Law of Persons Textbook 3rd Edition
Law of Persons Textbook 3rd Edition
Law of Persons
and the Family
3rd Edition
Edited by A Barratt
A Barratt, R Denson, W Domingo,
JD Mahler-Coetzee, F Osman
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording,
or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder.
To request permission to reproduce or adapt any part of this publication, please contact the
Rights and Permissions team on 021 532 6000 or email: [email protected]
Acknowledgements:
Cover, Rawpixel.com. Shutterstock; p18, Nikolay Zaborskikh. Shutterstock; p18, North Wind
Picture Archives / Alamy Stock Photo; p18, Nagel Photography. Shutterstock; p28, with kind
permission from Kauffman; p105, Arena Holdings; p118, Arena Holdings; p125, with kind
permission from Bloomsbury; p329, What religion want by Jonathan Zapiro
Contents
ABOUT THE AUTHORS xiii
Chapter 2 THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS – DEFINING WORDS AND CONCEPTS IN LAW
– Amanda Barratt 5
1 Defining words and concepts 5
2 What is a ‘person’ – and why does this matter? 6
3 What are rights, duties and legal objects? 6
3.1 Real rights 7
3.2 Personal rights 7
3.3 Personality rights 7
3.4 Constitutional rights 8
4 What is ‘capacity’? 8
4.1 Passive legal capacity 8
4.2 Capacity to perform juristic acts 8
4.3 Capacity to be held accountable for wrongdoing (delicts and crimes) 9
4.4 Capacity to litigate 10
5 What is ‘status’? 10
6 Forms of liability 11
6.1 Contractual liability 11
6.2 Delictual liability 12
6.3 Unjustified enrichment 12
7 Useful remedies, defences and doctrines 13
8 Succession 14
Chapter 7 DOMICILE
– Amanda Barratt 89
1 What is domicile? 89
2 When is it important to know where a person is domiciled? 89
2.1 Which legal system applies? ‘Choice of law’ or ‘conflict of laws’ or ‘private
international law’ 90
3 Where is a person domiciled? Domicile Act 3 of 1992 92
4 Domicile of choice 92
4.1 Is the person competent to establish a domicile of choice? 93
4.2 Has the person in fact established a domicile of choice? 93
5 Domicile of closest connection 95
6 Domicile of origin 96
7 Proving domicile 96
8 Exclusivity and tenacity of domicile 97
9 Excluding renvoi 98
5.4 What happens if a person refuses access or prevents a person from exercising their
parental responsibilities and rights? 158
6 Termination, extension, suspension or restriction of parental responsibilities and rights 158
Chapter 4 ENGAGEMENTS
– Jacques Mahler-Coetzee 177
1 Common law and the contents of an engagement 177
2 Capacity to conclude a contract of engagement 178
3 Termination of the contract of engagement 178
4 Breach of contract of engagement 179
5 Damages for breach of contract of engagement 179
5.1 Breach of contract 179
5.2 Delictual damages – The actio iniuriarum 181
5.3 Reconsidering damages for termination of engagement 182
6 Returning of the engagement gifts 182
7 The fate of children 183
BIBLIOGRAPHY 360
TABLE OF STATUTES 372
TABLE OF CASES 379
INDEX 388
Part
1 Law of persons
Chapter 1: Introduction 3
Chapter 2: Through the looking glass – Defining words and concepts
in law 5
Chapter 3: The beginning of legal personality 17
Chapter 4: Minority – How age affects status and capacity 31
Chapter 5: Sex and gender – Status and capacity 64
Chapter 6: Other factors affecting status and capacity 70
Chapter 7: Domicile 89
Chapter 8: The end of legal personality 101
Chapter 9: Law and the dead 112
1 Introduction
Most South African universities offer a course called ‘The law of persons’ in the first year of the LLB degree. Many
new law students are somewhat perplexed by the course name – surely all law is ‘the law of persons’? After all,
people make the law, and the law regulates human behaviour. Students soon discover that the law uses many
puzzling or esoteric terms. In law, things are often not quite what they seem at first glance.
