Technophany Vol.1 No.

Apropos Technophany
Yuk Hui

§1. The Concept of Technophany

The term “technophany” was coined by Gilbert Simondon to describe a form of mediation which allows

technology to be re-integrated into culture. 1 What does it mean, however, to re-integrate technology into

culture? Is not culture itself partially constituted by ever-evolving technology? We will have to answer

why such an integration is needed before we can understand what this form of mediation is and what

its limits might be today. For Simondon, there are conflicts between technology and culture that arise

for various reasons. First of all, there is, in general, a type of xenophobia present in what is understood

as culture where technical objects are prejudicially seen as alien to it; this forces technology to become

ostracised, which is to say, excluded from culture. 2 As we can already read in the “Introduction” to On the

Mode of Existence of Technical Objects (1958), technical objects have been undermined and undervalued

compared to aesthetic objects. Aesthetic objects are identified with culture, while technical objects are

reduced to utilities and, therefore, considered secondary beings whose value of being is no other than

utilitarian. 3

Besides this stereotype, which is deeply grounded in modern culture, there is a more fundamental

conflict that arises out of a process of polarisation, where there is the constant becoming obsoleteness

of culture, on the one hand, and the constant evolution of technology on the other. Even though both

culture and technology evolve over time, the evolution of technology occurs at a much faster pace

and constantly intensifies such a polarisation. Institutions and their related infrastructures struggle

1 The first time Simondon uses the word is unknown. From the existing publication, the term was
frequently discussed in a course he gave in Lyon between 1960 and 1961 with the title “Psychosociology
of Technicity,” the term was occasionally used in some other texts, which we will also mention in this
article.
2 Simondon compared this ostracism with the discrimination of the black population of the United
States, See “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” in Gilbert Simondon, Sur la technique (Paris: PUF, 2016),
37.
3 Gilbert Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (Paris: Aubiers, 2012).

©Author(s), 2023. Corresponding author: Yuk Hui, [email protected]

©Research Network for Philosophy and Technology
ISSN 2773-0875
Yuk Hui

to maintain an “organic” unity with the advancements of new technologies, 4 and when they look to
use those old technologies, which no longer exist, a lack which contains the seeds of discontent is

produced. The accelerating evolution of technical objects results in an antagonism between culture and

technology, or more generally, as it was known during the time of his writings, an antagonism between

culture and civilisation.

This disjunction between culture and technology has produced such a discontent, one which has

resulted in the accusation and demonisation of technology. Following the rapid industrialisation on the

19 th century, when the awareness of the alienation of workers by capital and machines started growing,

technologies became condemned as the source of this alienation and as a violation of mother nature.

However, this opposition between culture and technology is problematic in itself because culture here,

meaning outmoded institutions and values, is far too narrow to grasp true “Culture,” which should be

understood as the unity of both culture and technics, as Simondon contested:

In reality, culture and civilisation are reciprocal and complementary symbols, the sole

combination of which should be considered as culture in the broader sense of the term—

meaning in the sense of anthropologists, ethnologists, and ethnographers. In the broader

sense, culture encompasses, understands, and brings together civilisation and culture in

the narrower sense of the term. 5

A veritable culture reconciles the antagonism between a culture that looks backwards and technology

that moves forward. To reconcile this antagonism, it is necessary, as we are often reminded, to develop

a “technical culture.” 6 In his 1960–1961 course, Simondon distinguishes two kinds of technology:

phaneotechnics and cryptotechnics. The former refers to technologies directly exposed to the users’

perception; the latter are parts that are hidden in their internal design because they are not necessarily

to be shown therefore “susceptible of being introduced in the citadel of culture.” 7 Phaneotechnics is

the source of technophany since the latter is necessarily an exposure. It carries a halo which is expected

