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THE AUTHORITARIAN, LIBERTARIAN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND

SOVIET COMMUNIST CONCEPTS OF WHAT THE PRESS SHOULD BE AND DO

FRED S. SIEBERT THEODORE PETERSON WILBUR SCHRAMM

 Originally published in a clothbound edition, 1956
0 1956 by The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 56-11881

ISBN 0-252-72421-6

13 14 15 16 P 84 83 82 81
 These essays were prepared
in connection with astudy of
the social responsibilities
of mass communicators which
Dr. Schramm conducted for the
Department of the Church
and Economic Life of the
«National Council of Churches.
The authors are grateful to
the Council for releasing these
materials for publication apart
from the study.
 COJVTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

1 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY 9

FRED S. SIEBERT

2 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY 39

FRED S. SIEBERT

3 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY 73

THEODORE PETERSON

4 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY 105

WILBUR SCHRAMM

BIBLIOGRAPHY 147
 INTRODUCTION

By press, in this book, we mean all the media of mass communica-

tion, although we shall talk about the printed media oftener than
about broadcast or film because the printed media are older and have
gaillerecl.—abaut them more of the theory and philosophy of mass
communication.
In simplest terms the question behind this book is, why is the press
as it is? Why does it apparently serve different purposes and appear in
widel_y different
_ forms in different countries? Why, for example, is flT-e
pre ss of the Soviet Union so different from our own, and the press of
Argentina so different from that of Great Britain?
Partly, of course, these differences reflect the ability of acountry to
pay for its press, the mechanical ingenuity and resources that can be
put behind mass communication, and the relative degree of urbaniza-
tion which makes the circulation of mass media at once easier and
more necessary. Partly, the differences in the press of different coun-
tries reflect simply what people do in different places and what their
experience leads them to want to read about.
But there is amore basic and important reason for these differences.
The thesis of this volume is that the press always takes on the form and
coloration of the social and political structures within which it oper-
ates. Especially, it reflects the system of social control whereby the
 2 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted. We believe that

an understanding of these aspects of society is basic to any systematic
understanding of the press.
To see the differences between press systems in full perspective, then,
one must look at the social systems in which the press functions. To see
the social systems in their true relationship to the press, one has to look
at certain basic beliefs and assumptions which the society holds: the
nature of man, the nature of society and the state, the relation of man
to the state, and the nature of knowledge and truth. Thus, in the last
analysis the difference between press systems is one of philosophy, and
this book is about the philosophical and political rationales or theories
which lie behind the different kinds of press we have in the world
today.
Since the beginning of mass communication, in the Renaissance,
there have been only two or four basic theories of the press — two or
four, that is, according to how one counts them. We have written four
essays about them, but have tried to make clear that the latter two
"theories" are merely developments and modifications of the first two.
The Soviet Communist theory is only adevelopment of the much older
Authoritarian theory, and what we have called the Social Responsi-
bility theory is only amodification of the Libertarian theory. But be-
cause the Soviets have produced something so spectacularly different
from older authoritarianism, and something so important to the world
today, and because the social responsibility theory road is the apparent
direction of development which our own press is now taking, we have
thought it better to treat them as four separate theories, meanwhile
trying to point out their relationships.
The oldest of these theories is the Authoritarian. It carne into being
in the authoritarian climate of the late Renaissance, soon after the
invention of printi_l_n_ that_society, truth was conceived to be. ,_not
the product of the greet mass of people, but. of_a_few_yriscaun_who
were in a position to guide and direct their fellows. Thus truth was
thought to be centered near the center of power. The press therefore
functioned from the top down. The rulers of the time used the press to
inform the people of what the rulers thought they should know and the
policies the rulers thought they should support. The Tudors and
Stuarts maintained that the press belonged to the office of king and
therefore was obligated to support the royal policy. Only by special
permission was private ownership of the press permitted, and this
 INTRODUCTION 3

permission could be withdrawn any time the obligation to support the

royal policies was considered to have been dishonored. Publishing was
thus asort of agmement between power source and publisher, in which
the former
_ granted amonopoly_ziet and the latter eave support. But
the power source kept the right to set and change policy, the right to
license, and in some cases the right to censor. It is obvious that this
concept of the press eliminated what has come in our own time to be
one of the most common press functions: to check on government.
This theory of the press — the press beinz_a servant-of- the-state
responsible for much of its content to the power figures in charge_of
government at any giv- en___
---m
- emerif— was unWersally accepted in the

sixteenth and most of the seventeenth centuries. This concept set the
original pattern for most of the national press systems of the world,
and still persists. Indeed, as the following chapters will make clear,
authoritarian practice is still found to some extent in all parts of the
world even though another theory has been accepted, in word if not
in deed, by most of the non-Communist nations. But the growth of
political democracy and religious freedom, the expansion of free trade
and travel, the acceptance of laissez-faire economics, and the general
philosophical climate of the Enlightenment, undermined authoritarian-
ism and called for anew concept of the press. This new theory, which
was incipient in the late seventeenth century, came into real being in
the eighteenth, and flowered in the nineteenth, is what we have called
the Libertarki_n_theory.
The Libertarian theory reverses the relative position of man and the
state as we saw it in the Authoritarian theory. Man is no longer con-
ceived of as adependent being to be led and directed, but rather as a
rational being able to discern between truth and falsehood, between a
better and worse alternative, when faced with conflicting evidence and
alternative choices. Truth is no longer conceived_ of as the property
of power. Rather, theyight to searekfor_trutlikone of_the_inalienahle
natural rights of man. And where does the_press fit into the-LC.h..ex:Pe?
The press is conceived of as apartner in the search for _truth.
In Libertarian theory, the press is not an instrument of government,
but _rather adevice for presenting evidence and arguments on basis
of which the people can check on government and make up their
minds as -to
_--.1°
3 lic Y.
- Mier
-Wore
_ it is iiinpe_rativethe-Press--be t ree

from government control and influence. In order for truth to emerge,

_
all ideas must get afair hearing; ere must be a "free market place
 4 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

of ideas and information. Minorities as well as majorities, the weak as

wiIThe strong, must have access to the press. This is the theory of
the press which was written into our Bill of Rights.
For two hundred years the United States and Great Britain have
maintained this kind of press, almost wholly free of government influ-
ence and encouraged to serve as a "Fourth Estate" in the__goveniilg
process. As we indicated earlier, most other non-Communist countries
have given at least lip service to the Libertarian theory of the press.
But in our own century there have been currents of change. These
currents have taken the form of anew authoritarianism in the Com-
munist countries and atrend toward anew Libertarianism in the non-
Communist countries. It is the second of these that we have called, for
want of abetter name, the Social Responsibility theory.
The new Libertarianism received wide publicity in connection with
the reports of the Hutchins Commission, but the theory was reflected
much earlier by editors and publishers themselves. These men realized
that _twentieth-century conditions demand of the mass media a new
and different kind of social responsibility. This realization came about
the time that people began to measure and assess the "communication
revolution" through which they were passing.
It was apparent thirty years ago that it was no longer easy to enter
the publishing business or to operate a newspaper or a radio station.
As these units grew large, their ownership and management came to
involve huge amounts of money. No longer was the typical pattern a
multiplicity of small media units representing different political view-
points, from which the reader could select. Now, less than seven per
cent of the daily newspaper towns of the United States have competing
ownership in the dailies. Three television, four radio networks, three
wire services, shape alarge part of the information that goes into the
American home. In other words the press, as in the old authoritarian
days, is falling into the ÑhUa few: It is true that these
new rulers of the press are not, for the most part, political rulers. As
amatter of fact, they rigorously protect the ress against government
-Biitthe very -fact that control of the press is so limited puts anew _and
uneasy power into the hands of media owners and managers. No
longer is it easy— fôr— the press to be a free market place of ideas, as
defined by Mill and Jefferson. As the Commission on Freedom of the
Press said, "protection against government is not now enough to
guarantee that aman who has something to say shall have achance to
 INTRODUCTION 5

say it. The owners and managers of the press determine which persons,
which facts, which versions of these facts, shall reach the public." This
uneasiness is the basis of the developing Social Responsibility theory:
that the power and near monopoly position of the media impose on
them an obligation to be socially responsible, to see that all sides are
fairly presented and that the public has enough information to decide;
and that if the media do not take on themselves such responsibility it
may be necessary for some other agency of the public to enforce it.
Let us say again that the Social Responsibility theory should not be
thought of as an abstraction produced by the group of scholars who
made up the Hutchins Commission. The theory has been so treated by
some factions of the press with which the Hutchins Commission was in
bad odor. But all the essentials of this theory were expressed by respon-
sible editors and publishers long before the Commission, and have been
stated by other responsible editors and publishers since and quite inde-
pendently of the Commission. It is a trend, not an academic exercise.
While the Libertarian theory has been wrestling with its own prob-
lems and shaping its own destiny, anew and dramatic development of
authoritarianism has arisen to challenge it. This is, of course, the
Soviet Communist theory of the press. Grounded in Marxist determin-
ism and in the harsh political necessity of maintaining the political
ascendancy of a party which represents less than ten per cent of the
country's people, the Soviet press operates as a tool of the ruling
power just as clearly as did the older authoritarianism. PAlikl_Le
pattern, it is state rather than privately owned. The profit motive
has been removed, and aconcept of positive has been substituted for a
concept of negative liberty. Perhaps no press in the history of the world
has ever been so tightly controlled, and yet the Soviet spokesmen think
of their press as free because it is free to speak the "truth" as the Party
sees the truth. The American press is not truly free, the Soviets say,
because it is business controlled and therefore not free to sp_eak_the
Marxist "truth." Thus the two systems line up almost diametrically
opposite in their basic tenets, although both use words like freedom
and responsibility to describe what they are doing. 9.
1.t_ r press tries to
contribute to the searcirfor truththe_Seyia_prem tries to convey
pre-established Marxist-LeninistStalinist truth. We think of the audi-
ences of our press as "rational men," able to choose between truth and
falsehood; the Soviets think of theirs as needing careful guidance from
caretakers, and to this end the Soviet state sets up the most complete
6 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

possible safeguards against competing information. We bend over

backward to make sure that information and ideas will compete. They
bend over backward to make sure that only the line decided upon will
flow t_hrou_glie Soviet Ch—anneTs. We say that their press is not free;
they say that our press is not responsible.
These are the four theories which have largely determined what
kind of press the Western world has had: The Authoritarian theory
grounded in centuries of authoritarian political thought from Plato to
Machiavelli; the Libertarian, grounded in Milton, Locke, Mill and the
Enlightenment; the Social Responsibility, grounded in a communica-
tion revolution and in certain behavioristic doubts about the philoso-
phy of the Enlightenment; and the Soviet Communist, grounded in
Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and the dictatorship of the Communist Party in
the Soviet Union. We shall take up these theories, one by one, in the
following pages.
Each of the four chapters that follows represents the individual work,
style, and opinion of its author. We have made no attempt to impose
a majority viewpoint on any of the moot points discussed in these
chapters, although we have talked over among ourselves our papers
and our conclusions.
We shall begin, then, with the first theory in point of time, the
Authoritarian.
FOUR RATIONALES FOR THE MASS MEDIA

AUTHORITARIAN LIBERTARIAN SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY SOVIET-TOTALITARIAN

Developed in 16th and 17th century Eng- adopted by England after 1688, in U.S. in the 20th century in Soviet Union, although some
land; widely adopted and still and in U.S.; influential else- of the some things were done
practiced in many places where by Nazis and Italians

Out of philosophy of absolute power writings of Milton, Locke, Mill, writing of W. E. Hocking, Com- Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist thought,
of monarch, his government, or and general philosophy of ra- mission on Freedom of Press, with mixture of Hegel and 19th
both tionalism and natural rights and practitioners; media codes century Russian thinking

Chief purpose to support and advance the to inform, entertain, sell — but to inform, entertain, sell — but to contribute to the success and
policies of the government in chiefly to help discover truth, chiefly to raise conflict to the continuance of the Soviet social-
power; and to service the state and to check on government plane of discussion ist system, and especially to
the dictatorship of the party

Who has right whoever gets a royal patent or anyone with economic means to everyone who has something to loyal and orthodox party mem-
to use media? similar permission do so say bers

How are media government patents, guilds, by "self-righting process of community opinion, consumer surveillance and economic or
controlled? censing, sometimes censorship truth" in "free market place of action, professional ethics political action of government
ideas," and by courts

What criticism of political machinery defamation, obscenity, inde- serious invasion of recognized criticism of party objectives as
forbidden? and officials in power cency, wartime sedition private rights and vital social distinguished from tactics
interests

Ownership private or public chiefly private private unless government has public
to take over to insure public
service

Essential instrument for effecting govern- instrument for checking on gov- media must assume obligation state-owned and closely con-
differences ment policy, though not neces- ernment and meeting other of social responsibility; and if trolled media existing solely as
from others sarily government owned needs of society they do not, someone must see arm of state
that they do
 THE AUTHORITARIAN

THEORY OF

THE PRESS

FRED S. SIEBERT 1

Of the four theories of the relation of the press to society or to

government, the authoritarian has been most pervasive both histori-
cally and geographically. It is the theory which was almost auto-
matically adopted by most countries when society and technology
became sufficiently developed to produce what today we call the
"mass media" of communication. It furnishes the basis for the press
sys_tems in m_aru_modern societies; even where it has been abandoned,
has ti influence the practices of a number ofgovern-
ments which theoretically adhere to libertarian principles.
For almost two hundred years after the spread or- Friiiting in the
western world, the authoritarian theory furnished the exclusive basis
for determining the function and relationship of the popular press to
contemporary society. The Tudors in England, the Bourbons in France,
the Hapsburgs in Spain, in fact practically all western Europe,
utilized the basic principles of authoritarianism as the theoretical
foundation for their systems of press control. Nor has the appli-
cation of the theory been limited to the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. The theory has been the basic doctrine for large areas of
the globe in succeeding centuries. It has been consciously or uncon-
sciously adopted in modern times by such diverse national units as
 10 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

Japan, Imperial Russia, Germany, Spain, and many of the Asiatic

and South American governments. One can hazard that the authori-
tarian doarine has determined the mass communication pattern for
more_fflple over alonger time than any other theory of press contr_91.
All human societies, it seems, possess an inherent capacity to de-
velop systems of social control whereby the relations of individuals
and of institutions are adjusted and common interests and desires are
secured. As described by W. J. Shepard, "such systems are of two
general kinds, those which operate spontaneously and automatically,
springing directly from the common sense of right of the community
and enforced by sanctions of social pressure, and those which have
acquired a definite institutional organization and operate by means
of legal mandates enforced by definite penalties. This latter form of
social control is government, using the term in its broadest sense"
(21:8). The authoritarian theory of press control, as we shall discuss
it, is a system of principles which has resulted in the second type of
social control described by Shepard. It is a theicu_under which the
pLess, as an institution, is controlled_ in_its.function.s_ancLperation
21Lorganized society
_ _ through another institution, government.

BASIC POSTULATES

Since the press as well as other forms of mass communication was

introduced into an gre — a-d¡Ughly organized society, its relation lo

that society was naturally determined by the basic assumptions or

postulates which were then furnishing the foundation for social con-
trols. S'
.10.0__goverr1
most 2 f1 Europe e were operating on
authoritarian pring:ples when the popular press emerged, these same
_pLinciples berarneAliQhmil for a system of press control.
Any theory of relationship of the mass media of communication to
the organized society of which it is a part is determined by certain
basic philosophical assumptions (or conclusions, if you wish) about
man and the state. For our purposes these areas of assumption can be
identified as follows: 0 the nature of man, 0 the nature of society
and of the state, 0 the relation of man to the state, and IS) the basic
philosophical problem, the nature of knowledge and of truth.
The authoritarian theory of the functions and purposes of organized
society accepted certain postulates in those areas. First of all, man
could attain his full potentialities only as amember of society. As an
individual, his sphere of activity was extremely limited, but as a
member of society or of an organized community his ability to achieve
 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 11

his soals was immeasurably increased. Under this assumption, the

group took on an importance greater than that of the individual since
only through the group could an individual accomplish his purposes.
The theory inevitably developed the proposition that the state the
highest-exprrgsion of _group organization, superseded the individual in
a scale of values since without the state the individual was helpless
in developing the attributes of a civilized man. The individual's de-
pendence on the state for achieving an advanced civilization__apzªrs
to be a common ingredient of_alLauthoritarian systems, In and
through the state, man achieves his ends; without the state, man re-
mains a primitive being.
The state, then, was essential to the full development of man; that
assumption resulted in certain basic conclusions concerning the nature
of the state. Aside from its individual constituents, the state became
the summation of all desirable attributes. It derived its power to de-
termine ends and methods for achieving those ends through aprocess
not generally capable of complete human analysis. Sometimes it was
divine guidance, sometimes it was dependence on superior intellect or
on leadership qualities, sometimes it was lack of confidence in any
other type of process.
To the more basic philosophical problems of the nature fknowl-
edge and of truth the authoritarians gavq.iaIly categorical answers.
Knowledge was discoverable through mental effort. Men differed
widely in their ability to utilize mental processes and in their drive
to exert mental effort. Since such differences existed, they should be
recognized in the social structure. "Wise men" capable of analying
and_syrithesizing_should_become leaders in organized society, or if not
leaders, they should at least become the advisors of leaders. Knowl-
v_hich is not divinely inspired is acquired through human effort,
and this effort can best be channeled for the _good of all through the
state. Knowledge thus acquired or developed becomes the standard
for all members of society and acquires an absolutist aura which
makes change undesirable and stability or continuity avirtue in itself.
In addition, the authoritarian's theory demanded a unity of intellec-
tual activity since only through unity could the state operate success-
fully for the good of all. The idealist in the authoritarian camp
postulated that this unity would come from the realization of the
contribution of each to the society as awhole, while the realists recog-
nized that such unity of thought could in most circumstances be
attained only through constant surveillance and control.
12 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

PLATO ON AUTHORITARIAN THEORY

Let us now turn to some of the exponents of the authoritarian

theory of government. Plato idealized the aristocratic form of govern-
ment. He was convinced that the nature of man, including his mate-
rial interests and selfish passions, would tend_to degrade government
from an aristocracy to timocracy, to oligarchy, to democracy., and
fiito tiranny.Tre thought the state was safe only in the hands of
ii-
e—mert, the magistrates, who are • overned by moral authority and
who use this authority to keep the baser elements of society in line.
Just as the wise man clisiplines himself by keeping the impulses of
his heart and the greed of his stomach under control by his intellect,
so in society the magistrate keeps other classes of members from de-
generating into aconfused chaos. According to Plato, once authority
in astate is_equally distributed degeneration sets in.
In line with these basic postulates, Plato conceived the ideal society
as one in which the state established and enforced the unity of politi-
cal and cultural goals. That idea meant rigorous control of o pjeion
.

an_dJilqIssion.
c "Plato wanted to `co-ordinate' the life of the citizens
under a strict cultural code that banned all modes of art and even
of opinion not in accord with his own gospel. Very politely, in the Re-
public, he would 'send to another city' all offenders against the rigid
rules prescribed for the artist and the philosopher and the poet. With
equal politeness, in the Laws, he would require poets first to submit
their works to the magistrates, who should decide whether they were
good for the spiritual health of the citizens" (15:322). _
Even Plato's famous teacher, Socrates, could not devise a satisfac-
tory answer to the conflictinge— mands of lawful authority and free-
dom of e While insisting on his individual right to
deviate from the cultural life of Athens, Socrates recognized the phil-
osophical necessity for obedience to authority. He objected to the
rules under which he was convicted for seducing the youth of his city
because he thought they were wrong, but he accepted the right of the
authorities to enforce those rules however wrong. His only solution
was to accept the penalty.

