Observation of

the 2024 Presidential Election

in Venezuela
July 2024

The Carter Center

Final Report
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................................... 4
POLITICAL CONTEXT ............................................................................................................ 9
LEGAL FRAMEWORK........................................................................................................... 10
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION ............................................................................................ 12
VOTER REGISTRATION........................................................................................................ 15
CANDIDATE REGISTRATION .............................................................................................. 17
CIVIC AND VOTER EDUCATION ........................................................................................ 19
ELECTION CAMPAIGN ......................................................................................................... 20
CAMPAIGN FINANCE ........................................................................................................... 22
MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA ............................................................................................... 23
ELECTION OBSERVATION ................................................................................................... 25
ELECTION TECHNOLOGY ................................................................................................... 26
ELECTION DAY ...................................................................................................................... 31
ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS ......................................................................................... 33
POSTELECTION DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................................... 35
ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION ................................................................................... 37
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................ 38
RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................................................... 39
ANNEX 1: ELECTORAL TIMETABLE ................................................................................. 42
ANNEX 2: ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS................................................................ 43

2
INTRODUCTION
The Carter Center has been engaged with Venezuelan elections since 1998, deploying
observation missions, as well as expert and study missions, for a range of national and regional
elections and national referendums. 1 In November 2023, after being named in the Barbados
Accords as one of the institutions, along with the European Union and the United Nations, to be
invited to observe the 2024 presidential election, the Center conducted a needs assessment
mission to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and met with the National Electoral Council
(CNE), government officials, opposition representatives, and civil society organizations (CSOs),
and the international community in Caracas.
On March 7, 2024, The Carter Center received an invitation from the CNE to observe the July
28, 2024, presidential election process. Following a visit by Carter Center representatives to
Venezuela in April 2024, the CNE and the Center signed a memorandum of understanding
(MoU) on May 9, 2024, to guarantee that the Center could observe freely and speak publicly
about its findings and conclusions, in accordance with the Center’s standard methodology. The
commitments that the electoral authority made to give the mission full freedom and access were
essential to being able to conduct credible observation. However, on election night and
afterward, the Center did not have access to detailed CNE information on the election results.
This was not in line with the MoU agreed to prior to the mission’s deployment.
On June 29, 2024, The Carter Center deployed an international technical election observation
mission led by Jennie Lincoln, senior adviser for Latin America and the Caribbean. The mission
consisted of 17 experts and observers, including teams based in Caracas, Barinas, Maracaibo,
and Valencia. The mission met with a wide range of stakeholders, including the CNE, candidates,
political parties, CSOs, citizen observation groups, media representatives, government officials,
armed forces, and election experts.
The Carter Center mission observed technical preparations for the elections, the election
campaign, voter education efforts, the use of election technology, citizen observer access,
election day operations in 68 locations in four states, the announcement of results, and other
aspects of the election process. In accordance with Carter Center election observation
methodology, the mission assessed the process against international standards and commitments
for democratic elections as outlined in treaties, other international instruments, and documents on
electoral good practice.
The Carter Center mission observed the election day process in and around Caracas, Barinas,
Maracaibo, and Valencia with six teams. As the mission did not include a full short-term
observer delegation, its observations at polling locations were limited in scope and are not
necessarily representative of processes across the country. Therefore, this report does not provide
a comprehensive assessment of the voting and counting process. However, the mission’s
observations were generally consistent with reports from independent media and citizen observer
groups.
Following the CNE’s announcement of results on the night of July 28, 2024, The Carter Center
called on the CNE to immediately release the full results from all polling stations, stating that the
information contained in the results forms was indispensable for the mission’s evaluation of the

1
The list of Carter Center election observation and other election missions in Venezuela is available at
https://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/observed.html#experts

3
election process and fundamental for the Venezuelan people. 2 The Carter Center withdrew its
mission on July 30, 2024, in view of the security situation and the refusal of the CNE to provide
transparent election results. The Carter Center issued a preliminary statement on July 30,
concluding that “Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election did not meet international standards of
electoral integrity and [could] not be considered democratic.” 3 At the time of the publication of
this final report, the CNE had not published official results of the vote at polling station level.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Venezuelan elections took place in the context of extreme polarization between the
government and the opposition, longstanding concerns about the human rights situation, and the
continued emigration of millions of Venezuelans due to the economic and political situation. The
2023 Barbados Accords between the government and the opposition were seen as a window of
opportunity for the CNE to conduct the presidential election in a manner that could provide for a
degree of fair competition and the eventual acceptance of the outcome by all sides.
Despite the agreement reached in Barbados and the requirements of Venezuelan law, the electoral
process reflected a clear bias toward the incumbent president. This bias was apparent in the
candidate registration process, in the exclusion of most overseas voters from the process, and in
the manifestly unequal conditions for campaigning. Nevertheless, the main opposition grouping,
the Unitary Platform, was able to nominate a candidate and to get its message to voters. In that
sense, the election was competitive, and voters had clear choices when they went to the polls on
election day. In addition, the testing and auditing of voting machines was generally transparent in
the pre-election period, and all parties met by the Carter Center mission were satisfied that the
electronic voting system provided sufficient guarantees for an accurate and transparent vote
count and tabulation of results.
On election day, Venezuelan citizens appeared eager to participate in a democratic electoral
process. Despite problems in some areas – including reports of a few violent incidents, a tense
environment, slow processing of voters, and exclusion of opposition poll watchers – election day
was generally peaceful, and voters turned out in large numbers to express their will. In the
limited number of polling stations visited by the Carter Center mission, officials appeared to
follow procedures correctly for the most part.
However, the process deteriorated rapidly on election night. Amid widespread claims on social
media that the opposition had won by a large margin, the CNE announced that President Maduro
had won re-election with 51.2%, while Edmundo González Urrutia had 44.2%. The CNE did not
provide any polling station results, claiming that the reporting system had been hacked. In the
meantime, the opposition began posting online thousands of copies of paper results forms (actas)
produced by each voting machine at polling station level and collected by its party agents. These
results forms demonstrated a clear and convincing victory for the main opposition candidate,
González.
Although The Carter Center and others in Venezuela, the region, and around the world called for
greater transparency to ensure that the announced overall results matched the evidence provided
by each voting machine, the CNE refused to provide any evidence for its announcement. The

2
Carter Center Calls on Venezuelan Election Authorities to Release Detailed Results Immediately
https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2024/venezuela-072924.html
3
Carter Center Statement on Venezuela Election, July 30, 2024, https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2024/venezuela-073024.html

4
CNE did not post any electronic results from polling stations, nor did it make publicly available
the paper copies of the results that it received from every polling station.
Due to the extraordinary refusal of the CNE to fulfill the most basic function of accurately
reporting the results and the overwhelming physical evidence in the form of actas collected at
polling station level, The Carter Center concludes that Venezuela’s 2024 elections did not meet
international standards for electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic.
In addition to the absence of transparency in announcing the results and the apparent falsification
of the outcome, the Venezuelan authorities remained unable to fulfill several fundamental
conditions for a democratic election, including a neutral and enforced legal framework; an
impartial and transparent electoral body; a comprehensive and nondiscriminatory voter
registration; freedom of campaigning for parties and candidates; freedom of the media; free and
fair competition; full and equitable opportunities to observe the process; and impartial and
effective mechanisms for resolving disputes. While the CNE largely succeeded in the logistical
organization of the voting process, these efforts were nullified by a tabulation and results
announcement process that did not meet the minimum requirements of transparency. Thus, the
election results announced by the CNE could not be independently verified, which constituted a
serious violation of electoral principles and Venezuelan law.
Other key findings of the report are as follows:
Political context: Following the political crisis regarding the lack of recognition of President
Maduro’s term between 2018 and 2024, the path to the presidential elections was marked by a
negotiated approach from the international community, providing incentives for the opposition to
participate in the electoral route and for the government to create conditions for electoral
competition, starting with the 2021 regional elections. The negotiations led to the signing of the
Barbados Accord between the government and the opposition Unitary Platform (Plataforma
Unitaria) that included electoral guarantees for all actors, a timeframe for the elections, freedom
to choose candidates, provisions for international observation, and specific guarantees regarding
electoral integrity conditions.
The government entered the electoral process with control of the three branches of state, the
armed forces, and the electoral management body. Over the past several years, international
organizations and domestic civil society groups have denounced the erosion of the rule of law,
the closing of public space, and judicial intimidation toward political opponents and human
rights defenders.
Legal framework and electoral system: The legal framework was generally in line with
international electoral standards and commitments for democratic elections. Nevertheless, the
lack of judicial and institutional independence, the erosion of the rule of law, the CNE’s selective
enforcement of the law, political interference, and the human rights situation created a legal
environment that was not conducive to a genuine democratic electoral process.
The legal framework for the 2024 elections remained largely unchanged from the 2021 elections,
except for a few amendments, including stricter measures to ensure voter identity at polling
stations on election day. As a result, several legal shortcomings identified in previous elections

5
persisted. 4 In 2024, the National Assembly considered three new laws that further threatened
civic space and restricted the freedom of association and expression.
Candidate registration: The registration of candidates did not meet international standards. The
registration of the main opposition presidential candidate was subject to arbitrary decisions by
the CNE. The Unitary Platform was not allowed to register the winner of the primary election,
María Corina Machado, as its candidate. In an unexplained decision, the CNE then failed to
register the opposition’s second choice, citing a technological problem. Eventually, the CNE
allowed the registration of the Unitary Platform’s third choice, Edmundo González Urrutia. In
addition to President Maduro and González, eight other candidates also were registered.
The ability of some opposition parties to nominate candidates was affected by the fact that their
leadership had been replaced by pro-government leaders through judicial decisions over the past
several years. From January to July 2024, 19 opposition leaders and officials were disqualified,
including 12 sitting mayors, further impacting political participation. Despite these limitations,
much of the opposition coalesced around the candidacy of González, raising expectations of the
first competitive presidential election in many years.
Election administration: The CNE has extensive technical, operational, and logistical expertise,
ranging from biometric voter registration to the development of voting machines with a robust
set of audits. Although the constitution grants the CNE the status of an independent branch of
government, most stakeholders who met with the Carter Center mission perceived the current
configuration of the CNE as less independent than in previous elections. During the 2024
electoral process, the CNE favored the ruling party. The CNE’s inability or unwillingness to
enforce the law, its lack of response to allegations of electoral violations, and gaps in
transparency undermined the integrity of the electoral process and its overall credibility. The
CNE’s failure to publish transparent election results shattered any remaining confidence in its
professionalism and ability to manage the election process impartially.
Voter registration: The official registry for the 2024 elections totaled 21,392,464 voters. CSOs
estimated there were up to 3 million eligible voters in the country – particularly young people –
who were not on the electoral roll. This under-registration is at least partly a consequence of the
compressed electoral calendar, which resulted in a short timeframe, as well as fewer registration
centers and limited official publicity about voter registration. Citizens abroad faced excessive
legal requirements to register, some of which appeared arbitrary. This effectively disenfranchised
most of the migrant population, resulting in a very low number of voters abroad.
Campaign: The election campaign was characterized by an uneven playing field and unequal
access to resources among the candidates. The incumbent president’s campaign was well-funded
and highly visible through rallies, posters, murals, and street campaigning. In contrast, the
opposition candidates had very limited presence due to their lack of financial resources, which
limited their outreach efforts and forced them to rely heavily on volunteers.
The Carter Center mission heard numerous reports of the misuse of administrative resources on
behalf of the incumbent, including the use of government vehicles, public officials campaigning
while in their official capacity, and the use of state-funded social programs to encourage or
pressure voters to support the president. Some of these instances were directly observed by
Carter Center observers. In addition, the authorities frequently attempted to restrict the
4
See The Carter Center, Expert Mission to Observe Regional and Local Elections in Venezuela Final Report, p.13.
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/venezuela/venezuela-final-report-2021.pdf

6
opposition’s campaign activities. This included arbitrary detention of party activists, harassment
or intimidation of people who provided services or goods to González’s campaign, and
restrictions on the freedom of movement of opposition candidates and supporters.
Media: Media coverage throughout the campaign heavily favored the incumbent candidate. The
Maduro administration leveraged its control over a significant portion of the media to broadcast
the events and messages of its candidate and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV),
effectively dominating the airwaves, and covering the president’s events on most public and
private television stations. Meanwhile, opposition candidates received minimal coverage, with
their visibility further diminished by widespread self-censorship among media outlets. Several
candidates reported that many media platforms refused to run campaign advertisements and
interviews for fear of government reprisals.
The tone of the campaign reflected the high level of polarization and was marked by a significant
escalation of rhetoric as election day neared. While the opposition denounced the persecution
against them, Maduro’s discourse alleged direct threats to the country’s stability in case of defeat
and claimed a strategy by the opposition and the international media to reject the election results
and incite violence if he won. The PSUV accused the opposition alliance of fascism, and
President Maduro warned of “a bloodbath and a civil war” if the opposition won the elections.
Election day: Carter Center observer teams visited 68 polling stations on election day. 5 Election
day was generally calm in locations visited, with few incidents of violence or tension. As polls
opened, voter interest appeared to be high, 6 as Carter Center observer teams noted significant
lines of voters in locations visited. In some locations (e.g., Caracas), the lines dissipated
throughout election day. In some other locations, long lines persisted through the close of polls,
and the opposition alleged a “slowdown” policy in processing voters.
Election officials worked diligently to ensure a smooth voting process in locations visited by
Carter Center observers, and a strong presence of party agents and a modest number of domestic
observers contributed to transparency. However, a lack of knowledge of procedures among staff
was observed in some locations, and there were reports of party agents performing functions for
which they were not authorized. There were instances of social pressure on voters, such as ruling
party checkpoints near polling stations, known as “red points.”
The Carter Center mission observed the closing and counting process in seven polling stations.
While there were observations of minor shortcomings in the closing process, the overall
impression was that it went smoothly. The citizen verification of results at the polling station
level, in which the paper ballot receipts were hand-counted in public view at a selection of
polling stations following transmission of the electronic results, was conducted, and party agents
were able to sign and receive paper copies of the results at all seven polling stations observed
during closing.
Election technology: The electronic voting machine system was robust, and representatives of
political parties and civil society expressed a high level of confidence in the electronic voting
system. This confidence was the result of a comprehensive set of preelection auditing procedures
conducted by the CNE that were carried out in a transparent and effective manner. Additional

5
As noted above, these were a limited number of locations, and the findings regarding voting and counting operations are not necessarily
representative of these processes across the country.
6
The CNE reported a national turnout of 59%. This was consistent with data from the actas collected by the opposition from 81.7% of polling
stations, which indicated a turnout of 60%.

