cc mod 4 notes vtu pad
cc mod 4 notes vtu pad
Module 4 - Cloud Security: Risks, Top concern for cloud users, privacy impact assessment, trust, OS
security, VM Security, Security Risks posed by shared images and management OS.
Cloud Security Risks
Cloud computing security faces several risks that both users and providers must address. These include
traditional security threats, risks associated with system availability, and concerns around third-party
control of data.
Traditional Security Threats:
User-side threats: Users must secure their devices and infrastructure, which can be more
challenging when some components are outside their control.
Authentication and Authorization: Proper access control is crucial, with different access levels
for individuals within an organization. It’s also hard to integrate internal security policies with
those of the cloud provider.
Cloud-side threats: Cloud services are vulnerable to traditional attacks like DDoS, phishing,
SQL injection, and cross-site scripting. Virtualization also adds complexity, as shared resources
could be exploited by malicious users.
Availability Risks:
System Failures: Cloud services can face downtimes due to power outages or system failures.
Data lock-in can also affect business continuity if a provider fails.
Third-Party Control: Cloud providers may subcontract resources, and the risks of data loss or
breaches increase if those third parties are not trustworthy.
Cloud-Specific Threats:
Abuse of Cloud Resources: Criminals could misuse cloud resources for malicious activities like
launching DDoS attacks, sending malware, or distributing spam.
Shared Technology Risks: Issues in virtualization technologies could lead to vulnerabilities that
affect multiple users sharing the same resources.
Insecure APIs: Cloud service APIs might not provide adequate security for tasks like
authentication and monitoring.
Insider Threats: Cloud providers might have malicious insiders with access to sensitive
information or systems.
Data Loss or Leakage: There is a risk of losing critical data due to failures in replication or
storage media. This can be catastrophic, especially if there is no backup.
Account Hijacking: Cloud users face threats of credentials theft, which can lead to unauthorized
access to cloud services.
@VTUpadhai – Cloud Computing (21CS72) – Module 4 Notes
Mitigation Efforts:
The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has identified key threats like malicious insiders, data loss, insecure
APIs, and account hijacking. Their Security Guidance for Cloud Computing offers advice on how to
minimize these risks.
To address these security concerns, it's important to establish robust security protocols, ensure
transparency in provider operations, and be aware of new attack vectors unique to cloud computing, such
as multitenancy risks and data control challenges.
Figure 9.1 depicts the surfaces of attacks in a cloud computing environment. It shows the interactions
between three key actors: the User, the Service, and the Cloud Infrastructure.
User-Cloud: The user requests resources from the cloud, and potential attacks can occur during
this interaction.
Service-User: The service interacts with the user, and attacks may target the service from the user
side, such as phishing or SSL certificate spoofing.
Cloud-User: The cloud infrastructure can also be a source of attacks on the user, such as attacks
from compromised cloud resources.
Service-Cloud: The service interacts with the cloud infrastructure to manage and request
resources, and attacks can originate here, such as privilege escalation or data distortion.
Cloud-Service: Cloud infrastructure can attack the service, for example, through privilege-related
attacks or data injection.
including the "right to be forgotten," which allows individuals to have their data erased
from the internet.
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA):
A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is a tool for identifying privacy risks in information systems. PIAs
are critical for ensuring privacy is built into systems from the start rather than retrofitted. A PIA process
typically involves the following:
Notice: Organizations must provide clear information about what data they collect, how it’s used,
and if it's shared with third parties.
Choice: Users should have the ability to choose how their data is used, especially for secondary
purposes like marketing or sharing with external entities.
Access: Users should be able to review the data collected about them and correct inaccuracies or
delete information if necessary.
Security: Organizations must take reasonable steps to protect user data from unauthorized access
or breaches.
Proposed Tools for Privacy Management:
There is a call for tools to proactively address privacy concerns in systems. One proposed tool is a web-
based Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) tool that helps organizations evaluate and mitigate privacy risks.
This tool would take inputs from project information, risk assessments, and stakeholder details to
generate a comprehensive PIA report, covering areas like transparency, security, and cross-border data
flows.
The PIA tool would be supported by a knowledge base created by domain experts, which would use a
rule-based system to evaluate privacy risks and generate necessary actions based on specific legal and
regulatory frameworks. This proactive approach ensures privacy concerns are addressed before systems
are fully deployed, reducing the need for costly changes later.
Privacy remains a critical concern in cloud computing, particularly as personal data is stored on third-
party servers, and users often lose control over their information. Strong legislation, transparent privacy
policies, and tools like PIAs are essential to managing these risks and ensuring that privacy rights are
respected in the digital age.
