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 The Second Cold War

Toward the end of the Cold War, the last great struggle between the
United States and the Soviet Union marked the end of détente, and
escalated into the most dangerous phase of the conflict since the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Aaron Donaghy examines the complex history
of America’s largest peacetime military buildup, which was in turn
challenged by the largest peacetime peace movement. Focusing on the
critical period between 1977 and 1985, Donaghy shows how domestic
politics shaped dramatic foreign policy reversals by Presidents Jimmy
Carter and Ronald Reagan. He explains why the Cold War intensified
so quickly and how—contrary to all expectations—U.S.–Soviet
relations were repaired. Drawing on recently declassified archival
material, The Second Cold War traces how each administration
evolved in response to crises and events at home and abroad. This
compelling and controversial account challenges the accepted notion
of how the end of the Cold War began.

Aaron Donaghy teaches U.S. foreign relations history and modern

international history at University College Dublin. He is the author of
The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974 79 (2014).
 Cambridge Studies in US Foreign Relations

Edited by
Paul Thomas Chamberlin, Columbia University
Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Columbia University
This series showcases cutting-edge scholarship in US foreign relations that employs
dynamic new methodological approaches and archives from the colonial era to the
present. The series will be guided by the ethos of transnationalism, focusing on the
history of American foreign relations in a global context rather than privileging the US
as the dominant actor on the world stage.

Also in the Series

Amanda C. Demmer, After Saigon’s Fall: Refugees and US-Vietnamese Relations,
1975–1995
Heather Marie Stur, Saigon at War: South Vietnam and the Global Sixties
Seth Jacobs, Rogue Diplomats: The Proud Tradition of Disobedience in American
Foreign Policy
Sarah Steinbock-Pratt, Educating the Empire: American Teachers and Contested
Colonization in the Philippines
Walter L. Hixson, Israel’s Armor: The Israel Lobby and the First Generation of the
Palestine Conflict
Aurélie Basha i Novosejt, “I Made Mistakes”: Robert McNamara’s Vietnam War
Policy, 1960–1964
Greg Whitesides, Science and American Foreign Relations since World War II
Jasper M. Trautsch, The Genesis of America: US Foreign Policy and the Formation of
National Identity, 1793–1815
Hideaki Kami, Diplomacy Meets Migration: US Relations with Cuba during the Cold
War
Shaul Mitelpunkt, Israel in the American Mind: The Cultural Politics of US-Israeli
Relations, 1958–1988
(Continued after the Index)
 The Second Cold War
Carter, Reagan, and the Politics of Foreign Policy

AARON DONAGHY
University College Dublin
 University Printing House, Cambridge cb2 8bs, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, ny 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, vic 3207, Australia
314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India
79 Anson Road, #06–04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108838030
doi: 10.1017/9781108937016
© Aaron Donaghy 2021
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2021
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
isbn 978-1-108-83803-0 Hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of
URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
To my parents, Paula and Tom, and my brother, Cian
 Contents

Acknowledgments page viii

List of Abbreviations xi

Introduction 1
1 The Dwindling of Détente 18
2 “It’s All Political Now” 58
3 To the Right 77
4 Confrontation 114
5 The Nuclear Freeze Movement 142
6 Star Wars and the Evil Empire 162
7 The Most Dangerous Year 184
8 To the Center 215
9 Conciliation 252
Epilogue 283

Archives 295
Notes 298
Index 375

vii
 Acknowledgments

The roots of this book date back to 2015, with the award of a Marie
Skłodowska-Curie Global Fellowship from the European Union. Since
then I have incurred a string of debts, individual and institutional. At
Harvard University, Fredrik Logevall has been a terrific source of
intellectual insight and encouragement. Fred kindly agreed to support
my EU application, despite not knowing me or my work previously. I
am deeply grateful that he did. John Young (University of Nottingham)
has been extremely generous with his guidance and expertise ever since
serving as my PhD examiner. His help is enormously appreciated. My
early mentors at University College Dublin, Richard Aldous (now Bard
College) and William Mulligan, have been unswerving in their support
over the years. I am indebted to them both. Prior to joining Harvard, I
enjoyed a six-month stint at Cornell University. Matt Evangelista served
as my adviser and I wish to thank him here. I also want to acknowledge the
vital support of the European Union, which funded my research on either
side of the Atlantic.
As an Irishman, settling in Boston was not difficult. It was made even
easier by the kindness of Joe and Marina McCarthy. Few know the
Harvard scene better, and none are more generous with their time. I am
indebted to them beyond measure. Harvard’s Center for European
Studies was the perfect environment in which to work. For their
hospitality I wish to thank Elaine Papoulias, Charlie Maier, Mary
Sarotte, Grzegorz Ekiert, Art Goldhammer, Laura Falloon, Elizabeth
Johnson, Roumiana Theunissen, Filomena Cabral, Gila Naderi, and my
fellow visiting scholars. My thanks also go to the Harvard History
Department, especially Kimberly O’Hagan and Daniel Lord Smail.

