Notes in

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
(A Compendium from the books of Rufus B. Rodriguez, Ruperto Martin, Ruben A. Agpalo, Ricardo M,
Pilares III, Rolando A. Suarez, and Notes of Wigberto Tanada including:
Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends by Congressional Research Service)

LAST REVISION: September 18, 2023

* Notes on Statutes,

CONCEPTS AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. DEFINITION:

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: It is the art or process of discovering and

expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application in a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful among others, by
reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. (Black,
Interpretation of Laws, p. 1) Caltex vs. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247)

(Agpalo- p104)

“Construction is the drawing of warranted conclusion respecting subjects that lie

beyond the direct expression of the text, conclusions which are in the spirit, though not
within the letter of the text.”

-It is the art of seeking the intention of the authors of the law in enacting a statute and
applying it to a given set of facts.

-The art or process of ascertaining the intention of the law-making body to resolve
ambiguity in the law or its part.

-It is likewise defined as that branch of the law dealing with the interpretation of laws
enacted by a legislature.

Note: The legislature is presumed to know the rules of construction in enacting a

statute. The legislature enacts a law with the end in view that it will, in case of doubt,
be construed in accordance with settled principles and rules established by legal
hermeneutics.

(Agpalo- p 105-106)

“Rules of statutory construction are tools used to ascertain the legislative intent. They are
not rules of law but mere axioms of experience. (Hence, not binding nor controlling on the
courts.)

***In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to know the rules of statutory
construction. The legislature enacts a law with the end in view that it will, in case of doubt,
be construed in accordance with the settled principles of interpretation.

……… Thus, where there is ambiguity in the language of a statute, court employ
canons of statutory construction to ascertain its true meaning and intent.
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 1
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 …….. As instrument of construction, they may only be used to clarify, not to
defeat legislative intent.”

Note: Only statutes with ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory
construction.

(Suarez, page 2)

“The most basic rule to follow in Statutory Construction:

APPLY THE LAW- When the law speaks in clear and categorical language.

INTERPRET THE LAW - When there is ambiguity in the language of the statute,
ascertain legislative intent by making use of intrinsic aid, or those found in the statute itself.

CONSTRUCT THE LAW- When the intent of the legislature cannot be ascertained by
merely making use of intrinsic aids, the court should resort to extrinsic aids, or those found
outside the language of the law.”

(Suarez, p 25)
When an action is brought to the court for decision, “the court should apply, among
others, these basic rules, to wit:

1. When the law is clear, the court’s duty is to apply, not to interpret it.
2. In applying the law, the court should discover the real intent and purpose of the
legislature. If that intent and purpose can be discovered within the law, it is the duty of the court
to carry out the intention. If the intent and purpose cannot be found within the law, the court
should resort to extrinsic aids.
3. When all rules of statutory construction fail, it is presumed that the law making body
intended right and justice to prevail.

(Suarez… p27)

“In determining the intention of the legislature, the courts may use any of the following:
1, Intrinsic aids – elements found in the law itself
2. Extrinsic aids – facts or matters not found in the law
3. Presumptions – based on logic or established provision of law.”

*The established practice is to resort first to intrinsic aid (Interpretation) before resolving to
extrinsic aid and before indulging in presumptions.

Me: when resorting to any of these tools of construction, one must always bear in mind the
General Principles of Construction and Canons of Construction, in determining the intention
of the legislature.

(See -Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends…. p 68

Tools of Statutory Interpretation. (p 68

Judges use a variety of tools to help them interpret statutes, most frequently relying on
five types of interpretive tools: ordinary meaning, statutory context, canons of construction,
legislative history, and evidence of the way a statute is implemented.188

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 2

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Ordinary Meaning

Courts often begin by looking for the “ordinary” or “plain” meaning of the statutory text. 194
Where a term is not expressly defined in the statute,195 courts generally assume “that Congress
uses common words in their popular meaning, as used in the common speech of men.” 196

The Supreme Court has also referred to this exercise as seeking a word’s “natural meaning,”
198 or its “normal and customary meaning.” 199 However, this “ordinary meaning”
presumption can be overcome if there is evidence that the statutory term has a specialized
meaning in law200 or in another relevant field.20

Judges may use a wide variety of materials to gather evidence of a text’s ordinary meaning. In
many cases, “simple introspection” suffices, as judges are English speakers who presumably
engage in everyday conversation like the rest of the general public. 202 Judges also turn to
dictionaries to help inform their understanding of a word’s normal usage.203 Judges may then
have to choose between multiple definitions provided by the same dictionary204 or by different
dictionaries.205 Courts have also turned to books to discover a word’s ordinary meaning,
drawing from books.
8 Finally, judges may look for evidence of normal usage elsewhere in the law, such as in
judicial decisions209 or in other governmental materials.210

Statutory Context

Often, a statutory dispute will turn on the meaning of only a few words.223 Courts will interpret
those words, though, in light of the full statutory context. 224 To gather evidence of statutory
meaning, a judge may turn to the rest of the provision,225 to the act as a whole,226 or to
similar provisions elsewhere in the law. 227 As the Supreme Court said in one opinion,
“Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in
isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme. . . .”

Canons of Construction

Over time, courts have created the “canons of construction” to serve as guiding principles for
interpreting statutes. 253 The canons supply default assumptions about the way Congress
generally expresses meaning,254 but are not “rules” in the sense that they must invariably be
applied.255 A judge may decline to interpret a statute in accordance with any given canon if the
canon’s application is not justified in that case.25

Semantic Canons

The semantic, or textual, canons represent “rules of thumb for decoding legal language.” 264
Because these canons focus on statutory text, they are often favored by textualists. 265 The
semantic canons frequently reflect the rules of grammar that govern ordinary language usage.
266 Consequently, these rules may overlap with indicators of a provision’s ordinary meaning267
—and indeed, some authors label the principle that words should be given their ordinary
meaning as a semantic canon.26

For example, “grammatical ‘rule of the last antecedent’” states that “a limiting clause or
phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it
immediately follows.” 269 In Barnhart v. Thomas, the Supreme Court illustrated this canon with
the following hypothetical:

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 3

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 Consider, for example, the case of parents who, before leaving their teenage son alone in
the house for the weekend, warn him, “You will be punished if you throw a party or engage in
any other activity that damages the house.” If the son nevertheless throws a party and is caught,
he should hardly be able to avoid punishment by arguing that the house was not damaged. The
parents proscribed (1) a party, and (2) any other activity that damages the house.270 The last-
antecedent canon tells the reader of the parents’ edict that the descriptive clause “that damages
the house” refers to the “nearest reasonable antecedent”: here, “any other activity.” 271
Accordingly, that clause modifies only the phrase “any other activity,” and not “party,” a more
remote antecedent.272

Substantive Canons

In contrast to the semantic canons, the substantive canons express “judicial presumption[s] . . .
in favor of or against a particular substantive outcome.” 292 Some of these canons, primarily
those that protect constitutional values, are frequently described as “clear statement rules”
because courts will favor certain outcomes unless the statute makes a “clear statement” that
unambiguously dislodges the presumption.293 The substantive canons “look to the legal
consequences of interpretation rather than to linguistic issues alone.” 294 If a statute is
susceptible to more than one meaning, they may tip the scale toward a particular result.295
Accordingly, invocation of the substantive canons frequently invites judicial disagreement. 296
The canon of constitutional avoidance provides a good example of how even a well-
established297 substantive canon can provoke debate. 298 The canon of constitutional
avoidance provides that if one plausible reading of a statute would raise “serious doubt”
about the statute’s constitutionality, a court should look for another, “fairly possible”
reading that would avoid the constitutional issue. 299 Thus, for instance, the constitutional-
avoidance canon might lead a court to adopt a limiting construction of a statutory provision, if a
broader interpretation would allow the government to exercise a constitutionally problematic
amount of power.300

ELEMENTS OF THE DEFINITION:

Using definition by way of genus et deferentia

GENUS: It is an art/act or process

SPECIE: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

DEFERENTIA:

Purpose/objective: To ascertain the meaning and intention of Congress (authors of the

law).

“…..discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law”

(Note - “The cardinal rule in interpretation of all laws is to ascertain, and give effect to,
the intent of the law”

- “The purpose of Statutory Construction is to determine legislative intent when

the same cannot be readily ascertained from the plain language of the law.” (Pilares
III, p14-15)

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 4

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 (Tanada)

Purpose: Ascertaining the true intent of the legislature.

**** Assumption: The legislature enacts a law with the end in view that it will, in cases
of doubt, be construed in accordance with the settled principles of interpretation.

*Rules of statutory construction are used to ascertain legislative intent. But they are not
rules of law but mere axioms of experience, hence, not binding nor controlling on the
courts.

Legislative intent- is the essence of the law. It is the spirit which gives life to legislative
enactment.

Agpalo- p-108

“The term ‘intent’ includes two concepts, that of the purpose and that of the meaning.
It has been held, however, that the ascertainment of legislative intent depends more on the
determination of the purpose and object of the law. Intent is sometimes equated with the word
‘spirit’. While the terms ‘meaning’, ‘intent’, and ‘spirit’ are oftentimes interchangeably used by
the courts, they are not entirely synonymous.”

Legislative purpose- reason why a particular statute was enacted.

Agpalo, p. 108

“The legislative purpose is the reason why a particular statute was enacted by the
legislature. What did the legislature intend to achieve or accomplish by enacting a statute?
What is its object? Is it to prevent a mischief? Is it to create a right? Is it to eliminate defects in
existing law? Is it to implement specific provisions or mandates of the Constitution.”

Legislative meaning- is what the law, by its language means * The primary source of legislative
intent should be the statute itself.” (Tanada)

Note: Plain language rule

 The author of the law is presumed to know the meaning of the words that was
used and that it was used in its common and ordinary meaning.

Agpalo -109

“…. What it comprehends; what it covers or embraces; what it limits or confines are.

(Note: When, to whom, how and under what circumstances is the law to be APPLIED?)

*Note: As per definition, “the objective of construction is to find both meaning and
intent.

-The Supreme Court consistently relied on two conceptual references in determining the meaning
of the law and legislative intent. They have been commonly referred to as the VERBA LEGIS
RULE and the RATIO LEGIS RULE.” (Pilares III, page 59)

Verba legis and ratio legis are not opposing concepts. They should be viewed as
complementary principles (not mutually exclusive) of construction that should be used to
determine the meaning and intent of a statutory provision. (Pilares III, page 79)
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 5
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
VERBA LEGIS

(Tanada)

Verba legis (Plain meaning rule)

- Where the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without interpretation.
- Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application. 37
- *Law cannot be changed under the guise of interpretation.38

Maxim: Index Animi Sermo Est (speech is the index of intention)

***Presumption: The words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently.
*Take note of other presumptions that apply. (SEE DISCUSSION ON
PRESUMPTIONS)

RATIO LEGIS

(Tanada)

Ratio legis (Spirit of the law)

- Moving away from the literal interpretation

Maxims:
ratio legis et anima legis (the reason of the law is its soul);
ratione cessat lex et cessat lex (when the reason of the law ceases, the law ceases)

Presumption: The letter of the law is its body; the spirit (reason), the soul; and the construction
of the former should never be so rigid and technical as to destroy the latter.

“PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVENESS – a statute must be read in such a way as

to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute”.

AMBIGUITY

“WHEN, by reason of ambiguity in the language of the law – the facts of the case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.”

*A condition sine qua non, before the court may construe or interpret a statute, is
that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language. Elementary is the rule that when the
law is clear, it is incumbent upon the judge to apply them regardless of personal
belief or predilections- when the law in unambiguous and unequivocal, application,
not interpretation therefore is imperative."

CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSTRUCTION
(Pilares, pages 2-14)

A. “It is an art or Process

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 6

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 Construction is not an exact science. It does not depend on a set of formula that can
be readily applied in every case.

A statute can be interpreted differently if different maxims of construction are

applied.

 The principles of construction should not be used if by its application will run
counter to the clear legislative intent which can be determined from the other parts
the law. (Pilares page 2)

 The canons of construction should be considered as auxiliary rules of construction

which are neither universal nor conclusive in application. Thus ‘it should be
applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise
manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the
legislature.’(Pilares , page 4)

B. It involves the determination of the legislative intent.

Pilares , page 5 citing Torres vs. Limjap (G.R. No. 34385, 21 September, 1931)
quoting Sutherland

“…..Intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of
construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The intention of the
legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be with the strict letter of the law . Courts will
not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose
of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.
Intent is the spirit which gives life to legislative enactment. In construing
statutes, the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the
legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the content and
promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature
(Vol II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 693-695)

“…. (w)hen legislative intent is employed as the criterion for interpretation of

construction, the primary emphasis is on what the statute meant to the members
of the legislature which enacted it (while) (o)n the other hand, inquiry into the
‘meaning of the statute’ generally manifests greater concern for what the members
of the public to whom it is addressed, understand.” (Pilares III, page 58 quoting
Sutherland Stat Const 45.08, 5th Ed)

“In Araneta vs. Dinglasan, the Court held that a rule must be tested according to its
results, that is, the intention of the law in question must be sought for in its nature,
the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to
the Constitution.” (Pilares III, page 6)

“ In Ramirez vs. Garcia, the Court held that ‘ legislative intent is determined
principally from the language of the statute’ and that (w)here the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to the expressed terms,
and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation either would
be impossible, absurd, or would lead to a injustice.” (Pilares III, page 59)

WHAT IS LEGISLATIVE INTENT? WHAT DOES IT COMPREHEND?

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 7
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 (Agpalo, page108)

“The term ‘intent’ includes two concepts, that of the purpose and that of the
meaning’….. Intent is sometimes equated with the word ‘spirit’. While the term
purpose,’ ‘meaning,’ ‘intent,’ and ‘spirit’ are often times interchangeably used by the
courts, they are not entirely synonymous.”

1. LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE.

(Agpalo-p 108)

“The legislative purpose is the reason why a particular statute was enacted. What did
the legislature intended to achieve or accomplish by enacting a statute? What is its
object? Is it to prevent a mischief? Is it to create right? Is it to eliminate defect in
existing laws? Is it to implement specific provisions or mandate of the Constitution?”

- The ends to be achieved.

2. EGISLATIVE MEANING

(Agpalo, p 109)

“Legislative meaning is what the law, by its language, means. What it

comprehends; what it covers or embraces; what its limits or confines are. When
such question as – what does the legislature really intend? What is in its mind? – are
asked, what is being sought is the legislative intent. Does the language of the law
reflect what the legislature intended? If so, the legislative intent and the meaning is
synonymous. If there is ambiguity in the language used in the statute, its purpose may
indicate the meaning of the language and lead to what the legislative intent is…. ”
(Agpalo, page 109)

C. It is necessary when the legislative intent cannot be readily ascertained from the
words used in the law as applied to a set of facts.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. There is only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This is what is know as the plain-meaning rule or verba
legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or ‘speech is he index of
intention’. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or
‘from the word of a statute there should be no departure.’

“The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may
be the subject of statutory construction.”

D. It is a judicial function.

Power to construe - The duty and power to interpret or construe a statute or the
Constitution belongs to the judiciary (Sec. 4 Par. 2, Art. VIII). (DSLU)

It is the Court (Supreme Court) which has the final say as to what the law means.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 8

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 Limitations: The Court can only construe an applicable law in controversies which are
ripe for judicial resolution. Neither moot nor academic (purpose has become stale or
where no practical relief can be granted or which can have no practical effect).

Exception: If the issue is “capable of repetition yet evading review” especially where
public interest requires its resolutions. (Pimentel vs. Ermita)

*The legislature has no power to overrule the interpretation made by the Court.

“If the legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertained its meaning
by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion.”
(Endencia v. David)

Meaning: The legislature cannot, by law or resolution, modify or annul the

judicial construction without modifying or repealing the very statute which has been
subject of construction.

Exceptions:

1. When the Supreme Court reverses itself

2. By amending the Constitution

3. By enacting a new statute

Endencia v. David

After a judicial declaration interpreting a constitutional provision that taxing is a form

of diminution of salary, Congress enacted a law to include justices and members of the
judicial body in the scope of taxing power of the government. Held: Congress cannot, by
law, modify an interpretation of the Constitution made by the court. Including the judicial
officers to the scope of taxation is a form of interpretation of the Constitutional provision
against diminution of salaries.

In the case of In Re: R. McCullock Dick (G.R. No. 13862A, 15 April 1918, the court held
that under the Philippine system of government, the duty and the ultimate power to construe the
law is vested in the judicial department, just as the duty and ultimate power to legislate is vested
in the legislature.

Note: Separation of Power

AMBIGUITY

Note: Condition sine qua non: Before the court may use its power to construe, there must be ambiguity
in the language of the statute. For where there is no ambiguity, there is no room for construction, only for
application. (Tanada)

“Ambiguity- condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one
way, or of referring to two or more things at the same time.

*susceptibility to more than one interpretation” (Tanada)

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 9

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 Ambiguity is doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning, indistinctness or uncertainty of
meaning of an expression used in a written instrument. (Black Law Dictionary, 4th Edition,
p.105)

Ambiguity means a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in

more than one way or of referring to or more things at the same time- it is susceptible to more
than one interpretation. A law is deemed ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by
reasonably well-informed person in two or more senses.

Suarez, p 9

Ambiguity is doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning, indistinctness, or uncertainty of

meaning of an expression used in a written instrument. (Black’s Dictionary, 4th Edition, p
105) It has been held that ambiguity does not only arise from the meaning of the particular words
but also from the general scope and meaning of the statute when all the provisions are examined.
There is also ambiguity when a literal interpretation of the words would lead to
unreasonable, unjust, or absurd consequences, or where a statute is in conflict with the
constitution, or where the statute would defeat the policy of the legislation. (Tarlac
Development Corporation vs. C.A., L-41012, September 30,1976)

The judiciary interprets how legislation should apply in a particular case as no legislation
unambiguously and specifically addresses all matters.

Ambiguity may arise from various reasons. Some of which are the following:

A. Words are imperfect symbols to communicate intent. They are ambiguous and change in
meaning over time.

*Note that ambiguities may lead to invalid conclusions.

Fallacies of ambiguity:

a) Equivocation- most words have more than one literal meaning, and most of the
time we have no difficulty keeping those meanings separate by noting the context
and using our good sense when reading and listening. Yet when we confuse the
several meanings of a word or phrase – accidentally or deliberately – we are using
the word equivocally.

e.g. a ruler may refer to a person who rules but it may refer to a device used to
measure.

b) Amphiboly – (Greek meaning – two in a lump). A sentence may be ambiguous

because of their grammatical construction. A statement is amphibolous when its
meaning is indeterminate because of the loose and awkward way in which each
words are combined. Dangling participle and phrases often present amphiboly.

Eg. The farmer blew out his brains after taking affectionate farewell of his
family with a shotgun.

c) Accent - ambiguity caused by shifting or change of emphasis on a single word or

phrase, whose meaning does not change. It happens that in the Greek language of
Aristotle’s day, some words spelled identically had different meanings depending
on the way in which they were pronounced, or accented. e.g. We should not speak
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 10
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 ill of our friends. (Fallacy of Emphasis). If we accent the word “friend”, the
proposition might lead to a conclusion that it is okay to speak ill to anyone for as
long as that person is not your friend.

d) Composition – attributes of a part of a whole to the attribute of the whole itself.

