The Piper Alpha platform was destroyed in 1988 by a series of explosions.

The North Sea oil rig accident cost more lives than any other offshore disaster.
The Piper Alpha oil rig disaster, which occurred in 1988, remains the worst ever oil rig accident. Of the 226 mean on board the platform at the time only 61 survived. Two crewmen on a rescue boat also perished and 30 bodies were never recovered.

The Piper Alpha Oil Rig

Piper Alpha, located around 120 miles north east of Aberdeen, started oil production in 1976. By 1988 the platform was producing both crude oil and natural gas. The platform was of modular construction, with the control room sited as far away as possible from the dangerous drilling area. When the platform was modified to produce gas the huge condensate pumps, which pressurised the gas, were located near the control room and this was to play a critical role in the disaster. Piper Alpha was owned and operated by Occidental Petroleum.

Cause of the Oil Rig Accident

Due to their remote locations any oil rig accident is serious, but circumstances combined on Piper Alpha to produce a disaster of devastating proportions. In the accident the platform was almost completely destroyed, but investigators were able to trace the cause to a missing component on a condensate pump. The pressure safety valve on condensate pump A was removed for maintenance. Paperwork was completed by the engineer prohibiting the pump from being used in the meantime, but this was either lost or misplaced. This event laid the foundation for the worst oil rig accident in history. When condensate pump B broke down on the evening of July 6th, 1988, pump A was switched on instead as the control room was unaware that the safety valve had been removed.

The Piper Alpha Disaster

Soon after pump A was switched on gas began to leak and several alarms were triggered. The platform was then rocked by a huge explosion. The control room, which was situated near the pumps, was damaged, although the rig supervisor did manage to hit the emergency shutdown button. The various modules on Piper Alpha were separated by fire walls, but these were not blast proof. The first explosion ripped some of these walls apart and ruptured oil lines, resulting in an oil fire. Many of the crew made their way to the accommodation block under the helicopter deck to await rescue, but strong winds and smoke prevented any helicopters from landing. At this stage there were probably only a few casualties, but the oil rig accident was about to get much worse. Two neighbouring rigs, Claymore and Tartan, did not shut down their operations despite a mayday call from Piper Alpha. Oil continued to be pumped into a communal pipe and towards the stricken rig. This fuelled the oil fire and, at 10.20pm the intense heat caused a gas line to rupture. Another enormous explosion rocked Piper Alpha. Half an hour later, and with the neighbouring rigs still pumping oil, another gas line failed. Some crewmen survived by jumping into the sea, but many remained in the accommodation block. The module eventually fell into the sea around 11.20pm, by which time Claymore and Tartan had finally shut down.

The Legacy of Piper Alpha

In the wake of the Piper Alpha oil rig disaster an enquiry took place, under the supervision of Lord Cullen. It found Occidental guilty of poor maintenance and safety standards, but the company was never tried in a criminal court. Over 100 recommendations for improvement were made and accepted following the disaster. It is likely that the magnitude of the disaster would have been much less had the neighbouring rigs shut down immediately. With the huge losses incurred by shutting down production on an oil rig it was a case of profit before safety. Those affected most by the disaster set up the Piper Alpha Families and Survivors Association to campaign for better safety conditions for North Sea workers. A memorial statue was also erected in Hazlehead Park, Aberdeen.