2. Interdependence: Trust also depends on interdependence, where one entity's success relies on
the actions of another. This relationship is key in cloud services, where a user depends on the CSP
for data storage, security, and availability.
Phases of Trust:
1. Building Phase: Trust is initially formed based on initial interactions or promises.
2. Stability Phase: Trust becomes stable and established over time.
3. Dissolution Phase: Trust declines due to breaches or failures.
Types of Trust:
Deterrence-based Trust: Trust based on the belief that the penalties for breaching trust outweigh
any potential benefits from dishonest behavior.
Calculus-based Trust: Trust based on the belief that cooperation benefits both parties.
Relational Trust: Develops over time through repeated positive interactions, based on
dependability and reliability.
Trust in Online Environments:
Trust in online environments, especially on the internet, faces unique challenges. Anonymity and lack of
identity transparency reduce trust, as it becomes difficult to assess the true nature of an entity. Without
identifiable characteristics or accountability, the ability to trust becomes compromised.
Addressing Trust Issues:
1. Access Control: Mechanisms are needed to prevent unauthorized access and protect data.
2. Identity Transparency: Ensuring that the identities of parties involved in transactions are
verified and transparent. This can be achieved through biometric identification, digital signatures,
and certificates.
3. Surveillance: Ongoing monitoring of systems through intrusion detection or logging and auditing
ensures actions can be traced and reviewed, thus fostering accountability.
Mechanisms for Building Trust:
1. Credentials: Digital credentials, like digital signatures, serve as proof of identity and
competence. For example, a doctor’s diploma certifies their qualifications, just as a digital
certificate verifies the identity of a user or organization online.
2. Policies: Trust policies outline conditions under which trust is granted and specify actions to take
when conditions are met or violated. These often require the verification of credentials.
3. Reputation: Reputation is built over time based on interactions with an entity. Positive or
negative history influences trust decisions. Recommendations or reviews from other trusted
parties also contribute to reputation-building.
@VTUpadhai – Cloud Computing (21CS72) – Module 4 Notes
VM Security Models:
o In the Traditional System VM Model, the Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) enforces
security by controlling access to hardware and isolating VMs from each other.
o Hybrid and Hosted VM Models are less secure because the entire system’s security
depends on the host OS.
o Virtual Security Services: VMs can have their security managed either by the VMM
(Figure 9.2a) or a dedicated security VM (Figure 9.2b). A Trusted Computing Base
(TCB) is critical for maintaining security in virtualized environments.
Isolation and Control
VMM Isolation: The VMM ensures stricter isolation of VMs than traditional OS processes,
protecting VMs from malicious actions by other VMs.
Challenges: The VMM primarily manages lower-level system functions, while higher-level
security services are more abstract and difficult to enforce through the VMM.
Security Features of Virtualization
VM Cloning and Replication: The ability to clone or replicate VMs enhances security, as it
allows for the testing of suspicious applications in a controlled, isolated environment.
Communication and Isolation: Inter-VM communication is faster than between physical
machines, which can be used to enhance security by isolating sensitive processes.
Threats and Attacks
Sophisticated Attacks: Attackers may attempt to avoid VM honeypots, or access VM logs to
steal sensitive data like cryptographic keys. Log files must be carefully protected.
Security Trade-offs: Virtualization provides enhanced security but incurs higher hardware costs
and development overhead. The Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) introduces overhead due to
its involvement in privileged operations.
VM-based Intrusion Detection and Prevention
VM-based intrusion detection systems (IDS), such as Livewire and Siren, use VM isolation,
inspection, and interposition to detect attacks. VMs also support intrusion prevention systems
like SVFS and NetTop, focusing on protecting against threats before they impact the system.
VMM and VM-Based Threats
1. VMM-based Threats:
o Resource Starvation: Rogue VMs can bypass resource limits, starving other VMs.
o Side-Channel Attacks: Poor isolation between VMs can allow malicious VMs to attack
others.
o Buffer Overflow: Vulnerabilities within the VMM can be exploited by attackers.
@VTUpadhai – Cloud Computing (21CS72) – Module 4 Notes
2. VM-based Threats:
o Rogue VMs: Unauthorized VMs can be created and launched with insecure settings.
o Tampered VM Images: VMs may use insecure or compromised images, leading to
security risks.
Figure 9.2(a): This diagram illustrates a system where Virtual Security Services are provided by the
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM). The VMM controls the entire hardware access and manages the
interactions of the guest VMs, while also providing security services to ensure the integrity and isolation
of the VMs.
