2024:BHC-AUG:8188

wp-7446 & 8180 of 2009 judg.odt

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

WRIT PETITION NO. 7446 OF 2009

1. The Secretary,
Ahilyabai Holkar, Shikshan Prasarak
Mandal, Karyapur, Tq. Renapur,
Dist. Latur.

2. The Head Master,

Late Janardhanrao Rajmane
Secondary Ashram School, Janwal,
Tq. Chakur, Dist. Latur ..Petitioners

Versus

1. Venkatrao Dnyanoba Mane

Age. 31 years, Occu. Nil,
R/o. Subhadra Niwas, Nanded Naka,
Nath Nagar, Latur,
Tq. & Dist. Latur.

2. The Special District Social Welfare

Officer, Block-1, Zilla Parishad,
Latur, Dist. Latur ..Respondents

WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.8180 OF 2009

Venkatrao s/o Dnyanoba Mane

Age. 31 years, Occu. Service,
R/o. At : Subhadra Niwas, Nanded Naka,
Tq. & Dist. Latur. ..Petitioners

Versus

1. The Secretary,
Ahilyabai Shikshan Prasarak Mandal,
At : Karepur, Tq. Renapur,
Dist. Latur.

2. The Head Master,

Late Janardhanrao Rajmane Primary and
Secondary Ashram School at Janwal,
Tq. Chakur, Dist. Latur
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3. The Special District Welfare Officer,

Block-1, Zilla Parishad,
Latur, Dist. Latur ..Respondents
...
Mr. V.D. Sapkal, Senior Counsel i/b Mr. Mahesh S. Taur, Advocate for
Petitioners in WP/7446/2009 and Respondent Nos.1 & 2 in
WP/8180/2009.
Mr. V.D. Salunke h/f Mr. H.P. Jadhav, Advocate for Respondent No.1 in
WP/7446/2009 and Petitioner in WP/8180/2009.
...

CORAM : S.G. MEHARE, J.

RESERVED ON : FEBRUARY 27, 2024

PRONOUNCED ON : APRIL 19, 2024

JUDGMENT :-

1. The management as well as the employee have impugned

the judgment and order of the learned Presiding Officer, School

Tribunal, Latur, passed in Appeal No.16 of 2009 dated 01.10.2009.

2. Respondent No.1 in Writ Petition No.7446 of 2009 will be

referred to as the "appellant", and the petitioners will be referred to as

the "respondents" as to their original status before the School

Tribunal.

3. The parties are not in dispute that the appellant was

appointed by following due procedure of law. He was terminated on

30.04.2007. He had impugned that termination by Appeal No.51 of

2007. When the appeal reached for hearing, the respondents

withdrew the termination order 30.04.2007 and ultimately, the

appellant withdrew the appeal. Thereafter, on 18.12.2008, a show

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cause notice was issued to him framing 17 charges. Out of those six

charges, the subject matter of the previous appeal was the same. The

charges levelled against the appellant are summarized as follows :

(a) Consistent absence from the duties;

(b) Deliberate non-submission of the explanations;

(c) Failing to hold extra classes for the students;

(d) Not performing the educational work;

(e) Unnecessarily beating the students;

(f) Not staying at the headquarters;

(g) Adamant behavior with the seniors;

(h) Not participating in cultural programs;

(i) Deliberate negligence in discharging the duties;

(j) Doing the false correspondence against the society threatening

to;

(k) Pressuring the school management and the students;

(l) Valuing of the answer sheets incorrectly and giving less marks.

(m) Causing disturbance during the inquiry process.

4. The appellant had levelled the allegations against the

respondents that in 2007, respondent Nos.1 and 2 demanded

Rs.2,00,000/- towards his appointment. He had paid Rs. 3,00,000/-

at the time of his appointment. He refused to pay money again.

Therefore, the respondents started harassing him and levelling false

allegations. The respondents denied the allegations. However, the

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respondents have a case that the appellant was negligent in

performing his duties and committed misconduct. Therefore, after

due departmental inquiry, he was terminated. The Committee was

constituted strictly as per the Maharashtra Employees of Private

Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 ('MEPS Act' for

short). They also did not deny the termination and withdrawal of the

earlier termination order. It was pleaded that the appellant used to

leave the school without leave from the Headmaster. He was absent

from 04.01.2006 and 15.01.2006 without leave and intimation. The

Headmaster issued him notices. However, he did not improve his

behaviour. The appellant made a false representation before the

authority and published the newspaper news item, making false

allegations against the institution. The students had many complaints

against him. The complaints of misbehaviour with the female students

were also received. Therefore, by following the due procedure of law,

he was terminated.

