LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 10.

1177/0094582X04264745
Takenaka / THE JAPANESE IN PERU
The Japanese in Peru
History of Immigration,
Settlement, and Racialization
by
Ayumi Takenaka

Peruvians of Japanese descent, though constituting only 0.3 percent of

Peru’s population, were brought to the world’s attention by the election of
Alberto Fujimori, the son of Japanese immigrants, as president, and today
they are arguably one of the country’s most influential ethnic communities
both economically and politically. While well integrated into Peruvian soci-
ety, they remain a racial/ethnic minority and a close-knit community. Promi-
nent but closed, the Japanese-Peruvian community has evolved through the
processes of immigration, settlement, and racialization over the past century.
At the end of the nineteenth century in Japan, the rumor spread that a
country called Peru somewhere on the opposite side of the earth was “full of
gold.” This country, moreover, was a paradise with a mild climate, rich soil
for farming, familiar dietary customs, and no epidemics, according to the
advertisements of Japanese emigration companies (Konno and Fujisaki,
1984). A Japanese immigrant in Peru, now in her late 80s, told me, “I came
here because I heard there was gold and no snow in this country.” Another, in
his 90s, said that he had followed his uncle to Peru because “I wanted to
become a farmer. Owning land was my dream.” With various dreams in
mind, some 790 Japanese, all men between the ages of 20 and 45, left Japan
in 1898 to work on Peru’s coastal plantations as contract laborers. Their pur-
pose was simple: to earn and save money for the return home upon termina-
tion of their four-year contracts. The 25-yen monthly salary on Peru’s planta-
tions was more than double the average salary in rural Japan (Suzuki, 1992).
In four years’time, then, they expected their savings to amount to 860 yen.
The history that followed is one of misery and hardship. Japanese immi-
gration was simultaneously a form of exclusion from Japan. Rather than
being simply voluntary labor migration for higher wages, it was shaped by a
Ayumi Takenaka is an assistant professor of sociology at Bryn Mawr College. The research con-
ducted for this paper was funded by the Research Institute for the Study of Man, the Toyota Foun-
dation, and the Matsushita International Foundation. The author gratefully acknowledges their
support.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 136, Vol. 31 No. 3, May 2004 77-98
DOI: 10.1177/0094582X04264745
© 2004 Latin American Perspectives

77

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broader international context in which the sending country (Japan) and the
receiving country (Peru) in addition to a third country (the United States)
played a role. This article examines this context.

EMIGRATION FROM JAPAN

WHY DID THEY EMIGRATE?

Japanese emigration to Peru was initially encouraged by the Japanese

government. As soon as the Meiji government (1868–1911) had replaced the
closed Tokugawa regime (1600–1868), Japan began to look outward, partic-
ularly to the West. Emigration began in 1868 as a form of contract migration
to Hawaii under direct state sponsorship. Between 1868 and 1942, over
776,000 Japanese emigrated, primarily to North America (48.2 percent) and
South America (31.6 percent) (JICA, 1994). Many of them were sent by the
government, either directly or indirectly, or by private emigration companies
working in close cooperation with the government. To encourage emigra-
tion, the government provided subsidies for emigrants and established a
number of institutions: the Social Affairs Bureau (1921) within the Home
Ministry in 1921, the Ministry of Overseas Affairs (Takumusho) in 1929,
the Emigration Center in 1927, and the Emigration Cooperative Societies
(Kaigai Iju Kumiai) in 1927 (Tigner, 1981).
Emigration was encouraged, above all, as a way to control Japan’s rapidly
growing population (Idei, 1930; Yoshida, 1909; Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
1949; 1971). Although the population stayed stable at about 30 million dur-
ing the Tokugawa period, it reached 38 million in 1888, 56 million in 1920,
and 79 million in 1947, accompanied by rapid industrial development (Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, 1958). In hindsight, however, emigration did not
solve Japan’s “population problem” (Crocker, 1931); the approximately 1
million emigrants sent abroad over 80 years constituted merely 2.5 percent of
Japan’s population growth during the period, a negligible rate in comparison
with the comparable figures for England (74.2 percent), Italy (46.8 percent),
and Germany (14.6 percent) (Wakatsuki and Suzuki, 1975). Moreover, while
emigration was being encouraged, there was an influx of laborers from
Japan’s newly acquired overseas colonies. Among them were 770,000 Kore-
ans brought into Japan between 1917 and 1927 to meet the growing demand
for manual laborers (though 570,000 Koreans also left Japan during the
period) (Idei, 1930).
Emigration was more than a means of population reduction; in fact, it was
an important part of the Meiji government’s policy of industrialization and

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 Takenaka / THE JAPANESE IN PERU 79

