CENTRAL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH BIHAR

SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-II
ASSIGNMENT ON CASE – “SP ANAND VS. HD DEVE
GOWDA”

SUBMITTED TO:
MISS POONAM KUMARI
(ASSISTANT PROFESSOR) CUSB, SLG

SUBMITTED BY:
MOHAMMAD SAIF KHAN
ENROLLMENT NO. CUSB2213125054
BA.LLB 3 SEMESTER
RD

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all those who have contributed to the completion
of this assignment on the case “SP ANAND VS. HD DEVE GOWDA”. My heartfelt thanks
to MISS POONAM KUMARI (ASSISTANT PROFESSOR) CUSB, SLG for her valuable
guidance and support throughout the research and writing process. I am also thankful to
Classmates for their encouragement and insightful discussions.
Special appreciation goes to the legal experts, scholars, and the individuals whose experiences
and perspectives have enriched the depth of this assignment. Additionally, I extend my thanks
to the authors of legal texts, articles, and judgments that served as crucial references.
Lastly, I want to acknowledge the unwavering support of my family for their understanding
and encouragement during the course of this assignment.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
S.NO PAGE NO.

1. Case details 4
2. Introduction 5
3. Facts of the case 5-6
4. Issues of the case 6
5. Argument by the parties 6-7
6. Legal provisions involved 7-9
7. Interpretation of the law 9-10
8. judgement 10-11
9. Critical analysis 11-12
10.Related case laws 12-13
11.Conclusion 13
12.bibliography 14

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 CASE DETAILS

SP ANAND VS. HD DEVE GOWDA

DATE OF JUDGMENT 06 NOVEMBER, 1996

COURT SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

PETITIONER S.P. ANAND

RESPONDENT H.D. DEVE GOWDA & OTHERS

BENCH CJT, SUJATA V. MANOHAR

REFERRED ARTICLE 32

CITATION AIR 1997 SC 272

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 INTRODUCTION

In the case of S.P. Anand v. Union of India, a significant constitutional challenge was brought
before the Supreme Court of India through a petition filed under Article 32. The petitioner, S.P.
Anand of Indore, contested the appointment of Shri H.D. Deve Gowda as the Prime Minister
of India. Anand's argument cantered around the eligibility criteria for the position, asserting
that Deve Gowda, not being a member of either House of Parliament, was ineligible for the
role. The petitioner contended that the President of India, Dr. Shanker Dayal Sharma, had erred
in swearing in Deve Gowda and that such an action violated key provisions of the Constitution,
specifically Articles 14, 21, and 75. The petitioner sought a writ from the Court to quash the
appointment, claiming that it was void ab initio. Respondents in the case included the Union
of India, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, and the Leader of the Muslim League in Lok Sabha.
The central issue at hand was whether the appointment of a person not belonging to either
House of Parliament as the Prime Minister of India was in violation of the constitutional
framework. This case, therefore, brought forth a critical examination of constitutional
principles and the legal parameters surrounding the appointment of the country's highest
executive authority.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the case of S.P. Anand v. Union of India, the petitioner, S.P. Anand, hailing from Indore,
approached the Supreme Court of India by filing a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.
The crux of his legal challenge revolved around the appointment of Shri H.D. Deve Gowda as
the Prime Minister of India. Anand contended that Deve Gowda's selection was constitutionally
flawed, primarily due to his non-membership in either House of Parliament. According to
Anand, this lack of parliamentary affiliation rendered Deve Gowda ineligible for the position
of Prime Minister.

Anand further asserted that the President of India, Dr. Shanker Dayal Sharma, had committed
a serious constitutional error by administering the oath of office to Deve Gowda. The petitioner
argued that this act violated key provisions of the Constitution, specifically Articles 14 (which
guarantees equality before the law), 21 (which protects the right to life and personal liberty),
and 75 (which pertains to the composition of the Council of Ministers). Anand contended that
the alleged constitutional violations rendered Deve Gowda's appointment void ab initio.

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In pursuit of legal remedy, S.P. Anand sought a writ from the Supreme Court to quash the
appointment of Shri H.D. Deve Gowda as the Prime Minister of India. The respondents in the
case included the Union of India, representing the executive branch, the Speaker of the Lok
Sabha, and the Leader of the Muslim League in Lok Sabha, identified as respondents 2, 4, and
5, respectively. This case, therefore, unfolded as a significant constitutional challenge,
questioning the eligibility criteria for the Prime Minister's position and raising fundamental
concerns about the adherence to constitutional principles in the highest echelons of the Indian
government.

