1262912

research-article2024
JPR0010.1177/00223433241262912Journal of Peace ResearchDavies et al.

Special Data Feature

Journal of Peace Research

2024, Vol. 61(4) 673­–693
Organized violence 1989–2023, and the © The Author(s) 2024

prevalence of organized crime groups Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00223433241262912
https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241262912
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr

Shawn Davies
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden
Garoun Engström
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden
Therése Pettersson
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden
Magnus Öberg
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden

Abstract
This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in
2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the
highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The
decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60%
of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based
armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non-
state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the
active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall
decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state
conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime
groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political
goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug
smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.

Keywords
armed conflict, conflict data, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, organized criminal groups

Organized violence 1989–20231 government, which had consistently ranked as the most
lethal conflict annually since 2020. As seen in Figure 1,
In 2023, the number of fatalities in organized violence fatalities decreased in all three categories of violence,
decreased for the first time since it began increasing rap- though the downward trend was driven almost exclusively
idly in 2020. As depicted in Figure 1, fatalities in organ- by the decrease in state-based violence, which recorded
ized violence halved from 310,000 recorded in 2022 to over 154,000 fewer fatalities in 2023 compared to 2022.
154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures Notably, the two most severe state-based conflicts in
remain among the highest recorded since the Rwandan 2022, namely the conflict over government in Ethiopia
genocide in 1994, with only the years 2022 and 2021
surpassing them. This reduction can largely be attributed Corresponding author:
to the end of the Ethiopian intrastate conflict over [email protected]
674 journal of Peace Research 61(4)

Figure 1. Fatalities in organized violence by type of violence, 1989–2023.

and the interstate conflict between Russia and Ukraine, conflict between the government of Ethiopia and TPLF
witnessed substantially diminished fatality rates in 2023. (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) have been revised
This article presents trends in the three types of organ- upwards by around 62,000 in 2022, 115,000 in 2021,
ized violence with an emphasis on 2023, beginning with and 19,000 in 2020. Ukraine replaced Ethiopia as the
a section on the trends in state-based violence, followed world’s deadliest conflict in 2023, with nearly 71,000
by sections on non-state and one-sided violence, respec- fatalities recorded. The conflict between Israel and
tively. The final section examines a particular type of actor Hamas, which flared up in early October 2023, caused
that has fueled the past decade’s extraordinarily high levels the second-highest number of battle-related deaths with
of non-state violence while remaining relatively under- over 22,000 fatalities recorded during only the last three
studied in the field of peace and conflict research, namely months of the year.
organized crime groups. Despite the reduction in fatalities, the number of
state-based armed conflicts rose from 56 in 2022 to 59
in 2023, marking the highest number ever recorded by
State-based armed conflict
the UCDP since the data collection’s starting point in
Fatalities in state-based armed conflicts decreased mark- 1946.2 State-based armed conflicts have remained at his-
edly from 2022, yet remain at some of the highest levels torically high levels since 2015, with an annual tally
recorded by the UCDP in the post-1989 period. In ranging from 52 to 56. This can be compared to the 31
total, UCDP recorded over 122,500 battle-related to 39 conflicts recorded annually between 2000 and
deaths in 2023, less than half the nearly 277,000 fatali- 2013. While most conflicts are relatively minor, their
ties documented in 2022. Despite this decline, 2023 sheer number increases the risk of significant flare-ups,
marked the third deadliest year recorded by the UCDP of which we have seen several in recent years. In 2023,
since 1989, trailing only 2022 and 2021. The decrease UCDP recorded nine wars, meaning that the conflicts
can largely be attributed to the resolution of the conflict resulted in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths during the
in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for approx- year. This is one more than in 2022, and the highest
imately 60% of the battle-related deaths in both 2022 count since 2017.3 Of these nine wars, five occurred in
and 2021. Consequently, Ethiopia witnessed about Africa, two in the Middle East, and one each in Asia and
161,000 fewer state-based fatalities in 2023 compared Europe. Regional conflict trends will be explored further
to the previous year. Fatality figures from Ethiopia have below, after which current trends in the different types
been significantly revised upwards for all years from of state-based armed conflict will be discussed.
2020 onwards, based on new information on admitted As seen in Figure 2, violence drastically decreased in
losses provided by some of the warring parties them- Africa and, to a lesser extent, in Europe. This reduction
selves post-conflict. Specifically, fatality figures for the can be attributed primarily to the end of the conflict
Davies et al. 675

Figure 2. Fatalities in state-based conflicts by region, 1989–2023.

over government in Ethiopia and a significant decrease Despite the interstate conflict between Russia and
in civilian fatalities in Ukraine. The conflict between the Ukraine causing nearly 71,000 battle-related deaths and
Ethiopian government, supported by Eritrea, and the being the deadliest conflict of 2023, responsible for almost
former ruling party TPLF, broke out in late 2020. After 58% of all state-based fatalities during the year, violence in
two years of periodically extremely brutal fighting, a Europe decreased. Although around 21,000 fewer fatali-
peace agreement was signed in November 2022, result- ties were recorded compared to 2022, combatant fatalities
ing in a steep decline in fatalities. However, the peace actually increased by a quarter, from 54,000 during 2022
agreement caused severe divisions between the Ethiopian to 68,000 in 2023. However, as violence shifted away
government and their former allies during the war, in from major population centers such as Kyiv, Mariupol,
particular with the Fano, a decentralized militia in the and Kharkiv, and instead became concentrated in largely
Amhara region which opposed the terms of the peace evacuated cities such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka, the num-
agreement with Tigray. Fano began its own armed strug- ber of civilian and unknown deaths decreased by 93%,
gle against the Ethiopian government, aiming to estab- from over 37,000 in 2022 to just under 2,500 in 2023.5
lish local rule in Amhara as well as ousting the Ethiopian The Middle East was the only region in the world
president. Although the war in Amhara resulted in rela- where violence increased, primarily due to the territorial
tively fewer fatalities, with just over 1,200 recorded in conflict between Israel and Hamas. UCDP recorded over
2023, it poses a significant risk of further escalation and 22,000 fatalities in just three months of intense aerial and
of aggravating ethnic divisions within Ethiopia. ground operations centered on the Gaza Strip following
Africa remained the region with the highest number of the October 7 attack by Hamas into Israel.6 The Israel–
state-based armed conflicts, a position it has held since Hamas war overturned the positive development in the
2013, increasing by 1 from the previous year to 28, the region that had made 2022 the least violent year since
second highest number recorded by UCDP.4 The deadli- 2011. The war threatens to derail ongoing peace processes
est conflict in Africa was the new war over government in the region, such as the rapprochement between Iran and
with RSF (Rapid Support Forces) in Sudan, which caused Saudi Arabia. This could spur further violence in Yemen,
over 5,200 state-based fatalities, and thousands of inter- where an informal ceasefire during ongoing talks between
connected non-state and one-sided fatalities. The remain- Saudi Arabia and the Iran-aligned Ansarallah movement
ing three wars, in Somalia, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria, caused the conflict over government in Yemen to drop
were all active in 2022, but escalated further in 2023. The below the threshold for war for the first time since 2013.
war with JNIM (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) On a positive note, Asia continued to record the low-
in Burkina Faso saw the largest increase in violence, with est numbers of fatalities from state-based armed con-
more than twice as many fatalities in 2023 as in 2022. flicts in the post-1989 period, with around 4,300
676 journal of Peace Research 61(4)

