SSRN 1968579
SSRN 1968579
I provide a (very) brief introduction to game theory. I have developed these notes to
provide quick access to some of the basics of game theory; mainly as an aid for students
in courses in which I assumed familiarity with game theory but did not require it as a
prerequisite. Of course, the material discussed here is only the proverbial tip of the iceberg,
and there are many sources that offer much more complete treatments of the subject.1 Here,
I only cover a few of the most fundamental concepts, and provide just enough discussion
to get the ideas across without discussing many issues associated with the concepts and
approaches. Fuller coverage is available through a free on-line course that can be found via
my website: http://www.stanford.edu/∼jacksonm/
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The basic elements of performing a noncooperative game-theoretic analysis are (1)
framing the situation in terms of the actions available to players and their payoffs as a
function of actions, and (2) using various equilibrium notions to make either descriptive or
1
For graduate-level treatments, see Roger Myerson’s (1991) Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; Ken Binmore’s (1992) Fun and Games, Lexington, Mass.: D.C.
Heath; Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole’s (1993) Game Theory, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; and Martin
Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein’s (1994) A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. There
are also abbreviated texts offering a quick tour of game theory, such as Kevin Leyton-Brown and Yoav
Shoham’s (2008) Essentials of Game Theory, Morgan and Claypool Publishers. For broader readings and
undergraduate level texts, see R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa (1959) Games and Decisions: Introduction
and Critical Survey; Robert Gibbons (1992) Game Theory for Applied Economists; Colin F. Camerer (2003)
Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction; Martin J. Osborne (2003) An Introduction
to Game Theory; Joel Watson (2007) Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory; Avinash K. Dixit and
Barry J. Nalebuff (2010) The Art of Strategy: A Game Theorist’s Guide to Success in Business and Life;
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (2010) Games, Strategies, and Decision Making, Worth Publishing.
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“Noncooperative game theory” refers to models in which each players are assumed to behave selfishly
and their behaviors are directly modeled. “Cooperative game theory,” which I do not cover here, generally
refers to more abstract and axiomatic analyses of bargains or behaviors that players might reach, without
explicitly modeling the processes. The name “cooperative” derives in part from the fact that the analyses
often (but not always) incorporate coalitional considerations, with important early analyses appearing in
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s 1944 foundational book “Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior.”
• Player i has a set of actions, ai , available. These are generally referred to as pure
strategies.3 This set might be finite or infinite.
Normal form games are often represented by a table. Perhaps the most famous such
game is the prisoners’ dilemma, which is represented in Table 1. In this game there are two
players who each have two pure strategies, where ai = {C, D}, and C stands for “cooperate”
and D stands for “defect.” The first entry indicates the payoff to the row player (or player
1) as a function of the pair of actions, while the second entry is the payoff to the column
player (or player 2).
Player 2
C D
Player 1 C -1, -1 -3, 0
D 0, -3 -2, -2
The usual story behind the payoffs in the prisoners’ dilemma is as follows. The two
players have committed a crime and are now in separate rooms in a police station. The
prosecutor has come to each of them and told them each: “If you confess and agree to testify
against the other player, and the other player does not confess, then I will let you go. If you
both confess, then I will send you both to prison for 2 years. If you do not confess and the
other player does, then you will be convicted and I will seek the maximum prison sentence
of 3 years. If nobody confesses, then I will charge you with a lighter crime for which we have
enough evidence to convict you and you will each go to prison for 1 year.” So the payoffs
in the matrix represent time lost in terms of years in prison. The term cooperate refers
to cooperating with the other player. The term defect refers to confessing and agreeing to
testify, and so breaking the (implicit) agreement with the other player.
Note that we could also multiply each payoff by a scalar and add a constant, which is an
equivalent representation (as long as all of a given player’s payoffs are rescaled in the same
Player 2
C D
Player 1 C 4, 4 0, 6
D 6, 0 2, 2
There are many games that might have different descriptions motivating them but have
a similar normal form in terms of the strategic aspects of the game. Another example of the
same game as the prisoners’ dilemma is what is known as a Cournot duopoly. The story is
as follows. Two firms produce identical goods. They each have two production levels, high
or low. If they produce at high production, they will have a lot of the goods to sell, while at
low production they have less to sell. If they cooperate, then they agree to each produce at
low production. In this case, the product is rare and fetches a very high price on the market,
and they each make a profit of 4. If they each produce at high production (or defect), then
they will depress the price, and even though they sell more of the goods, the price drops
sufficiently to lower their overall profits to 2 each. If one defects and the other cooperates,
then the price is in a middle range. The firm with the higher production sells more goods
and earns a higher profit of 6, while the firm with the lower production just covers its costs
and earns a profit of 0.
for all a0i . A best response of player i to a profile of strategies of the other players is said to
be a strict best response if it is the unique best response.