7
voter integrity and transparency elements included voter identification through fingerprint
scanning and the generation of paper ballot receipts by the voting machines. The receipts allowed
each voter to verify his or her choice, and after the close of polling stations, the receipts served as
a verification tool to check the electronic results produced by the machines. Political parties and
civil society rightly had confidence in the system’s ability to accurately reflect the will of the
voters and maintain the secrecy of the vote.
On the other hand, the operation of some auxiliary computer systems caused frustration and
complaints among stakeholders. In particular, the system used to register political party agents
online suffered from interruptions and software errors that made the process unnecessarily
difficult. The online system used to train citizens selected to staff polling stations also
experienced problems, particularly with the printing of credentials.
Announcement of results: A few minutes after midnight, with 80% of the votes counted, the
CNE declared Nicolás Maduro the winner, with 51.2% of the vote, followed by Edmundo
González with 44.2%. The CNE did not publish the results by polling station, claiming – without
providing evidence – that a cyberattack had made it impossible to upload the results to its
website. However, the CNE did not release the results by any alternative method. The lack of
detailed results prevented independent verification of the overall results announced by the CNE.
The CNE canceled three postelection audits that could have verified the alleged cyberattacks.
This included a second citizen verification exercise. The integrity of the elections was damaged
by the lack of transparent information.
In a parallel effort, the opposition – through party representatives, observers, and citizens –
collected and published online more than 80% of the results forms produced by the voting
machines. According to these results, González received 67.1% of the vote, and Maduro received
30.4%. The Venezuelan government claimed – without providing evidence – that the results
forms published by the opposition were forged. However, the result forms published were
deemed legitimate by external auditors and academics. The Carter Center reviewed the data in
the results forms and found it to be accurate. In addition, the Center found that all the required
security elements were present in the result forms it reviewed, both online and several physical
copies, indicating that they were the actual copies printed by the voting machines. At the time of
publication of this report, the CNE had not published the results from the polling stations.
On July 31, 2024, Maduro petitioned the Superior Court of Justice (TSJ) to conduct a judicial
review of the election results. The stated purpose of the complaint was to verify the election
results. The TSJ claimed that it performed a forensic examination of electoral material that
confirmed the president’s victory. However, no opposition observers or independent observers
were present for the review, and no evidence was made public. This absence of transparency of
this review, the continued lack of public data from the CNE about the detailed results of the
election, and the failure to address the evidence contained in the polling station results forms
collected by the opposition reinforced the Carter Center’s overall conclusion about the conduct
of the election.
Based on its findings and assessments, The Carter Center offers recommendations at the
conclusion of this report. The Carter Center wishes to thank all the stakeholders who took the
time to meet with members of the mission. The Center also thanks the CNE, including the
magistrates and staff, for the invitation to observe, the cooperation in facilitating observation
accreditation, and responsiveness prior to election day to inquiries from the mission.

8
POLITICAL CONTEXT
Since Hugo Chavez’s election in 1998, the Venezuelan political scene has been dominated by the
movement he founded known as “Chavismo.” This included a new constitution in 1999 that took
steps to reduce inequality in the country but also removed term limits for the presidency (as
amended in 2007). After Chavez’s death in 2013, Vice President Nicolás Maduro assumed the
presidency, then was elected in 2013 and re-elected in 2018 in a process boycotted by the
opposition due to a lack of confidence in electoral and judicial institutions. This resulted in a new
presidential mandate that lacked national and international legitimacy.
In January 2019, the National Assembly, which had an opposition majority, refused to recognize
Maduro’s new term and instead swore in Juan Guaidó, president of the National Assembly, as the
interim president, based on the interpretation of the Venezuelan Constitution regarding
presidential succession. Economic and humanitarian conditions on the ground worsened and
increased Venezuelan dependence on China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba. Guaidó left the country in
2023. The National Assembly was re-elected in December 2020 because of the confrontation
between the government and the opposition that led to its dissolution. The opposition did not
participate in those elections, which resulted in an outright majority of the government coalition
in the 2021-2025 legislature.
The path to the 2024 presidential elections was marked by a negotiated approach from the
international community, providing incentives for the opposition to return to the electoral route
and incentives for the government to create conditions for electoral competition. The first steps
followed negotiations between the government and the opposition in Mexico City and the
opposition’s partial participation in the 2021 regional elections. Various international mediation
efforts led to the signing of the Barbados Accord between the government and the opposition
Plataforma Unitaria (Unitary Platform) on Oct. 17, 2023. 7 This was an important step toward
defining minimum conditions for elections in which the opposition could participate, including a
tentative timeframe, freedom to select candidates, provision for the presence of international
observers – including The Carter Center – and specific guarantees regarding electoral integrity.
However, the agreement was fragile, and both sides accused the other of breaching it.
A few days after the signing of the Barbados agreement, the opposition Unitary Platform held its
primary elections on Oct. 22, 2023. More than 2 million voters participated, and María Corina
Machado won with more than 90% of the vote. This provided the main opposition coalition with
a legitimate candidate. After significant problems with the registration of candidates, including
the disqualification of Corina Machado, Edmundo González was registered to represent the
Unitary Platform, running on the tickets of Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD), Un Nuevo
Tiempo (UNT), and Movimiento por Venezuela (MPV). The participation of a united opposition
candidate against the incumbent Maduro, in addition to eight other candidates, raised
expectations for competitive elections for the first time in many years.
The 2024 presidential election took place in a context of extreme polarization and distrust
between the ruling party and the main opposition, with restrictions on some political rights,
international sanctions, economic crisis, and an estimated 7 million Venezuelans migrating to
other countries in the region. Chavismo forces exercised control of all powers of the state. Over
the past several years, international organizations and domestic civil society groups have

7
Acuerdo Parcial sobre la Promoción de Derechos Políticos y Garantías Electorales para Todos

9
denounced the erosion of the rule of law, the closing of public space, and judicial intimidation
toward political opponents and human rights defenders.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A sound legal framework is essential to administering democratic elections and ensuring that a
country upholds its international obligations. According to international commitments, the legal
framework for democratic elections should be transparent and readily accessible to the public
and should address all the components of an electoral system necessary to ensure democratic
elections. 8 This includes guarantees for an “environment conducive to respect for and enjoyment
of human rights and fundamental freedom on an ongoing basis, without discrimination and
without arbitrary or unreasonable restrictions.” 9
Electoral System
The president is directly elected by a plurality of votes in a single round (first past-the-post
system) for a six-year term. Presidential term limits were abolished by a constitutional
amendment in 2007 by referendum, but there is the possibility of holding a recall referendum at
any time during the last three years of each presidential term. There is no fixed constitutional
date for the holding of elections, only for the inauguration of the presidential term, which was
held on Jan. 10, 2025.
International Commitments
Venezuela is a party to the main universal and regional human rights instruments relevant to
elections. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional
Protocol (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women and its Optional Protocol (CEDAW), and the
International Labor Organization Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries (ILO Convention 169). Venezuela withdrew from the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR) and from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 2013 and
was suspended from the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in 2017. Pursuant to Article
23 of the constitution, international treaties, covenants, and conventions regarding human rights
ratified by Venezuela have constitutional hierarchy, prevail in the internal order, and have
immediate and direct application by the courts and other public institutions.
Electoral Legislation
Overall, the legal framework governing presidential elections nominally conforms to the norms
and standards relating to genuine, inclusive, and transparent elections. It consists primarily of the
constitution (Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 1999), the Election Law
(Ley Orgánica de Procesos Electorales, 2009), and the Election Administration Law (Ley
Orgánica del Poder Electoral, 2009), supplemented by decisions, instructions, and regulations
issued by the CNE.

8
ICCPR, Article 2; U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment 25, paras. 5, 7, 9, 19, 20.
9
The Carter Center and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human Rights and Election Standards: A Plan of Action”,
December 2017, p. 6, para. 18.

10
The constitution guarantees fundamental rights and freedoms, including freedom of association,
assembly, movement, and expression, and a free media. It establishes an independent judiciary
and guarantees the right to vote and to be elected in periodic elections through universal, direct,
and secret suffrage ballot. Despite being formally guaranteed by the constitution and the electoral
legislation, the fundamental freedoms necessary for the conduct of democratic elections –
freedom of association, assembly, movement, and expression – were not fully respected.
The Electoral Law outlines the system and addresses critical aspects of the process, such as voter
and candidate registration, campaign regulations, election day procedures, election
administration, complaints and appeals, and sanctions. The Electoral Administration Law grants
significant powers to a well-resourced election administration headed by the five members of the
CNE (supported by five alternates) appointed in August 2023, including regulatory powers and
the interpretation of electoral legislation. While statutory laws remained largely unchanged from
those applicable to the 2021 elections, there were some changes in the regulatory framework.
The General Electoral Law Regulation issued by the CNE in 2013 was updated, and the CNE has
revised guidelines to include additional safeguards for legitimate assisted voting, the
rationalization of polling station layouts, and measures to protect the integrity of the system by
limiting the ability of polling station presidents to circumvent the normal method of voter
identification (digital fingerprints).
Despite these improvements, several legal deficiencies remain. Provisions related to candidate
registration, the suspension of political rights, party and campaign financing, as well as citizen
and international observation, fall short of international commitments for democratic elections.
These issues were previously identified by the Carter Center’s expert mission for the 2021
regional elections and have not been addressed. 10
Restrictive Legislative Proposals
In 2024, the National Assembly considered three new laws that fueled further concerns about
civil and political freedom and had a chilling effect during the election campaign.
The draft Law Against Fascism, Neo-fascism and Similar Expressions proposes prison sentences
for vaguely defined “fascist” behavior or language. This law raised serious concerns among
stakeholders about its potential retroactive applications and restrictions on freedom of thought
and expression. It was approved in its first reading on April 2, 2024, but was not adopted prior to
the election. The Law on Control, Regularization, Operation, and Financing of Non-
Governmental and Related Organizations introduces stringent operating requirements for NGOs,
including provisions for sanctions and closures based on noncompliance. The ambiguous
language used in this legislation has the potential to target organizations that monitor democratic
processes. The law was adopted by the National Assembly in August 2024. The Organic Law on
the Defense of Essequibo, passed in March 2024, introduced penalties for individuals or
organizations perceived as sympathetic to Guyana’s position in the territorial dispute. This law
was seen as a potential tool to disqualify opposition candidates or prevent the registration of
political parties.
These legislative efforts were viewed by civil society interviewed by the Carter Center team as a
direct threat to dissent and democratic participation and were identified as part of a broader
pattern of restrictions on civic space that further erode fundamental freedoms.

10
See the Carter Center’s final report, “Expert Mission to Observe 2021 Regional and Local Elections in Venezuela”

11
Challenges to Implementation of the Legal Framework
The legal framework is generally in line with international electoral standards and commitments
for democratic elections. However, the lack of judicial and institutional independence, the
erosion of the rule of law human rights concerns, the selective enforcement of the legislation,
and the political interference have created a legal environment that is not conducive to a genuine
democratic electoral process. The prevalence of political interference creates an environment of
discretionary decision-making and legal uncertainty.
The erosion of the rule of law and democratic principles in Venezuela stems mainly from the
dominance of the executive over other branches and institutions, coupled with a weak separation
of powers. The absence of independent judicial and electoral institutions has led to selective and
arbitrary application of the law, lack of due process, secret rulings and arbitrary detention. This
posed serious challenges to the right to political participation, introduced considerable
uncertainty into the electoral process, and undermined the fundamental principles of equal
treatment and fair competition. Ultimately, the integrity of the electoral process and the
democratic framework were seriously compromised.