Figure 3. State-based armed conflict by type, 1946–2023.

fatalities recorded in both 2022 and 2023. Another The first four years of the 2020s have already recorded
positive development is the decline in conflict interna- 17 instances, with four in 2020, 2021, and 2023, and
tionalization, which will be discussed below. five in 2022.7 Increasing incidents of conflicts with two
Figure 3 illustrates a decline in internationalized intra- state armies involved against each other is especially con-
state conflicts, where one or both parties to an intrastate cerning, as they carry the potential to be deadlier than
conflict receive troop support from an external state, in other forms of conflict.
recent years. However, they remain at historically high
levels with 20 such conflicts recorded in 2023, more than
Non-state conflict
at any point prior to 2015, but a decrease by two since
2022, and a decline from the peak of 27 in 2020. This In 2023, UCDP documented 75 ongoing non-state
reduction is attributed to Western disengagement from conflicts, resulting in nearly 20,900 fatalities. This
combating transnational jihadist groups, prompted by marked a reduction compared to 2022, with fewer con-
shifts in global attention and deteriorating relations with flicts recorded (down from 82) and a decrease in the
host countries, especially in West Africa. The continued number of deaths (down from over 21,400). Although
prevalence of conflict internationalization raises concerns, there has been a slight reduction, fatalities from non-
since research indicates that external troop involvement state conflicts remain at historically high levels. The data
tends to both prolong conflicts and make them more also reveal that the past decade comprises the ten most
lethal (e.g. Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008; Elbadawi and violent years on record, with organized crime groups
Sambanis, 2000). The average number of battle-deaths predominantly driving this trend. In 2023, conflicts
per conflict year is over four times higher compared to involving organized crime groups accounted for 79% of
intrastate conflicts that are not internationalized. the total fatalities in non-state conflict.
The number of interstate conflicts decreased from Figure 4 illustrates significant regional disparities in
three in 2022 to two in 2023. While interstate conflicts non-state conflicts. Europe exhibits the least docu-
have been occurring more frequently in recent years, mented instances of non-state violence, followed by
they remain relatively uncommon. Prior to 2020, the Asia. Throughout much of the post-Cold War era,
last instance of three or more interstate conflicts in a Africa has maintained a relatively steady level of non-
year was in 1988. Internationalized intrastate conflict, state violence, with exceptions including inter-ethnic
in which external states support non-state actors fight- conflicts in DR Congo and Burundi in 1993, preced-
ing against governments, has also increased in the past ing the Rwandan genocide in 1994. In contrast, the
decade. This constitutes instances of state armies fight- Middle East has experienced reduced violence follow-
ing each other outside of interstate conflicts. Whereas ing the turbulent years of the mid-2010s, characterized
only seven such instances occurred throughout the by several large-scale conflicts linked to the wars in
entire first decade of the 2000s, the 2010s witnessed 22. Syria. Since 2017, the Americas have emerged as the
Davies et al. 677

Figure 4. Fatalities in non-state conflict by region, 1989–2023.

region most severely affected by non-state violence, Non-state conflicts tend to be less lethal compared to
predominantly stemming from clashes between various state-based armed conflicts. States typically possess
criminal gangs vying for control over territories and greater access to resources, weaponry, and superior train-
drug trafficking routes. This trend is discussed further ing, rendering their engagements more deadly.
below. Despite a slight decrease in non-state fatalities Historically, few non-state conflicts have escalated to the
in the Americas since the peak year of 2021, the region threshold of at least 1,000 fatalities within a single calen-
maintains a dominant role in the trend, contributing dar year, a criterion commonly used to define a conflict
to 78% of the total fatalities in 2023. In 2023, nine of as a ‘war’ within the category of state-based armed con-
the ten deadliest non-state conflicts occurred in the flicts. In fact, over 60% of all non-state conflicts result in
Americas, with eight in Mexico. The Jalisco Cartel fewer than 100 fatalities annually, with an average of
New Generation (CJNG) was involved in six of these 228 yearly fatalities across all non-state conflicts. With
conflicts, including the deadliest non-state conflict in the exception of 1993, there were between one and four
2023, pitting CJNG against the Sinaloa Cartel. CJNG non-state conflicts causing 1,000 deaths or more annu-
has established dominance through brutality, exerting ally from 1989 to 2016. Since then, the number of con-
fear-based control over the population and other crim- flicts with at least 1,000 deaths per year has increased,
inal groups. For four consecutive years, the CJNG con- with four to eight such conflicts occurring annually.
flict against the Sinaloa Cartel has been the deadliest Conflicts between drug cartels and criminal gangs in
non-state conflict in the world, causing between 4,000 Mexico and Brazil, as well as inter-rebel fighting in con-
and 5,500 fatalities annually. In total, CJNG was nection to the Syrian wars, have resulted in numerous
involved in seven different non-state conflicts, result- high-intensity non-state conflicts in the past seven years.
ing in almost 10,300 deaths. Some of the groups involved, such as Syrian Democratic
For the first time since 2014, an active non-state con- Forces (SDF) in Syria, have enjoyed support from exter-
flict was registered in Europe. This conflict unfolded in nal states, boosting their access to resources and intelli-
Marseille, France, where a turf war between two rival gence. Others, like the CJNG, Carteles Unidos, and the
gangs engaged in the drug trade claimed nearly 50 lives Sinaloa Cartel, have become major players in the illicit
throughout the year. DZ Mafia and Yoda competed for economy, including drug trafficking, extortion, and
control in the lucrative drug trafficking network within money laundering, and have used their resources to
the city, leading to frequent shootouts resulting in casu- build formidable armies with access to high caliber
alties among innocent bystanders. weapons and advanced technology, such as drones.
678 journal of Peace Research 61(4)

