5768 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT, VOL. 21, NO.

5, OCTOBER 2024

Authentication of Smart Grid by Integrating QKD

and Blockchain in SCADA Systems
Shubhani Aggarwal and Georges Kaddoum , Senior Member, IEEE

Abstract—Information and Communication Technology (ICT) The modern era witnesses renewable energy plants on
provides customers with utilities and smart grid solutions, various scales, spanning from small-scale to large-scale
enabling enhanced monitoring and control of energy management power generation facilities integrated into electric networks,
systems. This technology is poised to elevate the reliability,
sustainability, and efficiency of future electric grids through incorporating power electronic converters. These converters
the implementation of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). oversee and regulate the power output from photovoltaic
However, current Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (PV) and energy storage (ES) systems. System coordination
(SCADA) systems lack trusted machine authentication in smart is managed through a plant supervisory control and data
grid communications, leaving the electric grid vulnerable to acquisition (SCADA) systems. The successful deployment
cyberattacks via sophisticated network technologies such as
wireless access points, sensors, routers, and gateways. Therefore, of these renewable plants hinges on the SCADA system’s
ensuring proper management of data integrity from field sensors ability to communicate with resources, facilitating operational
is crucial to enhance the reliability of SCADA systems. In this functionalities and optimization strategies. Real-time data col-
context, the utilization of quantum key distribution (QKD) key lected from sensors and devices empowers operators to make
pairs is proposed to uphold integrity in smart grid communi- informed decisions for grid efficiency optimization. Thus,
cations. This paper presents a fibre optic blockchain network
designed to manage and utilize cryptographic keys, facilitating ensuring secure and reliable two-way smart grid communica-
the authentication of peer-to-peer (P2P) communications in tions becomes crucial in SCADA systems.
SCADA systems. This demonstration underscores the feasibility Traditionally, SCADA systems involve a centralized archi-
of employing QKD and blockchain to further strengthen the tecture where data from remote devices and sensors are
integrity and authentication of smart grid communications. collected, processed, and monitored at a central location [2].
Additionally, this paper delves into discussing the performance
metrics and overhead expenses of the proposed scheme in This system uses a master-slave communication model, where
comparison with existing state-of-the-art proposals. Simulation a master station communicates with multiple remote terminal
results highlight the significant impact of blockchain size on the units (RTUs) or programmable logic controllers (PLCs) at
system setup’s throughput and latency. different sites. An adversary can attack and disrupt the RTUs
Index Terms—Blockchain, SCADA, quantum key distribution, and PLCs in this system. For instance, existing SCADA com-
MQTT protocol, smart grid communications, authentication, munication protocols, such as DNP3, Modbus, and Powerlink,
data integrity. provide no security mechanism. On the other hand, commu-
nication protocols such as IEC-61850 and IEC-60870 provide
I. I NTRODUCTION security with digital signatures. Besides this, SCADA systems
can incorporate various Internet-of-Things (IoT) protocols like
HE ELECTRIC grid is a network of synchronized electric
T providers and consumers connected by transmission and
distribution lines and operated by a central controller. It
message queuing telemetry transport (MQTT), data distribu-
tion service (DDS), and hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP)
for facilitating machine-to-machine (M2M) communications.
can include renewable and energy storage plants, such as
The lower layers (Layer I and Layer II) in SCADA systems
photovoltaic, wind, solar, hydroelectric, and energy storage
involve the actual transmission of raw data through physical
system technologies that reduce energy losses and generate
media such as cables and wireless signals and ensure reliable
more efficient power [1]. These technologies are widely used
data transfer between nodes with protocols like Modbus RTU
for energy management in the smart grid.
and Ethernet. The higher layer communications involve man-
Manuscript received 29 April 2024; revised 2 July 2024; accepted 3 aging data routing, session control, and application-specific
July 2024. Date of publication 10 July 2024; date of current version protocols [3]. However, these SCADA systems are vulnerable
16 October 2024. The associate editor coordinating the review of this article to various attacks, including physical tampering, Man-in-
and approving it for publication was A. Veneris. (Corresponding author:
Shubhani Aggarwal.) the-Middle (MitM) attacks, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks,
Shubhani Aggarwal is with the Department of Computer Science and malware, and insider threats, which can disrupt operations,
Engineering, Amity University Punjab, Mohali 140306, India, and also with steal data, and compromise system integrity.
the Ecole de Technologie Superieure, Montreal, QC H3C 1K3, Canada (e-
mail: [email protected], [email protected]). MQTT stands as the foremost communication protocol in
Georges Kaddoum is with the Ecole de Technologie Superieure, Montreal, IoT. It is renowned for its standard application layer attributes:
QC H3C 1K3, Canada, and also with the Cyber Security Systems and low complexity, minimal power consumption, efficient imple-
Applied AI Research Center, Lebanese American University, Beirut 03797751,
Lebanon (e-mail: [email protected]). mentation, and ease of use [4]. This protocol is widely
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TNSM.2024.3423762 embraced, especially in resource-limited IoT environments,
1932-4537 
c 2024 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See https://www.ieee.org/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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 AGGARWAL AND KADDOUM: AUTHENTICATION OF SMART GRID BY INTEGRATING QKD AND BLOCKCHAIN 5769