Westernization. The government viewed emigration as a vital tool for gain-

ing economic benefits, particularly as a means to increase capital by way
of remittances (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971; Wakatsuki and Suzuki,
1975). Although the total number of emigrants remained small, the economic
role of emigration was significant. In 1933, remittances sent to Japan (98.6
million yen) constituted as much as 10 percent of Japan’s total trade surplus
(Suzuki, 1992), and the Japanese immigrants in Brazil alone brought in
US$3.8 million by traveling back to Japan (Wakatsuki and Suzuki, 1975).
The government envisioned emigrants as promoting bilateral ties, thereby
stimulating trade, tourism, and other commercial activities and helping
secure resources and territorial expansion abroad (Wakatsuki and Suzuki,
1975; Nihon Kaigai Kyokai, 1950). Citing the colonial history of prosperous
European countries, Japanese statesmen and scholars often stressed that emi-
gration and territorial expansion were critical to “the prosperity of the Japa-
nese race” (Jiho Shinpo, January 4, 1896, cited in Wakatsuki, 1987). In his
1906 essay “Japanese Colonialism” (Nihon Shokumin-ron), Mironu Togo
asserted the importance of Japan’s duty to expand abroad as the only Asian
country capable of becoming a colonial power (Kumei, 1995), and according
to Shigenobu Okuma in “The Expansion of the Yamato (Japanese) Race and
Colonial Projects” (1908), “the most urgent task is to send emigrants
(shokumin) . . . under the banner of the rising sun” (quoted in Wakatsuki,
1987: 195). Emigration was correlated with colonialism: “Send millions of
Japanese emigrants to California to construct New Japan” and “Build a coun-
try for the Japanese race in the Rockies” (quoted in Wakatsuki, 1987: 192).
Indeed, the terms “emigrants” (imin)1 and “colonists” (shokumin or
kaitakumin) were frequently used interchangeably or combined (ishokumin)
until well into the 1930s. Emigration assumed a particularly strong national
character during the 1910s and 1920, when migratory flows were directed to
less desirable countries (e.g., South America) after Japanese immigration to
the United States ended and emigration was promoted in the name of the
nation.
Finally, emigration was regarded as a way of dealing with the “problem”
of poor farmers. The transformation of traditional agriculture brought about
by industrialization, coupled with the monetary policy failure of 1881, left as
many as 1 million peasant households out of work (Wakatsuki and Suzuki,
1975; Tsuchida, 1998). Emigration, as the government viewed it, would pro-
vide those excess farmers with job opportunities (Idei, 1930) and “civilize
those low-class citizens” by providing them with the opportunity to acquire
advanced Western labor discipline and ethics (quoted in Wakatsuki and
Suzuki, 1975: 75). Eliminating those “low-class laborers” would benefit the
country, since “their poverty would pose a national threat” (Muto, 1963,

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80 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

quoted in Wakatsuki, 1987: 177). Thus, an emigration policy officially pro-

mulgated to control population growth was a vital part of Japan’s “modern-
ization” policy.

WHO WAS THE EMIGRANT?

Throughout the history of Japanese emigration, emigrants shared several

characteristics. Demographically, they were largely males between the ages
of 20 and 45, a population targeted both by employers (e.g., plantation own-
ers) and by Japanese emigration companies. Many were second and later
sons, often lacking the right to inherit family properties (Wakatsuki and
Suzuki, 1975). Because of primogeniture and ancestor worship, the eldest
son usually became successor of the household, daughters married without
sharing the inheritance, and younger sons, single or married, migrated to the
city and sometimes abroad while still young (Maeyama, 1994).
Regionally, emigrants came from the relatively poor and predominantly
agricultural southwestern parts of Japan. The majority, or 99 percent, were
farmers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1958) and poor without much formal
education or training (Wakatsuki and Suzuki, 1975; Irie, 1951). Among the
pre–World War II emigrants, almost half originated from just four prefec-
tures—Hiroshima, Okinawa, Kumamoto, and Fukuoka (JICA, 1994). One
reason for this regional concentration was economic; rapid industrialization
worsened the already overcrowded conditions of many small-scale farmers,
particularly in poorer rural areas. Another factor was the long tradition of
emigration that prevailed in these poorer rural areas, with years of experience
in sending emigrants to the city or abroad (Wakatsuki and Suzuki, 1975). The
establishment of networks through prior emigration was also crucial, as per-
sonal networks reduced the costs associated with movements and settlement
(Nihon Kaigai Kyokai, 1950; Massey and Garcia, 1987). In Peru, in particu-
lar, these personal networks played an important role. After the Peruvian
government prohibited new waves of Japanese immigrants in 1927, the only
way Japanese could immigrate to Peru was by invitation of family members
already resident in the country. Finally, regional concentration was also a
result of recruitment policy; both the Japanese government and the emigra-
tion companies tried to recruit workers from certain prefectures and villages
to reduce the cost of recruitment and ease the emigrants’ adaptation to the
host country (Kodama, 1989).
Okinawa, in particular, was an important sending prefecture throughout
Japanese emigration history. Of the emigrants who left prior to 1926, 11 per-
cent were from Okinawa, and this proportion increased to 15 percent be-
tween 1926 and 1941 (JICA, 1994). Okinawa was and still is Japan’s poorest

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 Takenaka / THE JAPANESE IN PERU 81

prefecture, and its weak economy and shortage of revenues made it depen-
dent on the central government as “a permanent burden on the national trea-
sury” (Kerr, 1959: 402). Emigration, encouraged by the Okinawan prefec-
tural government, quickly became a way of coping with this situation. After
the decline of sugar prices in the 1920s (a blow to Okinawa’s vital industry),
emigration flows accelerated to both mainland Japan and abroad, primarily
to Hawaii, the United States, Brazil, and Peru (Tomiyama, 1990).
Because of the way it was induced, emigration came to carry a negative
connotation for the Japanese public. Emigration was a form of exclusion, and
emigrants were considered “abandoned people” (kimin) “pushed out” by the
government to feed the rest of the population. This image persists even
today.2 (Kimin also refers to “social outcasts” and “lower-class people” in
general, such as day laborers and untouchables.) The chasm between Japa-
nese immigrant (emigrant) communities and more recent arrivals from
Japan, such as businessmen, students, and other professionals, is also indica-
tive of this status difference.

IMMIGRATION TO PERU:
CONTEXT OF INCORPORATION

Peru emerged as a destination as a result of yet another form of exclusion.