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
An independent and impartial election management body that functions transparently and
professionally is essential for ensuring that citizens can participate in a genuinely democratic
electoral process. 11 It is the responsibility of an election management body to take necessary
steps to ensure respect for fundamental rights guaranteed by international principles. 12 The body
also should ensure accountable, efficient, and effective public administration as it relates to
elections and have the necessary resources to perform its functions effectively. International and
regional treaties also establish that access to information is a critical means of ensuring
transparency and accountability throughout the electoral process. 13
Mandate and Composition of the CNE
The CNE is the constitutional body responsible for organizing the electoral process. The
constitution establishes independence and impartiality as the fundamental principles of the
electoral institutions. The CNE is composed of five members, including the chairperson, for a
seven-year term. There are three subsidiary organs: the National Electoral Board (JNE),
responsible for administrative and logistical matters; the Civil and Electoral Registry
Commission; and the Political Participation and Financing Commission. The CNE has ample
experience in organizing elections and broad technical, operational, and logistical expertise,
ranging from biometric voter registration to developing voting machines.
The current members of the CNE (rectores) took office in August 2023, following the early
resignation of the previous CNE – with five years remaining on their term – ahead of the
primaries. The resignation of the CNE plenary initially did not have the support of the two
opposition members, who were subsequently forced to leave their posts. The selection process
for the replacement of the CNE members was the subject of criticism by opposition and civil
society groups. Most stakeholders met by the Carter Center mission perceived the current CNE
to be less independent than previous groups, as almost all members were perceived to be linked
11
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25 on the ICCPR, paragraph 20; U.N., UNCAC, art. 10(a); U.N. ICCPR, art. 19(2).
12
General Comment 25 to ICCPR, para. 20.
13
Ibid.

12
to the government. The most controversial appointment was that of the president, who had
previously been the comptroller general.
Decision-making of the CNE
The CNE generally enjoyed stakeholder confidence in its technical capacity to conduct elections.
However, the CNE plenary remained consistent in its approach of supporting the ruling party.
The CNE’s lack of enforcement of legislation, unresponsiveness to complaints of legal
violations, and lack of transparency undermined the integrity of the electoral process and
compromised its overall credibility. Examples include the manipulation of the online candidate
registration process, the approval and accreditation process for citizen observation groups,
restrictive requirements for out-of-country voting, and the failure to maintain a level playing
field for candidates in terms of campaign conditions or the media coverage. The government’s
involvement in the work of the CNE was denounced by one member, perceived to be close to the
opposition, who publicly stated that the plenary of five magistrates had not met for more than
two months and that the CNE chairperson made decisions without consulting the plenary. 14
Transparency of the CNE
Another issue of concern was related to the transparency of the CNE’s decision-making process.
Its decisions often were not published in a timely manner or made available on its website or
institutional profiles on social media. In most cases the CNE limited the information to press
releases that did not provide details on the technical aspects of the decision. The CNE’s
inadequate or nonexistent channels for official, public information regarding key aspects of the
process, including the registration of candidates, the criteria for the acceptance of citizen
observation groups, and changes to the electoral calendar, undermined the principles of
transparency, accessibility, and legal certainty. Various sectors of the opposition indicated that
they had problems accessing and communicating with the CNE and that the CNE chairperson
seldom responded to official communications and requests for meetings.
Preparation of Elections
Overall, the logistical and operational preparations for the elections were conducted effectively
for the most part. Venezuela has a technologically advanced electoral process. The degree of
automation that is present in the system covers almost all aspects of the process, including the
registration of candidates, voter identification, the counting and transmission of results, and the
tabulation of results. The CNE conducted voting simulations throughout the country to test the
electronic voting machines, evaluate possible problems, and provide an overall estimate of the
time voters would need to cast a ballot. The CNE also implemented mechanisms for voters to
find out the location of their polling stations. However, the shortened calendar established by the
CNE severely affected activities crucial to the elections, such as the notification and training of
polling station staff. The CNE also made biased decisions that affected the conduct of the
elections – for example, the installation of additional polling stations in the strongholds of the
ruling party. However, the CNE’s decisions regarding the transparency of the results had the
greatest impact on the integrity of the election (see the section on the announcement of the
results).

14
Efecto Cocuyo, “Rector Delpino: Amoroso viola los derechos de los rectores del CNE al tomar decisiones sin convocar sesiones” June 11,
2024, https://efectococuyo.com/politica/rector-delpino-amoroso-viola-los-derechos-de-los-rectores-del-cne-al-tomar-decisiones-sin-convocar-
sesiones/

13
According to international standards for democratic elections, the electoral calendar should
indicate an adequate time for implementation of all parts of the electoral process. 15 However, a
shorter timetable was established for these elections. According to the Barbados Accord, the
election should take place in the second half of 2024. On March 5, the CNE announced that the
presidential elections would be held on July 28. The CNE’s decision to hold the elections at the
end of July, when they are traditionally held at the end of the year, was perceived by opposition
sectors and CSOs as a maneuver to favor the ruling party in the face of increasing electoral gains
by the opposition. The CNE’s decision had a direct impact on the electoral process, leaving much
less time for adequate voter education campaigns, training of electoral staff, updating of the
electoral register, and the registration of candidates, among others.
For the 2024 presidential election, the electoral infrastructure consisted of 15,797 voting centers
with 30,026 polling stations – an average of 1.9 polling stations per center. Some 1,762 new
voting centers were installed for this election with 539,696 registered voters, while 105 centers
were removed since the 2021 regional elections. Of the new voting centers, 97% had only one
polling station.
The CNE informed the Carter Center mission that the increase in the number of voting centers
was intended to make voting more accessible. However, electoral experts, CSOs, and the
opposition claimed that most of the new voting centers were located in electoral strongholds of
the ruling party, increasing the possibility of pressure on voters to vote for the incumbent. Of the
new voting centers included in the CNE’s database of polling stations, at least 175 (nearly 10%)
were in “base de misiones,” government offices for the delivery of social benefits in working-
class communities that serve as a base of electoral support for the PSUV.
An additional factor was the CNE’s decision to require for the first time that persons wishing to
act as party agents be registered to vote in the polling station where they would perform their
activities, thus limiting the presence of opposition party agents in these new centers located in
the strongholds of the ruling party. The CNE claimed that all political parties and CSOs could
request the establishment of new voting centers, but the criteria for opening new centers were not
made public.
The CNE is responsible for the random selection of polling station workers from among
registered voters. The CNE informed the Carter Center mission that a text message was sent to
each person selected and that more than 60% of those selected were trained. Poll workers were
trained almost exclusively online, although in-person training – using the online platform – also
was available. Training began on June 28 and continued through July 27, the day before the
election. The Carter Center attended some of the in-person training sessions and found the videos
to be adequately produced and to contain the basic information for the training. However, the
mission team noted delays in the onset of the training, issues with the online training platform,
and inconsistent availability for in-person training across the country. The mission also observed
that citizens who completed the online training had difficulties printing their accreditation
certificates that would allow them to participate in the electoral process.

15
U.N. Center for Human Rights Handbook on the Legal, Technical, and Human Rights Aspects of Elections, para. 75

14
VOTER REGISTRATION
International standards require that States must take effective measures to ensure that all people
entitled to vote are able to do so. 16 Voter registration is recognized as an important mechanism
for protecting the right to vote and should be facilitated to promote universal and equal suffrage.
An effective voter registration process upholds these principles while increasing transparency
and public confidence in the electoral process. 17 The voter list should be publicly displayed, with
adequate time for public inspection, including time for objections and the adjudication of
disputes. 18 An effective remedy should be available to all citizens for violations of their rights
during the voter registration process. 19
Voter Registration Operations
The voter register in Venezuela is centralized and administered by the CNE, and is continuous,
permanent, and voluntary. Between elections, permanent registration centers exist only in state
capitals. The usual practice is to hold special voter registration exercises before elections by
installing additional registration centers throughout the country.
The official register for the 2024 election totaled 21,392,464 voters and showed an increase of
about 623,000 voters during the special registration period. 20 About 850,000 voters changed their
residence during this period. The CNE noted that there had been a recent short special
registration campaign prior to the Essequibo referendum in December 2023, during which
139,000 voters were added to the voter roll and 386,000 changes of residence were registered.
These two campaigns should be considered integrated because of the short time between them.
However, estimates from CSOs indicated that there were up to 3 million eligible voters in the
country who were not registered, particularly young people. This under-registration despite the
special registration campaign is at least partly the result of the compressed electoral calendar,
which resulted in a short timeframe for voter registration, fewer registration centers, and limited
official publicity regarding voter registration.
The CNE announced there would be 315 fixed centers operating from March 18 to April 16. This
number was complemented by mobile registration teams across the country, but there was no
official information available on their operation. The CSO Observatorio Electoral Venezolano
(OEV) observed the special voter registration and found the lowest number of points for voter
registration for a presidential election in 10 years. 21 In comparison, the 2018 presidential election
had 531 voter registration centers; the 2021 regional elections had 1,000 centers operating for 45
days; and the 2023 Essequibo referendum had 500 centers operating for 11 days. The OEV also
found that the CNE staff worked diligently.
According to the OEV, the registration turnout was low due to the CNE’s poor promotion for
these registration drives. On a positive note, the CNE extended the closing time in the final week
due to the increased number of citizens registering. The presence of unidentified people carrying

16
ICCPR, Article 25(b), UN HRC, General Comment 25, para. 11
17
UNCAC, Article 5(1)
18
ICCPR, Article 25(b), CCPR GC 31 para 15
19
U.N., Human Rights and Elections, 1st ed., para. 114, and Carter Center Election Obligations and Standards, p. 107.
20
These figures are the sum of two registration periods: the preliminary (Electoral Gazette N.1055, April 29) and definitive (Electoral Gazette
N.1057, June 1).
21
Observatorio Electoral Venezolano, “Observación de la jornada especial del Registro Electoral”, April, 2024,
https://oevenezolano.org/2024/04/estudio-observacion-de-la-jornada-especial-del-registro-electoral/

15
out a parallel registration of participants in the vicinity of the official voter registration centers
was perceived by civil society as a control mechanism from the ruling party.
Audit of the Voter Register
In May 2024, the CNE’s technical staff conducted three audits. The first audit involved the
validation of the biometric data of the voters processed by the CNE system, using a dactyloscopy
method (fingerprints) on a representative sample of voters. The results showed a high degree of
accuracy. The second audit focused on verifying the removal of deceased voters from the register
for the current year (January-April), by comparing a sample of death certificates issued by the
Ministry of Health with the list of deceased voters identified by the National Office of Electoral
Registry, a department in the CNE. The published results showed that 100% of the sample had
already been identified by the CNE through its current voter roll purging mechanism. The third
audit was a phone survey to assess voter satisfaction with their assigned voting centers.
According to the CNE, a total of 1,400 voters were contacted, and 97% reported some level of
satisfaction with their voting center. Although these audits indicated that the register was
accurate for voters included, no official audit was conducted to determine the extent to which
eligible citizens were not included in the register.
Registration of Out-of-Country Voters
Although the law provides for voting abroad, most Venezuelans outside the country were unable
to participate in this election. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), more than 7.7 million
Venezuelans resided outside the country as of June 2024. Of these, an estimated 5.5 million are
of voting age. 22 The Organic Law of the Electoral Process (Art. 124) requires residency or other
legal status for those living abroad. This is a very unusual requirement from an electoral
comparative perspective. Venezuelan diplomatic missions applied a restrictive interpretation of
the law, requiring citizens to provide excessive proof, such as a valid residence visa in the host
country, in order to register, even though many migrants have special status (for example, in
Colombia, Venezuelan migrants have been granted a temporary protection status), have different
valid documentation, or are undocumented.
CSOs also reported other undue requirements by embassies and consulates during the
registration period, such as the embassy in Ecuador requiring permanent visas for Venezuelans
living in that country, or in Uruguay, where the diplomatic delegation requested a non-existent
certificate from the Uruguayan government. Delays also were reported due to a lack of
instructions from the CNE and a lack of registration materials. 23 Additionally, embassies and
consulates were reported to have restricted hours of operation and limited the number of people
who could be registered per day. These restrictive factors resulted in only 508 new voters abroad
being added to the register during the special registration period, a figure confirmed to the Carter
Center mission by the CNE. The total number of Venezuelans registered to vote abroad was
approximately 69,000 (just over 1% of those potentially eligible). The under-registration both at
the national level and abroad resulted in the denial of political participation to a significant
number of citizens.

22
Interamerican Commission on Human Rights, https://www.oas.org/es/CIDH/jsForm/?File=/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2024/141.asp
23
The Carter Center did not observe voter registration in Venezuela or abroad. However, three domestic organizations published a joint report
listing arbitrary requirements for registration at different consulates, such as in Colombia, Peru, Spain, and Argentina:
https://alertavenezuela.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/BARERAS-AL-REGISTRO-ELECTORAL-EN-EL-EXTERIOR.pdf

16
CANDIDATE REGISTRATION
International and regional treaties protect the right and opportunity of every citizen to be
elected. 24 The effective implementation of the right to stand for elective office ensures that voters
have a free choice of candidates. 25 Any conditions placed on political party and candidate
registration processes should be reasonable and nondiscriminatory. 26 Individuals are entitled to
have decisions affecting fundamental rights reviewed by a competent, independent, and impartial
tribunal in a fair and public hearing. 27
For the 2024 presidential elections there were 10 registered candidates, all men, supported by 37
political organizations. The two main contenders were incumbent President Nicolás Maduro of
the PSUV, supported by 13 political parties in the Gran Polo Patriótico Simón Bolívar coalition;
and Edmundo González Urrutia of the Unitary Platform, the main opposition coalition supported
by three political parties on the ballot.
The registration of candidates for the 2024 election challenged the democratic principles and
international standards. The opposition’s efforts to present a unified front during the primaries
were undermined by subsequent government interventions, including the suspension of primary
results and the disqualification of key candidates. These developments, coupled with undue
restrictions on candidate eligibility, judicial intervention of political party leading bodies, the
CNE’s blockage to the registration of opposition candidates, and the government’s non-
compliance with the Barbados Accord, raised serious concerns about political pluralism, the
inclusivity and the overall integrity of the electoral process.
Eligibility Criteria
The constitution requires that a presidential candidate must be a registered voter, a Venezuelan
citizen by birth with no other nationality, in full enjoyment of his or her political rights, and at
least 30 years of age on election day. Other criteria include not having been convicted by a final
court decision and having a secular status (a candidate cannot be an active religious leader or
hold an official position within a religious organization). Candidates cannot hold the office of
vice president of the republic, minister, state governor, or mayor on the day of their nomination
or on the day of the election. The blanket restriction on convicted persons, regardless of the
seriousness of the crime committed, and the distinction between citizens by birth and
naturalization are not in line with international standards to which Venezuela adheres.
Opposition Primaries
Political parties have the right to choose their candidates freely either by nomination or through
primaries. The law requires political parties to register the persons in charge of submitting the
names of the candidates to the electoral authority. Additionally, the law establishes the possibility
for the CNE to organize primary elections of political parties only upon request of the party.
On Oct. 22, 2023, the Unitary Platform held primary elections that were organized without the
support of the CNE. Despite logistical challenges and obstacles by the executive, some 2.4
million Venezuelans participated. María Corina Machado, a prominent opposition leader, won

24
ICCPR, Article 25
25
ICCPR, Article 25(a); UN HRC, General Comment 25, para 15.
26
UN HRC, General Comment 25, paras 15 – 17.
27
UDHR, Article 10; ICCPR, Article 14.1. UN HRC, General Comment 32 notes that a tribunal must be independent of the executive branch
(para. 18).