facilitating diverse communication among distributed grid reliability, security, and scalability. Moreover, in the realm of
devices like sensors. quantum computing, fibre optic cables play a vital role in
However, the MQTT protocol provides a basic security quantum communication networks by providing an alternative
model that relies solely on username and password authen- to relying solely on specialized quantum hardware like super-
tication without additional built-in security measures. It is a conducting qubits, trapped ions, and photonic devices. This
lightweight messaging protocol designed for low-bandwidth network offers high-speed data transmission and low latency
and high-latency networks. While it provides features like to enable real-time communication among smart grid com-
publish/subscribe messaging, it lacks built-in security mech- ponents, facilitate rapid adjustments in response to changes
anisms [5]. Therefore, it is commonly used in conjunction in energy demand and supply, and enhance grid stability and
with other protocols like Transport Layer Security and Secure efficiency.
Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL) for encryption and authentication
to enhance security. This layered approach helps ensure data A. Motivation
integrity and confidentiality when transmitting messages over The integration of QKD and blockchain technology into
networks, especially in sensitive applications like industrial smart grid communications is motivated by the critical need
IoT systems, smart grids or home automation. Thus, establish- to increase the security, integrity, and resilience of SCADA
ing a dependable and secure connection between SCADA and systems. These systems play a vital role in monitoring and
ES systems is imperative for smart grid communications. controlling various industrial processes and essential infras-
To address the limitations observed in SCADA systems, tructure components, including smart grid communications
leveraging blockchain technology emerges as a solution, regarding power generation, transmission, and distribution.
enhancing security, transparency, and trust in smart grid However, they are increasingly vulnerable to cyber threats
communications. Extensive literature showcases the integra- such as unauthorized access, data manipulation, and system
tion of blockchain into SCADA systems for smart grid disruptions. QKD’s ability to generate highly secure cryp-
communications [6], [7], [8], [9]. Komarov et al. [10] tographic keys based on quantum principles provides an
proposed a distributed ledger framework in SCADA, ensuring unparalleled shield against potential interceptions or decryp-
an immutable exchange record between production systems tion attempts. This quantum-level security, when combined
and end-users. Seok et al. [11] introduced a lightweight with the blockchain’s immutable and decentralized ledger,
hash algorithm coupled with blockchain in SCADA-based significantly enhances the integrity and authentication of
Industrial-IoT architecture to reinforce security and privacy. data exchanged between the SCADA and the ES systems.
Gao et al. [12] suggested a blockchain utilizing the MQTT By leveraging the blockchain’s tamper-proof nature, smart
protocol for IoT communications among edge devices and grid communications are safeguarded against unauthorized
brokers, ensuring data integrity and authenticity simultane- alterations or access, ensuring a verifiable and unchangeable
ously during transmission. Abubakar et al. [13] presented record. This fusion serves as a robust defense mechanism,
a decentralized MQTT protocol framework for user identity particularly in countering emerging threats posed by quantum
system authentication and authorization. Similarly, papers computing advancements. The transparent and auditable nature
like [14], [15] concentrated on utilizing the MQTT protocol of blockchain transactions also fosters trust among stakehold-
with an Ethereum blockchain among IoT devices, emphasizing ers, providing a reliable framework for secure and future-ready
user privacy preservation and establishing trust and account- smart grid communications amidst evolving technological
ability. landscapes.
Blockchain technology relies on classical key distribution
methods, specifically public/private key pairs, necessitating B. Contributions
large and complex keys to ensure secure access, validate
transactions, and maintain data integrity in its decentralized The major contributions of this paper are summarized as
network [16]. In contrast, quantum key distribution (QKD) follows.
• Present a blockchain-based MQTT protocol for smart grid
harnesses the fundamental principles of quantum mechan-
ics to achieve theoretically unbreakable key distribution, communications in SCADA systems.
promising secure key establishment even across potentially • Introducing QKD in a fibre optic-driven blockchain

compromised communication channels [17]. As one of the authenticates the communication among power electronic
most developed quantum applications, QKD is practically uti- energy resources in the smart grid.
lized in blockchain technology for distributing cryptographic • Evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme to

keys [18]. QKD enables blockchain networks to ensure that measure the overhead and throughput of the system.
keys used for encrypting and decrypting sensitive information In-depth analysis of the authentication and integrity veri-
are not vulnerable to eavesdropping or hacking attempts. fication performance in the SCADA architecture utilizing
This paper concentrates on a fibre optic blockchain network an Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) network.
and aims to ensure ongoing field sensor authentication and
data flow integrity for smart grid communications in SCADA C. Organization of the Paper
systems. While blockchain technology itself does not require The remainder of the paper is organized into the following
fibre-optic infrastructure, fibre optic-driven networks offer sections. Section II details the Related Work concerning
numerous benefits for blockchain, including enhanced speed, the authentication of smart grid communications. Section III