A profile of strategies a ∈ A is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if ai is a best reply to
a−i for each i. That is, a is a Nash equilibrium if
for all i and a0i . This definition might seem somewhat similar to that of dominant strategy,
but there is a critical difference. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium only requires that the
action taken by each agent be best against the actual equilibrium actions taken by the other
players, and not necessarily against all possible actions of the other players.
A Nash equilibrium has the nice property that it is stable: if each player expects a to be
the profile of actions played, then no player has any incentive to change his or her action.
In other words, no player regrets having played the action that he or she played in a Nash
equilibrium.
In some cases, the best response of a player to the actions of others is unique. A Nash
equilibrium such that all players are playing actions that are unique best responses is called
a strict Nash equilibrium. A profile of dominant strategies is a Nash equilibrium but not
vice versa.
To see another illustration of Nash equilibrium, consider the following game between
two firms that are deciding whether to advertise. Total available profits are 28, to be split
between the two firms. Advertising costs a firm 8. Firm 1 currently has a larger market
share than firm 2, so it is seeing 16 in profits while firm 2 is seeing 12 in profits. If they
both advertise, then they will split the market evenly and get 14 in base profits each, but
then must also pay the costs of advertising, so they receive see net profits of 6 each. If one
advertises while the other does not, then the advertiser captures three-quarters of the market
(but also pays for advertising) and the non-advertiser gets one-quarter of the market. (There
Firm 2
Not Adv
Firm 1 Not 16, 12 7, 13
Adv 13, 7 6, 6
To find the equilibrium, we have to look for a pair of actions such that neither firm wants
to change its action given what the other firm has chosen. The search is made easier in this
case, since firm 1 has a strictly dominant strategy of not advertising. Firm 2 does not have
a dominant strategy; which strategy is optimal for it depends on what firm 1 does. But
given the prediction that firm 1 will not advertise, firm 2 is best off advertising. This forms
a Nash equilibrium, since neither firm wishes to change strategies. You can easily check that
no other pairs of strategies form an equilibrium.
While each of the previous games provides a unique prediction, there are games in which
there are multiple equilibria. Here are three examples.
Example 1 A Stag Hunt Game The first is an example of a coordination game, as depicted
in Table 4. This game might be thought of as selecting between two technologies, or coordi-
nating on a meeting location. Players earn higher payoffs when they choose the same action
than when they choose different actions. There are two (pure strategy) Nash equilibria: (S, S)
and (H, H).
This game is also a variation on Rousseau’s “stag hunt” game.5 The story is that two
hunters are out, and they can either hunt for a stag (strategy S) or look for hares (strategy
H). Succeeding in getting a stag takes the effort of both hunters, and the hunters are separated
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To be completely consistent with Rousseau’s story, (H, H) should result in payoffs of (3, 3), as the payoff
to hunting for hare is independent of the actions of the other player in Rousseau’s story.
Player 2
S H
Player 1 S 5, 5 0, 3
H 3, 0 4, 4
in the forest and cannot be sure of each other’s behavior. If both hunters are convinced that
the other will hunt for stag, then hunting stag is a strict or unique best reply for each player.
However, if one turns out to be mistaken and the other hunter hunts for hare, then one will
go hungry. Both hunting for hare is also an equilibrium and hunting for hare is a strict best
reply if the other player is hunting for hare. This example hints at the subtleties of making
predictions in games with multiple equilibria. On the one hand, (S, S) (hunting stag by both)
is a more attractive equilibrium and results in high payoffs for both players. Indeed, if the
players can communicate and be sure that the other player will follow through with an action,
then playing (S, S) is a stable and reasonable prediction. However, (H, H) (hunting hare by
both) has properties that make it a useful prediction as well. It does not offer as high a
payoff, but it has less risk associated with it. Here playing H guarantees a minimum payoff
of 3, while the minimum payoff to S is 0. There is an extensive literature on this subject,
and more generally on how to make predictions when there are multiple equilibria.6
Example 2 A “Battle of the Sexes” Game The next example is another form of coordination
game, but with some asymmetries in it. It is generally referred to as a “battle of the sexes”
game, as depicted in Table 5.