MACHIAVELLI AND LATER WRITERS

Succeeding social and political philosophers who have accepted

authoritarian principles in government include such well-known
names as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hegel and Treitschke. Machiavelli,
 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 13

unlike his Greek and Roman predecessors, was unconcerned about the
p_utppses and aims of the state. He was concerned, however, with the
means of attaining and maintaining political_power. He held a - basi-
-

cally pessimistic view of human nature and in his theory would sub-
ordinate all other considerations to the principal aim, the security of
the state. This was to be achieved by arealistic, nonmoralistic policy
on the part of the ruler or the prince. Under such adoctrine, public
discussion must necessarily be confined whenever the ruler thought
that it threatened the security of his principality. Machiavelli was not
too concerned whether the government was amonarchy or arepublic
(in fact, he indicated that perhaps a republic was superior). But he
was convinced that, human_nature being what it is, the role of the po-
litical leader is _to utilize whatever means are necessary to forward the
interests of his political unit. His influence on nineteenth-century Ger-
man and Italian political theorists of national movements has been
generally recognized.
Implicit in Machiavelli's writings is the proposition that patriotic
grounds justify strict control of the methods of discussion and of mass
dissemination of information as the basis for political action.
stability and advance of the state are paramount; individualistic con-
siderations of the citizen are subordinate. (See 3:191-202.)
Thomas Hobbes is perhaps the best-known English philosopher of
authoritarianism. Starting from two basic desires in man, freedom
from pain and the will to power, Hobbes developed acomplete-gem
of ''li . i.• ..., ., , . ...wer to k_Oa individual in
the interest of all was essential. he p_owei to PSiAlaliqh and maintain
order and peace is sovereign. It is not subject to private opinions 9n
whether or not its pecific actions are reasonable.
, since its establish-
_
ment with cnrnpetence to deide disputes
reason.
As Catlin has pointed out, Hobbes' theories led to this conclusion:
"Doctri 'vision V-
eret e
rations
as ure of autonomy, common lawyers who place
custom above the living_ sovereign and churches which claim
a
..._s_piritual allegiance rivaling that of the sovereign are threats to the

sovereign, to civic peace and to reason" (4:395). Hobbes' theories

about the nature of the state and man's relation to the state tended
to justify many of the authoritarian policies of seventeenth-century
14 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

governments. Although his greatest work, the Leviathan, was at-

tacked by both Royalists and Cromwellians, and by both Anglicans
and Puritans, it has been cited to justify many of the arbitrary acts
by governments in succeeding centuries.
Georg Hegel, the German philosopher, has been considered the
principal exponent of the political theory of authoritarianism in mod-
ern times, and to him have been attributed the genesis of both modern
Communism and Fascism. The following short passage cited from
Hegel is considered one of the vital texts in European thought. As
Alfred Zimmern points out, "every word is pregnant ...and they
trail with them acloud of memories from the philosophical speculation
of the past, from Plato and Aristotle onwards" (28:xvii).
Wrote Hegel:
The State is embodied Morality. It is the ethical spirit which has clarified
itself and has taken substantial shape as Will, a Will which is manifest before
the world, which is self-conscious and knows its purposes and carries through
that which it knows to the extent of its knowledge. Custom and Morality are
the outward and visible form of the inner essence of the State; the self-
consciousness of the individual citizen, his knowledge and activity, are the
outward and visible form of the indirect existence of the State. The self-
consciousness of the individual finds the substance of its freedom in the atti-
tude of the citizen, which is the essence, purpose, and achievement of its
self-consciousness.
The State is Mind, per se. This is due to the fact that it is the embodiment
of the substantial Will, which is nothing else than the individual self-
consciousness conceived in its abstract form and raised to the universal plane.
This substantial and massive unity is an absolute and fixed end in itself. In
it freedom attains to the maximum of its rights: but at the same time the
State, being an end in itself, is provided with the maximum of rights over
against the individual citizens, whose highest duty it is to be members of the
State (28:3).

Translating his basic principles into the field of communication

and the participation of citizens in public decisions, Hegel ridicules
the notion that "all should participate in the business of the state."
The individual needs to be informed about and concerned with public
problems only as amember of asocial class, group, society or organi-
zation but not as a member of the state. ofrgrlian
in
sense mgantIrreglom of the individual to know that he is_nat free
but that his actibLis are determined by history, bycirty and above
all by the AboluteIcich finds its highest manifestation in
thp %late
The notion_ that true freedom is freedom within the state rather
 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 15

than freedom from the state was developed more fully by the German
political philosopher and historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, both in
his littlèpamphlet on it/0m
-
_ lus later monumental work
Politics.. Taking a dim view of democracies in general and the de-
_
mocracies of Switzerland and the United States in particular,
Treitschke concluded that the rule of the majority was no guarantee
that either political freedom or social liberty would survive. The state,
in the ordinary evolution of history, is the great individual: what mat-
ters is its freedom and life. And like Nietzsche, with whom he gen-
erally disagreed, he concluded as an historian that the hero or leadgr
who headed the state could make the greatest contribution_to_the
welfare of its citizens.
Numerous other social and political philosophers since Plato have
espoused, directly or indirectly, the doctrine of authoritarianism.
Among them can be counted Jean Jacques Rousseau with his ideas
of anonhereditary monarchy, Thomas Carlyle and his hero theories,
Bernard Bosenquet with his emphasis on the determinate function
of state-community, and the more recent Ernst Troeltsch, who has
summarized the German conception of freedom.

FASCIST AUTHORITARIANISM

By no stretch of the imagination can either Mussolini or Hitler be

classed as political philosophers. Nevertheless, both their published
statements and their actions indicate a continuation in a perverted
form of the doctrines of authoritarianism, and their treatment of the
mass media was entirely consistent with the basic principle of abso-
lutism. As described by Catlin,
The Mussolini doctrine involves stress on this notion of achievement
through force, struggle, danger; the rejection of pacifism; the violent rejec-
tion of liberalism and toleration; the organization of the masses through an
elite or vanguard, leading and dominating apopular movement and the re-
jection of internationalism, and the substitution of "nation" based on the
middle class, the "class" meaning proletariat ...[and] emphasizing the
importance of the community as the matrix of the full moral life; and
identifying this society with the coercive Modem State (or armed and or-
ganized Nation) (3:719).
Thepremacy of the _ state under Fascism is exemplified_in the idea
of a"e_orporate_state" which_was_th_e_visible_expre_s_sion of the primacy
of the state over the economic and social groups within the nation.
Although allied with private enterprise in preserving the capitalistic
16 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

order, the corporate state was based on a theory of interventionism

in both economic and cultural affairs.
Said Mussolini: "Fascism combats the whole complex system of
democratic ideology, and repudiates it, whether in its theoretical
premises or in its practical application. Fascism denies that the
majority, by.the simple fact that it is a majority, can direct human
- -- -
s22.
çjy; it denies that numbers alone can govern by means of a
periodical consultation, and it affirms the immutable, beneficial, and
fruitful inequality of mankind, which can never be permanently
leveled through the mere operation of a mechanical process such as
universal suffrage" (16:303-04).
Adolph Hitler, more than any other exponent of authoritarianism,
expressed the theory of the Fascist or totalitarian State in terms of a
composite theory of truth and propaganda. Truth for the German
Nazis_ was "our truth — truth for u — in short that which would
advance the interests and solidarity of the German state.
The following is an oft-quoted excerpt from Mein Kampf (9:76-77) :
All propaganda should be popular and should adapt its intellectual level
to the receptive ability of the least intellectual of those whom it is desired
to address. Thus it must sink its mental elevation deeper in proportion to
the numbers of the mass whom it has to grip. If it is, as it is with propa-
ganda for carrying through a war, a matter of gathering a whole nation
within its circle of influence, there cannot be enough attention paid to avoid-
ance of too high alevel of intellectuality. The receptive power of the masses
is very limited, their understanding small; on the other hand, they have a
great power of forgetting. This being so, all effective propaganda must be
confined to afew points.
The Nazi theory of the state, its emphasis on racism, its idolatry
cftileprinciple_Di_leadctship,_its_intokrance and one-rauidedne_§s, and
above all its conception that the individual finds fulfillment
,tln•ojrgh
the state, all are consistent in form w he tr itions
of authoritarianism. Nazi Germany could no more resist the impo-
sition of controls on its mass media than it could avoid its "destiny"
as the agent for reviving and extending the greatness of the German
people.
Thus a common thread runs through all authoritarian theories of
governments — from Plato to Hitler. Not all these philosophies were
based on the greed for power or for personal aggrandizement. Many
were sincere efforts to grapple with the abstruse problems of the
nature of the state, the relation of man to the state, and the nature
of truth. Regardless of intellectual method or motivation, the result
 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 17

was asystem for organizing society under which the mass media were
assigned a specific role and were subjected to controls in order not
to interfere with the achievement of ultimate ends through the state.
The national states of western Europe were also undoubtedly in-
fluenced by the philosophical principles and the tradition of authori-
tarianism of the Church of Rome. The authority of the church is
based on revelation and on its foundation by Christ. It is absolute in
so far as it is of divine origin. The immediate center of ecclesiastical
authority is the Pope of Rome and the bishops.
Since the church considered itself the depository of revelation en-
trusted to it by Christ, it felt obliged to preserve this revelation from
contamination by any alien influences and to protect the purity of its
doctrines from the vacillations and inconsistencies of human opinion.
The truth taught by the church was absolute. Therefore it was not
subject to deviant secular interpretations. As the shepherd of man-
kind, the church was responsible for the souls of men, and to fulfill
this responsibility it sought to guard its doctrine as well as its
adherents from corruption.
The basic principles of the church necessarily led to protective
measures in the area of opinion and belief. The church was divinely
founded and taught the truth. Other versions of the truth were
merely attempts to debase its principles and to seduce its membership
from the only path to eternal salvation. Following Platonic precepts,
the church provided for the discussion of controversial issues in an
area limited to those of the hierarchy. At the same time, it firmly
restricted the questioning of fundamental doctrines by those who were
not of the hierarchy and who therefore were incompetent to deal
with religious doctrine. What the church could do in the spiritual
world, amonarchy could do in temporal affairs; and some monarchs,
like the British Tudors, thought that they could do both.
This chapter will make no attempt to develop the philosophical
bases for the principles of Marxist Communism, although these prin-
ciples are undoubtedly related to the main stream of authoritarian-
ism. The basic Communist doctrine as it affects the organization and
management of the mass media is discussed separately in the final
chapter of this volume. Suffice it to say here that Marx, as the saying
goes, turned Hegel on his head. Whereas Hegel maintained that the
state was the means whereby the individual could achieve self-
expression, Marx on the other hand insisted that the relation should
be reversed. The individual is not an end in himself but a means to
the self-realization of society of which he is an integral part (7:375).
18 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL SYSTEMS

Let us now describe and analyze in some detail the operation of the
system of mass media control in societies which have to agreater or
lesser extent adopted the authoritarian theory. The underlying phil-
osophy of authoritarianism has found expression in many types of
governmental organizations, but regardless of the variations, the
pattern of control has exhibited anumber of common characteristics.
When the authoritarian turns to the functions of the mass media,
he has already determined the basic purposes of government. These
purposes inevitably control his attitude toward both the cultural and
political aspects of communication. Like Plato he arrives through his
own logic at aposition where it is apparent that the dissemination of
information, ideas, and opinions among the members of the com-
munity must necessarily have an effect, sometimes immediate and at
other times remote, on the accomplishment of predetermined objec-
tives. Often this conclusion is reached through a negative route — by
experience with interference by the operators of the channels of com-
munication. Why should those who have access to the mass media,
who often are incapable of grasping the totality of purpose of the
state, who most often are not completely informed of the objectives
of state policy — why should such persons, through their ignorance
or stupidity, be permitted to threaten the success of that which has
been determined to be for the good of all?
The units of communication should support and advance the
policies of the government in power so that this government can
achieve its objectives. In the early stages of the development of the
mass media, this purpose was usually carried out in its negative
aspects through controls which attempted to avoid any interference
with the attainment of national ends. In later stages amore positive
policy can be discerned. Under it, the state actively participated in
the communication process and utilized the mass media as one of the
important instruments for accomplishing its purposes.
The first problem under any system of society is to determine who
has the right to use the media. Should the avenues of reaching the
individual citizen be operated directly by the state; should they be
semi-independent instrumentalities subject to surveillance by the
state; or should they be open to all who either by past performance
or present inclination indicate that they are not likely to interfere
with or openly oppose government policies? Authoritarian govern-
 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 19

ments have answered this question in various ways at various times,

depending on which policy seemed to provide the greatest chance for
success at the moment.
The British Tudors in the sixteenth century answered the problem
by granting exclusive patents of monopoly to selected, well-disposed
individuals who were permitted to profit from these monopolies so
long as they refrained from rocking the ship of state. Elizabeth I
found this an inexpensive method of identifying the interests of the
printers and publishers of popular literature with the interests of the
Crown. Governments in many continental countries of the same
period relied on a system of strict surveillance which of course re-
quired a bureaucracy to make it effective. Eventually most of the
authoritarian governments of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, faced with a multiplicity of voices both from within and from
without their territories, adopted a policy of actively entering the
mass communication field. "Official" journals, representing the gov-
ernment, were established in most western countries. They were
charged with giving the populace an "accurate" picture of govern-
ment activities and with counteracting misconceptions which might
be derived from sources which were for one reason or another out-
side the immediate control of the authorities. However, in contrast
with the success in modern Communist countries, no country in
western Europe was able for any extended period to monopolize the
channels of communication to its people. In most nations, privately
and individually operated publications existed alongside the official
journals and often provided a competitive service which was superior
in most respects.
The major problem in most authoritarian systems was establishing
effective restraints and controls over the--Pnvat-dy operated media.
The western nations tried numerous metho—d- s
—with varying degrees of

success, and it can be said that no single method of control was suc-
cessful over any extended period of time. One of the earliest methods
of assug favorable treatment for government policies was, as has
been mentioned, the granting of special "permits" (or "patents," as
th_5y_w_c_r_q_ca_l_le_cI) tD_selected_in'idtae in the "art and
mystery" of printing. In England this device was expanded in time
into an elaborate system of trade regulation. Patents were issued to
well-disposed printers for various classes of published works, such as
law books, school books, religious books, histories, plays, and many
others. Special care went into the selection of printers who were to be
20 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

entrusted with producing printed matter which concerned affairs of

state. When the earliest form of newspaper appeared, it too was
assigned to individuals who in return for the exclusive monopoly of
purveying news were all too ready to agree to publish only that
which forwarded the policies of the state.
In England the patent system flourished for about two hundred
years. During that period it apparently was more successful than any
other method of control. The British system culminated in an ex-
clusive organization of patentees or "privileged" printers known as
the Stationers' Company which through its officers and members was
able to police the printing trade at practically no expense to the
state. Its royal charter gave the organization power to admit and
to expel members from the printing trade and to impose lesser penal-
ties for minor infractions of the trade regulations. The Company was
generally assiduous in enforcing its controls since its own monopolistic
position depended on its ability to satisfy the government that it was
on the side of established authority.
The system of exclusive grants in printing broke down toward the
end of the seventeenth century largely because of its own inherent
defects and because of the development of private enterprise in all
areas of production. In seventeenth-century England the printing
monopolists, anxious to expand their production and their profits,
trained large numbers of apprentices in the craft. But when the
apprentices reached the journeyman stage, they discovered that they
could find employment only with a government-licensed publisher.
Since government edict limited the number of such publishers and
since no new printing enterprises could be established, the distraught
journeyman was forced either to accept whatever wages the monop-
olists offered or to engage in surreptitious publishing as an "outlaw"
printer subject to arrest and punishment. In the seventeenth century,
printers could readily find both religious and political groups willing
to finance the illegal production of tracts and pamphlets which
attacked the principles and practices of existing authorities.
The spread of literacy and the consequent demand for more printed
materials, the growth of private enterprises in all fields of production,
and the spread of religious and political heresies in the form of
Protestanism and Democracy — all contributed to the eventual in-
ability of the state to maintain the printing monopolies.
Another_ _closely related technique develo_ped in most _countries of
western Euree_wa.s____t1l__e___l_ieensin,g
. system_f_m_. ____individual printed
 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 21

works. This system, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

carne to be identified with the term "censorship," sometimes operated
in conjunction with alicensed or monopolistic press; at other times it
kept privately owned printing and publishing establishments undér
official control. The system was developed under secular auspices in
the sixteenth century, when even the monopolistic or state printers
were frequently unable or unwilling to follow the lines of government
policies. Publishers usually were not privy to state affairs and there-
fore were unable to make accurate judgments on controversial issues
which found their way into print. To remedy this defect, the state
required published works in specified areas such as religion and
politics to be submitted for examination by its representatives who
presumably were acquainted with what the state was attempting to
do. In the sixteenth century this was not too difficult a task since the
number of published works was relatively small and the duty of
examination could be assigned to asecretary of the principal religious
and secular authorities.
By the end of the seventeenth century, however, the difficulty of
providing an adequate check on the large quantity of materials issued
from the press became apparent. The increase in the number and
complexity of governmental problems added to the censor's burden.
Printers and publishers naturally became irritated with the delays
and vacillations inherent in the system and often expressed their
dissatisfaction. Even the censors themselves were not happy with a
duty which made them responsible for satisfying the varying demands
of public policy and public personages. To prejudge the develop-
ments of official governmental objectives and strategies as well as the
effects of particular published statements became an almost impossible
task. It was one which astute politicians on their way to the top assidu-
ously avoided. Better to let an underling make the decisions and take
the subsequent criticism.
The system of censoring individual i_te_ms of _printed matter also
became increasingly difficult as the newspaper became the principal
purveyor of _public information. The pressure of weekly and later
daily deadlines, the sheer volume of copy, and the cleverness and
subtlety of journalistic writers tended to confound the censors. No
one of consequence wanted the job, least of all the person who was
politically ambitious. In England the system died toward the end of
the seventeenth century because of its cumbersomeness and most of
all because by then political parties were being formed in the demo-
22 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

cratic tradition. These parties were unwilling to trust one another

with the direction and exclusive control of such an important instru-
ment for achieving and maintaining political power.
In the Anglo-American legal tradition, censorship meant the legal
requirement that all materials to be printed and offered for general
distribution must first obtain an official permit or license, or, as it
was called by the Roman Catholic church, an imprimatur. This type
of regulation as practiced under authoritarian philosophies was more
common than any other. It was practiced by the governments of
France, Germany, Spain, and the Italian states as well as by the
early colonial governments in America. In modern times the word
censorship has been used in a broader sense, particularly by social
scientists, to include all forms of regulation whether they are in the
form of licensing or not. The earlier meaning however continues to be
used by legal scholars and some historians.
A third general method of press control which authoritarian states
employed was prosecution before the courts for violation of accepted
or established legal rules of behavior. This method tended to develop
later than those previously discussed. It was usually adopted after
state monopolies or licensing had failed to accomplish the neces-
sary control. This method also represented an advance in practice
since the courts of law generally permitted an individual to take
advantage of the legal protections which were available to persons
accused of crime. This was particularly true in England, where the
courts for many generations had built up a body of procedural law
for the protection of the innocent.
Two traditional areas of the law — treason and sedition — were
the basis for prosecutions of persons accused or suspected of dissem-
inating information or opinions inimical to the authorities. In any
organized society, authoritarian or otherwise, treason is the basic
crime against society. In most systems of jurisprudence, it is the
keystone of the legal structure which supports the state. Three cate-
gories of acts constituted treason. To attempt to overturn the state
was treason; to engage in activities which might lead to the over-
throw of the established government was also treason; and in many
states to advocate policies which might lead to an overthrow was an
activity identifiable as treason. Individuals or groups which tried to
reach the public through the channels of mass communication could
be encompassed by either the second or the third category above.
The publisher of a newspaper or leaflet which attacked the govern-
 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 23

ment could readily be accused of "activities which might lead to the

overthrow of the state."
Another aspect of treason also threatened the printer and pub-
lisher in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In most countries of
Europe, the state was identified with a particular ruler or monarch.
To threaten the position of the monarch was to threaten the stability
of the state and was therefore treason. The penalty for treason was
usually death, apenalty which in certain periods of history made it a
particularly potent weapon against dissent. In other periods with a
different climate of opinion, the death penalty was a handicap in
obtaining convictions since it did not seem reasonable under some
circumstances to apply the extreme penalty to some of the casual
and rather innocuous remarks about aregime or areigning monarch.
In England prosecution for treason was never widely used to pun-
ish printers and publishers. Only three printers were executed for
publishing material which threatened the security of the state, one
in the sixteenth, one in the seventeenth, and one in the eighteenth
century. In many modern countries the crime was carefully circum-
scribed by either constitutional or statutory restrictions to make it
unavailable for the prosecution of opinions. In recent years, however,
the crime has been revived by both libertarian and authoritarian
governments to punish persons who in wartime have tried to assist
the enemy and to discourage their homelands through materials
broadcast by radio.
Control of the press under authoritarian governments was also
facilitated by the development of a branch of the law known as
seditious libel or sedition. Treason was reserved for activities which
shook the foundationi—o rthe state; sedition was used for the irritating
-

flea-bites of the dissident and the nonconformist.