For a start, the word ‘person’ when used as a legal term, does not mean exactly the same thing as the word
‘person’ in everyday language. The first thing that law students learn in their law of persons course is a new
definition of ‘person’ – a legal definition of person. Students are ‘persons’ in the eyes of the law – but so is their
university. In law, a university is also a ‘person’.
Much of the law of persons course examines ‘status’ and ‘capacity.’ A person’s status (their standing in the eyes
of the law) depends on the class or group to which the person belongs. The most important status is ‘minority’
(the status of people who are below the age of 18). Typically a law of persons course will look at minors in detail
and will examine the various capacities that minors do or do not have in the eyes of the law. The law of persons is
also concerned with the capacities of other groups of persons, for example, those who are mentally ill, or people
who are intoxicated.
Many law schools use a course on the law of persons as a general ‘Introduction to Law’. Law of persons is
often the first substantive law course that students do at law school, and this is where students first encounter the
many legal principles and concepts that they will use throughout their LLB (and in legal practice if they choose to
become lawyers). These principles and concepts are the ‘building blocks of law’ – they enable the law to work in
the way that it does.
Fortunately for law teachers and students, the law of persons provides many opportunities for using the
foundational building blocks of law: What is a ‘right’? What does it mean to have a right? How does the law protect your
rights or enable you to assert them? What is a legal ‘remedy’? What can you do with a remedy, and when, and how?
This book is intended primarily for new law students. One of the book’s purposes is to explain how to ‘think
like a lawyer’ and how to ‘work with the rules’. Thus the purpose of the book is not merely to present or state the
rules. Rules are easy enough to find using the internet ... anyone can do that. The primary purpose of a law school
is not to ‘teach rules’. Instead, students come to law school to learn how to use the rules. One of the purposes of
this book is to demonstrate why the rules and principles are useful and important, and how they can be put to use
when solving legal problems.
Law students also learn that all rules are not equal, and all sources of rules are not equal. Rules found in the
Constitution, Acts of Parliament, court judgments, or the writings of the Roman-Dutch writers are more
‘authoritative’ and important than rules found in a textbook. Constitutional rules are more important than rules
found in the other authoritative sources. It is important that you understand the sources of law, and learn how to use
them well. We provide examples of important legal sources and include activities intended to familiarise you with
the various types of legal literature. Again, the emphasis is on how to use the sources when solving legal problems.
The book contains several design features which make it a useful learning resource for law students: there are
activity features in all the chapters and a ‘review your understanding’ section at the end of each chapter. We also
list core ‘Further reading’ at the end of each chapter and the book has a full bibliography for those who wish to
read beyond the ‘Further reading’ lists. We use the index instead of a formal, separate glossary. Some of the terms
in the index are typed in bold, and we provide the page number where you can find a full definition and
explanation of the term.
We use the ‘Obiter’ feature for additional information and discussion. Many of the Obiter discussions
originate from questions asked by students during our lectures. The answers we gave were not core to our lectures,
but students found them interesting or useful, and we thought it would be worthwhile to include parts of those
discussions in this book.
Another core aim of a law school is to invite students to think critically about the law and its rules. Everyone
who works with the law should ask questions such as: ‘Is this a good rule?’; ‘Why does the rule look like this?’; ‘Is
this rule unfair?’; ‘Does this rule have the desired effect?’ In Part 1 of the book, we often use the Obiter boxes to
ask critical questions like this.
As your first ever ‘using law’ task, think about the following:
USING LAW
What legal rules concerning legal personhood and legal status are you already aware of?
Think back to your school days. Do you remember needing written permission from your parents to
go on a school trip? What about vaccinations that were given at the school? Did your parents need to
sign a permission form? Did you have a cellphone during your school days? Who had the cellphone
contract for this phone?
Words and concepts are the tools of the law. Unlike Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking Glass, we are not free
to decide what the words and concepts mean. In law, words and concepts have very precise meanings – and they
mean exactly that; ‘neither more nor less’ as Humpty Dumpty might say.