viii
 Acknowledgments ix

At Boston College, Rob Savage and Oliver Rafferty were great company
and always kind with their time. I would like to thank them both. For their
hospitality I wish to acknowledge Judith Weinraub, Heather Campion,
Sean Rowland, and Peter Ubertaccio, Dean of Arts and Sciences at
Stonehill College. I would also like to express my thanks to Ambassador
David Aaron and Ambassador Jack Matlock, who provided candid
recollections of the Carter and Reagan years, respectively. For the time
they gave me in Washington, DC, I am grateful to Brian Cahalane of the
Irish Embassy and Michael Murphy (Office of the Historian of the House
of Representatives). A number of excellent people made my stay at Cornell
enjoyable: among them were Matt Evangelista, Lisel Hintz, Dawn
Alexandrea Berry, Agnieszka Nimark, Judith Reppy, Nishi Dhupa, and
Elaine Scott.
This project also took me to Great Britain. A John Antcliffe fellowship
sponsored my research on the Margaret Thatcher/Cold War era at the
University of Cambridge, Churchill College. I wish to thank Andrew
Riley, Allen Packwood, David Reynolds, Barry Phipps, and Dame
Athene Donald. At the University of Nottingham, John Young, Sarah
Badcock, Paul McGarr, Bevan Sewell, Tracy Sisson, and the late Sandra
Winfield were very kind with their time, and I would like to thank them
all. A mention, too, for colleagues at University College Dublin past and
present—for their help in various ways: William Mulligan, Richard
Aldous, Robert Gerwarth, Christoph Müller, John McCafferty,
Diarmuid Ferriter, Sandra Scanlon, Paul Rouse, Declan Downey, Judith
Devlin, David Kerr, Maurice Bric, Robert Strong, Catherine Hynes,
Suzanne D’Arcy, Kate Breslin, Emma Lyons, Kate O’Hanlon, Richard
McElligott, Mark Jones, Laura Kelly, Susan Grant, James Matthews,
Marie Leoutre, Keith McLoughlin, Jennifer Farrell, Niamh Wycherley,
Ezequiel Mercau, Conor Tobin, Elaine Pereira Farrell, Conor Mulvagh,
and Jennifer Keating.
I have benefited from the assistance of archivists at many different
libraries and institutions. Special thanks go to the staff at the Ronald
Reagan Presidential Library, the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, and
the UK National Archives, who retrieved vast quantities of documents,
often at short notice.
It has been a pleasure to work with Cambridge University Press. I am
especially grateful to Cecelia Cancellaro, my editor in New York, for
agreeing to publish the book at a time when the world was upended by
the viral pandemic. I wish to thank editorial assistant Rachel Blaifeder,
former editor Debbie Gershenowitz, content manager Thomas Haynes,
x Acknowledgments

and the book series editors, Lien-Hang Nguyen and Paul Thomas
Chamberlin. I also want to express my gratitude to the anonymous
reviewers, whose insights and criticisms improved the quality of the book.
Above all, I want to thank my family. Caroline, Mary, Paddy, and Tina
Donaghy have been unceasingly kind and helpful over the years. My
greatest debts by far are owed to my parents, Paula and Tom, and my
brother, Cian, for all their devoted support and encouragement. It is to
them that this book is dedicated, with love and gratitude.

This project has received funding from the European Union’s

Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie
Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 659369.
 Abbreviations

ABC American Broadcasting Company

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations
ALCM Air-launched Cruise Missile
ASAT Anti satellite Weapons
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense
CBS Columbia Broadcasting System
CDE Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CDM Coalition for a Democratic Majority
CDU Christian Democratic Union (Federal Republic of Germany)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CNN Cable News Network
CPAC Conservative Political Action Conference
CPD Committee on the Present Danger
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EEC European Economic Community
ERW Enhanced Radiation Weapon
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIFA International Federation of Association Football
FRG Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)

xi
xii Abbreviations

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GDR German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GNP Gross National Product
GOP Grand Old Party (The Republican Party)
GRU Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (Chief Intelligence
Office)
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
IOC International Olympic Committee
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
KAL 007 Korean Airlines Flight 007
KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for
State Security)
LSG Legislative Strategy Group
MAD Mutual Assured Destruction
MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MFN Most Favored Nation
MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle
MI6 Military Intelligence, Section 6 (British Secret Intelligence
Service)
MX LGM 118A Peacekeeper Missile (Missile Experimental)
NAACP National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People
NACIPG Nuclear Arms Control Information Policy Group
NAE National Association of Evangelicals
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC National Broadcasting Company
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
NSDD National Security Decision Directive
NSPG National Security Planning Group
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAC Political Action Committee
PD Presidential Directive
PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PFIAB President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PRC People’s Republic of China
RDF Rapid Deployment Force
 Abbreviations xiii

RYAN Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie (Nuclear Missile Attack)

SACPG Senior Arms Control Policy Group
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (also Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty)
SANE National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy
SCC Special Coordinating Committee
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLCM Sea-launched Cruise Missile
SPD Social Democratic Party (Federal Republic of Germany)
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (also Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty)
TASS Telegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovietskovo Soyuza (Telegraphic
Agency of the Soviet Union)
TNF Theater Nuclear Forces
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
 Introduction

Never, perhaps, in the postwar decades was the situation in the world as
explosive and hence, more difficult and unfavorable, as in the first half of the
1980s.1
– Mikhail Gorbachev, February 25, 1986