5. The petitioner had impugned the termination order,

contending that the inquiry committee was not constituted strictly as

per the MEPS Act. A fair opportunity was not granted to him to

contest the inquiry. The principle of natural justice has not been

followed. He cannot be jeopardized for the same charges that were

alleged earlier, and the termination order based upon those charges

was withdrawn. He submits that one of the members of the inquiry

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committee, Mr. M.S. Karkare cannot be a judge of its case as he was

convener cum member of the inquiry committee. The order sheets

dated 08.04.2009 of the inquiry committee were also changed. The

proceedings of the inquiry committee were violative of Rule 37 of

Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service)

Rules, 1981 ('Rules, 1981' for short). The whole proceeding was

vitiated for violating the provisions of the M. E. P. S. Act

6. The learned Tribunal held that the appellant's services

were illegally terminated on the basis of the inquiry report. Against

that finding, the management has preferred the writ petition and

against the negative finding of constituting the inquiry committee as

per MEPS Act, the appellant has preferred another writ petition. The

management has impugned the judgment and order mainly on the

ground that the Tribunal has no power to reduce the punishment or

impose the punishment as per his own. Once the Tribunal held that

the inquiry was properly conducted, he can not exercise the powers to

reinstate the appellant. The School Tribunal has no power to re-

appreciate the evidence lead before the inquiry committee and

substitute his own conclusions. Unless the principles of natural justice

have been violated, the Court has no authority to go through the

elaborate evidence. The principles of natural justice have not been

violated. Therefore, there was no scope to interfere with the

termination order.
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7. The appellant has assailed the impugned judgment and

order mainly on the grounds that the learned Tribunal has erred in

believing the inquiry report and its constitution. The Tribunal did not

consider that a fair opportunity was not granted to the appellant to

cross-examine the witnesses, and the charges Nos. 2, 17 and 19 were

vague. The Tribunal did not take appropriate judicial review of the

impugned order.

8. The learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently

argued that the Tribunal has erroneously modified the punishment.

Such an order is without jurisdiction. The Tribunal has no power to

reassess or re-appreciate the evidence. To bolster his arguments, he

relied on the number of case laws. He prayed that the impugned

order is prima facie illegal as regards modifying the punishment on

the basis of re-appreciation of evidence. He also referred to the

findings of the Court to justify his contention.

9. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the

Tribunal has the power of the Civil Court. Therefore, the Tribunal

cane re-appreciate the evidence. It is the only authority to enter into

the findings on the charges. The management was biased. The

assessment of the question papers may differ from person to person.

Hence, there shall not be a straight jacket for valuing the answer

sheets. The management, at his whims, cannot say that the

assessment of the question papers done by the appellant amounted to

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negligent of services. The Tribunal has plainly referred to the evidence

led before the Tribunal, and the material has not been re-appreciated

before the inquiry committee.

10. He also submitted his notes of written arguments. In the

notes of written arguments, the facts have been reiterated, and the

questions raised before the Tribunal have also been requested. It has

been contended in the notes of written arguments that since the

principles of natural justice have not been followed, the opportunity

of cross-examining the witnesses is not granted. Non-supply of the

documents i.e. statement of witnesses in spite of written complaint or

violation of principle of natural justice. There were two reports of the

inquiry committee. However, both were violating Rule 37 of the Rules,

1981. The charges levelled against the appellant were vague and not

proved. His notes of written arguments seem that he has emphasized

only on the legality of the constitution of the Committee and violated

the principles of natural justice. He also relied on a bunch of

documents.

11. In reply, learned senior counsel for the respondents

submitted that the fact remains that some witnesses were not

examined. The committee report was by a majority of 2: 1. The term'

principle of natural justice is wider. The request to cross-examine the

witnesses was done deliberately late. That does not mean that the

principle of natural justice has not been followed. Even he did not ask
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for cross-examination. Hence, it was presumed that he declined to

cross-examine the witnesses. The objections raised in the writ

petitions were without foundation. In case, if one of the committee

members refuses to sign the report, it cannot be said that it was not a

combined award. In the absence of a nomination by the employee, as

per Rule 36(4) of Rules, 1981, the Committee of two members is not

bad in law. Again, he referred to various case laws and prayed that

the petition be dismissed.