Introduction On the evening of the 6th July 1988 there was a gas leak, which ignited, causing an explosion and fire. 167 people were killed. The subsequent report from the Lord Cullen public enquiry produced a broad range of recommendations for changes in the offshore safety regime. But for lessons learnt we must look to a wider area rather than just the official report. Pre Piper Attitudes Consider the situation prevailing in the North Sea five minutes prior to the disaster. The standard operating climate in the United Kingdom offshore oil and gas industry could be characterised as a lethal mixture of greed, ignorance, complacency, and a cavalier lack of concern for the danger that individuals faced. This long recognised, but conveniently ignored fact was given tacit approval by the government through the legal framework. It excluded the offshore industry from the provisions of the Health and Safety at Work Act, and allowed the government safety watchdog, the offshore inspectorate to exist as a small and understaffed, under funded, unimportant sub division of the revenue watchdogs, the Department of Energy. History of a young industry This was a new industry introduced at high speed into the UK approximately thirty years ago, at the time of a naive government, seduced by the arrival of a high tech, high risk, high reward sunrise industry. The employment and the revenue that Oil brought meant that it accepted and indeed fostered a benign and lucrative partnership between big business and government. The majority of the next twenty-five years was under the leadership of a government that was proud to demonstrate that it was inclined to favour business and profit over excessive "red tape" regulation and workers rights. And that was the accepted status quo in the North Sea. There was legislation, but exceptions had been made. There were regulations but enforcement was lax. There were rules but these were mostly paid lip service, or, adhered to for the duration of occasional inspector's visits. Generally a few missing fingers was seen as a mark of experience in the drilling industry. Strict adherence to the few safety rules was seen as wimpish and a disregard for the regulations was just part of the buccaneering can-do attitude that brought black gold to the surface. Corporate Pride and Craftsmanship There was a pervasive attitude in the North Sea. A cowboy pride in the frontier spirit, imported from the USA, coupled with a British pride in its engineering prowess, previously demonstrated during the industrial revolution. There was the "British Bulldog" spirit that would put up with any conditions because they could take it Men of Steel. There was the "Where there is muck there is brass" attitude. There was arrogance that enough money was being earned so obviously enough money had been spent. "If this major international oil company has spent 500 million on this platform there is no way they would risk losing all that money." There was also the grim acceptance among the workforce that if a 500 million platform was to go up in smoke it would be unlikely that a 50,000 life boat or a 5,000 rubber dingy would save your life. High

tech platforms crammed full of computers and high priced kit, pumping millions of dollars to shore every day with knotted ropes dangling down to the North Sea as means of escape. Board of trade regulations. Standby boats were viewed as hosed down trawlers with burned out alcoholic fishermen as crew. Nobody took that "safety" thing seriously. Not the owners, not the workers, not the government. So therefore the possibility of it all going up with a bang must be remote. Everybody was doing all right and the money was good. Apart from the occasional casualty- an unlucky chap who lost a finger, an arm or a leg or once in a while a fatality where someone in the wrong place at the wrong time got flattened by a sheet of steel or got washed overboard. Really serious accidents only happen overseas to under engineered and over loaded foreign ferryboats and clapped out dodgy chemical factories manned by the ill trained and the work-shy. At 5 minutes to ten on the evening of the 6 July 1988, that was the prevailing attitude. The single most important major change was a complete rethink in the attitude towards safety. Complacency rather than competency All major disasters lead to a tightening of regulations, and after the event major companies then comply with the newly imposed legal requirements. Until that point they do not generally spend any more time, money or management effort on making their operations safer or less polluting. Until the law says they have to, there is no perceived need. When Piper Alpha happened, the whole of the North Sea woke up to reality. It was time to grow up. A change to the rules The Health and Safety at Work Act in 1971 brought a major change from prescriptive to goal setting. The Cullen report was to belatedly introduce this principal to the offshore industry. This put the onus on the operator to consider what was necessary, rather than to just read and comply. This also required some tangible proof - a demonstration that what was required by the law had all been considered and the outcome of this consideration has been put in place and is deemed sufficient - Hence the Safety Case. It was time to Show and |Tell. Reaction and Acceptance This was an onerous requirement since it is no longer sufficient to have compliance with the legal minimum specifications throughout. There follows much casting about for alternative standards to adhere to, and gain approval from. Eventually the message sunk in and a realisation that there was no prescriptive code to follow - It would be necessary to start from first principals and to think about hazards, risk minimisation, safety, and to engineer safety into the operation. First, in the hardware, then the software, then the warm wear- the people. The mind set had to change. It becames imperative and cheaper to do it safely rather than faster. The consideration of all the Hazards, the quantification of all the risks, the planning of all the scenarios involved a lot of thought and consultation. Thinking. Instead of just acting in compliance with the law. Wise after the event Oscar Wilde said that if you wanted to end wars that you should stop glorifying soldiers and make society considered it vulgar to fight. The continuous UK government campaign over drinking and driving has largely changed the attitude of society over a generation. Gradually a more reflective, mature and serious attitude developed in the oil industry.