17
with 93% of the vote. The results were officially announced on Oct. 24, 2023, presenting a
united front of the main opposition forces against Maduro’s government. 28 The establishment’s
reaction to the primaries was swift and hostile. Questions about voter turnout led to the opening
of a criminal investigation on Oct. 25, 2023, against the organizers of the primaries, who were
charged with identity fraud and usurpation of authority. On Oct. 30, 2023, the Electoral Chamber
of the Superior Court of Justice (TSJ) suspended the results of the primaries, triggering
widespread condemnation both nationally and internationally.
In June 2023, just days after Machado formally entered the primary election process, the
Venezuelan government announced a 15-year ban on her running for office. The ban was based
on allegations that Machado supported U.S. sanctions and was involved in corruption, but the
grounds for the decision were not publicly disclosed or made available to her. Machado appealed
the decision, which was upheld by the TSJ on Jan. 26, 2024. The decision effectively barred her
from registering as a candidate for the presidential election. The disqualification of Machado was
interpreted as a violation of the Barbados Accord, in which the Maduro government committed
to recognize the right of political organizations to freely choose their candidates.
Registration Process
The electoral law provides for a three-phase registration process that began on March 21 and
ended on July 18, 2024, in accordance with the electoral calendar. From March 21 to 25, political
organizations could register their candidates online with the CNE. On March 25, Maduro’s
candidacy for reelection was formally registered. The opposition designated university professor
Corina Yoris to replace Machado after the TSJ decision. However, the CNE computer system
prevented Yoris’s registration until the end of the period, without any apparent reason or
justification on the part of the CNE. The MUD party registered Edmundo González Urrutia, its
president, as a temporary substitute. González pledged to withdraw his candidacy in favor of
another consensus candidate in the second phase of candidate registration. A total of 13
presidential candidates were registered during this phase, including Enrique Marquez, a former
electoral magistrate.
The second registration phase took place April 1-23. During this phase, political parties could
substitute their candidates. 29 However, the CNE required that substitute candidates be on the list
of the 13 candidates who had already qualified in the first phase of registration. This
interpretation was criticized by domestic election observation organizations, such as OEV and
Red de Observación - Asamblea Educativa (ROAE). After denouncing new problems with the
computer platform, the opposition UNT and MPV parties dropped their candidacies and gave
their support to the MUD candidate, González, who also had the endorsement of Machado.
During this phase, three candidates withdrew from the race, reducing the list to 10. The final
phase of candidate registration ended on July 18, 2024, with no further changes.
Obstacles to Political Participation and Political Pluralism
International standards and principles establish that political rights should only be suspended as a
result of a judicial decision, which provides for guarantees and due process and not merely as a
result of an administrative decision. 30 Article 42 of the constitution establishes that political
rights may be suspended only by a final judicial decision; however, subsidiary legislation allows
28
See OEV report on the observation of the primary at Informe-de-observacion-eleccion-primaria-22-octubre-2023.pdf
29
Articles 62 and 64 of the electoral law.
30
Open letter to Volker Türk, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, July 3, 2024.

18
for the suspension of political rights as result of an administrative sanction. 31 The comptroller
general disqualified individuals, primarily opposition figures, on administrative grounds,
circumventing the judicial process and constitutional safeguards designed to protect political
rights. 32 Some disqualified persons learned of their disqualification through informal channels,
further jeopardizing the principle of due process, and the right to a defense.
The arbitrariness and lack of transparency in the decision-making processes that led to most of
the disqualifications severely affected the right to political participation. On Jan. 26, 2024, the
same day that the TSJ upheld Machado’s disqualification, the chamber also upheld the 15-year
disqualification of Henrique Capriles. From January to July 2024, 19 opposition leaders and
officials were disqualified, including 12 sitting mayors. Since 2019, other prominent opposition
leaders also have been disqualified from holding public office, including Juan Guaidó, Freddy
Guevara, Antonio Ledezma, Leopoldo López, Antonio Fernández, and Freddy Superlano, and
most recently, Carlos Ocariz, Tomás Guanipa, Elías Sayegh, and José Antonio Fernández.
The TSJ has intervened in the affairs of at least 15 political parties 33 associated with the main
opposition groups or dissident factions of the Chavismo, suspending executive board members
and replacing the leadership with new bodies more inclined to negotiate with the government. As
a result of the judicial interventions, some of the traditional opposition parties were perceived as
becoming pro-government. The new leaders of these parties were able to select candidates and
were granted the use of the party’s identifying elements, such as logos, emblems, and symbols.
The most recent intervention occurred in August 2023, when the TSJ appointed new leadership
for the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), which had distanced itself from President Maduro.
The PCV denounced the TSJ’s decision and said that the party’s leadership had been transferred
to the PSUV.
As a result, genuine alternative political options have been reduced, undermining pluralism and
political competitiveness. The lack of transparency and due process in these disqualifications and
interventions also raised concerns about the fairness of the electoral process, and ultimately
about the overall integrity of the democratic process in the country.

CIVIC AND VOTER EDUCATION

International and regional treaties indicate that civic and voter education is crucial for ensuring
that the electorate has the information necessary to exercise its right to vote effectively. 34 It is
one of the key roles performed by election management bodies.
The CNE organized a nationwide election simulation on June 30 to encourage voters to
familiarize themselves with the voting machines and the process. The CNE also organized voter
education fairs at 1,000 fixed points across the country, including sample voting machines and a
virtual tour of the voting process through virtual reality headsets. 35 CSOs and opposition political
parties reported that official voter education campaigns on voting procedures and get-out-the-
vote efforts were largely absent in major cities and online. This was consistent with the findings
31
Organic Law of the Comptroller General, article 105.
32
ACHR, article 23. Also, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights maintains that disqualifications should only be imposed by judicial
conviction, not administratively.
33
PCV, Acción Democrática, Movimiento Primero Justicia, Voluntad Popular, Bandera Roja, Acción Ciudadana Positiva, Movimiento
Republicano, Por la Democracia Social, Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo, COPEI, Movimiento Ecológico de Venezuela, Tupamaro, Patria Para
Todos, Compromiso País, Nueva Visión para mi País, Avanzada Progresista, MIN-Unidad.
34
U.N. HRC General Comment No.25, paragraph 11
35
http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/normativa_electoral/elecciones/2024/eleccion_presidencial/documentos/puntos_feria_electoral_2024.pdf

19
of the Carter Center observation teams in Caracas, Barinas, Maracaibo, and Valencia. Despite the
CNE staff’s competence in explaining the voting system, observer reports indicated very low
attendance at CNE voter education events. Some additional voter education efforts were
conducted by the leading political parties. The only CNE voter education material available was
the “brújula electoral” – electoral compass – which was sparsely distributed at these points.

ELECTION CAMPAIGN
An open campaign environment that enables voters to receive messages from candidates and
parties is a critical aspect of democratic elections. Equitable treatment of candidates and parties
during the campaign period, as well as respect for the freedoms of expression, assembly, and
association, are all vital to democratic practice. 36 Political parties and candidates should be able
to campaign freely without unreasonable restrictions, and public resources should not be abused
in support of any political party or candidate. 37 International treaties also state that everyone,
including candidates, has the right to freedom of movement within the borders of each state. 38
The legal framework defines the principles and rights governing the campaign period rules, such
as level playing field and freedom of association and expression. Additionally, on July 3, one day

36
ICCPR, Articles 19, 21, and 25; UN HRC, General Comments 34 and 37
37
The Carter Center, Election Obligations and Standards: A Carter Center Assessment Manual (Second Edition).
38
ICCPR, Article 12

20
before the start of the official electoral campaign period, the CNE approved specific regulations
on the conduct of the campaign and advertising for the 2024 presidential elections. 39
The electoral campaign, which ran July 4-25, was marked by repression and the arrests of
opposition figures. According to the NGO Foro Penal (Criminal Forum), from January 2024
until the end of the campaign, there were 149 arbitrary detentions for political reasons, 135 of
which were linked to the campaign of the main opposition candidate. 40 Notably, 111 of these
detentions occurred after the official campaign period had begun. Foro Penal also reported that
there were 305 political prisoners in Venezuela, including 30 women, and saw these arrests as
part of a wider pattern of targeting political opponents. Amnesty International condemned the
escalation of repression during the election period, highlighting arbitrary detentions, enforced
disappearances, and torture. 41 Other efforts by the authorities to restrict opposition campaign
activities included fines and other administrative sanctions against businesses owned by party
activists and against individuals providing services to opposition figures, as well as restrictions
on freedom of movement.
President Maduro’s campaign was dominant, with extensive visibility through rallies and street
activities, and a pervasive presence in both traditional and social media. Media experts pointed to
both government policy and self-censorship as reasons for the low presence of opposition
candidates in traditional media. Abuse of administrative resources on behalf of the incumbent –
including the use of state media, social programs, and vehicles, and public officials campaigning
while in their official capacity – was observed throughout the campaign. Carter Center observers
reported these practices in Maracaibo, Barinas, Carabobo, and Caracas. Center observers also
observed public buses being used in Maracaibo to transport citizens to Maduro campaign events.
The OEV carried out a comprehensive observation of the precampaign period throughout the
country from June 2 to July 3, 2024, with 674 observers. The OEV reported that 68% of the
observers witnessed or knew that officials from the governors’ and mayors’ offices were
campaigning, and 50% reported that civil servants were campaigning in their workplaces, which
is a violation of both the electoral law and the law against corruption. Nearly 80% of observers in
the precampaign period reported seeing campaign materials in favor of Maduro at a public event,
including inaugurations of infrastructure, trade union events, graduation ceremonies, and home
deliveries. 42
During the official campaign period, Carter Center observers noted the visual dominance of
candidate Maduro, with thousands of billboards, posters, and paintings of all sizes on walls and
utility poles throughout the cities, in contrast to the very limited presence of the opposition
candidates. Opposition parties informed the Carter Center mission that they lacked financial and
material resources, which limited their outreach efforts and forced them to rely heavily on
volunteer resources. Carter Center interlocutors stated that private-sector companies were
reluctant to provide services to the opposition parties due to potential threats and reprisals.
Despite these obstacles, the main opposition party managed to convey its message to voters
39
Article 71 of the LOPRE defines the electoral campaign period and authorizes the CNE to establish its length. Article 72 clearly defines the
principles and rights governing the interpretation of campaign period rules, such as level playing field and freedom of association and expression,
according to international standards for genuine democratic elections. Additionally, the CNE approved specific provisions on campaign conduct
and advertising for the 2024 Presidential Elections on July 3, 2004,39 one day before the start of the electoral campaign. Gaceta Electoral
Numero.1061 Resolución no. 240703-055, mediante la cual se resuelve, dictar la normativa específica sobre campaña y propaganda electoral
para la elección Presidencial 2024, a celebrarse el 28 de julio de 2024.
40
Foro Penal press conference, 26 July 2024. https://foropenal.com/
41
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/07/venezuela-after-electoral-period-marked-repression-commitment-human-rights-imperative/
42
Elecciones Presidenciales 2024. Golpe a la soberanía popular. Observatorio Electoral Venezolano. Segundo reporte.