All countries of western Europe during the authoritarian period
developed a legal method of bringing before the courts individuals
who were attempting by public argument or exhortation to change
either the personnel or the practices of the state. Under seventeenth-
century theories of monarchy, the ruler was the fountainhead of
justice and law, and his acts were beyond popular criticism. "If the
ruler is regarded as the superior of the subject, as being by the nature
of his position presumably wise and good ...it must necessarily
follow that it is wrong to censure him openly, that even if he is
mistaken his mistakes should be pointed out with the utmost respect,
and that whether mistaken or not, no censure should be cast upon
him likely or designed to diminish his authority" (24:299).
24 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

In many states, prosecutions for sedition were conducted without

any of the safeguards now associated with criminal trials. In England,
however, even the trials for seditious libel, which were so prevalent
during the period of the Stuart monarchs, were circumscribed by
established judicial procedures common to all forms of criminal
prosecutions. These safeguards developed as a reaction against the
arbitrary prosecutions for political crimes in the well-publicized pro-
ceedings of the English Court of the Star Chamber. Transferred to
the common law courts, crimes against the state became less arbi-
trary in procedure without destroying the effectiveness of the remedy.
A prosecution for seditious libel was the principal weapon against
printers and publishers under the authoritarian Stuart monarchs.
The Crown stimulated the prosecution, appointed the judges, and
provided the witnesses. The law defined the crime which came in
time to embrace all types of public criticism and censure. Whatever
the authorities disliked was considered a basis for a prosecution for
sedition. The doctrine was firmly established by Chief Justice Holt
of the Court of King's Bench in his pronouncement:
This is avery strange doctrine to say that it is not alibel reflecting on the
government, endeavouring to possess the people that the government is mal-
administered by corrupt persons. ...To say that corrupt officers are ap-
pointed to administer affairs is certainly areflection on the government. If
people should not be called to account for possessing the people with an ill
opinion of the government, no government can subsist. For it is very neces-
sary for all governments that the people should have agood opinion of it.
And nothing can be worse to any government than to endeavour to procure
animosities as to the management of it; this has always been looked upon
as acrime, and no government can be safe without it (20:1095).
During the eighteenth century, the abandonment of many authori-
tarian principles in government, the rise of political parties, and the
spread of democratic doctrines made it difficult to enforce the law
of seditious libel. Although prosecutors continued to arrest and bring
to trial persons who criticized the government or its officers, and
although judges insisted on defining the law in terms of authoritarian
principles, juries revolted and refused to bring in general verdicts of
guilty. Experience with juries both in England and in the American
colonies forced the authorities to seek other weapons against the
constantly increasing activity of the publishers of newspapers and
pamphlets.
Throughout the eighteenth century, authoritarianism was on the
defensive and libertarian principles were on the march. The tradi-
 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 25

tional weapons against interference with government such as state

monopolies, licensing, and prosecutions were becoming less effective.
Other means had to be found for protecting the authority of the
state. The methods devised were less obvious in their purposes and
more devious in their operation. Instead of official journals managed
by government appointees, privately owned newspapers were pur-
chased or subsidized with state funds. During Walpole's long regime
as first minister in England, political writers were secretly put on the
payroll, newspapers were tied to the government through funds from
the secret service account, and opposition editors were alternately
threatened with prosecution and seduced with bribes. Dictator gov-
ernments in modern times have tended to continue these practices as
an effective method of reducing public criticism and of maintaining
a coterie in power.
These indirect methods of control of the media of mass communi-
cations have the advantage of allaying attacks from libertarian
sources since it is usually difficult, if not impossible, to trace the source
of corruption. And even if the fact of control can be established, the
authorities can always fall back on the argument that since private
interests use the press for their own advantage, the government also
is entitled to use whatever means are at hand for creating afavorable
attitude toward its officers and policies.
Another indirect method of control which was popular in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a system of special taxes
designed to limit both the circulation and the profit in printed matter,
especially newspapers seeking amass audience. A newspaper depend-
ing on a mass circulation for its financial success was by that fact
less dependent on government subsidies; therefore it tended to become
more truculent in its treatment of government affairs. Special taxes
on advertising and on circulation tended to reduce the profits of
newspapers without making an issue of the editorial contents. The
British "taxes on knowledge" became a violent political issue during
the first half of the nineteenth century. They were finally abolished
by 1861 (22:322).

PERMITTED AND FORBIDDEN SUBJECT MATTER

The principal instruments for controlling the mass media under

authoritarian states have been described in broad outlines. Now let us
turn to the types of content which were considered to be obnoxious
26 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

and therefore forbidden. I,bider_ttie authoritarian philosophy of the

nature and function of the state, all instrument ities o erating
within the state should advance the objectives and policies o the
s_ats„. The mass media as an important instrumentality in society tell
within this general principle, and their content was tested and evalu-
ated against its contribution to the achievement of established goals.
It was not the function of the media either to determine or to ques-
tion these goals. That function was reserved for the_inglividual or
mup exercising political power.
The authoritarians did not often object to a discussion of political
systems in broad philosophical terms. Unlike the modern Communists,
tyey_ did_ not demand complete conformance to a s_et of theoretical
pripçiples. They were us_tml_l_y_nntent_iL-the_merlia_avoided rtire_ct
criticism of current_political leaders and their projects, and with a
benevolence
_ uncommon in modern Communist and Fascist circles,
ffie—
y_tolerated a wide divergence from the political_prineiples_upcui
which their system
_ rested. What was not tolerated_ uins_an_overt
attempt to unseat ihe—a —u
-iTiorities themselves. The political machinery
might be subject to question; the manipulators of that machinery
were not. Elizabeth I in the sixteenth century permitted and some-
times even encouraged awide latitude of discussion on current issues
so long as her authority to make the ultimate decisions was not
questioned.
discussionthe pyramid of
within society narrowed. The public at large, the mass of
subjects, were considered to be incapable of understanding political
problems. Therefore, any discussion by this group was limited. Media
attempting to reach this level sif_sqçiety were more carefully_watched
because
_, of ih-Fdanger of disturbing the of cau§ipelh_em to
develop airifitere ___Ln—that—which_the.y_ia able of co-fripre-
hending_ and for_which—theji—had_m_direst_responsibility. A wider
latitude of discussion was permissible in the_ReliTalamilies which
were frequently a part of authoritarian political machinery. The
members of this group were charged with public responsibilities. Thus
theoretically they could be trusted to confine their discussions to
methods of assisting the central authority to accomplish its objec-
tives. But even in these assemblies there were frequent lapses, and a
monarch had occasionally to inform the group that it was transgress-
ing on the powers of the Crown. The most impiartanz-cligcugsiens were
reserved for the privy council of advisors who lesause-of their depend-
,
 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 27

ence on the central authority could be trusted with "secrets of state."

_-
Information on government affairs, as distinguished from discussion
of government policies, followed the same genepattern. In most
authoritarian states there was practically no published information on
the issues and arguments presented at meetings of the central advisory
boAy. The only decisions announced were requiring gen-eral
public compliance or support. Even the general assemblies closely
guarded their doors against public curiosity, and members who dis-
cussed the proceedings outside the walls of the meeting place were
frequently punished. Since the assembly was not representative in the
democratic tradition, there was no reason why pressures or instruc-
tions from the masses should handicap its deliberations. Here again the
theory of public responsibility came into play. Since the assembly was
a body with traditional responsibilities, it should be permitted to
operate in an atmosphere free from interference by individuals or
groups without such responsibilities.

AUTHORITARIANISM AND OTHER THEORIES

As indicated in the preface, this volume discusses four major theories

of the role and function of the mass media in society. Before proceed-
ing to discuss some contemporary applications, it might be useful at
this point to attempt to point up some of the similarities and some of
the differences between the authoritarian theory and the other three.
Among the four, the authoritarian and the Marxist-Soviet theories
have the greatest number of similarities, while the authoritarian and
the libertarian philosophies have the least in common.
Marxist political theories were derived from the early authoritarians
and were modified to take into account the industrial revolution and
the problems it created. To accomplish its aims Communism teaches
the necessity of setting up a dictatorship of the proletariat through the
Communist Party. This dictatorship, which-in-Communist theory. py
be only a transition st_agcuntil the remnants of capitalism are liqui-
dated, conforms in theory to_other historical types of absolutism. The
media of mass wonm nicej_on owe a duty to support the state. _They .
achieve their own ends hy nsrjstin_g in achieving the ends of the state.
However, the Soviet system differs from other authoritarian systems
-

in two respects. First the Communists place a greater emphasis on

the positive_ use of the mass media as part of the agitation for the
accomplishment of a world revolution. Under Communism the state
28 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

is not content to restrict the mass media from interfering with state
policies; it actively employs the media for the accomplishment of its
—.--
qq.ectives. A second difference and—the most imrL•ta__n_t one is that
under Communism the state holds a monopoly over all avenues of
reaching.lie masses. Other dictatorships in the past have _allowed the
mass media or the majOr part of them to remain in private hands as
private capitalistic enterpnse-
s
-Tbid--uncier Communism the state "on
"Bairrciiihe
- public" owns and operates all units of the mass media.

Not only does the state operate the internal media but sets up, in so
far as it is able, a complete monopoly of communication by imposing
severe restrictions on the importation of foreign-originated materials.
This is accomplished by an embargo on the importation of foreign
printed media and by astrict control of receiving sets for the electronic
media. (For further details on the Soviet methods, see Chapter 4.)
The authoritarian system differs most from the libertarian doctrines
of freedom of the press. The entire philosophical basis for a free ex-
change of ideas is foreign to authoritarian thinking. Since authority
rests in the state and since the responsibility for the solution of public
issues follows authority, the first duty of the press is to avoid inter-
ference with the objectives of the state. These objectives are deter-
mined by a ruler or by an elite rather than in "the market place of
ideas," as predicated by the libertarians. The idea that the press consti-
tutes acheck on government does not make sense to the authoritarian
who immediately asks the question — who checks the press?
It should be noted that in modern times many of the national gov-
ernments which are basically authoritarian in nature have added a
number of libertarian trappings to their organizations just as most
democratic states today retain vestiges of absolutism, and both authori-
tarian and libertarian states have in many cases incorporated some of
the features of socialism. This is particularly true in the area of the
mass media of communication. Hitler recognized the need for keeping
his countrymen informed on the essential issues facing his government
and permitted selected units of the press to operate on a capitalistic
free-enterprise basis. On the other hand, the authoritarians frequently
nationalized or socialized many of the media, particularly the more
recent units in the electronic field. Radio was always a state monopoly
under modern totalitarian governments.
The authoritarian theories have a number of elements in common
with the recently developed social responsibility theory of the press
 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 29

(see Chapter 3). Both agree that the press should not be permitted
to degrade the culture of a nation, and both postulate that when
definite goals for society are determined (by different methods, how-
ever) the mass media should not be permitted to interfere irrespon-
sibly with the accomplishment of these objectives. Both systems
recognize that there is arelationship between responsibility and action,
but they tend to approach the problem from opposite points of view.
The autorithrtn denies that the press has the responsibility for
determining either objectives or the method of achieving them, and
because of lack of such responsibility the press should refrain from
assuming a duty which is reserved for the central authority. The
advocates of the theory of social responsibility, however, retain the
democratic tradition that the public ultimately makes decisions, and
they charge the press with the duty of informing and guiding the
public in an intelligent discussion. The press has the duty to keep the
public alert and not to divert its attention or its energies to the irrele-
vant or the meaningless. The authoritarian and the Communist are
convinced that the state must control this process; the libertarian
asserts that the less political authority has to do with the process the
better; and the advocates of the theory of social responsibility contend
that, although libertarian principles may be basically sound, their
operation in the complex of contemporary society demands some form
of control, preferably by the media themselves with a benevolent gov-
ernment in the background unobtrusively checking the ground rules.

AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE MODERN WORLD

We now turn to some contemporary manifestations of the operation

of the authoritarian concept of the status and function of the mass
media in society. We shall make no attempt to describe the status of
the press in the pre-World War II regimes of Hitler and Mussolini
since both are largely of historical interest today. 1
There can be no question but that in the world at large, outside the
Russian Soviet orbit, the authoritarian theorists have had to admit the

IFor a compilation of the laws of the rigidly controlled Italian press of the
Mussolini era, in which the writer emphasizes the "singular imprint and high
political mission" given the press by Fascism, see 13.
The conversion of the German press into an instrument for government
propaganda has been described in 12. The state of the German press, publish-
ing, radio and cinema is described in greater detail in a book-length study of
German propaganda, 23.
30 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

ascendency of libertarian principles. Nevertheless, the libertarian doc-

trines are frequently merely window dressing behind which govern-
ments follow authoritarian practiees. United Nations surveys in which
national governments report on thesituation in their Co—unés indicate
that belief in freedom of expression is so strong apopular----conviction
everywhere that all cou ntries possessing information media claim— to
have afree press. However, freedom of expression in—manation.;has
been shaped to fit apatiern that has very little in common with the
western democratic conc- ept.
The conflict between democratic principles and authoritarian prac-
tices in the world today is described in areport prepared by Salvador
P. Lopez at the request of the,Économic and Social Council of the
United Nations from which the following is quoted:
In a world racked by ideological contention and insurgent national-
ism, there has grown an ever-sharpening struggle for the minds of men.
Highly developed techniques are being employed for the purpose of informa-
tion, propaganda and indoctrination with the result that each is often indis-
tinguishable from the others.
Inevitably in this struggle, the basic human right to freedom of opinion
and expression has become, in many parts of the world, a casualty. This is
true in the authoritarian States, but even in other countries this right is
constantly menaced by the tendency to sacrifice freedom in the ostensible
interest of defending freedom. The result is a complex social and political
problem, marked by continuous interplay between abuse and efforts to correct
abuses, between attempts to restrict freedom and attempts to widen it
(14:15).
The same report contains an appendix prepared by the secretariat
of the International Press Institute (Zurich) which attempts to assess
the extent of libertarian and authoritarian practices in the world
today:
The majority of the 248 editors in 41 countries who answered the ques-
tionnaire added that there was agrowing tendency, in democratic as well as
in non-democratic countries, to restrict the free gathering of the legitimate
news (14 :60).

