A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion

Author(s): Georg Simmel

Source: American Journal of Sociology , Nov., 1905, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Nov., 1905), pp. 359-
376
Published by: The University of Chicago Press

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 A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF
RELIGION '

PROFESSOR GEORG SIMMEL

Berlin

The ambiguity which surrounds the origin and nature of

religion will never be removed so long as we insist upon approach-
ing the problem as one for which a single word will be the " open
sesame." Thus far, no one has been able to offer a definition
which, without vagueness and yet with sufficient comprehensive-
ness, has told once for all what religion is in its essence, in that
which is common alike to the religion of Christians and South
Sea islanders, to Buddhism and Mexican idolatry. Thus far it
has not been distinguished, on the one hand, from mere meta-
physical speculation, nor, on the other, from the credulity which
believes in "ghosts." Its purest and highest manifestations are
not yet proof against comparison with these. And the multi-
plicity of psychological causes to which religion is ascribed corre-
sponds to this indefinite conception as to its nature. It matters
not whether fear or love, ancestor-worship or self-deification, the
moral instincts or the feeling of dependence, be regarded as the
subjective root of religion; a theory is only then entirely errone-
ous when it assumes to be the sole explanation, and then only
correct when it claims to point out merely one of the sources of
religion. Hence the solution of the problem will be approached
only when all the impulses, ideas, and conditions operating in this
domain are inventoried, and that with the express determination
that the significance of known particular motives is not to be
arbitrarily expanded into general laws. Nor is this the only
reservation that must be made in an attempt to determine the
religious significance of the phenomena of social life which pre-
ceded all religion in the order of time. It must also be emphat-
ically insisted upon that, no matter how mundanely and empiri-
'Translated by W. W. Elwang, A.M., University of Missouri.

359

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360 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

cally the origin of ideas about the super-mundane and transcen-

dental is explained, neither the subjective emotional value of
these ideas, nor their objective value as matters of fact, is at all in
question. Both of these values lie beyond the limits which our
merely genetic, psychological inquiry aims to reach.
In attempting to find the beginnings of religion in human
relations which are in themselves non-religious, we merely follow
a well-known method. It has long been admitted that science is
merely a heightening, a refinement, a completion, of those means
of knowledge which, in lower and dimmer degree, assist us in
forming our judgments and experiences in daily, practical life.
We only then arrive at a genetic explanation of art when we have
analyzed those aesthetic experiences of life, in speech, in the emo-
tions, in business, in social affairs, which are not in themselves
artistic. All high and pure forms existed at first experimentally,
as it were, in the germ, in connection with other forms; but in
order to comprehend them in their highest and independent
forms, we nmust look for themn in their undeveloped states. Their
significance, psychologically, will depend upon the determination
of their proper places in a series which develops, as if by an
organic growth, through a variety of stages, so that the new and
differentiated in each appears as the unfolding of a germ con-
tained in that which had preceded it. Thus it may help us to, an
insight into the origin and nature of religion, if we can discover
in all kinds of non-religious conditions and interests certain reli-
gious momenta, the beginnings of what later came to, be religion,
definitely and independently. I do not believe that the religious
feelings and impulses manifest themselves in religion only;
rather, that they are to be found in many connections, a co-operat-
ing element in various situations, whose extreme development
and differentiation is religion as an independent content of life.
In order, now, to find the points at which, in the shifting condi-
tions of human life, the momenta of religion originated, it will be
necessary to digress to, what may seem to be entirely foreign
phenomena.
It has long been known that custom is the chief form of social
control in the lower culture conditions. Those life-conditions