21
mainly through rallies, and social media, and through public appearances and messages by María
Corina Machado.
A number of opinion polls showed that González was leading by a wide margin. The
government’s own polling, such as Hinterlaces, gave Maduro the lead. In the weeks leading up
to the election, the campaign was marked by polarization and tension. While the opposition
denounced the persecution against them, Maduro’s discourse, which began with promises of
change and transformation after 25 years of revolution, turned into warnings about the country’s
stability in case of his defeat and an alleged strategy by the opposition and the international
media to reject the election results and incite violence if he won. Maduro’s messages included a
statement that an opposition victory could unleash a “bloodbath” in the country.
The campaign period ended on July 25, followed by a two-day period of silence before election
day. However, the Carter Center mission observed that the ruling party candidate engaged in
prominent public activities during this period, including the inauguration of a hospital, the
distribution of keys for public housing units, 43 and a two-hour program, “Nico Live,” 44 featuring
the president, on social media platforms. These actions were in clear violation of Venezuela laws,
which are designed to preserve the integrity of the election by ensuring a period of reflection for
voters without political interference.
The CNE informed the Carter Center mission that it had deployed more than 800 inspectors
throughout the country July 4-28 to monitor compliance with campaign regulations and had set
up a media monitoring room for this process. There is no public information on the number of
complaints filed with the CNE or on the number of administrative investigations initiated for
violations of campaign rules. Despite the numerous media reports of misuse of public resources
on behalf of the incumbent, unbalanced media coverage, the participation of state officials in
campaign activities, and intimidation of opposition supporters by tax authorities and other
official agencies, the CNE did not appear to take remedial action. The Carter Center mission did
not receive any information that sanctions were imposed by the CNE or that decisions were
issued by the courts regarding electoral violations.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Regulations to ensure oversight and transparency of political party and campaign financing, as
well as their effective and equitable enforcement, are essential features of a democratic election.
A spectrum of measures is associated with such a regulatory framework and, where applicable,
electoral legislation should provide for the transparency of donations to campaign activities, the
standardized presentation of campaign accounts, regular reporting mechanisms, and effective and
dissuasive sanctions. 45
Venezuela’s campaign finance system lacks adequate regulation, transparency, and
accountability. The constitution states that a law should regulate private financing and
contributions, establish control mechanisms, and limit spending and the duration of campaigns. 46
However, the law has not yet been enacted, and political financing is regulated only by the
General Regulation of the Electoral Law (RGLOPRE). The absence of a specific organic law, as

43
From the official presidential X (Twitter) account, https://x.com/PresidencialVen/status/1817036398676877542
44
https://x.com/PresidencialVen/status/1817013650109894865
45
U.N. Convention Against Corruption, Article 7(3); UN HRC General Comment 25, para. 19.
46
Articles 67 of the Constitution

22
recommended by the Constitutional Chamber of the TSJ in 2008, leaves the system vulnerable to
abuse.
The constitution explicitly prohibits public financing of political organizations, which means that
Venezuelan political parties must rely solely on private funding. According to the RGLOPRE,
candidates and parties must submit the final accounts of their electoral campaigns through the
automated accountability system within 60 days of election day. The CNE’s Political
Participation and Financing Commission is responsible for overseeing political parties’ finances.
Despite the detailed financial reports from candidates required by the CNE, interlocutors told the
mission that public disclosure of political financing is inadequate and control mechanisms are
not sufficient, resulting in the frequent circumvention of the financing rules and the potential
infiltration of illicit funds into Venezuela’s political and electoral systems through networks of
shell companies, offshore accounts, and money laundering, often linked to criminal activities.
The ban on public financing and the lack of legal limits on contributions and spending, coupled
with the use of state resources and the absence of effective controls, have created an uneven
playing field and further undermined Venezuelans’ confidence in the electoral process.

MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA

Free expression of information and ideas by voters and candidates is essential to democratic
elections: 47 the right for everyone to seek, receive, and impart ideas through any means of their
choice, including, but not limited to, writing, speech, print, and the internet. 48 The media play a
critical role in the electoral process, raising awareness and providing information, while also
serving as an “open forum for public debate and discussion, and providing candidates and parties
with an equitable podium for their campaigns.” Journalism, including investigative reporting,
keeps citizens informed and helps them make informed choices.
Media Regulation
The Venezuelan Constitution recognizes freedom of expression and access to information, 49 but
national legislation imposes several obstacles to the exercise of these rights. The Penal Code
contains articles criminalizing hate speech, defamation, and the dissemination of false
information, which have been used to censor and prosecute journalists and media outlets over the
past decade. Other administrative measures, such as the suspension of media licenses or the
imposition of fines, have led to self-censorship by media professionals. The so-called Hate Law
has been invoked to fine and imprison citizens and reporters for publishing “hate messages” in
the media and on social media. 50
Media Environment and Election Coverage
The media landscape in Venezuela is characterized by a concentration of outlets in the hands of
the state and of businesspeople with ties to the government. The number of independent
newspapers has declined dramatically over the past decade due to economic problems and
restrictions on access to government-controlled newsprint distribution. According to the National
Association of Journalists of Venezuela, 405 media outlets have been closed in Venezuela over

47
U.N., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19.
48
U.N. (ICCPR), General Comment No. 34, Para 12.
49
Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Articles 57 and 28.
50
Ley Constitucional contra el Odio, por la Convivencia Pacífica y la Tolerancia (2017).

23
the past two decades as a result of government policies against freedom of expression. 51
Intimidation, harassment, and, in some cases, arrests of journalists have been common as the
press has carried out its function of informing the public. For example, the National Union of
Press Workers denounced the expulsion of 14 international correspondents between July 25 and
Aug. 2. On election day alone, the NGO Espacio Público (Public Space) registered 29 cases and
30 complaints of violations of the right to freedom of expression against journalists.
Given their precarious situation, more than a hundred journalists and media outlets joined the
#VenezuelaVota alliance to ensure national coverage of the election. Despite this initiative, the
media environment during the campaign was characterized by an imbalance in coverage that
heavily favored the incumbent candidate. The Maduro government used its control of a
significant portion of the media to broadcast PSUV events and messages, effectively dominating
the airwaves and covering its own rallies on most public and private television stations.
Opposition candidates received minimal media coverage, and their visibility was further
diminished by widespread self-censorship among media outlets. Several of these candidates
reported that many media platforms refused to run campaign ads and interviews with them for
fear of government reprisals. Press associations reported difficulties in gaining access to official
sources and to the government candidate.
Social Media
The internet and social media have become important channels for informing citizens in
Venezuela. The country has 17.9 million internet users and 14 million social media users,
representing nearly 62% and 48%, respectively, of the country’s total population (29 million). 52
The establishment frequently clashed with social media platforms during and after the campaign,
culminating in the announcement of a temporary block on Signal and X in the country.
Following election day and the posting of polling station results on the internet by the opposition,
Maduro publicly asked Venezuelans to uninstall the WhatsApp application, claiming that
opposition leaders had handed over the “database” of Venezuelans to criminals and technological
imperialism outlets. 53
Selective blocking or shutting down of websites and social media platforms has been another
common way to control access to information. The government exercised this censorship during
the 2021 regional elections and has since expanded the number and techniques used to shut down
the websites of media and CSOs. 54 These tactics, which include blocking IP addresses or seizing
internet domains, 55 are ordered by government authorities and carried out by the main public and
private telecommunications companies operating in Venezuela. 56 According to the NGO
VESinFiltro (Venezuela Without Filter), 62 media and human rights organizations were blocked
during the 2024 elections, affecting 86 domains. Technical restrictions on access to content
constitute prima facie interference with the fundamental right of all people to exchange ideas and
information.

51
CNP: La pérdida de la Libertad de Expresión es un hecho cierto en Venezuela – Colegio Nacional de Periodistas (cnpven.org)
52
Data Reportal Digital 2024: Venezuela. https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2024-venezuela
53
“Fuera WhatsApp de Venezuela”: Nicolás Maduro pide que la app sea eliminada de forma voluntaria | WIRED
54
Carter Center Final Report: Expert Mission to Observe Regional and Local Elections in Venezuela, 2021.
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/venezuela/venezuela-final-report-2021.pdf
55
The NGO vesinfiltro.org keeps track of these blocks and provides information to citizens on how to avoid or circumvent them as much as
possible.
56
CANTV, Movistar, Digitel, Inter, NetUno, Airtek y Cable Norte, entre otras, según vesinfiltro.org.

24
Fact-checking organizations operating in the country also have been subject to these blockades.
These NGOs have denounced the increasing difficulty in carrying out their verification tasks due
to government censorship, which in some cases forces them to work from abroad, and the
obstacles sometimes imposed by the social media platforms. 57 For years, these organizations
have analyzed the disinformation techniques used by the government to discredit the opposition
and impose official narratives. 58 These include mobilizing the social media profiles of
government officials, civil servants, members of the military, and citizens to spread false or
misleading messages and place them in trending positions on social media platforms. According
to ProBox, a digital observer, some actors do this in exchange for benefits such as the payment of
food and basic services. 59
The main pro-incumbent narratives artificially disseminated through social networks focused on
an alleged coup d’état by the opposition and foreign interference in the Venezuelan electoral
process. The main pro-opposition narratives accused Maduro of preparing electoral fraud and a
possible army uprising against the government.

ELECTION OBSERVATION
International and regional treaties affirm the right of every individual to participate in their
country’s public affairs. 60 This right, recognized as fundamental in international law, includes the
ability to join NGOs. 61 Such treaties emphasize that the involvement of both domestic and
international election observers is an established form of citizen participation in public affairs
and is a crucial transparency measure to promote confidence in the electoral process. 62 The
transparency provided by observation is an important component of electoral integrity.
Domestic Observers
In a climate of deep polarization and challenge, domestic election observation organizations are
crucial for providing an impartial assessment of electoral processes. For the 2024 presidential
election, accredited local organizations included: ROAE, Proyecto Social, Asociación
Venezolana de Juristas, and Centro Internacional de Estudios Superiores (CIES).
Domestic observers faced numerous obstacles that significantly hindered their ability to
effectively monitor the process. The CNE imposed a cap on the number of domestic observers,
limiting them to 600 (less than the 700 allowed for the 2021 elections), while delays in issuing
accreditations created logistical difficulties in some states and complicated the organization of
their missions. Additionally, punitive legislation prohibited the observers from receiving foreign
funding, further limiting their operations. Economic and social challenges, such as high prices,
gasoline shortages, poor internet connectivity, and high transportation costs for moving materials
from Caracas added to the difficulties. In addition, the CNE implemented a new regulation
requiring prior approval for the publication of reports, creating a fear of reprisals for

57
The X network no longer allows free and open use of its API by researchers and verification entities, hindering their work to counterbalance
and denounce disinformation. Meta has partially disabled its CrowdTangle service, which is used to track disinformation.
58
Meta and Twitter deactivated in 2021 the account of the program Con el mazo dando of the vice president of the PSUV, Diosdado Cabello, for
violating these social networks’ disinformation policies. According to the fact-checking organization Probox, misinformation was published from
this account, which was then massively and artificially replicated. Two years later, X (previously known as Twitter) lifted this ban, and the
account returned to operate without restrictions.
59
https://proboxve.org/2024/03/11/bono-por-tuitear-asi-se-paga-por-impulsar-propaganda-y-desinformacion-en-venezuela/
60
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) - Article 25
61
UN HRC, General Comment 25, para. 11.
62
UN HRC, General Comment 25, para. 20.

25
documenting the elections and any potential irregularities. These obstacles undermined citizens’
right to participate in public affairs as election observers and their right to freedom of speech,
and posed significant challenges to ensuring a transparent and fair electoral process.
International Observers
The 2023 Barbados Accord called for the invitation of various international organizations to
observe the electoral process, including the European Union, the U.N., the African Union, the
Inter-American Union of Electoral Organizations, and The Carter Center. However, on May 28,
2024, the CNE withdrew its invitation to the EU. Instead, the CNE extended invitations to other
international organizations and individuals, including CARICOM. Ultimately, The Carter Center
was the only independent, long-term international observation mission accredited by the CNE.
Also, the U.N. deployed a four-member panel of experts to follow and report on the process.
More than 900 people were invited by the CNE and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to observe on
election day, representing more than 100 countries, including China, Russia, Cuba, Turkey, Iran,
and Latin American and African Union countries. Their observation activities were organized by
the CNE.
A number of international supporters invited by the opposition, including several former
presidents from the region, were denied entry into Venezuela by the government, effectively
barring them from participating as unofficial observers. 63

ELECTION TECHNOLOGY
International good practice shows that whenever electronic technologies are used in an electoral
process, the same principles of universality, equality, integrity, transparency, and accountability
need to be met. Electronic technologies should operate correctly and be sufficiently secure
against fraud, and their functioning must be ensured through an independent body. State practice
sources also state that technologies should be introduced gradually, based on prior planning,
testing, evaluation, and certification. 64
Venezuela has been using a fully automated electronic voting system since 2004, which has
allowed the CNE to develop expertise in managing such technology. Venezuelan voters also are
familiar with using electronic voting. The system used in 2024 was manufactured by ExCle,
which has provided biometric ID systems to the Venezuelan state since 2005. 65 It took over the
operation of Venezuela’s automated voting system when another supplier, Smartmatic, left the
country after a disagreement with the CNE over the announcement of the 2017 election results.
After a warehouse fire in 2020 destroyed almost all of the original Smartmatic machines, the
CNE and ExCle jointly designed and manufactured a new voting machine, which was first used
in 2021, and was used again in 2024.
Besides the core voting system, the CNE also has auxiliary systems, such as those used to
register candidates and party agents, print their credentials, provide election results, and train

63
According to the Panamanian Government, the Venezuelan government blocked the airspace of the country and retained airplanes of Copa
Airlines, preventing former leaders of Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, México, and Panamá from entering Venezuela.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn4v963pzm2o
64
Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Recommendation (2004)11 on e-voting, Articles 28, 30; and OSCE/ODIHR, Handbook for the
Observation of New Voting Technologies, p. 8.
65
E.g. for the Civil Registry and Immigration Authority (SAIME) and the “Biopago” fingerprint payment system run by Banco de Venezuela

26
polling station staff remotely using videos and online exams. These appear to have been
developed largely by the CNE’s own IT staff.
Electronic Voting Machines
A fingerprint scanner, for biometric voter identification, is wired to a touchscreen direct-
recording electronic (DRE) voting machine equipped with a voter-verified paper audit trail
(VVPAT) printer.
Fingerprints of voters registered at
each polling station are stored locally
on the voting machine. Voters present
their ID card, the ID number is
entered by a poll worker on the
scanner’s numeric keyboard, and the
voter is asked to place their thumb on
the scanner. If the scan matches the
stored print, 66 the voting machine is
unlocked, the ballot is displayed on
the touchscreen, and the voter can
cast their vote.
After registering the electronic vote,
the machine prints the vote on a
VVPAT paper slip. 67 The voter is
asked to verify their choice and then
place the paper slip in a separate
ballot box. Finally, the voter signs the
voter register and marks it with an
inked finger to document that they
have voted. The entire voting process
usually takes a minute or less.
Although the voting machine has audio hardware that could be used to allow blind voters to vote
without assistance, the software does not provide such functionality. Voters with disabilities are
encouraged to vote with the assistance of a trusted person of their choice.
When the polls close, the machine operator completes the voting process and “closes” the
machine. Poll workers and party agents add their signatures by writing with their fingers on the
touchscreen of the voting machine. Subsequently the machine prints a paper results slip 68 – the
“acta” – and the signatures are printed on the results slip from their digitally captured images.

