removal for between
20 and 90 minutes depending on the plant design, at which time makeup water
must be provided to prevent uncovering the condenser tubes. On the shell side of
the condenser, the water inventory will be provided for the heat removal between
20 to 90 minutes. At which time water makeup has to be provided to prevent
uncovering the condenser system tubes (Figure 3).

Figure 3.
Schematic diagram of isolation condenser system.

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.101099

The ISO system may be initiated manually, or automatically initiated on high

reactor pressure or low reactor pressure. On the initiation of ISO, one of the con-
densate return valves (VC2) opens and the vent valve (VV) gets closed. The steam
flows from the reactor vessel to steam isolation valves (VS1 and VS2). The steam gets
condensed in condenser tube bundles and condensed steam returns to the reactor
vessel (VC2 and VC2) with help of a recirculation pump. The boiled-off water is
replaced by the condensate transfer system or the firewater system. The ISO system
is designed in such a way that, the system automatically gets isolated from the
reactor pressure vessel in the event of a system pipe break. All the valves are closed
automatically (VS1, VS2, VC2, VC2, and VV) in the event of low differential pressure
exceeds three times the normal flow value. This isolation will mitigate the loss of
water inventory. The ISO system instrumentation and control consists of initiation
and containment isolation circuitry [18]. These circuits provide different functions,
both of which are important to system reliability. The entire system is operating in a
closed-loop manner.

6. Proposed framework of approach

To estimate the reliability by our approach of the ISO which consist of six steps
as shown in Figure 2 as described step by step as follows:

6.1 PN model generation

In this phase, we construct the PN model of ISO system based on system

requirements and specifications. As several researchers have proposed methods
[19], based on that we generated a PN model. Based on functional requirements, the
activity involves the PN generation to identify the places and transitions of the case
study: ISO system. The identified places and transitions as illustrated in Table 1.
Thereafter, we use the TimeNet4.5 [20] tool for SPN creation. Then we assign
the transition delay to the transition based on the system requirement. To get

Places Description Transitions Description

P0 Sensors detect trip T0 Sensors detects initial condition

P1 Initial signal generated T1 Triggers VV valve close and VV valve close

P2 Initial condition holds T2 IC loop triggers

P3 Initial condition forwards T3 Triggers VV valve open and VV valve close

P4 IC loop activated T4 Triggers Vs1 valve and Vs2 valve open

P5 Vc2 valve close T5 Send signal to Vw valve open

P6 Vc1 valve open T6 Triggers Vw valve open

P7 VV valve close T7 Reset

P8 Vs1 valve open T8 Reset of AC loss

P9 Vs2 valve open T9 Reset of restoration

P10 Level measure makeup

P11 Vw valve open

P12 Reset

Table 1.
ISO places and transitions based on function specification.

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throughput values of transition stationary analysis was performed in the TimeNet

tool as shown in Table 2.
The PN model was generated using TimeNet tools shown in Figure 4.

6.2 Tangible states and reachability graph creation

Tangible states are those for timed transitions [21], since we used SPN so there
are e tangible states with markings as shown in Table 3.
Based on the tangible states of the PN a reachability graph of the PN (Figure 4)
can be obtained as shown in Figure 5.

Transition Rate Symbol Throughput value

T0 1 ms λ0 0.26966908

T1 1 ms λ1 0.10385724

T2 1 ms λ2 0.28610826

T3 1 ms λ3 0.1771261

T4 1 ms λ4 0.08883328

T5 1 ms λ5 0.09000000

T6 1 ms λ6 0.03244971

T7 1 ms λ7 0.06681974

T8 1 ms λ8 0.03152016

T9 1 ms λ9 0.03244971

Table 2.
ISO throughput values.

Figure 4.
PN model of ISO.

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States Marking Tangible

M0 1,000,000,000,000 Yes

M1 0100000000000 Yes

M2 0000010011100 Yes

M3 0000010000011 Yes

M4 0000001000000 Yes

M5 0000000100000 Yes

M6 0000100000000 Yes

M7 0010000000000 Yes

M8 0001000000000 Yes

Table 3.
ISO tangible states with markings of PN.

Figure 5.
Reachability graph.

6.3 Markov chain model creation

The MC model shown in Figure 6 is obtained from the reachability graph of the
PN shown in Figure 4.
With the help of Q which is transition probability matrix, the transition
probability Pij of MC can be computed from SPN. For the transition matrix Q,
transitionrate qij is the transition of one state to another states unit/per time,
therefore we take the ratio of the transition qij and the transition rate of the states
sum must be zero. The diagonal elements can be defined as:

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Nuclear Reactors - Spacecraft Propulsion, Research Reactors, and Reactor Analysis Topics

X
qii ¼  qij (3)
j6¼i

It is clear that the system is no ergodic, therefore, Pij will be zero and defined as:
8 q
>
> ij
< P q , if k 6¼ i
k6¼i ik
Pij ¼ (4)
>
>
:
0, otherwise