Freedom of information is being especially threatened today. The ex-

perience of governments during the Second World War when the press had to
accept severe curtailment of its liberty, and the special requirements of
security in the succeeding "cold war" account partly for the tendency towards
Press restriction. The fact that some countries are still technically at war
helps to justify controls not only for themselves but in neighboring countries.
Further, in some cases, quarrels between neighbors, of whom one is totali-
 2Sq-SrD(00
.
THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 31

tarjan and the other democratic, lead to efforts to limit the freedom of
opinion expressed in the latter (14:61).
The Zurich report sets up the following categories:
1. Countries where press control is complete. Examples: Soviet
Union and its satellites, China, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Spain.
2. Countries where political criticism by the press is formally pos-
sible but where censorship operates. Examples: Colombia, Egypt,
Syria.
3. Countries where special press laws or other discriminatory legis-
lation expose editors to arrest and persecution. Examples: Union of
South Africa, Iran, Pakistan, India, Iraq, Lebanon.
4. Countries where unofficial methods discourage press opposition.
Examples: Turkey, Argentina, Indonesia. 2
At ameeting of the International Press Institute in Copenhagen in
May, 1955, it was reported that in the last few years more than one
hundred newspapers including the internationally known La Prensa
have been silenced in Argentina. Many of these journals were closed
on such charges as publishing aphotograph showing crowds in demon-
stration, selling rationed newsprint illegally, and the lack of hygienic
facilities in the plant (27:74).
Another attempt to survey press practices on aregional basis is made
periodically by the Freedom of the Press Committee of the Inter-
American Press Association. The report covering the period October,
1954, to April, 1955, stated: "Six months ago it was reported that
approximately 20% of the inhabitants of the Western hemisphere live
under one or another form of censorship. There has been little im-
provement since then with the sole exception of Nicaragua. Freedom
of the press does not exist or is limited in one way or another in
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Peru
and Venezuela" (2:12).
The American news service, the Associated Press, has for several
years made a semiannual survey of world press conditions gathered
by its correspondents. The survey for the last six months of 1954
reported little change in the status of the press from that reported in
previous surveys. Authoritarian practices were found in some Latin
American countries and in the Middle East. Domestic publications

'It should be pointed out that the above examples were listed on the basis
of data received in 1953. The status of the press in some of the countries listed
may have since changed.
32 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

were reported to be under strict control in Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia,

Iran, Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Communist China maintains
complete internal control of all media. Publishers have been arrested
in Peru; newspapers expropriated in Colombia; reports censored in
Venezuela. After several years of expropriation by the Peron govern-
ment, the famous Argentine newspaper, La Prensa, was restored to
its owners. In Brazil censorship of domestic newspapers was imposed
after the political upheaval in November, 1955 (18:4).
The New York Times commented editorially from a libertarian
point of view on the survey for the first six months of 1954 as follows:
Many Governments still do not dare allow their own people or the world
at large to know what is going on in the territories they control. This is the
gist of the latest Associated Press report on censorship made public yesterday.
The whole truth is not available in Russia, China or any Communist con-
trolled country; nor in Yugoslavia, which has its own anti-Moscow brand
of Communism; nor in other dictator-ruled countries such as Spain, Portu-
gal, and Argentina; nor in Bolivia, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt.
...The reasons for censorship do not change. Censorship is always and
everywhere intended to conceal facts that migla_hurz_Ahose Jn ppwei
(17:10).
As indicated previously, most nations of the world outside the Com-
munist orbit tend under the pressure of world opinion to give at least
lip service to the principles of libertarianism in their official pro-
nouncements on the status of the mass media. One of the few
countries which unequivocally states its authoritarian position is
Portugal. The constitution of Portugal (Article 22) contains the fol-
lowing provision: "Public opinion is a fundamental element of the
politics and administration of the country; it shall be the duty of the
state to protect it against all those agencies which distort it contrary
to truth, justice, good administration and the common welfare." The
constitution of Portugal also provides (Article 23) that since the press
exercises a public function it may not therefore refuse to insert any
official notices of normal dimensions on matters of national importance
sent to it by the government.
A point of view somewhat similar to that of Portugal is expressed
in a provision of the constitution of Ecuador (Article 187) which
asserts that "the primary aimºfjournalism is to deferui the national
ieerests,_and it constitutes a soçjal service worthy of the respect and
_
support of the state."
The Egyptian authorities have also been forthright in their public
 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 33

announcement of their policy toward the press. The following is

quoted from a proclamation issued on January 26, 1952:
In the interests of national security, ageneral censorship is hereby estab-
lished and shall continue to operate until further notice throughout the ter-
ritory and territorial waters of Egypt. The censorship shall be applied to all
written or printed matter, photographs, packets and parcels entering or
leaving or circulating in Egypt; all messages sent by telegraphy or telephony,
whether wireless or otherwise; all news, information or other broadcast mat-
ter; theatrical performances, cinematography films, phonograph records or any
other means of aural or visual reproduction, provided that all matter and
all messages originated by or addressed to the Royal Egyptian Government
shall be exempt from censorship control (26:55-56).
Although both India and Pakistan have adopted constitutional pro-
visions for protecting liberty of expression in the western libertarian
tradition, both countries have found it difficult to avoid authoritarian
practices. They _generglly justify these practices on the basis of na-
tionity. The Supreme Court of India has ruled that the con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of expression permits legislation
requiring the deposit of a security bond from a publisher accused of
circulating objectionable matter. (State of Bihar vs. Shailabala Devi,
Supreme Court of India, May 26, 1952, set out in 26:131-32.) In
Pakistan an act was passed in 1952 "to provide for special measures
to deal with persons acting in a manner prejudicial to the defense,
external affairs and security of Pakistan." The act permits the central
government to expel any foreigner or to impose such restrictions on
nationals as may be specified in the order. Among the powers granted
in the act is one requiring that "all matter or any matter relating to a
particular subject shall before being published be submitted for
scrutiny to an authority specified in the order." The central govern-
ment is also empowered to `Iprohibit for a specified period_tbe pub-
lication of any newspaper, periodical leaflet or other publication."
(Act No. XXV of 1952, quoted in full in 26:212-16.)
A not uncommon practice in some countries professing libertarian
pminciplesist1ie-ciipending of all cnnstitutional protection for c'vil
rights for a specified _pedod. For example, the Legislative Assembly
of El Salvador in adecree of September 26, 1952, suspended for thirty
days the safeguards of Articles 154, 158 (1), 159, and 160 of the
constitution which included freedom of expression and dissemination
of opinion, secrecy of correspondence, and freedom of association and
assembly.
34 FOUR THEMES OF THE PRESS

The development of the motion picture as a medium of entertain-

ment and information has posed some special problems of regulation
and control for both the authoritarian and libertarian states. For
countries operating on authoritarian principles, the problem was
merely to develop machinery and techniques for accomplishing pre-
determined objectives. In libertarian countries, the movies presented
a host of new issues which even today have not been completely
solved. (See Chapter 2, p. 62.)
In practically all countries of the world, the theater has been sub-
jected to official supervision in one form or another. The early motion
picture was so closely associated with the theater both in function
(entertainment) and presentation (in theaters) that governments com-
monly applied the same philosophy and the same regulations to both
forms of presentation. However, several differences soon appeared,
among them the development of educational films, documentaries, and
newsreels; the rise of giant monopolistic film-producing centers, par-
ticularly in the United States; and above all the enhanced effects of
the motion picture on an enlarged and frequently poorly educated
audience.
Under authoritarian principles, the basic problem was not too com-
plex. The motion picture should be treeted exactly like other media of
mass, communication. Like books, magazines, and newspapers, the film
should not interfere with the attainment of the objectives of the state;
if at all possible, it should definitely contribute to the attainment of
those aoals. The only question was how bao accomplish these pur-
pose. Some governments set up an official unit within one of the
ministries, charged with supervising and censoring motion pictures.
Recent information on the methods employed in various foreign
states is difficult to find, but in many countries the official supervisory
body is attached to the Department of Education or is a separate
group composed of members from various divisions of the government. 8
That the motion picture, whether afeature film, adocumentary or
anewsreel, can have apowerful effect on public attitudes and opinions
is unquestioned. Both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy placed strict
embargoes on American films just prior to World War II on the
ground that they were propaganda for the libertarian concept and

'A compilation of methods of regulation employed by foreign governments

was made by John E. Harley in 1940 and published as Chapter V of World-
Wide Influences of the Cinema, Los Angeles, University of Southern California
Press, 1940.
 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 35

for American policy. Hitler, like the Soviet-Russians, took the position
that all art forms should conform to the ideals of the state and should
not in any way detract from or debase these ideals.
The situation is described by John E. Harley, chairman of the
Committee on International Relations of the American Institute of
Cinematography, as follows:
It is a matter of common observation that American films have largely
molded the views and ideas of peoples throughout the world as regards the
United States and its people. This point may be accepted as well founded.
The extreme care exercised by national censors shows how keenly they ap-
preciate the power of the cinema over their people. No thoughtful person
can study the rules of censorship of the various nations without being struck
by the national censorial solicitude for the cultural screen_diet imported from
abroad or made at horrid:May-persons will -d- oubtless smile when they corn-
-
pare the rules of censorship as they exist in various countries (8:2).
Because of the political and cultural influence of the film, many
countries including democracies have attempted to expand national
film production and distribution through both financial aid and pro-
tective measures. Hollywood's dominance of the world film market has
tended to accelerate these efforts. Great Britain, France, Italy, and
Argentina are_exaraples of countries which subsidize the filnLinduary
as amatter of public_policy (19:167-77).
fiiitiin-ritarian- governments- ga-ve_eqmlly definite answers to the
problem gLcontrcilhing_an jegulating the tiewer electronic media of
mass _communicatipp,radio anitelevision broadcasting, Two factors
dictated state policy on these media. First the general principles of
- _
authoritarianism provided a solid basis for regulation. Radio and
television, like the older media, must further the interestern -
_
ment and =is- FREIF
- .to actvartce tile -at-
ilia-1a
—nd political objectives of
_
the central autherity, The second-factor was the nature of the media
as electronic communication All types of broadcasting required the
use of electromagnetic waves, of which the supply was limited. These
channels were the ro erty of the state:_ consequently their use was

Most authoritarian states have established complete state monopolies

of broadcasting. The operation and programming of both radio and
television rest with an official government agency which is respon-
sible for carrying out government objectives. Practically no authori-
tarian state has adopted the British system of apublic corporation or
the American system of privately owned free-enterprise broadcasting.
 36 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

Since broadcastipg of all 1

dnds
1Q.
c.s_iia t_hun
t its signal to the terri-
torial boundaries of a national state,se.veral special problems of
control and regulation arise. First which country gets what part of
the electronic spl5_ni_mi Thiestica has presented international
complications and has resulted in several world conferences on fre-
quency assignments. In most of the world, the internal national use
orthe
-- air waves is _ layiternational agreements which were
itrolled
ntfated under_gIe_ _auspices_ of the IpternationaLlelecommunica z
tions Union. The assignment of specific channels to national govern-
ments is subject to international negotiation and in large part has been
settled on by general agreement. An exception is the use of short-wave
frequencies for international broadcasting, which is still an issue on
which the major countries have hepn_linalilr th wee
A second problem inherent in the nature of broadcasting is the
internal control of signals emanating from outside the national borders
of a state. Books, magazines, newspapers, and films can be stopped at
the border and inspected for objectionable content. Radio meges,
because they ignore national borders, present an irritat_itig_problepa to
m_aty__gp_y_ernments. One solution is to ignore international agreements
anto_tjane_the_yave lengths of neighboring states. Another is to
establish rigid controls over the possession and use of receivingts.
_—

The modern theory of authoritarianism is aptly summed up by the

well-known British writer, Dr. Samuel Johnson, who took part in the
eighteenth-century controversy over the values of authority and
liberty:
Every society has aright to preserve public peace and order, and therefore
has agood right to prohibit the propagation of opinions which have a dan-
gerous tendency. To say the magistrate has this right is using an inadequate
word; it is the society for which the magistrate is agent. Ur may be morally
or theoloicaLJv wrong he
thinks dangerous, but he is politically right ...(1:249).
The danger of ...unbounded liberty and the danger of bounding it have
produced aproblem in the science of government, which human understand-
ing seems hitherto unable to solve. If nothing may be published but what
civil authority shall have previously approved, power must always be the
standa_rci_oLinall.; if every dreamer of innovations may propagate his proj-
ects, there can be no settlement; if every murmur at government may diffuse
 THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 37

discontent, there can be no peace; and if every skeptic in theology may

teach his follies, there can be no religion (11:107-08).
As was stated at the opening of this chapter, large segments of the
globe over extended periods have accepted the basic principles of
authoritarianism as a_guide for social action. These principles have
been particularly pervasive in the control, regulation, and utilization
of the media of mass communication. AncLjthough the theories
themselves have been discarded in most democratic countries, the
practices of authoritarian states have tended to influence democratic
practices. In some instances they have almost forced libertarian goy:
ernmeritl to take countersteps which in some aspects are indistinguish-
able from the totalitarian models.
 THE LIBERTARIAN

THEORY OF

THE PRESS

FRED S. SIEBERT 2

Like other theories of the status and 1jon of the mass media of
communication in society, the libertarian doctrine is adevelopment of
the philosophical principles which provide the basis for the social ni
political structure within which the media operate. Liberalism, as a
social and political system, has a set framework for the institutions
which function within its orbit, and the press, like other institutions,
is conditioned by the principles underlying the society of which it is a
Pab•
For the last century, alarge part of the civilized world has professed
to adhere to the principles of liberalism. Today, except for the coun-
tries under Communist domination, most nations atleast theoretically
have based their social and political organizations on the theories of
liberalism. With such a wide cultural and geogrllial dispersal of
these doctrines, it is not surprising that there should have developed
significant variations in the practical workings of social institutions,
including the mass media of communication. For instance, broadcast-
ing as it operates in the United States may have very little in common
with broadcasting under a libertarian government such as France or
Brazil.
40 FOUR THEMES OF THE PRESS

BASIC POSTULATES

To understand the principles governing the press under democratic

governments, one must understand the basic philosophy of liberalism
as it developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The dem-
ocratic nations of today owe their birth to principles which gradually
evolved from the theoretical explorations of a large number of indi-
vidual thinkers. Those thinkers in turn were directly influenced in their
speculations by the social, political, and economic events of their times.
The principles of libertarian philosophy, as of authoritarianism, are
based on the answers to questions about the nature of man, the nature
of society and man's relation to it, and the nature of knowledge and of
tiIAlthough libertarian phi osop ers may differ widely, they have
a number of common bonds which identify them as belonging to a
general school or system of philosophy.
Man, say the libertarians, is a rational animal and is an end in
himself. The happiness and well-being of the individual is the goal of
society, and man as a thinking organism is capable of organizing the
world around him and of making decisions which will advance his
interests. Although men frequently do not exercise their God-given
powers of reason in solving human problems, in the long run they
tend, by the aggregate of their individual decisions, to advance the
cause of civilization. Man differs from lower animals in his ability to
think, to remember, to utilize his experience, and to arrive at conclu-
sions. Because of this unique ability, man is unique. He is the prime
unit of civilization as well as its mover. The fulfillment of the indi-
vidual therefore becomes the ultimate goal — the goal of man, of
society, and of the state.
Libertarians have given varying accounts of the origin of society, but
all agree that the pHme fu'on of society is to a
ojjJividual members. Many adherents of liberalism cast a nos-
talgic eye at man in a state of nature where he was unencumbered
by much of the paraphernalia of civilization. Although society un-
doubtedly can contribute much to the well-being of man, at the same
time protections should be found against the tendency of society to
take over the major role and become an end in itself. The philosophers
of liberalism emphatically deny that the state is the highest expression
of human endeavor, although they admit with some hesitancy that the
state is a useful and even necessary instrument. The state exists as a
method of providing the individual with a milieu in which he can
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 41

realize his own potentialities. When it fails to further this end_ it

becomes a handicap which should be either abolished or draeically
modified. Liberal phifosopby does not accept the proposition that a
spsiely_be-comes a separate enti_ty of greater importance than the
individuaLnaembers which comprise it.
The libertarian theory of the nature of knowledge and of truth
strongly resembles the theological doctrines of early Christianity. The
power to reason was God-given just as the knowledge of good and
evil was God-given. With such an inheritance from his Maker, man
could achieve an awareness of the world around him through his own
efforts. On this foundation, the libertarians built a superstructure
which differed drastically from that developed by the philosophers of
the Middle Ages. Man's inheritance became less important and his
individual ability to solve the problems of the universe more obvious.
Reason was to act upon the evidence of the senses, not as in earlier
times after all authority had been exhausted, but as the only way_lp
find an authoritative explanation. Truth was something which might
be different from what had previously been taught (as the Reforma-
tioi-7.ii;nrnterled, but it was still adefinite disco_verable entity capable
of demonstration to all thinking men. The conception that there is one
basic unassailable and demonstrable explanation for natural phenom-
ena as developed by mechanistic experimentation and observation be-
came the model upon which libertarian philosophers proceeded to
generalize in all areas of knowledge. Although the path to truth might
lie through a morass of argument and dispute, that which lay at the
end of the path was definite, provable, and acceptable to rational men.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERALISM

The sixteenth century provided the experiences; the seventeenth

century saw the development of the philosophical principles; and the
eighteenth century put these principles into practice. Harold Laski,
whose The Rise of European Liberalism is the foremost history a ‘nd
analysis of western liberalism, has pointed out that social philosophy
is always the offspring of history and is unintelligible save in terms pf
the events from which it arosç. The geographical discoveries of the
sixteenth century provided a new spaciousness for the minds of men.
They were directly responsible for the expansion and consequent pro-
tection of trade and for the destruction of traditional attitudes through
knowledge of foreign peoples and foreign customs.
42 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

Scientific as well as geographical discoveries influenced the minds of

men by emphasizing the rationality of the universe and the possibility
of understanding it through patient analysis. The seventeenth century
was convinced that everything in the universe was controller-
Iby a set
of laws which could be reduced to a strict mathematical formulation.
Newton, Copernicus, Kepler, and Tycho Brahe laid the basis for the
construction of a new mechanistic universe. Progress in the western
sense took on a new significance. This was a new age with new ways
of thinking. Descartes was probably the principal figure in the shift
from the old to the new. By insisting on the supremacy of reason, he
challenged the whole faith of power and authority. Im licit in his
pLillosuphy was the supremacy of a secular as opposed to atheological
conception of the univsme Man was forced to rely on himself ratifer
than on adivine Providence.
_ _ _
Although the Reformation was both a theological and political
dispute, it became the relurtant parent of_ western liberalism. The
Puritans in England, with the Bible as their authority, revolted against
the authority of the church, but they soon discovered that they were
encouraging the habit of individual judgment. And rationalism in
religion inevitably led to sectarianism, to deism, and to secularism.
The Reformation also produced apattern of discussion and argument
which was congenial to the times, and because religion and politics
were so interwoven, this pattern was readily transferred to the purely
secular arena.
Another factor affecting the development of liberalism was the
emergence of the middle class. In most countries of western Europe,
the interests of the developing commercial class demanded an end to
religious disputes. ILaJEL_reAitke_d_Jiniisn_mmarclii,31 powers
..
ancian entesp.rie was
incompatible with medieval notions of status and se_Qt .
Li tr.The free
contract became the basis of the economic liberalism which the age
of 2ec_p_An
- sion demanded. Neither the church nor the state was allowed
to_questien-the-rnotal adequasrcit-en -àTcquisitive sociey_which was
busily enggjplying the wants of men.
Eigrand was the principal sou of political philosophy in the
seventeenth century, acentury which began with the complete ascend-
ency of authoritarian principles and which ended with the triumph of
liberalism. The Revolution of 1688 resulted in the supremacy of
Parliament over the Crown, in the creation of a party system, and
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 43

above all in the justification of the right of revolution. johj1 Locke

was the apologist and theorist for the British developments, and his
political philosophy profoundly affected all subsequent western liber-
tarians. Basing his conclusions on empirical methods, Locke developed
a theory of popular sovereignty, with the center of power in the will
of the people. T,he government was merely the trustee to which the
people had delegated authority and from which they could withaTaw
it. His political ..
existenq_otpo,p ilar rig,his in the fowl of law, the toleration of a
npinifm rnrripatilile with political unity, and an
economic _oJrcjetjiroviding for freedom of individual entetnikinjan
1 eessen of Locke's
He arguesi_that man under theguise of reason_has su,r-
rendered his personal ri hts_to the state in return for ajwarantee that
esate will recognize and maintain his natural rights. He denied the
po•TffiFelr_.1ic
.Jily of church gosernment and argued co ently for
religious toleration, excluding, of course, elements subversive o the
state. The revolutionary aspects of Locke made him esource of inspira-
tion for beth_the American and French revolutions—and much of bis
phraseology found its way into the American_Declaration of Inqe-
pe_ndeiee_mi_ d__I
the French Rights of Man.
The2Eialightennent" of ta"--evurrtrenth and eighteenth centuries
contn tow of
lilertarian4aindpks. Its basic aim was to free man from alLautside
restrictions on his capacity to use his reason for solving religious,
political and social problems. "The basic idea underlying all tenden-
cies of enlightenment was the conviction that human understanding
is capable, by its own power and without recourse to supernatural
assistance, of comprehending the system of the world and that this
of
m,._a_._st_e_ring,it. Enlightenment sought to am n universal recognition for
this ri ci I i the natural and intellectu • sics and
ethigi__jJ_t _tb.e philosophies of religo history, lawi_and politics''
(37:547).