66
There is no real-time in comparison to an online national biometric register, only local offline matching to locally stored minutiae associated to
a voter ID number. For some voters four prints are available (thumbs and index fingers), and for others only two (thumbs). A small percentage of
voters remain without registered fingerprints; their prints can be locally captured and stored on the scanner on election day. That way, the voter is
still allowed to cast their vote. The new fingerprint images and minutiae are recovered after election day when the machines return to the CNE
and are eventually added to the central electronic register. They are audited during a postelection voter data audit.
67
Special security paper is used.
68
The same security paper as for the VVPAT is used.

27
For added security, both a voting-machine-specific hash 69 (at the top) and a digital signature (at
the bottom) are printed on the results slip. The results are displayed both in a traditional results
form and encoded in a comma-separated values (CSV) format that is included in a QR code at
the bottom. The QR code allows quick machine reading of the results with a smartphone for
error-free data capture during quick counts and parallel counting exercises.
After the results slip is printed, the operator switches the machine to transmission mode.
Depending on the location of the polling center, one of three external transmission devices is
connected to the machine:
• A global system for mobile communications (GSM) cellular network modem, operating
on the network of state-owned carrier Movilnet.
• A dial-up modem connected to a fixed telephone line, using dedicated lines on the
network of the national telecommunications company, CANTV.
• A satellite modem (for remote voting centers), using a satellite communication system
that uses very small aperture terminals (VSATs) to transmit and receive data, voice, and
video signals.
As a security measure, only phone lines registered on a whitelist maintained by the respective
telecom companies can be used for transmission. The transmission is protected by several layers
of encryption. 70 Once connected to one of the two national tallying centers (CNTs) in Caracas,
the machine transmits a packet containing the voting results and auxiliary information about the
voting session. 71 CNTs 1 and 2 act as a mutual failsafe, so that no votes are lost if one center
loses connectivity. 72
After successful transmission, additional copies of the results forms are printed and given to
political party agents and poll workers at the polling station. 73
The final step in the voting process at the polling station is the citizen verification audit. For at
least 50% of the voting machines, 74 the ballot box containing the paper VVPAT receipts is
opened, and the receipts are counted publicly. The random selection of the machines to be
audited takes place in the polling center, after the polls have closed. 75 The count can be observed
by any interested citizen. The results are announced verbally, noted on a counting sheet, and then
printed as a results form (acta). The counting sheet of the paper receipts and the results form are
included in the electoral materials and returned to the CNE, along with the machines and all

69
A number generated through a mathematical procedure which clearly identified a specific version of a digital document. If even small changes
are made to the document, the hash will change completely, indicating that a change took place. The hash on the slip is generated from the
corresponding electronic vote record stored on the machine.
70
VPN tunnels provided by the respective telecom providers, SSL encryption, and file encryption.
71
E.g., important statistics such as the number of no-match events and overrides, as well as “new prints registered” for the biometric voter ID
system. No data identifying voters themselves is transmitted.
72
Data packets are replicated and stored redundantly at both CNTs.
73
The voting machine software allows the printing of extra copies of the tally slip also before transmission, as long as the machine has passed to
status “closed.” Actual practice on election day varied between voting centers: Some printed witness copies before transmission, some after.
74
In 2024, the CNE manual specified the following selection rule: one box to be opened in voting center with one to four voting machines, two
boxes in centers with five to eight machines, three boxes in centers with nine to 11 machines, and four boxes in centers with 12 or more
machines. In 2024, the number of voting centers with just one machine increased significantly, which explains why the total of voting machines
to be audited vs. their box was 55.4%.
75
Manually, usually by drawing papers from a hat or similar method.

28
other election materials under custody of the Plan República. Copies of that acta are available to
political party witnesses. 76
Process of Results Transmission, Reception, Tallying, and Publishing
The central tabulation system at the CNE receives and processes the incoming data packets from
all voting machines. During the transmission period, the system provides statistics on connection
health and overall transmission progress that are displayed on monitors in a high-security control
room that is separate from the tabulation room. Accredited political party agents have access to
this transmission room on election night and can monitor the data, but they cannot see the results
as viewed in the tabulation room and are not provided with partial results throughout the
evening.
Election results are only available to three CNE officials who make up the Junta Nacional
Electoral (JNE) 77 through a separate system module named “Certeza,” which is also used to
generate partial and final results bulletins. The JNE has at its disposition yet another system
module, called “Forecast,” that calculates the moment when the overall result becomes
irreversible. The JNE also has a publication module that allows the results to be published on the
CNE website, reported by polling station. The publishing process is not automatic; the CNE has
in the past decided not to publish disaggregated results, such as in the 2017 Constituent National
Assembly elections and the 2023 Essequibo referendum.
Confidence in the Voting System Through System Audits
During meetings with the Carter Center mission in the run-up to election day, representatives of
political parties and civil society alike expressed a high level of confidence in the automated
electronic voting system. This was the result of both the evidence provided by system audits and
a change in communication tactics by opposition parties.
In 2024 the opposition chose to emphasize a message of trust in the automated voting system in
their campaign communications, expressing confidence in the system to guarantee both the
integrity and the secrecy of the vote. Indeed, while both the opposition and CSOs protested the
uneven playing field encountered in the run-up to election day, they emphasized the strength of
the automated voting system as perhaps the only guarantee that voter choice would be respected,
and votes counted as cast.
As for evidence, past confidence stemmed from an extensive series of audits, conducted in the
run-up to election day with the participation of political party representatives.
Some of these audits took place before the Carter Center mission arrived. These included an
independent comprehensive examination of the voting system software source code conducted
by a team of 10 academic auditors from Venezuela’s public university system. These auditors
represented both government and opposition parties. The 2024 audit built on an “integral
technical audit” conducted by a similar team in advance of the 2021 elections, in which the same
10 experts examined the entire system line-by-line over a six-week period (24 sessions of six
hours each). The auditors were satisfied with the security when they reported their findings in
2021 and made suggestions for improvements, some of which were implemented for 2024.

76
The Center was not able to confirm in all polling stations in which it observed closure whether this acta was obtained by witnesses. In
conversations with stakeholders, it was reported that numerous voting center coordinators denied witnesses their copy of this acta.
77
Consisting of the president and vice president of the CNE, as well as Conrado Pérez Briceño, rector suplente of the CNE.

29
Because the source code was extensively secured with hashes in 2021, in 2024 only system
changes needed to be audited, resulting in a shorter audit period. 78
The audit sessions attended by the Carter Center mission covered the tabulation center software
and infrastructure, 79 transmission networks and whitelists, machine production and predispatch,
and “zeroing” (puesta en cero) of CNTs. 80 Most of the sessions took place at the CNE – some of
them in the high-security control room to allow configuration of core systems that could not be
accessed remotely but only locally. These sessions consisted mainly of “guided tours” of system
architecture, administrative tools, configuration files and scripts, and hash checks and generation,
performed by system vendor staff for political party representatives. The machine production
audit 81 and the preshipment audit 82 took place at a warehouse facility in the Mariche
neighborhood of Caracas. The transmission network audits 83 were conducted at CANTV and
Movilnet facilities in Caracas.
All audits were characterized by a nonconfrontational and collaborative environment, in which
auditors were allowed to request adjustments to procedures, which were often accepted and
implemented by the CNE and vendor staff. Questions were answered in a transparent and
forthcoming manner.
This environment of openness and collaboration around the verification of election technology
changed completely after election day. The three audits still to be performed according to the
audit plan – extremely important for assuring results and system integrity – were canceled
without explanation.
CNE’s Auxiliary Software Systems
In addition to the core voting system, the CNE also provides auxiliary systems, such as those
used to register candidates and party agents and to train polling station staff. Auxiliary systems
were not included in the CNE’s audit plan and therefore were not audited by political party
representatives. The performance of these auxiliary software systems led to frustration and
complaints from stakeholders. During the candidate registration phase, the system used to
register candidates experienced an unexplained outage that prevented the registration of
opposition candidate Corina Yoris. In the run-up to election day, political parties reported
frequent software errors in the online system used to register and print credentials for their
polling station witnesses, creating significant logistical challenges. A new online system used to
train citizens selected to serve as poll workers also experienced errors in issuing training
certificates, causing confusion and making it unnecessarily difficult for them to perform their
duties.

78
About one and a half days.
79
A video of this session can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VejMAfNhmYc.
80
A video of the zeroing session can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SvRqlDHO8fs.
81
During 14 days of machine production, a random sample of machines was picked from the production line each day and audited for correct
software installation and configuration. A video recording of a session can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FY9BUea-
G0Y&feature=youtu.be.
82
Performed on the Sunday prior to election day. A large sample of machines, randomly selected during the 14-day machine production period
and stored under custody (replacement machines are configured and dispatched in their stead). The sample machines are subjected to a “mock
election,” testing most aspects of operations on election day, including a comparison of votes as stored in the machine, printed on VVPAT and
tally sheets, and transmitted to the National Transmission Centers.
83
Consisting mostly of hash verifications and configuration of previously audited whitelists of telecommunication lines.

30
ELECTION DAY
Voting and counting are the cornerstones of the obligation to provide the free expression of the
will of the people through genuine, periodic elections. 84 The quality of voting operations on
election day is crucial to determining whether an election was conducted according to
democratic obligations. Holding elections by secret ballot is a core obligation under international
law and a recognized means of ensuring that the will of the people is freely expressed. 85
International standards also establish that voting procedures should facilitate free and equal
participation by all groups of voters and call for transparency and integrity of counting and
tabulation procedures. 86
Election day in Venezuela generally went smoothly, with a national turnout of 59%, according to
the CNE. Plan República was implemented, with more than 230,000 military personnel deployed
to provide security during the elections, including full custody of polling centers, voting
materials, and voting machines. The military is only permitted inside the polling station at the
request of the polling station president.
However, there were some incidents, including clashes and protests around some polling centers
reported by media and instances of voter intimidation and coercion reported by civil society. At
some polling centers, there were reports of refusal of access for opposition party agents,
unnecessary voting delays in historically opposition polling stations, and refusal to provide
copies of actas to opposition party agents.
Observers from The Carter Center and citizen observer groups reported that some voting stations
opened late due to a lack of polling staff. Many poll workers did not show up, and party agents
had to fill these official roles, which is allowed by law but is not ideal for maintaining an
independent and professional administration of the election. The use of casual polling staff is
also problematic because there is no guarantee that they have received adequate training.
In general, the participation of party agents and observers contributed to the transparency of the
process. However, opposition political parties reported that in some locations their party agents
were not allowed to enter polling stations because the list of party agents had not been provided
to the polling officials.
Carter Center observers visited 55 polling locations in and around Barinas, Caracas, Maracaibo,
and Valencia, mostly witnessing good civic behavior, with polling station workers and the
military acting appropriately. However, a lack of adequate knowledge of procedures was
observed among some poll workers, voting center coordinators, party agents, and military
personnel involved in Plan República. There were reports of party agents performing functions
for which they were not authorized, such as coordinating the polling stations and reporting to the
voting center coordinator.
The widespread presence of PSUV “red points” (puntos rojos) outside voting centers, a recurrent
issue in Venezuelan elections, also was noted at several locations. People running these points
told Carter Center observers that their role was to monitor who had voted and who had not,
writing down people’s names, talking to voters before and/or after they voted, and openly stating
that they were organizing the vote for the ruling PSUV party. According to PSUV

84
ICCPR, Articles 2, 25(a)
85
UDHR, Article 21; ICCPR, Article 25
86
UN HRC, General Comment 25, Para 20

31
representatives, these are social mobilization strategies that are not illegal. In practice, the red
points are associated with social control, voter harassment, and inappropriate campaigning.
These forms of social pressure were even more pronounced in some of the new voting centers
opened for this election, located in government-built, working-class housing communities,
government offices for the distribution of social benefits, and the headquarters of social
movements and community centers. Carter Center teams observed a biased and unprofessional
atmosphere in some of these locations, marked by irregularities such as the presence of more
than one PSUV party agent, and the absence of opposition party agents. Additionally, there often
was a close and open relationship between the voting center coordinator and the PSUV workers
operating the red points. The mobilization of voters by the community and the electoral
authorities in these centers appeared to be intrinsically linked to the goal of securing votes for the
PSUV candidate.
In response to the incumbent candidate’s red points, this election marked the first appearance of a
similar community-level mobilization effort by the opposition, known as “small command
centers” (comanditos). These centers were registered voluntarily by citizens on an opposition-run
online platform, received instructions, and organized election day monitoring in tents near voting
centers. Their presence was not as widely observed by the Carter Center teams as the red points,
and their capacity for coercion or intimidation was not as great. Media coverage of election day
reported a phenomenon known as “Operation Turtle” (Operación Morrocoy), characterized by
slow processing of voting at centers historically associated with the opposition, resulting in long
lines outside these locations. In some instances, this coincided with observations by Carter
Center teams. There also were reports of slow responses to technical problems with voting
machines, and arbitrary disruptions of the voting process. These tactics were reported on social
media and, in some cases, observed by Carter Center teams.
Carter Center observers reported delays in closing polling stations in some centers visited, along
with results transmission problems in some sites. After the polls closed and results were
transmitted, more than 50% of the country’s polling stations underwent a citizen verification
process. This is another step in the series of audits of the voting system by counting the paper
voter receipts deposited in a box at the polling station. Party agents were entitled to receive
copies of the results forms printed by the machines, enhancing the transparency of the process at
polling station level. The overall impression of Carter Center observers was that this part of the
process went smoothly in the limited number of locations visited, allowing citizens, party agents,
and polling staff to leave the polling stations at the end of the day confident that the votes had
been fairly counted and correctly transmitted, reflecting the will of the people.
Election Day Observations on Voting Technology
On election day, The Carter Center observed problems with voting machines at 18 of the 55
polling stations visited during the voting process. Problems centered mainly on the fingerprint
module, and included machines failing to turn on, frequent rebooting, and printer problems. In
the cases observed, the problems took hours to resolve, resulting in long lines of voters and
frustration. The technical contingency system provided by the CNE, with initial support by
phone, then on-site visits by roaming technicians, and finally replacement of machines from
contingency stocks in regional warehouses, was slow to resolve the problems observed in the
polling centers. The election procedure states that if a machine cannot be repaired or replaced in
time, manual voting will be used.