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 A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 36I

which, on the one hand, are subsequently codified as laws and

enforced by the police power of the state, and, on the other hand,
are remitted to, the free consent of the cultivated and trained
individual socius, are, in narrower and primitive circles, guaran-
teed by that peculiar, immediate control of the individual by his
environnment which we call custom. Custom, law, and the volun-
tary morality of the individual are different unifying elements of
the social structure which can carry the same obligations as their
content, and, as a matter of fact, have had them among different
peoples at different times. Many of the norms and practices of
public life are supported both by the free play of competing
forces and by the control of the lower elements by higher ones.
Many social interests were at first protected by the family organi-
zation, but later, or in other places, were taken under the care of
purely voluntary associations or by the state. It can, in general,
be asserted that the differentiations which characterize the social
structure are always due to definite ends, causes, and interests;
and so long as these continue, the social life, and the forms in
which it expresses itself, may be exceedingly diverse, just as,
on the other hand, this differentiation may itself have the most
varied content. It seems to me that among these forms which
huLman relations assume, and which may have the most diverse
contents, there is one which cannot be otherwise described than
as religious, even though this designation of it, to be sure, antici-
pates the name of the complete structure for its mere beginning
and conditioning. For the coloring, so to, speak, which justifies
this description must not be a reflection from already existing
religion; rather, human contact, in the purely psychological
aspect of its interaction, develops that definite tendency which,
heightened, and differentiated to independence, is known as
religion.
We can safely assume that many human relations harbor a
religious element. The relation of a devoted child to, its parent,
of an enthusiastic patriot to his country, of the fervent cosmop-
olite toward humanity; the relation of the laboring-man to his
struggling fellows, or of the proud feudal lord to his class; the
relation of the subject to the ruler under whose control he is, and

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362 THE AMERICAN IOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

of the true soldier to his army - all these relations, with their
infinite variety of content, looked at from the psychological side,
may have a common tone which can be described only as religious.
All religion contains a peculiar admixture of unselfish surrender
and fervent desire, of humility and exaltation, of sensual concrete-
ness and spiritual abstraction, which occasion a certain degree of
emotional tension, a specific ardor and certainty of the subjective
conditions, an inclusion of the subject experiencing them in a
higher order - an order which is at the same time felt to be
something subjective and personal. This religious quality is con-
tained, it seems to me, in many other relations, and gives them a
note which distinguishes them from relations based upon pure
egoism, or pure suggestion, or even purely moral forces. As a
matter of course, this quality is present with more or less strength,
now appearing merely like a light overtone, and again as a quite
distinct coloring. In many and important instances the develop-
ing period of these relations is thus characterized; that is to say,
the same content which previously or at some subsequent period
was borne by other forms of human relation, assumes a religious
form in other periods. All this is best illustrated by those laws
which at certain times or places reveal a theocratic character, are
completely under religious sanctions, but which, at other times
and places, are guaranteed either by the state or by custom. It
would even seem as if the indispensable requirements of society
frequently emerged from an entirely undifferentiated form in
which moral, religious, and juridical sanctions were still indis-
criminately mingled, like the Dharma of the Hindus, the Themnis
of the Greeks, and the fas of the Latins, and that finally, as his-
torical conditions varied, nlow one and now the other of these
sanctions developed into the "bearer" of such requirements. In
the relation of the individual to the group also these changes can
be observed; in times when patriotism is aroused, this relation
assumes a devotion, a fervor, and a readiness of self-surrender
which can be described only as religious; while at other times it
is controlled by conventionality or the law of the land. For us
the important thing is that it is, in every case, a question of
humani relations, and that it is merely a change, as it were, in the

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 A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 363