Although the United States was not directly involved in Japanese immigra-
tion to Peru, it nonetheless played an influential role in inducing this migra-
tion by shutting its doors to Japanese immigration by a 1907 “gentlemen’s
agreement.” Prior to the agreement, the United States and Hawaii had been
the primary destinations for Japanese emigration and had been preferred
because of their higher wages. Denied access to these traditional and more
profitable destinations, Japanese emigration companies had to seek others,
and subsequent migratory flows were directed to South America. Japanese
emigration to South America, reaching its peak in the 1910s, was directly
correlated with diminishing flows to North America.
Peru was the first South American country to receive Japanese immi-
grants. The contract labor agreement was a result of the diplomatic relation-
ship established with Peru in 1873 (the first between Japan and any South
American country) and of the personal relationship between Augusto
Leguia, the manager of a sugar manufacturing company and later president
of Peru, and Teikichi Tanaka, an emigration agent for the Morioka Emigra-
tion Company (Gardiner, 1975; Normano and Gerbi, 1943). High labor
demand for plantations also contributed to the initiation of Japanese immi-
gration to Peru (see Fig. 1).

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82 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

3500

3000
Number of Emigrants

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0
90 894 898 902 906 910 914 918 922 926 930 934 938 950 954 958 962 966 970 974 978
18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
45
19
Year

Figure 1. Japanese Emigration to Peru

In the late nineteenth century, after the Pacific War with Chile (1879–
1883), Peru entered a phase of rapid economic growth as a result of economic
expansion in Western Europe and the subsequent increase in demand for raw
materials. The rush of European capital brought the “agricultural revolution”
to the Peruvian coast (Fukumoto, 1997). Production of cotton increased from
less than 5,000 tons in 1891 to 24,000 tons in 1913 (Masuda and Yanagida,
1999). Exports of agricultural products, particularly of sugarcane, cotton,
and guano, also increased—from 14,000 soles in 1900–1904 to 150,000
soles in 1940–1943 (Fukumoto, 1997). This required armies of cheap labor,
but it posed a problem. Peru’s plantations had long depended on slave labor,
but slavery was abolished in 1854. The “coolie” trade, which brought over
87,000 Chinese indentured laborers, was abolished in 1874. An alternative
was to bring indigenous populations from Peru’s interior, but this failed
because of peasants’ attachment to their lands and the extremely harsh labor
conditions (Normano and Gerbi, 1943; Masuda and Yanagida, 1999). The
other alternative was to rely on immigration.
The Peruvian state, dominated by people of European descent, had always
considered European immigration desirable. In 1892, one statesman ob-
served that it was necessary to “improve our race” by incorporating European
immigrants; Indians, blacks, and Asians were considered “inferior races”

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 Takenaka / THE JAPANESE IN PERU 83

(Fukumoto, 1997). Since achieving its independence in 1821 through the

efforts of criollos (South American–born descendants of Europeans), Peru
has been practically dominated by whites constituting roughly 10 percent of
the population; the majority of the indigenous population (47 percent of the
population today), the mestizos (40 percent), and the small population of
Asians and blacks (3 percent) were not part of the independence movement
and always fell below whites in Peru’s racial hierarchy. This hierarchy has
remained fundamentally unchanged to this day.
In an attempt to attract European immigrants, the Peruvian government
implemented various laws to give them incentives; the “white preference
laws” of 1873 and 1906 subsidized European and U.S. immigrants exclu-
sively, and special labor recruitment programs targeted the Irish (in 1851)
and the Spanish (in 1860) (Suzuki, 1992; Vasquez, 1970). Yet, because Euro-
peans often preferred to immigrate to other countries such as Argentina,
Chile, and Brazil, these efforts largely failed. Relative to these countries,
Peru was politically unstable because of its long history of military regimes
and was considered economically undesirable, with lower standards of liv-
ing. The economic and political dominance of the latifundistas also posed
obstacles for immigrants, leaving them little opportunity to cultivate and own
land (Vasquez, 1970). In fact, several European governments, notably that
of Italy, strongly advised their citizens against emigrating to Peru (Tigner,
1978).
Faced with the “national crisis of labor shortages,” the Peruvian govern-
ment, under pressure from plantation owners, turned its eyes to the Orient. It
reluctantly acknowledged the need to allow Japanese immigration, hop-
ing that this would encourage European immigration. The Tokyo Keizai
Shimbun (quoted in Rippy, 1949: 52) described the situation as follows:

The government of Peru welcomes white workers and is not any too fond of
yellow laborers, but business in this country is not sufficiently developed to
appeal to white labor. It will, therefore, be obliged to depend upon Far Eastern
immigrants. If the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and the emigration
companies put forth all their efforts, this country will become a second Hawaii.

Peru did not become a second Hawaii, but it nonetheless led the way by redi-
recting Japanese immigration flows from North America to the South.
Japanese immigrants in Peru were incorporated as indentured laborers in
its transition from a slave economy to capitalism. During roughly the same
period, Indian and Chinese indentured laborers were similarly substituted for
African slaves in the Americas; this succession, Van der Veer (1995) argues,
was effective in undercutting African workers’ability to bargain. As did their
African and Chinese predecessors in Peru, Japanese immigrants responded

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84 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

to the harsh working conditions and discriminatory treatment on the planta-

tions by rebelling, protesting, and running away, and many of them even died
there. Even after slavery and the “coolie” trade officially ended, colonial-
style work relations persisted in Peru well into the late twentieth century. The
plantation owners, mostly Italians, English, or Peruvians of European ances-
try, generally mistreated Japanese immigrants, whipping them occasionally,
delaying payments, and violating other conditions stipulated in their
contracts (Irie, 1951).
Contrary to what the job advertisements stated, work conditions were so
harsh, the climate and dietary conditions so different, and tropical diseases so
prevalent that 150 out of 790 immigrants in the first group perished in epi-
demics before their four-year contracts expired (Irie, 1951). On one planta-
tion, Casa Blanca, only 30 out of 226 Japanese immigrants were fit to work
after three months (Peru Shimpo, 1975). By 1909 the death toll had increased
to 7.6 percent, or 481 out of 6,292 migrants who were sent by emigration
companies (Irie, 1951). Many others fell sick and fled the plantations. Even
as they acknowledged these problems, emigration companies failed to step in
and, in fact, continued to send emigrants to Peru (Wakatsuki and Suzuki,
1975).
Upon fleeing or terminating their contracts, the majority did not return to
Japan despite their intentions; within the first ten years after immigration,
just 6 percent returned home, having been unable to save enough money
(Peru Shimpo, 1975). Another 4 percent left for other countries such as
Bolivia, Argentina, Mexico, and the United States (Peru Shimpo, 1975).
Some remained in Peru’s rural areas. Yet, farming opportunities beyond con-
tract plantation work were limited for Japanese immigrants, arable lands
belonged to the colonists, and the preestablished Spanish-controlled land
system denied Japanese access to new lands. The decree of May 1910 clearly
stipulated that “the colonists in the Sierra mountain region can only be Peru-
vians or Europeans” (Gardiner, 1975). Consequently, the majority of Japa-
nese immigrants headed for urban centers such as Lima and its neighboring
port city, Callao.