Killing people had become a shameful thing to do. Injury likewise. The spectre of Corporate Manslaughter charges still stalks the boardrooms of the corporations. Reputations that have cost millions to establish are at risk. And as a consequence we now have the time and the inclination and the resources to do the job safely, after we have planned it, trained for it, analysed the risks and considered the options. Protect and Survive The report also identified that since offshore platforms are surrounded by water, in the event of a disaster there is no easy means of escape. Consequently two major recommendations were introduced. Provide a reliable organised means of escape. Provide a temporary refuge until escape is organised. The major fire that engulfed the platform was never controlled. In fact, it was continuously re-fuelled by operations on another production platform, even though the people there could see that there was a fire. The report recommended that there should be investigation and studies performed to try to prevent this from re-occurring. The control room should be manned at all times, by a person trained and qualified to control The enquiry discovered that Permit to work systems and Audits were operated in a manner to comply with procedures, to meet the requirements, rather than in the spirit of the purpose of these systems to identify and eliminate risks. He recommended that all such systems should be independently monitored to evaluate their effectiveness and that any remedial actions required be carried out in a timely manner. It is depressing to consider that it took a catastrophe of such proportions to introduce such glaring obvious requirements. How safe should an industry be? Here is the Government Definition. ALARP - As Low As Reasonably Practical That's how safe the industry should be. Our attitude to Safety must be deadly serious. Any compromise we make with safety will come back to haunt us. The cost of safety is always less than the cost of an incident. Until a couple of years ago a little old lady lived just up the street from me. She walked past my house occasionally. She looked a bit strange, a bit haunted. She talked to herself. Her son was on Piper Alpha the night of the disaster. His body was never recovered. She never recovered. A Life Ruined. A Real Person. ALARP Indeed. Piper Alpha was a North Sea oil production platform operated by Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd.[1] The platform began production in 1976,[2] first as an oil platform and then later converted to gas production. An explosion and resulting fire destroyed it on 6 July 1988, killing 167 men,[3] with only 61 survivors. The death toll includes two crewmen of a rescue vessel.[4] Total insured loss was about 1.7 billion (US$3.4 billion). At the time of the disaster the platform accounted for approximately ten percent of North Sea oil and gas

production, and was the worst offshore oil disaster in terms of lives lost and industry impact.
[5]

The Kirk of St Nicholas in Union Street, Aberdeen has dedicated a chapel in memory of those who perished and there is a memorial sculpture in the Rose Garden of Hazlehead Park in Aberdeen. Thirty bodies were not recovered.
Contents
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1 Piper oil field 2 Construction 3 Timeline of the incident 4 Aftermath 5 Legacy of accident 6 See also 7 References 8 External links

[edit]Piper

oil field

Four companies that later transformed into the OPCAL joint venture obtained an oil exploration licence in 1972 and discovered the Piper oilfield located at 5828N 015E in

early 1973 and commenced fabrication of the platform, pipelines and onshore support structures. Oil production started in 1976 with about 250,000 barrels (40,000 m3) of oil per day increasing to 300,000 barrels (48,000 m3). A gas recovery module was installed by 1980. Production declined to 125,000 barrels (19,900 m3) by 1988. OPCAL built the Flotta oil terminal in the Orkney Islands to receive and process oil from the fields Piper, Claymore and Tartan, each with its own platform. One thirty inch (0.762 m) diameter main oil pipeline ran 128 miles (206 kilometres) from Piper Alpha to Flotta, with a short oil pipeline from the Claymore platform joining it some twenty miles (32 km) to the west. The Tartan field also fed oil to Claymore and then onto the main line to Flotta.[6] Separate 46 cm diameter gas pipelines run from Piper to the Tartan platform, and from Piper to the gas compressing platform MCP-01 some 30 miles (48 km) to the northwest.