Figure 5. Fatalities in one-sided violence by type of actor, 1989–2023.

One-sided violence ISKP has become infamous for its large-scale attacks on
civilian targets, including schools, mosques, and
In 2023, following a period marked by escalating levels
churches. The Taleban government in Afghanistan has
of one-sided violence, there was a notable decline both
managed to suppress IS in the country, and attacks in
in terms of the number of actors involved and civilian
Afghanistan decreased in 2023 compared to previous
casualties inflicted by these actors. UCDP recorded a
years. However, the group’s focus has shifted to the
decrease from 49 to 42 actors involved in one-sided vio-
global scene and terrorist plots involving members of
lence compared to 2022, marking the lowest figure since
2019. Additionally, intentional, direct killings of civil- ISKP have been thwarted in several countries across
ians decreased to at least 10,200 in 2023 from almost Europe and Asia (Jadoon et al., 2023; Zelin, 2023). In
12,000 in the preceding year. January 2024, ISKP attacked a gathering of Shiite
Figure 5 illustrates that the most substantial change was mourners in Kerman, Iran, killing around 90 people. In
observed among state actors, where killings decreased by March 2024, the world’s attention was once again drawn
over half compared to the previous year. Conversely, non- to the global threat of ISKP as the group orchestrated an
state actors intensified their targeting of civilians, resulting attack on a concert hall located in the outskirts of
in fatalities reaching the highest levels since 2015. Moscow, Russia, claiming least 145 lives.
For the ninth consecutive year, IS was responsible for The second deadliest actor in one-sided violence was
the most one-sided killings globally. Despite carrying RSF in Sudan. Following the outbreak of civil war in
out attacks in 16 different countries, up from 13 in April 2023, RSF has been responsible for the deaths of
2022, total fatalities dropped from at least 3,800 in at least 1,700 civilians, though the UCDP’s high esti-
2022, to almost 2,200 in 2023, marking a significant mate reaches as high as 3,200. Eyewitnesses have
43% decline. Most attacks occurred in DR Congo, recounted RSF’s ruthless tactics, including burning
Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. IS typically used entire neighborhoods, executing individuals in their
small arms and light weapons in countries including homes and on the streets, pillaging, raping, and plun-
Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Syria, while dering, primarily in West Darfur. Accusations of ethnic
short-range weapons such as knives or machetes were cleansing have surfaced, particularly as most victims
also common in DR Congo and Mozambique, with belong to the Massalit community (HRW, 2023).
many beheadings recorded. In recent years, coordinated On 7 October 2023, Hamas and other Palestinian
suicide attacks on civilian targets have been almost armed groups launched ‘Operation al-Aqsa Flood’ from
exclusively associated with the Islamic State Khorasan Gaza into Israel, resulting in one of the most lethal days
Province (ISKP), based in Pakistan and Afghanistan. in terms of one-sided violence for the last year. What
Davies et al. 679

unfolded was a coordinated attack including both air challenging to fully comprehend the extent of one-sided
assault and land attacks, when nearly 3,000 Hamas killings in the occupied regions. In September 2023, the
members breached the Gaza–Israel barrier and several International Criminal Court (ICC) established a field
thousands of rockets were fired into Israel. In addition office in the Ukrainian capital Kyiv to investigate
to clashes with Israeli forces and attacks on police sta- Russian war crimes (Ukrainian Prosecutor-General’s
tions and military facilities, which are documented in Office, 2023). Russia continues to deny accusations of
the state-based conflict, Hamas carried out massacres on atrocities against civilians.
civilians in several kibbutzim around the Gaza strip.
One of the deadliest incidents targeted a music festival Trends in organized crime violence
near the town of Re’im, where authorities recovered the
remains of at least 360 individuals. Hamas seized hun- While organized crime violence has primarily been
dreds of hostages during the attacks on 7 October, and explored through sociological and criminological lenses,
reports of rape, sexual assaults, mutilations, and arson its dynamics remain relatively understudied within the
surfaced (UN, 2024; Wille, 2024). UCDP registered at frameworks of peace and conflict research. Since 2018,
least 670 civilians killed by Hamas in one-sided violence organized crime groups have dominated UCDP’s non-
during 2023, the vast majority on 7 October. While state conflict category. Defined as formally organized
acknowledging the Israeli government’s involvement in groups primarily focused on economic gain, organized
one-sided violence, the tens of thousands of civilians crime groups typically lack the clearly stated political
killed by Israeli reprisals on Gaza since 7 October are goals similar to rebel groups.8 Unlike rebel groups that
mainly documented in the state-based category of struggle for regime change or independence, these
UCDP organized violence. This category encompasses groups aim to maintain and expand criminal enterprises,
civilians killed in crossfire and in the indiscriminate notably drug trafficking. Despite the absence of an ide-
types of warfare typically used by Israel, such as shelling ology or political agenda to motivate their fight, fatali-
and airstrikes. ties resulting from conflicts between organized crime
Figure 5 further reveals that 13 state actors were groups surpass those of conflicts involving rebel groups.
responsible for one-sided violence in 2023, with the This underscores the significant role of economic
most prominent ones including the governments of motives in fueling organized violence. Rather than seek-
Myanmar, Burkina Faso, and Russia. In Myanmar, the ing to replace legitimate state authorities, organized
military junta continued to target civilians in resistance crime groups tend to establish parallel governance struc-
strongholds resorting to brutal tactics such as burning tures in areas of limited state presence, often through
people alive, executions, mass detentions, rape, and co-optation, intimidation, and bribery of political actors
other atrocities (GCR2P, 2024). Cluster munitions were and state institutions to facilitate their illicit activities
also reportedly used against the civilian population (Villa et al., 2021). Such groups pose distinct challenges
(Amnesty International, 2023). Similarly, in Burkina compared to rebel groups due to their intricate interac-
Faso, one-sided violence occurred in the context of state- tions with the state.
based armed conflict. The Islamist armed groups JNIM In UCDP data, non-state violence involving organ-
and IS have their primary base among the nomadic ized crime groups is most prevalent in Latin America
Peuhl (Fulani) community, which is why this ethnic and the Caribbean.9 As illustrated in Figure 6, organized
group has been the focal point of government assaults crime violence has been increasing since the mid-2000s,
on civilians suspected of affiliations with the armed with significant peaks in 2018 and 2021, driven by esca-
groups. Both JNIM and IS also carried out large-scale lations in violence between Mexican cartels and Brazilian
one-sided violence during the year, closely connected to gangs. With organized crime violence reaching an all-
state-based attacks. JNIM was the world’s third most time high and no end in sight, studying the patterns of
violent actor during 2023, following IS and RSF. violence and the circumstances under which these con-
During 2023, the number of civilians intentionally flicts emerge becomes all the more important.
killed by Russia decreased compared to 2022. However, Conflicts between organized crime groups typically
many atrocities carried out by Russian forces in Ukraine revolve around territorial control, resources, and smug-
were discovered and documented after Ukraine regained gling routes, and are characterized by brutal acts of vio-
control of Russian-occupied territory, including mass lence and violent messaging, such as executions,
killings in Bucha, Izyum, and Kherson. The ongoing beheadings, dismemberments, and massacres. Notorious
Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory makes it groups like Los Zetas and CJNG in Mexico and Mara
680 journal of Peace Research 61(4)