P ¼ I  d1
Q Q, where dQ ¼ diaðQ Þ diagonal matrix of Q:
The transition matrix is given in Eq. (5) as follows:
2 3
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8
6 7
6 M0 λ0 λ0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M1 0 λ1 λ1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M2 0 0 λ4 λ4 0 0 0 0 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M3 0 0 0 λ2 λ2 0 0 0 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M4 0 0 0 0 λ3 λ3 0 0 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M5 0 0 0 0 0 ðλ5 þ λ8Þ λ8 λ5 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M6 λ9 0 0 0 0 0 λ9 0 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 λ6 λ6 7
4 5
M8 λ7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 λ7
2 3
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8
6 7
6 M0 0:26966 0:26966 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M1 0 0:1038 0:1038 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M2 0 0 0:0888 0:0888 0 0 0 0 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M3 0 0 0 0:2861 0:2861 0 0 0 0 7
6 7
¼6 7
6 M4 0 0 0 0 0:1771 0:1771 0 0 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M5 0 0 0 0 0 0:0630 0:0315 0:090 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M6 0:0324 0 0 0 0 0 0:0324 0 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:0324 0:0324 7
4 5
M8 0:0668 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:0668
(5)

Figure 6.
Markov chain.

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Now we solve Eq. (5) to get the design metrics and it seriousness of the NPP
as defined in Eq. (6). We solve the Eq. (6) then we get the following linear equations.
2 3
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8
6 M0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
6 7
6 7
6 M1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
6 7
6M 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
6 2 7
6 7
6 M3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7
6 7 (6)
6M 7
6 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7
6 7
6 M5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:2 0:7 0 7
6 7
6M 7
6 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
6 7
4 M7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
M8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M0 ¼ M1 (7)
M2 ¼ M1 (8)
M2 ¼ M3 (9)
M3 ¼ M4 (10)
M4 ¼ M5 (11)
M5 ¼ 0:2M6 (12)
M5 ¼ 0:7M7 (13)
M6 ¼ M0 (14)
M7 ¼ M8 (15)
M8 ¼ M0 (16)
X
8
Mi ¼ 1 (17)
i¼0

6.4 Reliability analysis of proposed framework

Let pi ðtÞ be the probability which component in state at time t is i. When

components execute for t ! ∞ then probability leads to the stationary distribution.
Then probability is defined as:
!
p ½pðM0 Þ, pðM1 Þ, pðM2 Þ, pðM3 Þ, pðM4 Þ, pðM5 Þ, pðM6 Þ, pðM7 Þ, pðM8 Þ,  (18)
X
pðiÞ ¼ 1 (19)
iϵM
X
Reliest
ISO ¼ 1  Mi (20)
iϵ6

There is only one failure state M6 in MC. Now we solve the linear equation
Eqs. (7)-(16) and Eq. (17) using the standard method, we get steady-state
probability of each state as follows:
M0 ¼ 0:1282051, M1 ¼ 0:1282051, M2 ¼ 0:1282051, M3 ¼ 0:1282051,
M4 ¼ 0:1282051, M5 ¼ 0:1282051, M6 ¼ 0.025641, M7 ¼ 0.1025641, and
M8 ¼ 0:1025641

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Hence the reliability of ISO is:

Reliability ¼ 1  0:025641 ¼ 0:974359: (21)

7. Validation of proposed framework

In section, we compute the rate of failure to ensure the result experimentally of

the proposed framework and follow the six steps for reliability estimation [10, 22].
We divide the entire input class into several subclass and for estimating reliability
following equation required as:

X
6
hi
RðtÞ ¼ Pðei Þ (22)
i¼1
ni

Pðei Þ is the probability specified from input operation data. ni is the number of
trials from each comparable class. hi is a number of trial cases that are failed.
To estimate the actual reliability Table 4 data will be used.
Now using Eq. (22) we estimate actual reliability as:

X
6
hi
Relactual ¼ 1  Pðei Þ ¼ 0:989999
i¼1
ni

Now we compare estimated (predicted) and actual reliability as:

Reliðdiff Þ ¼ Relactual  Reliestimated

¼ 0:989999  0:974359

¼ 0:01564

Hence, the error percentages can be computed as:

Relðdiff Þ 0:01564
Error% ¼ X100 ¼ X100 ¼ 1:57981%
Relactual 0:989999

Hence, the accuracy of proposed reliability computed of proposed framework is

ð100  error%Þ ¼ 98:4201% that indicates the validation of our work.

Class P ðe i Þ hi ni hi
Pðei Þ
ni

Triggers VV valve close and VV valve close 0:028 2 170 0.00039

IC loop triggers 0.023 1 200 0.000115

Triggers VV valve open and VV valve close 0.0304 4 200 0.000608

Triggers Vs1 valve and Vs2 valve open 0.0987 2 40 0.004935

Send signal to Vw valve open 0.0342 3 30 0.00342

Triggers Vw valve open 0.0032 5 30 0.000533

Table 4.
Reliability estimation using [22].

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8. Conclusion

The proposed method is centered technique for computing reliability of

instrumentation and control system of the safety-critical system of NPP. We have
validated the result with operational and found accuracy with 98:4201%. With this
method, software designers take necessary preventive measures early design phase
to avoid any kind of failure.

Author details

Mohan Rao Mamdikar1, Vinay Kumar1* and Pooja Singh2

1 National Institute of Technology, Jamshedpur, India

2 VJIT, Mumbai, India

*Address all correspondence to: [email protected]

© 2021 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.

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