[edit]Construction A large fixed platform, Piper Alpha was situated on the Piper oilfield, approximately 120 miles (193 km) northeast of Aberdeen in 474 feet (144 m) of water, and comprised four modules separated by firewalls.[7] The platform was constructed by McDermott Engineering at Ardersier and UIE at Cherbourg, with the sections united at Ardersier before tow out during 1975, with production commencing in late 1976. For safety reasons the modules were organised so that the most dangerous operations were distant from the personnel areas. The conversion from oil to gas broke this safety concept, with the result that sensitive areas were brought together, for example, the gas compression next to the control room, which played a role in the accident. It produced crude oil and natural gas from 24 wellsfor delivery to the Flotta oil terminal on Orkney and to other installations by three separate pipelines. It has been said[by whom?] that at the time of the disaster, Piper was one of the heaviest platforms (along with Magnus and Brae B) operating in the North Sea. [edit]Timeline

of the incident

A new gas pipeline was built in the weeks before the 6 July explosion, and while this work disrupted the normal routine, the platform was operating as normal. The discovery of a small gas leak was not unusual and no cause for concern. Because the platform was completely destroyed, and many of those involved died, analysis of events can only suggest a possible chain of events based on known facts. Some witnesses to the events question the official timeline.[8] 12:00 p.m. Two condensate pumps, designated A and B, displaced the platform's condensate for transport to the coast. On the morning of July 6, Pump A's pressure safety valve (PSV #504) was removed for routine maintenance. The pump's fortnightly overhaul was planned but had not started. The open condensate pipe was temporarily sealed with a blind flange (flat metal disc). Because the work could not be completed by 6:00 p.m., the blind flange remained in place. The on-duty engineer filled out a permit which stated that Pump A was not ready and must not be switched on under any circumstances. 6:00 p.m. The day shift ended, and the night shift started with 62 men running Piper Alpha. As he found the on-duty custodian busy, the engineer neglected to inform him of the condition of Pump A. Instead he placed the permit in the control centre and left. This permit disappeared and was not found. Coincidentally there was another permit issued for the general overhaul of Pump A that had not yet begun.

7:00 p.m. Like many other offshore platforms, Piper Alpha had an automatic fire-fighting system, driven by both diesel and electric pumps (the latter were disabled by the initial explosions). The diesel pumps were designed to suck in large amounts of sea water for fire fighting; the pumps had an automatic control to start them in case of fire. However, the firefighting system was under manual control on the evening of 6 July: Piper Alpha procedures required manual control of the pumps whenever divers were in the water (as they were for approximately 12 hours a day during summer) regardless of their location, to prevent divers from being sucked in with the sea water (fire pumps on other platforms were switched to manual control only if the divers were close to the inlet). 9:45 p.m. Condensate (natural gas liquids NGL) Pump B stopped suddenly and could not be restarted. As the entire power supply of the offshore construction work depended on this pump, the manager had only a few minutes to bring the pump back online, otherwise the power supply would fail completely. A search was made through the documents to determine whether Condensate Pump A could be started. 9:52 p.m. The permit for the overhaul was found, but not the other permit stating that the pump must not be started under any circumstances due to the missing safety valve. The valve was in a different location from the pump and therefore the permits were stored in different boxes, as they were sorted by location. None of those present was aware that a vital part of the machine had been removed. The manager assumed from the existing documents that it would be safe to start Pump A. The missing valve was not noticed by anyone, particularly as the metal disc replacing the safety valve was several metres above ground level and obscured by machinery. 9:55 p.m. Condensate Pump A was switched on. Gas flowed into the pump, and because of the missing safety valve, produced an overpressure which the loosely fitted metal disc did not withstand.[9] Gas audibly leaked out at high pressure, drawing the attention of several men and triggering six gas alarms including the high level gas alarm, but before anyone could act, the gas ignited and exploded, blowing through the firewall made up of 2.5 x 1.5 metre panels bolted together, which were not designed to withstand explosions. The custodian pressed the emergency stop button, closing huge valves in the sea lines and ceasing all oil and gas production. Theoretically, the platform would then have been isolated from the flow of oil and gas and the fire contained. However, because the platform was originally built for oil, the firewalls were designed to resist fire rather than withstand explosions. The first explosion broke the