32
Another recurrent problem observed at several polling stations consisted of mismatches due to
illegible fingerprints, mainly from elderly voters. In 2021, machine operators were able to use
the administrator password of the presiding officer at the polling station to repeatedly override
the mismatches throughout election day, allowing these voters to cast their electronic ballot. 87
Concerned that this could be exploited to allow people to vote on behalf of others, the rules were
tightened for 2024: Only one such override was allowed with the president’s password. For
subsequent overrides, a new, one-time password had to be requested from a CNE hotline. Some
machine operators were unaware of the new rule and did not request additional one-time
passwords, resulting in the disenfranchisement of elderly voters in some locations.
After the polls closed, Carter Center observers witnessed transmission problems at one voting
center in Maracaibo. The machines could not connect to the National Transmission Center and
were generating error messages. After a considerable delay the problem was resolved, and the
machines were able to transmit. The Carter Center’s observations are consistent with media
reports of initial transmission problems in several states that were eventually resolved, with the
transmission successfully completed. This also is consistent with statements made by the
chairperson of the CNE, who announced the results shortly after midnight on election day “with
more than 80% of the result forms received,” indicating that the transmission problems had been
resolved.
ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS
The announcement of results constitutes one of the fundamental stages of election day, from both
a technical standpoint and the generation of certitude in the electoral process. Transparency,
accuracy, and timeliness are key aspects of election principles in announcing results.
In Venezuela, the result from each polling station is transmitted directly to the CNE after the
polls close. The transmission process was carried out under strict technological and security
conditions that guaranteed the integrity of the results. The election results are available only to
the three officials who make up the National Electoral Board (JNE) on election night.
The CNE does not announce any preliminary results until the outcome is determined to be
statistically “irreversible.” The CNE made its first announcement of results shortly after midnight
on July 29, declaring Maduro the winner with 51.2% of the vote, followed by González with
44.2%, based on 80% of the polling station results received. However, it did not provide results
by polling station. The CNE usually publishes disaggregated results by polling station on its
website. But the CNE claimed that it was unable to upload the presidential election results to its
website due to a cyberattack. 88
According to the opposition, polling station results forms showed that González had won by a
large margin. Protests against the CNE’s announcement began to take place in Caracas and other
areas of the country. The Carter Center issued a statement on July 29 calling on the CNE to
immediately publish the presidential election results by polling station. 89 The CNE refused to do
so, and it did not offer a reasonable explanation for not publishing these results.

87
The 2021 rule stipulated that a certain number of voters with a correct “match” must precede each “no-match” override, to avoid a scenario in
which groups of persons not registered at a particular polling station could vote by impersonating registered voters using overrides in quick
succession.
88
The CNE website has been offline since July 29, 2024.
89
“Carter Center Calls on Venezuelan Election Authorities to Release Detailed Results Immediately,” July 29, 2024,
https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2024/venezuela-072924.html

33
The lack of transparent information prevented independent verification of the announced results
and critically damaged the credibility and integrity of the election. The Carter Center issued a
preliminary statement on July 30, concluding that “Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election did not
meet international standards of electoral integrity and [could] not be considered democratic.” 90
The CNE made a second announcement on Aug. 2, confirming Maduro as the winner with 51.9%
of the vote, followed by González with 43.1%. The CNE stated that these results were based on
96.8% of polling station results but did not release those results. The CNE’s figures stood in stark
contrast to the physical evidence produced by the voting machines and collected by the
opposition from more than 80% of polling stations (see analysis below).
Analysis of the implausibility regarding the “irreversibility” of the result, 91 as well as statistical
anomalies reported in the percentages of the announced results, circulated widely, 92 further
increasing concerns about the manipulation of the election results.
At the time of publication of this report, the CNE had not yet published disaggregated results by
polling station. The CNE also did not publish the final results in the Electoral Gazette as
specified in Article 155 of the Electoral Law.
Cyberattack Claimed by the CNE
When the president of the CNE declared Maduro the winner shortly after midnight on election
day, he stated that the CNE’s data transmission system had experienced a cyberattack that had
caused delays in the transmission of results. He also affirmed that the CNE had nevertheless
successfully received 80% of the results from the voting machines nationwide. Whatever
problems the transmission system may have had before that moment had therefore apparently
been resolved.
It is difficult to know exactly what happened regarding the transmission of results on election
night without the telecommunications system. According to the CNE’s own preelection
information, the system’s transmission infrastructure was completely isolated from the internet,
which made the initial claims of a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack on the voting
system itself seem implausible.
The CNE later stated that it was referring to a DDoS attack on its web server, which allegedly
prevented it from publishing results disaggregated by polling station. Regardless of this alleged
attack, if the CNE had wanted to provide disaggregated election results as soon as possible, even
with a nonfunctioning website, it had alternative means at its disposal. For example, it could
have delivered the electronic results to the political parties on a DVD or flash drive. However, no
such attempts were made.

90
Carter Center Statement on Venezuela Election, July 30, 2024, https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2024/venezuela-073024.html
91
The CNE announcement on election night declared the “irreversibility” of Maduro’s victory with 80% of the results forms processed. Maduro
was stated to have obtained 5,150,092 votes at that moment, compared with 4,445,978 for Gonzáles and 462,704 votes for “others.” In the second
and final bulletin, presented on Aug. 2, the CNE reported a total of 12,335,884 valid votes. From this it can be inferred that when the
“irreversible” victory of Maduro was announced on July 29, about 2.3 million votes had not yet been counted according to the CNE. Maduro’s
declared lead at that time was 704,114 votes.
92
https://statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu/2024/07/31/suspicious-data-pattern-in-recent-venezuelan-election/ and
https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/08/07/actas-resultados-venezuela-oposicion-cne-comprobar-orix/

34
Cancellation of Postelection System Audits
While the preelection audits had been conducted as expected, the CNE postponed and
subsequently canceled all three scheduled postelection audits. The CNE did not provide any
reasons for the cancellations. The audits had been scheduled as follows:
• The Telecommunications System Audit, Phase 2, scheduled for July 29, 2024 (the day
after the election).
• The Citizen Verification Audit, Phase 2, scheduled for Aug. 2.
• The ADES Election Data Audit, Phase 2, scheduled for Aug. 5-8.
Given the transmission problems observed on election day, and the subsequent CNE allegations
of a “massive hacking event,” which was presented as the reason for not presenting the
disaggregated election results, the telecommunications audit would have been crucial to provide
certainty about the conditions under which the transmission of election results was conducted
and to clarify whether there was external interference in the process.
Likewise, given the allegations of falsification of election results by the opposition, the citizen
verification audit would have been extremely important. During this audit, a random sample of
voting machines selected on election day would compare the results stored in the machine’s
memory with the results received by the central tallying system, as well as the results recorded
on the original results form and the VVPAT paper receipts from the ballot box, both of which
were stored with the machine and secured by Plan República.
POSTELECTION DEVELOPMENTS
Protests began almost immediately after Maduro’s victory was announced. On July 29, Caracas
residents participated in “cacerolazos,” banging pots and pans in protest. González and
Machado contested the official results announced by the CNE, claiming that the results forms
collected by their party agents at the polling stations showed a resounding victory for González
over Maduro and that the CNE’s results were therefore fraudulent. Scans of these results forms
were posted online.
The international community expressed serious concerns about the integrity of the elections.
More than 20 countries and international organizations, including The Carter Center, the EU, and
the U.N., called for the publication of the results forms of all polling stations. Complaints from
several countries led to the expulsion of members of the diplomatic missions of Peru, Argentina,
Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay on July 29.
By mid-August, large-scale protests were organized in more than 350 cities worldwide, including
Caracas. Demonstrators demanded the release of complete election results and denounced
Maduro’s alleged victory. The government responded with arrests, detentions, suspension of
passports, social network shutdowns, threats, and intimidation. 93
The Opposition’s Results Forms
The opposition stated that it had obtained more than 80% of the results forms (actas) through
party agents and citizens working at the polling stations. These results forms were scanned and

93
As of Aug. 20, more than 1,500 illegal arrests had been made, according to Foro Penal.

35
posted online for public scrutiny. Studies conducted by academic experts and others, including
The Carter Center, have concluded that the forms are authentic.
Original copies of the results forms reviewed by the Carter Center team possess all the required
security features, including being printed on CNE security paper, bearing the signatures of
polling station staff and party agents, and containing security hashes and digital signatures.
Images of the results forms posted on the opposition website showed the same security features.
They also showed the heterogeneity in terms of metadata and photographic quality that would be
expected from a massive collection effort distributed among tens of thousands of party agents
and volunteers on election night, each taking photos with their personal cellphones. The massive
forgery operation alleged by the Venezuelan government is implausible.
In addition, many photos and videos were posted on social media on election night or after,
documenting polling station results favorable to the opposition. An initial study by a Venezuelan
fact-checking organization compared the results documented in this way with the results forms
posted on the opposition website and found them to be consistent. 94
While the opposition made its material available for verification, the same cannot be said for the
results forms in the CNE’s possession, nor for the results forms in the possession of PSUV party
agents. Neither the CNE nor the PSUV have produced any evidence to support their claims of
victory.
Carter Center Analysis of the Results Forms
In the days following the elections, photos of results forms collected by party agents were
published on https://resultadosconvzla.com/, along with transcribed results data in machine-
readable format. As of Aug. 1, 2024, results data and photos of the results forms from 24,533 of
30,026 polling stations (81.7%) were published on the website and available for download. In the
absence of disaggregated data published by the CNE, this data is the most credible polling
station-level results data available to the public.
The Carter Center conducted an independent analysis of the polling station results data published
by the opposition to verify the integrity of the official aggregate results announced by the CNE
(see Annex 2). To assess the fidelity and transcription accuracy of the polling station results data,
the Center randomly selected a sample of 100 polling stations and found no discrepancies
between the transcribed results data and the photos of the results forms. To determine where and
how many votes are unaccounted for due to missing results forms, the Center cross-referenced
the results data published on the resultadosconvzla.com website with the CNE’s polling station
list – which includes the number of registered voters per polling station – provided to political
party agents and observation group representatives prior to the elections.
According to the data from the results forms of 81.7% of the polling stations, González received
7,156,462 votes and Maduro received 3,241,461 votes, with a voter turnout of 60%. The
difference in the number of votes between González and Maduro is 3,915,001 votes. In the
18.3% of polling stations with missing results forms, there are 3,576,544 registered voters. This
is less than the difference between the vote totals for González and Maduro.
According to the results data, González received 67.1% of all votes and Maduro received 30.4%.
In the highly unlikely scenario that 100% of registered voters in polling stations with missing

94
https://x.com/cazamosfakenews/status/1825168249962594630

36
 results forms voted and cast their ballots for Maduro, González still would have won a majority
of the votes nationwide (50.2%). Consequently, even in the most extreme scenario, the results
announced by the CNE are statistically impossible. Even in the implausible scenario of 100%
voter turnout on his behalf in the polling stations with missing data, Maduro could have received
only 47.8% of the vote (see Table 1 below and Annex 2).
Table 1: Summary of Carter Center Analysis of Results Forms
# of % of
# of # of Voter # of # of Maduro González
Results Results # of Valid
Registered Null Turnout Maduro González Votes Votes
Forms Forms Votes
Voters Votes % Votes Votes % %
Received Received
Data From
Actual Results
Forms (81.7% 24,532 81.7% 17,745,239 1,065,912 1,139 60% 3,241,461 7,156,462 30.4% 67.1%
of Polling
Stations)
Missing
Results Forms
(18.3% of
Polling
Stations) 30,026 100% 21,321,783 1,423,567 1,139 66.7% 6,818,005 7,156,462 47.8% 50.2%
Hypothetical
Scenario:
100% Turnout
for Maduro

ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Effective electoral dispute resolution mechanisms are an integral part of ensuring that the will of
the people is upheld during all stages of the electoral process. International and regional treaties
establish that every person has the right to an effective remedy before a competent national
tribunal against acts that violate their rights or freedoms. The right to an effective remedy is
fundamental for ensuring the protection of all other human rights. Furthermore, this right must be
recognized within the legal framework. Regional treaties establish a link between the right to an
effective remedy, the conduct of elections, and the announcement of results. They also state that
when granted, such a remedy must be effective. An effective remedy requires that conflicts be
addressed in a timely manner and that the State ensures compliance with the remedy when
granted. 95
The complaint and appeal mechanism in Venezuela – both the administrative route through the
CNE and the judicial route through the ordinary courts – lacks trust and is not considered by
participants to be useful for resolving disputes. In addition, corruption, bias, and the
discretionary nature of the decisions (or lack of response to complaints) were cited as arguments
that discourage the pursuit of solutions through the legal channels provided for by the electoral
legislation. Many interlocutors denounced the lack of independence and impartiality of the
electoral administration and the judiciary, which are perceived as appendages of the executive
branch, and the absence of the rule of law in Venezuela.