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 5770 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT, VOL. 21, NO. 5, OCTOBER 2024

TABLE I
C OMPARISON B ETWEEN THE P ROPOSED S CHEME AND E XISTING P ROPOSALS

introduces the system model, illustrating blockchain-based centralized SCADA systems, these provers are typically rep-
smart grid communications in SCADA systems. In Section IV, resented by RTUs responsible for controlling field sensors at
the proposed scheme is detailed. Performance evaluation and the physical layer [21]. Even minor disruptions or malicious
overhead aspects of the proposed scheme are addressed in actions targeting critical RTUs can lead to prolonged outages,
Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and compromised process data, and potential damage to hardware
presents future perspectives. and software components. Hence, maintaining high reliabil-
ity, low-latency, and resilience is crucial. To address this,
researchers have proposed distributed technologies capable
II. R ELATED W ORK of offloading complex tasks from constrained devices, like
In this section, we focus on the authentication of smart grid RTUs, aiming to enhance system performance and secu-
communications in SCADA systems. Typically, conventional rity [22], [26], [27]. In another work, Waseem et al. [28]
SCADA systems employ two primary legacy communication aimed to develop of secure distributed smart grid applica-
protocols: DNP3 and Modbus. These protocols enable SCADA tions using blockchain technology. The authors also outlined
masters to supervise and control physical processes via field cybersecurity risks specific to smart grid communications in
sensors and controllers. Specifically crafted for SCADA pur- SCADA systems. Similarly, Augello et al. [23] proposed an
poses, DNP3 and Modbus lack robust security measures to architecture for integrating SCADA and blockchain technol-
authenticate field device identities. As a result, recent attention ogy, outlining the challenges within an innovative project
in cybersecurity has focused on PUF-based protocols, which for implementing Demand-Response programs using advanced
stand out for their unique and unclonable solutions in identi- technologies.
fying and authenticating embedded IoT devices [19], [20]. We observed from our literature review of blockchain in
In general, previous PUF-based protocols tend to impose SCADA systems [29], [30], most researchers have concen-
significant network overhead on the provers. In a cutting-edge trated on addressing the challenges associated with integrating

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 AGGARWAL AND KADDOUM: AUTHENTICATION OF SMART GRID BY INTEGRATING QKD AND BLOCKCHAIN 5771

distributed technologies with CPS and embedded IoT devices.