E.g. the part of an automobile is light therefore the whole automobile is light. It
claims that attributes of individual elements or members of a collection is the
attribute of the collection or totality of those elements.

e) Division – reverse of the fallacy of composition - what is true of a whole must

also be true of its parts. When one argues from the attributes of a collection of
elements to the attributes of the themselves.

Taken from: Copi and Cohen, “Introduction to Logic”, pages 157-166, 13 th

Edition, Pearson Education Inc.

B. Unforeseen situations are inevitable, and new technologies and cultures make
application of existing laws difficult.

C. Uncertainties may be added to the statute in the course of enactment, such as the
need for compromise or catering to special interest groups.

*The author/s of the law do not have the pre-science of the Delphic Oracle to look into
the future and predict what exactly is going to happen. The most that we can expect from
them is the use of their wisdom and experience in enacting a law and their honest,
reasonable and just intention in helping build and develop our society.

(Pilares, pp 8-9

TESTS IN DETERMINING WHEN A STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS REQUIRING

CONSTRUCTION

A.TEST OF MULTIPLE INTERPRETATION – when a statue is capable of two

or more reasonable interpretations such that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

B.TEST OF IMPOSSIBILITY- when literal application is impossible or

inadequate.

C.TEST OF ABSURDITY OR UNREASONABLENESS – when a literal

interpretation of a statute would result to unjust, unreasonable, absurd, or mischievous
result, or is at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole. (most specially if
the interpretation would defeat the purpose of the law/ reason why the law was
made).

Therefore, the court must try to determine how a statute should be enforced. This
requires statutory construction.

*It is a tenet of statutory construction that the legislature is supreme (assuming

constitutionality) when creating law and that the court is merely an interpreter of the law.
In practice, by performing the construction the court can make sweeping changes in the
operation of the law.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 11

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
RULE: ONLY STATUTES WITH AMBIGUOUS OR DOUBTFUL MEANING MAY BE
THE SUBJECTS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

“When the law is clear, all you have to do is to apply the law.”

WHEN IS A LAW SO “VAGUE” AS NOT TO SATISFY THE DUE PROCESS NEED

FOR NOTICE?

Ans: It is vague when it lacks comprehensible standard that men of “common

intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application.”
It is repugnant to the constitution is to respects:
1. It violates the due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
2. It leaves the enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provision
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the government
- Unnecessarily limits rights – people will tend to stir close to the middle
so as not to violate it
- The enforcer becomes an “ad hoc” committee in necessarily saying
what the law is and when it is to apply.

(Tanada)
More application, less construction
- The first and fundamental duty of the court is to apply the law.
- Construction comes only after there has been a showing of ambiguity, hence, application is
impossible

Verba legis (Plain meaning rule)

- Where the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without interpretation.
- Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.
There is only room for application. 37
- Law cannot be changed under the guise of interpretation.38

Maxim: index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention)

Presumption: The words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently.

Silva v. Cabrera
Cabrera wanted to construct an ice plant even if there is an existing one already owned by
petitioner. The case was brought to the Public Service Commission, and the agency appointed
Atty. Espellera to hear the case and receive evidence. The PSC rendered a decision allowing
respondent to operate
Held: Where the law is clear, there is only room for application. Although the law granted the
PSC to appoint an attorney to take testimony of the witnesses if residing distant from Manila, the
law is clear that only the commission can hear, receive evidence, and render a decision.

Quijano v. DBP
Petitioner, a veteran, obtained a loan from DBP. He wanted to pay the subsisting obligation
through the backpay certificate.
Held: The law is clear, backpay certificate may only be used to pay for the loan if the subsisting
obligation was obtained prior to the passage of RA 897. A subsisting obligation may only be

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 12

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
considered after receipt of the loan, not on the day of awarding of application (since, there was
still no obligation at that time).

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Limpan Investment

The BIR found that respondent had tax deficiencies for more than two years. They brought the
case to the Court of Tax Appeals where it held that the interest and surcharge should start from
period where the decision became final.
Held: The National Internal Revenue Code clearly stated that in computing the interest and
surcharge of the tax deficiency, it should start from the date of notice and demand. The CTA,
therefore, made an error where it fixed a new date.

People v. Mapa
Mapa claimed that he was a secret agent of Governor Leviste when he was charged for illegal
possession of unlicensed firearms.
Held: Although it was earlier held that secret agents may be exempted from possession of
firearms since they do the work of peace officers, the Revised Administrative Code clearly
enumerated those who may be exempted, and secret agents were not included.

Chartered Bank Employees v. Ople

Employees of Chartered Bank complained that they were not paid for the 10-day holiday.
Employer said that a circular made by Sec. Ople clarified that regular employees are presumed to
be paid for the whole year, thereby also counting holidays.
Held: The Labor Code clearly stated that holidays should be paid by the employer to regular
employees, hence, the circular is invalid. Moreover, it was also found out that the computation
for the salaries did not include said holidays, hence, the employer is really liable for said
payment.

Melendres v. COMELEC
Melendres lost to Concepcion in a barangay election. He filed an election protest to an MTC.
Concepcion filed a petition to the COMELEC and moved to dismiss it upon knowing that no
docket fee was paid. Hence, petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
Held: Payment of docket vests jurisdiction to a court (Gatchalian v. CA). Non-payment of this
means no protest must be given due course. The COMELEC is right when it dismissed it since
its Rules of Procedure provided that protests should be filed 10 days after the proclamation; the
payment was done 25 days after said proclamation.

LEGAL HERMENEUTICS
- It is the branch of science that establishes the principles and rules of
interpretation and construction of written laws.

- It is the branch of science /jurisprudence which establishes the principles and

rules of interpretation and construction of written laws.

*Hermeneutics- The science or art of construction and interpretation.

- ***Otherwise put, legal hermeneutics is the systematic body of rules which

are recognized as applicable to the construction and interpretation of legal
writings. (Black’s Legal Dictionary, Centennial ed. Quoted in Diaz, Stat. Con. 3rd
Ed., 2007 at page 11-12)

EXEGESIS
- The application of the principles and rules established by legal
hermeneutics.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 13

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 Statutory Construction Legal Hermeneutics Exegesis
Process. Branch of jurisprudence. Application of principles and
Seeking the intention using the Establish the principles and rules established in legal
principles/procedures to be rules; hermeneutics
able to interpret or construct
Goal: To ascertain the intention of the authors of the law.

Cardinal Rule on Statutory Construction

- Achieve the goal of the law- purpose of the law. (MENS LEGISLATORES)
- Ascertain and give effect to the intention of the framers of the law.

Formula:

LAW + FACTS = DECISION or

(L + F = D)
MAJOR PREMISE + MINOR PREMISE = CONCLUSION
 You cannot make a valid Conclusion when your major premise is ambiguous.

THEORIES OF CONSRUCTION

Pilares, pp 15-17
1. Textualist or originalism- the words used in the statute takes precedence over any other
modes of construction..
2. Intentionalism focuses on legislative intent in the belief that the policies (and) elected,
representative body choose (sic) should govern society. As such, it is the duty of the court to
discern the intent of that representative body and interpret statutes to further that intent.
3. Purpositivismor legal process theory- focuses on determining the problem that the
legislative is seeking to address. Thus, interpretation is made with a view to the public policy that
the statute seeks to advance.

(See: Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends)

In the tripartite structure of the U.S. federal government, it is the job of courts to say what the
law is, as Chief Justice John Marshall announced in 1803. When courts render decisions on the
meaning of statutes, the prevailing view is that a judge’s task is not to make the law, but rather to
interpret the law made by Congress. The two main theories of statutory interpretation—
purposivism and textualism—disagree about how judges can best adhere to this ideal of
legislative supremacy.

Regardless of their interpretive theory, judges use many of the same tools to gather evidence of
statutory meaning. First, judges often begin by looking to the ordinary meaning of the statutory
text. Second, courts interpret specific provisions by looking to the broader statutory context.
Third, judges may turn to the canons of construction, which are presumptions about how courts
ordinarily read statutes. Fourth, courts may look to the legislative history of a provision.
Finally, a judge might consider how a statute has been—or will be—implemented. Although
both purposivists and textualists may use any of these tools, a judge’s theory of statutory
interpretation may influence the order in which these tools are applied and how much weight is
given to each tool.18

When a statute becomes the subject of a dispute in court, judges usually must interpret the
law, ambiguous or not. As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in Marbury v. Madison: “It is
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 14
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 19 Judicial
pronouncements about statutes are generally the final word on statutory meaning and will
determine how the law is carried out—at least, unless Congress acts to amend the law. In the
realm of statutory interpretation, many members of the judiciary view their role in “say[ing]
what the law is” as subordinate to Congress’s position as the law’s drafter. 20 Indeed, the
legitimacy of any particular exercise in statutory interpretation is often judged by how well it
carries out Congress’s will.21

Judges have taken a variety of approaches to resolving the meaning of a statute. 22 The two
theories of statutory interpretation that predominate today are purposivism and
textualism.23 Proponents of both theories generally share the goal of adhering to Congress’s
intended meaning, but disagree about how best to achieve that goal.24 Judges subscribing to
these theories may employ different interpretive tools to discover Congress’s meaning, 25
looking to the ordinary meaning of the disputed statutory text,26 its statutory context,27
any applicable interpretive canons,28 the legislative history of the provision, 29 and
evidence about how the statute has been or may be implemented. 30

Goals of Statutory Interpretation:

Courts “say what the law is” 34 by resolving legal disputes in individual cases.35

The predominant view of a judge’s proper role in statutory interpretation is one of “legislative
supremacy.” 41 This theory holds that when a court interprets a federal statute, it seeks “to give
effect to the intent of Congress.” 42 Under this view, judges attempt to act as “faithful agents”
of Congress. 43 They “are not free to simply substitute their policy views for those of the
legislature that enacted the statute.” 44 This belief is rooted in the constitutional separation of
powers: in the realm of legislation, the Constitution gives Congress, not courts, the power to
make the law. 45 The judicial power vested in the courts entails only “the power to pronounce
the law as Congress has enacted it.” 46 Accordingly, courts must remain faithful to what the
legislature enacted.47

Major Theories of Statutory Interpretation

The two predominant theories of statutory interpretation today are purposivism and
textualism.93 As discussed, both theories share the same general goal of faithfully interpreting
statutes enacted by Congress. 94 This goal is grounded in the belief that the Constitution makes
the legislature the supreme lawmaker and that statutory interpretation should respect this
legislative supremacy.95 Interpretive problems arise, however, when courts attempt to determine
how Congress meant to resolve the particular situation before the court. 96 The actual intent of
the legislature that passed a given statute is usually unknowable with respect to the precise
situation presented to the court. 97 Accordingly, purposivists and textualists instead seek to
construct an objective intent.98

Accordingly, purposivists and textualists instead seek to construct an objective intent.98

Purposivists and textualists, however, disagree about the best way to determine this objective
intent. This disagreement is based in large part on distinct views of the institutional competence
of the courts.99 The concept of “institutional competence” assumes that each branch of
government “has a special competence or expertise, and the key to good government is not just
figuring out what is the best policy, but figuring out which institutions should be making which
decisions and how all the institutions should interrelate.” 100 “[T]he rules of [statutory]
interpretation allocate lawmaking power among the branches of government, and those
rules should reflect and respect what, if anything, the Constitution has to say about that
allocation.” 101 Consequently, because purposivists and textualists have different views of how
judges can best act to advance the will of the legislature, they advocate different modes of
interpretation102 and turn to different tools for evidence of Congress’s objective intent. 103

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 15

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Purposivism

Purposivists argue “that legislation is a purposive act, and judges should construe statutes
to execute that legislative purpose.” 104 Purposivists often focus on the legislative process,
taking into account the problem that Congress was trying to solve by enacting the disputed law
and asking how the statute accomplished that goal.105 They argue that courts should interpret
ambiguous text “in a way that is faithful to Congress’s purposes.” 106 Two preeminent
purposivists from the mid-20th century, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, advocated the
“benevolent presumption . . . that the legislature is made up of reasonable men pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably.” 107 But there was a caveat to this presumption: it should not
hold if “the contrary is made unmistakably to appear” in the text of the statute.108

Purposivists believe that judges can best observe legislative supremacy by paying attention to the
legislative process. 109 The Constitution “charges Congress, the people’s branch of
representatives, with enacting laws,” 110 and accordingly, purposivists contend that courts
should look to “how Congress actually works.” 111 As such, they argue that to preserve the
“integrity of legislation,” judges should pay attention to “how Congress makes its purposes
known, through text and reliable accompanying materials constituting legislative history.” 112
Courts should take into consideration any “institutional device that facilitates compromise and
helps develop the consensus needed to pass important legislation.” 113

To discover what a reasonable legislator was trying to achieve,115 purposivists rely on the
statute’s “policy context,” looking for “evidence that goes to the way a reasonable person
conversant with the circumstances underlying enactment would suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy.” 116
….. As a result, purposivists maintain that courts should first ask what problem Congress
was trying to solve,119 and then ask whether the suggested interpretation fits into that
purpose.12

Textualism
In contrast to purposivists, textualists focus on the words of a statute, emphasizing text
over any unstated purpose.126 Textualists argue courts should “read the words of that
[statutory] text as any ordinary Member of Congress would have read them.” 127 They look for
the meaning “that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside
the remainder of the corpus juris [the body of law].” 128 Textualists care about statutory purpose
to the extent that it is evident from the text.129 Accordingly, textualists “look at the statutory
structure and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable
user of words.” 130

Textualists believe that “judges best respect legislative supremacy” when they follow rules that
prioritize the statutory text. 131 For textualists, focusing on the text alone and adopting the
“presumption that Congress ‘means . . . what it says’ enables Congress to draw its lines
reliably— without risking that a court will treat an awkward, strange, behind-the-scenes
compromise as a legislative error or oversight.” 132 As Judge Frank Easterbrook stated,
“[s]tatutes are not exercises in private language,” but are “public documents, negotiated and
approved by many parties.” 133 Textualism focuses on the words of a statute because it is
that text that survived these political processes and was duly enacted by Congress,
exercising its constitutional power to legislate.134 Textualists have argued that focusing on
“genuine but unexpressed legislative intent” invites the danger that judges “will in fact pursue
their own objectives and desires” 135 and, accordingly, encroach into the legislative function by
making, rather than interpreting, statutory law.136

To discover what a reasonable English-speaker would think a statute’s text means, textualists
look for evidence of the statute’s “semantic context,” seeking “evidence about the way a

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 16

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
reasonable person conversant with relevant social and linguistic practices would have used the
words.” 137

Many textualists decline to use legislative history under most circumstances.138 Instead,
textualist judges generally seek to discover “the shared conventions” that are inherent in the
statutory language,139 asking what “assumptions [were] shared by the speakers and the intended
audience.” 140 As evidence of these shared assumptions, textualists might turn to rules of
grammar, or to the so-called “ canons of construction” that “reflect broader conventions of
language use, common in society at large at the time the statute was enacted.” 141

A Convergence of Theories?

Many judges, however, do not necessarily identify as pure purposivists or textualists; or even if
they do, in practice, they will often employ some elements from each theory.160 Some scholars
have argued that even the theoretical gap between these two theories is narrowing.1 Most
modern purposivists consider the statutory text to be both a starting point162 and an ultimate
constraint.163 And most textualists will look past the plain text, standing alone, to discover the
relevant context and determine what problem Congress was trying to address.164
xxxxx

Tools of Statutory Interpretation

Judges use a variety of tools to help them interpret statutes, most frequently relying on five
types of interpretive tools: ordinary meaning, statutory context, canons of construction,
legislative history, and evidence of the way a statute is implemented.1
These tools often overlap. For example, a judge might use evidence of an agency’s
implementation of a statute to support her own understanding of a word’s ordinary meaning.189
And basic principles about understanding statutory context are sometimes described as canons of
construction.190
Some theories of statutory interpretation counsel that certain tools are generally disfavored; for
example, textualism teaches that judges should only rarely look to legislative history.191
Consequently, a judge’s interpretive theory might influence which tools she uses. Different
judges, then, might unearth different evidence about the meaning of a particular statute, 192 and
even if they find the same evidence, they might consider it in different ways. 193 However, in
practice, judges will often draw on whatever tools provide useful evidence of the meaning of the
statute before them.

Ordinary Meaning
Courts often begin by looking for the “ordinary” or “plain” meaning of the statutory text. 194
Where a term is not expressly defined in the statute,195 courts generally assume “that Congress
uses common words in their popular meaning, as used in the common speech of men.” 196 Thus,
for example, in the context of a case that raised the question of what it meant to “use” a gun,
Justice Scalia stated the following in a dissenting opinion:
To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose.
When someone asks, “Do you use a cane?,” he is not inquiring whether you have your
grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall; he wants to know
whether you walk with a cane. Similarly, to speak of “using a firearm” is to speak of
using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon.197

The Supreme Court has also referred to this exercise as seeking a word’s “natural meaning,”
198 or its “normal and customary meaning.” 199 However, this “ordinary meaning” presumption
can be overcome if there is evidence that the statutory term has a specialized meaning in law200
or in another relevant field.201

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 17

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Judges may use a wide variety of materials to gather evidence of a text’s ordinary meaning.
In many cases, “simple introspection” suffices, as judges are English speakers who presumably
engage in everyday conversation like the rest of the general public. 202 Judges also turn to
dictionaries to help inform their understanding of a word’s normal usage.203 Judges may then
have to choose between multiple definitions provided by the same dictionary204 or by different
dictionaries.205 Courts have also turned to books to discover a word’s ordinary meaning,
drawing from works such as Moby Dick or the Bible206 as well as Aesop’s Fables207 and the
work of Dr. Seuss.208 Finally, judges may look for evidence of normal usage elsewhere in the
law, such as in judicial decisions209 or in other governmental materials.210

The idea that courts should generally give the words of a statute their “usual” meaning is an old
one.211 This principle straddles judicial philosophies: for example, all current members of the
Supreme Court have regularly invoked this rule of ordinary meaning.212 If Congress does in fact
generally use words as they would be normally understood, this interpretive tool helps judges act
as faithful agents of Congress by ensuring that judges and Congress—along with the ordinary
people governed by statutes—are looking to the same interpretive context: “normal
conversation.” 213

Although there is wide judicial consensus on the general validity of this rule, disputes arise in its
application. To say that a statutory word should be given the same meaning that it would have in
“everyday language” 214 serves only as a starting point for debate in many cases. 215 The
ordinary meaning of a term may often be “clear,” or uncontroversial in its application to some
core set of circumstances.216 Some have argued that invoking a word’s plain meaning in these
cases is tautological, equivalent to saying that “[w]ords should be read as saying what they say.”
217 Moreover, at the margins, when a court is no longer considering a prototypical example of
the disputed statutory term, the judge is called upon to explain how the statute applies to the facts
before the court.218 Therefore, in some cases, merely adverting to the ordinary meaning tool
may not help illuminate a statutory term.219

There are also a number of theoretical criticisms of the “ordinary meaning” standard. Some have
argued that judges might invoke “ordinary meaning” merely to mask their own policy
preferences.220 As Judge Easterbrook has claimed, frequently, “[t]he invocation of ‘plain
meaning’ just sweeps under the rug the process by which meaning is divined.” 221 Because
“ordinary meaning” invites judges to refer to their own experiences as English speakers, it is
arguably susceptible to the importation of personal policy preferences.222 As a result, if a judge
fails to justify an assertion about the ordinary meaning of a term, the underlying opinion could be
vulnerable to attack on that basis.