Figure 6. Fatalities in non-state conflicts involving organized crime groups compared to other formally organized groups,
1989–2023.

Salvatrucha and Mara 18 in Central America are known (Magaloni et al., 2020). Similar patterns are observed in
for their brutality against both rival factions and civilians other urban centers across the region. In Haiti, the big-
(Pereda, 2021; Suárez, 2023). Communicating through gest gang coalitions, G-9 and G-Pep, have established
different channels, organized crime groups often use control over neighborhoods in and around Port-au-
public banners, graffiti paintings, music, and social Prince since June 2020, employing extreme violence to
media to broadcast threats, claim responsibility for their extend and defend their territories (UN, 2023).
actions, recruit members, and mark their territory. Conflicts involving organized crime groups often
Organized crime violence is particularly prevalent in cluster around drug smuggling routes throughout the
urban settings, as demonstrated by the concentration of Latin American and Caribbean regions. As notable in
UCDP conflict events in cities and suburban areas. Figure 7, the Mexican cities of Tijuana and Ciudad
These groups often surge in marginalized neighbor- Juárez, bordering the US, have been fierce battlegrounds
hoods or slums emerging from rapid urbanization, for cartels, with over 20,000 fatalities recorded by the
where resources are scarce and state presence is low UCDP since 2006. The city of Acapulco along Mexico’s
(Jütersonke et al., 2009). In such areas, organized crime Pacific coast has also been heavily contested by the car-
groups may establish governance structures providing tels due to its role as an entry point for drugs coming
public services and conflict resolution mechanisms, from South America. Figure 7 also highlights the inten-
often in exchange for taxation or extortion (Lessing, sity of organized crime violence in northern and north-
2021). Violence typically occurs as groups fight for con- eastern Brazil, where port cities are key transit points for
trol over drug distribution locations and other lucrative transatlantic cocaine shipments destined for Europe and
businesses. For instance, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil shows a Africa. For example, the port city Fortaleza and neigh-
notable concentration of conflict events, underscoring boring municipalities have seen the battle for control
the presence of organized crime violence in its densely between Comando Vermelho, Guardiões do Estado
populated favelas. Gangs such as Comando Vermelho, (GDE), Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and
Terceiro Comando, and Amigos dos Amigos have been Massa causing thousands of deaths since 2017. Similarly,
disputing control over drug sales in the city’s favelas Manaus, situated along the Amazon River, appears as
since the 1990s. These conflicts intensify as gangs another focal point of conflict due to its importance in
attempt to seize control over a rival’s favela to expand the regional drug trade, linking Brazil to Colombia and
their territory. Beyond the drug trade, these gangs often Peru (Asmann, 2018). In Acre state located by the
provide public services to communities under their con- Brazilian borders with producer countries Bolivia and
trol and enforce their own justice through ‘tribunals’ Peru, criminal factions have been fighting over smug-
used to punish criminal offenses such as robbery or rape, gling routes in the state capital and Rio Branco and
at times killing offenders and innocent civilians neighboring towns since 2016.
Davies et al. 681

Figure 7. Fatalities in non-state conflict and one-sided violence involving organized crime groups across Latin America and
the Caribbean, 1989–2023.