aggregate condition of these relations when, instead of purely

conventional, it becomes religious, and instead of religious, legal,
and then, in turn, voluntary, as a matter of fact, many socially
injurious immoralities first found a place in the criminal code
because of the resentment of the church; or, as illustrated by
anti-Semitism, because a social-economic or racial relation
between certain groups within a group can be transferred to the
religious category, without, however, really becoming anything
else than a social relation; or, as some suppose, that religious
prostitution was merely a development of sexual life which was
earlier or elsewhere controlled by pure convention.
In view of these examples, a previously indicated error must
be more definitely guarded against. The theory here set forth is
not intended to prove that certain social interests and occurrences
were controlled by an already independently existing religious
system. That, certainly, occurs often enough, brings about com-
binations of the greatest historical importance, and is very signif-
icant also in the examples cited. But what I mean is precisely
the reverse of this, and, it must be admitted, of much less appar-
ent connection, and one more difficult to, discover; namely, that
in those social relations the quality which we afterward, on
account of its analogy with other existing religiosity, call reli-
ligious, comes into being spontaneously, as a pure socio-psycho-
logical constellation, one of the possible relations of man to man.
In contrast to this, religion, as an independent phenomenon, is a
derivative thing, almost like the state in the Roman and modern
sense, as an objective and self-sufficient existence, is secondary in
contrast to the original causes, relations, and customs which
immediately controlled the social elements, and which only gradu-
ally projected upon or abrogated to the state the conservation and
execution of their contents. The entire history of social life is
permeated by this process: the positively antagonistic motives of
individuals, with which their social life begins, grow up into,
separate and independent organisms. Thus, from the regulations
for preserving the group-life there arise, on the one hand, the law
which codifies them, and, on the other, the judge whose business
it is to apply them. Thus, from socially necessary tasks, first

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364 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

performed with the co-operation of all, and according to the rude

empiricism of the times, there develop, on the one hand, a tech-
nology, as an ideal system of knowledge and rules, and, on the
other hand, the laborer as the differentiated means for accom-
plishing those tasks. In a similar manner, although in these infi-
nitely complex affairs the analogy constantly breaks down, it may
have happened in things religious. The individual in a group is
related to others, or to all, in the way above described; that is to
say, his relations to them partake of a certain degree of exaltation,
devotion, and fervency. From this there develops an ideal content,
on the one hand, or gods, who protect those who sustain these rela-
tions; who brought the emotions which they experience into being;
who, by their very existence, then bring into sharp relief -as an
independent entity, so to speak - what had hitherto only existed
as a form of human relation, and more or less blended with more
actual life-forms. And this complex of ideas or phantasies finds
an executive representation in the priesthood, like law in the
person of the judge, or learning in a scholarly class. When this
identification or substantialization of religion has been accom-
plished, it, in turn, has its effect upon the direct psychical relations
of men among themselves, giving them the now well-known-and
so-called quality of religiosity. But in so, doing it merely gives
back what it had originally received. And it may, perhaps, be
asserted that the so often wonderful and abstruse religious ideas
could never have obtained their influence upon men if they had
not been the formulke or embodiments of previously existing rela-
tions for which consciousness had not yet found a more appro-
priate expression.
The intellectual motive underlying this explanation is a very
general one, and may be expressed as a comprehensive rule, of
which the materialistic conception of history affords a single
illustration. When materialism derives the entire content of
historic life from economic conditions, and defines custom and
law, art and religion, science and social progress accordingly, a
part of a very comprehensive process is exaggerated into the
whole. The development of the forms and contents of social
life, throughout its wide territory and multiplied phenomena, is

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 A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 365

such that the selfsame content finds expression in many formns,

and the same form in many contents. The events of history
arrange themselves as if they were controlled by a tendency to
make as much as possible of every given sum of movements.
This is, apparently, the reason why history doles not disintegrate
into a collection of aphoristic movements, but binds together inti-
mately, not only the synchronous, but the successive. That any
particular form of life -social, literary, religious, personal-
should survive its connection with a single content, and also lend
itself unchanged to a new one; that the single content should
maintain its essential nature through a mass of successive and
mutually destructive forms, is precisely what the continuity of
history will not permit. On the contrary, it prevents it, so that
there should not be at some point an irrational leap, a break in
the connection with the past. Since, now, the evolution of the
race generally advances from the sensual and objective to the
mental and subjective-only, it is true, frequently to reverse this
order -there will often occur, in economic life, factors in the
form of the abstract and intellectual, the forms which have built
up the economic interests will intrude themselves into entirely
different life-contents. But that is only one of the instances in
which continuity and the law of parsimony are found in history.
When, for example, the form of government exhibited in the state
is repeated in the family; when the prevailing religion gives
direction and inspiration to art; when frequent wars make the
individual brutal and offensive even in peace; when political
divisions influence non-political affairs and align diverging ten-
dencies of culture according to party principles; then these are
all expressions of this emphasized character of all historic life, of
which the materialistic theory of history illuminates only a single
side. And it is this side precisely which illustrates the develop-
ment with which we are here concerned; forms of social relations
either condense or refine themselves into a system of religious
ideas, or add new elements to those which already exist; or,
viewed differently, a specific emotional content which arose in
the form of individual interaction, transfers itself in this rela-
tionship into a transcendent idea; this builds a new category