Statutory Context

Often, a statutory dispute will turn on the meaning of only a few words.223 Courts will interpret
those words, though, in light of the full statutory context. 224 To gather evidence of statutory
meaning, a judge may turn to the rest of the provision,225 to the act as a whole,226 or to similar
provisions elsewhere in the law. 227 As the Supreme Court said in one opinion, “Statutory
construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is
often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme. . . .” 228

For instance, a court might look to see whether the disputed language is used in another statutory
provision.229 Courts will generally try to give identical terms the same meaning throughout
a statute, and another provision may offer context that illuminates the meaning of the
relevant term. 230 However, this rule calling for words to be defined consistently is defeasible,
again depending on the context: “A given term in the same statute may take on distinct
characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation
strategies.” 231 A judge might also look to the rest of the statute to find whether Congress used
different language in other provisions. If Congress elsewhere used language that more clearly

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 18

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
captured an interpretation urged by one of the parties, it might suggest that the disputed term
should not be given that construction.232 Courts will generally read as meaningful “the
exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is included in other provisions of the
same statute.” 233

Statutory context can also help a court determine how the disputed terms fit into the rest of the
law, illuminating the purpose of a provision.247 Courts may consider statutory declarations of
purpose as well as the broad functioning of the statutory scheme.248 Judges sometimes weigh
the practical consequences of the various proposed interpretations.249 It could be that “only one
of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the
law.” 250 This use of statutory context often implicates the broader debate between purposivism
and textualism, 251 as well as arguments over when judges should use practical consequences to
determine statutory meaning.252

Canons of Construction
Over time, courts have created the “canons of construction” to serve as guiding principles for
interpreting statutes. 253 The canons supply default assumptions about the way Congress
generally expresses meaning,254 but are not “rules” in the sense that they must invariably be
applied.255 A judge may decline to interpret a statute in accordance with any given canon if the
canon’s application is not justified in that case.256 Some judges, especially purposivists and
some pragmatists, may even doubt the general validity of the canons as interpretive rules. 257
However, the canons are widely used and defended.258

Just as the justifications for using the canons of construction vary, so may judges disagree on
what qualifies as a valid canon, either as a matter of theory or historical fact. 259 These
disagreements will sometimes stem from a judge’s individual theory of statutory
interpretation.26

Generally, legal scholars and judges divide the canons into two groups: semantic and substantive
canons.263

Semantic Canons
The semantic, or textual, canons represent “rules of thumb for decoding legal language.” 264
Because these canons focus on statutory text, they are often favored by textualists. 265 The
semantic canons frequently reflect the rules of grammar that govern ordinary language usage.
266 Consequently, these rules may overlap with indicators of a provision’s ordinary meaning267
—and indeed, some authors label the principle that words should be given their ordinary
meaning as a semantic canon.268 But there are a greater number of semantic canons beyond the
ordinary meaning rule, several of which are discussed below.

For example, the “grammatical ‘rule of the last antecedent’” states that “a limiting clause or
phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately
follows.” 269 In Barnhart v. Thomas, the Supreme Court illustrated this canon with the
following hypothetical:
Consider, for example, the case of parents who, before leaving their teenage son
alone in the house for the weekend, warn him, “You will be punished if you throw a party
or engage in any other activity that damages the house.” If the son nevertheless throws a
party and is caught, he should hardly be able to avoid punishment by arguing that the
house was not damaged. The parents proscribed (1) a party, and (2) any other activity that
damages the house.270
The last-antecedent canon tells the reader of the parents’ edict that the descriptive clause “that
damages the house” refers to the “nearest reasonable antecedent”: here, “any other activity.” 271
Accordingly, that clause modifies only the phrase “any other activity,” and not “party,” a more
remote antecedent.272

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 19

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
(Note: Continue inputting research material on Theories of Interpretation (File -PDF) p28

STATUTE, LAWS, BILLS

Law- is a rule of conduct or order of sequence which any being will not, ought not or cannot
deviate from.
Elements: rule of conduct or order of sequence, non-deviation, and, consequence
(Sanction - certain kind of force, implies legitimacy of authority)
 Natural law
 Positive Law

Law- a rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by legitimate power of the state. (DSLU)

Statute- is an act of the legislature as an organized body; it is the written will of the legislature,
expressed according to the form necessary to constitute it a law of the state and rendered
authentic by certain prescribed forms and solemnities.
Sometimes, the term is more broadly defined to include administrative regulations or any
enactment from whatever source originating, to which the state gives force of law.

Statute- an act of the legislature, as an organized body, expressed in the form, and passed
according to the procedure required to constitute it as part of the law of the land.1 (DSLU)

Classification of Statute (DSLU)

According to scope:
1. Public- affects the public at large or the whole community
a. General- applies to the whole state and operates upon all people or all class; does not omit any
subject or place
b. Special- relates to a particular persons or things or class or to a particular community
c. Local- confined to a specific place or community

2.Private- applies to a specific person or subject

According to duration:
1. Permanent- operation is not limited in duration but continues until repealed
2. Temporary- duration is for a limited period; ceases upon the happening of an event for which
it was passed

Other classifications:
According to application:
1. Prospective
2. Retroactive

According to operation:
1. Declaratory
2. Curative
3. Mandatory
4. Directory
5. Substantive
6. Remedial
7. Penal

According to form:

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 20

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
1. Affirmative
2. Negative

Manner of referring: 2
1. Public Act- passed by Philippine Commission and Philippine Legislature (1901-1935)
2. Commonwealth Act- passed during the Commonwealth (1936-1946)
3. Republic Act- passed by Congress of the Philippines (1946-1972;1987-present)
4. Batas Pambansa- passed by Batasang Pambansa

ENACTING STATUTES

Legislative power- authority to make laws, and to alter and repeal them

Section 1 (Const). The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the
extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Bill- is a proposed law; draft of a law submitted for the consideration of the legislative body for
adoption.

Kinds of Bills (must originate from the House of Representative)

1. Appropriation Bill
- the primary and specific purpose is to authorize the release of funds from the
public treasury.
2. Revenue Bill
- one that levies taxes and raises funds for the government.
3. Tariff Bill
- one that specifies the rates or duties to be impose on imported articles.
4. Bill Increasing Public Debt
- one that authorizes the government to borrow money, either by borrowing from
external sources or offering bonds for public subscriptions.
5. Bill of Local Application
- one which is local in character like the creation of new town, city or province.
6. Private Bill- one that will not operate directly for the public good but calculated to
serve goodwill (e.g. bills granting honorary membership).

HOW LAWS ARE MADE: (PROCEDURES IN PASSING A LAW)

NOTE: READ SEC. 16, 26, 27, ART VI of the Philippine Constitution.

“A bill is a proposed legislative measure introduced by a member or members of

Congress for enactment into a law. It is signed by its author/s and filed with the Secretary of the
House. It may originate from either the lower or upper House, except that APPROPRIATION,
REVENUE, or TARIFF BILLS, BILLS AUTHORIZING INCREASE OF PUBLIC DEBT,
BILLS OF LOCAL APPLICATION, and PRIVATE BILLS shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives”- in which case the Senate may propose amendments or concur with
amendments.

*In addition to the provisions in the Constitution (Sec. 26 Par. 2, Art. VI),

“x x x (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 21

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. x x x”

Congress (each house) has its own detailed procedures embodied in their Rules (Sec. 16 Par. 3,
Art. VI).
“x x x (3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, x x”

Note:
If there is a presidential certification, the requirement of three readings on separate days, and
printed copies in final form may be dispensed with (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance).

STEPS

1. A bill is introduced by any member of the Congress, signed by the authors and filed with the
Secretary of the house. May introduce in either house except appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of public debts, bills of local applications, and private bills (Sec.
24 Art. VI).

2. First reading- Secretary reports the bill for first reading:

- Reading the title and number of bill
- Referral to appropriate committee for study and recommendation
- Committee may hold public hearings and submit its report and recommendation for Calendar
for second reading.

 First Reading- any member of either house may present a bill, signed by him and
reference to the proper committee; principal author may propose the inclusions; the bill is
read by its title number and name/s of author/s.
 Referral to the Appropriate Committee- if disapproved, the bill dies a natural
death unless the House decides otherwise following the submission of the report.

3. Second reading- bill shall be read in full with the proposed amendments by the committee
- Subject to debates, pertinent motions and amendments
- After these, bill shall be voted upon

 Second Reading- the entire bill is read. Debates ensue and changes and amendments are
inserted. The bill is then printed and distributed to all the members of congress. If favored
the bill is forwarded to the Committee on Rules.

4.Third reading- final vote by yeas and nay7

 Third Reading- only the title of the bill is read; voting takes place; majority is sufficient
to pass the bill

*After a house has approved their own version, it will be transmitted to the other house, which
will follow the same procedures. If without amendments, the bill is passed by Congress and is
submitted to the President. If there are amendments, there will be a Conference Committee

 Referral to the Other House- the same procedure takes place

 Submission to Joint Bicameral Committee
 Enrolled Bill/Journal

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 22

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
5. Conference Committee- this is where the differences will be settled. The amendments
introduced in this level will have to be approved by both Houses for passage.8

Note: CONFERENCE COMMITTEE (Agpalo, pp 7-9)

If the other House approves the bill without amendments, the bill is passed by Congress
and the same will be transmitted to the president for appropriate action. If the other House
introduces amendments and the House from which it originated does not agree with said
amendments, the differences will be settled by the Conference Committee of both Chambers.,
whose report or recommendation thereon will have to be approved by both Houses in order that
it will be passed by Congress and thereafter sent to the President for action.
It may deal generally with the subject matter
There is nothing in the Rules which limits a conference committee to a consideration of
conflicting provisions. It is within its power to include in its report an entirely new provision that
is not found either in the House Bill or in the Senate Bill.
The requirement that no bill shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to the members
three days before its passage does not apply to Conference Committee reports. xxxx All that is
required is that the conference committee report be approved by both the Houses of Congress.

Note:
There are instances where the version of the conference committee is entirely different from
those of the two Houses- for it may deal generally with the subject matter or precisely to the
differences, or even introduce a new provision. However, this is still valid for the powers of said
committee are broad. That is why some political scientists call this the Third House (Philippine
Judges Association v. Prado).

6. Approval and authentication - signing of the Senate President and the House Speaker and
their respective secretaries (Enrolled Bill)

AUTHENTICATION OF BILLS
Before an approved bill is sent to President for his consideration as required by the
Constitution, the bill is authenticated. The system of authentication devised is the signing by the
Speaker and the Senate President of the printed copy of the approved bill, certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses, to signify to the President that the bill being presented to
him has been duly approved by the legislature and is ready for his approval or rejection.

Note: this authentication is very important in resolving the issue: which will prevail in
case of conflict between the enrolled bill and the journal.

ENROLLED BILL VS. JOURNAL

“ Enrolled bill- the bill as passed by Congress, authenticated by the House Speaker and
Senate President and approved by the President.

Rule: The text of the act as passed and approved is deemed importing absolute verity and is
binding on the courts. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified, the remedy is by amendment by enacting a curative legislation and not a judicial
decree. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez)

Presumption: It carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government that it was passed by the assembly. Hence, the respect due to co-
equal and independent departments requires the judiciary to act upon that assurance and to accept
all bills duly authenticated. (Morales v. Subido)

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 23

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Journal Entry- a requirement by the Constitution to each house of the Congress (Sec. 16 Par.4
Art. VI) - conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded
therein - based from considerations of public policy

“x x x(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the
yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be
entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings. x x x” (Sec. 16
Par.4 Art. VI)

*Enrolled bill v. Journal Entry -In case of conflict, the enrolled bill should prevail, particularly
with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered into the legislative record.

Exception: When the Speaker and Senate President withdraw their respective signatures from the
signed bill where there is serious and substantial discrepancy between the text of the bill as
deliberated and shown by the journal and that of the enrolled bill.” (Astorga v. Villegas)
(DLSU)

Enrolled bill is that which was passed by Congress, authenticated by the Speaker and the
Senate President.

Principle of the enrolled bill - the text of the Act as passed and approved is deemed
importing absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
The enrolled copy of the bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also its due
enactment.

Enrolled Bill Doctrine - the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed
are conclusive of its due enactment.

Reason: The reason an enrolled bill is accorded conclusive verity lies in the fact that the
enrolled bill carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and the executive
departments of the government, charged respectively with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws, that it is passed by the assembly. The respect to co-equal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance and to accept as having passed by the
assembly, all bill duly authenticated.

GENERAL RULE

In case of conflict between the enrolled bill and the legislative journals, it is the former
that will prevail.

EXCEPTION
Except as to matters that the Constitution requires to be entered in the journals, such as the
yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill or on any question at the request of at least 1/5
of the members of the House, the objections of the President to a vetoed bill or item, and
the names of the members voting for or against overriding his veto.

Withdrawal of authenticity
The withdrawal of the respective signatures of each head of the Houses could render the bill
without attestation and would nullify status of the bill ad an enrolled bill. in such case, the bill is

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 24

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
no longer accorded absolute verity ad regards its text and the entries in the journal should be
consulted.

Case: Arroyo vs. de Venencia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997)

7. Submission to the President:

Sec,. 27, Art. VI, Philippine Constitution

“Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to
the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at
large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all
the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.”

A bill is passed in three ways: 1. When the president signs it 2. When the president does not sign
nor communicate his veto of the bill within 30 days after his receipt 3. When the vetoed bill is
repassed by Congress by two-thirds vote of all its members, voting separately.

 Submission to the President

Three (3) ways when a bill becomes a law:

1. The President approves the enrolled bill.

2. Overriding of veto BY 2/3 VOTES OF CONGRESS

The bill together with the reason/s for the veto shall be returned to the House of origin
where it will decide whether or not to override the veto (2/3 votes of the members of the House
of origin is required to override the veto). Then it will be sent to the other House where it will
undergo the same process to override the veto (2/3 votes of the members of this House is
likewise required)

3. Non-action of the president

If after the lapse of 30 days from the submission of the approved bill to the Office of the
President, the Chief Executive did act on it (neither approves it nor vetoes it), then the bill
becomes a law.

Note that when a bill becomes a law in any of the three ways, it does not automatically
become effective.

Different Kinds of Statutes:

1. As to Nature
- Penal Statutes
- Remedial Statutes D’ Dencio’s Code
- Substantive Statutes
- Labor Statutes N- ature
- Tax Statutes
A- pplication
2. As to Application
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK P- erformance 25
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS S- cope

O- ther
classification
 - Mandatory
- Directory

3. As to Performance
- Permanent
- Temporary

4. As to Scope
- General
- Special

5. Other Classification
- A statute could either be prospective or retroactive
- A statute could either be repealing act or an amendatory
- A statute could either be reference statute or a declaratory statute

FUNCTIONS OF LAW:

In general, it regulates human conduct; promotion of the common good, peace and order,
social engineering, social values etc. (see. Introduction to Legal Philosophy by Pascual)

i. Defines the rights and duties of citizens (sets the limits of human conduct)
ii. Imposes taxes
iii. Appropriate funds
iv. Defines crimes and provides for their punishment
v. Creates and abolishes government offices; determines their jurisdiction and
functions

PARTS OF A LAW:

1. TITLE- gives a general statement of, and calls attention to the subject matter of an act so
that legislators and the public maybe appraised of the subject matter of the legislation,
and be put upon inquiry regarding thereto.

That which expresses the subject matter of the law. It can help in the construction
(interpretation) of statutes but it is not controlling and not entitled to much weight.

Note: “TITLE must have only one subject to:

1. prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation,
2. to prevent surprise or fraud, and to fairly apprise the people of the subject of
legislation

Hodge-Podge, Defined -A mischievous legislative practice of embracing in one bill

several distinct matters, none of which, perhaps, could singly obtain the assent of the legislator,
and then procuring its passage by a combination of the minorities in favor of each of the measure
into a majority that will adopt them all
-Objective: to unite the legislators who favor any one of the subjects in support of the
whole act. Effect-VOID

-Test of sufficiency of title: indicates in broad but CLEAR terms in nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. In case of doubt as to the sufficiency of the
title, the presumption is in favour of the validity of the act.” (Rufus Rodriguez; page 3)

Case:
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 26
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 “Lidasan vs COMELEC 21 SCRA 496 FACTS: RA 4790 “An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” was signed into law consisting of 21
barrios, 12 of which are from the municipalities of Parang and Buldon, province of Cotabato.
Xxxx
Two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: It creates the municipality of Dianaton
purportedly from 21 barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao
del Sur; and It also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao
del Sur” (Rufus Rodriguez page 4)

(Tanada)
“Title
- Bill must embrace only one subject expressed in its title.

Art. VI Sec. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof. x x x

- But must not be an index to, or be an exhaustive catalogue of the body of the act as to cover
every single detail
- It is enough that the title indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all provisions of
the act and not calculated to mislead the public.

Reasons:
- Prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legislation

- Prevent fraud and surprise through introduction of provisions not germane to the statute (which
have not received notice, action and study of the legislators) - Language that must be sufficient
to notify the legislators and the public
- Title serves as guide to ascertain legislative intent

How construed:

- Should be liberally construed

- Not be given technical interpretation nor narrowly construed to cripple or impede the power of
the legislature
- If there is doubt, it should be resolved in favor of the one title-one subject (presumption of
constitutionality)” (DSLU)

2. PREAMBLE- is the part of the statute following the title and preceding the enacting clause,
which states the reasons for or the objective of the enactment. It acts as a prefatory statement or
explanation or a finding of facts, reciting the purpose, reason, or occasion for making the law
to which it is prefixed.

It cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute.

Points to remember:
- A preamble does not create a right nor does it grant any right
- It is not a source of government power
- It is not an essential part of a statute

(Tanada)

“Preamble
- Prefatory statement or explanation (finding of facts, reciting the purpose, reason, or occasion
for making the law). Hence, important role in construction - Usually found after the enacting
clause and before the body in presidential decrees and executive orders.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 27

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
-Legislature seldom puts this because the reason for the law is contained in its explanatory note.”
(DSLU)

3. ENACTING CLAUSE- the part which indicates the authority which promulgated the
enactment. The enacting clause is not essential to the validity of the law but this clause
cloths the statue with certain dignity because the specific authority that promulgated the law is
therein stated.

(Tanada)

“Enacting Clause - Part written immediately after the title - States the authority by which the act
is enacted - Contains the phrases, “Be it enacted by...” or “Now, therefore, I... by virtue of the
powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree...” (DSLU)

4.BODY- it contains the subject matter of the statute. The body of the statue should embrace
only one subject matter as required by the Constitution.

(Tanada)
“Purview/Body of the Statute - What the law is all about - Should embrace one subject matter -
The provisions, although different and diverse, must be allied and germane to the subject and
purpose of the bill - Usually divided into sections (numbered and contains a single proposition) -
Usually includes a short title, policy, definition, administrative sections, sections prescribing
standards of conduct, imposing sanctions for violations of its provisions, transitory provisions”
(Tanada)

5. EXCEPTION AND PROVISOS- the part which acts as a restraint upon or as a

qualification of the generality of the language which it follows.

6. INTERPRETATIVE CLAUSE- the part of the statute where the legislature defines its own
language and prescribes rules for its construction.