The evolution of organized crime groups is character- Mayo’ Zambada. Following an initial calm, tension reig-
ized by continuous cycles of strategic alliances and frag- nited in 2019 after the arrest and subsequent release of El
mentation, in response to internal and external pressures, Chapo’s son Ovidio Guzmán López. He was rearrested in
often triggering increased violence (Atuesta and Pérez- January 2023 and extradited to the US in September of
Dávila, 2018). For instance, in Brazil, the breakdown of that year. Although the Sinaloa Cartel has a long history of
a long-standing truce between the largest groups internal disputes, the outcome of these recent develop-
Comando Vermelho and PCC in 2016 triggered a surge ments remains uncertain.
in organized crime, leading to over 300 gang-related
deaths in northern and northeastern Brazil. Since then,
organized crime violence in Brazil has primarily mani-
Conclusion
fested in confrontations between either Comando In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for
Vermelho or PCC and local gangs allied with their rival the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020,
faction. In Ecuador, organized crime violence has seen a with the number dropping to half of what was registered
sharp increase since 2021, after gangs Los Lobos and Los in 2022. The decrease was primarily attributed to the
Choneros ended their alliance following the killing of end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which
Los Choneros’ leader. The involvement of Mexican car- accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both
tels, CJNG and Sinaloa Cartel, further fueled the con- 2022 and 2021. Despite this decline, these figures repre-
flict, by supporting opposing factions. sent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the
Arrests of leadership figures often trigger organized Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of
crime violence, as potential successors attempt to fill the 2022 and 2021. Furthermore, the number of active state-
power vacuum (Phillips, 2015). In Mexico, the initiation of based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reach-
the ‘War on Drugs’ in 2006 and subsequent cartel crack- ing a peak of 59 conflicts, the highest ever recorded by
downs spurred violence as the original cartels fragmented the UCDP. In non-state conflict and one-sided violence,
into over a hundred new actors over the past decades. The UCDP noted a small decrease in 2023, although fatali-
arrest and extradition of Sinaloa Cartel boss ‘El Chapo’ ties resulting from non-state conflicts remained at his-
Guzmán in 2017 caused a power struggle between his sons torically high levels. Analysis of non-state conflict data
‘Los Chapitos’ and Sinaloa Cartel leadership figure ‘El over the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten
682 journal of Peace Research 61(4)

most violent years on record, with organized crime mutually exclusive and can be aggregated as ‘organized
groups playing a predominant role. However, despite its violence’. They also share the same intensity cut-off for
significant impact, the phenomenon of organized crime- inclusion – 25 fatalities in a calendar year. Appendices
related violence remains relatively understudied within 1, 2, and 3 list the active conflicts in 2023. See Online
the frameworks of peace and conflict research. Appendix for definitions.
2. Seven conflicts ended or dropped below the threshold for
inclusion in 2023; Ukraine: Novorossiya; Kyrgyzstan–
Replication data Tajikistan; Chad: Islamic State; Egypt: Islamic State;
The complete UCDP datasets updated to 2023, as well as Uganda: Islamic State; Ethiopia: Government; and
older versions of the datasets, are found at http://ucdp. Angola: Cabinda. Ten new conflicts started or re-
uu.se/downloads/. The figures in this article were created erupted in 2023; Cameroon: Islamic State; Syria: Rojava
directly from the Excel sheets at the UCDP web page. Kurdistan/Government; CAR: Logone; Mali: Azawad/
Detailed descriptions of the individual cases are found in Government; Ethiopia: Amhara; Chad: Government;
the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia at https://ucdp.uu.se/. Iran: Government; Russia: Government; Israel: Southern
Lebanon; and Myanmar: Kokang.
Replication data for this article can be found both at
3. The wars recorded in 2023 are the conflicts over govern-
http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ and https://www.prio.org/ ment in Burkina Faso, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, and
jpr/datasets/. Syria, the territorial conflicts Nigeria: Islamic State and
Israel: Palestine, and conflicts over government and terri-
Acknowledgements tory between Russia and Ukraine and in Ethiopia.
Numerous colleagues in Uppsala have contributed to the 4. In 2020, 30 state-based armed conflicts were recorded in
data collection, notably, Igor Barreto, Leonard Bektas, Africa.
Amber Deniz, Tania Estrada, Francisca Garcés, Helena 5. Excluding unknown fatalities gives a decrease of 87%,
from over 18,000 in 2022 to 2,400 in 2023. Almost
Grusell, Victor Hasslöf, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh,
17,000 of the 19,000 unknown fatalities coded in 2022
Amanda Löfström, Andrea Mularoni, Lotta Themnér, are likely civilians killed in Mariupol.
Anna Wadén, and Mert Can Yilmaz. Interns Maartje 6. The status of Palestine remains a complex and conten-
Blom, Mariana Brandão, Ana Carolina Castiglio, Heron tious issue in international politics. According to the
Lopes, Felice Mantel, Marco Paulino, José Rojas, Daniela UCDP definition, a state is ‘(a) an internationally recog-
Sanchez, and Leticia Souza were also of great help. A spe- nized sovereign government controlling a specified terri-
cial thanks to Mert Can Yilmaz for assistance with tory, or (b) an internationally unrecognized government
designing the figures. We also thank the editor and two controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not
anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign
government previously controlling the same territory’. In
Funding line with this definition, Palestine, including Gaza, is not
seen as an independent state in UCDP data.
This work was supported by Uppsala University, the 7. The four cases in 2023 were Armenian support for
Swedish Research Council (Grant No. 2021-00162), the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) against
and the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation Azerbaijan, the Saudi-led coalition supporting the
(Grant No. IN22-0051). Forces of the Presidential Leadership Council against the
Ansarallah government in Yemen, Turkish support for
ORCID iDs the armed opposition in Syria and Rwandan support for
M23 against the government of DR Congo.
Shawn Davies https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1162 8. Groups with stated political goals, as well as self-defense
-9512 groups and pro-government militias, are excluded,
Therése Pettersson https://orcid.org/0000-0002 although they also frequently engage in criminal activi-
-6837-2164 ties. While many organized crime groups frequently
Magnus Öberg https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5127 clash with state forces, at times exceeding 25 deaths
-9369 per year, these conflicts do not fulfil the criteria for
inclusion in the UCDP data due to the lack of a stated
incompatibility.
Notes 9. Organized crime violence is found globally, but con-
1. UCDP collects data on state-based armed conflict, flicts involving organized crime groups rarely reach the
non-state conflict, and one-sided violence. Data for all 25 deaths threshold required for inclusion in the UCDP
three categories go back to 1989; for state-based armed data. Other notable cases are found in for example
conflict, they extend back to 1946. The categories are Canada, France, Nigeria, and South Africa.
Davies et al. 683

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Appendix 1. State-based Armed Conflicts Active in 2023
684

This list includes all conflicts that exceeded the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in 2023 and fulfilled the other criteria for inclusion.1 The column Year shows the latest
range of years in which the conflict has been active without interruption. The start year is found in parenthesis in the Incompatibility column, which indicates when the armed
conflict reached 25 battle-related deaths for the first time. If a conflict has been inactive for more than ten years or if there has been a complete change in the opposition side,
the start year refers to the onset of the latest phase of the conflict. The column ‘Intensity in 2023’ displays the aggregated number of battle-related deaths. Thus, if more than
one dyad is active in the conflict, the intensity column records their aggregated intensity. Three fatality estimates are given in the table: low, best and high.