95
ICCPR, Article 2(3)

37
Maduro’s Writ of Amparo Before the TSJ
On July 31, 2024, Maduro petitioned the TSJ to conduct a judicial review of the election results.
This move came in response to the opposition’s refusal to recognize the election results
announced by the CNE and the widespread unrest in the country. Maduro filed a writ of amparo
– a legal instrument used by citizens who believe their constitutional rights have been violated –
with the TSJ. On Aug. 1, the injunction was granted, but the details of the complaint were not
made public. Based on a summary shared on X, it appeared that the purpose of the complaint
was to conduct a “verification” of the election results. The TSJ has jurisdiction over complaints
against the decisions, actions, and omissions of the CNE, but the constitution assigns the task of
verifying election results to the CNE. The content of Maduro’s complaint and the parties
involved remain unknown.
The TSJ summoned all 10 presidential candidates for hearings. However, there was no clear
information about the conditions under which these summons were issued, leaving the
candidates uncertain about their role, whether as defendants, plaintiffs, or witnesses. The lack of
transparency was further exacerbated by the fact that the TSJ website was shut down, and no
related decisions were published. It is unclear why the CNE could not publish the results per
polling station but could share them with the TSJ.
TSJ Election Audit Exercise
On Aug. 5, the TSJ initiated what it claimed was a forensic examination of unspecified electoral
material provided to the court by the CNE, in response to Maduro’s request to confirm the
election results that declared him the winner.
In addition to doubts about the legal and technical competence of the tribunal, the manner in
which the investigation was conducted is questionable. No methodology was published, and
opposition party agents were excluded from the process. No details of the materials presented by
the CNE were made public, and there was no documentation of their chain of custody. In
promotional videos posted on social media, masked TSJ staff could be seen reviewing what
appeared to be results forms. Sparse commentary suggests that a sample of results forms were
compared with electronic results from the CNE’s central tabulation systems, although the
statistical design of the sample was unknown.
Following the audit, the TSJ affirmed the CNE announcement of the election results on Aug. 22.
Opposition Challenge to the Election Results
After the TSJ ruling in favor of the electoral result, Enrique Márquez, a presidential candidate,
filed a recusal request against the president of the Electoral Chamber of the Supreme Court of
Justice, which was declared inadmissible. Marquéz and Antonio Ecarri, another presidential
candidate, separately asked the TSJ in September to annul its ruling on the results of the July 28
election. Both requests were refused by the court, which considered the issue res judicata, a
matter judged.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
Edmundo González left Venezuela and requested political asylum in Spain on Sept. 8 after
receiving information about a possible arrest. María Corina Machado was forced into hiding after
being threatened with arrest.

38
The government has continued to respond to opposition challenges with a crackdown and
restrictions on fundamental political rights, including freedom of expression, association, and
movement. Human rights organizations, including the Independent International Fact-Finding
Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela established by the U.N. Human Rights
Council, have documented mass detentions of opposition activists and others, including minors,
as well as instances of torture, sexual assault, and death of detained persons. 96

RECOMMENDATIONS
The Carter Center has consulted with key stakeholders regarding its findings and offers the
following recommendations. However, the overall recommendation is for the authorities to
demonstrate respect for the will of Venezuelan citizens by allowing a transparent, independent
review of the results of the 2024 presidential election.
Legal Framework
1. Ensure that any significant amendments to the electoral legal framework are made well in
advance of elections and with broad political consensus aimed to provide certainty of law,
adequate opportunity for operational adjustments, and stakeholder awareness.

2. Amend, repeal, or withdraw laws, bills, and regulations that seek to unduly restrict freedom
of expression and association, including the Law Against Fascism and Neo-Fascism; the
Law for the Control, Regularization, Operation, and Financing of Non-Governmental and
Related Organizations; and the Organic Law for the Defense of the Essequibo.

Election Administration

3. Reconsider CNE appointment procedures to ensure greater cross-party and stakeholder

support and confidence in the CNE as an independent, impartial, and professional body,
reiterating the Carter Center’s recommendation in the 2021 IEEM final report.

4. Publish all relevant information promptly and systematically, including CNE decisions and
the electoral calendar, and hold regular consultation framework meetings with stakeholders
to increase transparency and confidence in the process.

5. Improve the notification system and training for polling staff so they are less likely to be
replaced on election day by untrained, partisan individuals.

6. To ensure transparency, publicize the criteria for requesting the establishment of new polling
stations and the reasons for granting or rejecting requests.

7. Establish an election calendar in a timely manner that allows for the proper conduct of
election preparations.

96
See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/10/un-international-mission-reveals-gross-human-rights-violations-venezuela

39
Voter Education

8. Increase the effectiveness and reach of voter education projects aimed at increasing
understanding of the electoral process, enhancing confidence in the integrity of the elections,
and instructing voters on the use of voting machines.

Voter Registration

9. Enact effective measures to address the under-registration of voters before the next election,
as well as plan effectively for special voter registration campaigns. This should include
allocating sufficient time and resources to reach all citizens and ensuring timely publication
of voter lists at all stages to maximize the inclusiveness of the voter register, as well as
public confidence.

10. To increase citizen participation, organize a comprehensive voter register for Venezuelan
migrants without unnecessary restrictions based on migration status, reiterating the
recommendation included in the 2021 IEEM final report.

Candidate Registration

11. Abolish the comptroller general’s power to disqualify citizens from candidacy as an
administrative or supplementary sanction, so that political rights are suspended only by
judicial decision and subject to all appropriate procedural safeguards, as recommended in
the 2021 IEEM final report.

Campaign

12. Ensure compliance with campaign rules through the imposition of sanctions to create more
equitable electoral competition, in particular by addressing the misuse of state resources in
the electoral campaign.

Campaign Financing

13. Adopt a law that effectively regulates political financing, as recommended in 2021. This law
should address donation and spending limits; create mechanisms for monitoring and public
disclosure of party financial information to strengthen transparency; establish enforcement
mechanisms to ensure a more level playing field, accountability, and sanctions for
noncompliance; and lay the groundwork for oversight by an independent body.

Election Observation

14. Remove restrictions contrary to international standards and good practices for independent
citizen observation of all stages of the electoral process, guaranteeing freedom of movement
and expression and ensuring that election observers can carry out their duties without
obstruction.

40
Media

15. Strengthen the capacity of the CNE to ensure that state media resources are not used for
partisan purposes.

16. Implement literacy and verification programs to combat hate speech and misinformation on
social networks. To this end, cooperation agreements between the CNE and social media
platforms should be established and implemented. Collaborate with civil society
organizations on independent, nonpartisan fact-checking initiatives and other methods to
proactively identify and counter the spread of disinformation and hate speech.

17. Restrict the practice of blocking websites and blocking of media, multimedia platforms, and
censorship circumvention tools, among others, including by ensuring that any action to
block content is proportionate to its intended purpose and ordered by an independent and
impartial tribunal, as also recommended by The Carter Center in the 2021 IEEM final report.

Election Technologies

18. Establish clear legal requirements for the conduct of preelection and postelection audits and
certification of electronic voting machines and electronic voting processes to enhance
integrity and confidence in the process. This should include ensuring full transparency of the
audit and certification processes for political parties, observers, and the media, as well as the
publication of all documentation on the technical specifications of the automated voting
system. Adhere to scheduled audits in terms of timing and content and avoid cancellation or
undue delays.

Election Day and Announcement of Results

19. Establish clear limits on mechanisms of social control of voters and prevent infringement of
voters’ rights, such as “red points” to verify that people have voted, reiterating the Carter
Center’s findings in the 2021 IEEM final report.

20. Ensure timely and full publication of all data regarding declared election results, including
results by polling station, and ensure publication of all results forms.

41
ANNEX 1: ELECTORAL TIMETABLE

42
ANNEX 2: ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS
Based on Data From Available Results Forms (Actas) and Polling Station and Registration Data from Missing Results Forms

Registered
Registered Null Voter Maduro González Other Other
Expecte Received % Valid Maduro González Missing Voters
State Voters Votes Turnout Votes Votes Votes %
d Actas Actas Received (Actas) % (Actas) % (Actas) Actas (Missing
(Actas) (Actas) (Actas) (Actas) (Actas) (Actas) (Actas)
Actas)
Amazonas 199 108 54.2% 75,761 45,792 3 60.4% 17,374 27,219 1,199 37.9% 59.4% 2.6% 91 44,497
Anzoátegui 1,556 1,338 85.9% 1,034,534 631,645 62 61.0% 194,615 420,075 16,955 30.8% 66.5% 2.6% 218 144,639
Apure 604 533 88.2% 356,838 213,107 27 59.7% 74,842 134,203 4,062 35.1% 62.9% 1.9% 71 32,303
Aragua 1,620 1,509 93.1% 1,204,780 723,599 99 60.0% 212,285 487,938 23,376 29.3% 67.4% 3.2% 111 80,896
Barinas 1,024 945 92.2% 595,600 373,823 35 62.7% 88,668 278,692 6,463 23.7% 74.5% 1.7% 79 31,043
Bolivar 1,565 1,129 72.1% 812,953 471,538 68 58.0% 121,741 337,750 12,047 25.8% 71.6% 2.5% 436 275,169
Carabobo 2,059 1,362 66.1% 1,119,066 650,926 55 58.1% 172,285 459,753 18,888 26.4% 70.6% 2.9% 697 544,876
Cojedes 450 416 92.4% 262,047 173,610 11 66.2% 60,242 109,083 4,285 34.7% 62.8% 2.4% 34 12,897
Delta
Amacuro 249 176 70.6% 101,412 56,273 10 55.5% 24,797 30,074 1,402 44.0% 53.4% 2.4% 73 31,779
DTO. Capital
2,260 1,534 67.8% 1,210,692 717,719 93 59.2% 230,649 462,138 24,932 32.1% 64.3% 3.4% 726 508,934
(Caracas)
Falcón 1,188 1,062 89.3% 681,627 416,279 54 61.0% 111,637 294,981 9,661 26.8% 70.8% 2.3% 126 56,223
Guárico 856 757 88.4% 519,768 345,187 35 66.4% 116,636 220,995 7,556 33.7% 64.0% 2.1% 99 52,335
La Guaira 416 325 78.1% 248,952 159,251 16 63.9% 57,280 97,042 4,929 35.9% 60.9% 3.1% 91 66,089
Lara 2,017 1,487 73.7% 1,030,354 669,475 58 64.9% 194,738 458,080 16,657 29.0% 68.4% 2.4% 530 336,429
Mérida 953 910 95.4% 627,883 395,027 36 62.9% 84,482 303,767 6,778 21.3% 76.9% 1.7% 43 25,262
Miranda 2,963 2,223 75.0% 1,726,125 989,751 124 57.3% 309,947 649,403 30,401 31.3% 65.6% 3.0% 740 495,007
Monagas 997 767 76.9% 549,067 334,148 50 60.8% 125,364 201,689 7,095 37.5% 60.3% 2.1% 230 143,217
Nueva Esparta 539 507 94.0% 369,879 228,283 16 61.7% 70,605 151,664 6,014 30.9% 66.4% 2.6% 32 19,107
Portuguesa 1,082 984 90.9% 643,733 439,448 57 68.2% 147,673 281,482 10,293 33.6% 64.0% 2.3% 98 48,434
Sucre 1,107 1,039 93.8% 685,505 438,694 33 64.0% 208,962 219,377 10,355 47.6% 50.0% 2.3% 68 31,334
Táchira 1,272 1,229 96.6% 846,069 486,851 45 57.5% 79,224 398,690 8,937 16.2% 81.8% 1.8% 43 17,838
Trujillo 979 909 92.8% 547,998 347,602 32 63.4% 119,730 222,227 5,645 34.4% 63.9% 1.6% 70 18,917
Yaracuy 759 691 91.0% 448,723 297,973 19 66.4% 109,678 180,683 7,612 36.8% 60.6% 2.5% 68 32,074
Zulia 3,312 2,592 78.2% 2,045,873 1,053,127 101 51.4% 308,007 729,457 15,663 29.2% 69.2% 1.4% 720 527,245
Total 30,026 24,532 81.7% 17,745,239 10,659,128 1,139 60.0% 3,241,461 7,156,462 261,205 30.4% 67.1% 2.4% 5,494 3,576,544

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