7. REPEALING CLAUSE- the part which announces the legislative intent to terminate, revoke
or repeal another statute/s.

8. SAVING CLAUSE- the part which restricts the repealing act and preserves existing powers,
rights pending proceeding from the effect of the repeal.

9. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE- it is a clause which states that for any reason, any section or
provisions of the statute is held to be unconstitutional or revoked, the other section or
provision of the law shall not be affected.

Points to remember:
- A separability clause creates a presumption that the legislature intended a separability
rather than complete nullity of the statute. This means that if one part of the statute is
void or unconstitutional, the other parts, which are valid may still stand. This is the
GENERAL rule.
- The general rule, however, is subject to the limitation that if the parts of the statute are so
mutually dependent and connected thereby creating a belief that the legislature intended
them as a whole, the nullity or constitutionality of one part may violate the rest.

(Tanada)
“Separability Clause - States that if any provision is declared invalid, the remainder shall not be
affected.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 28

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 Presumption: Legislature intended a statute to be effective as a whole and would not have
passed it had it foreseen that some part of it is invalid. Exception: Where provisions cannot stand
alone as to those left, after the void part, is not complete and workable” (DSLU)

10. DATE OF EFFECTIVITY- specifies the date and time when the law takes effect. Usually
the provision as to the effectivity of the law states that it shall take effect 15 days from
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

“Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general publication, unless it is
otherwise provided…..”

“Art. 18 (AC) Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is
otherwise provided”

What is the meaning of “unless it is otherwise provided”?

It refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself which cannot in
any event be omitted. (Tuvera vs Tanada, G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985)

“Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.” (Ricardo M. Pilares III,
Statutory Construction: Concepts and Cases, pages 56-57)

(Tanada)
“Effectivity Clause - When the law takes effect.
- Usually 15 days from the publication in the Official Gazette16 or in a newspaper of general
circulation17”

SOURCES OF LAW:
 Constitution
 Statute enacted by Congress
 Decrees issued under the 1973 Constitution

Note: Decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law.

Kinds of statutes
1. Legislative acts

2. Presidential issuances- those which the president issued in the exercise of his ordinance power
(Chapter 2, Book III, AC)
a. Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders.
b. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of
governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated
in administrative orders.
c. Sec. 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force
of an executive order.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 29

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
d. Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the
Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
e. Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters relating to internal
administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the
departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance,
shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
f. Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.- Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special
orders.

3. Administrative rules and regulationsissued by administrative or executive offices in

accordance with, and as authorized by, law have the force and effect of law or partake the nature
of the statute
Requirement for validity:
1. Provisions should be germane to the objects and purpose of the law.
2. Not in contradiction with, but conform to, the standards that the law prescribes
3. They be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect the general provisions of the law
*The rule-making power of a public administrative agency is a delegated legislative power. It
may not use its power to bridge the authority to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended.

*The law passed by the legislature should be: (1) complete in itself, and (2) should fix a
standard, in order for an administrative agency to fill in the details n the execution,
enforcement and administration of said law.
- Administrative rule- promulgating a new law with force and effect of a valid law.
- Administrative interpretations rendering an opinion or giving a statement of policy
*The rules are binding upon the Courts, but the interpretation is not.

4. Supreme Court rule-making power the Constitution granted the Supreme Court to promulgate
its own rules. (Sec. 5 Par. 5, Art. VIII)

“x x x (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated
bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.”

*Usually procedural only for only the legislative department may create substantive laws.

5. Local government units- power to enact ordinances (Local Government Code of 1991)

Requirements of validity: ( See: Lagcao v. Labra)

1. Not contravene the Constitution or any statute
2. Not be unfair or oppressive
3. Not be partial or discriminatory
4. Not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. General and consistent with public policy
6. Not unreasonable Barangay/Municipal/City/Provincial ordinances

Barangay/Municipal/City/Provincial ordinances

- Passed by majority vote of council members

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 30

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 - Submitted to the mayor (for municipal/city), if unacted for 10 days, considered passed;
governor (for province), if unacted for 15 days, considered passed
- Vetoed ordinance may be passed by a vote of 2/3 of council members
- Subject to review by sangguniang bayan o panglunsod/sangguniang panlalawigan
- If no action in 30 days, ordinance will be presumed consistent with laws

Validity of statutes

Presumption of validity/constitutionality

Basis: Before the legislature passes a bill, it has decided the measure to be valid and
constitutional. And when the President approves the bill, he has been convinced of its validity.

Effect: To justify the nullification of the law, there must be clear and equivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.

*The final authority to declare unconstitutionality is the Supreme Court sitting en banc (Sec. 4
Par. 2, Art. VIII).

“1 x x x(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive

agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which
under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon.”

Judicial Power (Sec.1, Art VIII of the Philippine Constitution)

1. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
2. Determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Requisites:
1. Actual case and controversy
2. Locus standi
3. Raised at the earliest possible time
4. Lis mota of the case

Actual case and controversy

- There must be a justiciable controversy (can be decided on grounds recognized by the law)

Exceptions: Political questions- issues dependent upon wisdom not the legality of the law

Locus standi
- Legal standing to sue
- The person has substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury
1. Citizen standing- suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government (Tanada v. Tuvera)
2. Taxpayer’s standing- public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law
or Constitution (ITF v. COMELEC)

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 31

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 Basis: Expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds
3. Legislator’s standing- when their powers are impaired; questioning the validity of a
presidential veto (Ople v. Torres)
4. Transcendental significance- the Court has adopted a liberal attitude (brushing aside
technicalities of procedure) on standing where the petitioner has shown that an issue has
paramount importance to the public (Chavez v. PEA and AMARI)

Raised at the earliest possible time

- Question must be raised in the pleading, complaint, information or petition by the plaintiff or
petitioner or in the answer by defendant or respondent.

Exception: 1. Can be raised in a motion for reconsideration if the statute sought to be invalidated
was not in existence when the complaint was filed.23
2. At any stage of the proceedings in a criminal case24
3. Where the determination of the question is necessary to the decision for civil cases25
4. Where it involves jurisdiction of the court below26

Lis mota of the case

- The Court may not pass upon the validity of a statute if it can decide the case on some other
grounds
- If the only issue is the constitutional question which is unavoidable, the Court should confront
the question and decide the case on the merits

Test of constitutionality
1. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
2. Must be general and consistent with public policy
3. Must not be unfair or oppressive
4. Must not be partial or discriminatory 5. Must not be unreasonable 6. Must not prohibit but
may regulate trade

Grounds for nullification

1. Not within the legislative power to enact

2. When it allows something to be done which the fundamental law condemns or prohibits
3. Vagueness- lacking comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application

Basis: - Violates due process for failure to accord the people fair notice of what conduct to avoid.
- Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the government muscle

Effects of unconstitutionality
General rule:
An unconstitutional act is not a law, confers no right, imposes no duties, affords no protection,
creates no office; in legal contemplation, inoperative as though it had never been passed.
*This is also known as the orthodox view. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by
declaration of nullity; no one may invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it
subsequently
*The orthodox view is expressed in Art. 7 (CC). 27 However, it is not always the case that a law
is constitutionally faulty per se (i.e., may be valid in its general import but invalid in its
application to certain situations). A judicial declaration of nullity may not necessarily obliterate
all the effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such declaration. A situation that

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 32

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
is fait accompli may no longer be open for inquiry, let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent
declaration of nullity of a statute.

Modern view

- The court does not annul or repeal statute if it violates Constitution; it simply refuses to
recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if it had no existence
- The decision affects the parties only
- No judgment against the statute: opinion of the court may act as a precedent, but it does not
strike out, repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul it

Exception: Invalidity Due to Change of Conditions

Inapplicable to a statute that is declared invalid because of the change of circumstances affecting
its validity (emergency laws). The declaration of their nullity should be applied prospectively,
and affect only the parties involved in the case.

Partial Invalidity
General rule: Where the part of the statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another
part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced
(separability clause).
Reason: Legislature intended a statute to be effective as a whole and would not have passed it
had it foreseen that some part of it is invalid
Exception: When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest.

Effectivity of statutes

General rule: Statutes continue to be in force until changed or repealed by the legislature.
*Not changed by change of sovereignty, conquest or colonization.
1. For statutes proper, usually 15 days from the publication in the Official Gazette28

28Art. 2 (CC). Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
one year after such publication.

or in a newspaper of general circulation, 29 unless provided otherwise. But the ruling may seem
in contradiction with the PVB Employees Union v. Vega, the phrase “unless otherwise provided”
provided an exception as to the date of effectivity of a statute.

29Sec. 18 (AC) Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise
provided.

2. For issuances, rules and regulations, there should be a publication30 and filing in the the UP
Law Center.31

2. For ordinances, Sec. 59 of the Local Government Code shall apply.32

“31 Sec. 3, Book VII (AC). Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of
the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in
force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months
from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons.”

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 33

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 “32Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. (a) Unless otherwise stated in the
ordinance or the resolution approving the local development plan and public investment
program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is
posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or
barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the
local government unit concerned.
(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or
resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city,
municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local government
unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or
English and in the language or dialect understood by the majority of the people in the
local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such
fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting.
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned
belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province,
posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province
where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized cities, the main features of the ordinance or resolution
duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local
newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof
the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation.

Manner of computing time:

When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years
are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four
hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they
shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. In computing a
period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (See Art. 13 NCC)

Exception: Computation of the prescription of a crime. If the last fell on a Sunday or a

legal holiday, a charge cannot be filed on the next working day since it shall be
considered prescribed” (DSLU)

THE THREE (3) DEPARTMENTS (BRANCHES) OF GOVERNMENT

1. EXECUTIVE
- vested in the president; administer laws, carrying them into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance

2. LEGISLATIVE
- power to make, alter or repeal laws
- vested in a bicameral Congress

3. JUDICIARY
- power to interpret and apply the laws
- vested in one Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law

PRINCIPLES:
 Check and Balance (maintain equilibrium)

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 34

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 -Lawmaking power of Congress subject to veto power of the president, which in turn
may be overridden (avoid hasty and improvident legislation, i.e. Hodgepodge and log-
rolling legislation)
-Congress may refuse to give concurrence to an amnesty granted or treaty entered into by
the president
-Judicial review

 Separation of Powers- The purpose is to prevent the concentration of authority in one person
or group that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise. (Absolute power
corrupts absolutely.)
Justice Laurel:
“To secure action, to forestall over action, to prevent despotism (absolute power)
and to obtain efficiency”
Constitution:
The three branches are entrusted with each of their powers are not permitted to
encroach upon the powers of confided to the others.

 Non-delegation of Powers
- What has been delegated cannot be delegated.
- Delegated power constitutes not only a right but also a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgement.

THE TEST OF VALID DELEGATION

a.) Completeness Test

Laws must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions so that
there will be nothing left for the delegate to except to enforce it.

b.) Sufficiency of Standard Test

Indicates the circumstances which the policies are to be pursued and
implemented. Limits and provides parameters of discretion; purpose is to prevent
total transference of legislative power from the law-making body to the delegate.

THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY TO INTERPRET

Construction is a judicial function

The duty and power to interpret and construe a statute or the Constitution is a judicial
function.

It is the court that has the final word as to what the law means. The legislature cannot
overrule judicial construction.

WHEN JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION MAY BE SET ASIDE:

1. The Supreme Court in an appropriate case, change or overrule its previous

construction
2. The rule that the supreme court has the final word in the interpretation or construction
of a statute merely means that the legislature cannot, by law or resolution, modify or
annul the judicial construction without modifying or repealing the very statute
which has been the subject of construction. By so amending or repealing the
statutes thus construed, the consequence of which is that the previous judicial

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 35

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 construction is modified or set aside accordingly. (SEPARATION OF POWER-
POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO MAKE, AMEND OR REPEAL LAWS.)

WHEN EXERCISED:

The court does not interpret a law in a vacuum. It construes or applies the law based on
facts and the law involved as it decides concrete or controverted case. The Supreme Court
construes the applicable law in controversies which are ripe for judicial resolution. There must
be an actual controversy.

Note: Declaratory relief:

Rule 63

Section 1. Who may file petition - Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.

It does not give legal opinion on hypothetical cases or in cases which have become moot and
academic.

Moot and academic-when its purpose has become stale or where no practical relief can be
granted or which can have no practical effect.

Exceptions (moot and academic)

a) If it is capable of repetition, yet evading review;

b) When the rendering of a decision on the merits would be of practical value.

LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER TO CONSTRUE:

There must be an actual controversy:

1. ONLY POWER IS TO ASCERTAIN THE INTENTION OF THE AUTHORS OF

THE LAW WHICH PRESUPPOSES THE PRESENCE OF AMBIGUITY

The first and fundamental duty of the court is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible
or inadequate without it.

In construing a statute, it is not enough to ascertain the intention or meaning of the

statute; it is also to see whether the intention or the meaning has been expressed in
such a way as to give it legal effect and validity.

Elementary is the rule that when the law is clear, it is incumbent upon the judge to
apply them regardless of personal belief or predilections- when the law is
unambiguous and unequivocal, application not interpretation therefore is imperative.

Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions where none is provided from consideration of convenience, public
welfare or for any laudable purposes, nor may it engraft into the law the
qualifications not contemplated nor construe its provision by taking into account
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 36
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 questions of expediency, good faith, practical utility and other similar reasons so as
to relax noncompliance therewith.

It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or
onerous.

*Courts cannot change the law under the guise of interpretation and enlarge the
scope of the statue and include therein situations not provided or intended by the
lawmakers.

It is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of the law
for indeed, courts are bound by the words of the statue. The law is applied as it is.

The court cannot be made to accept an interpretation that would defeat the
intent of the law and its legislators.

* WHEN CAN YOU SAY THAT THE LAW IS CLEAR? (See Tests of Ambiguity)

CONFLICTS BETWEEN SOURCES OF LAW

Where legislation and case law are in conflict, there is a presumption that legislation takes
precedence insofar as there is any inconsistency. (? Research further- In the Philippines -
separation of power)

In the United Kingdom this principle is known as Parliamentary Sovereignty. In Australia

and in the United States, the courts have consistently stated that the text of the statute is used
first, and it is read as it is written, using the ordinary meaning of the words of the statute.

 "[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn to one cardinal canon before
all others. . . .[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain,
112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992). Indeed, "when the words of a statute are unambiguous,
then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.'"[1]

 "A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that every part of a statute be
presumed to have some effect, and not be treated as meaningless unless absolutely
necessary." Raven Coal Corp. v. Absher, 153 Va. 332, 149 S.E. 541 (1929).

 "In assessing statutory language, unless words have acquired a peculiar meaning, by
virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction, they are to be construed in
accordance with their common usage." Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923
P.2d 783, 787-88 (Alaska 1996);

 "The principal command of statutory construction is that the court should

determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature using the plain language of the
statute as the primary indicator of legislative intent." State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234,
242, 880 P.2d 845, 853 (1994) “The words of a statute . . . should be given their
ordinary meaning, absent clear and express legislative intention to the contrary,” as
long as the ordinary meaning does “not render the statute’s application absurd,
unreasonable, or unjust.” State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382
(1995) When the meaning of a statute is unclear or ambiguous, we have recognized that it
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 37
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 is “the high duty and responsibility of the judicial branch of government to facilitate
and promote the legislature’s accomplishment of its purpose.” State ex rel. Helman v.
Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994). - New Mexico v. Juan, 2010-
NMSC-041, August 9, 2010

 Federal jurisdictions may presume that either federal or local government authority
prevails in the absence of a defined rule. In Canada, there are areas of law where
provincial governments and the federal government have concurrent jurisdiction. In these
cases the federal law is held to be paramount. However, in areas where the Canadian
constitution is silent, the federal government does not necessarily have superior
jurisdiction. Rather, an area of law that is not expressly mentioned in Canada's
Constitution will have to be interpreted to fall under either the federal residual
jurisdiction found in s. 91 -- known as the Peace, Order and Good Government clause --
or the provinces residual jurisdiction of "Property and Civil Rights" under s. 92(10) of the
1867 Constitution Act. This contrasts with other federal jurisdictions, notably the United
States and Australia, where it is presumed that if legislation is not enacted pursuant to a
specific provision of the federal Constitution, the states will have authority over the
relevant matter in their respective jurisdictions.

***IN THE PHILIPPINES, solution of this problem should be related to the Principle
of STARE DECISIS -

“The maxim STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA NON MOVERE (follow past
precedents and not to disturb what has been settled) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code
which provides that “[j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines” It is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, they should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument. The principle is one of policy grounded on the necessity
for securing certainty and stability in judicial decisions. LEGIS INTERPRETAIO LEGIS
VIM OBTINET or the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law. The Supreme Court is described as having the last word on what the law
is, as it is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. As such, lower courts are enjoined
to follow the decision of the Supreme Court.”

(Relate to judicial acquiescence – presumption)

Internal and external consistency

Note- see presumption against inconsistency

It is presumed that a statute will be interpreted so as to be internally consistent.

A particular section of the statute shall not be divorced from the rest of the act.

The ejusdem generis (Latin for "of the same kind") rule applies to resolve the problem of
giving meaning to groups of words where one of the words is ambiguous or inherently unclear.
The rule results that where "general words follow enumerations of particular classes or persons
or things, the general words shall be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the
same general nature or kind as those enumerated." 49 F. Supp. 846, 859. Thus, in a statute
forbidding the concealment on one's person of "pistols, revolvers, derringers, or other dangerous
weapons," the term "dangerous weapons" may be construed to comprehend only dangerous
weapons of the kind enumerated, i.e., firearms, or perhaps more narrowly still, handguns. Here,
the term "dangerous weapons" must be given a meaning of the "same kind" as the word of
established meaning.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 38

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 A statute shall be interpreted so as NOT to be inconsistent with other statutes.
Where there is an inconsistency, the judiciary will attempt to provide a harmonious
interpretation.

The rule is - HARMONIZE different laws (old or new) with the same subject matter.

HARMONIZING STATUTES

The rule is that a statute should be so construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to
harmonize with other laws of the same subject, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible system...... every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statute as
to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. (Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211)

Statutes in pari materia should be construed to attain the purpose of an express national policy.
For the assumption is that whenever the legislative enacts a law, it has in mind the previous
statutes relating to the same subject matter, and in the absence of an express repeal or
amendment, the new law is deemed enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied
in these prior statutes. (Corona vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 378 (1993)

"Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will be
applied in a proceeding under the other act when not inconsistent with its purpose. Prior statutes
relating to the same subject matter are to be compared with the new provisions, and if
possible, by reasonable construction, both are to be construed that effect is given to every
provision of each. Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are so far as
reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other. (Vda. de Urbano vs.
GSIA,G.R.No. 137904, Oct. 19, 2001. Cited in Ruben Agpalo, Syatutory Construction, p. 378,
Sixth Ed., 1990, published by Rex Book Store)

Statements of the legislature

Legislative bodies themselves may try to influence or assist the courts in interpreting their laws
by placing into the legislation itself statements to that effect. These provisions have many
different names, but are typically noted as:

 Findings;
 Declarations, sometimes suffixed with of Policy or of Intent; or
 Sense of Congress, or of either house in multi-chamber bodies.

Note: See Interpretative clause.

These provisions of the bill simply give the legislature's goals and desired effects of the law, and
are considered non-substantive and non-enforceable in and of themselves.

INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

Suarez, pp 4-9

Purpose of interpretation and construction

Interpretation and construction have the same purpose and that is to ascertain and give
effect to the legislative intent.

When is it necessary to interpret and construct?

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 39
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 It is necessary to interpret or construct when any of the following reasons exists:
1)When the language of the statute is ambiguous, doubtful, or obscure, when taken in
relation to a set of fact.
2) When reasonable minds disagree as to the meaning of the language used in the statute.

When is it not necessary to interpret and construct?

It is not necessary to interpret or construct when the law speaks in clear and categorical
language. The duty of the court, in such a case, is to apply the law, not to interpret it. (Go Ka Toc
& Sons v. Rice & Corn Board, G.R. No. L-23607, May 23, 1967; People v. Mapa , G.R. No L-
22301, August 30, 1967; Luzon Security Co v. De Guzman, G.R. No.L-25659,Oct. 31, 1969

*Cynthia S. Bolos v. Danilo T. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010
“ A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity there is no room for construction or interpretation There is only room for
application As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-
meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index anime sermo, or speech is the
index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maximum verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of statute there should be no departure.”

Rule: In determining the intention of the legislature, courts should resort first to
interpretation
(using intrinsic aids) before resorting to construction (using extrinsic aids).

There is nothing wrong if we use the two methods at the same time- since both of them
are resorted to for the same purpose, that is: to ascertain the intention of the authors of
the law.

Reason: SPEECH IS THE INDEX OF INTENTION (INDEX ANIMI SERMO

EST)

*Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% grant of special allowance for
judges be included in the computation of his retirement benefits, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868,
August 13, 2004;

TWO PROCESSES (WAYS) OF ASCERTAINING THE INTENTION OF THE

LEGISLATURE

A) INTERPRETATION
B) CONSTRUCTION

Basically, these two processes of ascertaining the intention of the author of the law,
interpretation and construction, have the same object or purpose and that is: ascertaining
the intent of the legislature.

The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain, and give effect to the
intent of the law (Agpalo, page 107)

The purpose of all rules or maxim is to discover the true intention of the law. They are
only valuable when they sub-serve this purpose. (City of Baguio vs. Marcos, GR No.
26100, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 342; 82 CJS page 526)

In determining the intention of the legislature, courts should resort first to intrinsic aid
before resorting to extrinsic aid.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 40

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 I. INTERPRETATION- the act or process of ascertaining the intention of the author/s of
the law using intrinsic aid.

- is the art of finding the true sense and meaning of word/s without going beyond the
context of the statute.

Interpretation- act of finding the true meaning and sense of any form of words (Tanada)

The process of discovering the true meaning of the language used. It is limited to
exploring the written text.

*The court resorts to interpretation when it seeks to ascertain the meaning of a word
found in a statute because such word, when considered with other words used in the statute
may reveal a meaning different from that which seemed apparent when such word is
considered abstractly, when given its usual meaning, or apart from the rest of the text.
(viewed in isolation)

It is the art of finding the true sense and meaning of word/s without going beyond the
context of the statute. It utilizes intrinsic aids (those found in the law itself) e.g. manner in
which the words were written or arranged, punctuations etc.

*INTRINSIC AID – those found in the statute itself

- Interpretation utilizes intrinsic aids (those present in the law itself), which are as
follows:

a. Title- expresses the subject matter of the law

b. Preamble- states the reasons and objectives of the enactment

c. Punctuation- may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal

meaning of the words thus punctuated but can never control against the
intelligible meaning of a written word.
- it is an aid of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute
and can never control against the intelligible meaning of a written word.
However, if the punctuation of a statute gives it a meaning that is reasonable and
in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words thus punctuated.

d. Words, Phrases, Sentences and Context- the intention must primarily be

determined from the language of the statute and such language consist of the
words, phrases and sentence s used therein. The meaning of the law should,
however, be taken from the general consideration of the law as a whole and not
from any single part/portion or section or from isolated words, phrases and
sentences used.

e. Headings and Marginal Notes- determines the scope of the provisions and their
relation to other portions of the act, however, if the meaning of the statute or if its
text is clear, it will prevail as against the heading, if the latter has been prepared
by compilers and not the legislature.

f. Legislative Definition and Interpretation- definition of the legislature of the

words used in the stature and the construction to be placed thereon. The rules are
as follows:
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 41
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 - If a law provides that in case of doubt, it should be construed and
interpreted in a certain manner that the courts should follow such instructions.
-In case of conflict between the interpretation clauses and the legislative
meaning, as revealed by the statute when considered in its totality, the latter shall
prevail.
- A term is used throughout the statute in the same sense it is first defined.
- Legislative definition in similar terms on the statute maybe resolved to,
except, where a particular law expressly declares that its definition therein is
limited in application to the statutes in which they appear.

DIFFERENT PARTS OF A LAW

Note: The different parts of a statute are intrinsic aids.

A) TITLE: That part of the statute which gives a general statement of, and calls attention to,
the subject matter of an act, so that the legislators and the public may be appraised of the
subject matter of the legislation, and be put upon inquiry in regard thereto.
It expresses the subject matter of the law
It can help in the construction of statutes but it is not controlling and not entitled to much
Weight

B) PREAMBLE: it is that part of the statute following the title preceding the enacting clause
which states the reason for, or the object of the statute.
Preamble- that part of the statute following the title and preceding the enacting clause
which state the reason or objectives of the enactment. It cannot enlarge or confer powers,
or cure inherent defects in the statutes.

- states the reasons and objectives of the enactment.

It is that part of statute explaining the reasons for its enactment and the objects sought to
be accomplished. Usually it starts with the word “whereas”. Generally, a preamble is a
declaration by the legislature of the reasons for the passage of the statute and is helpful in
the interpretation of any ambiguities within the statute which it is prefixed (People vs.
Purisima, 86 SCRA 542)

Points to remember:

(i) A preamble does not create a right nor does it grant any right. It is not a source of
substantive right.

(ii) It is not a source of government power.

(iii) It is not an essential part of the statute.

C) Words, Phrases and Sentences, Context- The intention of the legislature must primarily
be determined from the language of the statute and such language consist of the words,
phrases and sentences used therein. The meaning of the law should, however, be taken
from the general consideration of the law as a whole and not from any single part, portion
or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses, or sentences used.

D) Punctuation – It is an aid of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can
never control against the intelligible meaning of a written word. However, if the
punctuation of a statute gives it a meaning that is reasonable and in apparent accord with

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 42

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 the legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal
meaning of the word thus punctuated.
Implicit here is the presumption that the legislature knows the language it used, its rules
on grammar and the specific function of punctuation marks thus used.

It may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words thus
punctuated but can never control against the intelligible meaning of a written word.

It is an aid of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against
the intelligible meaning of a written word. However, if the punctuation of a statute gives it a
meaning that is reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an
additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words thus punctuated.

E) Headings and Marginal Notes – If the meaning of the statute is clear or if the text of the
statute is clear, they will prevail as against the headings, especially if the headings have
been prepared by compilers and not by the legislature.

It determines the scope of the provisions and their relation to other portions of the act,
however, if the meaning of the statute or if its text is clear, it will prevail as against the
heading, if the latter has been prepared by compilers and not the legislature.

F) Body – It contains the subject matter of the statute. The body of the statute should
embrace only one subject matter expressed in the Title as required by the Constitution.

It is the main operative part of the statute containing its substantive and even procedural
provisions. Provisos and exceptions may also be found in the body of the statute. (Diaz,
page 21)

In particular statutes may have these:

G) Enacting clause- It is that part of the statute which indicate the authority which
promulgated the enactment.

The enacting clause is not essential to the validity of the law but this clause
clothes the statute with a certain dignity because the specific authority that promulgated
the law is therein stated.

“Be enacted” is the usual formula to start this clause.

H) Body – It contains the subject matter of the statute. The body of the statute should
embrace only one subject matter expressed in the Title as required by the Constitution.

It is the main operative part of the statute containing its substantive and even procedural
provisions. Provisos and exceptions may also be found in the body of the statute. (Diaz,
page 21)

I) Exceptions and Provisos- It is a clause added to an enactment for the purpose of acting as
restraint upon or as qualification of, the generality of the language it follows.

A proviso is an article or clause in a statute that introduces a condition. It shall be

confined to that which directly precedes it, or the section to which it has been appended,
unless it clearly pears that the legislature intended it to have wider scope

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 43

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 J) Interpretative clause – That part of the statute where the legislature defines its own
language or prescribes rules for its construction.

Legislative Definition and Interpretation – If the legislature have defined the word/s used
in a statute and has declared the construction to be places thereon, such definition or
construction should be followed by the courts.

The rules are as follows:

i)If a law provides that in case of doubt it should be construed and interpreted in a
certain manner, the court should follow such an instruction. This is part of the law -
making power of the legislature and should not be regarded as part of the power of
the other department to interpret (Judiciary). This may be found in the interpretative
clause of the law. Example of the manner of construction -Art. 4 of the Labor Code

“Art. 4. Construction in favor of Labor – All doubts in the

implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules
and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.”

ii) in case of conflict between the interpretation clauses and the legislative meaning,
as revealed by the statute when considered in its totality, the latter shall prevail.

iii) A term is used throughout the statute in the same sense in which it was first
defined unless it can be shown that it is being used in a different context in the
succeeding part of the law.

iv) Legislative definition of similar terms on the statute may be resorted to except
where a particular law expressly declares that its definition therein is limited in
application to the statutes in which they appear.

On the definition of the legislature of the words used in the stature and the construction to
be placed thereon, the rules are as follows:
- If a law provides that in case of doubt, it should be construed and
interpreted in a certain manner that the courts should follow such instructions.
-In case of conflict between the interpretation clauses and the legislative
meaning, as revealed by the statute when considered in its totality, the latter shall
prevail.
- A term is used throughout the statute in the same sense it is first defined.
- Legislative definition in similar terms on the statute maybe resolved to,
except, where a particular law expressly declares that its definition therein is
limited in application to the statutes in which they appear.

K) Repealing clause – That part of the statute which announces the legislative intent to
terminate or revoke another statute or statutes

That part of the statute which announces the prior statutes or specific provisions which
have been abrogated by reason of the enactment of the new law. (Diaz, page 21)

L) Saving clause – This restricts a repealing act and preserves existing powers, rights and
pending proceedings from the effect of the repeal.

A restriction in a repealing act which is intended to save rights, proceeding, penalties,

etc., from the annihilation which would result from an unrestricted repeal. (Diaz, page
21)
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 44
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 M) Separability clause – It is a clause which states that if for any reason any section or
provision of the statute is held to be unconstitutional or revoked, the other section or
provision of the law shall not be affected thereby.

That part of the statute which provides or shows the intention of the legislature that in the
event that one or more provisions of the law are nullified, declared void or
unconstitutional, the remaining provisions which can stand by themselves without the
nullified parts, shall still be in force. (Diaz, page 21)

Points to remember:

(i) A separability clause creates a presumption that the legislature intended separability
rather than complete nullity of the statute. This means that is one part of the statute is
void or unconstitutional, the other parts thereof which are valid may still stand.

(ii) This general rule, however, is subject to the limitation that if the parts of the statute
are so mutually dependent and connected thereby creating a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, the nullity or unconstitutionality of one part may vitiate the
rest.

N) Effectivity clause – That part of the statute which announces the time or date when the
law will become effective.

Note: Difference between the “effectivity of the law” (Tanada vs. Tuvera) from “when a
bill becomes a law”.

II. CONSTRUCTION - the act or process of ascertaining the intention of the author/s of the law
employing extrinsic aid.

It is the drawing of conclusions with respect to subject that are beyond the direct expression
of the text from elements known and given in the text. (Diaz, page 2).

Construction is the drawing of warranted conclusion respecting subjects that lie beyond the
direct expression of the text; conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter of
the text. (Agpalo, page 104)

Construction- Drawing warranted conclusions not always included in direct expressions, or

determining the application of words to facts in litigation. Conclusions which are in the spirit,
though not within the letter of the text

Purpose: (for both Interpretation and Construction)

-Ascertaining the true intent of the legislature.

Assumption: The legislature enacts a law with the end in view that it will, in cases of
doubt, be construed in accordance with the settled principles of interpretation.

*Rules of statutory construction are used to ascertain legislative intent. But they are not rules
of law but mere axioms of experience, hence, not binding nor controlling on the courts.

EXTRINSIC AIDS – those found outside the written language of the law. Extrinsic aid can
only be resorted to after intrinsic aid have been used and exhausted.
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 45
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 - Extraneous facts, circumstances of means of explanation resorted to for the purpose of
determining the legislative intent.
- drawing conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text.
- It can only be resorted when intrinsic aids have been used and exhausted.

CONSTRUCTION utilizes extrinsic aid, which includes the following:

1.. Contemporaneous Circumstances – refers to the factual environment

existing at the time of the passage of the law. Considering that legislative intent
refers to the purpose or reason why the law was passed, the contemporaneous
circumstances under which the law was passed may shed light as to the intention
of the legislature.

- contemporaneous circumstances extends noy only to factual circumstances at the

time of the enactment of the statute but also the legal circumstances existing at the
time, particularly the prevailing doctrine of the Supreme court.

-conditions existing at the time the law was enacted; previous state of the law;
evils sought to be prevented; customs and usages of the people. (these
circumstances constitute the reason why the law was enacted)

2. Policy- the general policy of the law or the settled policy of the state which
induced the enactment may enlighten the interpreter of the laws as to the intention
of the legislature enacting the same.

3. Legislative deliberations- refer to the debates of the members of Congress,

whether in a committee, in a plenary session or during bicameral conference. The
meaning put forth in a provision during legislative deliberations my be adopted in
case of doubt as to what such provision means

4. Legislative History of the Statute- refers to the historical background of the

passage of a law, as shown by legislative documents leading to the passage of a law, such
a draft of the bills, as well as previous legislation covering the same pr similar subject
matter.
It may be found in the reports of the legislative committees in the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during hearings, and investigations.
ERECTORS INC. Vs. NLRC, HON. JULIO ANDRES JR and
FLORENCIO BURGOS (GR NO. 104215, MAY 8, 1996)- intention because of
amendments.

5. Contemporaneous and Practical Construction- those who lived near or at

the time when the law was enacted were more acquainted of the conditions why
the law was enacted. Their understanding and application of the law, especially if
the same has been construed by the judicial tribunals and legal profession, deserve
to be considered by the courts.

6. Executive Construction- deserves great weight and should be respected if said

construction has been formed and observed for a long period of time. The rules to
remember are as follows:
- Congress is deemed to have been aware of the contemporaneous and
practical construction made by the officers charged with the administration of and
enforcement of the law.
- The court should respect that contemporaneous construction except if it
is clearly erroneous.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 46

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 - Executive construction has more weight if it is rendered by the Chief
Legal Adviser of the government who can issue opinions to assist various
departments of the government charged with the duty to administer the law.
- The opinion, however, by the Chief Legal Adviser is subservient to the
ruling of the judiciary which is in charge of applying and interpreting the laws.

7. Legislative Construction- entitled to consideration and great weight but

cannot control against the court’s prerogative to decide on what is wrong and
right interpretation.

8. Judicial Construction- it is presumed that statues were enacted in the light of

judicial construction that the prior enactment had received.

- it is presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had in mind the
judicial construction of former statute on the subject.

-with respect to a statute adopted from another state, it is presumed that it was
adopted with the construction placed upon it by the court of that state but this
construction should only be followed if it is reasonable, in harmony with justice
and public policy and consistent with the local laws.

9. Construction by the Bar and Legal Commentators- it is presumed that the

meaning publicly given a statute by the members of the legal profession is a true
one and regarded as one that should not be lightly changed. The opinion and
commentaries of text writers and legal commentators, whether they are Filipinos
or foreigners, may also be consulted, as in fact they are oftentimes cited or made
as references in court decision.

(NOTE: Extrinsic aids are entitled to respect, consideration and weight but the
courts are at liberty to decide whether they are applicable or not to the case
brought before it for consideration.)

*Construction and Interpretation thus differ from each other. The former uses intrinsic
aid while the latter employs extrinsic aid. Both, however, have the same purpose - and that is to
ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent - so you can use them at the same time. If not-
you must use intrinsic aid first before resorting to extrinsic aid because of the principle “speech
is the index of intention.”

PURPOSE AND INTENTION DISTINGUISHED:

PURPOSE – deals with the reason why the law was made, the remedy it seeks to
achieve, the mischief it seeks to prevent etc. It deals with the GOAL /OBJECTIVE of the law.

INTENTION – has something to do with the meaning and the when, how or to whom
the law will apply. It deals with the manner of APPLICATION of the law. Meaning of the
word, phrase, punctuations etc.

Relate to:
COMPLETENESS TEST
SUFFICENT STANDARD TEST

Rule: In determining the intention of the legislature, courts should resort first to
interpretation (intrinsic aid) before resorting to construction (extrinsic aid)

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 47

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 “WHEN THERE IS DOUBT INTERPRET AND WHEN EXHAUSTED, CONSTRUCT”

Reason: SPEECH IS THE INDEX OF INTENTION (INDEX ANIMI SERMO EST)

(Bustamante vs. NLRC, 265 SCRA 61, (1996).

PRACTICAL FORMULA IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

INTERPRETATION
Exegesis

Intrinsic Aids + LAW (Principle) = Conclusion

Statutory
Intention of the
Construction
Authors of the Law

CONSTRUCTION
Exegesis

Extrinsic Aids + LAW (Principle) = Conclusion

(Note to be discussed after Presumptions and General Principles of Construction. See pages 74-
82)

INTRINSIC GUIDES
Use of Latin Maxims:
(See: CANONS- TEXTUAL)

LATIN MAXIMS ON CONSTRUCTION/INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND

PHRASES

A) VERBA LEGIS

Verba Legis (Plain Language Rule)

- If the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
- The language of the statute affords the best means of its exposition and
legislative intent must be determined primarily therefrom. It is the court’s duty to give the
statute the interpretation called for by its language. The court may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. Popular clamor as to the
enforcement of a law adds nothing to, and detracts nothing from the duty of the court to
construe the law as it is. The law may sometimes be harsh, but if it is so written and
intended by the legislature, the courts have no recourse but to apply it.
(READ: Daoang vs. Municipal Judges of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, March 28, 1988, 159
SCRA 369)

Plain Meaning Rule

If the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without interpretation. This is rule rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the
court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 48

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are
found in the statute. It is also known as VERBA LEGIS.

Plain Meaning
When writing statutes, the legislature intends to use ordinary English words in their
ordinary senses. The United States Supreme Court discussed the PLAIN MEANING RULE in
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), reasoning "[i]t is elementary that the meaning
of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if
that is plain... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." And if a
statute's language is plain and clear, the Court further warned that "the duty of interpretation does
not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."
VERBA LEGIS (Plain- meaning Rule)- if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This
rule rest on the presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute
correctly expresses its intent or will and thus, thus precluding the court from construing it
differently.

Common and ordinary meaning:

-Natural meaning- normal and customary (usual) meaning of the word-NORMAL

USAGE

-presumption that Congress uses common words in their popular meaning as used
in the common speech of men.

Except- if there is evidence that the statutory term has a specialized meaning in
law or another relevant field.