“The main issue Kennedy is raising is leadership,” Carter mused. “The

weekend newspapers were unbelievable, practically anointing Kennedy
as the president and claiming the 1980 election is already over.” It was
September 17, 1979, and “the Kennedy challenge” was on Carter’s mind.2
An ABC–Harris Poll showed the Massachusetts senator leading the
president by 61–34 percent in the race for the Democratic nomination.3
Carter’s prospects were cast into further doubt on November 4, when
sixty-six Americans were taken captive in Iran. At the suggestion of his
secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, Carter forwent a holiday tradition. The
great Christmas tree south of the White House was left unlit to signify
sorrow for the hostages’ plight. It seemed to cap a miserable year, which
saw inflation and interest rates spiral amid a major oil crisis. Fuel short-
ages led to long queues at gas stations across America. Gallup polls in June
and October gave the president an approval rating of 28 percent.4
Christmas brought little festive cheer. On December 25, Carter learned
of another foreign emergency: the Soviet 40th Army had crossed into
Afghanistan. ‘There goes SALT II!’ he exclaimed.5
Carter was excoriated by the political right, who accused him of
weakness and inaction. He had sought to reorient U.S. foreign policy:
pledging to curtail defense spending, scale back military engagement, and
reduce nuclear arms. He bemoaned the “inordinate fear of communism”

1
2 The Second Cold War

and exaggerations of the Soviet threat.6 Such were the principles on which
Carter had campaigned as a Washington outsider. Now, one by one, these
were hastily dismantled. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he said, was
“the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War.”7
A string of new hardline policies were adopted, many of them at odds with
the goals he previously espoused. Carter imposed a grain embargo against
the Soviet Union and ordered a U.S. withdrawal from the Moscow
Olympics. He promised to increase defense spending by 5 percent and
reinstated draft registration. He unveiled the “Carter Doctrine”—
extending the containment policy to the Persian Gulf and committing
U.S. forces to defend American interests in the region, if necessary by
military action. The U.S. ambassador to Moscow was recalled. A Rapid
Deployment Force was activated. Covert military aid was approved for
Afghan rebels and Pakistan. In July 1980, a year after signing the SALT II
Treaty, Carter issued PD-59—an aggressive strategy designed to give
U.S. presidents more flexibility in planning for and executing a nuclear
war.8
A new and more dangerous Cold War was in motion. This power
struggle would escalate into a confrontation so politically charged that
within three years U.S.–Soviet relations had reached their nadir. By then,
Ronald Reagan was embarking on the largest peacetime military buildup
in U.S. history, leading an administration with the most avowed anti
communist agenda in at least two decades. A series of events in 1983 led to
the worst phase of the conflict in a generation. It was the year in which the
president denounced the Soviet Union as an “evil empire,” having earlier
declared Marxism-Leninism destined for the “ash heap of history.”
Reagan upped the military ante with Moscow by unveiling the Strategic
Defense Initiative—a proposal for a space-based missile defense system to
protect the United States from nuclear attack. In early September, Soviet
forces shot down a Korean airliner that had drifted into Russian airspace,
costing the lives of all 269 on board. Among the victims were sixty-two
Americans, including a member of Congress. In the following month,
U.S. forces invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada and ousted its pro-
Marxist government.
Worse was to follow. In early November, a NATO military exercise
spanning Western Europe was misinterpreted by Moscow as a possible
prelude to a U.S. nuclear strike. Soviet leaders prepared their forces for
a retaliatory attack. Oleg Gordievsky, the deputy KGB chief in London
(who doubled up as a spy for Britain’s MI6), reported to Westminster and
Washington on the state of panic in the Kremlin.9 Reagan was briefed by
 Introduction 3

his advisers on the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), which

outlined the U.S. procedures to wage nuclear war. “It was,” he recalled,
“a scenario for a sequence of events that could lead to the end of civiliza-
tion as we knew it.”10 Two weeks later, the first U.S. intermediate-range
nuclear missiles were deployed in Western Europe; NATO’s response
to the Soviet SS-20 deployments. The Soviet Union withdrew from arms
control talks. Reagan, like Carter, would enter election year amid an
international crisis.
As the real 1984 loomed, journalists drew parallels with George
Orwell’s fictional world: a militarized culture, propaganda, and the spec-
ter of war. In the United States, bomb shelter sales were on the rise. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) designed elaborate
evacuation plans to help save communities from potential radiation
sickness.11 Doomsday scenarios were portrayed in print and film, illus-
trating the likely effects of nuclear catastrophe. Antinuclear activists took
to the streets across America and Western Europe. Participants numbered
in the hundreds of thousands, beseeching Reagan to halt the arms race. In
the Soviet Union, signs indicating the location of air raid shelters were
ubiquitous. Several times a day, Kremlin approved broadcasts on the
radio and television suggested the possibility of a U.S. nuclear attack.12
Far from abating, the Cold War showed every sign of intensifying.
Yet abate it did. Like Carter, Reagan’s foreign policy would be trans-
formed during his fourth year in office. Within weeks of these events,
Reagan used a televised address to announce a change in outlook. He
depicted a fictional Ivan and Anya crossing paths with Jim and Sally,
sheltering from a rainstorm and speaking in a common tongue. The
theme was cooperation, not confrontation. “Together we can strengthen
peace, reduce the level of arms,” Reagan declared. “Let us begin now.”13
As 1984 progressed, Reagan—who had not met with a Soviet leader—
pursued diplomatic exchanges and bilateral agreements as never before. In
September, the president made his first direct contact with a top-ranking
Soviet official (Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko) during nearly four
years in office. “For the sake of a peaceful world,” Reagan said, “let us
approach each other with ten-fold trust and thousand-fold affection.”14
Few could have foreseen the events to follow. Within three years
a major disarmament agreement was achieved. Two years further on,
communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed, followed by the Berlin
Wall. Decades of repressive rule were ended, families and friends were
reunited. By the end of 1991 the USSR itself had ceased to exist. It
was an astonishing transformation. The pace of change seemed to defy
4 The Second Cold War

