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A Less Wrong Theory of Small Arms Suppressive Fire

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24 views21 pages

A Less Wrong Theory of Small Arms Suppressive Fire

Uploaded by

nicolasiung29
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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A less-wrong theory of small

arms suppressive fire


Dermot Rooney
Wapentakes
Shrivenham Close Combat Symposium
25 July 2017
[email protected]

Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


Tac Psych is complicated

Image Copyright Jary, Biteback, Matrix Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


Suppressive fire is simple
Or it should be…
• Agreeable
• Definable
• Variable
• Target 
• Situation   ?
• Fire 
• Measurable
• Modellable
• Trainable
• Buyable

Image Copyright Viggers/Reuters http://blogs.reuters.com/photographers-blog/2008/05/19/close-enough/ Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


What’s the problem?
Doctrine today
1m radius

WW2 research
3yd radius

Image Copyright Wapentakes / Niteworks Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


370BC to 1944
• Break up attacks
• 2006 & 1914
• Pin for strike
• 2009 & 1940
• Pre-assault
• Pila &
Peninsula
• Freedom of
movement
• Brecon &
Anabasis
Image Copyright Gallica: http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b8495610j?rk=21459;2 Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017
1944
AORG 123
• Gun group structure to
neutralise
• Slit trench & pill box
• Hit probability
• 2.5%-min
• 10%-min
• ‘Exceedingly tentative’
• 3yds ‘sounded near
enough to be
dangerous’

Image Copyright National Archive, probably Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


Korea and Vietnam
• Lost AORG work
• “We want MG42”
• “We want M16”
• “We want…”
• Repeated surveys
• Lethality vs loudness
• Hung up on target &
situation
• Not clear enough for
procurement

Image Copyright Eisner/US DOD Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


CDEC trials
• Yom Kippur!
• Real soldiers & bullets
• “Controlled fear”
• H&S
• Fig 11
• Behaviourism
• Rewards
• Demands
• Loudness

Image Copyright Wapentakes Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


CDEC model
• Smoothed to fit equation
• Muzzle energy = loudness = suppression
• X factor?
• Close enough for Saggers
• But

Many thanks to
Emeric Daniau from
DGA for the link to
this data.

Image Copyright Wapentakes Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


CAEn & IWARS
• Not generalisable
• Difficult model fit
• Abbreviated

Image Copyright Canada at War; insert Paulissen & Huisjes 2007 Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017
CDEC v CAEn/IWARS
• Same data
• Different answers

VC-level
heroism
Demand
characteristics
& flinching?

Image Copyright Wapentakes Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


Reduce to absurdity - bear with me

20:79:157

Image Copyright Visit London Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


Opposing advice (= cherrypick?)

Image Copyright: MOD (Defence Images) Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


So what? Lethality
• Fire has to be (potentially) lethal
• Can now measure lethality
• Back to 1944 -
– Historical analysis brackets lethality-suppression
– 10%-min over2015 Afghan Asylum
engineered (but good enough?)
175,000 EU28
161,000 Serbia/Kosovo
63,000 Turkey
407,000 World total

Image Copyright: http://www.erstes-garderegiment.de/ Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


So what? Amateur acoustics!
• Fire has to advertise its lethality
– Visual impact important but doubly
variable (Daniau & Williams 2016)
– Perceived loudness more
consistent indicator
2015 Afghan Asylum
• Crack test175,000
proposed inEU28
2014 &
2015 – no161,000
interest Serbia/Kosovo
63,000 Turkey
• What if 1m/3yd
407,000thing World
is justtotal
.303
being louder?
• Fag packet acoustics

Image Copyright Wapentakes


 Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017
So what? Tricky bits
• Psychoacoustics
– Sound pressure ≠ perceived loudness
– Very loud, very brief tricky
– Finding an expert who cares
– Time in the butts
2015deceptive
Afghan Asylum
• Danger perception
175,000 EU28
– Perceived161,000 Serbia/Kosovo
loudness ≠ perceived
danger 63,000 Turkey
– Sudden acceleration
407,000 World total
– S-curve or cusp?
• Yes, the chair picture is embarrassing

Image Copyright Wapentakes Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


A better anchored model

Quicker climb once in


real danger zone

Hinge on
142dB
(1944) No residual effect
for very wide miss

Image Copyright Wapentakes


Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017
What about universal calibre?
5.56mm

7.62mm

6.5mm?

Crack test or calculate from drop data?


Image Copyright Wapentakes / Niteworks Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017
Now what?
• Partnered with Cranfield
• Made the theory
• Now we’d like to test it
• Validate the model
– Drill into CDEC2015
andAfghan
AORG data
Asylum
– Bracket lethality
175,000with better
EU28historical samples
– Review hit rate calculations
161,000 Serbia/Kosovo
– Repeat crack test (with INM?)
63,000 Turkey
– Review S-curve
407,000psychology
World total
• Produce a model-ready equation
• Then give it to Dstl, or Bohemia

Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


A less-wrong theory of small
arms suppressive fire
Dermot Rooney
Wapentakes
Shrivenham Close Combat Symposium
25 July 2017
[email protected]

Wapentake Systems Ltd 2017


Bad science – engagement range
• Biased samples
• Biased analysis
• Hits not engagements
• Support for SPIW
• McNamara has spoken
• Sulky academics

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