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 366 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

according to which the forms or contents are experienced which

have their origin in human relationships. I shall try to demon-
strate this general suggestion by applying it to a particular phase
of the religious life.
The faith which has come to be regarded as the essential, the
substance, of religion, is first a relation between individuals; for
it is a question of practical faith, which is by no means merely a
lower form' or attenuation of theoretical belief. When I say,
" I believe in God," the assertion means something entirely differ-
ent from the statement, " I believe in the existence of ether
waves;" or, "The moon is inhabited;" or, "Human nature is
always the same." It means not only that I accept the existence
of God, even though it be no,t fully demonstrable, but it implies
also a certain subjective relation to him, a going out of the affec-
tions to him, an attitude of life; in all of which there is a peculiar
mixture of faith as a kind of method of knowledge with practical
impulses and feelings. And now, as to, the analogy of all this in
human socialization. We do not base our mutual relations by any
means upon what we conclusively know about each other. Rather,
our feelings and suggestions express themselves in certain repre-
sentations which can be described only as matters of faith, and
which, in turn, have a reflex effect upon practical conditions. It
is a specific psychological fact, hard to define, which we illustrate
when we "believe in someone" - the child in its parents, the
subordinate in his superior, friend in friend, the individual in the
nation, and the subj ect in his sovereign. The social role of this
faith has never been investigated; but this much is certain, that
without it society would disintegrate. Obedience, for example, is
largely based upon it. In innumerable instances it depends
neither upon a definite recognition of law and force, nor upon
affection, or suggestion, but upon that psychical intermediate
thing which we call faith in a person or a group of persons. It
has often been remarked that it is an incomprehensible thing that
individuals, and entire classes, allow themselves to be oppressed
and exploited, even though they possess ample power to secure
immunity. But this is precisely the result o,f an easy-going,
uncritical faith in the power, value, superiority, and goodness of

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 A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 367

those in authority - a faith which is by no means an uncertain,

theoretical assumption, but a unique thing, compounded of knowl-
edge, instinct, and feeling, which is concisely and simply described
as faith in them. That, in the face of reasonable proof to the
contrary, we still can retain our faith in an individual is one of
the strongest of the ties that bind society. This faith, now, is of
a most positive religious character. I do not mean that the reli-
gion was first, and that the sociological relations borrowed their
attribute from it. I believe, rather, that the sociological signifi-
cance arises without any regard for the religious data at all as a
purely inter-individual, psychological relation, which later exhibits
itself abstractly in religious faith. In faith in a deity the highest
development of faith has become incorporate, so to speak; has
been relieved of its connection with its social counterpart. Out
of the subjective faith-process there develops, contrariwise, an
object for that faith. The faith in human relations which exists
as a social necessity now becomes an independent, typical func-
tion of humanity which spontaneously authenticates itself from
within; just as it is no rare phenomenon for a certain object to
produce a certain psychical process in us, and afterward for this
process, having become independent, to create a corresponding
object for itself. Human intercourse, in its ordinary as well as in
its highest content, reveals in so many ways the psychological
form of faith as its warrant that the necessity for "believing "
develops spontaneously, and in so doing creates objects for its
juostification, much as the impulses of love or veneration can
fasten themselves upon obj ects which in themselves could by no
means evoke such sentiments, but whose qualifications for so
doing are reflected upon them from the needs of the subject, or, as
looked at from the other side, God as creator has been described
as the product of the causal necessity in man. This last assertion
by no means denies that this conception also has objective reality;
only the motive out of which it grew subjectively into an idea is
in question. The assumption is that the infinitely frequent appli-
cation of the causal idea in the realm of its origin, the empiric-
relative, finally made the need for it a dominating one, so that it
found satisfaction, which was really denied it in the realm of the