explanation. Even the protagonists were caught by surprise. “Did you ever
expect this to happen?” a journalist asked Reagan, days after the Wall fell.
Reagan shrugged. “Someday,” he replied.15
How did the Cold War begin anew, and why did it escalate? Why did
tensions start to recede? What led both presidents to adopt policies in their
fourth year that were so at odds with the course they had earlier pursued,
and on which they staked their reputation? These questions led me to
examine the actions of American policymakers. I focus chiefly on what
some historians call the “Second Cold War”: the roughly six-year time
frame between 1979 and 1985 which followed the era of détente.16 This
period witnessed the most serious challenges of the second half of the Cold
War. The course of events was highly contingent (three Soviet leaders
dying within three years), and it would not have taken an extraordinary
stretch in circumstances to have produced a scenario in which U.S.–Soviet
relations had deteriorated irretrievably, rendering a later breakthrough
impossible. As fears of nuclear war were raised, so the domestic schisms
deepened. The largest peacetime military buildup was challenged by the
largest peacetime peace movement. The conflict began with the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. It concluded with the meeting of
Reagan and Gorbachev in Geneva in late 1985—the first summit since
Carter and Brezhnev had kissed cheeks in Vienna, six and a half years
earlier.

the decline of political history

The end of the Cold War caught scholars by surprise. To explain the
events, historians have assessed U.S.–Soviet relations at a state-to-state
level, or within a wider global context.17 More recently, the “trans-
national turn” has seen an emphasis on the role of non-state forces, such
as human rights groups and peace movements. The prevailing argument
today—though by no means a consensus—is that the Cold War ended
because of the courageous efforts of citizens across Eastern Europe, and
the reformist thinking of a new generation of Soviet leaders who took
power in 1985. Led by Gorbachev, they saw that the arms race had placed
an unsustainable burden on the Soviet economy, drained by the Afghan
War and long-term structural problems. Reagan subsequently engaged,
and their determination to reduce the nuclear threat was the catalyst for
change.18
But what of the years preceding Gorbachev’s arrival—one of the most
fraught periods in East–West relations and the greater fraction of the late
 Introduction 5

Cold War? Studies on this era have been dwarfed by those on the Reagan–
Gorbachev rapport. The trend is regrettable for several reasons. Firstly,
the confrontation of the early 1980s offers important lessons for crisis
management. U.S.–Soviet relations worsened to the point that a nuclear
exchange appeared more likely than at any stage since the Cuban Missile
Crisis. Why this did not materialize, and how tensions began to ease, are
questions which warrant examination. The path which led to the events of
1986–89 was highly contingent. It was not preordained that the East–
West crisis would be defused, or that war would be avoided. Secondly, the
policy reversals of successive U.S. presidents merit far greater scrutiny.
These symmetrical shifts had a huge bearing on the direction of the late
Cold War, yet have rarely been explored. For most of Carter’s presidency
and most of Reagan’s first term, both presidents pursued a course which
seemed to reflect their convictions. Yet, in their fourth year in office, both
adopted policies that bore little resemblance to what had gone before.
Their turns—Carter to the right, Reagan to the center—helped lead to the
rise and fall of the last great Cold War struggle. How and why they
occurred are questions at the heart of this book. A third drawback has
been the misconception that the change in U.S. policy and easing of
tensions began only with the arrival of Gorbachev as Soviet leader. The
“new thinking,” combined with a greater readiness to reduce nuclear
arms, led Reagan to believe that in Gorbachev the Soviets at last had
someone with whom he could “do business.” The conventional wisdom is
that only then did Reagan reconsider his foreign policy approach.19 It is
demonstrated here that this was not so.
The lack of attention to these questions owes something to the decline
of political history as a field of study.20 The disorderly nature of politics is
at odds with the academic ethos, which tends to reward neat, conceptual
frameworks. (Hal Brands terms this “the elegance of theory versus
the messiness of reality.”21) In recent decades most historians have looked
abroad to examine American foreign policy. Their work has focused on
transnationalism, the role of non-state actors, and global interdependence.22
The trend followed the rise of globalization. It breathed new life into the
field, incentivizing scholars to pursue topical global issues. Many took the
form of social or cultural studies at the expense of the political. The aim was
to de-center the United States and engage with perspectives from around the
world. To contend with a more interconnected, competitive academic mar-
ket, younger historians were drawn toward research which could demon-
strate transnational themes. A number of fine studies emerged, expanding
our knowledge of how overseas actors influenced U.S. foreign policy.
6 The Second Cold War