SETTLEMENT IN PERU:
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

SOJOURNING AS URBAN MIDDLEMAN MERCHANTS

In 1909, ten years after the initial immigration, there were 493 Japanese in
Lima (Fukumoto, 1997). Upon arriving in cities with little capital, limited

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 Takenaka / THE JAPANESE IN PERU 85

command of the language, and few personal contacts, Japanese immigrants

became street vendors or domestic servants. Major industries were domi-
nated by Europeans and Peruvians of European descent, because the Peru-
vian government permitted only Europeans to develop them (Vasquez,
1970). The immigrants observed the prevalence of foreign-owned stores, and
as they amassed capital they established their own.
The host society’s efforts to undermine immigrants’ economic activities
often resulted in their concentration in certain occupations (Bonacich, 1973).
Just as Japanese immigrants in San Francisco and Buenos Aires were con-
centrated in the laundry business, so in Lima they started out as barbers. Bar-
ber shops required relatively little capital and skills and thus were easy for
immigrants to start. The first Japanese-owned barber shop was opened in
1904, and within two years the number had jumped to 15 (Peru Shimpo,
1975). After the Japanese Barbers’ Association was established in 1907 as
the first formal Japanese association, the number of Japanese-owned barber
shops further increased. In 1914, 80 out of the 110 barber shops in Lima were
owned by Japanese (72.7 percent), and by 1924 their share had increased to
73.9 percent (130 out of 176) (Peru Shimpo, 1975; Irie, 1951).
Gradually, Japanese immigrants expanded their businesses to other areas,
notably small grocery stores, clothing stores, and restaurants, and established
their status as a “successful middleman minority” (Gardiner, 1975). In 1930,
45 percent of Japanese immigrants were owners of small businesses, mostly
in food-related enterprises (60 percent) such as grocery stores (20 percent)
and cafés (11 percent), followed by barber shops (9 percent). They soon
came to dominate certain sectors; by the late 1930s, three out of every four
small coffee, candy, or refreshment shops were run by the Japanese (Alegria
and Saco, 1942). Almost a quarter of the mechanical, watchmaking, and
repair shops in Lima were Japanese, as were 42 out of 53 machine shops, 92
out of 192 restaurants, and 78 out of 114 bakeries (Morimoto, 1992). Among
public market vendors and street peddlers, Japanese represented some 20
percent of the total, while Peruvians constituted 55 percent and Chinese 12
percent (Normano and Gerbi, 1943).
This high concentration in small businesses reflected, apart from a lack of
alternatives, the immigrants’desire to save as much money as possible before
returning home. Unlike an industrial plant, a small business can be liquidated
easily. Another reason for their success as merchants was the immigrants’
sojourning mentality. First, it encouraged them to be thrifty, relying on cheap
or nonwage family labor (Bonacich, 1973). Their limited contact with the
outside world helped them to save instead of spending money on social and
cultural activities, and most of them used their stores for living quarters (Peru
Shimpo, 1975). Second, it helped cultivate a sense of ethnic solidarity, since

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86 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

they had little reason to assimilate, and this solidarity proved convenient for
their businesses. In addition to the availability of cheap labor, their economic
ties with Japan permitted access to Japanese producers of low-cost goods
(Tigner, 1978), and numerous “ethnic” associations helped their businesses
flourish. Above all, tanomoshi groups, small rotating-credit unions, played a
key role in financing and expanding their businesses (Morimoto, 1979). By
1915 there were over 40 such groups, some of which later grew into formal
financial institutions, immigrants often being unfamiliar with and denied
access to Peruvian banks. These trust-based groups helped foster communal
solidarity and a sense of ethnic identity and continued to be important half a
century later, when Japanese-Peruvians, for the most part, still engaged in
small businesses.
The immigrants’ ethnic solidarity was further reinforced by increasing
hostility from the outside world. Middleman minorities throughout the world
face increasing discrimination as they become economically successful
(Zenner, 1991), and discrimination, in turn, reinforces their sojourning men-
tality. This dilemma lies in the nature of being middlemen, who feel alien in
the very country where they exert economic influence (Bonacich, 1973). As
resentment against them grew, it took on a racial tone. The Japanese mer-
chants came to be known as chinos de la esquina (street-corner Chinese) and
began to face animosity from the host society.

BECOMING A RACIAL MINORITY

The Japanese immigrants’ success led to their “racialization,” which, in

turn, accelerated discrimination. The anti-Japanese movement produced var-
ious discriminatory measures against immigrants and eventually exploded in
the racial riot of 1940.