For example, Gupta et al. [24] introduced a blockchain-
integrated solution to secure M2M communication in IIoT
systems that outperforms conventional methods in terms of
throughput and computational efficiency. Edge server-based
classification and enhanced onion routing enable it to effec-
tively address modern security threats and improve system
reliability. Similarly, Lv et al. [25] proposed a blockchain-
based pub/sub model for IoT to enhance security and
reliability. Their model utilizes PKEwET and decentralization
to mitigate single point failures and ensure confidential data
handling. The resource constraints and scalability limitations
of field sensors pose significant challenges in modern SCADA
systems. This paper therefore focuses on communication
between SCADA and energy systems in smart grids. We
introduce a blockchain-based MQTT protocol designed to
optimize processes and establish safety certifications, ensuring
the authenticity of sensor data and verifiability of transmitted
information. The deployment of QKD in a distributed ledger
technology ensures secure and reliable smart grid communi- Fig. 1. SCADA architecture.
cations in SCADA systems. The limitations of the existing
proposals and the proposed scheme are shown in Table I.
levels in SCADA systems. It facilitates efficient decision-
making and control of complex processes in various industries,
III. S YSTEM M ODEL : B LOCKCHAIN -BASED S MART G RID like energy, manufacturing, and more.
C OMMUNICATION IN SCADA S YSTEMS The traditional SCADA system, relying on conventional
Generally, SCADA systems are integrated systems that protocols, like Modbus [32], faces significant challenges con-
monitor and control smart grid communications. They are cerning security and privacy in smart grid communications.
designed to ensure reliability, efficiency, and safety across The use of centralized and standard protocols in these systems
various industries such as manufacturing, energy, and trans- introduces various security vulnerabilities, paving the way for
portation. As shown in Fig. 1, a conventional SCADA system potential cyberattacks, like spyware, MITM attacks, and DoS
is centralized in nature, including four layers: the ground layer, incidents [33].
the automatic control layer, the supervisory layer, and the To address the limitations inherent in traditional SCADA
central layer [31]. Each layer is described as follows. systems for smart grid communications, we have introduced
• Ground Layer (Field Devices - Sensors/Actuators): This blockchain and quantum computing into SCADA systems.
is the lowest layer in the SCADA system, comprising This enhancement aims to support security and maintain data
physical field devices, like sensors and actuators. These integrity in the smart grid’s power system. While QKD focuses
devices interact directly with the physical environment, on the secure distribution of cryptographic keys, blockchain
gathering data and affecting processes. technology is more broadly able to ensure the security and
• Automatic Control Layer (PLCs, LANs, RTUs, WANs): integrity of energy exchanges in distributed networks.
The second layer involves PLCs connected via Local Fig. 2 illustrates the system model delineating blockchain-
Area Networks (LANs) and RTUs connected via Wide based smart grid communications in SCADA systems. This
Area Networks (WANs). This layer monitors and controls model showcases the blockchain’s interaction with RTUs at
the devices at the ground layer. the automatic control layer and the central server at the
• Supervisory Layer (Supervisory Computers): The third supervision control layer. Its fundamental purpose is to authen-
layer consists of supervisory computers that link the units ticate communications between power management (PM) and
in the automatic control layer. These computers gather SCADA systems. Subsequently, we will discuss a generalized
information from lower layers, coordinate commands, view supporting smart grid authentication through QKD on a
and aim to plan, manage, and schedule operations. blockchain network.
• Central Layer (Central Computer, Management Team): In this model, we employ a coordination controller bridging
The topmost layer involves the central computer, which SCADA and PM systems in smart grid communications. This
is linked to the main server. Here, the management controller serves as an interface managing power data from the
team oversees and manages all the data and information ground to the automatic control layer. Placing the coordination
aggregated from lower layers. They have decision-making controller in the hardware system makes it possible to automat-
authority regarding the data and information processed ically apply QKD to smart grid communications. This system
and sorted by the lower layers. minimizes noise and interference, and ensures quantum states
This hierarchical structure allows for a systematic approach are accurately detected and measured in SCADA systems.
to monitoring, controlling, and managing data across different It also plays a crucial role in enabling secure cryptographic

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 5772 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT, VOL. 21, NO. 5, OCTOBER 2024

Fig. 2. Blockchain-based smart grid communications in SCADA systems.

key distribution among the nodes based on the principles of The MQTT approach between SCADA systems and the
quantum mechanics. coordination controller in smart grid communications is struc-
Moreover, our model utilizes a multi-agent framework that tured as follows: the coordination controller subscribes to
comprises converter, load, intelligence, and interface agents the control information published by the SCADA systems,
that act as ground devices or field sensors. We focus on the while the SCADA systems subscribe to the measurement
converter agents that are responsible for collecting smart grid information provided by the coordination controller. The flow
communication status information and data and sharing them of information using publish/subscribe in the MQTT protocol
with a power electronic controller using the MQTT protocol is shown in Fig. 3.
over the WAN link. The MQTT protocol is based on the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) pro- IV. P ROPOSED S CHEME
tocol and establishes a direct connection between the PM and
Numerous cyber threats, including unauthorized access and
the SCADA systems in the system model for ordered and loss-
spyware, exploit the inadequacies in security measures in
less bidirectional transmission. Similarly, other frameworks
SCADA systems, leaving smart grid communications vulnera-
involve load, intelligence, and interface agents interacting with
ble to fraud. To address these concerns, we introduce a phased
their respective controllers, exchanging information over a
implementation of blockchain-based smart grid communica-
local bus. Upon sharing data with the coordination controller,
tions in SCADA systems. This initiative is geared towards
the RTUs transmit this information to the central server,
ensuring data integrity and authenticating communications in
subject to validation by the blockchain. Subsequently, the
SCADA systems.
validated information empowers the central server to control
and command the RTUs via the communication network.
The Human-Machine Interface (HMI) acts as an intermedi- A. Phases of Blockchain-Based Smart Grid Communications
ary between SCADA software and hardware, managing smart in SCADA Systems
grid communications. Collected data is stored in the cloud and The proposed scheme is composed of three phases,
extracted for insights in comprehensible formats. i.e., (i) profiling phase, (ii) enrollment phase, and
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 AGGARWAL AND KADDOUM: AUTHENTICATION OF SMART GRID BY INTEGRATING QKD AND BLOCKCHAIN 5773