But the “transnational turn” has come at a price. Lost in the discourse
is the role of domestic politics. The result is a distorted portrayal of how
decisions were reached. Presidents are cast less as politicians than global
statesmen, whose rationale is based on strategic factors or an ideological
hue. Only by examining the full landscape—international and domestic—
can we truly grasp how the key figures operated: what influenced their risk
calculus; why they chose certain policies and discarded others; or why
they decided to change course at a given time. Long before Gorbachev’s
arrival, pressures closer to home presented constraints and incentives
against which Carter and Reagan acted.
As Fredrik Logevall and Campbell Craig have argued, the trend toward
internationalizing the study of American foreign relations is compounded
by the fact that the United States, post-1945, was no ordinary actor. It was
the sole superpower, with an unrivaled military, political, and economic
reach. Studies which privilege the foreign over the domestic run the risk of
becoming ahistorical, by ascribing greater importance to various overseas
actors than they in fact warrant. Too much agency becomes assigned to
the international sphere, without a corresponding examination of domes
tic forces, and the parameters they set for foreign policy. What is lost is the
“intermestic” dimension of policy, where the international and domestic
agendas become entwined.23 If the Cold War ended largely because of
events overseas, the fate of the six-year conflict which preceded it rested as
much on how American decision-makers wielded power. Understanding
why U.S. policy changed in 1980 and 1984, and with it the Cold War, is to
understand that domestic variables—public opinion, election campaigns,
congressional restraints, party politics, personal ambition—figured as
much in their calculus as did proximate external factors.
The path of American foreign policy was not so linear as to follow
global patterns. It was a more complex, messy process, subject to the push
and pull of domestic pressures, prone to change for reasons distinct—
though never independent—of international events. Foreign and defense
issues frequently developed into partisan tug-of-wars: arms control;
strategic defense; U.S.–Soviet relations; the Panama Canal treaties; inter-
vention in Central America and Lebanon. In the post-Vietnam era, foreign
affairs were matters of interest to an increasingly decentralized political
constellation: Democratic and Republican Party hierarchies, members of
Congress, interest groups, and labor unions, from the Committee on the
Present Danger to the AFL-CIO. Added to this was the media and a public
audience more attuned to events abroad than ever before. All presented
pressures that shaped the context in which foreign policy was discussed.
 Introduction 7

For Carter and Reagan, success rested on their ability to master this
international–domestic nexus. Managing the legislative demands, moni
toring public opinion, and anticipating partisan challenges became as
much a part of their thinking as did attitudes in the Kremlin.
None of which is to ignore the significance of external matters. It was
precisely because of the purchase of globalization, and the expanding
contours of U.S. policy, that domestic actors sought a more active
engagement in foreign affairs. One example was human rights, where
a complex of liberal and conservative humanitarian issues animated dif-
ferent constituencies.24 Foreign policy decisions seldom have monocausal
roots. This book by no means suggests that every position taken by Carter
and Reagan was driven by partisan wrangling, electioneering, or personal
ambition. Rather, it integrates discussion of domestic politics into an
interpretative framework which also gives attention to geostrategy and
ideology in explaining the course of the conflict.25 Both presidents had
profound ideas about how American power should be projected overseas.
Both were strongly antinuclear, and targeted arms control agreements
with Moscow using particular strategies. Some policies were the result
of mainly external factors (Reagan’s support for the Polish Solidarity
movement, for example). But all major initiatives were taken only after
the choices had been carefully measured against the consequences back
home. Even the most strategic and ideological decisions, such as SDI or
aid to the Contras (“Reagan’s obsession”), were bound up with party
politics, public opinion, and other domestic considerations. Not least the
role of Congress, characterized by Reagan as a meddlesome “committee
of 535.”26

the politics of foreign policy

The notion that foreign policy is always a matter of domestic politics
would be a truism for many nations.27 In the United States, the foreign–
domestic nexus is axiomatic. Nowhere among major Western democra-
cies is a political system so decentralized, where national security or
foreign trade impacts upon congressional districts across the country.
Representatives and senators, career politicians, cater to the interest of
their constituents as it pertains to foreign policy (e.g., an economic group,
ethnic lobby, or industry), often with little regard for events overseas.28
During the Cold War, regions dependent on military bases or weapons
industries were typically prone to exploitation. But the openness of the
U.S. system could also work in reverse. It ensured, for example, that the
8 The Second Cold War

grassroots, antinuclear movement in Reagan’s first term found easy access

to political elites, with a freeze resolution adopted by the House in 1983.29
Moreover, there are few (if any) nations in which the election cycle affects
the foreign policy outlook of decision-makers as much as it does in the
United States, where the campaigning never stops. Nor does any compar-
able nation have an executive branch whose external policies operate
against such legislative oversight. Watchful units such as the Senate’s
Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and Armed Services committees are
entrusted with vital tasks: blocking or passing treaties; monitoring aid
and arms sales; authorizing foreign intervention and declaring war.30
A glance at America’s Cold War should dispel any doubt about the
weight of politics on the course of events. The two presidents who used
tape recorders for the majority of their terms, Lyndon Johnson and
Richard Nixon, revealed personal ambition, candid thinking, and
a preoccupation with the domestic implications of foreign affairs.31
Candidates, presidential and congressional, wrestled with the temptation
to play politics with policy. With the Truman Doctrine of 1947, the East–
West dichotomy was fertile ground for politicians looking to prove their
anti communist bona fides. Even during the “bipartisan age” of Senator
Arthur Vandenberg, partisan wrangling shaped the treatment of foreign
issues; politics never stopped at the “water’s edge.”32
The stances which proved risk averse with votes at stake were those
which denounced communism, talked up the Soviet threat, or called for
a greater military arsenal. In election season there were few drawbacks
to creating alarmist impressions or labeling opponents weak. John
F. Kennedy made the Republican handling of foreign policy the focal
point of his campaign against Nixon in 1960. He charged the
Eisenhower–Nixon administration with presiding over a decline in
U.S. military power, and for allowing a “missile gap” to develop, with
the Soviets “outproducing” America in nuclear weapons. “Never before
have we experienced such arrogant treatment at the hands of our
enemies,” Kennedy declared, attacking Nixon’s vice presidential leader-
ship as one of “weakness, retreat, and defeat.”33
America’s costliest wars were among those issues most susceptible to
political maneuvering. The Korean War, which stalemated as the battle
lines held, coincided with the 1952 presidential campaign. Harry Truman,
who faced criticism for not doing more to combat anti-communism at
home, was under pressure to avoid appearing “soft” on Soviet expansion-
ism. As election season neared, Republicans attacked the administration’s
military and diplomatic strategies, as well as the credentials of Democratic
 Introduction 9