4 Simondon’s use of the term organic is intriguing and inconsistent. In his writings around 1950s and
1960s, he occasionally used terms such as holistic and organic, for example, in “Cybernetique et philos-
ophie” (1953) he used the term “holique,” and in “Technical Mentality” (1961), he spelt it as “holistique.”
Here we can understand it in terms of reciprocal relations between parts, and between parts and the
whole. The whole is important since the concept of sacrality which we will discuss extensively in this
text is closely related to the concept of totality.
5 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 33, “En fait, culture et civilisation sont des symboles
réciproques et complémentaires dont la réunion seule doit être considérée comme la culture au sens ma-
jeur du terme, c’est-à-dire au sens des anthropologues, des ethnologues, des ethnographes. La Culture, au
sens majeur, compte, comprend, et réunit la civilisation et la culture, au sens mineur du terme.”
6 Simondon, Du mode, 102.
7 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 38.

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Apropos Technophany

to resolve the tension between culture and technology and, therefore, to reintegrate technical objects

into Culture:

Such technophanies, acknowledged and culturalized, are the path through which the

technical object regains a place in a culture that ostracises it: the object re-enters the

fortress of culture through a ritualisation, rich in images and symbols, much like the

aspects of sexuality, ostracised and veiled by clothing, reappear in the culturalized ritual

of elegant grooming. 8

As technophany suggests, it is the manifestation of technicity (in analogy to hierophany, the

manifestation of sacrality), which is consecrated in symbols and images. These symbols and images are

recognised by culture and can penetrate and aestheticise the citizens’ everyday lives. A popular science

fiction book and film carry these symbols and images; they reintroduce technologies and machines by

elevating them to the rank of culture. We might be able to define these technophanies as the product

of industrial aesthetics, which re-aestheticise technologies in the form of art or aesthetic objects, for

example, photography and cinematography—two technophanic examples that Simondon gave along

with science fiction. 9 Simondon also recognises the constant successions of technophanies from the
17 th century to the 20 th century. He made a comparison between the technologies of the 1930s and those

of the late 1950s and early 1960s, noting how, following the launch of Sputnik, space technology began

to supplant Hertzian innovations like radio and television:

From 1935 to 1944, the most powerful and prestigious technophany was radio broadcasting.

Germany and England waged part of the war using radio transmitters, with jamming and

counter-transmissions. Hitler, in particular, had understood the technophanic significance

of Hertzian diffusion. However, in contemporary times, the power of radio waves no

longer holds the same prestige, and technophanic power has shifted towards rockets and

artificial satellites … 10

8 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 39, “De telles technophanies, reconnues et cultura-

lisées, sont la voie par laquelle l’objet technique reconquiert une place dans une culture qui l’ostracise :
l’objet rentre à nouveau dans la citadelle de la culture par le biais d’une ritualisation, riche en images et
en symboles, tout comme les caractères de la sexualité, ostracisés, voilés par le vêtement, se manifestent
à nouveau dans la ritualisation culturalisée de la toilette élégante.”
9 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 40–41.
10 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 117, “De 1935 à 1944, la technophanie la plus puis-
sante et prestigieuse était celle de l’émission hertzienne. L’Allemagne et l’Angleterre ont fait une partie
de la guerre au moyen des émetteurs hertziens, avec brouillages et contre émissions. Hitler, tout particu-
lièrement, avait compris le sens technophanique de la diffusion hertzienne… Or, de nos jours, la puis-
sance des émissions hertziennes n’a plus autant de prestige, et le pouvoir technophanique s’est déplacé
vers les fusées et les satellites artificiels…”

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Yuk Hui

In 1958, Hannah Arendt opened The Human Condition by writing that the launch of Sputnik was the

most significant scientific event in the century. 11 Both Arendt and Simondon would be shocked by
the development of computational technology that followed. Even though Simondon provided us with

a philosophical treatise on transistors (i.e., in METO), he wrote very little about modern computers.