PLAIN MEANING RULE/ VERBA LEGIS

The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation.40 This rule derived from the maxim Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a
statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the
statute.41 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.42

(41 Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation, G.R.
No. 158540, July 8, 2004, 434 SCRA 65, 93;
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 530, 602
42 Enjay, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 315 Phil. 648, 656 (1995);

Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
82511, March 3, 1992, 206 SCRA 701, 711.)

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 49

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 The language of the statute affords the best means of its exposition and legislative intent
must be determined primarily therefrom. It is the duty of the court to give the statute the
interpretation its language calls for. The court is not to speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words. Popular clamor as to the enforcement of a law adds nothing to,
and detract nothing from the duty of the court to construe the law as it is. The law may
sometimes be harsh but if it is so written and intended by the legislature, the courts have no
recourse but to apply it. (DURA LEX SED LEX)

**Thus, where what is not clearly provided in the law is read into the law by construction
because it is more logical and wise, it will be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define
the wisdom of the law, which is judicial legislation (Rizal Commercial Bank Corporation vs.
IAC, 320 SCRA 279, (1999).

Whether a statute is wise or expedient is not for the courts to determine. Court must
administer the law, not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to
consequences. (Director of Lands vs. Abaya, 63 Phil. 559, (1936).

1. National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC, 327 SCRA 158 (2000)

*The apparent presumption here is that the legislature is presumed to know the meaning
of the word, to have used it advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. (Aparri vs. CA, G.R. No. 30057, January 31, 1984)

RELATED LATIN MAXIMS:

*VERBA LEGIS NON EST RECEDENDUM- from the words of the statute there should
be no departure.

Verba Legis Non Est Recedendum

- From the words of a statute there should be no departure.

*OPTIMA STATULI INTERPRETATIX EST IPSUM STATUTUM- the best interpreter

of the statute is the statute itself.

*ABSOLUTA SENTENTIA NON INDIGET- When the language of the law is clear, no
explanation of it is required.

Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget

- When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required.

*DURA LEX SED LEX – the law may be harsh but that is the law.

Dura Lex Sed Lex (The law may be harsh but it is the law.)
- The reason for the rule is that the legislature must be presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used the words advisedly and to have expressed its intent
by the use of such words as are found in the statute.

HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX SCRIPTA EST- it is
exceedingly hard but so the law is written. (the law may be exceedingly harsh but it is so
written)

*AEQUITAS NUNQUAM CONTRAVENIT LEGIS – Equity never acts in

contravention of the law. (Aguila vs. CFI of Batangas, 160 SCRA 352 (1988).
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 50
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 *MALEDICTA EST EXPOSITIO QUAE CORRUMPIT TEXTUM- it is dangerous
construction which is against the text (Victoria vs. COMELEC, 229 SCRA 269 (1994).

“OPPOSITE” MAXIMS: Literal import or meaning must yield to its apparent intent,
purpose or spirit.

“Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of a statute.

The courts are not to be hedged in by the literal meaning of the language of the
statute; the spirit and intendment thereof must prevail over its letter. This rule of
construction is specially applicable where adherence to the letter would result to
absurdity and injustice (Casela vs. CA, GR No. 26754, Oct. 16, 1970, 35 SCRA 279;
Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of House of Representative, 199 SCRA 692 (1991), would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it would
be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within the spirit or intent. (Rufino Lopez
& Sons, Inc. vs. Court of tax Appeal, 100 Phil. 850 (1957).

*RATIO LEGIS- interpretation according to the spirit or reason of the law.

Ratio Legis (Interpretation according to spirit)

In construing a statute, the courts must look into the spirit of the law or the reason for it.
The spirit or intention of the law prevails over the letter thereof. The statute may be extended to
cases which are not included within the literal meaning of the words, if such case is within the
reason for the statute. And the cases within the letter of the law but not within the spirit thereof
are not within the statute. No reason, however, may be imputed to the legislature, which is not
supported by the fact of the law itself. In determining the reason for the law, recourse may be had
to the preamble or applicable where adherence to the letter would lead to absurdity, injustice,
contradiction or defeat the plain purpose of the act. Apparent inaccuracies and mistakes in the
mere verbiage or phraseology will be overlooked to give effect to the spirit of the law.

*Ratio Legis Est Anima

- The reason of the law is its soul.
- “A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, and that what is within
the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within
the letter but not within it spirit is not within the law. This principle of construction is
very helpful when legislative intent cannot be ascertained purely from the letter of the
law.” (Pilares III, page 65)

Pilares III, page 79:

Verba legis and ratio legis are not mutually exclusive concepts…. (T)hey
should be seen as complementary principles of construction which are used in order
to in determining the meaning and intent of a statutory provision.
If the law is clear, there is no room for construction, not because verba legis takes
precedence over ratio legis, but rather because the literal interpretation of the
words used in the law correctly expresses the intention of the legislature….
(I)f the words used in the statute are not clear, or it is not clear how the statutory
provision will apply in a given set of facts, verba legis may not be enough to determine
the true meaning of the law, and in this case, the courts must resort to ratio legis
and find out the intention behind the law.
What is clear from the rulings of the Supreme Court, however, is that in any case
requiring interpretation of a legal provision, verba legis is the starting point. After
all, the legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used the
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 51
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 word advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as found in the
statute, consistent with the maxim d index animo sermo est (speech is the index of
intention). It is only after it is shown and established that the statute is ambiguous,
by applying the test of ambiguity …. that the Court should abandon verba legis and
apply ratio legis in order to determine the true intent of the legilsture.”

*Cessante Ratione (Legis) Cessat Ipsa Lex

- When the reason for the law ceases, the law also ceases to exist.

*VERBA INTENTIONI, NON E CONTRA, DEBIT INSERVIRE- words ought to be

more subservient to the intent and not to the intent of the word (intent of the word
should not be contrary to the intention)- EXTENSION= THE INTENT OF THE
STATUTE IS THE LAW= CONSTRUCTION TO ACCOMPLISH PURPOSE.

B) DOCTRINE OF LAST ANTECEDENTS

The Doctrine of Last Antecedent refers to the maxim ad proximum antecedens fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia or “relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it is
prevented by the context”
Under this principle, “qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to
which thy are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.
Doctrine of Last Antecedents rules refers to the application of a qualification to the
immediately preceding references when more than one references are contained in the
sentences or provision, unless otherwise it was clearly evident that it refers to a different
reference contained therein.

Ex.- A provision stipulates “teachers, parents with mentally retarded kids must
attend the .P & T meeting” Here, the qualification “mentally retarded kids” refers to the
parents as per last antecedent rule.
Relative and qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the word or
phrase immediately preceding and not to others more remote.

Republic vs. Lacap, GR No. 158253, March 2, 2007

C) EJUSDEM GENERIS (Of the same kinds, class, or nature)

Under the rule of ejusdem generis, where, in a statute, general words follow a designation
of particular subject or classes of persons, the meaning of the general word will be ordinarily
presumed to restricted by the particular designation, and to include only things or persons of the
same kind, class, or nature as those specifically enumerated. Ejusdem generis means the same
kind, class or nature, or of the same specie.

The doctrine is “an attempt to reconcile an incompatibility between specific and general
words so that all the words in a statute and other legal instrument can be given effect, all parts of
the statute can be construed together and no words will be superfluous.” (Sutherland Stat Cons
5th Ed – cited in Pilares III at p.185) (Note: Presumption of effectiverness)

Purpose of the Rule

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 52

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 “The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and
general words., by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as
including all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular
words. This is justified on the ground that if the law making body intended the general word to
be used in their unrestricted sense, it would not have made an enumeration of particular subjects
but would have used only the general words.” (National Power Corporation vs. Angas et al.,
G.R. No 60225 to 60226, May 1992 – citing 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 3rd Ed.)

Restrictive effect

The effect of ejusdem generis is to limit the scope of the general word to those that
belong to the same class as those particularly enumerated. It is thus, important in the construction
of a statutory provision in applying this principle to identify the category/class to which the items
particularly enumerated belong to.

Ejusdem generis (eh-youse-dem generous) adj. Latin for "of the same kind," used to
interpret loosely written statutes. Where a law lists specific classes of persons or things and then
refers to them in general, the general statements only apply to the same kind of persons or things
specifically listed. Example: if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and
other motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles" would not include airplanes, since the list was of land-
based transportation.

.In the construction of laws, wills and other instruments, when certain things are
enumerated, and then a phrase is used which might be construed to include other things, it is
generally confined to things ejusdem generis; as, where an act (9 Ann. C. 20) provided that a writ
of quo warranto might issue against persons who should usurp "the offices of mayors, bailiffs,
port reeves, and other offices, within the cities, towns, corporate boroughs, and places, within
Great Britain," &c.; it was held that "other offices" meant offices ejusdem generis; and that the
word "places" signified places of the same kind; that is, that the offices must be corporate
offices, and the places must be corporate Places. 5 T. R. 375,379; 5 B. & C. 640; 8 D. & Ry. 393;
1 B. & C. 237.

When a list of two or more specific descriptors is followed by more general descriptors,
the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if
any, of the specific words that precede them. For example, where "cars, motor bikes, motor
powered vehicles" are mentioned, the word "vehicles" would be interpreted in a limited sense
(therefore vehicles cannot be interpreted as including airplanes).

Where a statute describes things of particular class or kind accompanied by words of a

generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a kindred nature with
those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statute to repel
such influence. Ejusdem generis could be expansive, however, because the list is not exclusive; it
may be expanded if a juridical tie could be found with another item.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp: Because gambling was with the phrase ‘and other prohibited
games of chance’ it was construed to refer only to illegal gambling.
PBA v CA: Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned.

Where the general term follows the designation of particular things or classes of persons
or subjects, the general term will be construed to include only those things or persons of the same
class, kind or nature as those specifically enumerated.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 53

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 * The principle applies when specific words preceding the general expression are
of the same nature.
* Where if they are of different genra, the meaning of the general word remains
unaffected by its connection with them.

(READ: Mutuc vs. COMELEC, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 228)

D) EXRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS (The express mention of one thing
excludes all others)

Items not on the list are assumed not to be covered by the statute. However, sometimes a
list in a statute is illustrative, not exclusionary. This is usually indicated by a word such
as "includes" or "such as."

 EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS (Inclusio Unius Est Exclusio

Alterius)

The maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius or “express mention is implied exclusion” ,
means that “express mention of one thing in law, as a general rule, means exclusion of others no
expressly mentioned”.

Purpose of the rule

The maxim is to limit the coverage of a legal provision to those expressly mention
therein.

It is based on the rule of logic and the natural working of the human mind in determining
the probable intention of the law makers in mentioning some and not the others of the same
class. This borne from reasoning that “when people say one thing, they do not mean something
else” (Pilares III, p. 191)

-The mention of one person, thing, act, or consequences excludes all other things.

Me: What is not included is deemed excluded.

This maxim cannot be invoked where no reason appears as to why other things not
enumerated should be excluded.
It is likewise not applicable where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration is not
intended or where the enumeration is by example only. E.g. the phrase “specifically including”
appear before the beginning of the enumeration.
Finally, it is not applicable in instances where the Doctrine of Necessary Implication
applies. (Pilares III, p 192-193)

The express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
 - Mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another
 When a statute enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, it is to be
construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned.

Variation: Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is
implied.

Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or

construction, be extended to other matters.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 54

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 Canon of restrictive interpretation.

Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Malinias v Comelec: An attempt to use an administrative charge for a criminal complaint against
police officers accused of violating the election code. The court ruled that not all violations of
the election code provided for criminal penalties and in this case, the violated provisions only
warrant the imposition of administrative, not criminal, penalties.

Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos: A group of old men charged with violating the solicitation permit
law was acquitted because the term religious purpose was not expressly included in the
provisions of the statute, and what the law does not include, it excludes. The law referred only to
charitable purposes, which phrase cannot be construed so as to include a religious purpose.

 The maxim is only auxiliary rule of statutory construction. It is not of universal

application neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering
the legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should never be permitted to
defeat the plainly indicative purpose of the legislature.

Note: The maxim does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example, or to
remove doubts.

CASE: ESCRIBANO V. AVILA G.R. NO. 30375, September 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245
- SARMIENTO III VS. MISON (L-79974, DEC. 17, 1987) - Sec 16, Art VII of
the 1987 Constitution. (Appointment by the president without the approval of the
commission on appointment.

See:
CASUS OMISUS
 Casus Omisus
- Under this rule, the words or phrases may be supplied by the courts and inserted
in a statute where that is necessary to eliminate repugnancy and inconsistency in the
statute and to complete the sense thereof, and to give effect to the intention of the
legislature manifested therein. The rule is especially applicable where such application is
necessary to prevent the law from becoming a nullity. This rule is also used to supply
omissions occasioned by clerical errors, by accident or inadvertence.

CASUS OMISUS PRO HABENDUS EST

 Casus Omisus Pro Omisso Hebendus Est

As corollary to the maxim “what is not included is deemed excluded” the maxim “cassus
omissus pro habendus est” means that “a person. Object, or thing enumerated not enumerated
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.”
This principle operates only when the omission is clearly established. It is not applicable
when the term in the previous law was substituted with an equivalent word.

Under this rule, a person, object or thing omitted from the enumeration must be held to
have been omitted intentionally. The maxim can operate when the omission had been clearly
established.

This maxim is better used when you justify the omission in a new law as compared to a
prior law.
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 55
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 Note: Differentiate this maxim from Inclusio Unios Est Exclusio Alterius

E) IN PARI MATERIA (Upon the same matter or subject)

When a statute is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined in light of other statutes on
the same subject matter.

All statute relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be
construed together as if they constituted one law. They should be construed and
harmonized with the existing law.

F) NOSCITUR A SOCIIS (A word is known by the company it keeps)

Me: *Birds of the same feather flock together*

When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the
statute.

 Noscitur a Sociis

Nocitur a sociis, also known as the Doctrine of Associated Words, provides that where a
particular word or phrase in a statute is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear pr specific by considering the
company in which it is found or which it is associated.
 Under this rule, the meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by
reference to words associated with or related to them in a statute.

 Where particular word or phrase in a statute is ambiguous in itself, or is simply

susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is found or which it is associated.

- Where there are two or more words of ambiguous meaning together in a statute, they
are understood to be used in their cognate sense to express the same relations and give
color and expression to each word.
- Where a law does not define a word therein, it will be construed as having a
meaning- similar to that of words associated or accompanied by it.

(READ: Caltex vs. Palomar, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 247)

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

Words must be construed in conjunction with the other words and phrases used in the
text. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. Where a particular word or phrase in a
statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true
meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found
or with which it is associated.

Aisporna vs. CA: wife of insurance agent prosecuted for having sold an insurance without
registering as an agent. Using this doctrine, the Court ruled that an insurance agent is one who
sells insurance in return for compensation, and it was not proved that Aisporna received

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 56

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
compensation for the insurance she was alleged to have sold. (Her defense was that as her
husband’s clerk, she only renewed the insurance because her husband was out at the time).

Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing Corp. v. Villarama: Dai-Chi filed a complaint against

Villarama for violating an agreement that he would not join the company’s competitor within
two years after leaving Dai-Chi. Dai-Chi filed a complaint against Villarama at the RTC, which
dismissed it on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, for it should have been filed before a labor
arbiter. Using the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the court ruled that while the Labor Code says
that “all money claims of workers” were under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, it did not
mean to encompass the entire universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers
against their employers. Paragraph 3 should not be read in isolation, but rather in conjunction
with paragraphs 1 to 5, which all refer to money claims of workers arising from violations of or
in connection with an employee-employer relationship. Dai-Chi’s complaint was anchored on a
violation of contract, since Villarama was no longer an employee. The court ruled that the RTC
was the proper venue for filing of the case.

G) REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS

REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS

Referring each to each; let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be
taken distributively.
Amadora v CA: Teachers should apply to pupils and students; and heads of establishment
of arts and trades to apprentices. The teacher in charge must answer for a student’s tort, but in
this case none of those charged were either the teacher in charge or the dean of boys.
People vs Tamani: Promulgation should refer to judgment and notice should refer to
order. The computation of the filing of the petition was wrong. (This was an obiter because the
filing was late either way it is computed, and the court decided on the case anyway).

 Reddendo Singula Singulis (Let each be put in its proper place)

- Under this principle, where a sentence has several antecedents and several
consequents, they are to be read distributively. The antecedents should be referred to their
appropriate consequents and vice versa.
- Each word, phrase or clause must be given its proper connection in order to give
it proper force and effect, rendering none of them useless or superfluous. A transposition
of words and clauses may be resorted to where the sentence or clause is without meaning
as it stands.
- This is also to be referred to as the doctrine of collocation which literally means,
“referring each to each.”

The maxim redenddo singular singulis means that words in different parts of a statute
must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving each in its place , its proper force
and effect, and if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict
grammatical construction demands otherwise. It means that “the words are to be applied
to the subject that seems most appropriately related by context and applicability.”
e.g.
If the law provides “the barrower shall mortgage and pledge his real property and
personal property ”, the term “mortgage” must be referred real property and the word
“pledge” must be referred to personal property.

Note: Reddendo…. is different from DOCTRINE OF LAST ANTECENDENT

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 57

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 Doctrine of Last Antecedent - When a list of words has a modifying phrase at the
end, the phrase refers only to the last, e.g., firemen, policemen, and doctors in a hospital.
(THE PHRASE “in a hospital refers only to “doctors) - doctrine of last antecedent

H) GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT (The general does not detract from the
specific)

Described in The Vera Cruz (1884) 10 App. Cas. 59 as: "Now if anything be certain it is
this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible
application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation,
you are not to hold that earlier legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from
merely by force of such general words, without any evidence of a particular intention to
do so." This means that if a later law and an earlier law are potentially - but not
necessarily - in conflict, courts will adopt the reading that does not result in an implied
repeal of the earlier statute. Lawmaking bodies usually need to be explicit if they intend
to repeal an earlier law

 Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant

 A general law does not nullify a specific law. Special provisions prevail over general
provisions. A special law must be intended to constitute an exception to the general law
in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

J) CASUS OMISSUS

Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an
enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally.

This needs two laws. In expressio unius, it’s just the enumeration you are looking at, not another
law.
COA of the Province of Cebu v Province of Cebu: This case is about the effects of a new
law on an old law. The Special Education Fund (SEF) allowed the use of part of the realty and
cigarette taxes for extension programs and scholarships. When the Cebu provincial office used it
to pay for salaries of teachers and scholars, COA said those were not chargeable to the SEF since
RA 5447, which created the SEF, was deemed repealed by the Local Govt Code. Because the
two retained sections in the LGC omitted the scholarship grants, the court ruled that what was
omitted must have been omitted intentionally, and so may not be included.

K) UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUIRE DEBEMOS

WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD ALSO NOT
DISTINGUISH.

Founded on logic, the rule is corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute
should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance (Generalia Verba Sun
Generaliter Intelligencia). It requires that the general words and phrases should not be reduced
into parts and other parts distinguished from the other part so as to justify its exclusion from the
operation of the law. There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where
none is indicated.
-VASQUEZ vs. HOBILLA-ALINIO (GR NO. 118813-14, APRIL 8, 1997, 271
SCRA citing Deloso vs. Domingo 191 SCRA 549 (1990)

I) DISSIMILUM DISSIMILIS EST RATIO

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 58
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature
intended a distinction or qualification.