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368 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

absolute, in the idea of an Absolute Being as the cause o,f the

world. A similar process may project belief beyond the confines
of its social origin, develop it into a similar organic need, and
beget for it the idea of deity as an absolute object.
Another side of the social life which develops into a corre-
sponding one within the religious life is found in the concept of
unity. That we do not simply accept the disconnected manifold-
ness of our impressions of things, but look for the connections and
relations which bind them into a unity; yes, that we everywhere
presuppose the presence of higher unities and centers for the
seemingly separate phenomena, in order that we may orient our-
selves aright amid the confusion with which they co-me to, us, is
assuredly one of the important characteristics of social realities
and necessities. Nowhere do we find, so, directly and appreciably,
a whole made up of separate elements; nowhere is their separation
and free movement so energetically controlled by the center, as in
the gens, the family, the state, in every purposive organization.
When primitive associations are so often found organized in tens,
it means, clearly, that the group-relationship is similar to that of
the fingers of the hand -relative freedom and independent move-
ment of the individual, and, at the same time, unity of purpose
and inseparableness of existence from others. The fact that all
social life is a relationship at once defines it as a unity; for what
does unity signify but that many are mutually related, and that
the fate of each is felt by all ? The fact that this unity of society
is occasionally attacked, that the freedom of the individual
prompts him, to break away from it, and that it is not absolutely
true of the closest and most naive relations, like the unity of the
constituent parts of an organism -all this is precisely what must
have driven it home to human consciousness as a particular form
and special value of existence. The unity of things and interests
which first impresses us in the social realm finds its highest repre-
sentation - and one, as it were, separated from all material con-
siderations - in the idea of the divine; most completely, of
course, in the monotheistic, but relatively also in the lower, reli-
gions. It is the deepest significance of the God-idea that the
manifoldness and contradictoriness of things find in it their rela-

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 A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 369

tion and unity, it matters not whether it be the absolute unity of

the one God, or the partial unities of polytheism. Thus, for
example, the social life of the ancient Arabians, with the all-
controlling influence of its tribal unity, foreshadowed mono-
theism; among Semitic peoples, like the Jews, Phoenicians, and
Canaanites, the method of their social unification and its trans-
formations was plainly reflected in the character of their gods.
So long as family unity was the controlling form, Baal signified
only a father, whose children were the people. In proportion as
the social aggregate included foreign branches not related by
blood, he became a ruler objectively enthroned above. So soon as
the social unity loses the character of blood-relationship, the reli-
gious unity also loses it, so that the latter appears as the purely
derived form of the former. Even the unification which rises
superior to the sex-differentiation forms a particular religious
type. The psychological obliteration of the sex-contrast, found
so conspicuously in the social life of the Syrians, Assyrians, and
Lydians, terminated in the conception of divinities which com-
bined the two-the half-masculine Astarte, the man-woman
Sandon, the sun-god Melkarth, who exchanges the sex-symbols
with the moon-goddess. It is not a question about the trivial
proposition that mankind is reflected in its gods -a general truth
which needs no proof. The question is, rather, to find those
particular human characteristics whose development and exten-
sion beyond the human create the gods. And it must also be borne
in mind that the gods do not exist as the idealization of individual
characteristics, of the power, or moral or immoral characteristics,
or the inclinations and needs of individuals; but that it is the
inter-individual forms of life which often give their content to
religious ideas. In that certain phases and intensities of social
functions assume their purest, most abstract, and, at the same
time, incorporate forms, they form the objects of religions, so that
it can be said that religion, whatever else it may be, consists of
forms of social relationships which, separated from their empirical
content, become independent and have substances of their own
attributed to them.
Two further considerations will illustrate how much the