Exclusionary measures. Resentment against the Japanese first surged

among Peruvian workers. In 1917, Lima’s central labor union established the
Anti-Asian Association and appealed to the president to abolish “yellow
immigration” through its newspaper La Hoja Amarilla (The Yellow Page)
(Suzuki, 1992). A series of discriminatory measures followed, mostly aimed
at curtailing further Japanese immigration. The first such measure was the
abolition of contract migration in 1923. The pretext for this was that a large
number of Japanese immigrants had fled the plantations, but the truth was
that demand for plantation labor had declined (Peru Shimpo, 1975). The end
of contract migration made future Japanese immigration possible only by
invitation by family members already residing in Peru. A 1936 decree re-
stricted Japanese reentry into Peru (Peru Shimpo, 1975) and practically

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 Takenaka / THE JAPANESE IN PERU 87

halted Japanese immigration by limiting the number of qualified immigrants

to 16,000 per nation (the number of Japanese in the country—20,385 in
1930—already exceeded the quota) and forbidding immigration of “racial
groups.” Although this term was left undefined, it clearly targeted Asiatic and
particularly Japanese immigrants (Peru Shimpo, 1975; Tigner, 1978). (Chi-
nese immigration was similarly restricted; a 1909 agreement limited Chinese
immigration to families of those resident in Peru, and two additional proto-
cols [in 1932 and 1934] brought it to halt [Tigner, 1978]. Also, between 1923
and 1944, regulations were imposed on Chinese emigration and reentry
[Wong, 1994].)
Legal restrictions extended to the realm of citizenship even among Peru-
vian-born children (thus Peruvian citizens) of Japanese immigrants. One
year after the 1936 immigration law was introduced, the Peruvian govern-
ment added another restrictive clause, prohibiting registration of any alien
offspring born in Peru prior to 1936 (Barnhart, 1962; Suzuki, 1992). Thereaf-
ter, Japanese who had not registered the births of their children before 1936
were unable to do so. Not having proof of birth in Peru implied a denial of
Peruvian citizenship. Moreover, a 1940 act introduced further restrictions on
citizenship: second-generation immigrants who left Peru for their parents’
homeland to live, study, or undergo military training during their minority
automatically lost their Peruvian citizenship. (This clause applied only to
persons born in Peru of foreigners from jus sanguinis [blood-based citizen-
ship] countries such as Japan [Barnhart, 1962].) Although the word “Japa-
nese” nowhere appeared, these measures implicitly targeted the Japanese.
That Japanese immigrants occasionally sent their children to Japan for their
education was viewed as an act of betrayal and a sign of anti-Peruvian
militancy.
Discriminatory measures also restricted economic activities. Although
the Japanese were not the sole target, these measures were implicitly aimed at
breaking the Japanese “monopoly” over various retail businesses in Lima
(Normano and Gerbi, 1943). The most notorious was the “80 Percent Law”
of 1932, which required that at least 80 percent of the employees in every
business enterprise be Peruvian. The 1936 decree further restricted Japanese
businesses by making it illegal to transfer business ownership (Peru Shimpo,
1975). In addition, the Japanese-Peruvian Commerce Treaty of 1928 was
annulled in 1934, and imports of Japanese textiles were regulated (Normano
and Gerbi, 1943). Funds in the hands of Japanese were frozen, while some
Japanese-owned shops were expropriated and Japanese-held land leases
were transferred to native Peruvians (Titiev, 1951).
Hostilities eventually extended into the realm of “culture,” with resent-
ment being translated into the attachment to the Japanese of negative cultural

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88 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

attributes. The Japanese, it was argued, were well suited to hard plantation
work because, like all “Asian immigrants,” they were accustomed to working
as semislaves (Vasquez, 1970). Since their standard of living was “as low as
that of highland Indians” (Beals, 1935), they were “happy with the little they
got” (Vasquez, 1970: 82). As Japanese immigrants became successful mid-
dleman merchants, their success was attributed to their “cunning,” “shrewd-
ness,” and “stinginess.” La Crónica, an anti-Japanese newspaper, remarked
in 1937: “They are dishonest and aggressive when it comes to money and
they break laws. So, there is no way we can compete with Japanese mer-
chants” (quoted in Peru Shimpo, 1975: 107). Alegria and Saco (1942: 83)
argued in a foreign policy journal that stinginess was the secret of Japanese
success: “They never go out to shows or events. Any clothing will do if it is
clean. Their lives are dedicated to their work.” The former senator and anti-
Japanese advocate Seoane (1943) also explained that the Japanese were suc-
cessful because “Japanese barbers lived frugally, paid little rent, and charged
less for a haircut than the Peruvian.” Such negative cultural characteristics
were noted not only by Peruvian authorities but also by journalists and
(pseudo-) historians (Nakamoto, 1988).
Since the Japanese were “racially” and “culturally” different, they were
“naturally” unfit to adapt to Peruvian society: so went the argument in the
lower house for the 1903 Japanese Exclusion Act. Pointing to the high Japa-
nese death toll on the plantations, Peruvian officials concluded that they
could not adapt to Peru and therefore should return to Japan immediately
(Suzuki, 1992). In explaining “the Asiatic labor problem” in the context of
increasing Japanese immigration to Peru, a congressman explicitly referred
to the Japanese as “an alien race dissimilar in habits, morals, and process of
thought” (in the American Review of Reviews, 1907: 622–623). Seoane
(1943: 675) also pointed to the Japanese’s “obscure cultural practices,” de-
scribing the tanomoshi as “a strange procedure to obtain capital” and picture
brides as “strange Japanese marriage practices.” He went on: “When there
are no marriageable Japanese women available, young Japanese bachelors
find their wives through ‘sweet-heart ships’ which bring Japanese girls in
groups of 50 to 100 who smilingly greet their husbands even without having
met them before” (674).
Such cultural characteristics were described as not only negative and dif-
ferent but also dangerous and threatening. First, it was suggested that rather
than contributing to the Peruvian economy, the Japanese drained resources.
According to a Peruvian statesman, they “earn, save, and send money home”
(Alegria and Saco, 1942). Compared with the “Anglo-Saxon powers” (refer-
ring to white Europeans in general) who “sent immense capital to Peru to
develop mines and factories, the Japanese solely sent labor, not capital”