Location Incompatibility Opposition organization(s) in 2023 Year Intensity in 2023

Low Best High

EUROPE
Azerbaijan Territory (Artsakh (Nagorno- Republic of Artsakh2 2020-23 462 462 462
Karabakh)
(1991)
Russia Government LSR, RDK, Wagner 2023 60 97 176
(2023)
Russia, Ukraine Government/Territory (Crimea) 2022-23 50896 70697 141521
(2022)
MIDDLE EAST
Iran, Israel Government3 2018-23 160 160 160
(2018)
Iran Government Jaish al-Adl 2023 34 34 34
(2005)
Iraq Government4 IS 2004–23 203 203 205
(2004)
Israel Territory (Palestine) PIJ, Hamas 2021-23 22595 22659 22733
(1949)
Israel Territory (Southern Lebanon) Hezbollah 2023 139 139 140
(2023)
Syria Government5 Syrian insurgents6 2011–23 1006 1006 1041
(2011)
Syria Territory (Islamic State)7 IS 2013–23 458 458 564
(2013)
Syria Government/Territory (Rojava SDF 2023 40 40 40
Kurdistan)
(2016)
Turkey Territory (Kurdistan) PKK 2015–23 350 350 465
(1983)
Yemen Government Forces of the Presidential 2009–23 731 800 4710
(2009) Leadership Council8
ASIA
journal of Peace Research 61(4)

Afghanistan Government AFF, NRF 1978–2023 54 74 179

(1978)
(Continued)
Appendix 1. (Continued)

Location Incompatibility Opposition organization(s) in 2023 Year Intensity in 2023

Davies et al.

Low Best High

Afghanistan Territory (Islamic State) IS 2015–23 102 149 224
(2015)
India Government CPI-Maoist 1996–2023 95 96 97
(1991)
India Territory (Kashmir) Kashmir insurgents9 1990–2023 111 119 173
(1990)
Indonesia Territory (West Papua) OPM 2021-23 39 59 75
(2018)
Myanmar Territory (Arakan) ULA 2022-23 80 80 140
(2016)
Myanmar Government NUG, PSLF, CNF 2021-23 1604 1757 6829
(2021)
Myanmar Territory (Kachin) KIO 2021-23 280 292 725
(2011)
Myanmar Territory (Karen) KNU 2021-23 174 174 1167
(1989)
Myanmar Territory (Karenni) KNPP 2021-23 149 150 413
(2021)
Myanmar Territory (Kokang) MNDAA 2023 49 49 169
(2009)
Pakistan Government TTP, TJP 2007–23 808 845 852
(2007)
Pakistan Territory (Balochistan) BRAS 2019-23 48 110 208
(2004)
Pakistan Territory (Islamic State) IS 2021-23 85 86 86
(2016)
Philippines Government CPP 1999–2023 164 164 167
(1969)
Philippines Territory (Islamic State) IS 2016-23 69 70 84
(2016)
Thailand Territory (Patani) Patani insurgents10 2003–23 19 30 30
(2003)
AFRICA
Benin Government JNIM 2022-23 28 28 33
(2022)
Burkina Faso Government11 JNIM 2018-23 3771 3788 4786
(2018)
Burkina Faso Territory (Islamic State) IS 2019-23 572 817 925
685

(2019)
(Continued)
Appendix 1. (Continued)
686

Location Incompatibility Opposition organization(s) in 2023 Year Intensity in 2023

Low Best High

12
Burundi Government RED-TABARA 2019-23 32 92 99
(2014)
Cameroon Territory (Ambazonia) Ambazonia insurgents 2017–23 185 193 240
(2017)
Cameroon Government JAS 2022-23 108 113 138
(2015)
Cameroon Territory (Islamic State) IS 2023 33 53 67
(2015)
CAR Government13 CPC 2018-23 223 230 251
(2018)
CAR Territory (Logone)14 MPC 2023 31 31 31
(2023)
Chad Government CCMSR 2023 61 61 79
(2018)
DR Congo Government15 M2316 2016-23 166 179 212
(2011)
DR Congo Territory (Islamic State)17 IS 2019-23 340 349 505
(2019)
Ethiopia Territory (Oromiya) OLA 2019-23 391 455 5037
(2019)
Ethiopia Government/ Territory (Amhara) Fano 2023 1222 1222 1845
(2023)
Kenya and Territory (Northeastern Province Al-Shabaab 2015–23 191 196 212
Coast) (2015)
Mali Government18 JNIM 2012–23 900 913 1171
(2009)
Mali Territory (Islamic State)19 IS 2022-23 182 182 215
(2017)
Mali Government/Territory (Azawad) CSP-PSD 2023 159 164 224
(2023)
Mozambique Territory (Islamic State)20 IS 2019-23 85 176 247
(2019)
Niger Government21 JNIM 2021-23 48 48 59
(2021)
Niger Territory (Islamic State)22 IS 2015–23 217 275 637
(2015)
Nigeria Government23 JAS 2011–23 251 464 502
journal of Peace Research 61(4)

(2009)
(Continued)
Appendix 1. (Continued)

Location Incompatibility Opposition organization(s) in 2023 Year Intensity in 2023

Davies et al.