candidate Adlai Stevenson. Talk of negotiating an armistice was criticized

as weakness and appeasement. Republicans called for a “rollback” of
communism to replace the more cautious policy of containment. Dwight
Eisenhower, the party candidate, claimed that Democrats were willing “to
barter away freedom in order to appease the Russian rulers.”34 Democrats
were blamed for the loss of China, for the Soviet atomic buildup, and for
allowing the Communists time to regroup their forces in Korea. The
weight of criticism led the Truman administration to conclude that the
safer political option would be to “hang tough” in Korea, rather than
compromise.35
The scope of America’s commitment in Vietnam also became contin-
gent on how decision-makers grappled with priorities at home. As the
war effort foundered, successive presidents (Johnson and Nixon) contem-
plated how military realities would impact their electoral prospects.
Johnson’s decision to increase the U.S. role in 1964 owed much to his
obsession with winning the election in November of that year. The subse-
quent “Americanization” of the war stemmed from concern that the
administration’s political credibility (and Johnson’s personal credibility)
would be irreparably damaged if the United States failed to sustain the
military effort.36 Nixon, as tape recordings reveal, sought to withhold
an earlier exit from Vietnam in order to extract maximum benefit for
the 1972 election. Between January and November his administration
gradually modified its negotiating position. Troop withdrawals took
place periodically, timed to remind the war-weary public that
U.S. involvement was winding down, and to stifle criticism from
Democrats. But a final settlement was delayed, so that any problems
which resulted would occur too late to affect the election.37 “Winning
an election is terribly important,” Nixon told Henry Kissinger, in
August 1972. The national security adviser agreed. “We’ve got to find
some formula that holds the thing together a year or two,” he replied.
“After a year, Mr. President, Vietnam will be a backwater. If we settle it
this October, by January 1974 no one will give a damn.”38
It was during the 1970s that the relationship between the executive and
legislative was transformed. This was the symptom of a trauma. Conduct
of the war in Vietnam, together with Watergate, produced a crisis of
confidence in the government among Congress and the public. It ushered
in legislative acts designed to restrict the executive’s room for maneuver,
ending the notion of an “imperial presidency.” These changes had major
consequences for foreign policy. The War Powers Act set limits on the
ability of the president to send American armed forces into combat areas
10 The Second Cold War

without congressional approval. The amendment to the Trade Reform

Act made U.S. trade with other nations conditional on the right of citizens
to free movement. Pressure from Congress to link foreign policy to human
rights resulted in the formation of a bureau of human rights within the
State Department.
The measures promised to bring accountability to the policymaking
process. But other consequences emerged. With a more assertive
Congress (and the proliferation of subcommittees), special interest
groups began wielding greater power in domestic and foreign affairs.
Senators and representatives capitalized on the new political landscape,
often for their personal concerns. The number of moderates in both
parties diminished. Harvard professor Samuel Beer described the trend
as “a new and destructive pluralism,” which disorganized public policy
and set group against group.39 Ideological schisms widened between
liberals and conservatives. The Democratic Party was itself divided
between the “neoconservative” wing that favored a large military
buildup, and those of a liberal persuasion who advocated diplomacy,
détente, and a freeze on nuclear weapons. As liberals campaigned for the
reorientation of U.S. power, conservatives perceived a crisis, in which
Soviet expansion was being met with retreat and submissiveness. By
1976, groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger were on
the rise. They cast détente as weakness and appeasement that was
“doomed to failure.”40 Notions of Soviet military supremacy were
peddled, external threats were inflated, and American strength was
consciously downplayed. Norman Podhoretz, the editor of Commentary,
charged liberals with being so traumatized by Vietnam that they had turned
into “isolationists.” He decried the limits on presidential authority, which
“damaged the main institutional capability for conducting an overt fight
against the spread of Communist power.”41
Carter’s promise of U.S. military restraint met with a firm response.
Interest groups mobilized to frustrate reform and campaign for new
defense programs, anxious to protect long-existing policies and the
military-industrial complex. To conservatives in both parties, Carter’s
pursuit of a SALT treaty with Moscow symbolized the way in which
policymakers had throttled back power. Their lament would become the
platform on which Reagan launched his presidential campaign. By 1980,
many neoconservatives were switching party allegiance, with their con-
victions more aligned with the Republican candidate. Paul Nitze, Jeane
Kirkpatrick, Eugene Rostow, Richard Pipes, and Elliott Abrams would all
defect to hold key roles in the Reagan administration. As Carter took
 Introduction 11

office, the distinction between politics and policy had already become
blurred. It was against this backdrop that he and Reagan operated.