The players have an incentive to choose the same action, but they each have a different
favorite action. There are again two (pure strategy) Nash equilibria: (X, X) and (Y, Y).
Here, however, player 1 would prefer that they play equilibrium (X, X) and player 2 would
prefer (Y, Y). The battle of the sexes title refers to a couple trying to coordinate on where to
meet for a night out. They prefer to be together, but also have different preferred outings.
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See, for example, the texts cited in Footnote 1.
Player 2
X Y
Player 1 X 3, 1 0, 0
Y 0, 0 1, 3
Example 3 Hawk-Dove and Chicken Games There are also what are known as anti-coordination
games, with the prototypical version being what is known as the hawk-dove game or the
chicken game, with payoffs as in Table 6.
Player 2
Hawk Dove
Player 1 Hawk 0, 0 3, 1
Dove 1, 3 2, 2
Here there are two pure strategy equilibria, (Hawk, Dove) and (Dove, Hawk). Players are
in a potential conflict and can be either aggressive like a hawk or timid like a dove. If they
both act like hawks, then the outcome is destructive and costly for both players with payoffs
of 0 for both. If they each act like doves, then the outcome is peaceful and each gets a payoff
of 2. However, if the other player acts like a dove, then a player would prefer to act like
a hawk and take advantage of the other player, receiving a payoff of 3. If the other player
is playing a hawk strategy, then it is best to play a dove strategy and at least survive rather
than to be hawkish and end in mutual destruction.
Goalie
L R
Kicker L -1, 1 1, -1
R 1, -1 -1, 1
This is also the game known as “matching pennies.” The goalie would like to choose
a strategy that matches that of the kicker, and the kicker wants to choose a strategy that
mismatches the goalie’s strategy.7
It is easy to check that no pair of pure strategies forms an equilibrium. What is the
solution here? It is just what you see in practice: the kicker randomly picks left versus right,
in this particular case with equal probability, and the goalie does the same. To formalize this
observation we need to define randomized strategies, or what are called mixed strategies. For
ease of exposition suppose that ai is finite; the definition extends to infinite strategy spaces
with proper definitions of probability measures over pure actions.
7
For an interesting empirical test of whether goalies and kickers on professional soccer teams randomize
properly, see Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose (2002) Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are
Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer, American Economic Review 92(4):1138 - 1151; and see
Walker and Wooders (2001) Minimax Play at Wimbledon, American Economic Review 91(5):1521 - 1538.
for an analysis of randomization in the location of tennis serves in professional tennis matches.
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Goalie
L R
Kicker L -1, 1 1, -1
R 1, -1 0, 0
What does the equilibrium look like? To calculate the equilibrium, it is enough to find
a strategy for the goalie that makes the kicker indifferent, and a strategy for the kicker that
makes the goalie indifferent.10
Let s1 be the kicker’s mixed strategy and s2 be the goalie’s mixed strategy. It must be that
the kicker is indifferent. The kicker’s expected payoff from kicking L is −1 · s2 (L) + 1 · s2 (R)
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and the payoff from R is 1 · s2 (L) + 0 · s2 (R), so that indifference requires that
which implies that 2s2 (L) = s2 (R). Since these must sum to one (as they are probabilities),
this implies that s2 (L) = 1/3 and s2 (R) = 2/3. Similar calculations based on the requirement
that the goalie be indifferent lead to
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Each node has a player’s label attached to it. There is an identified root node that
corresponds to the first player to move (player 1 in Figure 1) and then subsequent nodes
than the two-by-two games discussed above.