Low Best High

Nigeria Territory (Islamic State)25 IS 2015–23 1279 1545 1914
(2015)
Nigeria Territory (Biafra)25 IPOB 2021-23 98 116 138
(2021)
Rwanda Government FDLR-FOCA 2023 130 132 133
(2001)
Somalia Government26 Al-Shabaab 2006-23 3846 3859 4851
(2006)
Sudan Government RSF, SPLM/A-North 2020-23 5292 5315 5742
(1983)
Togo Government JNIM 2022-23 26 26 43
(2022)
AMERICAS
Colombia Government ELN, FARC - EMC 2018-23 86 87 88
(1964)
Total number of battle- 101017 122518 214293
related deaths in 2023
1
See online appendix for definitions.
2
Supported by troops from Armenia.
3
Israel supported by troops from United States of America.
4
Government supported by troops from France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States of America.
5
Government supported by troops from Iran and Russia.
6
Supported by troops from Turkey.
7
Government supported by troops from Iran and Russia.
8
Supported by troops from Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and United Arab Emirates.
9
E.g. Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizbul Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammed.
10
E.g. BRN-C and RKK.
11
Government supported by troops from Mali and Niger.
12
Government supported by troops from DR Congo.
13
Government supported by MINUSCA, involving troops from Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, and
Zambia.
14
Ibid.
15
Government supported by troops from Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
16
Supported by troops from Rwanda.
17
Government supported by troops from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.
18
Government supported by MINUSMA, involving troops from Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, China, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mexico,
Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States of America.
(Continued)
687
Appendix 1. (Continued)
688

19
Ibid.
20
Government supported by troops from Angola, Botswana, Dr Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia.
21
Government supported by troops from Burkina Faso.
22
Government supported by troops from France.
23
Government supported by troops from Niger.
24
Government supported by troops from Cameroon and Niger.
25
Government supported by troops from Cameroon.
26
Government supported by AMISOM, involving troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia. Also, United States of America
contributed troops on the side of the government.

Unclear cases of state-based armed conflict in 2023

Cases that have been completely rejected because they definitely do not meet the criteria of armed conflict are not included in the list below.
For the conflicts listed here, the available information suggests the possibility of the cases meeting the criteria of armed conflicts, but there is
insufficient information concerning at least one of the three components of the definition: (a) the number of deaths; (b) the identity or level
of organization of a party or (c) the type of incompatibility. The unclear aspect may concern an entire conflict or a dyad in a conflict that is
included above.

Location/government Opposition organization(s) Unclear aspect(s)

DR Congo URDPC Incompatibility
Myanmar ABSDF, SSPP Number of deaths
Pakistan Forces of Hafiz Gul Bahadur Incompatibility
journal of Peace Research 61(4)
Appendix 2. Non-state Conflicts Active in 2023
This list includes all non-state conflicts that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 deaths in 2023 and fulfilled the other criteria for inclusion.1 The column ‘Start Year’
shows the first year when the non-state conflict caused at least 25 fatalities (since 1989). The column ‘Fatalities in 2023’ displays the number of people killed, in the low,
Davies et al.

best and high estimate.

Location Side A Side B Start Fatalities in 2023

Year Low Best High

EUROPE
France DZ Mafia Yoda 2023 47 47 47
MIDDLE EAST
Syria IS SDF2 2015 119 119 150
Syria SNA3 SDF 2019 257 258 259
Syria Deir ez Zor Military Council SDF 2023 93 93 93
Yemen AQAP Forces of the Presidential 2015 88 107 125
Leadership Council4
ASIA
India Kuki Meitei 2023 96 102 126
Pakistan Shia (Pakistan) Sunni (Pakistan) 2023 6 29 31
AFRICA
Burkina Faso, IS JNIM 2020 430 436 553
Mali
CAR Azande Ani Kpi Gbe CPC 2023 101 101 101
Chad Farmers (Chad) Herders (Chad) 2022 42 42 42
DR Congo CNPSC Mayi Mayi Biloze Bishambuke 2023 30 32 34
DR Congo FPIC Chambre noire URDPC 2023 45 45 45
sanduku
DR Congo Lengola Mbole 2023 89 89 93
DR Congo M235 VDP 2023 206 215 228
DR Congo Teke Yaka 2022 28 28 31
DR Congo URDPC Zaire self-defense group 2022 69 69 69
Ethiopia Anuak Nuer 2002 43 43 43
Ethiopia Amhara Oromo 1991 34 34 38
Mali Dan na Ambassagou JNIM 2020 85 85 86
Mozambique IS Naparama 2022 25 30 30
Nigeria Atyap Fulani 2020 47 74 74
Nigeria Birom Fulani 2002 86 86 86
Nigeria Black Axe Eyie 2011 54 66 66
Nigeria Chain Guys Full Force 2023 20 30 35
Nigeria Fulani Idoma 2023 54 54 54
689

Nigeria Fulani Kuteb 2023 51 51 61

(Continued)
Appendix 2. (Continued)
690

Location Side A Side B Start Fatalities in 2023

Year Low Best High

Nigeria Fulani Mwaghavul 2023 209 215 215
Nigeria Fulani Mwaghavul, Ron 2023 198 198 361
Nigeria Fulani Tiv 2011 190 190 203
Nigeria IS JAS 2021 364 373 895
Nigeria Karimjo Wurukum 2023 56 70 70
Somalia SSC-Khatumo Republic of Somaliland 2012 290 290 451
Administration
South Sudan Luac Jang Dinka Pakam Dinka 2023 150 150 150
South Sudan, Twic Dinka Ngok Dinka 2022 72 72 72
Sudan
Sudan Arab Masalit 2021 39 39 39
Sudan Arab Gimir 2023 126 126 126
Sudan Habaniya Salamat Baggara 2017 175 175 175
Sudan Hausa Nuba 2023 25 25 25
Sudan Beni Halba Baggara Salamat Baggara 2023 164 252 286
AMERICAS
Brazil Amigos Para Sempre Família Terror Amapá 2021 108 108 108
Brazil Bonde dos 40 Comando Vermelho 2021 62 62 66
Brazil Bonde dos 40 PCC 2022 164 164 165
Brazil Bonde do Maluco Comando Vermelho 2021 258 258 258
Brazil Bonde do Maluco Katiara 2021 32 32 32
Brazil Cartel do Norte Comando Vermelho 2021 236 236 236
Brazil Comando Vermelho GDE 2017 126 126 126
Brazil Comando Vermelho PCC 2015 705 705 709
Brazil Comando Vermelho Holanda 2023 46 46 46
Brazil Comando Vermelho Massa 2023 35 35 35
Brazil GDE, PCC Sindicato do Crime 2020 124 124 129
Brazil Nova Okaida Estados Unidos 2012 125 125 125
Brazil Nova Okaida PCC 2023 34 34 34
Brazil PCC Sindicato do Crime 2017 108 108 113
Brazil, Bolivia Bonde dos 13, PCC Comando Vermelho 2017 66 66 66
Colombia AGC ELN 2023 29 30 52
Colombia AGC ELN, FARC-EMC 2023 24 26 26
Colombia FARC - EMC ELN 2022 50 50 50
Colombia Los Costenos Los Pepes 2023 26 26 33
journal of Peace Research 61(4)

(Continued)
Appendix 2. (Continued)
Davies et al.