Since the 1950s, not only have technological developments in computing brought us a seemingly

inexhaustible list of innovations, but likewise the merger of art, design, and technology has entered a

new stage. While Simondon often referred to the creation of automobiles, which pioneered integrating

engineering and industrial design in the first half of the 20 th century, it is now up to us to imagine what

Simondon would have said about the Macintosh and Tesla. Today, the automobile industry is only one

of the countless industries that effectively integrate art, design and technology into their products.

The technological convergence (of the automobile, space technology, artificial intelligence, etc.) has

produced even more spectacular technophanies, in which Elon Musk’s launch of a red Tesla into orbit

between Mars and Jupiter stands out as a representative. There are far too many technophanies to count

if we try to extend Simondon’s examples. Furthermore, it is perhaps necessary to ask if Simondon’s

observations made more than 60 years ago are still valid today? While Simondon’s observation and

analysis remain undoubtedly important for us, and its originality and profoundness are still plausible,

does the hiatus between culture and technology still pose a problem? And is technophany, illustrated

by the above examples, still an effective means to resolve such a problem?

Every quarter, if not more often, we see new applications, new gadgets with improved interactions, and

new infrastructures with faster speeds and at larger scales; we are subject to the constant process of

disruption. These new products and technologies produce shocks that cannot be easily absorbed. Two

attitudes in the face of this new technophanic situation can be observed. Firstly, we hear more and more

calls for the return to microorganisms, to plants, and animals. Such a “political naturalism” is a crucial

move if we are to undermine humancentrism. However, it fails to confront the technological condition

that Simondon described, one that becomes more sophisticated day by day. Secondly, a type of dogmatic

materialism has been reborn that glorifies the transformations caused by digital technologies in every

aspect of human life and sees it as the inevitable progress of the completion of the human (it constitutes

what we can call “digital vitalism.”) According to this transhumanist and posthumanist point of view,

the ultimate technophany would be the realisation of technological singularity, the moment when

homo sapiens are redeemed so as to become homo deus. With this awareness of the omnipresence and

omnipotence of technology, could we conclude that we are now ready to realise veritable Culture, which

has been until now only obscured by culture, its nostalgic psycho-social shadow?

11 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992 [1958]), 1.

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Apropos Technophany

§2. The Analogy between Technophany and Hierophany

It would be too hasty to already announce the completion of Simondon’s project, especially since the

term technophany has yet to be scrutinised. One might want to first ask why did Simondon want to coin

a term that resonates so closely with Mircea Eliade’s hierophany? While in On the Mode of Existence of

Technical Objects (1958), the term technophany was not yet evoked and Mircea Eliade was not mentioned,

in “Psychosociology of Technicity” (1960–1961), a course that Simondon gave in Lyon, and which could

also be read as the continuation of MEOT, Simondon began and ended it by precisely entering into

dialogue with Eliade’s concept of hierophany. Retrospectively, one cannot help but recognise the

influence of Eliade’s thinking on Simondon’s genesis of technicity 12 present in Part III of METO and
identify Simondon’s effort to respond to Eliade’s proposition regarding the degradation of sacrality by

conceiving technicity as both the rescue of sacrality and the base of culture. 13 In METO, after Simondon

analyses the evolution of technical objects (Part I “Genesis and Evolution of Technical Objects”) and

the role of technology between humans and the world (Part II “Man and Technical Object”), Simondon

confesses that a more profound analysis is still missing regarding the genesis of technicity. 14 Moreover,

it seems to me that if this connection were not clarified, we would not be able to understand the

philosophical proposal of Simondon, which was hinted at in an unsent letter he addressed to Jacques

Derrida on the occasion of the establishment of the Collège International de Philosophie (CIPH) in

1982, concerning the aesthetics of technology. 15 This letter, published posthumously, could be easily

misread as a unconvincing proposal about the marketing of technological products, or even industrial

propaganda, which one could hardly relate it to the agenda of CIPH.