firewall and dislodged panels around Module (B). One of the flying panels ruptured a small condensate pipe, creating another fire. 10:04 p.m. The control room was abandoned. Piper Alpha's design made no allowances for the destruction of the control room, and the platform's organisation disintegrated. No attempt was made to use loudspeakers or to order an evacuation. Emergency procedures instructed personnel to make their way to lifeboat stations, but the fire prevented them from doing so. Instead the men moved to the fireproofed accommodation block beneath the helicopter deck to await further instructions. Wind, fire and smoke prevented helicopter landings and no further instructions were given, with smoke beginning to penetrate the personnel block. As the crisis mounted, two men donned protective gear in an attempt to reach the diesel pumping machinery below decks and activate the firefighting system. They were never seen again. The fire would have burnt out were it not being fed with oil from both Tartan and the Claymore platforms, the resulting back pressure forcing fresh fuel out of ruptured pipework on Piper, directly into the heart of the fire. The Claymore continued pumping until the second explosion because the manager had no permission from the Occidental control centre to shut down. Also, the connecting pipeline to Tartan continued to pump, as its manager had been directed by his superior. The reason for this procedure was the exorbitant cost of such a shut down. It would have taken several days to restart production after a stop, with substantial financial consequences. Gas lines of 140 to 146 cm in diameter ran to Piper Alpha. Two years earlier Occidental management ordered a study, the results of which warned of the dangers of these gas lines. Due to their length and diameter it would have taken several hours to reduce their pressure, so that it would not have been possible to fight a fire fuelled by them. Although the management admitted how devastating a gas explosion would be, Claymore and Tartan were not switched off with the first emergency call. 10:20 p.m. Tartan's gas line (pressurised to 120 Atmospheres) melted and burst, releasing 15-30 tonnes of gas every second, which immediately ignited. A massive fireball 150 metres in diameter engulfed Piper Alpha, killing two crewmen on a fast rescue boat launched from the standby vessel Sandhaven and the six Piper Alpha crewmen they had rescued from the water.[4] From that moment on, the platform's destruction was assured.

10:30 p.m. The Tharos, a large semi-submersible fire fighting, rescue and accommodation vessel, drew alongside Piper Alpha. The Tharos used its water cannons where it could, but it was restricted, because the cannons were so powerful they would injure or kill anyone hit by the water. 10:50 p.m. The second gas line ruptured, spilling millions of litres of gas into the conflagration. Huge flames shot over 300 ft (90 m) in the air. The Tharos was driven off by the fearsome heat, which began to melt the surrounding machinery and steelwork. It was only after this second explosion that the Claymore stopped pumping oil. Personnel still left alive were either desperately sheltering in the scorched, smoke-filled accommodation block or leaping from the deck some 200 ft (60 m) into the North Sea. 11:20 p.m. The pipeline connecting Piper Alpha to the Claymore Platform burst. 11:50 p.m. The generation and utilities Module (D), which included the fireproofed accommodation block, slipped into the sea. The largest part of the platform followed it. 12:45 a.m., 7 July The entire platform had gone. Module (A) was all that remained of Piper Alpha. At the time of the disaster 224 people were on the platform; 165 died and 59 survived.
[10]

Two men from the Standby Vessel Sandhaven were also killed.

[edit]Aftermath There is controversy about whether there was sufficient time for more effective emergency evacuation. The main problem was that most of the personnel who had the authority to order evacuation had been killed when the first explosion destroyed the control room. This was a consequence of the platform design, including the absence of blast walls. Another contributing factor was that the nearby connected platforms Tartan and Claymore continued to pump gas and oil to Piper Alpha until its pipeline ruptured in the heat in the second explosion. Their operations crews did not believe they had authority to shut off production, even though they could see that Piper Alpha was burning.[11] The nearby diving support vessel Lowland Cavalier reported the initial explosion just before 22:00, and the second explosion occurred twenty two minutes later. By the time civil and military rescue helicopters reached the scene, flames over one hundred metres in height and visible as far as one hundred km (120 km from the Maersk Highlander) away prevented safe approach. Tharos, a specialist firefighting vessel, was able to approach the platform, but could not prevent the rupture of the Tartan pipeline, about two hours after the start of the disaster, and it was forced to retreat due to the intensity of the fire. Two crewmen from