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370 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

unity of the group belongs to the functions that have developed

into religion. The unity of the group, is brought about and con-
served, especially in primitive times, by the absence of war or
competition within the group, in sharp contrast to, the relations
sustained to all outsiders. Now, there is probably noi other single
domain in which this non-competitive form of existence, this
identity of aimi and interest, is so clearly and completely repre-
sented as in religion. The peaceful character of the group-life
just referred to is only relative. With the majority of the efforts
put forth within the group there is also implied an attempt to
exclude others from the same goal; to, reduce as much as possible
the disproportion between desire and satisfaction, even if it be at
some cost to others; at least to find a criterion for doing and
enjoying in the corresponding activities of others. It is almost
solely in religion that the energies of individuals can find fullest
development withoiut coming into competition with each other,
because, as Jesus so beautifully expresses it, there is room for all
in God's house. Although the goal is common to all, it is pos-
sible for all to achieve it, not only without mutua.l exclusion, but
by mutual co-operation. I call attention to the profound way in
which the Lord's Supper expresses the truth that the same goal is
for all, and to be reached by the same means; and also to the
feasts which objectify the union of those who are moved by the
same religious emotions, from the rude feasts of primitive reli-
gions, in which the union finally degenerated into sexual orgies,
to its purest expression, the pax homninibus, which extended far
beyond any single group. That absence of competition which
conditions unity as the life-form of the group, but which always
reigns only relatively and partially in it, has found absolute and
intensest realization in the religious realm. It might actually be
said of religion, as of faith, that it represents in substance -yes,
to a certain extent consists of the substantialization of -that
which, as form and function, regulates the group-life. And this,
in turn, assumes a personal form in a priesthood which, despite
its historic connection with certain classes, stands, in its funda-
mental idea, above all classes, and precisely on that account repre-
sents the focus and unity of the ideal life-content for all indi-

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 A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 37I

viduals. Thus the celibacy of the Catholic priesthood frees them

from every special relation to any element or group of elements,
and makes possible a uniform relation to each; just as " society "
or the "state" stands above individuals as the abstract unity
which represents all their relationships in itself. And, to men-
tion a thoroughly concrete instance, throughout the Middle Ages
the church afforded every benevolent impulse the great con-
venience of a central reservoir into which every benefaction could
flow unclhallenged. He who desired to rid himself of his wealth
for the benefit of others did not have to bother about the ways
and means, because there existed for this very purpose a universal
central organ between the giver and the needy. Thus benevolence,
a form of social relation within the group, secured, in the church,
an organization and unity above the individual.
In like manner the reverse o,f this relation, with, however, the
same germ, is seen in the attitude toward heretics. That which
arrays great masses in hatred and moral condemnation against
heretics is certainly not the difference in the dogmatic content of
teaching, which, in most instances, is really not at all understood.
It is rather the fact of the opposition of the one against the many.
The persecution of heretics and dissenters springs from the
instinct which recognizes the necessity for group-unity. Now, it
is especially significant that in many instances of this kind reli-
gious variation could very well exist in conjunction with the unity
of the group in all vital matters. But in religion the social
instinct for unity has assumed such a pure, abstract, and, at the
same time, substantial form that it no longer requires a union
with real interests; while non-conformity seems to threaten the
unity -that is to say, the very life-form -of the group. Just
as an attack upon a palladium or other symbol o,f group-unity
will evoke the most violent reaction, even though it may have no
direct connection with it at all, so religion is the purest form of
unity in society, raised high above all concrete individualities.
This is demonstrated by the energy with which every heresy, no
mnatter how irrelevant, is still combated.
And, finally, those internal relations between the individual
and the group which we characterize as moral offer such deep

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372 THE AMERICAN JO URNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