LIBERALISM AND THE PRESS

With this background, we can now discuss the effects of libertarian

philosophy on the status and function of the mass media of communi-
cation. The important contributions of liberalism in this area were
44 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

the insistence on the importance of the individual, the reliance on his

powers of reasoning, and the concept of naiural rights, of which free-
dom of religion, speech and press became a part. The late Professor
Carl Becker has stated the basic assumptions succinctly:
The democratic doctrine of freedom of speech and of the press, whether
we regard it as anatural and inalienable right or not, rests upon certain as-
sumptions.V2tle_ of these is that men desire to know the truth and will be
disposed to be guided by it.lAnather is that the sole method of arriving at
the truth in the long run is by the free competition of opinion in the open
market. it1 is that, since men will invariably differ in their opinions,
each man must be permitted to urge, freely and even strenuously, his own
opinion, provided he accords to others the same right.Vind the final assum,-
gm is that from this mutual toleration and comparison of diverse opinions
the one that seems the most rational will emerge and be generally accepted
(31:33).
The eighteenth century completed the transfer of the press from
authoritarian to libertarian principles. At the opening of the century,
the authoritarian system of press control was dying. The power of the
Crown to regulate the press had been abandoned, the church had been
removed as a regulatory agency, and state monopolies in publishing
had been abolished. By the end of the century, libertarian principles
were enshrined in the fundamental law of the land in constitutional
phrases protecting freedom of speech and of the press. At least three
Englishmen and one American made significant contributions toward
this transition: John Milton in the seventeenth century; John Erskine
and Thomas Jefferson in the eighteenth; and John Stuart Mill in the
nineteenth.
John Milton, in the Areopagitica, published in 1644, wrote a ma-
jestic argument for intellectual freedom in the libertarian tradition.
Although it is not acomprehensive statement of the principles of free-
dom of speech and of the press, it was for its time apowerful argument
against authoritarian controls. Milton was personally irritated by the
Puritan censorship of his own writings and indicted the theory and
practice of licensing. Basic to his argument were the assumptions that
men by exercising reason can distinguish between right and wrong,
good and bad, and that to exercise this talent man should have un-
limited access to the ideas and thoughts of other men. Milton was
confident that Truth was definite and demonstrable and that it had
unique powers of survival when permitted to assert itself in a "free
and open encounter." Out of Milton have developed the contemporary
concet lace oricleas" and the "self-righting
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 45

process": Let all with something to say be free to express themselves.

The true and sound will survive; the false and unsound will be van:
quished. Government should keep out of the battle and not weigh the
odds in favor of one side or the other. And even though the false may
gain a temporary victory, that which is true, by drawing to its defense
additional forces, will through the self-righting process ultimately
survive.
Milton recognized that the right of free discussion might be limited
but he avoided any general principles on which these limitations might
be based. He wanted freedom from government censorship for serious-
minded men who held honest, although differing, opinions. Because
he thought they did not live up to his standards of honesty, he would
deny full freedom to Roman Catholics and to the ephemeral journal-
ists of his day. His powerful appeal for intellectual freedom unfor-
tunately had little effect on his contemporaries, but his work was
revived in the eighteenth century and widely circulated in England
and America.
No comprehensive statement of the problem of the relation of gov-
ernment to the press appeared in print between Milton and John
Stuart Mill. Nevertheless the pressure of practical problems of regu-
lation produced a number of additions to, and elaborations of, the
Miltonian thesis. Such varying personalities as Lord Camden, John
Wilkes, "Junius," and Thomas Paine contributed to both the theory
and the application of the concept "freedom of the press." The most
artirideP of the eighteenth-century group in England was J9lan
Erskine,
_ In his defense of
_- publishers
- accused of violating the law, he
advanced the libertarian principles of freedom of speech and press.
Erskine made_his._position clear in defendiay_line for publishing The
Rights of Man: "The proposition which I mean to mirritain ai the
basis of liberty of the_presu and without whichit _is an empty sound,
is this: that every man, not intending_ to mislead, but seeking to
enlighten others with what his own reason and conscience, however
_ _
erroneously, have dictated to him as truth, may address himself to the
universal reason of the whole nation, either upon subje-cts of goverri-
_
ment in general_ or _upon that of our own partiaar count- ry"
(467414).
John Stuart Mill approached the problem of authority versus liberty
from the viewpoint of a nineteenth-century utilitarian. For Mill,
liberty was the right of the mature individual to think and act as he
46 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

pleases so long as he harms no one else by doing so. All human action,
said Mill; slutifild - aim
— ai creating, maintaining, and increasing the

greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons; for the good
society is one in which the greatest possible number of persons enjoy
the greatest possible amount of happiness. One of the main ways for
society to insure that its members will contribute most to this end is e
by giving them the right to think and act for themselves.
Translating these general ideas on liberty to the specific liberty
of expression, Mill presents four basic propositions. First, if we silen_çe
an opinion, for all we know, we are silencing truth. Secondly, awrong.
opinion may contain a_grain of truth necessary for finding_the whole
truth. Third, even if the commonly accepted opinion is the while
_ _ --
truth, rile public feri-
di to hold it not on rational grounds but as a
prejudice— unless it is forced to defend it. Last, unres-s
-the commonly

held opinion is contested from time to time, it loses its vitalityandit

effect on conduct and character.
Mill's -impha-sis on the importance of the individual's freedom of
expression is expressed in the following well-known quotation from
his work On Liberty:
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were
of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that
one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing
mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the
owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private in-
jury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted on a
few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of
an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the
existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those
who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of
exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a
benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by
its collision with error (52:16).
Thomas Jefferson was both a philosopher and a statesman, a man
of ideas and a man of action, who attempted to put his ideas into
practice. By fusing the two streams of liberalism, the legalism and
traditionalism of England with the more radical rationalism of France,
he hoped to create a government which would provide both security
and opportunity for the individual. Jefferson was firmly convinced
that, although individual citizens may err in exercising their reason,
the majority as a group would inevitably make sound decisions. To
facilitate this process, the individuals in a society should be educated
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 47

and informed; hence Jefferson's interest in the instruments of edu-

cation. For the mature individual, the press was an essential source of
information and guidance, and in order properly to perform its func-
tion in ademocracy, the press should be free from control by the state.
Jefferson concluded that the principal function of government was to
establish and maintain a framework within which the individual
could pursue his own ends. The function of the press was to partici-
pate in the education of the individual and at the same time to guard
against deviations hy_governmPnt irom. its original purposes.
Although Jefferson as a political figure suffered greatly from the
calumnies of the press of his time, he held to his conviction that,
despite its errors and vituperation, the press should be subject to a
minimum of interference by the federal government. In his Second
Inaugural Address, he even proclaimed that a government which
could not stand up under criticism deserved to fall and that the real
strength of the federal government_was its willingness to permit and
its ability to withstand public criticism. Jefferson's conception of the
function
_ of the press is summarized in the following:
No experiment can be more interesting than that we are now trying, and
which we trust will end in establishing the fact, that man may be governed
by reason and truth. Our first object should therefore be, to leave open to
him all the avenues to truth. The most effectual hitherto found, is the free-
dom of the press. It is therefore the first shut up by those who fear the in-
vestigation of their actions. The firmness with which the people have with-
stood the late abuses of the press, the discernment they have manifested be-
tween truth and falsehood, show that they may safely be trusted to hear
everything true and false, and to form a correct judgment between them. I
hold it, therefore, to be certain, that to open the doors of truth, and to fortify
the habit of testing everything by reason, are the most effectual manacles we
can rivet on the hands of our successors to prevent their manacling the
people with their own consent (48:32-34).
The transfer of the mass media from authoritarian to libertarian
principles in England and America was not accomplished overnight
but over several centuries. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 made
no mention of the press. However, press freedom was implicit in the
recognition of the insistent demand for the protection of the individual
from arbitrary power. The main battle to establish freedom for the
mass media was fought in the eighteenth century, and in the vanguard
of that fight were the printers and publishers of newspapers. With
the abolition of the licensing system in 1694, the press found itself
subjected to prosecutions for sedition as well as to more indirect
48 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

restrictions, such as special taxation, subsidization, and regulations

against access to proceedings of Parliament. One by one these obstruc-
tions were demolished but not without extended arguments and, on
occasions, violent opposition by government officials and their sup-
porters.
There, were tw.o.inairi struggles in the eighteenth centu_g_jt_k_gtablish
libertarian principles as they affected the press. One was concerned
with seditious libel; the other dealt with the right of the press to pub-
lish the proceedings of government. As was pointed out inpr 1,
p, 23, the government both in England and in the American colonies
sought to control open criticism of its activities___1?_y_L:trosecutions for
seditious libel. The judges, appointed by the Crown, were often
sympathetic with the government's attempt to restrain the press from
disturbing the public. During the eighteenth century, the courts
adhered to the principle that published material attacking government
policies or personnel tended to undane the state and therefore was
illegal. Under the -Eriglistem orjürisprudence, the question of
whe-ther or not the published words were dangerous or "seditious" was
obvious from a mere reading of them and therefore could be deter-
mined by the judge. The question of whether or not the words were
published by the individual brought -before the bar was one of fact
which could be determined by ajury Early in the eighteenth century,
juries in England and Americi.-began to rebel agifnst this division of
function. Goaded by both publishers and libertarian political leaders,
the refu e to brin in convictions. Fox's Libel Act settled the dispute
in 1792 by giving the jury the right to determine eharmful tendency
of the published material.
A related problem and one which raised more serious questions was
whether or not the publisher could justify publishingmittedly harm-
ful words on the &round that they constituted a true and accurate
account. Throughout the eighteenth century,- furists contended that
words which injured the government were punishable whether true
orialse. Libertarian_principles finally triumphed with the establish-
ment of truth as adefense in America by constitutional provisions and
in England by a Parliamentary Act (1843).
Another arena in which libertarian principles battled for ascendency
was Parliament, which for centuries had excluded strangers and had
prohibited written notes for fear that the public might intrude on the
discussions. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, afinal skirmish
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 49

resulted in atriumph for democracy. The newspapers of the time con-

tended that since Parliament represented the interests of the people
its debates should be open to the public. The press as amedium for
reaching the public therefore had aright as well as a duty to inform
the public of what took place in Parliament; consequently Parliament
had no right to place restrictions on the exercise of this functio —n.

Traditional British officialdom rose up in horror at this contention,

but in aseries of skirmishes the press emerged the winner.
—
The contest for recognitionA libertarian doctrines as—they affected
the press culminated in the formulization and adoption of Bills of
Rights which included provisions establishing press freedom. This
freedom was coupled in many statements with freedom of speech and
of religion. Statements on freedom of the press in the early American
Bills of Rights preceded provisions on both speech and religion, and
in most early discussions were less controversial than the question of
religion. In aperiod covering not more than twenty years, protections
for freedom of the press were incorporated into most of the American
state constitutions and into the federal constitution.
The wording in the Bills of Rights of the right to freedom of the
press was necessarily vague and subject to varying interpretations. On
only one point were all interpretations agreed — that freedom of the
press was not absolute but was subject to limitations. The problem of
what limitations could properly be imposed on the press became the
mafoi:issue under liberalism,
Eighteenth-century En lish 'mists made the first attempt to define
the limits of freedom ol the press. Two eminent English judges, ters_l_
Mansfield and Chief Justice Blackstone, advanced an interpretation
based on conservative British tradition. Both asserted the superiority
of law as defined by the courts and Parliament over the concept of
freedom of the press. Both considered censorship in the form of
licensing to be illegal. Beyond that they refused to go, contending that
control of the abuses of the press was a proper function of law.
Mackstone's statement, widely circulated in the American states,
summarizes the eighteenth-century legalistic position:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state,
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not
in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every free
man has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the
public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he pub-
lishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the conse-
50 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

quences of his own temerity ...thus the will of individuals is still left free;
the abuse only of that free-will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is
any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry; liberty of
private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad
sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which society
corrects (34:1326-27).
>h. Erskine and Jefferson contended for a broader interpreta-
tion of the constitutional protection of the press from government
control than either Mansfield or Blackstone was willing to accept. The
Erskine thesis was that even though the matter published was errone-
ous and even though it might adversely affect the interests of the state,
no penalties should be placed on the publisher who was honest and
sincere in his purposes and intent. Jefferson argued that while the
press should be subject to punishment for damages to individuals it
should not be heId liable for injuries to the reputation of the govern-
ment. Defining the _pro_per limitations on the freedom of the media
is the most disturbing_pfoblern— tacinj the supporter of libertarian
principles. Even today, as we shall see later in this chapter, no agree-
ment has been reached in democratic circles on the proper sphere of
government control and regulation of the various types of mass media.

STATUS AND FUNCTION OF THE MASS MEDIA IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

With that background to help us understand libertarian concepts,

we can now examine the status and function of the mass media of
communication in democratic societies. In societies based on libertar-
ian principles the status of the press becomes aproblem of adjustment
to democratic political institutions and to the democratic way of life.
Government in 4 democracy is the servant of the people. As such it
occupies a much different relationship to its adherents than does the
authoritarian .government. Yet even though the government is sub-
servient to and responsible to the public at large, it is not thoroughly
trusted to identify its ends with the ends of its citizens. Innumerable
devices have been invented in democratic countries to keep govern-
ments from reverting to authoritarian practices as well as from
subverting the "unalienable rights" of its individual citizens.
The basis for a libertarian press system was developed by Milton
and Locke in the seventeenth century, as already described; the details
were worked out and put into practice in the eighteenth century; and
the system spread throughout the world when liberalism was at its
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 51

zenith, in the nineteenth century. Practically all democratic countries

in the world adopted the libertarian theories and embodied them in
their constitutions or fundamental laws.
Under the libertarian concept. the functions of the mass media of
communication are to inform and to entertain. A third function was
developed as a necessary correlate to the others to provide a basis of
economic support and thus to assure financial independence. This was
the sales or advertising function. Basically the underlying purpose of
the media was to help discover truth, to assist in the process of solving
political and social problems by presenting all manner of evidence and
opinion as the basis for decisions. The essential characteristic of this
process was its freedom from government controls or domination. The
government together with its officials was frequently a party with a
direct interest in the outcome of a dispute. Therefore, it should not
have the additional advantage of exclusive access to the public which
ultimately made the decisions. Neither should it have the right or the
power to interfere with the presentation of arguments from the oppo-
sition. Thus there developed arefinement of the function of the press
as apolitical institution. It was charged with the duty of keeping gov-
ernment from overstepping its bounds. In the words of Jefferson, it was
to provide that check on government which no other institution
could provide.
Libertarian theorists assumed that out of amultiplicity of voices of
the press, some information reaching the public would be false and
some opinions unsound. Nevertheless, the state did not have the right
to restrict that which it considered false and unsound. If it did, it
would inevitably tend to suppress that which was critical of the state
or which was contrary to the opinions of government officials. The
alternative procedure, as espoused by the libertarians, was to let the
public at large be subjected tp abarrage of information and opinion,
some of it possibly true, some of it possibly false, and some of it con-
taining elements of both. Ultimately the public could be trusted to
digest _the_whok to discard that not in the public intere-st -arid' to
accept that which served the needs of the individual and of the soçiety
of which he_is awt. This was the well-known "self-righting" proces5.
The libertarians also assumed that in a democratic society there
would be amultiplicity of voices available to, if not actually reaching,
the public. Let every man who has something to say on public issues
express himself regardless of whether what he has to say is true or
52 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

false, and let the public ultimately decide. At no time in history was
this assumption completely in accord with the facts. Some men had
superior abilities for verbal expression; some men had the interest,
energy and drive to express themselves; and some had more direct
access to public audiences than others. But theoretically all had the
same opportunity if not the same ability or the same means of access.
The libertarians opposed government monopolies of the avenues of
communication. They argued that anyone, citizen or alien, who had
the inclination should have the unrestricted opportunity to own and
operate a unit of mass communication. The field was op ep_ts_lal. It
was also assumed that the masjdip
society
_ in which_ free enterprise191_1_eleng_prirle. TILLurl_eant
that the in-trumrnts of_conununication would be privately owned and
would compete in an open market. Anyone with sufficient capital could
start a communication enterprise, and his success or failure would
depend upon his ability to produce a profit. Profit, in fact, depended
upon his ability to satisfy his customers. In the end, the success of the
enterprise would be determined by the public which it sought to serve.
The problem of the economic support of the mass media was never
squarely faced by libertarian theorists. They were opposed to govern-
ment support since it led to domination, and they trusted the capitalist
system of private enterprise to find a way. The different media have
in the course of history developed different methods of support. The
early printed media, especially books, relied almost solely on direct
sales of the product to customers. The purchaser provided the eco-
nomic base. This practice has continued in the book and motion
picture industries. The early_newspapers and mageplles_soon dis-
covered a lucrative source of revenue from the sale of "notices" or
advertisemadditional function for the
press, to stimulate consumption and sell products. The growth of
advertising as an important source of economic support for the press
was particularly noticeable in Great Britain and in America, and in
these countries newspapers and magazines were most free from gov-
ernment domination. Other areas of the globe which were less
advanced industrially and in which consumer goods were less widely
distributed faced greater difficulties in developing advertising revenues.
Cultural differences also played apart in expanding the sales function
of the mass media. As a result, economic support in some countries
was primarily derived from direct sales to the consumer or in some
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 53

instances from subsidies supplied by outside interests. The economic

support of contemporary media is discussed later in this chapter; but it
may be said here that under libertarian theories anyone with eco-
nomic means can enter the communications field, and his survival
depends on his ability to satisfy the needs and wants of his consumers
in the face of competition from other units seeking the same market.
What, then, are the principal controls operating on the mass media
in a democratic society? Despite all that has been said, the state
through its various instrumentalities cannot avoid taking some part in
the communications process. Libertarians recognize this fact, but they
contend that the less government becomes involved the better. Thus is
raised the perennial problem of the extent to which government should
be allowed to participate. The state generally operates the_postal
system through which some of the media are distributed. In many
countries the state also operates the telephone and telegraph_systems
through which it 112‘_ the opportunity nf mposing regulations. The
state ccampoets--and--e es
taxes. Through
_ any of these instruments,...tlmstate_could-impese-special
restrictions on the mass media.
Inmost_clemocratic societies, the chief instrument of control is the
judicial system. In the United-States the courts are paramount since
the not offly apply the law — o
-fthe land to the press but also determine

when the other branches of government are overstepping their author-

ity in imposinz restrictions which might contravene constitutional
-
protections. In the last analysis, under our constitutional system the
courts determine the limits to which government may go in exercising
the authority over the mass media. In other democratic countries,
-
tradition or the legislature performs this function.
-In the place of state supervision, libertarian theory provides for a
more informal type of control through the self-righting process and
through the free competition in the market _place of information,
opinion& and_ entertainment. The principal function of the state is to
maintain astable framework within which the free forces of individ-
ualism may interact. At times this interaction may be chaotic and the
results unproductive. Nevertheless, in the long run this process is to be
preferred to authoritarian direction.
The most persistent problem facing democratic societies is determin-
ing proper limitations to freedom of expression in the mass media. As
has been indicated, all libertarian philosophers agree that freedom of
54 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

expression is not absolute but limited. What restrictions, then, can be

imposed within the framework of democracy without violating liberal
doctrines? Unfortunately, no general principles have been developed
to assist in solving the problem. The only guide is the historical
acceptance of specific limitations without the assistance of a unifying
concept.
Professor Zechariah Chafee has listed some of the methods which
have been used to control or suppress the mass media: the require-
ment that books or other publications be licensed in advance, censor-
ship of offending material before publication or while publication is
under way, seizure of offending material, injunctions against the pub-
lication of a newspaper or book or of specified matter therein, surety
bonds against libels or other offending publications, compulsory dis-
closure of ownership and authorship, postpublication criminal penal-
ties for objectionable matter, postpublication collection of damages in a
civil action, postpublication correction of libels and other misstate-
ments, discrimination in access to news sources and facilities, special
prohibitions and restrictions on the foreign language press, discrimina-
tion and denial in the use of communications facilities for distribution,
interference with importation, copyright protection or the denial
thereof, taxes, discriminatory subsidies, interference with buying,
reading, or listening (40:62-68).
Several_types_of_limitations on the freedom of tte_p_rm_have been
universally accepted_ as .being_ consistent with libert2ri2n principles.
All_democratiEgovernments
- recogpize the duty_of the state to protect
the rep-utations of individuals, Some states _perform. this duty_ more
uosl than others, but all recognize the need to restrict the rags
--