Figure 9.2(b): This figure shows an alternative architecture where a dedicated Security Services VM
handles security tasks. In this setup, the security functions are separated from the VMM and run in their
own isolated VM. This additional layer enhances security, especially for managing sensitive data and
policies.
VM technology offers strong isolation and security features, but it is not without its challenges. It requires
careful management, especially regarding resource allocation, image integrity, and monitoring for threats.
While the benefits of virtualization, like better isolation and flexibility, enhance security, it requires
additional overhead, including higher hardware costs and development efforts.
2. Bundling: The image is compressed, encrypted, and split into segments to be uploaded.
3. User Instantiation: The user specifies resources, credentials, firewall configuration, and region
settings to instantiate the AMI.
The process of sharing images can introduce various security risks because of leftover sensitive data or
improper configurations.
Key Findings from AMI Security Audits
A security audit of 5,303 AMIs revealed several critical security risks:
1. Vulnerabilities:
o 98% of Windows AMIs and 58% of Linux AMIs had critical vulnerabilities, including
remote code execution risks.
o These vulnerabilities were often outdated, with many images being several years old, and
sometimes lacking necessary patches.
2. Backdoors and Credentials:
o Many Linux AMIs had left-over credentials (e.g., ssh keys and passwords), allowing
unauthorized users to log into running instances.
o Some AMIs retained the original creator's ssh keys, allowing them to access instances
remotely without detection.
o Password hashes in AMIs could be cracked using tools like John the Ripper, opening
further access for attackers.
3. Omitted Security Configurations:
o Cloud-init scripts, meant to regenerate ssh host keys on boot, were sometimes omitted.
This allowed attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks by exploiting shared ssh
keys across instances.
4. Unsolicited Connections:
o Some AMIs were configured to send information to external agents (e.g., syslog logs and
IP addresses), potentially leaking sensitive data to malicious actors.
o These connections could be disguised as legitimate, making it difficult for users to detect
unauthorized data exfiltration.
5. Malware:
o Malware, including Trojans, was discovered in some Windows AMIs. These Trojans
could facilitate keylogging, data theft, and process monitoring, compromising the privacy
and security of users.
@VTUpadhai – Cloud Computing (21CS72) – Module 4 Notes
1. Trusted Computing Base (TCB): In a virtualized environment, the TCB includes the hardware,
hypervisor, and management OS (running in Dom0). While the hypervisor provides isolation
between VMs, the management OS is a critical component and can introduce vulnerabilities. In
Xen, Dom0 manages VM creation, I/O device emulation, and other administrative tasks.
2. Vulnerabilities in the Management OS: A study of Xen found that most attacks targeted the
service components of the management OS, not the hypervisor itself. For instance, vulnerabilities
could allow for buffer overflows, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, or even the modification of the
guest OS kernel to allow malicious control.
3. Potential Malicious Actions by Dom0: A compromised Dom0 could perform several harmful
actions:
o Prevent a VM from starting (denial-of-service).
o Alter the kernel of a guest OS to monitor or control applications.
o Manipulate memory mappings and virtual CPU states, undermining VM integrity.
4. Communication Risks: During runtime, Dom0 facilitates communication between guest OSes
(DomUs) and external systems via shared device drivers. This communication is typically
unsecured, and while TLS encryption can be used, it doesn’t prevent Dom0 from potentially
extracting sensitive information, such as cryptographic keys, from memory.
5. Critical Role of XenStore: XenStore, a critical component for maintaining the state of the
system, can be targeted by malicious VMs to deny access to other VMs or even gain unauthorized
access to memory.
6. Protection Requirements for Dom0:
o Memory Sharing: Dom0 should be restricted from accessing the memory of DomUs
unless initiated by a hypercall from Dom0 and the memory is encrypted.
o Hypercall Restrictions: Security-critical hypercalls should be tightly controlled. Certain
hypercalls that can harm a DomU, like foreign mapping or debugging hypercalls, should
be monitored and possibly restricted.
o Ensuring Confidentiality and Integrity: Virtual CPU registers and memory should be
encrypted during save and restore operations. The hypervisor should also perform
integrity checks.
7. Performance Overhead: Increased security measures, such as encrypted memory and encrypted
virtual CPU states, can lead to significant overhead. Performance measurements show that the
overhead can increase domain build times, save times, and restore times by up to 2.3 times.
@VTUpadhai – Cloud Computing (21CS72) – Module 4 Notes