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 Takenaka / THE JAPANESE IN PERU 89

(Alegria and Saco, 1942). “Unlike Anglo-Saxon immigrants, not a single

Japanese name has endeared itself to Peruvian national feeling and not a Jap-
anese is known but for his mercantile activities” (Normano and Gerbi, 1943).
Second, it was argued that the Japanese posed a threat to the Peruvian
economy. This view became widespread especially in the 1930s after La
Prensa waged a fierce campaign against “Japanese infiltration” (Gerbi,
1943; Suzuki, 1992). During the campaign, one editor of the paper insisted
that the foods and drinks sold by the Japanese were poisonous. Nationalism
was mobilized against this alleged danger; white Peruvians made statements
such as “Even the manufacturing of chicha, an exclusively national drink of
Peru, is now in the hands of the Japanese” (Zegarra 1941, quoted in Normano
and Gerbi, 1943: 99).
Third, it was asserted that the Japanese posed a threat to Peru’s racial and
national integration. According to former Foreign Minister Ulloa, Asiatics
were “unsuited” to this “European” country and a “menace” to the “racial
homogeneity of the Peruvian people” (Normano and Gerbi, 1943: 114) even
though descendants of Europeans were clearly a numerical minority. More-
over, since they did not assimilate quickly into Peru’s European culture, the
Japanese were considered a cultural threat. “Unlike well-assimilated Italians,
Japanese did not speak Spanish or practice Catholicism” (La Prensa, quoted
in Normano and Gerbi, 1943: 122). They did not even attempt to become
integrated into Peruvian society; they participated in rotating-credit unions
instead of depositing their savings in Peruvian banks, and not a single Japa-
nese was listed among the foreign borrowers from the Banco Industrial,
the major Peruvian bank, in 1941 (cited in Titiev, 1951; Seoane, 1943). La
Prensa (quoted in Alegria and Saco, 1942: 84) also criticized the Japanese for
their “closed and secretive” community:

In the Japanese schools in Lima, the child is taught that his primary allegiance
is to Japan. These boys speak Japanese better than Spanish and feel themselves
bound in no way to the country of their birth. The Japanese flag waves in the
school below the Emperor’s portrait. The Japanese schools are always sur-
rounded by high walls that prevent the passer-by from seeing within.

It was argued, moreover, that students in Japanese schools swore allegiance

to Emperor Hirohito every day (Ulloa, cited in Normano and Gerbi, 1943:
123) and that the only social activities they engaged in were “the meetings of
their Japanese societies and for their national festivity, the birthday of the
Emperor” (Alegria and Saco, 1942: 83).
Japanese endogamy further stirred criticism. Unlike the Chinese, who
came to Peru without wives and “mingled freely with natives,” the Japanese

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90 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

were overwhelmingly endogamous (Normano and Gerbi, 1943). Peruvian

marriage records for 1939 show that Japanese were the only national group
that registered more endogamous marriages than mixed marriages to native
Peruvians. According to Normano and Gerbi (1943), only 79 Chinese chil-
dren were born of Chinese parents, as against 268 born of a Chinese father
and a Peruvian mother. In contrast, out of 25 marriages involving Japanese
men, 6 were to Japanese women and 19 were to “Peruvian-born Japanese.”
Although the validity of these figures was questionable, since most Japanese
were reluctant to register their marriages with the Peruvian authorities, their
rates of endogamy were nevertheless high enough to be criticized as a sign of
“disloyalty” to Peru.
In part, Japanese immigrants’ resistance to assimilation was due to their
sojourning orientation; since they planned to return to Japan, they had little
reason to develop lasting relationships with members of the surrounding host
society (Bonacich, 1973). Also, it was a form of self-defense in a hostile en-
vironment (Nakamoto, 1988). One reason Japanese immigrants became
small-business owners was that institutional barriers prevented them from
establishing large businesses and engaging in agriculture on their own land.
Similarly, the Japanese had to construct their own school in Lima because
there were too few schools to accommodate even Peruvian nationals (Titiev,
1951). Regardless of their motivations, however, Japanese resistance to
assimilation resulted in reinforcing the anti-Japanese movement in Peru. The
cycle was self-perpetuating; attachment to the homeland was enhanced by
host hostility and at the same time increased host hostility by being inter-
preted as a sign of disloyalty (Bonacich, 1973).

Discrimination in context. The series of anti-Japanese measures just

described emerged at a time of a growing Japanese presence in terms of both
demographic and economic influence. Between 1918 and 1930 the Japanese
population in Peru grew from 9,890 to 20,385, faster than any other foreign
group (Peru Shimpo, 1975). By 1925 the Japanese had become the largest
foreign group in Peru, surpassing the Chinese and the Italians, who had been
partially absorbed through intermarriage (Gerbi, 1943). Their presence was
particularly noticeable because of their high concentration in cities; 87 per-
cent were concentrated in Lima, constituting 32 percent of all foreign resi-
dents in the metropolitan area (Peru Shimpo, 1975). Perceiving this as a
threat, native white Peruvians frequently exaggerated the size of the Japanese
population. Although the 1940 census counted 25,000 Japanese citizens
(Normano and Gerbi, 1943), Seoane (1943: 674) declared that there were
over 50,000 Japanese, including “Peruvian-born Japs.” According to the
1933 Enciclopedia Italiana, Peru was “saturated with Japanese workmen

