Rural Bank of Mabitac, Laguna, Inc. v. Canicon, G.R. No.

196015, [June 27, 2018]

FACTS: An information against respondents Canicon, Espeleta and Aguilar (at large) were
filed before the RTC of Binan, Laguna, and subsequently, a warrant was also issued against
the latter. Espeleta filed an urgent motion for reinvestigation with the court which remained
unresolved when the RTC Judge arraigned the accused. However, the assistant provincial
prosecutor (APP), on her own, conducted a reinvestigation and recommended the dismissal
of the case as to Espeleta. APP filed a motion for leave to amend the information with the
attached amended information dropping Espeleta from the indictment, which was
thereafter granted by the court (sitting then under Judge Cabuco- Andres). Said order
granting the amendment of the information was reversed by the court (under Judge, now
Justice, Laguilles), ruling that the reinvestigation without judicial imprimatur is a nullity and
created no vested rights. This subsequent order was, in turn, reversed by the same court
(under a new judge, Judge Baybay), ruling that the public prosecutor has the sole discretion
whether to indict a person and reinstating the charge against Espeleta would violate her
right against double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Was the reinclusion of Espeleta in the indictment, done after arraignment, violated
her right against Double Jeopardy?

HELD: NO. Double jeopardy attaches when the following elements concur: ( 1) a valid
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2)
a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (
4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express
consent. The absence of any of the requisites hinders the attachment of the first jeopardy.

The first to third elements are non-issues in this petition. The contentious element in this
case is the fourth one, i.e., whether the dismissal was with express consent of Espeleta.

As a rule, where the dismissal was granted upon motion of the accused, jeopardy will not
attach. In this case, Espeleta's filing of the urgent motion for reinvestigation did not amount
to her express consent. We have held before that the mere filing of a motion for
reinvestigation cannot be equated to the accused's express consent.

However, we still find that Espeleta gave her express consent when her counsel did not
object to the amendment of the information. As held in another decided case, dismissal of
the case without any objection on the part of the accused is equivalent to the accused's
express consent to its termination, which would bar a claim for violation of the right against
double jeopardy. [the amendment of the information dropping Espeleta was equivalent to
dismissal of the case against Espeleta.

Considering that the first jeopardy did not attach when the case was previously dismissed as
to Espeleta, this petition will not expose Espeleta to double jeopardy.
People v. Solar, G.R. No. 225595, [August 6, 2019])

Facts: An Information was filed against Rolando and Mark Solar for the murder of Joseph
Capinig. During the arraignment, Rolando pleaded not guilty while Mark Kenneth remained
at large and was not brought to the RTC's jurisdiction

RTC: Convicted Rolando of the crime murder. The qualifying circumstance of treachery was
present in the killing of Joseph, and hence, the crime committed by Rolando was Murder.

Rolando appealed to the CA and prayed for his acquittal, stating that the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt by failing to prove his identity as the perpetrator.
He argued that since the eyewitness testified that it was Mark Kenneth who incited the fatal
blow on the victim and there were no facts available to support finding of conspiracy.

CA: Downgraded the offense from Murder to Homicide, holding that the Information did not
sufficiently set the particular facts establishing the existence of the qualifying circumstance
of treachery.

Issue: Whether Rolando may still question the defect in the Information?

Ruling: No. Rolando has waived his right to question the defects in the Information filed
against him. The right to question the defects in Information is not absolute. Rolando did not
question the supposed insufficiency of the Information filed against him through either a
motion to quash or a motion for a bill of particulars. He voluntarily entered his plea during
the arraignment and proceeded with the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any of the
waivable defects in the Information, including the supposed lack of particularity in the
description of the attendant circumstances. Rolando is also deemed to have understood the
acts imputed against him by the Information. Again, he is deemed to have waived any of the
waivable defects in the Information filed against him.

The accused who fails to raise the issue of defective information will be deemed to have
waived the defect. The only defects in information that are not deemed waived are where
no offense is charged, lack of jurisdiction of the offense charged, extinction of the offense or
penalty, and double jeopardy.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 147703, [April 14, 2004], 471 PHIL 415-
440

Facts: On July 1994 accused Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty. The court ruled that Rabbit Bus Lines shall
be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused in the event of the accused insolvency.
Evidently, the judgment against the accused had become final and executory.

The accused jumped bail. Rule 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of
appeal when appellant jumps bail. Rabbit Bus Lines filed a notice of appeal which was
denied by the trial court.

On appeal, the CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of
the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against
the accused-employee, the employer's subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.

The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil
liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify
or defeat a final judgment.

Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then
the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory.
Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability. Hence, this
Petition.

Issue: Whether or not employer is subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of the accused-
employee.

Ruling: Yes. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for
the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter's insolvency.

The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability - Articles 102 and 103 - are
deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the
subsidiary liability of the employer.

The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

Before the employer’s subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate
evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2)
that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by
the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter
has not been satisfied due to insolvency.

Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee
does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary.
Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the
accused-employees conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the
employer ipso facto attaches.

In this case, since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason
of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly
contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, L-66839-42, 71654, 74524-25, 75122-49, 75812-13,
725765-67, 75789, [December 18, 1986], 230 PHIL 406-428]

Facts: The petitioners presented the issue of the constitutionality of BP 22, popularly known
as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, as they insist that

- BP 22 offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;

- BP 22 impairs freedom of contract; o BP 22 contravenes the equal protection clause;
o BP 22 unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
- BP 22’s enactment is flawed in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated
the constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on Third Reading.

The petitioners alleged the BP 22 is in conflict between the statute and the constitutional
provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to
the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or
non-payment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is
consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to
the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What
it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is
claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat
of penal sanction.

Issue: Whether enactment of BP 22 is repugnant of the constitutional inhibition against

imprisonment for debt and, therefore, is a valid exercise of police power.

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court finds that the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police
power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to
coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

The SC has emphasized the effects of bouncing checks has on our country. Any practice
tending to destroy the confidence on checks should be deterred, for the proliferation of
worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.

It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-
payment of a debt ex contractu. But certainly, it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking
body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in
se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society
as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the
community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. Hence, the
enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of power and is constitutional as it is for the public
welfare.