media from injuring members of society by defamation. Protection for

t e individual is usually provided by law and administered by the
courts. Innumerable subtleties have engrafted themselves onto the law
of defamation and have resulted, in many instances, in enforcement
difficulties. Cultural differences may also affect the operation of the
law of defamation by placing reliance within aparticular culture on
substitute methods of protecting individual reputations. A particularly
difficult problem arises when damaging words are applied to an in-
dividual who is also a public official. Under libertarian doctrines, as
an individual he should be protected but as apublic official he should
be open to public criticism. Here again several unworkable distinctions
were attempted by the early nineteenth-century courts. The end re-
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 55

suit is that in the United States both public officers and candidates
for public office find little protection in the law of defamation.
Another commonly accepted restraint on the press is the prohibi-
tion against the dissemination of obscene and indecent materials. No
sound basic principles have been developed to support the laws
against obscenity other than that such restraints are necessary to pro-
tect morality. Mprality itself is difficult to define, and bath courts and
legislatures have struggled for several centuries to _arrive at an accept:.
able definition of obscenity. The definition of obscenity has usually
been determined by an aggressive minority or by some judge's esti-
mate of the current state of morality. Although some libertarians
argue against all types of control based on obscenity, the majority
agree that the state has an obligation to protect society, or at least
some parts of it, from lewd and indecent publications.
More than two centuries of argument have been devoted to the right
of itr_s_1ª.1e_tt_protect itself against the dissemination of information
and opinion which might disparage it or undermine it among its
aairents. The authoritarians gave a direct and unequivocal answer
to the problem (Chapter 1, p. 22), but for the libertarians the solution
is not so simple. As noted in the previous chapter, the authoritarians
recognized the right of the state to protect its reputation, just as the
libertarians
__ _conceded the right of the individual to his protection
from defamatory_publications..
Although the common law of England provided abasis for punish-
ing reflections on the government, this law was never congenial to the
American temperament. American independence was accomplished
with the aid of both reasoned and vituperative attacks on the British
colonial authorities in which many prominent Americans took part.
These same Americans, when they framed agovernment of their own,
were predisposed to recognize the value of uninhibited criticism of
public officials and public affairs. The revolutionists generally under-
stood that the old law of seditious libel was no longer in effect in the
new republic. However, as the leaders settled down to the difficult
day-by-day operation of agovernment covering a wide geographical
territory and dispersed population, the task of maintaining authority
made officials inclined to revert to traditional attitudes and practices.
Many of the newly established state governments revived the com-
mon law of seditious libel, particularly during the tense partisanship
of political campaigns. Because of its federal nature, the national
56 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

government was unable to apply the English criminal law. Therefore

it turned to legislation for its protection in times of stress and insecu-
rity. The Alien and Sedition Law of 1798 was an attempt to give the
government the power to protect itself from unwarranted criticism. The
administration of th) y the Federalists for partisan political pirr-
poses conflicted with the deep-seated democratic principles of the
American public. As aresult, no further attempts were made in this
direction throughout the nineteenth century. The individual states
gradually abandoned the English doctrine of seditious libel, and by the
time Jacksonian democracy took over, the law was obsolete.
The characteristic of the libertarian concept of the film-lion of the
press in society which distinguishes it from the other theories dis-
cussed in this volumej the.iight and duty of the press to serveas an
extralegal check on government. The press was to keep officers of the
state from abusing or - excieling their authority. It was to be the
watchdog over the workings of democracy, ever vigilant to spot and
expose any arbitrary or authoritarian practice. And to fulfill this
function adequately, the press had to be completely free from control
or domination by those elements which it was to guard against. Be-
cause liberalism was forced to struggle for several centuries against
authoritarianism, it considered the established government its greatest
enemy. Governmental authority, however, could be made to serve
the interests of liberalism if strong and effective checks on its use
could be found. The press was an instrument which, together with
other safeguards, could fulfill this function. Under traditional authori-
tarianism as well as under the Russian-Soviet Communist system, the
interests of the people were theoretically identified with the interests
of the state. Therefore what liberals called a "check on government"
was to the authoritarians merely an attempt to impede or interfere
with the accomplishment of the objectives of the state.
Although the founders of the American system of government held
the political function oriFe— pre-ss to be param-- ount, other activities
important to the adequate functioning of a democratic society were
also assigned to the mass media. The media were envisaged as the
principal instruments for adult education. They were to be the ave-
nues by which the general public received information and discussion
on matters of public importance. The federal postal system was no
sooner set up than reduced rates were authorized to encourage the
growth of newspapers and periodicals. The success of democracy was
posited upon an intelligent and informed electorate, and the mass
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 57

media along with public schools were charged with providing_the

public with educational materials. The media were to contribute to
the development of arts and sciences, to the elevation of public tastes,
and to improvements in the practical business of daily living. The
authoritarians did not disagree with assigning educational functions
to the press, since under their system both educational institutions and
the mass media were to be guided by the same principle — the ac-
complishment of the objectives of the state.

THE PRESS IN MODERN LIBERTARIAN THEORY

We now turn from the theory behind the functioning of the pres:
under libertarian principles to a discussion of the operation of tilt
mass media in contemporary society. Great Britain, the United States,
and some of the British Dominions follow acommon pattern in what
has been described as the Anglo-American tradition. A number of the
younger democratic countries have tried to imitate or transplant this
tradition with varying degrees of success, and their failures and ac-
complishments will be discussed later in this chapter. Let us look at
the operation of the mass media in the United States.
The twentieth century has been faced with the problem of applying
the libertarian theory to contemporary problems of the mass media.
Whatever contribution has been made has grown out of experiences in
two world wars and out of the development and expansion of the new
media of communication such as motion pictures and broadcasting.
During the two world wars, the immediate problem was to establish
principles governing the dissemination of expressions which might in-
terfere with the immediate objective of the government — winning the
war. Pure libertarian doctrine made no provision for the cataclysmic
effects of a world-wide war or, for that matter, a local war. In a
vague way, libertarians had granted that agovernment had the right
to protect itself from destruction under special circumstances, but
they had made no reasoned analysis of how far astate might go in cur-
tailing liberty of expression in wartime. During World War I, the
government set up a system for censoring outgoing and incoming
messages, but it made no attempt to muzzle the mass media within
the territorial boundaries of the United States. A system of voluntary
censorship was put into operation with the cooperation of the mass
media, principally the newspapers and magazines. The same system
with improved procedures was adopted during World War II, this
time including radio.
58 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

An important contribution growing out of wartime experiences

was the attempt by the Supreme Court of the United States to define
the limits of free discussion in a democracy. Members of the court
recognized that under special conditions such as a major war the
traditional freedoms of the individual must yield to the immediate ob-
jective. The problem was to find a formula that would preserve as
much of the libertarian concept of freedom as possible while permit-
ting the state to carry out its program without undue interference or
obstruction. Authoritarian governments were, of course, unconcerned
about this problem, but for libertarian governments it was a
serious and confusing issue. During the Supieme Court took
the position that if there was are.ason ,h1p tzd çyfoi to
obstruct the war effort, such discussion could be declared amile and
its participants punished. Liberal thinkers and legal scholars rushed
to criticize the court for departing from traditional libertarian prin-
ciples, and shortly after the war the court changed its mind by
adopting the formula originally proposed by Justices Brandeis and
Holmes. Justice Holmes introduced the formula in the Schenck case
in these words: "The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create aclear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has aright to prevent. It is aquestion of
proximity and degree" (57:52).
This formula has become known as the clear and present danger test.
Both IL:limes_ and Brandeic reengnize.d_thc need for some restric-
tion on freedom of _speech and press during national emergencies.
Their formula was an attempt to provide a principle which would
determine the bounds of free discussion on one hand and the restric-
toiw__ers_oLgay.ranme
— nt on the other. They rejected the "reasonable
tendency" test in favor of one which would allow awider latitude of
freedom. They granted the government the right to punish anyone
who exceeded the bounds of freedom, and they set those bounds to
cover as wide an area as possible. Their solution was to restrict gov-
ernment interference with freedom of exprssion except under cir-
cumstances where there was an urgent danger to the objectives of the
state. And not only must the danger be urgent but the possibility
that the discussion might adversely affect the objectives of the state
must be immediate. The "clear and present danger test" became the
basis for determining the validity of most attempts to curtail freedom
of speech and of the press since World War I.
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 59

AI I1
sistent_withJilrt.aran rinci 1 .He argues that discussion by mem-
rs of the public should have the same immunity from government
interference as that of members of the legislature who in their de-
bates are not subject to a "clear and present danger test." He also
attempts to differentiate between the "liberty" of the First Amend-
ment and the "liberty" of the Fifth Amendment. The liberty of the
First Amendment, he argues, is a public right (by which he appar-
ently means one enforceable by the public) which is unabridgable.
The liberty of the Fifth Amendment is a private right (one enforce-
able by the individual) which can be limited by government under
"due process" (51:35-41). 4
The Supreme Court of the United States has also approved legis-
lative proposals to penalize discussions advocating the overthrow of
the democratic system of government by force and violence. The
problem under libertarian governments was to draw the line between
discussions of the relative merits of the Communist and capitalist
systems and agitation or advocacy which sought to supplant the exist-
ing state by revolutionary methods. The phrase "by force and vio-
lence" has been introduced into restrictive legislation by both the
federal government and many of the states. This legislation has been
used to silence some of the Communist Party officials, but it has not
been employed to suppress Communist Party organs such as the
Daily Worker. This type of statute when coupled with the "clear and
present danger test" has been accepted by the Supreme Court as a
constitutional method of dealing with persons who seek to overthrow
the democratic capitalist system. However, libertarians are concerned
over the problem of preserving free discussion under traditional prin-
ciples when fear and hysteria may affect the climate of public opinion.
The Supreme Court, particularly when Charles Evans Hughes was
Chief Justice, followed basic libertarian principles in a number of
decisions affecting the freedom of the mass media. Among the restric-
tions it declared unconstitutional were the Minnesota injunction
against the further publication of a political scandal-sheet (283 U.S.
697, 1931) and a Louisiana tax on the gross receipts of large news-
papers which opposed the Huey Long regime (297 U.S. 233, 1936).
Subsequently the Supreme Court has restricted the powers of inferior
courts to punish newspapers for contempt of court for publications

The clear and present danger test is also discussed and criticized in a series
of articles by Chester J. Anticau in 29 and 30.
60 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

which might interfere with the administration of justice (314 U.S.

252, 1941), and it has struck down legislative attempts to limit the
circulation of publications devoted to "crime and bloodshed" (335
U.S. 507, 1948). The unique function of the Supreme Court under the
American system is to evaluate all types of limitations on freedom of
speech and of the press which emanate from government sources.
Practically no other democratic government seems to have adopted
this device for protecting the mass media from the encroachments
by government.
The printed media, being the first on the scene, have been most
active in the struggle to establish libertarian principles of freedom.
Newspapers, particularly, led in the battle against attempts by the
state to reduce their status and limit their functions. With the estab-
lishment of a theoretical basis for the modern concept of freedom of
expression, the press developed what has been called
objective reporting" to fulfill its function as an information medium.
This theory, which originated some time in the nineteenth century,
was widely acclaimed in the United States and Great Britain as a
unique contribution to journalism during the first quarter of the
twentieth century. Its origin in America may be traced to the growth
of cooperative news-gathering associations which furnished the local
newspaper with information from state, national, and international
sources. Most newspapers were then violently partisan, and they re-
sented attempts to induce them to publish materials favorable to, or
slanted in the direction of, the opposition party. The alternative was
to eliminate as far as possible all political bias in the news. The news
agencies instructed reporters and writers to remember that their writ-
ings were being distributed to both Democratic and Republican clients
and had to be acceptable to both. Writers became adept at construct-
ing nonpartisan accounts, and from this practice grew the concept of
objective reporting which has permeated American journalism to the
present.
The spread of objective reporting throughout American journalism
was accelerated by the decline in political partisanship in the press
and by the change of the newspaper from opinion journal to news
medium. The_growth of advertising and the drive to increase c_ii_•cu-
lations also contributed to the general acceptance of the kleall of
objectivity. Newspaper reporters thought that their job requireçl an
utjtude
. ind_alocifness They became spectators rather than participants
jn the controversies of the day. They carefully avoided any appear-
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 61

ance a partisanship or evaluation. News was araw account; opinions

were_to he sharply_ separated from it and in most American news-
papers relegated to the editorial page. The theory of objective re-
porting became a matter of professional pride among American jour-
nalists, who held that reporting the "facts of the day" was their only
duty. In many countries professing libertarian principles, the theory
failed to find general acceptance, and in countries where the press
was tied to political parties the ideal of objectivity failed to flourish.
In recent years objective reporting has been severely criticized on the
ground that it neglects to tell the whole truth and that it fails to
give the reader a sufficient basis for evaluating the news in terms of
social goals. These criticisms are discussed more fully in the succeed-
ing chapter on the social responsibility theory of the press.
Another problem of journalism which involves libertarian concepts
and which_ the press has avidly_pursued in recent years is the right
of access to government sources of information. The contest to report
the debates of the British Parliament was discussed earlier in— ihis
ciapter (p. 48). The early American constitutional conventions were
closed to both public and reporters. As the nineteenth century ad-
vanced, the press was able to point out the logical necessity under
democratic theory of a complete report of governmental activities to
the public. Although logical theory supported the news media, the
practical problem of implementing the theory presented obstacles.
The task of telling the public what government at all levels was doing
was not too difficult in the early years of the present century. Gov-
ernment was conducted by a relatively small number of officials, and
its activities were principally legislative or judicial. However, during
the second quarter of this century, atremendous expansion took place
both in the activities of government and in the number of its person-
nel. This was particularly true in the administrative area. Practically
no aspect of life today is exempt from government participation at
either the national, state, or local level, and the pervasiveness of this
participation has intensified the problem of reporting the contempo-
rary scene to the American public.
Such reporting is particularly difficult at the national level, where
government activities have expanded at an impressive rate. The tradi-
tion of secrecy derived from authoritarian precedents has always been
most pronounced in the area of foreign affairs, which are normally
under the jurisdiction of national governments. Although reporters
and correspondents have been permitted to attend the sessions of
62 FOUR THEMES OF THE PRESS

legislative bodies for generations, they do not have the same degree of
access to administrative officers or groups. News representatives have
seldom been allowed to sit in on diplomatic sessions.
Unfortunately no general principles have been developed to indicate
when and where the public has a legitimate interest in public affairs,
and consequently newsmen have had very little guidance. Since the
Department of State or the Foreign Office could refuse to reveal its
activities, why could not other offices of the government? And if the
federal government could refuse access to information, why could not
the state and local governments? Libertarian theory assumed that
the government's business was the public's business. Yet impressive
arguments can be advanced for denying the public or its representa-
tives access to some government proceedings or records.
Since World War II the problem of restricting information which
might affect the military security of the nation has been exceedingly
troublesome both to government officials and representatives of the
press. What types of information should be classified and by whom
continues to be debated. And what check can be placed on the classi-
fiers to see that they are not overzealous in carrying out their func-
tions? The problem becomes particularly acute when decisions are
made on withholding scientific information which might possibly be
useful to apotential enemy. Also, many government activities impinge
upon the privacy of the individual. Does the public at large have

(
the right to know how much income tax an individual citizen pays?
Do newsmen have the right to sit in on conferences in the state de-
partment or committees of Congress? Should they be permitted to
attend the meetings of the local county board or the board of
education?
Libertarian theory has not been able as yet to answer these per-
plexing questions. The mass media through their professional organ-
izations have contended that all government business should be open
to them and that they as purveyors of information to the public have
both the obligation and the right to gather and transmit news about
government activities at all levels.

MOTION PICTURES IN CURRENT LIBERTARIANISM

The newer media, including motion pictures and the various forms
of broadcasting, have forced the libertarian theorist to face a host
of novel and complex problems. The original democratic solutions to
the problem of the function of the mass media were based largely
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 63

on the political contributions of the printed media. When entertain-

ment was added to the political function and when methods of reach-
ing a mass audience other than through the printed word were de-
veloped, libertarian theory was confronted with the need for
adjustment.
The motion picture as amass medium is aproduct of the twentieth
century. Because of its similarities and association with the legitimate
theater, its place in the social structure has followed that which had
been assigned to the stage. Authoritarian theory had assumed that the
state had complete control of the theater. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century governments established the right, if not always the practice,
of strictly regulating entertainment on political and religious as well
as on moral grounds. (See 45.) The Protestant Reformation produced
no great and persuasive argument for freedom of the theater as it
did in John Milton's plea for freedom of the press. Consequently,
libertarian theory either ignored the problem or, because of its non-
political characteristics, assumed that it was unimportant. The advent
of the motion picture with its ability to reach vast audiences and to
produce profound effects on these audiences has forced a re-
examination of the bases of libertarian theory. Theaters had been
licensed and plays censored for generations; motion pictures were
merely an extension of the theater and therefore subject to licensing
and censorship by the authorities. This reasoning was applied to the
early attempts to establish official censorship boards and received the
approval of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1915. 5
Since World War I, the motion picture has clearly shared the func-
tion of furnishing information and opinion as well as entertainment
on which citizens build their attitudes and convictions and upon
which, in part, they base their behavior. The newsreel is an informa-
tional medium. Documentary films, now produced in considerable
volume, perform both informational and educational functions. The
analogy with the theater has decreased and the similarities with the
press have increased as the motion picture has expanded its news and
opinion offerings. Unlike the newspaper, the motion picture industry
has not battled vigorously for its rights — at least not until recently.
Producers cooperated with both official and unofficial regulatory
agencies. The industry as awhole tried to regulate its more recalci-
trant members through avoluntary Production Code under the aus-
'The most comprehensive account of the problems of the motion picture
industry is that contained in Freedom of the Movies, by Ruth A. Inglis (47).
 64 FOUR THEMES OF THE PRESS

pices of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America.

Why should the motion picture be subject to licensing and censor-
ship while the printed media are free from these restrictions? This
was the question which faced the government and libertarian theo-
rists. Granted that the movies were primarily entertainment, granted
that they reached a relatively youthful segment of the population,
granted that they were capable of debasing moral standards, never-
theless were they not an important institution in democratic society
and should they not also be tested on the basis of libertarian princi-
ples? As Miss Inglis has pointed out: "The problem as regards the
movies is only an individual instance of the general question which
has puzzled philosophers and statesmen for centuries: How can the
public will prevail and order be maintained and, at the same time,
dissident minorities have their proper influence for change? The prob-
lem is one of devising social mechanisms for achieving these results"
(47:173).
The Commission on Freedom of the Press, headed by Robert M.
Hutchins, after a careful and considered study of the problem of the
motion picture in a democratic society, made the following rec-
ommendation: "The constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press
should be recognized as including motion pictures. The growing im-
portance of the documentary film gives fresh emphasis to the need"
(47:vi).
But giving the motion picture status under the constitutional guar-
antees does not finally solve the problem. Even if one accepts the
proposition that the movies should enjoy the traditional libertarian
freedoms, the question remains as to what if any regulations can be
imposed upon the medium. The Supreme Court of the United States
took asignificant step in answering this question by eliminating some
of the more objectionable standards under which official motion pic-
ture censors operate on the ground that they were too vague for satis-
factory administration (36). In the United States at least, the motion
picture is rapidly being accepted as a medium worthy of being en-
compassed by the traditional libertarian concept of freedom of ex-
pression, and progress is being made toward achieving this end.