Lawyers are deeply concerned with definitions of words and concepts. They want to know precisely what the
words mean ... whole court cases sometimes hinge on the meaning of a particular word.2 You will notice that Acts
of Parliament often begin with a lengthy section called ‘definitions’. This section explains precisely what the words
mean in the context of the statute.3
The first book on Roman-Dutch law, Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland (Inleiding tot de
Hollandsche Rechtsgeleertheyd) was written by Hugo Grotius. The first official publication of this book (in 1631)
began with a foreword addressed to ‘Dear Reader’, which explained that the reason for publishing the book was
that unscrupulous publishers had been printing unauthorised copies that were ‘all imperfect and full of mistakes’.
The reader is assured that this author ‘has been careful to make definitions correspond with the words defined, a
matter in which the jurists often go wrong.’4 There is therefore evidence of the need to define legal words and
concepts precisely on the first page of the very first published work on Roman-Dutch law.
1 The quotation above is from Through the Looking Glass, a still popular book that was written for children in the nineteenth century.
(Carroll, 1998: 186).
2 See, for example, Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) where the Constitutional Court considers the legal meanings of
the words ‘husband’, ‘wife’, ‘spouse’, and ‘marriage’.
3 See, for example, section 1 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, which has several pages of definitions.
4 The quotations in this paragraph are from the Dear Reader foreword to Grotius’s Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland as
translated by R.W. Lee (Oxford University Press, 1926). Lee writes about the publishing history of Grotius’s work in his own preface. He
explains that Grotius wrote his book while imprisoned at the Castle of Loevenstein between 1619 and 1621. Grotius did not intend to
publish this work: he wrote it to teach his own children about the laws of their country. However, defective copies of the book began to
circulate in the 1620s, and it was in response to this that Grotius decided to authorise the first official publication of the book in 1631.
Many of the chapters in Part 1 refer to important legal ‘remedies’ that arise from contract, delict, or unjustified
enrichment. We have grouped together some of the most important remedies at the end of this chapter where we
explain them briefly.
Finally, we provide a brief introduction to the law of succession because readers will require some knowledge
of this area of law when reading later chapters.
When you have worked through this chapter, you should be able to answer the following questions:
• What is a person (legal subject)?
• What is a legal object?
• What are the various classes of rights?
• What is legal capacity?
• What are the various types of legal capacity?
• What is legal status?
The last three sections of the chapter are intended primarily for future reference. As you work through this book,
you can return to these sections for introductions to:
1. Forms of liability:
a) contractual
b) delictual
c) unjustified enrichment
2. Useful legal remedies
3. Introductory rules for the law of succession.
Chapter 2: Through the looking glass – Defining words and concepts in law 7
• Performances (for example, babysitting, a taxi-ride, or the payment of money). Where the object of the
right is a performance, the right is a ‘personal right’.
• Aspects of your personality (for example, your reputation or your privacy). Where the object of the right is
an aspect of your personality, the right is a ‘personality right’.
All legal rights give rise to corresponding legal duties. The kind of duty or obligation to which the right gives rise
depends on what kind of right is involved. This can be illustrated by means of specific examples such as those
discussed below.
Where the object of the right is one of these aspects of personality, the right is a personality right. Personality
rights operate against the whole world. Everyone else in the world has a corresponding duty to respect these rights
and must not interfere with them.
4 WHAT IS ‘CAPACITY’?
In general terms, ‘capacity’ means ‘ability’ or ‘competence’. This is close to its legal meaning. In law, ‘capacity’
refers to what a person is capable of doing in terms of the law. In other words, what are the person’s legal abilities
or legal competencies? Capacity is a complex legal concept and has given rise to considerable debate among legal
commentators.15
Boberg has a clear and straightforward approach to capacity: first, he distinguishes between ‘passive legal
capacity’ and ‘active legal capacity’. Then he divides ‘active legal capacity’ into various types or forms of active legal
capacity. This chapter follows Boberg’s approach. This is the overall structure:
• passive legal capacity
• capacity to perform juristic acts (for example, enter into contracts, get married, transfer ownership of
property)
• capacity to be held accountable for wrongdoing (crimes and delicts)
• capacity to litigate.