Hierophany, the manifestation of sacrality[sacralité], is a term that Eliade prefers to the more

conventionally used theophany, the manifestation of God. Hierophany is a world-making process in

that the world ceases to be a homogenous space but becomes a constellation of heterogenous places

12 This is rather evident when we read “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 31, where Simondon made
evident that his elaboration on technicité is methodologically mirroring Eliade’s discourse on sacrality,
“Au-delà de l’utilité qui ferait de ces objets des ustensiles (terme employé par Heidegger), au-delà d’un
symbolisme facile et superficiel d’appartenance à une caste ou à une place, on doit s’efforcer de découvrir
un sens de la technicité, comme Mircea Eliade s’efforce de découvrir, sous les images et les symboles, un
sens de la sacralité.”
13 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 31.
14 Simondon, Du mode, 213.
15 Gilbert Simondon, “On Techno-Aesthetics,” Parrhesia No.14 (2012), 1–8, without understanding the
concept of technophany, it seems to me that it is difficult to understand Simondon’s intention of writing
this letter to Derrida related to the establishment of the CIPH, but also other essays, for example, “L’effet
de halo en matière technique : vers une stratégie de la publicité (1960),” reprinted in Simondon, Sur la
technique, 279–293.

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Yuk Hui

where the sacred manifests itself. These places could be as diverse as the top of a mountain, a gigantic

tree, the source of a stream, etc. They are where the shaman would go to communicate with the heavenly

gods directly. 16 In the METO, Simondon calls these places key points [points clés], which indicates the
place of sacrality and supernatural power. The key points are not isolated, instead they form a network

of power. These singular points reveal a new reality which is distinguished from its surroundings.

Retrospectively, Simondon could have directly cited Eliade in METO:

When the sacred manifests itself in any hierophany, there is not only a break in the

homogeneity of space there is also revelation of an absolute reality, opposed to the

nonreality of the vast surrounding expanse. The manifestation of the sacred ontologically

founds the world. 17

Eliade, as a historian of religion, wants to return to hierophany because what he saw in modern

society was the degradation of sacrality. The distinction between the non-modern and the modern

is described as pre-modern and modern; with sacrality becoming depreciated as superstition having

already been overcome by the modern. This depreciation of sacrality is fundamentally a mistake for

Eliade; instead, he believes that rediscovering the archetype of hierophany may allow the moderns to

renew their relations with the sacred. Simondon saw an isomorphism between technicity and sacrality.

Like sacrality, technicity is maintained by a network or what he calls a reticular structure, indicated

by the key points or the places of hierophany; true technicity, as Simondon claims, is a character of

the network of objects and not a single object. 18 In METO, Simondon saw an even more profound
relationship between the two. The genesis of technicity started with a magic phase, where the world

is indicated by key points or places of hierophany. The oversaturation of the magic phase led to its

bifurcation into technics and religion; each of them later bifurcated into theoretical and practical

parts. This bifurcation process is accompanied by a desire to return to the unity analogical to the magic

phase. I emphasise analogical because Simondon did not mean to suggest that one should return to the

actual unity of the magic phase, but rather a unity analogous to it, like the reciprocal and communal

relation between figure and ground we find in Gestalt psychology. One of the aims of the study of the

genesis of technicity is to renew the relation between technicity and sacrality, especially in the modern

conception; science and technology mean profanity, and they are often opposed to religious sacrality,

but more fundamentally (as a methodology), technological thought must be resituated within a genesis

together with religious, aesthetic and philosophical thought, without which, we will easily fall prey to

technological determinism.

16 Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism, trans. Philip Mairet (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1991), 167.
17 Mircea Eliade, Myths, Rites, Symbols. A Eliade Reader Vol. 1 (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 144.
18 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 83.