BROADCASTING IN LIBERTARIAN THEORY

Broadcasting, including both radio and television, is the youngest

of the mass media of communication and has presented libertarian
theory with many perplexing problems. In its early phases, the trans-
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 65

mission of messages by radio resembled in many respects the telephone

and telegraph systems. These latter were generally considered to be
outside the sphere of mass communications since they were merely
point-to-point transmission systems which took no account of the
character of the messages which they transmitted. The telephone and
telegraph were by nature monopolistic and consequently subject to
government regulation as common carriers. Libertarian doctrines
accepted governmental regulation or operation of these transmission
monopolies "in the public interest." When point-to-point radio ar-
rived, it was automatically endowed with the characteristics of a
common carrier and subjected to the same type of control.
Broadcasting, however, was something different from the mere
transmission of messages by radio. Here, in fact, was a new mass
medium capable of reaching a vast audience simultaneously. It was
concerned not only with the transmission of messages but with the
content of those messages. To this extent it resembled newspapers,
magazines, and motion pictures. On the other hand, it utilized electro-
magnetic waves, of which there is a limited supply. Obviously not
everyone could establish a radio broadcasting station without pro-
ducing complete chaos on the air waves. Regulation was necessary if
only for the allocation of frequencies.
Libertarian societies have solved the problem of broadcasting in
various ways. Some like France have established government-owned
and -operated monopolies following the precedent of telephone and
telegraph carriers. Others have adopted the British model, which is
based on a public corporation only indirectly responsible to the gov-
ernment in power. In the United States, the solution has been a sys-
tem of private ownership under allocation and regulation by afederal
commission created by the Congress. Canada has attempted to oper-
ate a dual system under which a public corporation operates the na-
tional stations and private enterprise the local stations.
Although the American system of broadcasting is more consistent
with libertarian principles than the others, it faces the problem of
adjusting traditional doctrines of freedom with the physical facts of
broadcasting. A government agency is a necessary and obvious solu-
tion to the problem of allocating frequencies. On what basis should
it make these allocations? The standard adopted was one which had
been used for some time in the common-carrier field — the standard
of "public interest, convenience and necessity." This was a vague
standard, but apparently it was the best that Congress could provide
66 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

under the circumstances. It had been used as a basis for regulating

railroads, power companies, and telephone and telegraph companies,
and was an obvious choice for broadcasting.
The Federal Communications Commission, established in 1934 as
the successor to the Federal Radio Commission (1927), undertook
putting the standard into practice. How was it to determine that an
assignment of asegment of the electromagnetic spectrum to Applicant
A would better serve the "public interest, convenience and necessity"
than an assignment to Applicant B or C? The other mass media were
private enterprises established at the will of the entrepreneur. In fact,
agovernment license to operate was abhorrent to libertarian princi-
ples. Such adevice struck at the very basis of the effectiveness of the
medium as a check on government and its officials. But no other
alternative was apparently available for broadcasting; and the Com-
mission, faced with the necessity of issuing licenses, searched for some
reasonable ground on which to base its decisions. It almost inevitably
took the position that, since the air waves were anatural resource of
limited capacity, their assignment must be based, in part at least,
on program content. Public interest would be served if all segments
of the population were able to receive the best possible radio and
television programs. An agency of the government was now definitely
passing judgment on the content of the medium. The broadcasting in-
dustry objected vigorously that this interpretation of the function of
the Commission violated the traditional libertarian principles of free-
dom of speech and of the press. Broadcasting, the industry contended,
was not the same as a telephone company; it was more like a news-
paper or amagazine with some aspects of the theater and the motion
picture industry thrown in. Armed with the slogan, "radio as free as
the press," the broadcasters argued that the function of government
was solely to assign frequencies and not to regulate program content.
The Commission's position was set out in anow famous document,
the Blue Book. In that document, the Commission asserted that
standards of performance must necessarily be considered in frequency
allocation, otherwise the occupant would acquire a vested interest in
public property, and it specified some of the attributes of adequate
programming. A full-blown debate followed the publication of the
Blue Book, but no permanent conclusions were reached. Neither the
Congress nor the Supreme Court has seen fit to resolve the issue. The
court has indicated that broadcasting comes under the protection of
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression, but it also
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 67

has taken the position that the government through the Federal Com-
munications Commission has the right not only to supervise the use
of the air waves but also to determine the composition of the traffic
on those waves.
The question of the economic support has added to the complexity
of the problem of broadcasting. Some libertarian democracies have
provided for direct government subsidies; others have set up asystem
of taxation on the use of receiving sets; and others like the United
States have relied on advertising revenues. Since economic support
can seriously affect the performance of an instrument of mass com-
munication, the problem of the extent of the dependence on state sup-
port becomes a serious one. The high cost of television operation has
tended to increase rather than decrease the seriousness of the issue.
How can amedium dependent on state funds remain immune to gov-
ernment influence? Advertising revenues offer an alternative, but to
what extent will they debase or standardize radio and television
performance?
Libertarian theory has not yet solved the problems of motion pic-
tures and broadcasting. It has set a broad framework within which
the new media are seeking to adjust themselves. The answers will prob-
ably be found through experimentation and experience, through trial
and error, as well as through amore careful analysis of the theoretical
functions of the new media. As it has done in the past, libertarian
philosophy is muddling through, postponing any final decisions until
it is sure that it is on the right track.

THE LIBERTARIAN PRESS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD

The United States and Great Britain have been the chief custodians
of libertarian principles for more than a century, but other countries
of the world have to a greater or lesser extent adopted these same
principles. As the democratic form of government spread throughout
the world, the concept of freedom of speech and press followed as an
integral part of the libertarian doctrine. In some countries the con-
cept found a fertile soil; in many others it was planted with a great
flourish and with high expectations but in a short time withered and
died. In others the seed produced a variation that showed little re-
semblance to the Anglo-American variety.
Many of the underdeveloped areas of the world found it particu-
larly difficult to transplant the western ideals of afree press. In many
 68 FOUR THEMES OF THE PRESS

instances the ideal was accepted with enthusiasm, but internal con-
ditions apparently were not conducive to the full development of
democratic principles. Nationalistic pressures, internal security and
economic conditions were the principal factors which made it difficult
to implement libertarian theories.
Constitutional protections for the mass media have generally been
adopted by the newer democracies which have been established since
World War I. The constitution of the Philippine Islands (1935) con-
tains asimple statement: "Article 8, No law shall be passed abridging
freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble and petition the government for ,redress of griev-
ances." The constitution of Israel (1948) is more elaborate: "Article
16, Freedom of speech and the free expression of opinion in writing
or in any other form are guaranteed. This constitutional guarantee
shall not extend to utterances of publications which are libelous,
slanderous, or obscene, or which are designed to stir up racial or
religious hatred, or to incite to violence or crime, or which advocate
the suppression of human rights, or of the democratic system of
government, or which reveal secrets of national defense. The institu-
tion of a preventive censorship shall be unlawful save in time of war
or national emergency and shall require specific legislative authoriza-
tion and be subject to continuous parliamentary control and review."
Despite the spread of democratic principles, some nations which
have officially adopted libertarian protections against government con-
trol of the press have reverted to authoritarian practices whenever a
domestic political crisis arises. Both Argentina and Colombia have
adopted traditional constitutional protections for their press, but both
have on occasions ignored these provisions and suppressed objection-
able publications. (For a recent example in Colombia, see 43:36.)
In the later stages of World War II, libertarians had high hopes
that democratic principles of free speech and press would spread
throughout the world when the war ended and an effective interna-
tional organization was established. They were confident that in an
international arena they could effectively cope with the principles of
authoritarianism and Communism. One of the motivating forces be-
hind the establishment of the United Nations was the world-wide
recognition of "fundamental human rights" in the libertarian tradi-
tion. One of these basic human rights was freedom of expression or,
as it later came to be known under tutelage of American experts,
"freedom of information."
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 69

The task of defining and implementing these human rights through-

out the world was assigned to the General Assembly of the United
Nations, to the Economic and Social Council, and to a special Com-
mission on Human Rights. The Commission on Human Rights set
up a Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and the Press
which tackled specific problems of the mass media of communication.
At a United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information in
Geneva in 1948, the authoritarians, libertarians, and Communists
presented arguments for their particular doctrines on the function
of the mass media in society. In spite of the apparent difficulties of
reconciling the divergent points of view, leaders in the United Nations
hoped that some agreement could be reached. Succeeding confer-
ences and meetings of the Sub-Commission studied particular prob-
lems, such as the adequacy of news available to the peoples of the
world, the obstacles to a free flow of information, an international
code of ethics for information personnel, the jamming of radio broad-
casts, the free transmission of newsreels, the newsprint problem, and
discriminatory treatment of foreign information personnel.
In the meantime the General Assembly drafted aConvention on the
International Transmission of News and the Right of Correction
which was approved but not opened for signatures pending the com-
pletion of a draft of a Convention on Freedom of Information. Here
at last the machinery broke down, as it appeared impossible to recon-
cile the divergent points of view. The principal antagonists were the
United States on one side and Soviet Russia on the other. In between
were the small nations which were unwilling to accept the principles
of either libertarianism or Communism. No apparent progress has been
made in the last several years toward solving the problem of informa-
tion agencies on aworld-wide basis.
In analyzing the causes of the difficulties encountered, the rappor-
teur on freedom of information of the Economic and Social Council
has written in his 1954 report:
Fundamental to most of the debates on freedom of information and a
main factor in retarding progress has been the marked difference of opinion
regarding the rights and freedoms as against the duties and responsibilities
involved in the concept of freedom of information. It would however be an
oversimplification to reduce the difference to a conflict between the thesis
that the interests of organized society are most effectively advanced by an
unrestricted access to the market-place of ideas, and the thesis that such
interests are better safeguarded by state control and indoctrination. The
actual situation in the world may be more accurately described as a "con-
 70 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

tinuous ideological spectrum," with all the various countries ranged some-
where between two extremes. This "spectrum" has been observed during
practically all discussions on freedom of information since 1946 (50:11).

nummAR-
Y)

The libertarian theory of the function of the mass media in ademo-

cratic society has had a long and arduous history. This history has
paralleled the development of democratic principles in government
and free enterprise in economics. The theory itself can trace a re-
spected lineage among the philosophers of ancient times, but it
received its greatest impetus from the developments in western
Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. From Milton to
Holmes it has stressed the superiority of the principle of individual
freedom and judgment and the axiom that truth when allowed free
rein will emerge victorious from any encounter. Its slogans have been
the "self-righting process" and the "free market place of ideas." It
has been an integral part of the great march of democracy which has
resulted in the stupendous advancement of the well-being of humanity.
It has been the guiding principle of western civilization for more than
two hundred years.
In recent years the libertarian theory has been subjected to search-
ing criticisms. Some of these are set forth in the following chapter on
the theory of social responsibility. It has been pointed out that some
of the underlying axioms of the theory are far from sound. Rationalism
has been under fire, particularly by modern psychologists; the theory
of natural rights has been exposed as merely a persuasive slogan with-
out basic political or social foundations; free enterprise has been ques-
tioned as an economic philosophy; and the right of the individual to
jeopardize the welfare of the majority has been forcefully attacked.
Carl Becker has aptly summarized some of the current confusion:
What confuses our purposes and defeats our hopes is that the simple con-
cepts upon which the Age of Enlightenment relied with assurance have lost
for us their universal and infallible quality. Natural law turns out to be no
more than a convenient and temporary hypothesis. Imprescriptible rights
have such validity only as prescriptive law confers upon them. Liberty, once
identified with emancipation of the individual from governmental restraint,
is now seen to be inseparable from the complex pattern of social regulation.
Even the sharp, definitive lines of reason and truth are blurred. Reason, we
suspect, is a function of the animal organism, and truth no more than the
perception of discordant experience pragmatically adjusted for a particular
purpose and for the time being (32:93).
 THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF THE PRESS 71

In spite of such questionings, libertarianism has demonstrated its

theoretical and practical advantages. It has struck off the manacles
from the mind of man, and it has opened up new vistas for humanity.
Its greatest defect has been its failure to provide rigorous standards
for the day-to-day operations of the mass media — in short, a stable
formula to distinguish between liberty and abuse of liberty. It is vague,
inconclusive, and sometimes inconsistent. Its greatest assets, however,
are its flexibility, its adaptability to change, and above all its confidence
in its ability to advance the interests and welfare of human beings by
continuing to place its trust in individual self-direction.
L
 THE SOCIAL RESPOJYSIBILITY

THEORY OF

THE PRESS

THEODORE PETERSON 3

Today, when newspaper publishers speak about their calling, such

phrases as "the public's right to know" and "the public responsibility
of the press" are likely to creep into their talk. Such ideas and the
press performance resulting from them represent an important modi-
fication of traditional libertarian theory, for nothing in libertarian
theory established the public's right to information or required the
publisher to assume moral responsibilities. A fairly valid expression of
the publisher's position under libertarian theory was that attributed to
William Peter Hamilton of the Wall Street Journal: "A newspaper is
a private enterprise owing nothing whatever to the public, which
grants it no franchise. It is therefore affected with no public interest.
It is emphatically the property of the owner, who is selling a manu-
factured product at his own risk. ..."

THE THEORY IN BRIEF

The twentieth century, however, brought agradual shift away from

pure libertarianism, and in its place began to emerge what has been
called the "social responsibility theory of the press." Just what do we
mean by "social responsibility theory"? Later, when we compare the
theory with libertarian theory, we will see it in full dimension and in
 74 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

full implication. But for an understanding of just what we are talking

about, let us here sketch the theory in general outline. The theory has
this major premise: Freedom carries concomitant obligations; and the
press, which enjoys a privileged position under our government, is
obliged to be responsible to society for carrying out certain essential
functions of mass communication in contemporary society. To the
extent that the press recognizes its responsibilities and makes them the
basis of operational policies, the libertarian system will satisfy the needs
of society. To the extent that the press does not assume its responsibili-
ties, some other agency must see that the essential functions of mass
communication are carried out.
The functions of the press under social responsibility theory are
basically the same as those under libertarian theory. Six tasks came to
be ascribed to the press as traditional theory evolved: (1) servicing
the political system by providing information, discussion, and debate
on public affairs; (2) enlightening the public so as to make it capable
of self-government; (3) safeguarding the rights of the individual by
serving as awatchdog against government; (4) servicing the economic
system, primarily by bringing together the buyers and sellers of goods
and services through the medium of advertising; (5) providing enter-
tainment; (6) maintaining its own financial self-sufficiency so as to be
free from the pressures of special interests.
The social responsibility theory in general accepts those six func-
tions. But it reflects a dissatisfaction with the interpretation of those
functions by some media owners and operators and with the way in
which the press has carried them out. Social responsibility theory
accepts the role of the press in servicing the political system, in en-
lightening the public, in safeguarding the liberties of the individual;
but it represents the opinion that the press has been deficient in
performing those tasks. It accepts the role of the press in servicing the
economic system, but it would not have this task take precedence over
such other functions as promoting the democratic processes or enlight-
ening the public. It accepts the role of the press in furnishing enter-
tainment but with the proviso that the entertainment be "good"
entertainment. It accepts the need for the press as an institution to
remain financially self-supporting, but if necessary it would exempt
certain individual media from having to earn their way in the market
place.
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 75

ROOTS OF THE THEORY

Just as libertarian theory was a composite of ideas, so the emerging

social responsibility theory has grown out of the ideas of many persons.
Men who have contributed component ideas to it might abhor the
theory as a whole — just as, say, John Milton, who contributed the
idea of the self-righting process to libertarian theory, no doubt would
have found fault with libertarian theory in its full form.
The social responsibility theory still is largely agrafting of new ideas
onto traditional theory. However, the Commission on Freedom of the
Press in its various books after World War II did agreat deal toward
making social responsibility anew, integrated theory instead of amere
appendage to the traditional one. Especially important to the idea of
social responsibility were A Free and Responsible Press by the Com-
mission as a whole and Freedom of the Press: A Framework of Prin-
ciple by William E. Hocking, a member of the Commission. Even
members of the Commission were not in unanimous accord, since some
of them hugged tradition and others stood far from it. However, all
members did assent to the joint report and to a brief "Summary of
Principle."
The developing social responsibility theory, like the libertarian
theory which it is replacing, is an Anglo-American concept. About the
time that the Commission began issuing its reports in this country, a
Royal Commission on the Press, formed at the instigation of the
National Union of Journalists, started to study concentration in the
press in Britain and to consider means of improving press performance
there. Its report supports and supplements the writings of the Com-
mission on Freedom of the Press.
5t It is important to remember that the social responsibility theory is
still chiefly a theory. But as atheory it is important because it suggests
a direction in which thinking about freedom of the press is heading.
Then, too, some aspects of the theory have found their way into
practice.
In Britain, on recommendation of the Royal Commission, a General
Council of the Press has been formed to encourage a sense of public
responsibility and public service in the press. Its main function •has
been to condemn and publicize questionable practices on the part of
the press, to investigate complaints, to seek redress if the complaints
are justified, and to reply to them if they are not. Its first annual
report, available to the public, included charges against a number of
 76 FOUR THEORIES OF TILE PRESS

specific newspapers as well as its survey of trends in the press as a

whole.
In America, the publishers of several newspapers — the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, the Louisville Courier-Journal, the Milwaukee Journal,
the Cowles newspapers of Iowa and Minnesota, to name just afew —
seem to feel astrong responsibility to the communities they serve. The
movie industry, operating under asystem of self-regulation, serves the
public interest as it conceives it. The radio and television networks and
stations, required by law to serve the public interest, perform in what
they take to be the public welfare. Many persons doubtless would
remark that there is alarge chasm between the genuine public interest
and what the movies, radio, and television take it to be. That is not
the point. The point is that the self-regulation of the movies and the
gçwernmentregulation of broackastin represent sharp with
ttearaçWional_theuzyudil_lepress The_y_are_in-far-eleser-barrnany_with
social responsibility theory than with libertarian theory.
When the framers of the federal constitution appended an amend-
ment establishing freedom of the press, they had no intention of bind-
ing the publisher to certain responsibilities in exchange for his freedom.
As Charles Beard has said, freedom of the press meant "the right to be
just or unjust, partisan or nonpartisan, true or false, in news columns
and editorial column," and truth telling had little or nothing to do
with it (77:13). Indeed, the press in the first years of the new United
States was characterized by partisanship, invective and unrestraint,
and Frank Luther Mott has called the early nineteenth century "the
Dark Age of Partisan Journalism." Publishers may have thought that
public opinion approved of their excesses, since public opinion had
demanded the end of restrictions on the press.
But there was a deeper reason for the free hand which the consti-
tution gave to publishers, one which we will explore in greater detail
when we discuss the premises underlying the emergent social responsi-
bility theory of the press. The fralprrs of the constitttime_ chil-
dren of the Enlightenment, and their assumptions about the nature of
man and the relationship of man to government were implicit in the
instrument they -drifia.--Go-Vernm
--ent was the chief f
-oe of liberty, they

believed, and the press must be free to serve as a guardian against

governmental encroachments on individual liberty. If the _press were
free, men would speak. True, they might lie, vilify, distort. But tie
wonderful invisible
_ hand envisioned by Adam Smith and the self-
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 77

righting process discerned by John Milton would set things right.—Man

would seek with amidst the welter of ideas which swarmed in the
market place; and being rational, he wous truth rom false-
hgood from bad.
But somewhere along the way, faith diminished in the optimistic
notion that avirtually absolute freedom and the nature of man carried
built-in correctives for the press. A rather considerable fraction of
articulate Arnericgns be an tQdemand certpin standards of dorm-
ance from the press. They threatened to enact Leelation, even did
enact it, if the press did not meet certain of those standards. Chiefly
oT their own volition, pub-Es-hers began to link responsibility with free-
dom.. They formulated codes of ethical behavior, and they operated
their media with some concern -for the public good — the public good
as they regarded it, at least. Somewhere along the way, in short, a
rationale of —
soCTO responsibility began to evolve; and to put it into its
proper context, let us look at its historical origins before we examine it
critically.