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and decide how player’s will act at next-to-last decision nodes, anticipating the actions at
the last decision nodes, and then iterate. This is called backward induction. Consider the
choice of firm 2, given that firm 1 has decided not to advertise. In this case, firm 2 will
choose to advertise, since 13 is larger than 12. Next, consider the choice of firm 2, given that
firm 1 has decided to advertise. In this case, firm 2 will choose not to advertise, since 7 is
larger than 6. Now we can collapse the tree. Firm 1 will predict that if it does not advertise,
then firm 2 will advertise, while if firm 1 advertises then firm 2 will not. Thus when making
its choice, firm 1 anticipates a payoff of 7 if it chooses not to advertise and 13 if it chooses to
advertise. Its optimal choice is to advertise. The backward induction prediction about the
actions that will be taken is for firm 1 to advertise and firm 2 not to.
Note that this prediction differs from that in the simultaneous move game we analyzed
before. Firm 1 has gained a first-mover advantage in the sequential version. Not advertising
is no longer a dominant strategy for firm 1, since firm 2’s decision depends on what firm 1
does. By committing to advertising, firm 1 forces firm 2 to choose not to advertise. Firm 1
is better off being able to commit to advertising in advance.
A solution concept that capture found in this game and applies to more general classes of
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3 Some Exercises
Exercise 1 Product Choices.
Two electronics firms are making product development decisions. Each firm is choosing
between the development of two alternative computer chips. One system has higher efficiency,
but will require a larger investment and will be more costly to produce. Based on estimates
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Firm 2
High Low
Firm 1 High 1, 2 4, 5
Low 2, 7 5, 3
The first entry in each box is the present value to firm 1 and the second entry is the
present value to firm 2. The payoffs in the above table are not symmetric. Firm 2 has a
cost advantage in producing the higher efficiency chip, while firm 1 has a cost advantage
in producing the lower efficiency chip. Overall profits are largest when the firms choose
different chips and do not compete head to head.
(b) Given your answer to part a), what should firm 2 expect firm 1’s choice to be? What
is firm 2’s optimal choice given what it anticipates firm 1 to do?
(c) Do firm 1’s strategy (answer to (a)) and firm 2’s strategy (answer to (b)) form an
equilibrium? Explain.
(d) Compared to (c), firm 1 would make larger profits if the choices were reversed. Why
don’t those strategies form an equilibrium?
(e) Suppose that firm 1 can commit to a product before firm 2. Draw the corresponding
game tree and describe the backward induction/subgame perfect equilibrium.
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Find the backward induction solution to Figure 1 and argue that there is a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium. Provide a Nash equilibrium of that game that is not subgame
perfect.
Two armies are fighting a war. There are three battlefields. Each army consists of 6
units. The armies must each decide how many units to place on each battlefield. They do
this without knowing how many units the other army has committed to a given battlefield.
The army who has the most units on a given battlefield, wins that battle, and the army
that wins the most battles wins the war. If the armies each have the same number of units
on a given battlefield then there is an equal chance that either army wins that battle. A
pure strategy for an army is a list (u1 , u2 , u3 ) of the number of units it places on battlefields
1, 2, and 3 respectively, where each uk is in {0, 1, . . . , 6} and the sum of the uk ’s is 6. For
example, if army A allocates its units (3,2,1), and army B allocates its units (0,3,3), then
army A wins the first battle, and army B wins the second and third battles and army B wins
the war.
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Two children must split a pie. They are gluttons and each prefers to eat as much of the
pie as they can. The parent tells one child to cut the pie into two pieces and then allows the
other child to choose which piece to eat. The first child can divide the pie into any multiple
of tenths (for example, splitting it into pieces that are 1/10 and 9/10 of the pie, or 2/10 and
8/10, and so forth). Show that there is a unique backward induction solution to this game.
Each of two players receives an envelope containing money. The amount of money has
been randomly selected to be between 1 and 1000 dollars (inclusive), with each dollar amount
equally likely. The random amounts in the two envelopes are drawn independently. After
looking in their own envelope, the players have a chance to trade envelopes. That is, they are
simultaneously asked if they would like to trade. If they both say “yes,” then the envelopes
are swapped and they each go home with the new envelope. If either player says “no,” then
they each go home with their original envelope.
The actions in this game are actually a full list of whether a player says yes or no for
each possible amount of money he or she is initially given. To simplify things, let us write
down actions in the following more limited form: an action is simply a number between 0
and 1000, meaning that if they get an envelope with more than that number, then they say
“no” and otherwise they say “yes”.
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Finding equilibria to Colonel Blotto games is notoriously difficult. One exists for this particular version,
but finding it will take you some time.
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