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Apropos Technophany

In “Psychosociology of Technicity,” the intimacy between technicity and sacrality is not presented in

the same way as in METO. However, Simondon constantly indicated the isomorphism and intimacy

between technicity and sacrality. How could we understand this nuance? Considering that the term

technophany did not appear even once in METO, could we understand “Psychosociology of Technicity”

to be placing more of an emphasis on this new concept? If so, given the consistency of Simondon’s work,

where could we place technophany back in METO, or more specifically, in Simondon’s speculation

on the genesis of technicity? Technophany, for Simondon, like hierophany, is not only any kind of

revelation but a movement which transcends images and symbolism towards the interiority of the real,

namely an extraordinary reality distinguished from everyday reality:

The technophanic initiation is not merely an unveiling, but rather, in the etymological sense,

a movement towards the interior of the real, seen increasingly closely and understood

more essentially in its structural and functional intimacy. However, what remains constant

during this journey into the interior of the real is the style of majesty and majority of the

technical object.[italics are mine] 19

What is manifested in technophany is not merely a beautiful design but rather something more profound

and difficult (if not impossible) to fully grasp. However, even though technophany is isomorphic

to hierophany, its mode of revelation is necessarily technical. Access to the interiority of the real

cannot be achieved via means other than through technical objects. Technicity and sacrality are put

into a subtle competition, to the extent that technophany becomes a replacement for hierophany.

The hiatus between technicity and sacrality enlarges over time. In “Psychosociology of Technicity,”
Simondon historically moves from the 17th-century artisanal culture to 19th-century positivism via the

18th-century encyclopaedia to show how such a hiatus was produced and compensated and how the

overcoming of this hiatus should be regarded as a significant philosophical task. In the 17 th century,

sacrality was superior to technicity because technical objects of that epoch were only simple tools

subordinated to artisans; therefore, we saw the domination of sacrality. In the 18 th century, the hiatus

was enlarged due to the improvement of technologies and the emergence of larger-scale ateliers;

consequently, encyclopedism appears as a technophany to mediate the two. As Simondon pointed out,

encyclopedism added nothing more to Descartes’ mechanism but only prolonged and multiplied it by

endowing it with an “aesthetic turn.” 20 In other words, the Encyclopaedia of d’Alembert and Diderot

19 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 101, “L’initiation technophanique n’est pas seule-

ment un dévoilement, mais bien, au sens étymologique, un mouvement vers l’intérieur du réel vu de plus
en plus près et compris de plus en plus essentiellement en son intimité structurale et fonctionnelle. Mais
ce qui reste constant au cours de cette marche vers l’intérieur du réel, c’est le style de majesté et de majo-
rité de l’objet technique. ”
20 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 104.

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Yuk Hui

constituted technophanies, which, according to Simondon, are “partially hierophanies,” though “the

hierophanic element being aestheticised, became implicit.” 21 19th-century positivism was accompanied
by the rise of gigantic automatic machines, to which the workers had to subordinate their bodies. The

technophany of encyclopedism ceased to be effective. The hiatus between sacrality and technicity was

enlarged so that an antagonism appeared irreconcilable.

§3. The No Man’s Land Between Sacrality and Technicity

Simondon pointed out several times in “Psychosociology of Technicity” that there is a no man’s land

between sacrality and technicity. How should we understand this no man’s land? Is it a vacuum produced

by the hiatus between sacrality and technicity, one still waiting to be filled? Simondon mentions that

leisure is the no man’s land between sacrality and technicity; however, it does not provide anything

common between them, therefore it also fails to be a veritable candidate. 22 Nevertheless, he gave a

criterion to the occupier of this no man’s land:

There exists a no man’s land between sacredness and technicity. In this no man’s land, a

normativity must emerge as the foundation for a cultural unity suitable for the current

psychosocial conditions of life for most human groups. Indeed, it is in this no man’s land

that the most polarising and remarkable actions are instituted, and they are instituted

without positive norms.[italics are mine] 23

In On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, we are told that aesthetics appeared to be the mediative

power of convergence after the bifurcation from the magic phase to religion and technics. However,

aesthetics failed to maintain its converging power when further bifurcation continued in the genesis

because aesthetic thinking is still situational, meaning its role is to serve as “the paradigm for orienting

21 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 105.