14 Human rights are often understood to give rise to three kinds of state obligations: states have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil
people’s human rights. Section 7(2) of the Constitution provides that ‘The state must protect, promote and fulfil the rights of the Bill of
Rights.’ This particular approach is often called the ‘tripartite typology’. See, for example, Steiner and Alston (2000: 181). The rights in the
South African Constitution also apply to relationships between private individuals (see Currie and De Waal, 2013: 45).
15 See the discussion in Boberg (1999: 65–74).
16 This is part of the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary.
17 Boberg (1999: 66).
18 See the definition of ‘person’ above.
19 See, for example, the discussion in Road Accident Fund v Mtati 2005 (6) SA 215 (SCA).
20 See Boberg (1999: 66 fn 8). See Part 2, Chapter 2 for more information on the reciprocal duties of support between parents and children.
21 See Wille’s Principles (2007: 146) defining juristic acts as ‘voluntary human acts to which the law attaches at least some of the legal
consequences willed by the party or parties performing the act’.
22 See Boberg (1999: 746).
23 Wille’s Principles (2007: 173).
Chapter 2: Through the looking glass – Defining words and concepts in law 9
their acts. For this reason, the law only recognises capacity to perform juristic acts if the person is capable of
understanding the legal nature and legal consequences of their acts.24
Some people have full capacity to perform juristic acts; other people have none. If, on the one hand, an
unmarried, 45-year-old man of sound mind enters into a contract, he will be bound by that contract.25 He has full
capacity to act and the law will attach all the intended legal consequences to his actions. A man like this is capable
of understanding the legal nature and legal consequences of his acts. On the other hand, if a six-year-old enters
into a contract the contract will be void and will have no legal effect. This is because the law does not recognise the
contracts of six-year-olds. In the eyes of the law, six-year-olds can never understand the legal nature and
consequences of their acts. Six-year-old children have no capacity to perform juristic acts.
Boberg has a useful way of organising the various kinds of juristic acts.26 He lists them as follows:
• entering into contracts
• getting married
• acquiring and alienating property
• making a will
• consenting to medical treatment
• holding office.
We will discuss whether or not various categories of people have the capacity to perform these juristic acts in the
various contexts of the chapters in this book. The longest discussion in the following chapters concerns the
minor’s limited capacity to perform juristic acts. There, we will look specifically at the minor’s capacity to incur
binding contractual obligations.
Intention and negligence are complex concepts. They are defined simply here:
People act with intention if they do something ‘on purpose’ or deliberately: they know what will
happen, and they purposefully go about achieving this result. For example, person Z knows that
OBITER
Mr Smit’s cat will die if he shoots it and he deliberately achieves the death of Mr Smit’s cat by
shooting it.29
Negligence means ‘carelessness’ of a particular kind. In law, person X will be found to have acted
negligently if a reasonable person in X’s position (a) would have foreseen the possibility that his action
might cause damage to someone else, and (b) would have taken steps to avoid this consequence, and
(c) X failed to take such steps.30
In this book, however, our concern is not so much whether people acted with intention or negligence, but whether
they were even capable of having legal intention or negligence. If the person is capable of having the mental states
of intention or negligence they can be held accountable for their crimes and delicts. If they are not capable of
having these mental states, they can never be accountable for crimes or delicts.31
A person will be accountable (that is, capable of having ‘fault’ in the form of intention or negligence) if
a) the person has the mental ability to distinguish between right and wrong, and
b) the person is able to act in accordance with this understanding.32
As you will see in the following chapters, some people are not regarded as accountable in this way (for example,
very young children and people suffering from mental illness). Because these people are not accountable and
cannot form the mental states of intention or negligence, they cannot be held liable in delict33 or be found guilty
of a crime. In Latin, if a person is accountable (that is, capable of fault in the form of negligence or intention) they
are culpae capax.34
5 WHAT IS ‘STATUS’?
In the legal context, the word ‘status’ means your standing in the eyes of the law.35 People’s legal status determines
their ‘ability or capacity to relate to the legal system’.36 Specifically, a person’s status determines which legal
capacities a person has in the eyes of the law37 – how do we know if a person has the capacity to conclude contracts,
get married, or litigate? This will depend on their ‘status’.