analogies to the individual's relations to his God that they would

seem almost to be nothing more than their condensation and trans-
formation. The whole wonderful fulness of the former is reflected
in the many ways in which we "sense" the divine. The compelling
and punitive gods, the loving God, the God of Spinoza who can-
not return our love, the God who both bestows and deprives us of
the inclination and ability to act -these are precisely the tokens
by which the ethical relation between the group and its members
unfolds its energies and oppositions. I call attention to the feeling
of dependence, in which the essence of all religion has been found.
The individual feels himself bound to a universal, to something
higher, out of which he came, and into which he will return, and
from which he also expects assistance and salvation, from which
he differs and is yet identical with it. All these emotions, which
meet as in a focus in the idea of God, can be traced back to the
relation which the individual sustains to, his species; on the one
hand, to the past generations which have supplied him with the
principal forms and contents of his being, on the other, to his
contemporaries, who condition the manner and extent of its
development. If the theory is correct which asserts, that all
religion is derived from ancestor-worship, from the worship and
conciliation of the immortal soul of a forbear, especially of a
hero and leader, it will confirm this connection; for we are, as a
matter of fact, dependent upon what has been before us, and
which was most directly concentrated in the authority of the
fathers over their descendants. The deification of ancestors, espe-
cially of the ablest and most successful, is, as it were, the most
appropriate expression of the dependence of the individual upon
the previous life of the group, even though consciousness may
reveal other motives for it. Thus the humility with which the
pious person acknowledges that all that he is and has comes from
God, and recognizes in him the source of his existence and ability,
is properly traced to, the relation of the individual to the whole.
For man is not absolutely nothing in contrast to God, but only a
dust-mote; a weak, but not entirely vain, force; a vessel, but yet
adapted to its contents. When a given idea of God is, in essence,
the origin and at the same time the unity of all the varieties of

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 A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 373

being and willing, of all the antitheses and differences especially

of our subjective life-interests, we can without more ado put the
social totality into its place; for it is from this totality that all
those impulses flow which come to us as the results of shifting
adaptations, all that multiplicity of relations in which we find
ourselves, that development of the organs with which we appre-
hend the different and almost irreconcilable aspects of the uni-
verse. And yet the social group is sufficiently unified to be
regarded as the real unifying focus of these divergent radiations.
Furthermore, the divine authority of kings is merely an expres-
sion for the complete concentration of power in their hands; as
soon as the social unification, the objectification of the whole as
against a part, has reached a certain point, it is conceived of by
the individual as a supra-mundane power. And then, whether
he still directly conceives it as social, or whether it is already
clothed with divinity, the problem arises how much he, as an
individual, can and must do to fulfil his destiny, and how much
that supra-mundane principle will assist him. The independence
of the individual in relation to that power, from which he received
his independence, and which conditions its aims and methods, is
as much a question in this case as in the other. Thus Augustine
places the individual in a historic development against which he
is as impotent as he is against God. And the doctrine of syner-
gism is found throughout the entire history of the church condi-
tioned by her internal politics. Just as, according to the strict
religious conception, the individual is merely a vessel of the grace
or wrath of god, so, according to the socialistic conception, he is
a vessel of the forces emanating from the universal; and both
instances reproduce the same fundamental ethical problem about
the nature and the rights of the individual, and in both forms the
surrender of the one to the other opposite principle frequently
offers the only satisfaction still possible when an individuality,
thrown wholly upon its own resources, no longer has the power to
maintain itself.
This arrangement of religious and ethical-social ideas is sup-
ported by the fact that God is conceived as the personification of
those virtues which he himself demands from the people. He is

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374 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

goodness, justice, patience, etc., rather than the possessor of these

attributes; he is, as it is sometimes expressed, perfection in sub-
stance; he is goodness itself, and love itself, etc. Morality, the
imperatives that control human conduct, has, 'so to speak, become
immutable in him. As practical belief is a relation between per-
sons which fashions an absolute over and above the form of
relation; as unity is a form of relation between a group of persons
which raises itself to that personification of the unity of things
in which the divine is represented; so morality contains those
forms of relation between man and man which the interests of the
group has sanctioned, so that the God who exhibits the relative
contents in absolute form, on the one hand, represents the claims
and benefits of the group, as against the individual, and, on the
other, divests those ethical-social duties which the individual
must perform of their relativity, and presents them in himself in
an absolutely substantial form. The relations of persons to each
other, which have grown out of the most manifold interests,
have been suppo,rted by the most opposite forces, and have been
cast into the most diverse forms, also attain a condition in the
aggregate whose identification with and relation to a Being above
and beyond them we call religion - in that they become both
abstract and concrete, a dual development which gives religion
the strength with which it again, reflexively, influences those
relations. The old idea that God is the Absolute, while that which
is human is relative, here assumes a new meaning: it is the rela-
tions between men which find their substantial and ideal expres-
sion in the idea of the divine.
If investigations like this, touching the fundamentals of being,
are usually acconmpanied by the hope that their significance should
be understood sufficiently comprehensively, the reverse must here
be the case, and the wish expressed that the arguments here set
forth must not be permitted to intrude upon neighboring domains,
beyond their own limited boundaries. They are not intended to
describe the historical course of the origin of religion, but only to
point out one of its many sources, quite irrespective of the fact
whether this source, in conjunction with others, also from the
domain of the non-religious, gave birth to religion, or whether