Garvida v. Sales: Sales sought to have Garvida disqualified from the SK post because of
age. The court ruled that while the Local Gov’t Code provided that SK members should be 21
years old, it added a qualification that should officials should be 21 years old on the date of
election. Garvida was disqualified because she was more than 21 years old, although she was
less than 22 years old.

L. MENS LEGISLATORES

The courts look into the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief to be
remedied or the purpose to be observed. The court should give the statute a reasonable or
liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it even
though such construction is not within the strict literal interpretation of the statute.
- The court should give the statute a reasonable or liberal construction which will
best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it.
- Statutes must be construed to avoid injustice

M) EX NECISSITATE LEGIS (Doctrine of Necessary Implication)

This doctrine provides that “ every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all
such provision as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges, or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its
term”
Every statutory grant of power, right, or privilege is deemed to include all incidental
power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser expressed in
the maxim “in eo plus sit, simper inest est minus”.

Basis:
No law can be legislated that can provide all the details involved in its application. Here
is always an omission that my not meet particular situation. What is thought, at the time
of enactment, to be all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the
unfolding event of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced.
One of the rules of statutory construction used or designed to fill in the gap is the
Doctrine of Necessary Impication

What is implied in the statute is as much part thereof as that which is expressed. Every
statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms.
-Every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental powers, rights or privileges to make it effective/effectual.

N) Generalia Verba Sun Generaliter Intelligencia

What is generally spoken shall be generally understood.

Note: Relate to WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, WE SHOULD NOT
DISTINGUISH

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 59

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 Note: The Doctrine of Progressive Construction (Pilares III, pp 158-159)

Laws should be progressively construed so that they may meet new conditions, so
long as hey fall within the general purposes of the statute.
A general law may, and frequently does, originate in some particular case, or
classes of cases which is in the mind of the legislature at that time, but so long as it is
expressed in general language the courts cannot, in absence of expressed restrictions,
limit its application to these cases, but must apply it to all cases that come within the
terms and general purpose and policy. Hence, statute framed in general terms apply to
new cases that arise, and to new subjects that are created, from time to time, and which
come within the general scope and policy. It is a rule in statutory construction that
legislative enactments in general and comprehensive terms, prospective in operation,
apply alike to all person, subjects, and business within their general purview and scope
coming into existence subsequent to their passage.
It is this progressive interpretation that keeps the legislation from becoming
ephemeral (lasting for very short time) and transitory. It is obvious that legislators want
their creation to be a rule of conduct for an indefinite time. To carry out that desire of the
legislators, a statue should always be made adaptable by the courts to the changing
conditions of he social order.

P) Legis Posteriors Priores Contraries Abrogant

In case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the latter
enactment prevails. The rationale is that a latter law repeals an earlier one because it is the later
legislative will. It is to be presumed that the lawmaker knew the older law and intended to
change it. In enacting the older law, the legislators cannot have known the newer one and hence
could have intended to change what they did not know. Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones.

Relate to Implied Repeal and The Principle of Harmonizing Laws of different vintages
but dealing with the same subject matter.
-New law prevails over old law if the two law cannot be harmonized

Q) Optima Statuli Interpretatix Est Ipsum Statutum

- The best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.

R) Ut Res Magis Quam Pereat

This means that it is not enough that the statute should be given effect as a whole but that
effect should be given to each of the provisions of the statute.

S) Lex Prospicit, Non Respicit

- The law looks forward not backwards.

*Lex De Futuro, Judex De Praterito

- The law provides for the future, the judge for the past.

T) Index Animi Sermo Est

- Speech is the index of intention

U) Interpretation Talis In Ambiguis Semper Frienda Est, Ut Evitatur Inconveniens Et

Absurdum

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 60

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 - Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and
absurdity is to be adopted.

V) In Eo Plus Sit, Simper inest et Minus

The greater includes the lesser.

OTHER LATIN MAXIMS

I. ON CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

A. POWER TO CONSTRUE

1. Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet.

Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law.

AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

A. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION

Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege.

Contemporary construction is strongest in law.

Optima est legum interpres consuetudo.

Custom is the best interpreter of a statute.

Regula pro lege, si deficit lex.

In default of the law, the maxim rules.

Optimus interpres rerum usus.

The best interpreter of the law is usage.

Communis error facit jus.

Common error sometimes passes as current law.

Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalescit.

That which was originally void, does not by lapse of time become valid.

Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur.

Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate.

Stare decisis et non quieta movere.

Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.

Interest republicae ut sit finis litium.

The interest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation.

II. ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF STATUTE LITERAL

INTERPRETATION

Index animi sermo est.

Speech is the index of intention.

Animus hominis est anima scripti.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 61
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
The intention of the party is the soul.

Verba legis non est recedendum.

From the words of the statute there should be no departure.

Maledicta et exposition quae corrumpit textum.

It is bad construction which corrupts the text.

Littera scripta manet.

The written word endures.

Clausula rebus sic stantibus.

Things thus standing.

Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent.

When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.

Dura lex sed lex.

The law may be harsh but it is the law.

Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est.
It is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written.

III. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION

Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis.

Equity never acts in contravention of the law.

Aequum et bonum est lex legume.

What is good and equal is the law of laws.

Jus ars boni et aequi.

Law is the art of equity.

Ratio legis est anima legis.

The reason of the law is the soul of the law.

Littera necat spiritus vivificate.

The letter kills but the spirit gives life.

Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservice.

Words ought to be more subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words.

Benignus leges interpretandae sunt, quod voluntas eraum conservetur.

Laws are to be construed liberally, so that their spirit and reason be preserved.

Qui haret in littera haret in cortice.

He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning.

Quando verba statute sunt speciali, ratio autem generalia, statum generaliter est
intelligendum.
When the words used in a statute are special, but the purpose of the law is general, it should be
read as the general expression.

Cessante rationi legis, cessat et ipsa lex.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 62

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum.

Where there is ambiguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity
is to be adopted.

Legis construction non facit injuriam.

The construction of the law will not be such as to work injury or injustice.

Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in lege.

An argument drawn from inconvenience is not forcible in law.

Verba nihil operari melius est quam absurde.

It is better that words should have no operation at all than that they should operate absurdly.

Lex simper intendit quod convenit rationi.

The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason.

Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus.

Like reason doth make like law.

Argumentum a simili valet in lege.

An argument drawn from a similar case, or analogy, prevails in law.

De similibus idem est judicium.

Concerning similars, the judgment is the same.

Ubi eadem est ratio, ibi est eadem legis disposition.

Where there is the same reason, there is the same law

Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret.

That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice.

Lex injusta non est lex.

An unjust law is not a law.

Fiat justitia, ruat coelum.

Let right be done, though the heavens fall.

Nemo est supra legis.

Nobody is above the law.

Nulla potential supra legis esse debet.

No power must be above the law.

Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem.
It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stranger should reap the pecuniary produce of
another man’s work.

Surplusagium non nocet.

Surplusage does not vitiate a statute.

Utile per inutile non vitiatur.

The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 63

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Falsa demostratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat.
False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute.

Nil facit error nominis cum de corpora vel persona constat.

Error in name does not make an instrument inoperative when the description is sufficiently clear.

Certum est quod certum reddi potest.

That is sufficiently certain which can be made certain.

Ibi quid generaliter conceditur, inest haec exception, si non aliquid sit contras jus basque.
Where anything is granted generally, exemption from rigid application of law is implied; that
nothing shall be contrary to law and right.

Summum jus, summa injuria.

The rigor of the law would be the highest injustice.

Jus summum saepe, summa est militia.

Extreme law is often extreme wrong.

Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia.

The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility.

Impossibilum nulla obigatio est.

There is no obligation to do an impossible thing.

Lex non cogit ad impossibilia.

The law does not require an impossibility.

Lex non intendit aliquid impossible.

The law does not intend the impossible.

IV. IMPLICATIONS

Ex necessitate legis.
By the necessary implication of law.

In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus.

The greater includes the lesser.

Cui jurisdiction data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus jurisdiction explicari
non potuit.

When jurisdiction is given, all powers and means essential to its exercise are also given.

Ubi jus, ibi remedium.

Where there is a right, there is a remedy for violation thereof.

Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum.

Where the law is uncertain, there is no right.

Ex dolo malo non oritur action.

An action does not arise from fraud.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 64

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Nullius commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria.
No one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act.

In pari delicto potior est condition defendentis.

Where the parties are equally at fault, the position of the defending party is the better one.

Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum.

What cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

V. INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

A. IN GENERAL

Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligencia.

General words should be understood in their general sense.

Generis dictum generaliter est interpretandum.

A general statement is understood in its general sense.

Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam.

A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used.

Verba mere aequivoca, si per communem usum loquendi in intellectu certo

sumuntur, talis intellectus preferendus est.

Equivocal words or those with double meaning are to be understood

according to their common and ordinary sense.

Verba artis ex arte.

Words of art should be explained from their usage in the art to which they belong.

Verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personam.

General words should be confined according to the subject-matter or persons to which they
relate.

Ubi lex non distinguit necnon distinguere debemus.

Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.

Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio.

Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar.

B. ASSOCIATED WORDS

Noscitur a sociis.
A thing is known by its associates.

Ejesdem generis.
Of the same kind or species.

Expressio unius est exclusion alterius.

The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.

Expressum facit cessare tacitum.

What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 65

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Argumentum a contrario.
Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.

Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est.

A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally.

Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential.

A qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent.

Reddendo singular singulis.

Referring each to each, or referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let
each be put in its proper place.

C. PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES

Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.

A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule.

STATUTE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES

A. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE

Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum.

The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself.

Ex tota materia emergat resolution.

The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together.

Injustum est, nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita indicare vel
respondere.
It is unjust to decide or to respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole
of the law.

Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere possit antequam totum interum atque interim
perlegit.
The sense and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one whole and
not of one part only by itself.

Ex antecendentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretation.

A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it.

Verba posterima propter certitudinem addita ad priora quae certitudine indigent sunt
referenda.
Reference should be made to a subsequent section in order to explain a previous clause of which
the meaning is doubtful.

Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat.

A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it.

VI. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER

STATUTES

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 66

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Pari materia.
Of the same matter.

Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus.

Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of law.

Distingue tempora et concordabis jura.

Distinguish times and you will harmonize law.
- Tempora mutantur et leges mutantur in illis.
- Times have changed and laws have changed with them.

Mutatis mutandis.
With the necessary changes.

VII. STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION

A. IN GENERAL

Salus populi est suprema lex.

The voice of the people is the supreme law.

Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur.

Statutes enacted for the public good are to be construed liberally.

Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur.

The private interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of the public.

B. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED

Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.

The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty.

Actus me invito facturs non est meus actus.

An act done by me against my will is not my act.

Privilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntate consonem concedentis.

Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them.

Renunciatio non praesumitur.

Renunciation cannot be presumed.

Strictissimi juris.
Follow the law strictly.

Nullum tempus occurit regi.

There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.

VIII. MANDATORY AND DIRECTIONAL STATUTES

A. MANDATORY STATUTES

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 67

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt.
The law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.

Potior est in tempore, potior est in jure.

He who is first in time is preferred in right.

IX.PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES

A. IN GENERAL

Lex prospicit, non respicit.

The law looks forward, not backward.

Lex de futuro, judex de praeterito.

The law provides for the future, the judge for the past.
- Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis.
- A new statute should affect the future, not the past.

Leges quae retrospciunt, et magna cum cautione sunt adhibendae neque enim janus locatur
in legibus.
Laws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received, for Janus has really no place in
the laws.

Leges et constitutiones futuris certum est dare formam negotiis, non ad facta praeterita
revocari, nisi nominatim et de praeterito tempore et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit.
Laws should be construed as prospective, not retrospective, unless they are expressly made
applicable to past transactions and to such as are still pending.

B. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT

Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine lege.

There is no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law.

Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda.

Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.

X. AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL

A. REPEAL

Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.

Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto.

Generalia specialibus non derogant.

A general law does not nullify a specific or special law.

XI. BINDING FORCE OF RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Ignorance of the law excuses no one.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 68

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
XII. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE WHEN AMBIGUOUS

In obscuris inspici solere quod versimilius est, aut quod plerumque fieri solet.
When matters are obscure, it is customary to take what appears to be more likely or what usually
often happens.

Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur.

A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence.

XIII. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE AND HARDSHIP

Ad ea quae frequentibus accidunt jura adaptatur.

Laws are understood to be adapted to those cases which most frequently occur.

Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt non quae ex inordinato.
Laws ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen most frequently, and not to
those which are of rare or accidental occurrence.

Quod semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores.

Legislators pass over what happens only once or twice.

De minimis non curat lex.

The law does not concern itself with trifling matters.

XIII. TITLE OF THE ACT (INTRINSIC AID)

Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet Rubrum.

The black (body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or rubric of the
statute printed in red)

TEXTUAL MAXIMS

 Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius (Inclusio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius)
 Casus Omisus Pro Omisso Hebendus Est
 Casus Omisus
 Reddendo Singula Singulis (Let each be put in its proper place)
 Generalia Verba Sun Generaliter Intelligencia
 General Dictum Generaliter Est Interpretandum
A general statement is understood in a general sense
 Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguire Debemos
 Noscitur a Sociis
 Doctrine of Last Antecedent

NON-TEXTUAL MAXIMS

 Ratio Legis (Interpretation according to spirit)

 Mens Legislatores
 Cessante Ratione (Legis) Cessat Ipsa Lex
 Ratio Legis Est Anima
 Ex Necissitate Legis (Doctrine of Necessary Implication)


PROSPECTIVE/RETROACTIVE

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 69

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
  Lex De Futuro, Judex De Praterito
 Lex Prospicit, Non Respicit
Nova constitution futures formam imponere debet no praeteritis
A new statute should affect the future, not the past

GENERAL/SPECIAL

 Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant

General Dictum Generaliter Est Interpretandum
A general statement is understood in a general sense

WHEN COMPARING OLD LAWS AND NEW LAWS

 In Pari Materia Rule

 Leges Posteriores Priores Contrarias Abrogant
 Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant

USE OF SPECIFIC WORDS/ PARTICULAR WORDS OR PHRASES

The word “AND”

As a rule, the word “and” is a conjunctive term, and if it is used in a sentence, it means that the
members or a sentence are to be taken jointly.

As a general rule, the use of the word “and” is interpreted as conjunctive. The word “and”
implies conjunction, joinder or union.

However, the use of the word “and” does not necessarily signify a conjunctive relationship if
such interpretation will be contrary to the clear legislative intent.

Exception: The word “and” may mean “or” if this is the plain intention of the legislator which
could be gleaned from the context of the statue.

The conjunctive “and” should not be taken in its ordinary acceptation, but should be construed
like a disjunctive “or” if the literal interpretation of the law would pervert or obscure the
legislative intent.

The word “OR”

The word “or” denotes a disjunctive relationship. As a disjunctive term, it signifies dissociation
and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated.

The term “AND/OR”

Th use of the term “and/or” means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive “and” and
the disjunctive “or” depending on which one will serve the legislative intent.

It is well settled-rule in statutory construction that the use of the term “and/or” means that the
word “and” and the word “or” are to be used interchangeably. The word “or” is a term
signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from the other.

Mandatory word “SHALL”

The general rule of construction is that the word “shall” means that the requirement is
mandatory. It is imperative.
When used in statute, it operates to impose a duty.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 70

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Generally, the use of the word “shall” in a statute connotes a mandatory order, its use in the
statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.

Permissive word “MAY”

The word “may” means that the provision is permissive and it operates to confer jurisdiction.

The rule, however, is not absolute. The word “shall” may be construed as “may” when so
required by the context or by the intention of the statute.

Affirmative and Prohibitory

Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as
mandatory while hose in the affirmative are merely directory

….. negative (prohibitory and exclusive words or terms are indictive of the legislative intent that
the statute is to be mandatory

Ordinarily the word “may” is directory.

Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory. E.g. cannot, shall not, and no.are
words indicating the intention of the legislature mandatory and prohibitive.

Including/ involving

The use of the word “including” followed by an enumeration generally denotes that the
enumeration is not exclusive.

Note, that the principle expressio unius est eclusio alterius (which means that the explicit
inclusion of certain things implies the excluded of those not included) is inapplicable when the
enumeration is by way of example only, or when the enumeration is prefaced with the words
“including” or “involving”.

--------------------------------------------------o -----------------------------------------------------------

Note: the following are additional researches on Statutory Construction

CANONS

Also known as canons of construction, canons give common sense guidance to courts in
interpreting the meaning of statutes. Most canons emerge from the common law process through
the choices of judges. Proponents of the use of canons argue that the canons constrain
judges and limit the ability of the courts to legislate from the bench. Critics argue that a
judge always has a choice between competing canons that lead to different results, so
judicial discretion is only hidden through the use of canons, not reduced.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 71

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Textual

Textual canons are rules of thumb for understanding the words of the text. Some of the
canons are still known by their traditional Latin names.

Plain Meaning

\ When writing statutes, the legislature intends to use ordinary English words in their
ordinary senses. The United States Supreme Court discussed the plain meaning rule in Caminetti
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), reasoning "[i]t is elementary that the meaning of a statute
must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is
plain... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." And if a statute's
language is plain and clear, the Court further warned that "the duty of interpretation does not
arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."

Ejusdem generis (Of the same kinds, class, or nature)

When a list of two or more specific descriptors is followed by more general descriptors,
the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if
any, of the specific words that precede them. For example, where "cars, motor bikes, motor
powered vehicles" are mentioned, the word "vehicles" would be interpreted in a limited sense
(therefore vehicles cannot be interpreted as including airplanes).

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (The express mention of one thing excludes all others)

Items not on the list are assumed not to be covered by the statute. However, sometimes a
list in a statute is illustrative, not exclusionary. This is usually indicated by a word such as
"includes" or "such as."

Exclusionary rule/maxim

In pari materia (Upon the same matter or subject)

When a statute is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined in light of other statutes on
the same subject matter.

Noscitur a sociis (A word is known by the company it keeps)

When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the
statute.

Reddendo singula singulis (Refers only to the last)

Also known as Doctrine of Collocation

Let each be put in its proper place - a transposition of words and clause may be resorted
to where the sentence or clause is without meaning as it stands.

Also distributive – Under this principle, where a sentence has several antecedents an
several consequents, they are to be read distributively. The antecedent should be referred to the
appropriate consequents and vice versa.

Each word or phrase must be given its proper connection in order to give it proper force
and effect, rendering none of them useless or superfluous.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 72

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 When a list of words has a modifying phrase at the end, the phrase refers only to the last,
e.g., firemen, policemen, and doctors in a hospital.

Generalia specialibus non derogant (The general does not detract from the specific)

Described in The Vera Cruz (1884) 10 App. Cas. 59 as: "Now if anything be certain it is
this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible
application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are
not to hold that earlier legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force
of such general words, without any evidence of a particular intention to do so." This means that
if a later law and an earlier law are potentially - but not necessarily - in conflict, courts will adopt
the reading that does not result in an implied repeal of the earlier statute. Lawmaking bodies
usually need to be explicit if they intend to repeal an earlier law.

Substantive

Substantive canons instruct the court to favor interpretations that promote certain values
or policy results.

 "Charming Betsy" Canon

National statute must be construed so as not to conflict with international law. See
Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804): "It has also been observed
that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains..."

 Interpretation in Light of Fundamental Values

Statute does not violate fundamental societal values. See, for example, Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).