A person’s legal status (and their consequent legal capacities) is based on membership of a particular class or
group.38 The law is not concerned with all kinds of groups. Paton points out that it is possible to identify various
groups of people – he uses the example of people with blue eyes, or people who play bridge.39 But the law is not
concerned with such groups.40 As we explain in the following chapters, the law is primarily concerned with groups
of people defined in terms of age and mental disability (we also look at sex and gender, intoxication, prodigality,
insolvency and physical disability as factors that might affect status and capacity). Marriage also affects people’s
status and might affect their legal capacities. People who marry in community of property, for example, have
limited capacity to perform some juristic acts.41
On the whole, it is not possible to choose which of these groups you belong to.42 All 17-year-olds fall into the
class ‘minors’ for example.43 Furthermore, once the law assigns you to a class and thus gives you a particular
status, you cannot change the capacities conferred by this status.44 The various capacities associated with a status
are ‘conclusively fixed’ by the law; not chosen by the people who have a particular status.45 All minors have limited
capacity to bind themselves in contract.46 This is the legal consequence of their minority status.
The law decides which groups will be associated with legal status. In South African law, for example,
membership of the group ‘minors’ affects legal status; membership of the group ‘blue-eyed people’ does not. South
African law also decides which people fall into the various groups – how do we know that a 17-year-old is a
minor? This is a rule of South African law. The Children’s Act provides that the age of majority is 18.47
33 With the exception of strict liability delicts. See the discussion in Part 1, Chapter 4.
34 For a general discussion on accountability as requirement for delictual liability, see Neethling (2010: 125–126). For a discussion on the
requirements for criminal accountability, see Burchell (2005: 455–554); Snyman (2020: 25–30).
35 Boberg (1999: 68).
36 Boberg (1999: 68).
37 Boberg (1999: 68). See also Boezaart (2020: 7); Hosten (1980: 284).
38 Paton (1972: 399).
39 Paton (1972: 400)
40 Paton (1972: 400). See also Hosten (1980: 284).
41 See Part 2, Chapter 8 on marital property.
42 See Paton (1972: 400). However, there are obvious exceptions to this general rule: for example, people can choose whether to marry or
not, and people who marry can decide whether or not they wish to marry in community of property. We explain this in Part 2, Chapter 8
on marital property.
43 Unless they are married.
44 Paton (1972: 399). Again, the obvious exception is marriage. It is possible to change some of the consequences of marriage (see Part 2,
Chapter 8 on marital property). There are also invariable consequences of marriage that cannot be changed (see Part 2, Chapter 7 on
personal consequences of marriage).
45 Paton (1972: 399).
46 We discuss this in Part 1, Chapter 4 on minority. Minors need their guardians’ assistance to incur binding contractual liability.
Emancipated minors have more ‘general assistance’, but they are subject to the limited capacities of their minority status.
47 Children’s Act 38 of 2005, s 17. The age of majority was changed in July 2007. Before this date, the age of majority was 21 and
20-year-olds were thus minors. Since July 2007, 20-year-olds are majors in the eyes of the law.
Chapter 2: Through the looking glass – Defining words and concepts in law 11
In South African law, a person’s status is determined by their legal domicile.48 The law of the country of
domicile determines which groups are important, and which group the person belongs to. We discuss this in
Chapter 7 on Domicile.
6 FORMS OF LIABILITY
Many of the chapters in the law of persons’ part of this book refer to various forms of civil liability. The most
important forms of civil liability discussed in this part of the book are:
• contractual liability
• delictual liability
• liability for unjustified enrichment.
As background to the discussions in the following chapters, we set out some of the foundational principles of
these forms of liability here. You might prefer to postpone reading this section on liability until you need to
understand a particular form of liability in the context of another chapter.