ISSUE INVOLVED

The primary legal question at the heart of the case, S.P. Anand v. Union of India, centred on
the eligibility criteria for the appointment of the Prime Minister of India. The pivotal issue
revolved around whether an individual who is not a member of either House of Parliament can
constitutionally assume the office of the Prime Minister. The case sought to determine whether
such an appointment, in the absence of parliamentary membership, would constitute a violation
of the constitutional provisions governing the qualifications for the Prime Ministerial position.
The resolution of this fundamental issue carried significant implications for the interpretation
and application of constitutional norms regarding the highest executive office in India.

ARGUMENTS BY THE PARTIES

Petitioner’s Argument:

1. Ineligibility of H.D. Deve Gowda: The petitioner, S.P. Anand, vehemently argued that Shri
H.D. Deve Gowda, as the appointed Prime Minister, lacked the essential qualification of being
a member of either House of Parliament. Contending that this rendered Deve Gowda ineligible
for the Prime Ministerial role, the petitioner emphasized a strict interpretation of the
constitutional prerequisites for holding such a high office.

2. Violation of Constitutional Articles: The petitioner asserted that the appointment of Deve
Gowda violated crucial constitutional provisions, specifically Articles 14, 21, and 75. Article
14, guaranteeing equality before the law, Article 21, safeguarding the right to life and personal
liberty, and Article 75, which outlines the criteria for ministerial appointments, were cited as
foundational to the petitioner's claim of constitutional transgression.

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3. Seeking Quashing of Appointment: S.P. Anand earnestly sought a remedy through the
judicial process, urging the Court to quash the appointment of Deve Gowda as Prime Minister.
The petitioner invoked the authority vested in the Court under Article 32 to issue an appropriate
writ, thus challenging the legality of the appointment.

4. Impleading Other Respondents: In a comprehensive legal strategy, the petitioner expanded

the scope of the challenge by naming additional respondents— the Union of India, the Speaker
of the Lok Sabha, and the Leader of the Muslim League in the Lok Sabha—asserting their roles
and responsibilities in the contested appointment.

Respondent’s Argument:

1. Precedent Cases: The respondents countered the petitioner’s claim by invoking precedent
cases that had previously addressed the issue of non-members of Parliament being appointed
as Ministers. Drawing on established legal decisions, the respondents argued that historical
judicial interpretations permitted such appointments.

2. Interpretation of Constitutional Provisions: Responding to the alleged constitutional

violations, the respondents asserted that the Constitution itself allowed for the appointment of
non-members as Ministers. They underscored the significance of the President seeking the
confidence of the Lok Sabha during the appointment process, highlighting the democratic
accountability inherent in the constitutional framework.

3. Collective Responsibility: Emphasizing the principle of collective responsibility, the

respondents argued that even if a Prime Minister was not a member of Parliament, the collective
responsibility of the entire Council of Ministers to the House of the People ensured democratic
accountability. This collective accountability, according to the respondents, served as a
safeguard.

4. Dissuading Frivolous Litigation: Expressing concerns about the potential for frivolous
litigation, the respondents urged a cautious approach in public interest cases. They emphasized
the need for thorough research and expertise in constitutional law, discouraging litigants from
rushing to court without due diligence, particularly in matters of significant public interest.

LEGAL PROVISIONS AND ARTICLES INVOLVED

In the case mentioned, various legal provisions, articles, and sections were invoked:

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1. Regarding Ministerial Appointments in State Legislature:

Provision: Unspecified, but the case involves the rule that a Minister who has not served in the
State Legislature for six months loses their position.

2. Minister's Salary and Allowances:

Provision: Unspecified, but the case refers to the Second Schedule for determining the salary
and allowances of Ministers until the State Legislature decides otherwise.

3. Historical Precedents - Shri T.N. Singh Case:

- Articles Involved: Articles 163 and 164.

- Judicial Action: The court rejected the petition filed under Article 226.

4. Interpretation of Article 164, Clause 4:

- Articles Involved: Articles 163 and 164.

- Legal Principles Invoked: Rigorous interpretation of the provisions.

5. Distinction Between Articles 74, 75, 163, and 164:

- Articles Involved: Articles 74, 75, 163, and 164.

- Comparison: Emphasizes the differences between Articles 74 and 75 (pertaining to the

President and the Prime Minister) and Articles 163 and 164 (governing the Governor and the
Chief Minister).

6. Specific Differences in Article 163 and Article 74:

- Articles Involved: Article 163 and Article 74.

- Noted Differences: Absence of the proviso in Article 163(1) present in Article 74(1), and
the distinct phrasing related to the Governor's function in Article 163.

7. Uniformity in Article 75 and Article 164:

- Articles Involved: Article 75 and Article 164.

- Noted Similarities: The uniformity between Article 75(1) and (2) and Article 164(1), except
for the consolidation of two clauses in Article 164(1).

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The case primarily involves interpretation and application of various articles of the Indian
Constitution, particularly Articles 163, 164, 74, and 75.

INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS

In the context of ministerial appointments in the State Legislature, a noteworthy stipulation

prevails, whereby a Minister, having not served continuously in the State Legislature for a
duration of six months, forfeits their position upon the expiry of that term. The remuneration
and allowances accorded to Ministers adhere to the specifications delineated in the Second
Schedule, unless otherwise determined by the State Legislature.

Antecedent to the present case involving Shri H.D. Deve Gowda, several analogous situations
had arisen, with Shri T.N. Singh being a pertinent precedent. The opposition in Uttar Pradesh
contested Singh's nomination due to his non-affiliation with either chamber of the parliament.
However, a petition filed under Article 226 was rejected by the court, employing an
exceedingly narrow construal of Articles 163 and 164.

The interpretation of Article 164, Clause 4, which mandates the termination of a Minister's
position under certain circumstances, has undergone a historical evolution. The Court, in cases
such as those involving Shri KP. Tiwari and Shri Sita Ram, consistently arrived at comparable
conclusions by adopting a rigorous interpretative approach to the relevant provisions.

Preceding the adjudication of the Deve Gowda case by the Supreme Court of India, similar
contentions had been presented before the high courts of Calcutta and Delhi. These prior
petitions, scrutinized and subsequently dismissed, deemed the inclusion of the Prime Minister
unnecessary, asserting that the term "minister" inherently covered the Prime Minister.
Distinguishing the roles and corresponding articles, it was underscored that while Articles 74
and 75 pertain to the President and the Prime Minister, Articles 163 and 164 govern the
Governor and the Chief Minister.

The divergence between Article 74, Clause 1, and Article 163, Clause 1, is negligible, save for
the unique phraseology pertaining to the Governor's function in Article 163, which commences
with "except" and culminates with "discretion." Furthermore, Article 163(1) lacks the proviso
found in Article 74(1), endowing the President with a distinctive prerogative. Article 74, Clause
2, aligns precisely with Article 163, Clause 3.

Likewise, Article 75(1) and (2) and Article 164(1) exhibit uniformity, except for the
amalgamation of two clauses in Article 164(1). Noteworthy is the absence in Article 75 of the

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State-specific proviso inherent in Article 164, Clause 1. Barring these nuanced distinctions, the
remaining provisions within the two articles maintain identicality.

JUDGEMENT

Judgment of the High Court:

The decisions rendered by this Court and various High Courts elucidate that an individual,
notwithstanding non-membership in either House of Parliament or a State Legislature, is
eligible for appointment as a Minister in the Central Cabinet, encompassing the role of the
Prime Minister, or as a Minister in a State Cabinet, including that of a Chief Minister.

Proceedings in the Supreme Court:

The petitioner, who passionately and personally presented the case, expressed concerns about
the preservation of the democratic process and the inherent integrity of our constitutional
framework. The contention posited was rooted in the apprehension that if an individual not
elected by the people and lacking their confidence were permitted to assume the significant
office of the Prime Minister, entrusted with the governance of the nation in times of both peace
and war.

In order to comprehensively assess the arguments presented in this petition and to ascertain the
relevance of the earlier decision relied upon by the learned Attorney General, a closer
examination of Articles 74 and 75, in conjunction with Articles 163 and 164 of the Constitution,
is warranted:

In its definitive judgment, the Court unequivocally endorsed the appointment of an individual
not affiliated with either House of Parliament to the esteemed position of Prime Minister in
India. The Court, grounding its decision in constitutional provisions, particularly Article 75(5),
underscored that this constitutional provision expressly sanctioned the appointment of such an
individual as a Minister for a stipulated duration of six consecutive months. Importantly, the
Court elucidated that the individual in question would cease to hold the ministerial position if
they failed to secure election to either House of Parliament within that timeframe.

Furthermore, the Court accentuated the principle of joint accountability of the Council of
Ministers to the House of the People. This emphasis was pivotal in asserting that even a Prime
Minister appointed by a non-member of Parliament would remain accountable to the elected
representatives in the House of the People.

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The Court took a critical stance on the petitioner's argument, rebuking the petition's lack of
depth and rigor. Specifically, the Court criticized the petitioner for filing the petition in a
seemingly casual and cavalier manner, underscoring the imperative of meticulous research and
expertise when initiating public interest litigation.

The Court dismissed the petitioner's contentions and upheld the appointment of a non-member
of Parliament as Prime Minister, contingent upon securing the support and confidence of the
House of the People, albeit restricted to a maximum duration of six months. Notably, the Court
refrained from imposing costs on the petitioner but issued a cautionary admonition against the
filing of similar petitions without due diligence in the future.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

In the context of ministerial appointments, Article 75, Clause 5 of the Constitution explicitly
delineates the framers' intent to afford individuals who are not members of Parliament an
opportunity to serve as Ministers for a duration of six months before vacating their positions in
both houses, should they fail to secure election during that stipulated period. A historical
examination of the Constituent Assembly debates illuminates this intention, underscoring a
conscious decision to permit non-members to hold ministerial positions for a defined period.