risk, credibility, and timing

The “intermestic” concept was born in this era. Bayless Manning, the first
president of the Council on Foreign Relations, was writing for Foreign
Affairs in January 1977—just as Carter strode into the White House. He
noted the decline in presidential prestige which made it easier for Congress
to stymie the executive on certain matters. Special interests exerted
increasing influence on foreign policy by applying pressure on their repre-
sentatives. Manning stressed the growing interdependence between
national economies, a trend which had more far-reaching effects than
older examples such as tariffs. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 showed
how quickly international events struck into the political and economic
heart of domestic constituencies. U.S. industries, manufacturers, and
farmers were immediately subject to any disruption of a supply of
a commodity from overseas. “These new issues are simultaneously, pro-
foundly, and inseparably both domestic and international,” Manning
argued. “These issues are intermestic.”42
How did domestic politics shape U.S. policy in the late Cold War?
Three interrelated themes—risk, credibility, and timing—pervade the
narrative. The first is the way in which political pressures shaped risk
perception. From the time they entered the Oval Office, Carter and
Reagan were forced to weigh the domestic costs of their international
agenda. Almost every issue with which they grappled became a tempestu-
ous political struggle, from arms control and détente to Central America
and strategic defense. Congressional powers, public opinion, and electoral
considerations all weighed heavily, imposing restraints or incentives that
would help shape the U.S. position.
Carter had to placate critics of the SALT I agreement, notably Henry
Jackson, who had the potential to mobilize discontented, conservative
Democrats and independents against a second SALT agreement, as well as
Carter’s bid for a second term. Carter began courting Jackson and acting
on his advice in 1977 as he pursued negotiations with the Soviets. Reagan,
too, acted on political considerations. He recognized the growing power
of the nuclear freeze movement and the dangers it posed to his national
security policies, particularly his buildup of military strength. The timing
of his proposal for a Strategic Defense Initiative (Chapter 6) had every-
thing to do with public opinion and the burgeoning strength of the freeze
12 The Second Cold War

campaign. Reagan accepted the conclusions of the Scowcroft Commission

in order to salvage support for his strategic program, promising to imple
ment a more flexible approach to arms control, known as “build-down.”
As the presidents moved toward their fourth year the political stakes
grew higher. Both administrations became as preoccupied about how
their foreign policies would be perceived by domestic audiences as by
Moscow: rival candidates, influential senators, the media, and the broad
public. Identifying public attitudes, anticipating partisan challenges, and
devising ways to reduce vulnerability became priorities.
For Carter, viewing the invasion of Afghanistan as a symptom of Soviet
behavior, rather than an aberration or a defensive maneuver, was the risk-
averse decision. Wider forces such as Afghan nationalism, radical Islam,
and Soviet security interests were willfully downplayed. Instead, the key
decision-makers saw Moscow’s actions through the prism of the Cold
War, as part of a “grand design” for global expansion. To have suggested
otherwise would have exposed the president to further charges of softness
and naivety. The consequences were profound. Carter’s approval of
a string of hardline countermeasures spanned the first half of 1980,
ensuring that every facet of bilateral relations—economic, cultural,
diplomatic, and military—became predicated on the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan. With the closure of all political avenues, the structure
upholding détente was firmly dismantled. Carter’s new containment
approach revived memories of the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines of
the early Cold War. Soviet leaders, who made their fateful decision against
the advice of diplomats and the military, were taken aback by the
U.S. response.
For American presidents the risks are magnified in election season,
which lends an urgency to the craft of foreign policy. It is not
a coincidence that shifts often take place in the final year to eighteen
months of a president’s first term. One need not go back to Johnson and
Nixon, or Carter and Reagan, for evidence. As Clinton’s late intervention
in the Balkans in 1995, and Bush’s adjustments in Iraq in 2004 demon-
strate, geostrategy is not the only rationale. “Anticipating that a bid for
reelection will become a referendum on his record, an incumbent presi-
dent has strong incentives to burnish his legacy by introducing course
correctives that appear timely,” notes author Michael Armacost.43 By late
1983, Reagan’s record in foreign affairs was anything but impressive.
Three years of rearmament, sanctions, and tough rhetoric had failed to
induce any positive change in Soviet policy. Bilateral relations were in
disarray. For the first time in fifteen years strategic arms talks were off the
 Introduction 13

agenda, increasing public fears about a nuclear war—the single greatest

threat to Reagan’s reelection. As 1983 progressed, Reagan’s pragmatic
advisers (Shultz, Baker, Matlock, and McFarlane) called for a more
flexible approach with the Soviet Union. Terms such as “credibility,”
“timing,” and “building a record” would increasingly seep through policy
papers. “We must stress in public your call for dialogue and your desire to
reduce tensions and solve problems,” McFarlane warned Reagan in early
1984. “Tangible progress and a summit that produced positive results
could be helpful if the Soviets decide to bite the bullet and adjust their
policies sufficiently. But if they continue to resist negotiation, you must be
in a position by late summer to make it clear that this was their fault, not
yours.”44

*
The second theme is credibility, which applied domestically and person-
ally as much as internationally.45 How to reconcile policy overseas with
the quest for support at home became a prime consideration. Whereas
political challengers are generally not judged on their foreign policy
credentials, the records of first-term presidents are heavily scrutinized.
Carter and Reagan grasped the importance of overseas accomplishments
to bolster their credibility as commander-in-chief. Both understood that
initiatives had to be adapted according to the domestic mood (e.g.,
Reagan’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Lebanon in early 1984).
In election year, more attention is devoted to the appeal of foreign policy
positions at home rather than their efficacy abroad.46
In 1980, the need to demonstrate strength became the common denom-
inator of almost every initiative taken by Carter and his national security
adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Within hours of the Soviet march into
Afghanistan, Brzezinski warned Carter: “Our handling of Soviet affairs
will be attacked by both the right and left [. . .] Soviet ‘decisiveness’ will be
contrasted with our restraint, which will no longer be labeled as prudent
but increasingly as timid.”47 The invasion, following the Iran hostage
crisis, made it easy for Republicans to link the two events as examples
of U.S. weakness. Reagan cited the Soviet action as proof that Carter’s
approach had been flawed all along. To outflank the political right, Carter
would stake his credibility on a hawkish, alarmist response: authorizing
new weapons systems, isolating the USSR diplomatically, and exaggerat-
ing the threat to national security. The credibility factor thwarted even the
most tentative efforts to revive a dialogue with Moscow. When Vance
proposed reopening talks with the Soviets in late February, Brzezinski
14 The Second Cold War