This book focuses on people who either lack contractual capacity altogether, or who have limited capacity to
contract. People who have limited capacity to contract (for example, unassisted minors between the ages of seven
and 18) cannot incur binding contractual obligations. This means that the other party to the contract will be
unable to sue them ex contractu (on the basis of contract) and will not have the benefit of the powerful contractual
remedies. In some cases (for example, if the contract involves an infant under seven or a person who is mentally
ill), the contract will be entirely void in the eyes of the law. As far as the law is concerned, there is no contract at
all – nothing happened. The parties must be put back in the same position that they were immediately before the
purported (apparent) contract was entered into.53
You use specific delictual remedies to claim damages for different kinds of harm.57 We discuss some of these
delictual remedies in the section on ‘remedies’ below. In general, the law distinguishes between ‘patrimonial’ and
‘non-patrimonial’ damages. You sue for patrimonial damages when the defendant’s act causes you financial or
monetary loss. In our example, Mr Larney can bring a delictual claim for the money he spends fixing his car and
for receiving treatment in hospital. The aim of these patrimonial damages is to put the plaintiff (Mr Larney) in the
same financial position that he would have been in if the delict had not been committed.58
You can also sue in delict for non-patrimonial damages (for non-monetary harm). For example, Mr Larney
might have experienced considerable pain and suffering as a result of his accident. Mr Larney’s pain does not
cause him any financial loss. However, the law will still award him delictual damages (in the form of money) as
compensation for the pain caused by Sophia’s wrongful and negligent act.59 These are non-patrimonial damages.
The aim of non-patrimonial damages awarded for pain and suffering is to compensate the plaintiff – to somehow
‘make good the loss, and to amend the injury’.60 People can also sue for non-patrimonial damages if other
personality interests have been infringed, for example, if someone damages their reputation, invades their privacy,
or harms their body. The aim of an award of damages under the actio iniuriarum is to ‘compensate for impairment
of personality rights’.61
53 See Wille’s Principles (2007: 738–739), noting that the purported contract is ‘worthless and non-existent’.
54 Boberg (1989: 1).
55 As explained above, infants (for example) are not legally capable of acting with either intention or negligence. This means that this
element of delict cannot be satisfied when the act of an infant causes damage to someone else.
56 These ‘elements of delict’ are set out on page 1094 in Wille’s Principles and briefly discussed on pages 1094–1095. See also Boberg (1989:
24–25). The question of ‘wrongfulness’ is particularly complex and controversial. For a brief introduction and overview of wrongfulness
see Wille’s Principles (2007: 1096–1102). See also Neethling (2010), generally.
57 See Wille’s Principles (2007: 1092).
58 Wille’s Principles (2007: 1133); Boberg (1989: 478).
59 Boberg (1989: 516); Wille’s Principles (2007: 1161).
60 Per Moseneke DCJ in Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund 2006 (4) SA 230 (CC) at para 41.
61 Burchell (1998: 435).
62 See Visser (2008: 9), pointing out that enrichment claims are used ‘where the rules of contract, delict, and property “run out”,’ but
arguing that unjustified enrichment should be seen as ‘an autonomous area of obligations’. See also Sonnekus (2008: 29), discussing the
view of enrichment remedies as offering ‘the last ray of hope’.
63 See BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391. However, see also Visser’s discussion on
unjustified enrichment claims as ‘subsidiary’ to contractual claims (2008: 56–59).
Chapter 2: Through the looking glass – Defining words and concepts in law 13
In general,64 an action on the grounds of unjustified enrichment arises where ‘one person’s estate is increased
at the expense of another without legal cause’.65 The basic requirements for the remedy are:
1. The defendant has been factually enriched, and the plaintiff has been factually impoverished.
2. There is a causal link between the defendant’s enrichment and the plaintiff ’s impoverishment (in other
words, the defendant has been enriched at the plaintiff ’s expense).
3. There is no valid legal reason (cause) that justifies the enrichment of the defendant at the plaintiff ’s
expense, or that justifies the retention of the enrichment by the defendant.66
You can already see some of the reasons why this claim is weaker than a contractual claim. If a person sues in
contract, they can sue for the full amount owing in terms of the contract. In unjustified enrichment, however,
their claim is limited to the amount of the plaintiff ’s factual impoverishment (see point 1 above).67 Imagine, for
example, that a certain Mr Lee sells an iPhone to Bibi and the purchase price is R2 000. If Bibi is bound by the
contract and doesn’t pay, Mr Lee can sue Bibi ex contractu for the full amount owing. Therefore, if Bibi has not yet
paid anything, Mr Lee can sue Bibi for R2 000.