During the Constituent Assembly deliberations, an amendment aimed at ensuring that a person
must be an elected member of the house at the time of Ministerial appointment was proposed.
However, this amendment, framed to forestall any potential infringement on democratic
principles, was ultimately rejected by the Constituent Assembly. The judicial precedent set
forth in the case of Har Sharan Verma v. Union of India further reinforces that such
appointments align with the democratic ideals embedded in the Constitution.

In adjudicating the matter at hand, the Supreme Court adhered to a rigorous interpretation of
Article 75(5), affirming that the term "minister" encompasses the Prime Minister of the country.
However, a discernible concern emerges—namely, the potential exploitation of this provision.
To address this issue, the Supreme Court, in the case of SR Choudhari v. State of Punjab (1995),
unequivocally ruled that the re-appointment of a Minister after the initial six-month period is
deemed undemocratic, as it runs contrary to the foundational democratic principle necessitating
the appointment or election of a minister by the people.

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Therefore, this legal precedent serves as a robust safeguard against the exploitation of the
stipulated time frame for ministerial appointments, establishing a clear judicial stance on the
undemocratic nature of re-appointing a Minister after the expiration of the prescribed period.
While there exists a well-established precedent addressing this particular loophole, it is notable
that no precedent specifically addresses the scenario of re-appointing a Prime Minister who is
not a member of either house of Parliament after the initial six-month term.

RELATED CASE LAWS

In the matter of SR Choudhari v. State of Punjab1, the court, drawing upon the
aforementioned precedents, delivered a decision. The Supreme Court, in its adjudication,
employed a highly stringent interpretation of Article 75(5), asserting that the term "minister"
encompasses the Prime Minister of our nation. Nevertheless, a notable concern arises: what if
this opportunity is susceptible to exploitation? Specifically, what are the implications if,
subsequent to the initial six-month appointment period, the same individual is re-appointed as
a minister or prime minister?

Fortunately, the aforementioned issue found resolution in the precedent-setting case of SR

Choudhari v. State of Punjab [v] in the year 1995. A meticulous breakdown and analysis of the
case elucidate the nuanced considerations and legal reasoning that underpin the court's
resolution of the aforementioned matter.

In the matter of Har Sharan Verma v. Union of India2, the constitutional provision in question
explicitly mandates that "No person may be appointed a Minister unless at the time of his
appointment, he is elected a member of the House." Notably, during the deliberations of the
Constituent Assembly, a proposed amendment seeking modification of this provision was
thoroughly examined and subsequently rejected following comprehensive discussions[vi].

The judicial perspective on this constitutional stipulation was expounded in the aforementioned
case, where the court discerningly pronounced that the nomination of an individual who is not
an elected member of the House at the time of appointment does not run afoul of the democratic
ideals encapsulated in our Constitution. The dual considerations of the rejected amendment and

1
SR Choudhari v. State of Punjab & Ors (2001) 7 SCC 126

2
Har Sharan Verma v. State of U.P. (1985) 2 SCC 48

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the judiciary's validation of such nominations collectively affirm the alignment of these
provisions with the democratic principles enshrined in our constitutional framework.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the constitutional delineation of the roles and responsibilities associated with
the positions of the Prime Minister at the national level and the Chief Ministers at the state
level reflects a meticulous consideration of their paramount importance within the executive
structure of the country. The Constitution provides exhaustive details regarding the
appointment of the Council of Ministers and the procedure for oath-taking, offering a
comprehensive framework for the governance structure.

The specified guidelines within the Constitution serve to streamline the tasks of the President
and Governors, providing a clear and structured approach to the formation and functioning of
the executive branch. Nevertheless, the dynamism inherent in democratic governance
introduces the need for ongoing adaptation to address emerging challenges, often necessitating
amendments to existing laws and engendering robust debates and discussions.

In the context of the aforementioned matters, the SP Anand case serves as a poignant example,
prompting pertinent questions about the constitutional intricacies surrounding the appointment
and tenure of key executive officeholders. As democracy evolves, legal precedents and case
law become crucial tools for interpreting and applying constitutional provisions to
contemporary challenges, ensuring the continued re framework.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sources used in making of this assignment are mentioned below:

Books:
1. Shukla, V.N. constitution of India, (Eastern book company, India 13th edition 2019).

Acts:
1. The constitution of India, 1950.

Website:
1. https://indiankanoon.org/
2. https://legalserviceindia.com/
3. https://legalvidhiya.com/

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