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 Takenaka / THE JAPANESE IN PERU 91

and peasants,” although in reality the Japanese made up far less than 1 per-
cent of Peru’s population (1933, vol. 17, p. 19, cited in Normano and Gerbi,
1943: 75).
Animosities against the Japanese further increased in the context of a
growing trade imbalance between Peru and Japan. As a result of the rapid
expansion of the cotton trade, Japan’s bilateral trade surplus increased from
US$3.3 million in 1913 to US$74 million in 1937 and US$87 million in 1940
(Rippy, 1949). Adding remittances, as much as 113 million yen was drained
out of Peru between 1916 and 1935 (Suzuki, 1992). Beals (1935) warned of
this “threat” in an article entitled “Japan Invades Latin America.” Such crit-
icisms intensified in the 1930s as Peru sank in the midst of a worldwide
economic depression. Political instability following the end of Leguia’s 11-
year-long dictatorial rule (1919–1930) further aggravated anti-Japanese
sentiment.
During this period of economic and political instability in the 1930s, Peru
experienced a wave of nationalism. The Great Depression and Leguia’s mis-
handling of the country’s finances galvanized the forces of the left. The
nationalists attributed Peru’s growing economic and societal problems to the
penetration of foreign capital, which had increased to US$400 million in the
mid-1930s (Connell, 1995). Indeed, the United States, Peru’s major creditor,
controlled most of its largest corporations, while the British dominated its
principal railways, petroleum, mining, agriculture, manufacturing, and
trade. Italians controlled 50 percent of Peru’s banking, Germans controlled
nearly half the sugar production, and the Japanese predominated in the retail
trades and in cotton production (Fortune, January 1938, pp. 124–126, quoted
in Connell, 1995). The growing nationalist sentiment further aggravated the
anti-Japanese movement (Gerbi, 1943).
Animosities against the Japanese in the Americas were intensified by the
increasing Japanese presence on the continents and Japan’s military aggres-
sion in Asia during the 1930s. The United States viewed these expanding
interests with uneasiness and, particularly through the Pan-American Con-
ferences held between 1920 and 1940, encouraged Latin American countries
to take measures against them (Rippy, 1949; Peru Shimpo, 1975; Connell,
1995). Having banned Japanese immigration in 1907, the United States had
annulled Asians’ right to naturalize in 1917. The subsequent National Ori-
gins Act of 1924, intended to limit increasing immigration from southern and
eastern Europe, also targeted the Japanese, whose economic success was
viewed as a threat especially in the context of recession (Kumei, 1995). Fol-
lowing the lead of the United States, Central and South American countries
introduced similar acts of exclusion. In Guatemala, Panama, Venezuela, and
Paraguay, these laws excluded any “nonwhite race” (Rippy, 1949).

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92 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Argentina, which stated its preference for European immigrants in its consti-
tution, also allowed no Japanese immigrants (Wakatsuki and Suzuki, 1975).
Likewise, Brazil, home to the largest Japanese population on the continent,
passed anti-Japanese immigration legislation in 1923 (later blocked by the
parliament by a small margin). It went on to enact the “2 Percent Law” in
1934, restricting Japanese immigration by setting immigrant quotas at 2
percent of each national group (Wakatsuki and Suzuki, 1975).
U.S. involvement spurred draconian discriminatory measures, particu-
larly during World War II, in Peru. As an ally of the United States, Peru
annulled its diplomatic relations with Japan as soon as the former went to war
with Japan in 1941. This made the Japanese in Peru de facto enemy aliens,
and anti-Japanese measures escalated with aid from the United States. There-
after, all community institutions were disbanded, and Japanese-language
publications and meetings of more than three persons were prohibited as spy-
ing (Peru Shimpo, 1975). Japanese-owned businesses were either expropri-
ated or subjected to forced sale to the highest bidder, Japanese-owned depos-
its in Peruvian banks were frozen (Thompson, 1974), and land leases to
Japanese (as well as Germans and Italians) were canceled by a 1942 law
enacted jointly with the United States (Gerbi, 1943). The freedom of Japa-
nese to travel outside their home communities was also restricted.
All these actions culminated in the deportation of 1,800 Japanese to U.S.
detention camps. Mostly community and business leaders, these Japanese
were blacklisted by the U.S. embassy in Peru, “kidnapped” by the Peruvian
police, and shipped to Crystal City, Texas, together with 500 or so Japanese
from other Latin American countries (Connell, 1995; Emmerson, 1978).
Among the 11 Latin American countries, Peru was the major contributor to
the Japanese deportation program. Home to 75 percent of people of Japanese
origin on the Pacific side of South America and most aggressive in its efforts
to eliminate them from its land, Peru quickly became the target of the United
States, whose intention was to deport from Peru all 30,000 Japanese, both
first-generation immigrants and the Peruvian-born second generation,
regardless of citizenship (Connell, 1995). The program, justified in the name
of national security to eliminate “dangerous enemy aliens,” was carried out in
order to exchange them for U.S. soldiers detained by the Japanese army
(Connell, 1995). The deportation program succeeded in debilitating the
already damaged Japanese community institutions.
As hostility against the Japanese escalated in Peru, so did the process of
racialization. “After all,” remarked Seoane (1943: 674), “even Peruvian-born
children of Japanese immigrants were in reality ‘Japs’ in their spirit, their
organization, will, and customs.” The Japanese were perceived as dangerous
and problematic to Peru, as Guevara (1939) argued in his book The Biggest

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 Takenaka / THE JAPANESE IN PERU 93

National Problems. Moreover, they were considered racially inferior. The

use of the concept of race aggravated and simultaneously justified a variety of
discriminatory measures. This notion of racial difference and inferiority fil-
tered through to the Peruvian public and ultimately exploded in a riot.
In May 1940 a mob of student-led protesters looted Japanese businesses
and residences in downtown Lima one after another. During an entire day of
looting, over 600 establishments—almost all Japanese businesses in Lima—
were damaged (Peru Shimpo, 1975); dozens were injured and one Japanese
was killed. The police failed to step in. The damage amounted to more than
US$1.6 million (Gardiner, 1975; Peru Shimpo, 1975). In its extent and dam-
age, this was the worst rioting in Peruvian history. Moreover, it was the first
racially motivated riot to target a specific population. According to Peruvian
officials, the rioters were mostly lower-class people acting out of envy of Jap-
anese economic success (Connell, 1995). Whatever their motives, the riot
became a symbol of racial hatred.

