The document discusses the increasing cybersecurity threats faced by the healthcare sector, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting the financial and operational risks involved. It emphasizes the need for comprehensive cooperation, robust cybersecurity measures, and the establishment of effective frameworks to protect sensitive health data. The document also outlines the disparities between developed and developing countries in terms of cybersecurity maturity and suggests collaborative approaches to enhance resilience against cyberattacks.
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RESEARCH
The document discusses the increasing cybersecurity threats faced by the healthcare sector, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting the financial and operational risks involved. It emphasizes the need for comprehensive cooperation, robust cybersecurity measures, and the establishment of effective frameworks to protect sensitive health data. The document also outlines the disparities between developed and developing countries in terms of cybersecurity maturity and suggests collaborative approaches to enhance resilience against cyberattacks.
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RESEARCH
The accelerating rate of digitalization
Cornerstone of the 21st century the intersection between technological integration and vulnerabilities of health services warrants immediate attention and actions. Address an issue which transcends borders and poses a risk to global welfare This technological transformation aims to elevate the quality and availability of medical treatments In such a backdrop, COVID-19 placed even further strain on the healthcare industry Cyberdefense, cybersecurity, build/ implement cyber- resilience, robust cybersecurity measures The problems have not been solved due to a) Lack of comprehensive cooperation b) Lack of recognized treaties c) An incomplete coordination between IT professionals and healthcare sector ( specialized data regulations, healthcare workers) Threats of cybersecurity a) Financial losses deeply concerning domestic economies and international communities (HIPAA Journal reporting an average cost of $4.24 million per breach in 2022), place a significant financial burden on already strained healthcare system b) The public leakage (the list of renowned athletes in the World Anti-Doping agency (WAG) c) Healthcare data and welfare systems can be hijacked for the furtherance of certain political agendas ( cyberterrorists infiltrated NHS websites and uploaded images related to the Syrian civil war) d) Impede medical operations and patient care by making access to digital databases impossible for the staff e) The risk of medical devices being employed in advanced cyberwarfare strategies ( in the case of Australia where medical card numbers were found available on the dark web) f) Jeopardize patients’ health and research efforts g) Erode patient trust in healthcare providers (reputational damage) (make patients reluctant to disclose fully their conditions) -> deteriorate mental disorders,.. defer individuals from seeking essential treatment they are usually considered the most sophisticated cybersecurity threats due to their substantial resources (sensitive (sexual dietary) or valuable information (identification, medications, misuse of ensurances)) and capacity for large-scale breaches over prolonged periods of time with little risk of detection While electronic records provide certain advantages over conventional paper ones, namely the ability to conveniently monitor staff’s involvement in patient's treatment, it has also intensified the risks of potential breaches by allowing unfettered remote access through online databases. Malicious, political, mercenary reasons
Most vulnerable target
Examples: +March, 2020 the servers of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) experienced a massive distributed denial- of-service (DDoS) attack Global view Historical context Healthcare industry has long been an inviting target for cyberattacks due to + possess a comprehensive source of valuable and sensitive information + historically slower than others on adopting novel more secured technologies due to lengthy purchase cycles and stringent restrictions. ( obsolete unsupporting operating systems ) + Check Point research found an ultrasound machine running a Windows 2000 OS that no longer receive security patches (which means successful infiltration of this device is synonymous with potential myriad problems like leaked personal information, ransomware, misconducted medical machines,.. ) Covid-19 placed even further strain on the healthcare industry (2020 witnessed a staggering 42% increase in data breaches in healthcare due to global pandemic) + April 2020, a cyberattack targeted the University Hospital in Brno, one of the largest centers for Covid-19 blood testing in the Czech Republic, leading to the cancellation of several surgical operations as doctors couldn’t process coronavirus tests after the attack. To alleviate the challenge, healthcare organizations provide security guidance to their staff, and governments also provision individuals and organisations with this. + UK, National Health Service (NHS) Digital added guidance on working from home security, ramping up its on-site support for trusts on risk mitigation, data backup and threat response as well as offering free NCSC’s Protective Domain Name Service to the NHS The health sector had established security policies and legislation in place for cybersecurity management, available to protect medical cyber-physical systems + The US Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act with the goals of facilitating the interoperability of of electronic health data, safeguarding cybersecurity and privacy Healthcare organisations were advised to possess risk management programmes by adopting standard frameworks such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Current situation Recent decades have experienced a substantial surge in the number of cybersecurity attacks in the healthcare sector of various members states Global attacks have registered a 28% rise since 2022 In 2022 alone, there were 571 confirmed incidents with system intrusion representing 87% of total cases Singapore-based Cyber Risk Management (CyRiM) found that healthcare was the sector with the second highest losses incurred malware attacks with $10 billion damages worldwide Most prominent types of attack is basic web application attack, with the most prevalent being broken authentication and security misconfiguration The strongest motivation(instead of malpractice or human fallibilities) seems to be financial gain as data from the welfare sector are estimated to be higher than any other data gleaned from the Internet Past actions + United Nations General Assembly: adopted the Resolution 73/218 (2019) “ICT for sustainable development”; “encourage strengthened and continuing cooperation between and among stakeholders from both developed and developing countries” + Word Health Organization (WHO): Possess authority and