12. After hearing the respective counsels, the following

points arise for determination:

(I) Was the inquiry committee constituted as provided under

Rule 36 of the Rules, 1981?

(II) Should there be a combined award signed by all

committee members, else bad in law?

(III) Can the Tribunal re-appreciate the evidence and substitute

his own opinion?

(IV) Has the Tribunal power to reduce or change the nature of

punishment imposed by the employer?

13. The appellant has no complaint about complying with the

formalities of serving the charge sheet, statement of imputation and

other statutory and mandatory procedures as required under Rules,

1981 for initiating departmental inquiry. However, he has raised the

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objection that the Committee constituted under Rule 37 was not

constituted as per the mandate of the law.

14. He has objections that one of the members Mr. D.H.

Bhosale of the inquiry committee, was not the national awardee. He

was over 75 years. Another member Shri Karkare cannot act as a

member of the Committee as well as the convener. Therefore, the

inquiry he conducted is illegal. To bolster his arguments, he relied on

the case of Vidya Vikas Mandal and Anr Vs. Education Officer and

Anr, 2007 AIR (SC) (Supp) 395. In this case, the inquiry committee

was not constituted as per Rule 37(6) of the Rules, 1981. This Court

had directed the management to constitute the Committee in

accordance with the rules and to go in the matter afresh. If the

Committee constituted under Rule 36 is defective, the Tribunal has to

remit the matter to the management with a direction to hold the

inquiry afresh from the stage where the defect has been committed. In

the case at hand, it is evident that Mr. Bhosale was a national

awardee. The entire proceeding was gone as per rules. It is the further

argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that Mr. D.H.

Bhosale was above 75 years old. Hence, not competent to be

appointed as a member. However, the learned Tribunal has correctly

observed by relying on the judgment of Sudha Bhaskarrao Sasikhede

Vs. Yashodabai Shikshan Sanstha and Others, 2003 (4) Mh.L.J. 659

that the rule does not disqualify an awardee teacher if he is above 65

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years of age. There is no age restrictions of appointing a member of

the School Committee. Therefore, there is no substance in the

arguments that the constitution of the Committee is bad only for the

reason that Mr. Bhosale, the member of the Committee, was above 75

years old and such persons are not eligible to be appointed as a

committee member.

15. The further objection is that another member was the

convener cum member and it is prohibited under the rules. Sub-rule

(5) of Rule 37 of Rules, 1981 provides for nomination of the convener.

It has been provided therein that the convener of the inquiry

committee is the nominee of the President and he shall maintain all

relevant record of the inquiry. The role of the convener is to maintain

all the relevant record of the inquiry. Therefore, there may not be

illegality in appointing the member of the Committee as a convener.

16. Considering the material available on record and rule 37

of the Rules 1981, there is no substance in the objection that the

inquiry committee was not constituted strictly as per the mandate of

Rule 36 of Rules, 1981.

17. It is the vehement arguments of the learned counsel for

the appellant that the third member of the Committee did not put his

signature on the report of the two members. It is not a combined

report. Therefore, the inquiry report is bad.

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18. It is admitted fact that two members have recorded the

finding against the appellant, and one is in his favour. The inquiry

report was by the majority of 2:1. The member nominated by the

appellant has submitted his independent dissenting report.

19. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that every

member of the managing Committee had the right to prepare their

independent report and the rule of majority would prevail.

20. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 37 provides for recording the

findings on the charges against the employee and its decision on the

basis of these findings. The inquiry committee has also to suggest a

specific action to be taken against the employee. It is the duty of the

inquiry committee to forward the copy of the findings and the

proposed specific action to the employee/head, Education Officer or

Deputy Director by registered post acknowledgement. The

management has no scope to take an independent decision other than

the action specifically proposed by the inquiry committee. The

management is bound to implement the decision of the inquiry

committee. Rule 37 is silent about submitting a joint report. Every

member of the inquiry committee has independent rights to record

the findings and conclusion and differ from the conclusions of other

members. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the report/decision of

the management committee shall be combined. There appears no

violation of the rules. Hence, the objection of the appellant that for
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want of the combined decision of the inquiry committee, the inquiry

vitiates has no force.

21. Learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently

argued that the learned Tribunal has erred in law in re-appreciating

the evidence and substituting his opinion. He has referred to the

findings of the Tribunal. He also argued that the Tribunal had violated

the law by re-appreciating the evidence of the witnesses before the

inquiry committee. To bolster his arguments, he relied on the case of

Gram Vikas Shikshan Parishad and Anr Vs. Shivaji Hindurao Kamble

and Anr, in Writ Petition No.190 of 2017 with another writ petition of

the Bombay High Court decided on 14.02.2018, Shivaji Education

Society through its Secretary Vs. Presiding Officer, Schools Tribunal

and another, 2001 (Supp). Bom.C.R. 400. By catena of judgments,

the law is well settled that the School Tribunal cannot re-appreciate

the evidence and substitute its opinion to the one taken by the inquiry

committee. The nature of power that flows from section 9, read with

section 11(2, is restricted to the enquiry on the basis of whether the

decision was without any legal evidence on record. The scope of

enquiry cannot be enlarged to re-appreciate the evidence of the

witnesses before the Enquiry Committee by substituting the opinion of

the Enquiry Committee or the Management. Re-appreciating the

evidence of each witness is exceeding the jurisdiction.

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22. A perusal of the findings of the Tribunal clearly

establishes that he discussed the entire material produced before the

inquiry committee and substituted his own opinion for the opinion

taken by the inquiry committee. However, he also held that two

charges, absence from duties without intimation and leave and

valuing the answer sheets incorrectly, have been proved.

23. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued

that the Tribunal has the power of the Civil Court. Therefore, the

Tribunal can re-appreciate the evidence. To bolster his arguments, he

relied on the Shri Brijlal Biyani Vidya Niketan Shikshan Prasarak

Mandal and Anr Vs. Bharti w/o. Khanderao Dabhade and Anr, 2016

(1) ALL MR 797 and Saindranath s/o Jagannath Jawanjal Vs.

Pratibha Shikshan Sanstha, AIR Bom R 119, 2007.

24. In the case of Shri Brijlal (supra), the issue was whether

the Tribunal could be termed as a Civil Court, which possesses power

under Order XVIII, Rule 4 of the Code, to record the oral evidence of

witnesses. The Court held that the School Tribunal exercising

jurisdiction under Section 9 of the MEPS Act possesses all the powers

that are conferred by the Code on the Courts of original jurisdiction,

and the Tribunal can be termed as a "Civil Court", which possesses

power under Order XVIII, Rule 4 of the Code to record the oral

evidence of witnesses. Even if the provision is titled as "Right of

appeal to Tribunal to employees of a private school", it can be termed

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as continuation of suit and the power of the School Tribunal becomes

coextensive with that of the Trial Court and what could be done by

the Trial Court in the proceedings of the suit can always be done by

the School Tribunal in its appellate jurisdiction in the interest of

justice. The School Tribunal can, therefore, conduct the proceedings

of an appeal as the Court of original jurisdiction to administer the

oath, record the evidence as contemplated by Order XVIII, Rule 4 of

the Code of Civil Procedure by permitting the parties to examine and

cross-examine the witnesses, etc.

25. In the case of Saindranath (supra), the issue was referred

to the Larger Bench regarding the powers of the School Tribunal

constituted under the Act of 1977 as there were conflicts of views.

Two pronouncements conflicted with the powers of the Tribunal to

record the evidence itself. The Hon'ble Division Bench analyzing the

entire scheme of the M.E.P.S. Act held that the Tribunal has power to

take additional evidence on record, mainly in the contingency, when

the management wants to supplement its evidence already on record,

at the same time, the employee has also a corresponding right to lead

additional evidence either in rebuttal or to supplement his attempt to

dislodge the action of the management, again but subject to the

provision of Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C. This is independent power of

the Tribunal given under Sub-rule (1)(b) of Rule 27 of Order 41 of

C.P.C.
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26. Learned counsel for the appellant tried to point out that

since the Appellate Court has powers to allow the parties to lead the

evidence as provided under Rule 27 of Order 41 of C.P.C. and it is a

Civil Court, the Tribunal has every power to re-appreciate the

evidence.

27. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents

vehemently argued that the law is well settled that the Tribunal is not

sitting as Appellate Authority though the appeal has been provided

under Section 9 of the Act. He also referred to the judgment of Gram

Vikas (supra). He further relied on the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs.

Union of India and Others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , Shivaji Education

Society (supra), Anant R. Kulkarni Vs. Y.P. Education Society and Ors,

2013 AIR (SC) 2098, State of Maharashtra through Secretary,

Agriculture, Animal Husbandary, Dairy Development and Fisheries

Department, Mantralaya and Others Vs. Madhukar Suryabhan Ingale,

2020 (6) Mh.L.J. 267, State of Karnataka and Another Vs. Umesh,

(2022) 6 SCC 563, Manik Abas Jadhav Vs. Mira Bhayandar Municipal

Corporation and Others, 2019 (2) Mh.L.J. 693 , Thapar Education

Society and another Vs. Shyam Maroti Bhasarkars and others, 1997

(3) Mh.L.J. 709.

28. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), the Hon'ble

Supreme Court had discussed the judicial review and the powers of

the Tribunal to interfere with the findings of fact based on the

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evidence before the inquiry committee and held that the judicial

review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in

which the decision is made. The power of judicial review is meant to

ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure

that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct

in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of

misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned with

determining whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer,

whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules

of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or

conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with

the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to

reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based

on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor

of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein apply to disciplinary

proceedings. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion

receive support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to

hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The

Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review, does not act as

appellate authority to re- appreciate the evidence and arrive at its

own independent findings. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where

the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a

manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice, in violation of

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statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry, or where the

conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on

no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable

person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere

with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make

it appropriate to the facts of each case. The ratio of this case has been

consistently followed in other cases relied upon by the respondents.

29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of

Karnataka (supra) again reiterated that in the exercise of judicial

review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings

of the disciplinary authority. The Court does not re-appreciate the

evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been

arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court, in the

exercise of judicial review, must restrict its review to determine

whether: (i) the rules of natural justice have been complied with; (ii)

the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the

statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have

been observed; and (iv) the findings of the disciplinary authority

suffer from perversity; and (v) the penalty is disproportionate to the

proven misconduct.

30. Re-appreciation of evidence and allowing the parties to

lead the evidence are two distinct issues. The judgment the appellant

relied upon regarding the powers of the Tribunal to allow the parties
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to lead the evidence is not a matter of judicial review. It is an

opportunity for the parties to supplant the material to prove and

disprove the charges against the delinquent. Such action cannot be

equated with the power of the Tribunal under judicial review. The law

is already well settled, and the direct rules of evidence and proof do

not apply to departmental inquiries. The sufficiency of evidence is

also not within the realm of judicial review. The standard of proof

required for a criminal trial is not allowed in departmental inquiries.

The findings of the learned Tribunal are clearly in the form of re-

appreciation of the evidence. So far, the charges that the Tribunal has

declined to accept have been proved. However, he believes the two

charges are consistent absence and incorrect valuation of the answer

sheets/papers of the students.

31. The respondents have raised the objection that the

Tribunal has no power to reduce the punishment proposed by the

inquiry committee. Section 11, sub-section (2) of the M.E.P.S. Act, is

crystal clear, empowering the Tribunal to modify the penalty if it is

disproportionate in order to prove misconduct. Therefore, it does not

require more discussion.

32. Learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently

argued that the charges against the appellant of incorrect assessment

of the mark sheets and giving lesser marks to the students is

misconduct as defined under Rule 28(5) of Rules, 1981. He has

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vehemently argued that the learned Tribunal has incorrectly observed

that the case of Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, Wadegaon and another

Vs. The Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Amravati and others, 2007

(3) ALL MR 773 does not apply when the ratio laid down in the said

case was squarely applicable to the case at hand. He would submit

that once the Tribunal accepted that such a serious charge had been

proved against him, he ought not to have interfered with the

punishment specified by the Committee.

33. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 28 defines the term ‘misconduct’. It

includes the violation of the Code of conduct. Rule 22 of the said

Rules provides for the Code of conduct and duties of the teachers and

non-teaching staff. Sub-clause (d) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 22 speaks of

impartiality of the teacher in assessment of the students and the

teacher shall not deliberately overmark or undermark or victimize

students on any ground. The charges against the appellant giving

lesser marks have been proved. The appellant has no evidence against

such serious charges in rebuttal. Violating the Code of conduct is

misconduct for which the severe penalty of termination from services

may be imposed. The Bombay High Court, in the case of Shikshan

Prasarak Mandal (supra) dealt with identical case in which the

teacher was held guilty of malpractices while undertaking the work of

valuation of the answer papers of the Higher Secondary examination.

The Court has discussed Rules 28(3) and 22 (2)(d) of the Rules and
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held that the order of dismissal of the teacher from the services was

proper. It has also been held that the teacher who does not himself

honour his own position and sanctity of such important examination

and, on the contrary, violates it cannot claim any right to be continued

as a teacher.

34. The arguments of the learned counsel for appellant that

there is no straight jacket formula and assessment of answer sheets

may differ person to person is correct. One can understand if the

difference in valuation of answer sheets by more person than one is

reasonable. However, such rule would not apply the cases where the

difference is vast and it is evident that lesser or higher marks are

given with malafides. It was the evidence of respondent that there

was vast different in the valuation done by the appellant by

independent valuer of the same subject. Therefore, his arguments

would not save the appellant.

35. The next argument of the learned counsel for the

appellant is that the non-supplying of true copies of the documents to

the delinquent employee is a violation of the principles of natural

justice. To bolster his arguments, he relied on the case of Mahalaxmi

Shikshan Sanstha Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, MEC 864 .

Therefore, the matter is liable to be remitted to the inquiry committee

for holding an inquiry afresh. He also argued that opportunity to

cross-examine the witnesses was also not granted to the appellant.

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36. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that when

the witnesses were examined, the appellant did not deliberately cross-

examine the witnesses and, with a mala fide intention to protract the

inquiry, has subsequently asked for cross-examination of the

witnesses.

37. The nature of serious allegations of not valuing the

answer sheets correctly and absence from duty without leave and

intimation were the matters of documentary evidence. The burden

was on the appellant to proved that he was absent on securing a leave

or on intimation. This negative burden was not on respondent. The

documentary evidence on record was available on record. The

appellant had not evidence in rebuttal. The documentary evidence

established the serious charges against the appellant, namely that he

was negligent in discharging his duties and unfair in assessing the

answer sheets of the students. The serious allegations of violating the

Code of conduct have been proved. The appellant had no explanation

why he did not cross examined the witnesses immediately. So the

committee was right drawing the inference that appellant does not

want to cross examining the witnesses The inquiry was conducted

according to the law.

38. The learned Counsel for respondents also submits that

the allegations of the appellant that the roznamas have been

manipulated is also unfounded, and there is no material to believe his

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allegations. The appellant never complained that he had not received

the charge sheet containing the specific charges. He never complained

that the charges were vague. On the contrary, he responded to the

charges supplied to him along with the necessary documents. The

documentary evidence before the inquiry committee was stronger and

sufficient to believe that serious charges against the appellant had

been proved. Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the

case, it cannot be accepted that the principle of natural justice has

been followed. Therefore, it is not a fit case to remit to the inquiry

committed for fresh inquiry.

39. Considering the ratio laid down in the case of Shikshan

Prasarak Mandal (supra) and the misconduct of the appellant in not

valuing the answer sheets properly, the punishment of the termination

from his services was legal, proper and correct. However, the learned

Tribunal has erred in law in modifying the punishment. Therefore, it

is liable to be set aside. In view of the discussion above, the following

order is passed :

ORDER

(i) Writ Petition No.7446 of 2009 is allowed.

(ii) The impugned judgment and order of the learned Presiding

Officer, School Tribunal, Latur, passed in Appeal No.16 of 2009 dated

01.10.2009, is quashed and set aside and the appeal of employee

stands dismissed.
 wp-7446 & 8180 of 2009 judg.odt
(23)

(iii) Rule is made absolute in the above terms.

(iv) Writ Petition No.8180 of 2009 stands dismissed.

(v) Rule is discharged.

(vi) No order as to costs.

(S.G. MEHARE, J.)

Mujaheed//