CONSEQUENCES OF RACIALIZATION:
JAPANESE-PERUVIANS TODAY

The 1940 riot had significant and somewhat paradoxical consequences

for the Japanese in Peru. It was a turning point, prompting the immigrants to
reflect upon their community. For the first time, they recognized the need to
open up to and become integrated into Peruvian society. Having lost much of
their property, they had to start again from the beginning and give up any idea
of returning home, at least any time soon. In addition, Japan’s defeat in World
War II made it impossible to return to their devastated, poverty-stricken
country, particularly to Okinawa, which was severely damaged by the ground
battle there. Thus, the riot set a new direction for the Japanese immigrants
and their community.
Paradoxically, however, it also reinforced their communal solidarity.
As the “most traumatic event in Nikkei history” (Fukumoto, 1997: 521),
Japanese-Peruvians continue to talk about it to this day and use it to express
anger toward other Peruvians and to legitimize their “difference” from them.
Those who experienced the event vividly remember the looting of their stores
and their having hidden in nearby houses. Even those who did not experience
it directly mention the riot whenever they talk about their history, discrimina-
tion, and suffering. A second-generation Japanese-Peruvian in his 50s asked
me angrily, “Do you think you can trust those people who once attacked us
and confiscated all of our properties?” According to a Japanese-Peruvian
community leader, in a community-sponsored essay contest for children in

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94 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

1990 titled “About My Grandparents,” virtually every Japanese-Peruvian

child wrote about the riot.
The riot was also a significant event for Japanese-Peruvians in reinforcing
their fear of “outsiders.” Even 60 years later, Japanese-Peruvians continue to
live in fear of a recurrence and try to maintain a low profile. Most of them did
not support Fujimori during his first presidential election in 1990 for fear that
his poor performance if elected might lead to another riot. It was the nation’s
majority—the poorer indigenous and mestizo populations—who saw hope
and change in this nonwhite candidate. Among ruling-class white Peruvians,
his emergence as the first nonwhite presidential candidate created a consider-
able backlash. Some Japanese-Peruvians reported that their businesses were
attacked during the election campaign; others were denied entry to exclu-
sive discos and clubs (for whites) on racial grounds. Similarly, whenever
there were anti-Fujimori protests on Lima’s streets in the 1990s, Japanese-
Peruvians feared a second riot. As a legacy of discrimination, the riot pro-
vides them with a renewed sense of community with a distinct history.
The significance of the 1940 riot indeed reflects the salience of race in
organizing Peruvian society. Although racial labels—“mestizo,” “Indian,”
“white,” “Negro,” or “Asian”—have been eliminated from official docu-
ments such as the census and personal identification forms, the Peruvian gov-
ernment’s “race-blind policy” has not significantly diminished the salience
of race or altered the racial order, with numerically few whites on top, the
numerical majority of Indians at the bottom, and others in between.
Today, Japanese-Peruvians continue to be treated primarily in racial
terms—as “Asians,” “Orientals,” or “Chinese.” A third-generation native of
Lima recalled how he was bothered by his schoolmates: “They yelled at me,
‘chino, chino cochino’ (Chinese, dirty Chinese). I knew I looked different,
but I hated it when others called me Chinese.” As a racial minority, Japanese-
Peruvians are also treated as foreigners. They are often asked about Japan,
about which they know nothing. When they travel, they are frequently treated
as Japanese tourists, and when they travel to other South American countries
they often impress natives with their command of Spanish. At the same time,
they are immediately associated with (former) President Fujimori. Although
he had no personal ties with the Japanese-Peruvian community, he quickly
became “representative” of all Japanese-Peruvians (as well as Japanese in
general) as the most famous “Chino” in Peru. In a way, the fact that he was
elected president assured them of being accepted as full-fledged members of
Peruvian society. As one second-generation Japanese-Peruvian said, “After
Fujimori was elected, we felt we were finally accepted in this country. We
didn’t vote for him [in 1990], so Peruvians themselves voted for this son of
Japanese. They were saying that you are Peruvians just like us and you have

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 Takenaka / THE JAPANESE IN PERU 95

all the rights, including the right to govern the country.” Yet, they were also
aware that whenever his opponents criticized him, the issue of national mem-
bership and, particularly, doubts about his “Peruvianness” came up (e.g.,
whether he was truly born in Peru). In criticizing the Fujimori government, a
prominent (white) journalist occasionally made remarks such as “We should
recover Peru for Peruvians.”
Japanese-Peruvians are distinguished by their physical appearance,
which often stands out in a mostly Indian-mestizo country, and have been
treated positively or negatively depending on the economic and political situ-
ation (see Lesser, 1999). Although Japanese-Peruvians perceive little racial
discrimination today, their history of immigration and settlement as a racial
minority has had a significant impact on the creation and maintenance of
what is often described as a thriving and simultaneously a closed major racial
ethnic community in Peru. Their racialization has increased as they have
become economically successful; in a country where the majority of the
population are poor Indian-mestizos, economically advantaged Japanese-
Peruvians have a reason to want to remain a distinct racial minority.

NOTES

1. Yet, imin meant a “laborer”; according to the Encyclopedia of Japanese Diplomatic His-
tory, it referred to “people and their families who voyaged to countries other than China and
Korea for the purpose of labor” (quoted in Kumei, 1995: 13).
2. See, for example, Nihon o Suteta Nihonjin (The Japanese Who Abandoned Japan)
(Ishidoya, 1991), Suterareta Nihonjin (Abandoned Japanese) (Fujisaki, 1986), and Dominika
Imin wa Kimin Datta (Japanese Immigrants to the Dominican Republic Were Abandoned Peo-
ple) (Konno and Takahashi, 1993).

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