adeptness in surveillance and monitoring, developing guidelines, policies, risk assessment, etc In May 2018, the Health Assembly adopted resolution WHA 71.7 in digital health which was a global strategy identifying priority areas including where WHO should focus its efforts WHO aims to improve the digital skills of all citizens through working with civil society to build public trust The Member States of the WHO, in this resolution, noted the urge to develop, as appropriate, legislation and/or data protection policies around issues regarding digital health such as cyberattacks, illegal data access and so on. After 3 years since the adoption of the above resolution, the WHO introduced a comprehensive 2020-2025 Global Strategy on Digital Health with four objectives The strategy emphasizes the need to create multi-level mechanisms for collaboration on global, regional, national level. Regarding the countries that currently lack resources and infrastructure, the Global Strategy promotes other countries to establish good sharing networks to review and adopt more updated, inclusive national cyber frameworks Success lies in the commitment of the stakeholders and smart measures by each Member State + The ITU: In 2021, the ITU introduced the publication “Guide to developing a National Cybersecurity Strategy 2nd Edition – Strategic engagement in cybersecurity” which mentioned the healthcare sector of Member States need to establish a risk-management approach to identifying and protecting critical infrastructure. Hence, the ITU is working with Member States with a view to establishing and strengthening each country’s National Computer Incident Response Teams (CIRTs) Bloc Positions a) Developed countries Compared to developing countries, developed ones generally gained an edge, achieved superior overall cybersecurity maturity due to + relatively stable financial capacity, which leverages their proactive investment in protective measures ( evidence: The dominance of North American countries like USA, Canada in the revenue share of the healthcare cybersecurity market as of 2021) + advanced healthcare infrastructure + robust legal systems ( the Healthcare insurance portability and accountability act (HIPAA), enacted by the United States federal government, can be perceived as a role model of a stringent, impactful law for introducing high levels of standardization on a national scale) However, it is incontrovertible that developed nations often become susceptible to ambitious cyber-attacks due to the vast repository of valuable and sensitive healthcare data. Drives behind these cyberattacks + majorly monetization + cyber espionage + healthcare algorithms training + intellectual property (IP) infringement b) Developing countries Orangeworm and APT22 are cybercrime alliances that target healthcare organizations in Asia by using malware mainly in India and Saudi Arabia The same situation is notable in the remaining countries, whose healthcare institutions had to switch to manual processing after the main server suffered from cyberattacks. (The Mexican, Brazilian and Indonesian governments lacks a clear stance on strategy on health cybersecurity and have weakened regulatory oversight of the ICT sector. ) There is lack of tangible framework, policies and regulations to develop the widespread use of ICT (information and communication technology) among the countries’ citizens. Lack of trust, coupled with the lack of trained personnel and specialized infrastructure in cybersecurity Fail example: South Africa’s cyber laws are coordinated by different government agencies, creating windows of opportunities for inconsistencies, fragmentation and misalignment, thus weakening initiatives for an effective national cybersecurity strategy Successful example: Nigeria, with the adoption of globally-recognized National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework, a comprehensive guidelines dealing with all entities from hospital to patients and other stakeholders Lesson: to achieve the national strategic goals of building technical cybersecurity capacities, four cybersecurity frameworks should be developed in parallel including: + Risk Management Framework + Incident Response Framework + Information Sharing Framework + Capability Building Framework Healthcare institutions can be proactive by implementing intrusion detection and prevention systems such as NIST in Nigeria to + monitor their networks for suspicious activities + generate alerts to them + automatically launch the predefined countermeasure to a potential cyberattack. Possible approaches 1. Measures a) Preventative measures + assess the efficiency of national policies and legislation regarding the current context of each country and the world would allow regions to defect flaws and further leverage their strengths + governments should incorporate technological advancements in to design suitable and medical devices that are up to standard criteria (securing stable IT foundation of infrastructures, devices: anti-virus, backup and restoration of files/data, data loss prevention, email gateway, encryption at rest, etc) + promote a risk-based approach: identify priorities in the processes of vulnerability management, patch management, penetration testing and increase the resilience in the face of disasters including epidemics, natural catastrophes… + heighten the awareness and broaden cybersecurity-related knowledge of healthcare workers b) Proactive measures Through reports of incidents, authorized bodies should be able to analyse and exchange cases of cyber crimes They can react quickly to unfortunate cases and minimize risks by + Applying technical controls and devices to ensure cryptographic security across network systems + Infuse homomorphic encryption, blockchain, network segmentation into the sector’s control system + Apply advanced security measures such as anti-theft apparatus, disaster recovery, digital forensics, etc 2. Fostering cooperation and collaboration between stakeholders at the national and international level a) National scale Countries and regions can promote partnerships between the authorities and different stakeholders. This can involve + Assessing the efficiency of existing normative, legal, and policy frameworks and making amendments + Implementing new policies depending on the circumstances of each country. + Having alternative and backup solutions in case of emergencies pertaining to cyber fraud b) International scale + Maintaining effective channels of communication about the secure usage and control of cyber networks in healthcare affairs among countries’ authorities, and trading partners. + Harmonizing cybersecurity in healthcare sector legislation between countries in the same region with relevant international agreements may minimize the risks of fraud. + Reporting any incidents of cyber criminals happening in Member States’ channels to the WHO can help contribute valuable information that promotes the identification of patterns, trends, and emerging threats, thereby enabling timely intervention, preventing further damage and minimizing the impact.