Algorithm 1 Enrollment Phase

Input:SensorIDn =
(SensorID1 , SensorID2 , . . . , SensorIDn ) of all field sensors
Output: IVm = {IV1 , IV2 , . . . , IVm }
1: procedure (Enroll)
2: Access to Keyn = {k1 , k2 , . . . , kn } from the
SensorIDn and Blockchain network.
3: In = getInfo(Keyn )
4: Rn = getResponse(In )
Fig. 3. SCADA and coordination controller communications using publisher-
subscriber model. 5: ObjectIDm = enroll (sensorIDn )
6: addIVm (In , Rn , ObjectIDm )
(iii) authentication phase. The description of each phase is 7: return IVm
provided as: 8: end procedure
1) Profiling Phase: In this phase, the field sensors
that are present in the first layer of the system model Algorithm 2 Authentication Phase-I
(defined in Fig. 2) are authenticated on blockchain using Input: ObjectIDm
the Quantum Diffie-Hellman protocol. Using this, the key- Output: Smart Contract (SC )
pairs i.e., Keyn = {k1 , k2 , . . . , kn } are generated for each
field sensor having unique identity, i.e., (sensorIDn = 1: procedure (Auth − I )
{(sensorID)1 , (sensorID)2 , . . . , (sensorID)n }), where n is 2: Rm , Im = getIV (ObjectIDm )
the count. Each field sensor is identified with sensorIDn = 3: TS = Timestamp()
Keyn to ensure trustworthiness in smart grid communications. 4: H1 = HMAC (Rm Im ||TS )
2) Enrollment Phase: In this phase, the RTUs present at 5: SC = Im , Rm , TS 
the second layer of the system model (defined in Fig. 2) verify 6: return SC
the field sensors using QKD on a blockchain and ensure data 7: end procedure
integrity. The functioning of the enrollment phase is as follows.
• The RTUs verify the field sensors and add the field
sensors with an initialization vector, i.e., IVm = cyberattacks, such as replay attacks, in smart grid com-
{IV1 , IV2 , . . . , IVm }, where m is the number of ini- munications. Here, we take the ObjectIDm as input
tialization vectors concerning field sensors, as per the and get the SC as output. The function Auth-I gets the
requirement in the proposed scheme. information Im and response Rm from ObjectIDm and
• Using a smart contract (SC) at an enroll- adds the timestamp TS to it. Further, we use hash-based
ment phase, the RTUs enroll a unique object MAC (HMAC) to get the encrypted hash value H1 [34].
identity w.r.t. IVm , i.e., (ObjectIDm = Then, prepares a SC with Hm , Rm , TS .
{(ObjectID)1 , (ObjectID)2 , . . . , (ObjectID)m }) against • Algorithm 3 defines the mutual authentication between
each field sensor to monitor the sensor’s data and activity. the RTUs and the field sensors to ensure data integrity
• Once the enrollment of each field sensor has been done at on a blockchain. Here, we take RTUs’data request DR as
the blockchain, the RTUs collect the critical information. input and get that response request RDR as output. The
The information is exchanged between the blockchain function Auth-II reads the request having Rm , Im , TS 
network and the automatic control layer. Using the and gets a response Rm w.r.t. the request. Further, the
enrolment’s SC, the RTUs can add as many initialization SC finds hash H1 from that Rm and matches it with
vectors as possible to collect important information from hash H1 . If they match, there is mutual authentication;
the field sensors. otherwise not. Now, we read the sensor’s data Data and
Algorithm 1 defines how we collect the correct information create HMAC, i.e., H2 w.r.t. Rm and Data. Then, we get
from the field sensors. Here, we take the SensorIDn of field RDR from the field sensors with data, H2 .
sensors as input and combine it with IVm as output. The • Algorithm 4 details the authentication of field sensors
function enroll gets the information In from sensorIDn using and data integrity validation to send the data from
Keyn and gets a response Rn concerning In . Furthermore, the automatic control layer to the central layer on a
RTUs enroll sensorIDn with ObjectIDm and add them as blockchain. Here, we take RDR and Im as inputs and
IVm on a blockchain. send the data to the central layer DSC as output. The
3) Authentication Phase: In this phase, the blockchain function Auth-III reads the RDR and gets a response Rm
network validates the data and identity of each field sensor. If from it. Further, the SC finds hash H2 and matches it
both are valid then RTUs send the same data to the central with the hash value H2 . If they match the field sensor is
server for analysis and monitoring. The functioning of the authenticated and Data is forwarded to the central server.
authentication phase is defined as follows. In conclusion, the central server exclusively receives data
• Algorithm 2 describes that the blockchain network uses following successful verification of data integrity and authen-
a nonce (random number) to improve the security against tication of the field sensor by the blockchain network.