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 A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 375

religion had already come into being when the sources here dis-
cussed added their quota to its content -their effectiveness is not
dependent upon any particular historical occasion. It must also
be borne in mind that religion, as a spiritual experience, is not a
finished product, but a vital process which each soul must beget
for itself, no matter how stable the traditional content may be;
and it is precisely here that the power and depth of religion are
found, namely, in its persistent ability to draw a given content of
religion into the flow of the emotions, whose movements must
constantly renew it, like the perpetually changing drops o,f water
which beget the stable picture of the rainbow. Hence the genetic
explanation of religion must not only embrace the historical origin
of its tradition, but its present energies also which allow us to
acquire what has come down to us from the fathers; so that in
this sense there are really " origins" of religion whose appearance
and effectiveness lie long after the "origin " of religion.
But, more important even than to, deny that we ofer here a
theory of the historical origin of religion, is it to insist that the
objective truth of religion has nothing whatever to do with this
investigation. Even if we have succeeded in the attempt to
understand religion as a product of the subjective conditions of
human life, we have not at all impinged upon the problem whether
the objective reality which lies outside of human thought contains
the counterpart and confirmation of the psychical reality which we
have here discussed. Thus the psychology of cognition seeks
to explain how the mind conceives the world to be spatial, and of
three dimensions, but is content to have other disciplines under-
take to prove whether beyond our mental world there is a world
of things in themselves of like forms. It is true, there may be a
limit beyond which the explanation of subjective facts from
purely subjective conditions may not be sufficient. The chain of
causes may have to terminate somewhere in an objective reality.
But this possibility or necessity can concern only him who has in
view the complete elucidation of the origin and nature of religion,
but it does not affect our attempt to trace only a single one of the
rays that are focused in religion.
Finally, the most important consideration remains. The emo-

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376 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

tional value of religion - that is to say, the most subjective

reflexive effect of the idea of God -is entirely independent of all
assumption about the manner in which the idea o-riginated. We
here touch upon the most serious misconception to which the
attempt to trace ideal values historically and psychologically is
exposed. There are still many who feel that an ideal is deprived
of its greatest charm, that the dignity of an emotion is degraded,
if its origin can no longer be thought o,f as an incomprehensible
miracle, a creation out of nothing- as if the comprehension of its
development affected the value of a thing, as if lowliness of origin
could affect the already achieved lo,ftiness of the goal, and as if
the simplicity of its several elements could destroy the importance
of a product. Such is the foolish and confused notion that the
dignity of humanity is profaned by tracing man's origin to the
lower animals, as if that dignity did not depend upon what man
really is, no matter what his origin. Persons entertaining such
notions will always resist the attempt to understand religion by
deriving it from elements not in themselves religious. But pre-
cisely such persons, who hope to preserve the dignity of religion
by denying its historical-psychological origin, must be reproached
with weakness of religious consciousness. Their subjective cer-
tainty and emotional depth must assuredly be of little moment, if
the knowledge of their origin and development endangers or even
touches their validity and worth. For, just as genuine and deep-
est love for a human being is not disturbed by subsequent evidence
concerning its causes - yes, as its triumphant strength is revealed
by its survival of the passing of those causes -so the strength of
the subjective religious emotion is revealed only by the assurance
which it has in itself, and with which it grounds its depth and
intensity entirely beyond all the causes to which investigation may
trace it.

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