Location Side A Side B Start Fatalities in 2023

Year Low Best High

Ecuador Los Lobos Los Tiguerones 2023 31 31 31
Haiti G9 an Fanmi e Alye G Pep 2021 76 76 80
Honduras Mara 18 (Honduras) Mara Salvatrucha (Honduras) 2010 55 109 112
Mexico Caborca Cartel, Sinaloa Sinaloa Cartel – Chapitos 2020 776 776 776
Cartel - Los Mayos
Mexico Cartel Independiente de Los Rusos, UPOEG 2022 344 345 345
Acapulco
Mexico Carteles Unidos Jalisco Cartel New Generation 2021 2333 2340 2341
Mexico Carteles Unidos, Guerreros Los Tlacos 2023 198 198 199
Unidos
Mexico Jalisco Cartel New Nueva Plaza Cartel 2017 626 687 688
Generation
Mexico Jalisco Cartel New Pájaros Sierra 2022 25 25 25
Generation
Mexico Jalisco Cartel New Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel 2018 2034 2034 2034
Generation
Mexico Jalisco Cartel New Sinaloa Cartel 2015 4167 4167 4167
Generation
Mexico Jalisco Cartel New Zetas Vieja Escuela 2022 560 560 560
Generation
Mexico Jalisco Cartel New Los Rojos 2022 474 474 474
Generation, Sangre Nueva
Zeta
Mexico Juarez Cartel Sinaloa Cartel 2004 1806 1806 1806
Mexico Los Ardillos Los Tlacos 2022 143 143 143
Mexico Los Rusos, UPOEG Los Tlacos 2023 30 30 30
Mexico Sinaloa Cartel – Los Sinaloa Cartel - Los Mayos 2020 196 196 197
Chapitos
Total number of fatalities in non-state conflicts in 20535 20898 22085
2023
1
See online appendix for definitions.
2
Supported by troops from United States of America.
3
Supported by troops from Turkey.
4
Supported by troops from United Arab Emirates and United States of America.
5
Supported by troops from Rwanda.
691
 692

Appendix 3. One-sided violence in 2023

This list includes all cases of one-sided violence that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 fatalities in 2023 and fulfilled the other criteria for inclusion.1 The column ‘Start
Year’ shows the first year when one-sided violence caused at least 25 fatalities (since 1989). The column ‘Fatalities in 2023’ displays the number of civilians killed, in the low,
best and high estimate.

Location Actor Start Year Fatalities in 2023

Low Best High

EUROPE
Ukraine, Georgia Government of Russia 1991 10 311 414
MIDDLE EAST
Israel Government of Israel 1989 41 41 44
Israel Hamas 1994 673 673 678
ASIA
Afghanistan Government of Afghanistan 1993 17 43 99
India CPI-Maoist 2005 39 41 41
Indonesia OPM 2023 28 28 28
Myanmar Government of Myanmar 1991 596 596 601
AFRICA
Burkina Faso Government of Burkina Faso 2018 345 345 397
Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Togo, Benin JNIM 2018 1043 1067 1168
Burundi, DR Congo Government of Burundi 1991 37 38 38
Cameroon Government of Cameroon 1994 20 25 25
Cameroon, Nigeria Ambazonia insurgents 2020 89 105 107
CAR CPC 2021 27 28 30
DR Congo Government of DR Congo 1989 78 80 83
(Zaire)
DR Congo Government of Rwanda 1990 78 100 108
DR Congo FPIC Chambre noire sanduku 2020 44 44 44
DR Congo M23 2013 124 124 164
DR Congo Mobondo 2023 175 180 181
DR Congo URDPC 2019 730 757 789
DR Congo VDP 2023 51 53 56
DR Congo Zaire self-defense group 2020 61 61 64
DR Congo, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, IS 2004 1948 2176 2383
Niger 2
Ethiopia Government of Ethiopia 1989 175 176 447
Ethiopia OLA 2020 145 145 157
journal of Peace Research 61(4)

Ethiopia Fano 2022 131 131 147

(Continued)
 Davies et al.

Appendix 3. (Continued)

Location Actor Start Year Fatalities in 2023

Low Best High

Mali Government of Mali 1990 174 174 436
Nigeria Government of Nigeria 1990 31 36 52
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger JAS 2010 127 166 186
Somalia, Kenya Al-Shabaab 2008 54 60 60
Sudan RSF 2023 1735 1746 3191
AMERICAS
Brazil Bonde do Maluco 2022 32 32 32
Brazil Bonde dos 40 2023 25 25 32
Brazil Comando Vermelho 2021 86 87 92
Colombia ELN 1998 30 30 37
Colombia FARC-EMC 2018 63 66 102
Colombia, Venezuela AGC 2021 111 120 136
Haiti Government of Haiti 1991 84 84 87
Haiti Grand Ravine gang 2023 65 65 65
Haiti G Pep 2023 49 49 49
Haiti 5 segon, Canaan 2 gang 2023 70 70 70
Haiti Terre Noire 2023 72 72 72
Mexico Jalisco Cartel 2022 25 25 25
Total number of fatalities from one-sided violence in 2023 9538 10275 13017
1
See online appendix for further information regarding definitions.
2
The majority of the violence took place in these five countries. However, killings were also registered in Afghanistan, Belgium, Cameroon, France, Iraq, Mozambique, Pakistan, Philippines, Somalia, Syria, and
Uganda.
693