 Rule of Lenity

In construing an ambiguous criminal statute, the court should resolve the ambiguity in
favor of the defendant. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); See, e.g.,
Muscarello v. U.S., 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (declining to apply the rule of lenity); Evans v.
U.S., 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Scarborough v. U.S., 431 U.S. 563
(1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting); See United States v. Santos (2008).

 Avoidance of abrogation of state sovereignty

See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243 (2006); see also Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)

Deference

Deference canons instruct the court to defer to the interpretation of another institution,
such as an administrative agency or Congress. These canons reflect an understanding that
the judiciary is not the only branch of government entrusted with constitutional
responsibility.

 Deference to Administrative Interpretations (US Chevron deference)

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 73

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 If a statute administered by an agency is ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
courts will defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute. This rule of
deference was formulated in the US by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

A) Avoidance Canon (Canon of Constitutional Avoidance)

If a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, courts should

choose an interpretation that avoids raising constitutional problems. In the US, this
canon has grown stronger in recent history. The traditional avoidance canon required the
court to choose a different interpretation only when one interpretation was actually
unconstitutional. The modern avoidance canon tells the court to choose a different
interpretation when another interpretation merely raises constitutional doubts.[4][5]

 Avoiding Absurdity

The legislature did not intend an absurd or manifestly unjust result.[6][7]

B) CLEAR STATEMENT RULE

When a statute may be interpreted to abridge long-held rights of individuals or

states, or make a large policy change, courts will not interpret the statute to make
the change unless the legislature clearly stated it. This rule is based on the
assumption that the legislature would not make major changes in a vague or unclear
way, and to ensure that voters are able to hold the appropriate legislators
responsible for the modification.

Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant (Subsequent laws repeal those before enacted to
the contrary, aka "Last in Time")

When two statutes conflict, the one enacted last prevails.

Criticism

Critics of the use of canons argue that canons impute some sort of "omniscience" to the
legislator, suggesting that it is aware of the canons when constructing the laws. In addition,
it is argued that the canons give a credence to judges who want to construct the law a certain
way, imparting a false sense of justification to their otherwise arbitrary process. In a classic
article, Karl Llewellyn argued that every canon had a "counter-canon" that would lead to the
opposite interpretation of the statute.[8]

However, it could be argued that the fundamental nature of language is to blame for the problem
of "for every canon, a counter." Interpreting whether a statute applies to a given set of facts often
boils down to analyzing whether a single word or short phrase covers some element of the
factual situation before the judge. The expansiveness of language necessarily means that
there will often be good (or equally unconvincing) arguments for two competing
interpretations. A judge is then forced to resort to documentation of legislative intent, which
may also be unhelpful, and then finally to his or her own judgment of what outcome is ultimately
fair and logical under the totality of the circumstances. Canons of statutory construction give
judges the ability to decide questions of statutory interpretation that necessarily rely on an
element of judicial discretion.

-----------------------------------------------------------0 ----------------------------------------------------

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 74

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
(Discuss this first before Canons and Latin Maxims)
PRESUMPTIONS

Judges use a variety of tools to help them interpret statutes, most frequently relying on five
types of interpretive tools: ordinary meaning, statutory context, canons of construction,
legislative history, and evidence of the way a statute is implemented.1
These tools often overlap.

Suarez, p 110-116

While in the process of construing statutes, the court may indulge in presumptions which
are justified by the rules of logic, human experience, good sense, and by specific provision
of law

Me: this proposition assumes that the statue under consideration is ambiguous, hence
when the statue is clear (legislative intent), there is no need to apply said presumption/s.

Note: The legislature is presumed to know the rules of construction in enacting a statute.
The legislature enacts a law with the end in view that it will, in case of doubt, be construed
in accordance with settled principles and rules established by legal hermeneutics.

*"[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn to one cardinal canon before all
others. . . .[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146,
1149 (1992). Indeed, "when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also
the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.'"[1]

*“A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that every part of a statute be
presumed to have some effect, and not be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary."
Raven Coal Corp. v. Absher, 153 Va. 332, 149 S.E. 541 (1929). (See Presumption against
Ineffectiveness)

*"In assessing statutory language, unless words have acquired a peculiar meaning, by
virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction, they are to be construed in accordance
with their common usage." Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 787-88
(Alaska 1996);

"The principal command of statutory construction is that the court should determine and
effectuate the intent of the legislature using the plain language of the statute as the primary
indicator of legislative intent." State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 242, 880 P.2d 845, 853 (1994)
*“The words of a statute . . . should be given their ordinary meaning, absent clear and
express legislative intention to the contrary,” as long as the ordinary meaning does “not
render the statute’s application absurd, unreasonable, or unjust.” State v. Rowell, 121 N.M.
111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995) When the meaning of a statute is unclear or ambiguous,
we have recognized that it is “the high duty and responsibility of the judicial branch of
government to facilitate and promote the legislature’s accomplishment of its purpose.”
State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994). - New
Mexico v. Juan, 2010-NMSC-041, August 9, 2010

 Presumption of Validity

Statute should not be presumed to be invalid unless it clearly appears that they are
within some inhibitions of the fundamental laws of the state.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 75

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 Every statute passed by the legislature is presumed to be valid because the legislature is
supposed to have considered the question of its validity before approving it.
The legislative department of the government itself first determines the question of
validity of every statute- even the president when the bill is submitted to his office for approval
(executive department).

In cases of doubt, the court resolves in favor of its validity.

 Presumption of Constitutionality

TO DOUBT IS TO SUSTAIN

The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality. However, if the statute is really

unconstitutional, the courts are not only authorized but must declare its unconstitutionality. The
court must see to it that the other departments have not exceeded their constitutional authority.
(Essence of Separation of Powers and System of Check and Balance)

- ABAKADA GURO PARTY vs. HON. CESAR PURISIMA (GR NO. 166715, AUG.
14,2008)
“A law enacted by Congress enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
a doubtful and equivocal one. (CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
INC. Vs. BANKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, GR NO. 148208, DEC. 15, 2004, 446
SCRA 299)”

“ To invalidate RA 9335 based on the petitioner’s baseless supposition is an affront to

the wisdom not only to the legislature that passed it but also to the executive which
approved it.”

 Presumption of Good Faith

It is presumed that the legislative department had good motives in having considered and
adopted a particular law; that it acted from patriotic and just motives; that it acted with a desire to
promote an intention not to disregard the civil and political liberties of the people. (Ruperto G.
Martin – Statutory Construction, p 132)

 Presumption against Injustice

In case of doubt in the interpretation of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail (Art. 10, New Civil Code of the Philippines).

 Presumption against Inconsistency/Presumption on Consistency

In case of doubt, such construction as will make all provisions of the statute
consistent with one another and with the entire act should be adopted.
A word or phrase repeated in a statue will have the same meaning throughout the
statute, unless a different intention appears. (Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil.
461)

*It is presumed that a statute will be interpreted so as to be internally consistent. A

particular section of the statute shall not be divorced from the rest of the act. The ejusdem
generis (Latin for "of the same kind") rule applies to resolve the problem of giving meaning to
groups of words where one of the words is ambiguous or inherently unclear. The rule results that
where "general words follow enumerations of particular classes or persons or things, the general
words shall be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or
kind as those enumerated." 49 F. Supp. 846, 859. Thus, in a statute forbidding the concealment
on one's person of "pistols, revolvers, derringers, or other dangerous weapons," the term
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 76
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
"dangerous weapons" may be construed to comprehend only dangerous weapons of the kind
enumerated, i.e., firearms, or perhaps more narrowly still, handguns. Here, the term "dangerous
weapons" must be given a meaning of the "same kind" as the word of established meaning.

*A statute shall not be interpreted so as to be inconsistent with other statutes.

Where there is an inconsistency, the judiciary will attempt to provide a harmonious
interpretation.

HARMONIZING STATUTES

The rule is that a statute should be so construed not only to be consistent with itself but also
to harmonize with other laws of the same subject, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible system...... every statute must be so construed and harmonize with other statute
as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. (Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211)

Statutes in pari materia should be construed to attain the purpose of an express national policy.
For the assumption is that whenever the legislative enacts a law, it has in mind the previous
statutes relating to the same subject matter, and in the absence of an express repeal or
amendment, the new law is deemed enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in
these prior statutes. (Corona vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 378 (1993)

"Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will be
applied in a proceeding under the other act when not inconsistent with its purpose. Prior
statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be compared with the new provisions,
and, if possible by reasonable construction, both are to be construed that effect is given to
every provision of each. Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are so far as
reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other. (Vda. de Urbano vs.
GSIA,G.R.No. 137904, Oct. 19, 2001. Cited in Ruben Agpalo, Statutory Construction, p. 378,
Sixth Ed., 1990, published by Rex Book Store) (copied to pandect)

When the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish (Ubi lex non distinguit, nec
nos distinguire debemos)

 Presumption against Absurdity

It is presumed that the legislature does not intend that absurdity will flow from its enactment.
The courts therefore have the duty to interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd results.
(People vs Malabanan, G.R. No. L-16478, Aug. 31, 1961)

Whenever possible, a legal provision must not be construed to be a useless surplusage, and
accordingly meaningless, in the sense of adding or nothing to the law or having no effect
whatsoever thereon. (Uytengsu vs. Republic, 95 Phil. 890)

-ELCANO vs. HILL, 77 SCRA 98 (1977)

-FUELLAS vs. CADANO ET AL, 3 SCRA 361-367
-LIBI vs. IAC, 214 SCRA 16 (1992)

 Presumption against Ineffectiveness

It is presumed that the legislative body does not intend to adopt laws, which are unnecessary
and ineffective. It is presumed that it intends to impart to its enactment such a meaning as will
render them operative and effective. There are two important rules in statutory construction on
this point, thus:

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 77

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 a.) Where a law is susceptible of two constructions, one will render it
unconstitutional and the other upholds its validity, the latter must be adopted.
(U.S. vs. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1
b.) Where the language of the law is susceptible of two or more construction, one
will render the statute ineffective or inefficient and another which will tend to
give effect to the object for which the law was adopted, then latter should
prevail. (Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs. DENR, G.R.No. L-29534, February
23, 1977)

*“A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that every part of a statute be
presumed to have some effect, and not be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary."
Raven Coal Corp. v. Absher, 153 Va. 332, 149 S.E. 541 (1929).
Presumption against Irrepealable Laws

 Presumption against Irrepealable law/ Implied Repeal

*It is presumed that the lawmaking body does not intend that its laws shall be irrepealable
because Congress cannot enact irrepealable laws nor limit its future legislative act. The need of
today and the situation obtaining now will not most likely be the same in the years to come.

Laws should adopt to changing times.

Repeal by implication is not favored. There are two requirements before a statute
can be considered to have repealed a prior statue by implication, namely:
a.) That the statute touch on the same subject matter; and,

b.) That the latter statute is repugnant to the earlier one

Note: Rules to remember on the matters of repeal.

1. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not
be excused by disuse, custom or practice to the contrary (Art. 7, New Civil Code of the
Philippines).
2. When a law which expressly repeals a prior one, the first law shall not be thereby
revived, unless expressly so provided. However, when a law repeals a prior law, not expressly
but by implication only, its repeal revives the prior law, unless, the language of the repealing
statute provides otherwise. (U.S. vs. Soliman 36 Phil 5)
3. A general law does not repeal special law unless it is so expressly provided, or they
are incompatible, in which case, the special law prevails over the general law. (Compania
General de Tabacos vs. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8)

 Presumption against Violation of Public Policy

“… ‘policy’ is meant any guideline strategy or program concerning the creation , clarification
aand realization of values” (Crisolito Pascual, “Introduction to Legal Philosophy”, p 316)

Policy – a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by a government.

A set of ideas or plan of what to do in particular situation that has been agreed to
officially by a group of people, a business organization, a government, or a political
party.

It is presumed that the legislature designed to favor and foster rather than to contravene the
public policy which is based upon the principles of natural justice, good morals and the

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 78

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
settled wisdom of the law as applied to the ordinary affairs of life. (Black, Interpretation of
Laws, 2nd Edition, p. 134)

 Presumption of Knowledge of Existing Laws

In enacting a law, the lawmaking body is presumed to have the full knowledge of existing
laws on the subject. Hence, if there are two laws on the same subject enacted in different dates,
the latter law cannot be held to have abrogated the former law unless repugnancy is clear,
convincing and irreconcilable. (Manila Lodge No. 76 vs. C.A. et al)

 Presumption of Acquiescence to Judicial Construction

When the court has construed a statute in a particular manner and the lawmaking body made
no move to alter or amend the said statute, it is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced to
that interpretation.

Another kind is when Congress uses a word or phrase which had been consistently defined by
the Supreme Court in various decided case, it is presumed that Congress used that particular
word or phrase in such manner as consistently defined by the Supreme Court in the previous
cases.

 Presumption of Jurisdiction

A statute will not be construed in such a manner as to oust or restrict the jurisdiction of the
superior courts or to vest a new jurisdiction in them, unless, there are express words or a
necessary implication to the effect.

 Presumption on Acting within the Scope of Authority

It is presumed that the legislature acted within the scope of its authority.
If a statute admits of more than one interpretation, one that places the statute outside of the
legislative competence and one that places the legislative within the limits of legislative
competence, the court should adopt the latter interpretation.

 Presumption against Violation of International Law

It is presumed that a statute is in conformity with the rules and principles of
International Laws, or with treaties duly entered into and accepted by our government.
This is in line with Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

“Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,

adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation
and amity with all nations.”

 Doctrine of Incorporation- holds that every state is, by reason of its membership
in the family of nations, bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law.

 Doctrine of Transformation- holds that an international agreement would be

binding only upon a state if that state enacts a law specifically making such
international agreement part and parcel of their laws.

"Charming Betsy" Canon

National statute must be construed so as not to conflict with international law. See Murray
v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804): "It has also been observed that an act of

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 79

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains..."

GENERAL PRICIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES

Before going into the various specific tools of construction, there are general principle of
construction that should always be taken into account in the interpretation of statute. These
principles should be taken into consideration regardless of whether one is engaging in
interpretation (use of intrinsic aid) or construction (use of extrinsic aids).

1. In Pari Materia Rule: When a statute is ambiguous, its meaning may be

determined in light of other statutes on the same subject matter.

Under this rule, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the general
purpose , should be read and construed together as if constituted one law. (C.J.S.
pp 803-806)

This rule is based on the assumption that in enacting a law, the legislature has in
mind prior/ previous statutes dealing with the same subject matter/ general
purpose, and in absence of express repeal or amendment, the new statute is
deemed enacted in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in the
previous statute enacted.

2. Statutes must be read and construed as a whole.

A Statute must be construed s a whole and the words, phrases, and clauses is a
law should be not be read or scrutinized in isolation but rather analyzed in light of
the other related or cognate provisions of the statute in order to understand the
meaning attached to them by legislature

This principle is significant because statutes are enacted as a whole and not as
disjointed parts or sections.

In the interpretation of a statute, one must firs and foremost, look at how a term is
used in the statue as a whole, the first step is to see if the word in question is
defined in the same statute or the manner the term is used in other provision of the
same statute.

A statute is to be construed not only to be internally consisted with itself but also
to harmonize it with other laws on the same subject matter in order to from a
complete, coherent and intelligible system.

Every statute must be construed and harmonized with other statute as to from a
uniform se of jurisprudenc. (Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus
interpretandi modus)

ME: AVOID OUT OF CONTEXT INTERPRETAT ION

(relate to: HARMONIZING STATUTE; presumption against ineffectiveness)

Principle: The Court have the duty to reconcile or harmonize the different
provisions of the statute including its conflicting provisions
Each provision in a state is inserted for a definite reason. The legislature
have good reason/s for inserting a provision in the statute, hence, one must, as far
as practicable, reconcile or harmonize (make consistent and compatible) the

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 80

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 different parts of a statute, including the conflicting provisions, so as to make
them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. It is only through this that the statute
will be given effect as a whole.

3. Legislative intent must be ascertained from the statute as a whole.

The best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself. (OPTIMA STATULI
INTERPRETATIX EST IPSUM STATUTUM)

It is presumed that the purpose of the legislature is to make every part of the
statute effective.

(Ut res magis quam pereat- it is not enough that the statute should be given effect
as a whole but that effect should be given to each of the provision of the statute)

This maxim requires a court to presume that the legislature put every provision in
a statue for a purpose, and to contrive (deliberately make) the statute to give
effect to each provision of the statute.

- It is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void

- That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.
- It is better to validate a thing instead of invalidating it.

See; PRESUMPTION ON EFFECTIVENESS

4. Courts have the duty to reconcile or harmonize the different provisions of the
statute, including the conflicting provisions thereof.

Principle: The Court have the duty to reconcile or harmonize the different
provisions of the statute including its conflicting provisions

Each provision in a state is inserted for a definite reason. The legislature have
good reason/s for inserting a provision in the statute, hence, one must, as far
as practicable, reconcile or harmonize (make consistent and compatible) the
different parts of a statute, including the conflicting provisions, so as to make
them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. It is only through this that the statute
will be given effect as a whole.

See Presumption on Consistency (internal and external) and Effectiveness

5. As a rule, statutes of latter dates prevail.

Where two statutes of different vintage and of contrary tenor are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the statute later date prevails.

The statute of a later date is presumed to be the latest expression of legislative

will on the subject.

Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.

Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant (Subsequent laws repeal those
before enacted to the contrary, aka "Last in Time")

When two statutes conflict, the one enacted last prevails.

Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto.

6. Generalia specialibus non derogant

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 81
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
 Special provisions prevail over the general provision.
Special provisions prevail regardless of the position it occupies in the statute, and
whether it was enacted or earlier or later than the general law.

Note however, that if it possible is possible to harmonize the general and special
provision, then one must do so. The best way to do this is to treat the special law
as an exception to the general law.

7. A special law prevails over a general law

As between a specific statute and general statute, the former must prevail since it
evinces/ manifests the legislative intent more clearly than a general statutes

Exceptions to the rule:

a) The general law prevails over the special law when it treats the subject I
particular and the special la refers to it in general.( Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R.
No. 42631, December 17, 1976)
b) The general law prevails over the special law when the legislature intended
the general enactment to cover the whole subject and to repeal all prior laws
inconsistent therewith (Lechoco vs. civil Aeronautics Board, 43 SCRA 670)

CASSION vs. BANCO NACIONAL FILIPINO, 89 Phil. 560-561

8. In interpreting re-enacted statutes, the court will follow the construction

which the statute previously received.
Reenact- bring (a law) into effect again when the original statute has been
repealed.
-Recreate

A reenacted statue is a statute which reenacts a previous statue. In reenacting the

provisions of a previous statute, it is presumed that the legislature has the intention
adopting the construction and he language of the previous act.

9. In case of adopted statutes, the interpretation of the court from where the
statute was adopted should be CONSIDERED.

Adopted statutes are those which are patterned after or copied from the statute of
another country.
In construing adopted statue, courts will necessarily be guided by the
interpretation and construction of the courts of the country from which such
statute was taken.

Ex. Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause in our Constitution is of
American origin.
Law on incorporation and insolvency is of American origin.

10. In case of conflict between a common law principle and a statutory provision,
the latter prevails.
Example of a common law principle is equity
“Principle of equity cannot be applied if there is a provision specially applicable
to the case. ”

Equity applies only in the absence and never against statutory la or juridical rules
of procedure.

ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 82

Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
ATTY. NESTOR MONDOK 83
Professor, Statutory Construction
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS