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As the first months of 1865 passed, the Confederate Congress
realized the extreme tension of affairs, and provided, among other
expedients, for the enrollment of negroes as Confederate soldiers.
Other measures for giving confidence and strength to the cause
were adopted.
On the 21st of January the Confederate President was informed of
disaffection in the Virginia Legislature, and, what was more
significant, in the Confederate Congress, where a resolution
expressive of want of confidence in the Chief Executive was under
informal consideration, and would undoubtedly pass by a large vote
if introduced. At this critical juncture it seems that a compromise
was effected. It was agreed that Congress should enact a law
providing a supreme commander of the Confederate armies, this law
to be approved by the President, who should then call General Lee
to the exercise of the functions of that office. The intention was to
invest him with dictatorial power.
During the early days of February, Hon. Montgomery Blair visited
Richmond upon a mission of peace, and brought about a meeting at
Hampton Roads between President Lincoln and Secretary Seward
and the Confederate Vice-President, Alexander H. Stephens, and the
Hon. R. M. T. Hunter and Judge J. A. Campbell. President Lincoln
was firm for the surrender of the Confederate armies and the
abolition of slavery, which the Confederate President did not care to
consider.
About the 15th of February, Major-General J. C. Breckenridge was
appointed Secretary of War, and Brigadier-General F. M. St. John was
appointed commissary-general of subsistence.
General Ord, commanding the Army of the James, sent me a note
on the 20th of February to say that the bartering between our troops
on the picket lines was irregular; that he would be pleased to meet
me and arrange to put a stop to such intimate intercourse. As a
soldier he knew his orders would stop the business; it was evident,
therefore, that there was other matter he would introduce when the
meeting could be had. I wrote in reply, appointing a time and place
between our lines.
We met the next day, and presently he asked for a side interview.
When he spoke of the purpose of the meeting, I mentioned a simple
manner of correcting the matter, which he accepted without
objection or amendment. Then he spoke of affairs military and
political.
Referring to the recent conference of the Confederates with
President Lincoln at Hampton Roads, he said that the politicians of
the North were afraid to touch the question of peace, and there was
no way to open the subject except through officers of the armies.
On his side they thought the war had gone on long enough; that we
should come together as former comrades and friends and talk a
little. He suggested that the work as belligerents should be
suspended; that General Grant and General Lee should meet and
have a talk; that my wife, who was an old acquaintance and friend
of Mrs. Grant in their girlhood days, should go into the Union lines
and visit Mrs. Grant with as many Confederate officers as might
choose to be with her. Then Mrs. Grant would return the call under
escort of Union officers and visit Richmond; that while General Lee
and General Grant were arranging for better feeling between the
armies, they could be aided by intercourse between the ladies and
officers until terms honorable to both sides could be found.
I told General Ord that I was not authorized to speak on the subject,
but could report upon it to General Lee and the Confederate
authorities, and would give notice in case a reply could be made.
General Lee was called over to Richmond, and we met at night at
the President’s mansion. Secretary-of-War Breckenridge was there.
The report was made, several hours were passed in discussing the
matter, and finally it was agreed that favorable report should be
made as soon as another meeting could be arranged with General
Ord. Secretary Breckenridge expressed especial approval of the part
assigned for the ladies.
As we separated, I suggested to General Lee that he should name
some irrelevant matter as the occasion of his call for the interview
with General Grant, and that once they were together they could talk
as they pleased. A telegram was sent my wife that night at
Lynchburg calling her to Richmond, and the next day a note was
sent General Ord asking him to appoint a time for another meeting.
The meeting was appointed for the day following, and the result of
the conference was reported. General Ord asked to have General
Lee write General Grant for an interview, stating that General Grant
was prepared to receive the letter, and thought that a way could be
found for a military convention, while old friends of the military
service could get together and seek out ways to stop the flow of
blood. He indicated a desire on the part of President Lincoln to
devise some means or excuse for paying for the liberated slaves,
which might be arranged as a condition and part of the terms of the
convention, and relieve the matter of political bearing; but those
details were in the form of remote probabilities to be discussed
when the parties became advanced in their search for ways of
settlement.
On the 1st of March I wrote General Lee giving a report of the
second interview, and on the 2d he wrote General Grant as follows:
“Head-quarters Confederate States Armies,
“March 2, 1865.
“Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant,
“Commanding United States Armies:
“General,—Lieutenant-General Longstreet has informed me that, in a
recent conversation between himself and Major-General Ord as to
the possibility of arriving at a satisfactory adjustment of the present
unhappy difficulties by means of a military convention, General Ord
states that if I desired to have an interview with you on the subject
you would not decline, provided I had authority to act. Sincerely
desiring to leave nothing untried which may put an end to the
calamities of war, I propose to meet you at such convenient time
and place as you may designate, with the hope that upon an
interchange of views it may be found practicable to submit the
subjects of controversy between the belligerents to a convention of
the kind mentioned. In such event I am authorized to do whatever
the result of the proposed interview may render necessary or
advisable. Should you accede to this proposition, I would suggest
that, if agreeable to you, we meet at the place selected by Generals
Ord and Longstreet for their interview, at eleven a.m. on Monday
next.
“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
“R. E. Lee,
“General.”
The letter was sent to me open, with instructions to read, seal, and
forward. I rode into Richmond to ask that some other business
should be named as the cause of the call for the interview, but he
was not disposed to approach his purpose by diplomacy, and
ordered the letter to be delivered.
He sent another letter, however:
“Head-quarters Confederate States Armies,
“March 2, 1865.
“Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant,
“Commanding United States Armies:
“General,—Lieutenant-General Longstreet has informed me that in an
interview with Major-General Ord, that officer expressed some
apprehension lest the general terms used by you with reference to
the exchange of political prisoners should be construed to include
those charged with capital offences.
“General Ord further stated that you did not intend to embrace that
class of cases in the agreement to exchange. I regret to learn that
such is your interpretation, as I had hoped that by exchanging those
held under charges by each party it would be possible to diminish, to
some extent, the sufferings of both without detriment to their
interests. Should you see proper to assent to the interview proposed
in my letter of this date, I hope it may be found practicable to arrive
at a more satisfactory understanding on this subject.
“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
“R. E. Lee,
“General.”
To which General Grant replied,—
“City Point, Virginia,
“March 4, 1865.
“General R. E. Lee,
“Commanding Confederate States Armies:
“Your two letters of the 2d instant were received yesterday. In
regard to any apprehended misunderstanding in reference to the
exchange of political prisoners, I think there need be none. General
Ord and General Longstreet have probably misunderstood what I
said to the former on the subject, or I may have failed to make
myself understood possibly. A few days before the interview
between Generals Longstreet and Ord I had received a despatch
from General Hoffman, Commissary-General of Prisoners, stating in
substance that all prisoners of war who were or had been in close
confinement or irons, whether under charges or sentence, had been
ordered to City Point for exchange. I forwarded the substance of
that despatch to Lieutenant-Colonel Mulford, Assistant Agent of
Exchange, and presumed it probable that he had communicated it to
Colonel Robert Ould. A day or two after, an officer who was neither a
prisoner of war nor a political prisoner, was executed, after a fair and
impartial trial, and in accordance with the laws of war and the usage
of civilized nations. It was in explanation of this class of cases I told
General Ord to speak to General Longstreet. Reference to my letter
of February 16 will show my understanding on the subject of
releasing political or citizen prisoners.
“In regard to meeting you on the 6th instant, I would state that I
have no authority to accede to your proposition for a conference on
the subject proposed. Such authority is vested in the President of
the United States alone. General Ord could only have meant that I
would not refuse an interview on any subject on which I have a right
to act, which, of course, would be such as are purely of a military
character, and on the subject of exchanges which has been intrusted
to me.
(Signed) “U. S. Grant,
“Lieutenant-General.”
Under the impression that General Lee would construe the act of
Congress in its broad sense and proceed to handle the Confederate
armies and affairs under his own good judgment, I wrote, begging
that he would call General Joseph E. Johnston back to service and
command, and presently suggested and then wrote that I was
credibly informed that there was plenty of produce in the country
which the farmers would cheerfully deliver at Richmond or
Petersburg if liberal prices in gold could be paid them; that the
authority given to impress bread and meat stuffs should be applied
as including gold; that right or wrong the emergency called for it,
and that I would undertake to secure the gold upon his authority. I
suggested that as Grant’s combinations were looking to
concentration against the Army of Northern Virginia and Richmond,
we should use the railways for collecting and drawing detachments
from southern points, calling cavalry by the dirt roads, while the
farmers were bringing their produce by private conveyance.
Furthermore, I cited the fact that there were eight or ten thousand
non-combatants in Richmond who could be put in my trenches as
conscripts, and officered by the officers of the department on duty
there, and twelve hundred in Lynchburg that could be made similarly
available; and argued that using them in the trenches would enable
him to draw the First Corps out for a movable force to meet flanking
efforts of his adversary, and keep open his lines of communication.
In that way, I continued, he could collect a hundred thousand men
at Richmond, with a good supply of rations, while General Grant was
drawing his two hundred thousand together to attack us; that when
concentrated Grant would find himself obliged to give speedy battle,
as he could not long supply his large force; that our interior lines
would enable us to repel and break up the attack and relieve
Richmond.
The times were heavy of events, Executive authority intended to be
suspended, and it seemed possible that the use of a little gold would
so manifest its power as to induce our people to let cotton and
tobacco go for foreign exchange which might put us on a gold basis
for a twelvemonth. This was the expedient that offered light and
hope for the future, and the times called either for heroic methods
or the giving over of the forms of war.
General Lee agreed that the provisions were in the country and
would be delivered for gold, but did not think the gold could be
found. He made his orders assuming command of the armies, but
instead of exercising authority on a scale commensurate with the
views of Congress and the call of the crisis, applied to the Richmond
authorities for instructions under the new assignment, and wrote
that he would call General Johnston to command if he could be
ordered to report to him for duty.
General Johnston was so ordered, and was assigned to command of
such fragments of troops as he could collect in the Carolinas.
General Wade Hampton was relieved of duty as chief of cavalry in
the Army of Northern Virginia and ordered to join General Johnston.
After collecting such detachments as he could gather, General
Johnston threw them from time to time along the flank of Sherman’s
march from Georgia for Virginia, and had some spirited affairs with
that army, which was gathering strength along the seaboard as it
marched.
 CHAPTER XLI.

BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS.

Various Affairs of the Closing Campaign—
The Massing of Grant’s Forces—
Sortie against Fort Steadman—
Captured but quickly retaken—
General Grant’s Move around the
Confederate Right—General Lee
anticipates with Aggressive Work—
Sheridan makes Battle with his
Whole Force at Five Forks—
Desperate Situation of the
Confederates—Disparity of Numbers
—Splendid Stand and Battle of
Generals Pickett and Ransom—
Colonel Pegram mortally wounded—
W. H. F. Lee, the “Noble Son of a
Noble Sire”—Corse’s Division—
Pickett’s Generalship—Casualties.
Meanwhile General Grant was drawing forces from the North and
West to further strengthen his already overwhelming combinations
against Richmond. General Schofield was called from Tennessee to
North Carolina to guard and join on, if necessary, the flank of
Sherman’s column. The cavalry and infantry of the Valley of Virginia
were brought down to the Union army about Richmond and
Petersburg,—the latter by transports.
General Sheridan marched his cavalry, ten thousand strong, from the
Valley to ride across James River, through Lynchburg, to join the
northward march of Sherman’s column. His divisions were under
Generals Custer and Devens; General Wesley Merritt was his chief of
cavalry. He was to destroy railroads, canals, bridges, and other
works of value as he marched. At Staunton he decided to take in the
balance of General Early’s command near his route at Waynesboro’.
He found that command posted behind field-works, but the line did
not cover the left of the position near the river. After some
preliminary dashes, General Custer found his way around General
Early’s left, and, with part of the cavalry dismounted, made a bold,
simultaneous charge on the front and flank, breaking up the line and
capturing most of the troops.
Some of the Union commanders claimed that the Confederates
cheered them as they surrendered. This, however, the Confederates
deny. The affair is mentioned in the diary of Major J. Hoskiss, the
engineer of the Confederate army of the Valley, in not more
creditable terms than General Early gave of his battle of Cedar Run.
Pickett’s division, Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry, and other detachments
were sent to Lynchburg to defend against Sheridan’s ride; but the
high waters of James River and other obstacles turned Sheridan
from his southern course to a sweep down the north side.
Generals Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee were recalled and ordered to the
north side to join me at Richmond for a march to intercept
Sheridan’s forces. General Pickett reported on the 13th, and we
marched for Hanover on the 14th. I made requisition for a pontoon
bridge, and was delayed a day waiting for it and for the cavalry. The
bridge was not sent. As we marched towards the Pamunkey River,
General Sheridan heard of the move and crossed to the north bank
with his main force, leaving a brigade to watch our march, but
presently drew the brigade after him.
General Rosser reported to me with five hundred cavalry, one of the
remnants of General Early’s army not captured, and was ordered
across the Pamunkey River to follow Sheridan’s ride. Our artillery
and infantry were delayed part of a day and night building a bridge
from the timbers of an old barn that stood near the bank of the river,
and part of the command crossed early in the morning to find a cold
cavalry trail, growing colder. As the prospect of overhauling the
march was not encouraging, we retraced our steps, returning to
Richmond on the 18th, where Pickett’s men rested until the 24th.
As Sherman’s army drew towards Richmond, General Grant gave up
the thought of taking the city by attack of his strong columns on the
north side, lest he should leave open the way of escape of the
Confederate army, and give time for it to combine with Johnston’s
forces before he could overhaul it. He found, too, that the “attrition”
policy could not be made effective, even with his superior numbers,
unless he could so manœuvre as to call his adversary from his
fortified grounds to make the work of attrition mutual.
On the 14th of March he gave instructions of preparation for a
general move by his left, and on the 24th gave definite orders for
the move to be made on the 29th.
On the 24th, General Lee gave consent to the making of a sortie
from his line at Hare’s Hill, in front of Petersburg, against Fort
Steadman of the enemy’s works. The distance between the lines at
that point was one hundred and fifty yards, the distance between
the picket lines fifty yards. Union officers had given out that
deserters from the Confederate army were permitted to march into
the Union lines with their arms.
Under the circumstances it was conceived to be practicable to gain
Fort Steadman by surprise, and the Confederate chief was led to
believe that there were other forts to the rear of Steadman that
could be carried and held until General Grant could be forced to
make a longer line to reach our southern communications, and give
us time to find dry roads for our march away, or for reinforcements
to join us. It was a hazardous adventure at best, but his brave heart
usually went with a proposition for a bold fight.
The Second Corps, under Major-General Gordon, was assigned for
the sortie, to be reinforced by other troops to be called. Pickett’s
division of the First Corps, that had been resting on the north side
since the 18th, was called to report to General Lee at Petersburg,
without intimation of the service proposed, but all calls and orders of
the times were looked upon as urgent. The quartermaster was
despatched to Richmond to have the transportation at the station as
soon as the troops could reach the depot, and the division was
ordered to march in anticipation of due preparation for their transit.
But the quartermaster found that the railroad company could furnish
transportation for three brigades only. General Lee was informed of
the fact, and I suggested that his only way to be assured of the
service of a division was to draw Mahone’s from Bermuda Hundred
and have Pickett’s march to replace it. He preferred part of Pickett’s
division,—finding it could not be used as a division, as Pickett, the
ranking officer, would be called to command the work during the
early morning, for which he had no opportunity to prepare.
General Lee collected about eighteen thousand men near the
sallying field, ordered men selected to cut away the fraise and abatis
for the storming column that should advance with empty guns (to
avoid premature alarms), and ordered a squadron of cavalry ready
to dash across the lines to cut the wires about General Grant’s lines.
The Army of the Potomac, General Meade commanding, was posted,
—the Ninth Corps on the right from James River to Fort Howard,
including Fort Steadman, General Parke commanding; next, on
Parke’s left, was the Sixth Corps, under General Wright; then
General Humphreys with the Second Corps, General Warren with the
Fifth; General Sheridan’s cavalry, armed with repeating rifles, on the
extreme left; General Ord, commanding the Army of the James, on
the north side, Generals Gibbon and Weitzel commanding corps,—all
officers of the highest attainments and veterans in service. The
armies of the Potomac and the James and Sheridan’s cavalry,
constituting General Grant’s immediate command, numbered one
hundred and eleven thousand soldiers.[203] Colonel W. H. Taylor,
chief of staff with General Lee, reports, “Lee had at that time only
thirty-nine thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven available
muskets for the defence of Richmond and Petersburg.”[204]
The stormers advanced before daylight, gained quiet possession of
the enemy’s picket line, carried his works between Batteries 9 and
10, moved to the right and left, captured Fort Steadman and its
garrison, and turned the guns there and at Battery 10 against the
enemy. But the alarm spread and the enemy was afield, feeling his
way towards the assailants, for it was not yet light enough to see
and direct his artillery fire over his own men. Batteries 11 and 12
were taken, and guides sent to conduct the Confederate columns to
forts reported to be in rear of Steadman were in search, but there
were no forts there. Redoubts constructed on the main line had
commanding positions over Fort Steadman, and a sweeping fire
along its lines, in anticipation of a surprise attack, but their fire was
withheld for daylight to direct it.
Light broke and the fire opened. General Parke called his field
artillery under Tidball into practice from high ground over the
Confederates, put the divisions of Hartranft and Wilcox against the
Confederate flanks, and held them back near the troops crowding in
along the breach, and called for a division from the Second Corps.
The Confederate columns were strong enough to repel the attack of
two divisions,—were put there for that purpose,—but so far from
breaking up and pushing back the ninety thousand men in front of
them, they were not so handled as to check two divisions long
enough for the forces to get back to their lines.
The artillery fire not only tore the Confederate ranks, but crossed fire
in their rear, cutting off reinforcements and retreat. Our side was
without artillery, except captured guns, which were handled by
infantry. As the sortie was noised along the line, General Humphreys
and General Wright advanced the Second and Sixth Corps against
the Confederate lines along their fields to learn if troops had been
drawn from their fronts to join the attack. Batteries 11 and 12 were
recovered before eight o’clock, and General Parke ordered
Hartranft’s division to regain Fort Steadman and Battery 10, which
was done with slight loss before nine o’clock.
Many Confederates got back to their lines in disordered flight, but
1949 prisoners and nine stands of colors were taken by the Ninth
Corps.
The aggregate of Union losses was reported as 2107. Confederate
losses are not reported in detail or in numbers. General Meade’s
estimate of our loss was 5000.
General Humphreys captured the intrenched picket line in front of
him, but found the Confederate works in front well manned. General
Wright got well in on the front of his line to favorable position, from
which he assaulted and carried the Confederate works on the 2d of
April.
Corse’s and Terry’s brigades of Pickett’s division remained in wait
under arms until a late hour of the 25th, but were not called to take
part in the sortie.[205]
The result calls for little comment upon the adventure. For an army
of forty thousand veterans, without field batteries, to dislodge from
their well-chosen and strongly-fortified lines an army of ninety
thousand well-armed and thoroughly-appointed veterans was
impossible.
Pursuant to previous orders, General Grant started on his move
around the Confederate right on the 27th. General Ord was called to
the south side with fourteen thousand men of the Army of the
James, leaving General Weitzel with twenty thousand on the north
side.[206] In front of that force we had ten thousand men of Field’s
and Kershaw’s divisions and G. W. C. Lee’s division of local defence
troops (not including Gary’s cavalry, the sailors and marines) holding
the forts at Drury’s and Chapin’s farms. General Grant’s orders were
that his troops at all points should be ready to receive orders for
assault.
Duly informed of the enemy’s movements, and understanding his
purpose, General Lee marched to his right on the 29th. Fitzhugh
Lee’s cavalry was called in advance to march for Five Forks. General
Lee marched with fifteen thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry
(including Fitzhugh Lee’s division), and a quota of artillery, along the
White Oak road to his right.
The purpose of the enemy was to overreach the fortified grounds
and call the Confederates to field work, and General Lee thought to
anticipate him by aggressive work as soon as he was in the open
field, and ordered battle for the 31st.
General Pickett, with three brigades of his division, two of B. R.
Johnson’s division (Ransom’s and Wallace’s), with the cavalry, was
ordered to engage Sheridan’s cavalry at Five Forks, while General
Lee attacked, with McGowan’s, Gracie’s, Hunton’s, and Wise’s
brigades, the Fifth Army Corps, that was between Pickett and our
line of fortifications. The opening of this part of the battle was in
favor of the Confederates. General Lee drove back the advance
division of the Fifth Corps to the next, and pushed the two back to
concentration upon the third, where that part of the battle rested.
General Pickett made his part of the battle by putting W. H. F. Lee’s
and Rosser’s divisions of cavalry on his right, and following that
leading by his infantry and artillery, leaving Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry
division, under General T. T. Mumford, along the right front of
Sheridan’s cavalry. He pressed his separate battle by his right
advance until night, forcing Sheridan back to Dinwiddie Court-House,
where the latter reported to General Grant that the force in front of
him was too strong, and asked for reinforcements. Pickett prepared
to follow his success by early morning battle and rested for the
night, but Miles’s division of the Second Corps was put against the
other end of the battle, and the Fifth Corps rallied and advanced
against the brigades that were with General Lee. They were forced
back to the White Oak road, then into their fortified lines, leaving an
interval of five miles behind Pickett’s left.
Responding to General Sheridan’s call, General Grant ordered the
Fifth Corps, under General Warren, fifteen thousand[207] strong, and
Mackenzie’s cavalry division (sixteen hundred). The design was that
the Fifth Corps should come in on Pickett’s left rear and cut off his
retreat, but heavy rains of the 30th and morning of the 31st had so
flooded the streams and roads that the night march was slow and
fatiguing, and Pickett receiving notice during the night of the
projected move against his rear, changed his orders for battle, and
directed the troops withdrawn for Five Forks before daylight. His
retrograde was made in time to escape the Fifth Corps, and was
followed by Sheridan’s cavalry, but no serious effort was made to
delay his movements. He made his march of five miles to Five Forks,
put his troops in order of battle by nine o’clock of the morning of the
1st of April, and ordered his well-chosen line examined and put
under construction of field-works. Corse’s, Terry’s, and Steuart’s
brigades of Pickett’s division, and Ransom’s and Wallace’s brigades
of B. R. Johnson’s division, were posted from right to left. Of
Pegram’s artillery, three guns were planted at the Forks, and three
more near his right; W. H. F. Lee’s division of cavalry on his right;
Fitzhugh Lee’s division on his left,—General T. T. Mumford
commanding the latter; Rosser’s division in rear guarding trains.
General Fitzhugh Lee was chief of cavalry.
As soon as the infantry line was formed, the troops set to work
intrenching the position. The line of battle was parallel to and lay
along the White Oak road, the left broken smartly to the rear, the
retired end in traverse and flanking defence. The extreme right of
the infantry line was also refused, but not so much. Four miles east
from Pickett’s left was the right of the fortified lines of General Lee’s
army. On the right and outside of those lines was a detachment of
cavalry under General Roberts. The division of Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry
was ordered to cover the ground between Roberts’s cavalry and
Pickett’s left by a line of vedettes, and his division was posted on
that part of the field.
W. H. F. Lee’s cavalry held strong guard on the right, and had the
benefit of some swamp lands. His lines formed and field-works
under construction, General Pickett rode to the rear for his noon
lunch, and was soon followed by the cavalry chief.
Sheridan’s cavalry followed close on Pickett’s march, but did not
attempt to seriously delay it. He made a dash about ten o’clock to
measure the strength of the works under construction, and found
them too strong to warrant fierce adventure. Delayed by the heavy
roads and flooding streams, the Fifth Corps was not in position until
four o’clock in the afternoon.
General Sheridan planned for battle to have General Merritt display
the cavalry divisions of Custer and Devens against the Confederate
front and right, to convey the impression that that was the field from
which his battle would be made, while he drew up and massed the
Fifth Corps at the other end of the field for the real fight. The corps
was arranged, Crawford’s division in column on the right, Ayres’s on
Crawford’s left, Griffin’s division in support, Mackenzie’s cavalry
division on the right of the infantry column, at the White Oak road.
The Fifth Corps was to wheel in close connection and assault against
the face of the return of Confederate works, while the cavalry
divisions in front were to assail on that line and the right of the
works.
The march and wheel of the Fifth Corps were made in tactical order,
and the lines advanced in courageous charge, but staggered and
halted under the destructive infantry fire. The charge was repeated,
but held in check until Crawford’s division found a way under cover
of a woodland beyond the Confederate works, and marched to that
advantage.
Ransom drew his brigade from the intrenched line to meet that
march, but it was one brigade against three—and those supported
by part of Griffin’s division.
Ransom’s horse was killed, falling on him; his adjutant-general,
Captain Gee, was killed, and the brigade was forced back.
This formidable move by open field to Pickett’s rear made his
position untenable. Feeling this, the veteran soldiers of the left
brigades realized that their battle was irretrievable. Those who could
find escape from that end of the works fell back in broken ranks,
while many others, finding the enemy closing in on their rear,
thought it more soldierly to surrender to Ayres’s brave assaulting
columns, and not a few were the captives of Crawford’s division.
It was not until that period that General Pickett knew, by the noise
of battle, that it was on. He rode through the fire to his command,
but his cavalry chief, riding later, was cut off from the field and failed
to take part in the action. When Pickett got to the Forks, Colonel
Pegram, of the artillery, had been mortally wounded, the battery
commander was killed, and many of the cannoneers killed or
wounded. He found an artillery sergeant and enough men to man
one gun, and used it with effect until the axle broke.
The brigades of Steuart and Terry changed front and received the
rolling battle. The cavalry assailants of the front and right had no
decided success, but the infantry columns pressing their march, the
Confederate brigades were pushed back to their extreme right,
where in turn Corse’s brigade changed front to receive the march,
leaving W. H. F. Lee’s cavalry to look to his right.
The Union cavalry essayed to charge the Confederate remnants to
dismay, but the noble son of the noble sire seized opportunity to
charge against the head of this threatening column before it could
pass the swamp lands, drove back its head until Corse’s brigade got
back to cover of woodland, and night came to cover the disastrous
field.[208]
The remnants of the command were collected as soon and as well
as they could be in the dead of night and marched towards Exeter
Mills, where Pickett proposed to cross the Appomattox and return to
the army, but early movements of the next morning changed the
face of the military zodiac.
The position was not of General Pickett’s choosing, but of his orders,
and from his orders he assumed that he would be reinforced. His
execution was all that a skilful commander could apply. He reported
as to his position and the movements of the enemy threatening to
cut his command from the army, but no force came to guard his
right. The reinforcements joined him after night, when his battle had
been lost and his command disorganized. The cavalry of his left was
in neglect in failing to report the advance of the enemy, but that was
not for want of proper orders from his head-quarters. Though taken
by surprise, there was no panic in any part of the command; brigade
after brigade changed front to the left and received the
overwhelming battle as it rolled on, until crushed back to the next,
before it could deploy out to aid the front,—or flank attack,—until
the last right brigade of the brave Corse changed and stood alone on
the left of W. H. F. Lee’s cavalry, fronting at right angle against the
enemy’s cavalry columns.
It is not claiming too much for that grand division to say that, aided
by the brigades of Ransom and Wallace, they could not have been
dislodged from their intrenched position by parallel battle even by
the great odds against them. As it was, Ayres’s division staggered
under the pelting blows that it met, and Crawford’s drifted off from
the blows against it, until it thus found the key of the battle away
beyond the Confederate limits.
In generalship Pickett was not a bit below the “gay rider.” His
defensive battle was better organized, and it is possible that he
would have gained the day if his cavalry had been diligent in giving
information of the movements of the enemy.[209]
The losses are not found in separate reports. Both sides suffered
severely, Pickett losing two thousand. He had nine thousand men of
all arms. His adversary had twenty-six thousand.
Reinforcements of Hunton’s brigade, and Lieutenant-General R. H.
Anderson with the other brigades of B. R. Johnson, were sent him
too late, and a telegram came for me at Richmond to march a
division to Petersburg to report to General Lee. The hour at which
the telegram was received was not noted. As the operations at Five
Forks were not decisive until after five o’clock, the telegram may
have been received about seven p.m. Field’s division was ordered to
the railway station, and the quartermaster was sent in advance to
have the cars ready to move it.
To give the troops the benefit of our limited transportation I rode
with the staff by the dirt road.