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 5774 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT, VOL. 21, NO. 5, OCTOBER 2024

Algorithm 3 Authentication Phase-II the communication among these nodes, they must agree on
Input: Data request (DR) by RTUs a publicly shared value set, i.e., SP , initialized as SP = |0
Output: Response of DR by field sensors (RDR) in SCADA systems. The starting point for any operation
performed by all the nodes must be such a mutually known
1: procedure (Auth − II ) state.
2: Rm , Im , TS  = read () the request The unitary operators of Si = |S1 , S2 , . . . , SN | and
3: Rm = getresponse(Im ) SP are U (S ) = |U (S1 ), U (S2 ), . . . , U (SN )| and U (SP ),
4: H1 = HMAC (Rm Im ||TS ) respectively. These operators are used to change either the
5: if H1 ! = H1 then coordinates or the state. The step-wise description of the QDH
6: Close process between two nodes is defined as under, and the flow
7: else chart of this process is shown in Fig. 4.
8: Data = read () sensor • In step 1, N1 creates a qubit state |0 and sends a qubit
9: H2 = HMAC (Rm ||Data) |0  U (S1 )|0 := |(φ1 ) to N2 .
10: RDR = Data, H2  • In step 2, N2 receives φ1 and modifies it with its own
11: end if unitary operator, i.e., |φ21  := U (S2 )|φ1 .
12: return RDR • In step 3, N2 sends its own qubit |φ2  = U (S2 )|0 to N1 .
13: end procedure • In step 4, N1 receives |φ2  and modifies it that results,
|φ12  := U (S1 )|φ2 U (SP ).
Algorithm 4 Authentication Phase-III Following that, both nodes possess control over the data, such
as:
Input: RDR, Im
U (SP )U (S1 )U (S2 ) · · · U (SN )= U (S1 )U (S2 ) · · · U (SN )
Output: Data forwards to central server (DSC )
Given that: |φ12 = |φ21 
1: procedure (Auth − III ) Thus, both nodes are in possession of identical quantum
2: Data, H2  = unpack (RDR) the request states without knowing each other’s secrets.
3: Rm = getresponse(Im ) 2) Data Transmission Process: The security and preserva-
4: H2 = HMAC (Rm ||Data) tion of data integrity during the transmission from the agent
5: if H2 ! = H2 then to the central server stand as the cornerstone of the proposed
6: Exit scheme. The step-by-step outline of the data transmission pro-
7: else cess is elaborated below, complemented by the corresponding
8: Auth = Authenticate field sensor flowchart in Fig. 5.
9: DSC = Data forwards to central server • In step 1, the agent sends a sensor identity, RTU address,
10: end if and data packet to transmit its data to the central layer
11: return DSC on a blockchain network.
12: end procedure Msg1 = sensorID , RTUaddr , datapacket 
• In step 2, the nodes on a blockchain checks whether the
sensorID is enrolled or not on a blockchain.
Subsequent to a successful blockchain process, a new ini- • In step 3, if the verification and validation are true on
tialization vector is employed, eliminating the potential for a blockchain, then the agent sends datapacket to the
attacks, while the previous one is discarded. This measure automatic control layer of RTUaddr .
mitigates data hacking during the exchange of smart commu- • In step 4, the automatic control layer checks whether the
nications in SCADA systems. RTUaddr is available and consistent.
• In step 5, if RTUaddr is true, then the automatic control
layer executes datapacket and sends an acknowledgement
B. Implementation of Blockchain-Based Smart Grid Ackdata to the agent.
Communications in SCADA Systems • In step 6, the automatic control layer further sends
The implementation of blockchain-based smart grid com- datapacket to the supervision layer for interaction with
munications in SCADA systems ensures robust security the HMI, where planning, management, and scheduling
measures to prevent any data leakage during exchanges. of datapacket is performed for future perspective. Then,
This implementation comprises two integral processes: (i) the finally the datapacket is stored on a cloud server at the
quantum Diffie-Hellman process and (ii) the data transmission central layer.
process.
1) Quantum Diffie-Hellman Process: The DH algorithm
uses key exchange between two parties for secret com- V. R ESULTS AND D ISCUSSION
munication over a local network. Here, we use quantum This section encompasses the simulation results and
physics-based DH that can exchange qubits between nodes, performance analysis of the proposed scheme and comparison
i.e., N1 , N2 , . . . , NN on a blockchain. Each node holds a with state-of-the-art solutions. It is divided into five parts:
secret value defined as Si = |S1 , S2 , . . . , SN |, where N is the (i) evaluation setup, (ii) overhead performance, (iii) blockchain
number of nodes on the blockchain network. Before starting network performance, (iv) MQTT protocol performance,

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 AGGARWAL AND KADDOUM: AUTHENTICATION OF SMART GRID BY INTEGRATING QKD AND BLOCKCHAIN 5775

Fig. 4. Flow chart of quantum DH process.