the standby vessel MV Sandhaven Fast Rescue Craft were killed when an explosion on the platform destroyed their Fast Rescue Craft; the survivor Ian Letham later received the George Medal. The largest number of survivors (37 out of 59) were recovered by the Fast Rescue Craft MV Silver Pit; coxswain James Clark later received the George Medal. Others awarded the George Medal were Charles Haffey from Methil, Andrew Kiloh from Aberdeen, and James McNeill from Oban. The blazing remains of the platform were eventually extinguished three weeks later by a team led by famed firefighter Red Adair, despite reported conditions of 80 mph (130 km/h) winds and 70-foot (20 m) waves.[12] The part of the platform which contained the galley where about 100 victims had taken refuge was recovered in late 1988 from the sea bed, and the bodies of 87 men were found inside.[4] [edit]Legacy

of accident

Memorial to the disaster in Hazlehead Park, Aberdeen.

The Cullen Inquiry was set up in November 1988 to establish the cause of the disaster. In November 1990, it concluded that the initial condensate leak was the result of maintenance work being carried out simultaneously on a pump and related safety valve. The inquiry was critical of Piper Alpha's operator, Occidental, which was found guilty of having inadequate maintenance and safety procedures. But no criminal charges were ever brought against it.[4]

The second phase of the enquiry made 106 recommendations for changes to North Sea safety procedures, all of which were accepted by industry.[13] Most significant of these recommendations was that the responsibility for enforcing safety in the North Sea should be moved from the Department of Energy to theHealth and Safety Executive, as having both production and safety overseen by the same agency was a conflict of interest.[14] The disaster led to insurance claims of around US$ 1.4 billion, making it at that time the largest insured man-made catastrophe. The insurance and reinsurance claims process revealed serious weaknesses in the way insurers at Lloyd's of London and elsewhere kept track of their potential exposures, and led to their procedures being reformed.[15] Survivors and relatives of those who died went on to form the Piper Alpha Families and Survivors Association, which campaigns on North Sea safety issues.[16] The wreck buoy marking the remains of the Piper is approximately 120 metres from the south-east corner of the replacement Piper Bravo platform. A lasting effect of the Piper Alpha disaster was the establishment of Britain's first "post-Margaret Thatcher" trade union, the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee. A memorial sculpture, showing three oil workers, can be found in the Rose Garden within Hazlehead Park in Aberdeen.[17] The sculptor is Sue Jane Taylor, the Scottish artist who had visited the Piper platform the previous year, and based much of her work around what she saw in and around the oil industry. In 2008, to mark the 20th anniversary of the disaster, a stage play, Lest We Forget was commissioned by Aberdeen Performing Arts and written by playwright Mike Gibb . It was performed in Aberdeen, Scotland in the week leading up to the anniversary with the final performance on 6 July 2008, twenty years to the day.[18] Beginning in 1998, one month after the tenth anniversary, Professor David Alexander, director of the Aberdeen Centre for Trauma Research at Robert Gordon University carried out a study into the long-term psychological and social effects of Piper Alpha. He managed to find thirty-six survivors who agreed to give interviews or complete questionnaires. Almost all of this group reported psychological problems. More than 70% of those interviewed reported psychological and behavioral symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder. Twentyeight said they had difficulty in finding employment following the disaster; it appears that some offshore employers regarded Piper Alpha survivors as Jonahs bringers of bad luck, who would not be welcome on other rigs and platforms. The family members of the dead and survived victims also reported various psychological and social problems. Alexander also wrote that "some of these lads are stronger than before Piper. They've learned things

about themselves, changed their values, some relationships became stronger. People realised they have strengths they didn't know they had. There was a lot of heroism took place."
[4]