warned Carter of the “devastating political consequences” of being iden

tified with the “soft side.” “A further initiative could have the most fateful
domestic and international consequences [. . .] I shudder to think of the
impact this could have in Congress and in the mass media, and how it
would be used by our political opponents.”48
The scale of Carter’s opposition traversed party lines, making the
administration even more wary of its approach. Carter’s pursuit of
SALT II was labeled “appeasement” by conservative Democrats such as
Jackson.49 His overseas achievements—the Arab–Israeli accords; the
Panama Canal treaties; and the normalization of relations with China—
had reaped few political dividends at home. The external problems of Iran
and Afghanistan were joining long-existing internal ones: inflation,
unemployment, and a poor intraparty relationship. It left the president
exposed to attack from his Democratic rival, Sen. Ted Kennedy, who prior
to the hostage crisis led by thirty points in opinion polls.50 The Afghan
crisis became a test of Carter’s credibility on national security, a chance to
demonstrate decisiveness and blunt charges of weakness. “It represented
an opportunity for [Carter] to demonstrate his genuine toughness,”
recalled Brzezinski, whose own outlook was animated by strategy and
anti communism as much as political expediency.51 Brzezinski drew
Carter’s attention to some dubious historical analogies, comparing the
power vacuum in the Persian Gulf to that of Europe in the late 1940s.52
The Soviets, he claimed, were capitalizing on an “arc of crisis,” with
a strategic thrust toward the oil-rich Middle East and warm-water ports
of the Indian Ocean.53 What emerged was a hasty, skewed analysis of the
Soviet motives for the invasion.54
Reagan was in a comparatively healthy position as he entered the final
stage of his first term. A glance at the 1984 election might tempt the
skeptical reader to conclude that domestic politics could have had little
to do with foreign policy adjustments. But that is to confuse cause and
effect. As Logevall notes, “what matters most is what candidates think
the importance of foreign policy in a given election will be or could be,
rather than what ex post facto analysis shows it to have been.”55 As
East–West relations sank to their lowest point, Reagan’s handling of
foreign affairs—particularly nuclear arms talks—became the main area
of concern for his reelection campaign.
Public protests against U.S. policy had mushroomed from 1981, not-
ably through a nuclear freeze movement. Congressional resistance duly
followed. Successive Boland amendments curbed U.S. efforts to assist the
Contras in Nicaragua; a nuclear freeze resolution was passed in the House
 Introduction 15

of Representatives; and to win support for his strategic defense program,

Reagan accepted the recommendations of the bipartisan Scowcroft
Commission. Democrats portrayed Reagan as the first president since
Hoover who had not met with a Soviet leader, citing his opposition to
arms control agreements reached by Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and
Carter.56 A poll in March 1983 gave Reagan a negative rating on his
handling of nuclear arms talks by 64 to 29 percent.57 Six months later,
pollster Richard Wirthlin warned Reagan’s chief of staff, James Baker,
that “the handling of foreign policy and the fear of a possible unwanted
war underlie public apprehension toward his reelection.” The “sharpest
issue” was opposition to the arms race.58 The campaign plan of
October 1983 (led by Baker and Wirthlin) made it clear where the accent
for 1984 would be placed. “We must strongly position the President on
the ‘peace’ side of the ‘peace through strength’ formula,” they counseled.
“We need to launch some foreign policy initiatives that dramatically
symbolize ‘peace’.”59
The Cold War paradigm was inverted. In 1980 Reagan and Carter had
sought to project military strength. Four years on, with public concern
over nuclear war (and new defense programs in place), peace and diplo-
macy became the central themes. What Reagan sought was “a full, cred
ible agenda on arms control,” with “more flexible” positions on START
and INF. He told policymakers to “build a record” of agreements with the
Soviets, from MBFR and chemical weapons to missile tests and CDE, as
well as a host of nonmilitary issues.60 By mid-1984, Reagan was reversing
most of the sanctions imposed by Carter in 1980, announcing sixteen
initiatives under discussion with Moscow.61 He invited Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko to Washington for a White House meeting—instituting
yet another change in U.S. policy. By early 1985 the arms talks had
resumed. A thaw had developed in U.S.–Soviet relations, in which the
sense of fear, paranoia, and distrust were eased. Orwellian scenarios did
not come to pass.

*
The final theme is timing. Domestic politics intruded into foreign policy
from the start of the Carter and Reagan presidencies, and became more
prominent as their terms progressed. Both administrations calibrated
policy: Carter and Brzezinski gradually forged a “middle ground” pos-
ition, which was in place by 1979 (Chapter 2); Reagan and Shultz began
reviewing the U.S. approach toward the Soviet Union during 1983
(Chapter 7). But the key policy changes were implemented at the same
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