22 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 99, “Le loisir est un no man’s land entre sacralité et
technicté, mais non point un terrain commun offrant une perspective commune. Il n’existe pas de forme
unique de loisir, mais deux formes peu compatibles : le loisir de sacralité, halo négatif prohibant la tech-
nicité et la repoussant hors des limites du temps sacré comme on repousse les réalités profanes hors des
zones voisines du temple, et le loisir de technicité, conçu comme une des fonctions de l’activité complète
de l’homme au travail.”
23 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 124, “Il existe un no man’s land entre la sacralité
et la technicté, et c’est dans ce no man’s land qu’une normativité doit se faire jour comme fondement
d’une unité culturelle adéquate aux actuelles conditions psychosociales de vie de la plupart des groupes
humains. C’est, en effet, dans ce no man’s land que s’instituent les actions les plus polarisantes, les plus
remarquables, et elles s’instituent sans normes positives.”

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Apropos Technophany

and supporting the effort of philosophical thinking,” 24 implying that philosophical thinking will have
to intervene to bring about a higher order of convergence. In “Psychosociology of Technicity,” such

an opposition between aesthetic thinking and philosophical thinking was not emphasised; instead,

Simondon suggested again that aesthetics could resume this function; however, one will need to redefine

what aesthetic here means and distinguish from aesthetics thus conventionally understood:

However, the aesthetic category that converges technicity and sacrality is not the

usual aesthetic category, detachable from the world. It is a concern for totality and the

organisation of existing reality according to its lines and powers, to add, in accordance with

the uniqueness of this singular world, an overdetermination brought about by the creativity

of techniques: in this aesthetics of totality, there is a perception of sacredness, that is, the

uniqueness of the given world, prior to technicity, the basis of constructiveness, an open

system of the complete nature.[Italics are original] 25

Does this suggest that Simondon abandoned the categorisation of aesthetic and philosophical thinking

present in METO? In METO, we recall that Simondon, by referring to Bergson, juxtaposed philosophical

intuition from the concept and idea, deduction and induction, and indicated that the former is a

veritable philosophical method to grasp the genesis of technicity. Simondon distinguishes three kinds

of intuition, namely magical, aesthetic, and philosophical, which also correspond to three successive

stages of convergence in the genesis of technicity. The distinction between aesthetic intuition and

philosophical intuition is clearly stated as follows:

Aesthetic intuition is contemporary with the bifurcation of magical thinking into technics

and religion, and it does not truly synthesise the two opposed phases of thought; it merely

indicates the necessity of a relationship and accomplishes it allusively in a limited

domain. Philosophical thinking, on the contrary, must genuinely accomplish the synthesis,

and it must construct culture, coextensive with the culmination of all technical thought

and all religious thought.[italics are mine] 26

24 Simondon, Du mode, 276.

25 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 120, “Mais la catégorie esthétique faisant converg-
er technicité et sacralité n’est pas la catégorie esthétique habituelle, détachable du monde. Elle est une
préoccupation de totalité et d’organisation du réel existant selon ses lignes et ses pouvoirs, pour ajouter
conformément à l’unicité de ce monde unique une surdétermination apportée par la créativité des tech-
niques : dans cette esthétique de la totalité, il y a perception de la sacralité, c’est-à-dire de l’unicité du
monde donné, antérieur à la tech nicité, base de la constructivité, système ouvert de la nature complète.”
26 Simondon, Du mode, 324–325, “L’intuition esthétique est contemporaine du dédoublement de la
pensée magique en techniques et religion, et elle n’effectue pas une synthèse vséritable des deux phases
opposées de la pensée ; elle indique seulement la nécessité d’une relation, et l’accomplit allusivement
dans un domaine limité. La pensée philosophique au contraire doit accomplir réellement la synthèse, et
elle doit construire la culture, coextensive à l’aboutissement de toute la pensée technique et de toute la
pensée religieuse.”