TABLE II
and (v) SCADA performance. The simulation environment DHT11 S PECIFICATIONS
includes four Raspberry Pi 4 models and a DELL Precision
7530 series.

A. Evaluation Setup
The physical SCADA simulation operates using
Hyperledger Fabric v2.2, comprising one anchor peer, six TABLE III
peer nodes, and one orderer peer [35]. In our comprehensive C OMPARISON B ETWEEN THE P ROPOSED S CHEME
AND E XISTING P ROTOCOLS
evaluation of the proposed scheme, we assume standard
operation in traditional SCADA ecosystems, particularly
regarding data sensor flow. Field sensors and RTUs exchange
information utilizing the MQTT protocol, while the remaining
HLF network utilizes state-of-the-art TCP/IP communication.
Our physical test scope is restricted by the operational
limitations of the DHT11 sensors. Both the enrollment smart
contract and the verification smart contract are deployed across
all blockchain peers.
Temperature and humidity significantly influence the effi-
ciency and performance of PV systems in smart grid
communications. To measure these parameters, we utilize
the DHT11 environment sensor [36]. Table II displays the
DHT11’s measured signal output, ensuring long-term stabil-
ity and high reliability. Equipped with a resistive type of
humidity measurement to counter humidity effects and a
thermistor to mitigate temperature impacts on simulations, the stream size. Table III illustrates the performance metrics
DHT11 provides a controlled environment for the operation when parsing a single data request from the DHT11 sensor,
of blockchain-based field sensors. highlighting the comparative advantages of our proposal
over existing solutions, such as the PUF protocol [21] and
B. Overhead Performance BIoSPAI [22]. These latter two protocols rely on the physical
1) Data Verification Request: Compared to existing characteristics of hardware components, such as integrated
state-of-the-art proposals, our proposed scheme shows better circuits, to generate cryptographic keys, whereas QKD utilizes
performance in data transmission, specifically regarding data principles of quantum mechanics for secure key distribution.
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 5776 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT, VOL. 21, NO. 5, OCTOBER 2024

Fig. 5. Flow chart of data transmission process.

Similarly, Fig. 6 shows the performance when validating This accelerates key consumption, facilitating authentica-
data requests of 1KB to 10 KB from the master node to the tion of smart grid communications on a fibre optic-driven
field sensors. blockchain in SCADA systems. This evaluation observes the
From the results, we conclude that the proposed scheme blockchain’s performance across three key attributes: (i) time
performs better in all the considered data streams. taken to commit transactions, (ii) log size, and (iii) network
2) Authentication Time: Considering the authentication setup time, elaborated below.
time for sensor identity and data integrity verification in our 1) Time to Commit Transactions: Fig. 8 demonstrates that
proposed scheme, our results showcase superior performance as the number of blockchain peers increases, there is a
compared to existing state-of-the-art solutions. While tra- proportional increase in the average time required to commit
ditional protocols authenticate data requests in a threshold transactions. This marginal time variance is attributed to
value of 200 ms, our proposed scheme significantly reduces network maintenance in the HLF [35]. It is important to note
processing time and overall overhead by 10%. Fig. 7 illustrates that stable and consistent network connections among peers
the relationship between processing time and volume of data are vital for transaction commitment.
transmitted. Moreover, our proposed scheme exhibits improved
performance, executing transactions in less time compared
to existing proposals. This efficiency is attributed to the
C. Blockchain Network Performance utilization of QKD for key consumption on a blockchain.
Prior to initiating communications with the coordination 2) Log Size: Fig. 9 illustrates that with an increase in the
system, each field sensor collects keys from the QKD system. number of blockchain peers, there is a corresponding increase

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 AGGARWAL AND KADDOUM: AUTHENTICATION OF SMART GRID BY INTEGRATING QKD AND BLOCKCHAIN 5777

Fig. 8. Time to commit a transaction with number of peers on a blockchain.

Fig. 6. Data overhead vs data sent in KB.

Fig. 9. Log size with number of peers on a blockchain.