If Mr Lee is unable to sue Bibi on the contract (for example, if Bibi is an unassisted minor) then Mr Lee could
potentially bring a claim based on unjustified enrichment. Unjustified enrichment claims are limited to the factual
amount of the plaintiff ’s impoverishment.68 As it happens, the real worth of the iPhone is only R1 500. This means
that the most Mr Lee will be able to claim is R1 500. In fact, Mr Lee has only been impoverished to the amount of
R1 500-worth of iPhone, and the unjustified enrichment claim is based on factual impoverishment and not on the
contract price (that is, the enrichment claim is not based on the purchase price of R2 000).69
Another weakness of the unjustified enrichment remedy is that the plaintiff can sue only for the amount that
the defendant in fact remains enriched by, on the day that the plaintiff institutes their action.70 This could be a
problem for Mr Lee. Imagine, for example, that Bibi drops the iPhone into the ocean and it gets swept out to sea;
now Bibi is no longer enriched by R1 500-worth of iPhone. This is unfortunate for Mr Lee – they are using an
unjustified enrichment remedy, and their claim is limited to the amount of Bibi’s factual remaining enrichment.
Unfortunately for Mr Lee, Bibi’s remaining enrichment is now zero.71
64 It appears that South African law does not have a general ‘unjustified enrichment’ claim and that strictly speaking, enrichment claims
arise only in certain recognised situations (see Visser, 2008: 4–5) and Sonnekus (2008: 17). These, however, are the general principles
that underpin the claim in these situations.
65 Visser (2007: 1041–1043), quoting Lotz & Brand.
66 Visser (2007: 1041–1046). See also Visser (2008: 157) and Sonnekus (2008: 1).
67 This is because of the ‘double cap rule’ (see, for example, Visser (2008: 8)). The plaintiff ’s claim is limited to the extent of his
impoverishment.
68 Visser (2008: 158–159).
69 But see Part 1, Chapter 4 discussing the rule that the contract price will set a maximum cap on what can be claimed in situations where
the true value of the thing is more than the contract price.
70 This is the other side of the ‘double cap rule’. Wille’s Principles (2007: 1049–1050) and Visser (2008: 163).
71 We will look at other ways in which factual enrichment might be reduced or wiped out in Part 1, Chapter 4 on minority.
72 See Wille’s Principles (2007: 539); Silberberg (2006: 242–246).
73 See generally Visser (2008); Visser (2007: 1041–1090) and Sonnekus (2008).
74 U-Drive Franchise Systems (Pty) Ltd v Drive Yourself (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 137 (D) at 149D. See Wille’s Principles (2007: 827–828). This
remedy is available only if A has contracted to perform before B or at the same time as B. See Skead v Conradie 1995 (2) SA 111 (A) at
118I. See also Eiselen (2012: 316–321).
The Aquilian action (called the actio legis Aquiliae in Latin) is a delictual remedy. A plaintiff can use this
remedy to claim damages for patrimonial loss caused by the defendant’s wrongful act. The defendant must have
acted with either intention or negligence.75
The actio iniuriarum is a delictual remedy. A plaintiff can use this remedy to claim non-patrimonial damages
when their personality rights have been infringed.76 The actio iniuriarum requires fault in the form of intention;
the plaintiff cannot use this remedy if the defendant has been merely negligent.77
The action for pain and suffering is a delictual remedy. A plaintiff can use this remedy to sue for non-
patrimonial damages arising from physical injury (for example, caused in a car accident). They can sue for pain,
suffering, disfigurement, disability and loss of amenities of life, and shortened life expectancy.78 The defendant
must have acted with either intention or negligence.79
The doctrine of estoppel provides that:
1. where A has lied, and
2. B has relied on A’s lie to B’s disadvantage, then
3. A will be prevented (‘estopped’) from relying on the truth in their defence.80
Note that some of these remedies are ‘actions’. X takes the initiative and brings the case to court using the remedy,
for example, the actio iniuriarum or the rei vindicatio. The exceptio non adimpleti contractus, however, is only a
defence (i.e., not an ‘action’). B can use this exceptio only if and when A sues them for performance.