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Yuk Hui

It is not possible to conclude from Simondon’s existing publications if there is a significant change in the

philosopher’s thinking concerning the role of aesthetics. The lack of references in his writings and the

limited published work make such research unproductive. Moreover, intuition, be that philosophical or

magical, cannot be isolated from the very concept of aesthetics if, by aesthetics, we mean, as the Greeks

understood, the study of the sensible. 27 However, in his 1960–1961 course on the psychosociology of
technicity, we could at least say that he reaffirmed the importance of aesthetics as having the capacity

to grasp “totality” and perceive “sacrality.” It seems that the redefined concept of aesthetics is able

to take up the task of philosophical thinking and occupy the no man’s land between technicity and

sacrality; as Simondon said, “if this discovery is possible, it will provide the basis of a culture that

would give again to aesthetic category the central place which it did among the Greeks.” 28 If we follow

this line of thought, then the concept of technophany is the key to conceiving the power of aesthetics

and the possibilities of convergence in the future. It is that which withholds at the same time a pair of

polarising forces: schematisation of technics and intuition of the sacred. 29 The example that Simondon

gave to explain this polarisation is nonetheless rather astonishing: Le Corbusier’s Couvent Sainte-

Marie de La Tourette. With this example, his definition of aesthetics acquires a more concrete meaning.

Figure 1. Couvent Sainte-Marie de La Tourette (1960), Source: Wikimedia

27 As we know that only in the 18th century, a rather narrow concept of aesthetics was established by
Alexander Baumgarten, who understands aesthetics as the study of the lower faculty of cognition, in con-
tradistinction to logic, which belongs to the higher faculty of cognition.
28 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 121.
29 Simondon, “Psychosociologie de la technicité,” 122.

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Apropos Technophany

The building of Le Corbusier, according to Simondon, possesses such polarising categories. On the

one hand, there is a negative aesthetic, which presents itself as monstrosity; on the other hand, it

also contains a positive category, namely, functional optimisation. The negative aesthetic intuits and

withholds the totality; the functional optimisation analyses and segments, according to functionalities.

It is interesting to notice that the totality is associated with negativity because only the negativity

withholds the whole without determining it, such as Kant’s negative affirmation of the beautiful

expressed in the two moments, purposiveness without purpose and pleasure without interest. Simondon’s

task to reconcile sacrality and technicity could also appear analogous to Kant’s ambition to unify

nature and freedom. This containment of the two polarising forces constitutes a new normativity;

this normativity is necessarily teratological. It is a constructiveness [constructivité], simultaneously

auto-normative and auto-constructive. The example of the monastery of Sainte-Marie was mentioned

again in another text titled “Technical Mentality,” thought to be written during the same period as his

course on psychosociology of technicity (i.e., 1961); the article was primarily a discussion on the rise

of cybernetics as a new epistemology and the design of open machines. Towards the end of the article,

Simondon evokes Le Corbusier’s Sainte-Marie as an archetype of the open system. It resonates with the

impression that is left to us in the course, and the term technophany also appears for the first time in

this article:

And this is possible not only because of the architectural conception of the whole, but

also because of the spirit of pairing down that manifests itself in the choice of forms and

the use of materials: it will be possible, without any break between the old and the new,

to still use concrete, shuttering, iron, cables, and the tubulature of long corridors. The

non-dissimulation of means, this politeness of architecture towards its materials which

translates itself by a constant technophany, amounts to a refusal of obsolescence and to

the productive discovery amongst sensible species of the permanent availability of the

industrial material as the foundation for the continuity of the work.[italics are mine] 30

Once an example is given to demonstrate such a philosophical task, controversies arise, like opening

a Pandora’s box. What are the other examples which demonstrate Simondon’s vision of technophany?

Would Le Corbusier have become the saviour of culture? One could undoubtedly examine other

examples teratological architecture made since the 20 th century by world famous architects, assessing

if they succeeded, in reconciling technicity and sacrality as Le Corbusier’s Sainte-Marie did according

to Simondon. However, such a demonstration would be almost arbitrary, and such research might well

be futile. Sacredness is not an object or a thing; it is the unthinged [unbedingt]. As Simondon claims,

sacredness is maintained by a reticular structure, isomorphic to technology; it is also something that

30 Gilbert Simondon, “Technical Mentality,” Parrhesia 14, (2012): 25.

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Yuk Hui

cannot be reduced to science or even religion. Simondon’s concept of technophany didn’t resolve the

problems of our time, rather he handed down to us a specific inquiry into the future of technology,

design, and art.

Today, it is already in everyone’s consciousness that we have entered into a technological era no matter

whether one likes it or not; the importance of technology in the process of hominisation, as well as

in the constant reconstruction of the world view, is recognised even in mass media. However, the

concept of technophany, which Simondon envisioned to converge the technical and the sacred, has yet

to be fully reflected upon. The task of convergence between sacrality and technicity remains a major

challenge in contemporary thought, 31 and it is handed to us as an essential resource for a critique of

technological determinism and political naturalism. 32 This task will demand a persistent questioning

and reconceptualisation of technology, with and beyond Simondon: with Simondon, because his

original thought on technology allows a new dialogue between technology and philosophy; beyond

Simondon, since his thought will have to be verified, modified, prolonged and enriched under the new

technological and planetary condition.

31 See Jacques Garelli, “Être-au-monde et être cosmique,” Psychiatr Sci Hum Neurosci 1, (2003): 41–49.
32 I developed the concept of cosmotechnics as a response to it, for a shorter introduction, see Yuk
Hui, “On Cosmotechnics: For a Renewed Relation between Technology and Nature in the Anthropo-
cene,” Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 21, no. 2–3 (2017): 1–23; for more elaborated concept
of cosmotechnics, see Yuk Hui, The Question Concerning Technology in China. An Essay in Cosmotechnics
(Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2016) and Yuk Hui, Art and Cosmotechnics (Minneapolis: University of Minneso-
ta Press/E-Flux, 2021). Readers might equally want to consult the work of the late Jacques Garreli, who
picked up Simondon’s allagmatic method to reconcile physics and phenomenology, see Jacques Garreli,
Rythmes et Mondes : au revers de l’identité et de l’altérité (Grenoble: Jerôme Millon, 1991).

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Apropos Technophany

References:

Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958/1992.

Eliade, Mircea. Myths, Rites, Symbols. A Eliade Reader Vol. 1. New York: Harper & Row, 1976.

Eliade, Mircea. Images and Symbols. Studies in Religious Symbolism. Translated by Philip Mairet. Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1991.

Garreli, Jacques. Rythmes et Mondes : au revers de l’identité et de l’altérité. Grenoble : Jérôme Millon, 1991.

Garreli, Jacques. “Être-au-monde et être cosmique.” Psychiatr Sci Hum Neurosci 1, (2003): 41–49.

Hui, Yuk. “On Cosmotechnics: For a Renewed Relation between Technology and Nature in the

Anthropocene.” Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 21, no. 2–3 (2017): 1–23.

Hui, Yuk. The Question Concerning Technology in China. An Essay in Cosmotechnics. Falmouth: Urbanomic,

2016.

Hui, Yuk. Art and Cosmotechnics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press/E-Flux, 2021.

Simondon, Gilbert. “On Techno-Aesthetics.” Parrhesia, 14 (2012): 1–8

Simondon, Gilbert. “Technical Mentality.” Parrhesia 14, (2012): 17–27.

Simondon, Gilbert. Du mode d’existence des objets techniques. Paris : Aubiers, 2012.

Simondon, Gilbert. “L’effet de halo en matière technique : vers une stratégie de la publicité (1960).” In

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