4) Network Scalability: We assess the network scalability

Fig. 7. Processing time vs data sent in KB.
of the system model by analyzing the proposed scheme’s aver-
age throughput and latency. Fig. 11 illustrates the scheme’s
average throughput for various transaction sending rates
in log size requirements among peers. In our approach, reported in terms of the number of peers on the blockchain
leveraging QKD facilitates extensive information exchange network. At moderate rates, such as 50 and 100 tx/sec,
and sustains stable peer-to-peer communication. As a result, the system achieves maximum throughput by processing all
the proposed scheme necessitates a smaller log size to store transactions and appending them to the blockchain. However,
the exchanged information compared to the BIoSPAI protocol at higher rates, such as 200 and 500 tx/sec, through-
based existing scheme. put is influenced by the number of peers and drops as
3) Network Setup Time: In this section, we analyze the the number of peers approaches 20. This could lead to
network setup time required to deploy a blockchain network. a decrease of up to below 40% of the sending rate of
Fig. 10 illustrates that as we deploy smart contracts among 500 tx/sec.
a greater number of peers, the network setup time increases. Similarly, Fig. 12 illustrates the scheme’s average latency
This escalation is attributed to the amplified communication whose relationship to the number of peers on the blockchain
maintenance demanded by the heightened network traffic due is opposite to that of throughput. At a moderate sending rate
to the increasing number of peers. Notably, it is evident that and network size, the average latency for various transaction
the network setup time maintains a direct proportionality to sending rates ranges from 2.3 to 2.9 seconds. Nevertheless,
the resources allocated for the blockchain. latency is significantly higher at higher sending rates and

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 5778 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT, VOL. 21, NO. 5, OCTOBER 2024

Fig. 12. Average latency verses number of peers on a blockchain.

Fig. 10. Average network setup time on a blockchain.

Fig. 13. Response time to receive confirmation of the processed data versus
data size.
Fig. 11. Average throughput verses number of peers on a blockchain.

larger network sizes, reaching up to 11 seconds. Fig. 12 clearly the MQTT protocol both before and after its integration with
indicates that the delay is greater at higher transaction rates due blockchain.
to additional time required to disseminate the corresponding 1) Response Time: Fig. 13 presents the results depicting
volume of data to all peers. Furthermore, the results indicate the response time for data processing before and after the
that the maximum throughput that can be accommodated is integration of blockchain. In this analysis, we conduct four
200 tx/sec, which aligns with the implementation platform’s tests with varying data sizes-125 KB, 400 KB, 750 KB, and
capabilities. 1000 KB-transmitted to the client. As observed in Figure 13,
In conclusion, our proposed scheme, which integrates QKD an increase in message volume correlates with an increase in
and blockchain, demonstrates superior performance in terms data processing time. However, upon comparing the response
of transaction commitment time, network setup time, and log time with and without blockchain integration, it is evident that
size. the proposed scheme showcases an average decrease of 12%
in data processing time.
D. MQTT Protocol Performance 2) Concurrent Access: To evaluate the concurrency using
We establish the MQTT broker on a blockchain test environ- the MQTT protocol, we conduct an experiment involving
ment. The designated test MQTT broker, mqtt.IoTmqtt.com.cn, the simultaneous transmission of 10,000 KB of data to
operates on port 1883. For MQTT testing, we employ the 4 clients. This experiment spans 5 minutes. Fig. 14 illus-
standard tool, MQTT.fx. In our experimental setup, the Quality trates that concurrent data transmission exhibits improved
of Service (QoS) for MQTT message publishing is configured performance on a blockchain, showcasing an average increase
to 1. The subsequent analysis examines the performance of of approximately 10%.

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 AGGARWAL AND KADDOUM: AUTHENTICATION OF SMART GRID BY INTEGRATING QKD AND BLOCKCHAIN 5779

securely storing encryption keys for use in communica-

tion between SCADA devices.
2) Quantum Channel: The hardware must support the trans-
mission of quantum signals over a dedicated quantum
channel. This involves integrating of fibre optic compo-
nents, in accordance with the system’s communication
requirements and environmental constraints.
3) Integration With SCADA Protocols: QKD implemen-
tation should be compatible with existing SCADA
protocols and communication standards to ensure seam-
less integration with the existing SCADA infrastructure
and minimal disruption to operations.
4) Quantum Detectors: The SCADA hardware must
include quantum detectors that are capable of accu-
rately measuring the quantum states transmitted over
the quantum channel. These detectors should be highly
quantum efficient and produce little noise to ensure
Fig. 14. Concurrent Access of data with and without blockchain. reliable quantum signal detection.
In the end, we can say that implementing QKD on industry-
grade SCADA hardware requires careful consideration of
hardware components, key management protocols, and inte-
gration with existing communication systems to ensure secure
and reliable smart grid communications.

VII. C ONCLUSION
This paper introduced a fibre optic-driven blockchain
network designed to oversee and optimize smart grid com-
munications in SCADA systems. Our approach employs the
MQTT protocol to establish reliable communication between
SCADA and ES systems. Through this demonstration, we
validated the viability of integrating QKD and blockchain
technologies for enhancing the integrity and authentication of
smart grid communications. We delved into the performance
metrics and overhead costs of our proposed solution in
comparison to existing state-of-the-art approaches. Simulation
results highlighted the impact of the blockchain size on the
system throughput and latency.
Fig. 15. Time to commit transactions in a SCADA environment.
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