You should also distinguish between the property-based claim (the rei vindicatio) and the personal claims.
The rei vindicatio is part of the law of property. The rei vindicatio is based on ownership of the thing. It can be
brought against anyone who is in possession of the thing without cause. It is a claim in rem (rem means, ‘thing’, in
Latin).81 It is based on a real right.
Claims based on contract, delict, or unjustified enrichment Intestate succession if unmarried
are part of the law of obligations. The contractual, delictual, and and without children:
enrichment remedies cannot be brought against just anyone –
they can be brought only against a particular person. These are A
claims in personam. Leaves R12 000
8 SUCCESSION
This is the area of private law governing what happens to your
Mother gets Father gets
property when you die. You will need a basic knowledge of the R6 000 R6 000
law of succession as you work through some of the chapters in
this book.82
Figure 2.4: Example 1 Intestate succession
The property of the person who dies is referred to as ‘the
estate’. Your estate means everything you own: this includes all
your physical property, for example, house, farm, car, clothes, Intestate succession married
with two children:
book collection, and so on, and all the money you have in the
bank.
B
If you die without a valid will, you die ‘intestate’ and your Leaves R12 million
estate will be divided up according to the rules of ‘intestate
succession’. ‘Intestate succession’ means inheritance where there
is no valid will. Wife gets Child D gets
The basic rule of intestate succession is that the estate must R4 million R4 million
be divided among the deceased’s next of kin (closest family).83
Here are some typical examples: Child C gets
In Example 1, A is unmarried and she has no children. R4 million
However, both her parents are still alive. In this situation, her
next of kin are her parents and they will share her estate equally. Figure 2.5: Example 2 Intestate succession
75 Boberg (1989: 268–269). In practice, most claims are based on negligence rather than intention (Boberg, 1989: 269). See also Neethling
(2010: 8).
76 Wille’s Principles (2007: 1166); Neethling (2010: 12).
77 Boberg (1989: 18).
78 See Boberg (1989: 516); Wille’s Principles (2007: 1161); Neethling (2010: 15).
79 Boberg (1989: 516).
80 See, for example, the definition provided in Miller v Dannecker 2001 (1) SA 928 (C) at para 18. See also Wille’s Principles (2007: 552).
81 The Latin word for ‘thing’ is res. In Latin, the form of the word changes depending on the context. Rem is the same word, and so is rei.
82 For more information on the law of succession see Jamneck and Rautenbach (2017); De Waal (2008) and Palekar (2007: 666–729).
83 See Wille’s Principles (2007: 679–682) for a full explanation of who the ‘next of kin’ are in terms of South African Law of Succession.
Chapter 2: Through the looking glass – Defining words and concepts in law 15
In Example 2, B is married and has two children. His wife and two children share the estate equally.
Testate succession means succession in terms of a will. The basic rule is that the wishes expressed in the will
must be carried out.84 The person who writes the will is called the testator. If the will fails for some reason (for
example, the person who is supposed to inherit the entire estate in terms of the will is already dead), then the rules
of intestate succession will apply.85
For all forms of succession, the estate ‘vests’ (becomes due) on the day of the deceased’s death.86
Unjustified enrichment
Visser, D. (2008) Unjustified Enrichment, Cape Town: Juta.
See also the chapters on unjustified enrichment in Wille’s Principles.
Delict
Neethling, J. and Potgieter, J. (2010) Law of Delict, Durban: LexisNexis.
See also the chapters on delict in Wille’s Principles.
Criminal law
Burchell, J. (2008) Principles of Criminal Law, 3rd edition, Cape Town: Juta.
Snyman, C. (2020) Criminal Law, 7th edition, Durban: LexisNexis.
Property law
Pope, A. du Plessis, E. (eds) (2021) The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa, 2nd edition, Cape Town: Oxford
University Press.
See also the chapters on property law in Wille’s Principles.
Succession
Jamneck, J. and Rautenbach, C. (eds) (2017) The Law of Succession in South Africa, Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
See also the chapter on succession in Wille’s Principles.
Constitutional rights
Currie, I. and de Waal, J. (2013) The Bill of Rights Handbook, 6th edition, Cape Town: Juta.