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS BEHIND THE THEORY

The social rcoiliy theory of the press was born of several

things. One was the technological and industrial_ revoution w ich
changed the face of the nation and_ the American _way of living_ and
which affected the nature of the_press itself. Another was the sharp
voice of criticism, which spoke often as the media grew in size and
importance, and which sometimes carried the tacit threat of govern-
nriŒe t. fothcr was a new intellectual climate in which
some persons looked with suspicion on the basic assumptions of the
Enlightenment. And finally there was the development of a profes-
si_onal_serit as journalism attracted men of principle and education,
and as the communications industries reflected the growing sense of
social responsibility assumed by American business and industry
generally.
"the technological and industrial revolution and the social changes
which came with it had manifold effects on the press. Technological
advances increased the size, speed, and efficiency of the old media and
brought new ones — movies, radio, and television. Industrialization
was accompanied by a growing volume of advertising, which became
the major support of newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting. It also
was accompanied by urbanization, and the large numbers of persons
 78 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

brought together helped to make possible newspapers of large circula-

tion. Gains in education and in the number of citizens tremendously
expanded the market for products of the press. The press became a
ubiquitous instrumentality.
It also became one controlled by arelatively few owners. Technolog-
ical improvement made it . possible for just afew media to serve a vast
audience. But the facilities for reaching a large audience were costly.
As units of the press became increasingly large and expensive, new-
comers found it increasingly difficult to enter the communications
industries, and many old-timers failed to survive. Ownership of the
media came to be concentrated in comparatively few hands. Dairy
newspapers steadily decreased in number, and so did the cities with
competing papers. Five giant publishers accounted for the great bulk
of total magazine circulation and of the total sum spent on magazine
advertising. Another five companies produced almost all of the movies
which Americans saw. Two or three large networks served virtually
all of the broadcasting stations in the nation.

DEVELOPING CRITICISM OF THE PRESS

As the press became a mammoth, pervasive implement of mass

communication, it became the object of a good deal of criticism. The
first full-length book assailing the press appeared in 1859, and there
had been attacks before that; but the criticisms increased in force and
intensity in the twentieth century. The themes of twentieth-century
criticism, in general, have been these:
1. The press has wielded its enormous power for its own ends. The
owners have propagated their own opinions, especially in matters of
politics and economics, at the expense of opposing views.
2. The press has been subservient to big business and at times has
let advertisers control editorial policies and editorial content.
3. The press has resisted social change.
4. The press has often paid more attention to the superficial and
sensational than to the significant in its coverage of current happen-
ings, and its entertainment has often been lacking in substance.
5. The press has endangered public morals.
6. The press has invaded the privacy of individuals without just
cause.
7. The press is controlled by one socioeconomic class, loosely the
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 79

"business class," and access to the industry is difficult for the new-
comer; therefore, the free and open market of ideas is endangered.
Those have been the general indictments against the press as a
whole; the specific charges have varied with the times and with the
media.
Books and magazines have been singled out less frequently, perhaps,
than the other media. However, individual books have been damned
as corrupters of morals from time to time since the century opened, as
were large numbers of inexpensive paper-bound editions in the forties
and fifties. Magazines have often been included in blanket criticisms
of the press, and an occasional sniper has fired at their low denomi-
nator content and at their subservience to the counting room. The
shrillest criticism of magazines has been of periodicals on the fringes
of the industry — the magazines which traffic in pornography and the
comic books, which have been charged with debasing moral standards
and with inciting young people to crime.
The lines for much contemporary criticism of the newspaper were
laid down in 1911 by Will Irwin in aseries of articles in Collier's (71).
Among other things, Irwin observed that the influence of the news-
paper had shifted from its editorials to its news columns; that the
commercial nature of the newspaper, not just advertising, was respon-
sible for many of its shortcomings; and that entry into the field had
become exceedingly difficult for the newcomer.
As advertising became increasingly important to newspapers, it was
viewed as a sinister force which tainted the news columns and caused
editors to suppress material unfavorable to big advertisers. That was
the line taken by Upton Sinclair in The Brass Check in 1919 and by
George Seldes in Freedom of the Press in 1935. Seldes maintained that
line in a newsletter, In Fact, in the forties, but by then it had become
largely discredited; critics recognized that the publisher, as a business-
man, might naturally share the attitudes of other businessmen and be
influenced by them in the conduct of his newspaper. During the thir-
ties, newspaper publishers as businessmen shared in the attacks against
business generally, and they were the subjects of such group portraits
of "lords of the press" as Harold Ickes' America's House of Lords and
of such individual portraits as Ferdinand Lundberg's Imperial Hearst.
In the forties, amajor concern was the declining number of dailies in
the face of the highest circulations on record, a situation which some
observers thought threatened the free flow of ideas.
80 FOUR THEMES OF THE PRESS

The charges against the movies have remained essentially the same
since the twenties: that they endanger morals, and that they have
failed to raise the level of popular taste. In the twenties the movies
were violently attacked for their preoccupation with sex, for their
lascivious advertising, and for the offscreen escapades of their stars.
Under the pressure of public opinion, the industry formed the ma-
chinery for self-regulation and drew up the first of its production
codes of ethics. Thereafter, critics found fault with the sex and violence
in movies, with their distorted picture of American life, and with the
juvenility of their plots.
The Department of Justice instituted suits against several of the
major film companies in July, 1938, on the grounds that they were
engaged in monopolistic practices and in illegal restraint of trade in
the production, distribution, and exhibition of motion pictures. After
adecade of hearings and litigation, the Supreme Court found that the
five fully integrated companies had monopoly of exhibition as a goal,
although it did not find monopolistic or illegal practices in production.
By 1952, either by court order or consent decree, the five major pro-
ducers were required to get rid of the theaters they held and to cease
certain trade practices held inimical to independent exhibitors.
Criticisms of radio and television have fallen into afamiliar pattern,
several of the-
m— ite-mming from the domination of programming by two
or three major netw-
orks. One common complaint has been that pro-
gramming has rested not with the networks as it should but with the
advertiser and his agents, who have prepared the shows, assembled
the casts, and bought time to broadcast them, along with their annoy-
ing commercials. Another complaint has been that stations have failed
to serve their communities by developing local talent, by discussing
local issues, and so forth; instead they have become merely outlets for
the big networks. Still another common charge has been that the lis-
tener has only a fictitious choice of programs; his choice at a given
hour is not between culture and comedy but between two comedy
shows, both pretty much alike. Critics have spoken out against the
heavy balance of entertainment over serious programs and against the
low caliber of the entertainment which is offered. In their discussions
of public affairs, other critics have charged, radio and television have
depended too heavily on conservative commentators and have avoided
genuine, healthful controversy. An additional fault has been found
with television: Its programming has been heavy on crime and
violence.
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 81

INTELLECTUAL CLIMATE OF THE NEW THEORY

The intellectual climate of the twentieth century seems to have

favored the growth of atheory such as social responsibility and to have
blighted libertarian theory. As Alfred North Whitehead once observed,
the mentality of an age derives from the world view which is dominant
in the educated sections of society, and this world view influences the
thought patterns in such areas as ethics, religion, and science (82: viii).
A theory of the press which diverges fundamentally from the mentality
of its age, then, may well be modified or scrapped altogether. And the
libertarian theory is at odds with the emergent world view which
seems to be replacing the one which saw its inception, as Jay W.
Jensen has plausibly argued (73).
Thelihertarian_theory of the press accommodated itself to the world
view of the Enlightenment. Its basis was the perpetual motion world
machine of Newton, which ran timelessly according to certain immu-
table laws of nature; the natural rights philosophy of John Locke with
its insistence that freedom was inherent and that man was a rational
creature; the doctrines of classical economics with their emphasis on a
minimum of governmental interference and their faith that as men
worked for their own self-interest they would inevitably work for the
common good; and the self-righting process of John Milton, which
held that truth would emerge from the free encounter of ideas in the
open market.
But the revolution in modern thought has all but demolished the
world view which supported the libertarian theory of the press. Shap-
ing the emergent world view of the twentieth century is the Darwin-
netzlIttion, which has wrought profound changes in the think-
ing of the educeed _sections oT•society. Jensen_ has suriii up
- the
pact of modem thought on libertarian theory in this way:
__
It is clear that the philosophical foundations of the traditional concept of
freedom of the press have been precipitously undermined by the revolution
in contemporary thought. The static and timeless World-Machine of Newton
has been wrecked by the idea of evolution and the dynamic concepts of
modern physics. Locke's doctrine of natural rights has been subverted not
only by Romantic philosophy but also by present-day social science. Classical
laissez -faire economics has been repudiated by most contemporary economists,
and in practice by almost every modern industrial nation. Moreover, the
Miltonian doctrine of the "self-righting process" has lately become suspect
(73:405-06).
82 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

The ideas which have undermined the Newtonian cosmology and

the philosophical underpinnings of traditional theory are in closer
harmony with a collectivistic theory of society than with the indi-
vidualistic theory from which the libertarian system sprang. Each of
those two more or less antagonistic theories of society, the individual-
istic and the collectivistic, has important implications for the functions
of the press and for the way in which the press fulfills them. The
individualistic theory presupposes that the individual takes precedence
over society; in contrast, the collectivistic theory presupposes that
society takes precedence over the individual. At its logical extreme, of
course, the collectivistic theory is represented by totalitarianism — by
Fascism, by Communism.
However, even a society operating under the principles of indi-
vidualistic theory does, in some of its aspects, adopt certain elements
of the collectivistic. The social responsibility theory of the press repre-
sents just such an intermingling_ of ideas. This is not to say that social
responsibility theory even in its extremes indicates a trend toward
totalitarianism. On the contrary, the theory poses social responsibility
of the_media as a safeguard against totalitarianism. The Commission
on Freedom of the Press has said that a great potential danger to
freedom of the press lies in the appealing notion that the government
can solve all of the problems arising from the complexity of modern
society and from the concentrations of power; unthinkingly, the nation
might move toward totalitarianism if it relies on the government to
correct conditions within the press. "If modern society requires great
agencies of mass communication, if these concentrations become so
powerful that they are a threat to democracy, if democracy cannot
solve the problem simply by breaking them up — then those agencies
must control themselves or be controlled by government. If they are
controlled by government, we lose our chief safeguard against totali-
tarianism — and at the same time take along step toward it" (66:5).
The ideas on which democratic capitalism rested also underwent
changes in the twentieth century; the belief that each entrepreneur
would automatically serve the common good as he selfishly pursued
his own interests gave way to the belief that American business and
industry must assume certain obligations to the community. The ex-
pression "the public be damned" was replaced by the expression "the
consumer is king." Alongside this sense of accountability to the public
which characterized American business and industry in the twentieth
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 83

century, the press developed a sense of mission requiring it _ta serve

the general welfare. As it did .so,, it planted the seeds for a coherent
theory of social responsibility.

THE NEW SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY

Just when the traditional theory of virtually unrestrained freedom

began to yield to acceptance by publishers of certain responsibilities,
it is hard to say. Certainly publishers were not likely to concern them-
selves with the ethical aspects of their calling so long as they were
primarily printers who regarded their newspapers as adjuncts of their
printing establishments, although from the earliest years some journal-
ists had been men of high resolve. By the middle of the nineteenth
century, journalism had begun to attract men of education and prin-
ciple who set high standards for their craft and tried to live up to
them. Some such men formulated codes of ethics for their own staffs.
The growir_ig_ professional siiirit was no doubt fostered in part by
schools of journalism, Which-began springing up in the first years of
this century and which not only taught the techniques of journalism
but also in time showed increasing concern with the responsibilities of
the media.
AS thè twentieth century opened, publishers spoke more and more
often of the duties which accompanied the privileged position of the
;
press under the constitution. Joseph Pulitzer, defending his proposal
for a school of journalism, wrote in the North American Review in
1904: "Nothing less than the highest ideals, the most scrupulous
anxiety to do right, the most accurate knowledge of the problems it
has to meet, and a sincere sense of moral responsibility will save
journalism from a subservience to business interests, seeking selfish
ends, antagonistic to public welfare" (75:658).
In similar words, as the twentieth century wore on, other publishers
spoke not merely of their right to exercise their freedom but also of
the responsibilities attached to its exercise. They were joined by movie-
makers, by radio and television broadcasters. Publishers in one-
newspaper cities spoke of the responsibilities which monopolies imposed
upon them. Industry groups formulated codes of ethical performance.
And it was not merely the large communications units which spoke
thus. Fifty years after Pulitzer had penned his words for the North
American Review, stockholders of the small Park Region Echo at
84 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

Alexandria, Minnesota, adopted a declaration of aims which said in

part:
To begin with, we must recognize that a truly great newspaper must be
greater than any one of, or the combined consciences of its editor in that,
when it speaks, its words are those of someone far wiser, far more reasonable,
far more fair, far more compassionate, far more understanding and far more
honest than those men, crippled by human weaknesses and failings, whose
task it is to write those words. ...A truly great newspaper must remain un-
fettered by the leash of any and all special interest groups.
The rise of broadcasting made the government a major contributor
to the theory of social responsibility. In the early twenties, as radio
stations sprouted up in chaotic profusion, competitors broadcast on
the same wave lengths, amateurs mixed their signals with those of
professionals, and the cacophony was carried into a growing number
of listeners' homes. The government, at the urging of the broad-
casting industry, reluctantly stepped in to bring some order to the air
waves. In 1927 Congress created the Federal Radio Commission to
assign frequencies and to keep an eye on program content. The Corn-
Mu —nic
-aiiiims Act of 1934, which reserved radio for operation in the
-

ptiblie- interest, created the Federal Communications Commission, a

pe_n_y_iallent---age,iley-for issuing broadcast licenses and supervising the
•
air waves.
Although the law expressly forbids F.C.C. censorship of program
material, the Commission has taken the position that it is responsible
for supervising over-all program content to insure its serving the public
interest. While the individual licensee has the right to choose specific
program material, the Commission has said, his choice must be "con-
sistent with the basic policy of Congress that radio be maintained as
amedium of free speech for the general public as awhole rather than
as an outlet for the purely personal or private interests of the licensee"
(80:3-317 -The F.C.C.'s policy statements, its actions against some
broadcasters and its authority to issue and revoke licenses all have
reminded broadcasters that they are trustees, not owners, of the air
waves.
Once we have established that both the press and its critics agree
that the press should assume responsibilities, we come to a fork in the
road. Down one turning goes a theory of social responsibility as it is
being evolved by the most articulate spokesmen for the press itself;
down the other goes the theory as it has been formulated in its most
coherent elaboration by the Commission on Freedom of the Press. Both
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 85

roads head away from traditional libertarian theory, and they parallel
one another for various distances at various places. Although the press
was generally hostile to the report of the Commission, its criticisms
were not directed to several of the primary assumptions of the report.
Evidently few if any of the media took issue with the Commission on
the fundamental point that the press has a social responsibility, 'for
example, or even on the function of the press in contemporary demo-
cratic society. Indeed, many spokesmen for the press have views coin-
ciding with those of the Commission on those very points, and the
Commission has said that it took most of its ideas from the professions
of the communications industry itself. What the press did criticize
were the Commission's evaluation of press performance, which the
press thought was not as bad as the Commission depicted; the Com-
mission's assertion that concentration in the media has endangered
the free flow of ideas, to which the press replied that the nature of
competition has changed; and, above all, the Commission's suggestion
that the power of the government over the media be extended, even
cautiously.
Since the writings of the Commission provide the most unified dis-
cussion of the goals of social responsibility theory and since those
writings have never been analyzed in detail for their implications for
traditional theory, most of the balance of this discussion will deal
primarily with the social responsibility theory as formulated by the
Commission and its member, William Hocking. But let us remember
that practitioners, in their professions and practices, contributed agood
deal to the shaping of that theory, even if they may not agree with
the logical extensions of the Commission's report.

THE CODES REFLECT THE NEW THEORY ./

And even the codes of ethics of the various media show a changed
view of such points as the nature of man and the principles of ethical
behavior. The earliest of these codes, the ge_ram.of_joumesm, was
adopted by the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1923. It
called on newspapers to practice responsibility to the general welfare,
sincerity. truthfulness, impartEalit ,fair la decency, and respect for
the individual's privacy. Perhaps because the newspaper was some
three hundred years old when the code was drawn up and hence
had along tradition, the Canons depart less markedly from libertarian
theory than do the codes of such twentieth-century media as the
86 FOUR THEMES OF THE PRESS

movies, radio, and television. Implicit in the Canons are faith that man
is primarilyrational creature, able to discover truth and to separate
right from wrong by _power of reason; faith in the efficacy of the self-
righting process; and the belief that the newspaper is chiefly an instru-
ment of enlightenment making its appeal to the critical sense of the
reader. The Canons seem to assume that the newspaper should pro-
mote democratic government by expediting the self-righting process;
the press can aid thé workings of the self-righting process by striving
for such ideals as truthfulness and fair play. The one new idea in the
Canons is that the press is responsible to the general welfare.
The codes of the movie industry in 1930, of the radio industry in
1937 and of the television industry in 1952 reflected the changed
intellectual climate. The codes were all drawn up against abackground
of public hostility to the media. The movie code was formulated to
forestall government regulation. The radio and television codes were
drawn up by an industry regulated by the government and required
to perform in the public interest, convenience, and necessity. The
movie code envisions the film as primarily entertainment, although it
can contribute to "correct thinking." The radio and television codes
regard broadcasting as chiefly a medium of entertainment, although
it can serve the economic system by carrying advertising. All three
codes see the media as pervasive and as capable of suspending the
critical faculties. Perhaps in consequence, the codes reflect a far
different picture of man than the newspaper code. All three codes
regard man as essentially immature and as highly susceptive to the
corruption of his morals. Therefore, ethical performance for those
three media differs from that of the newspaper. Ethical behavior as
exemplified by the movies code consists of promoting public morals
(in general, by promoting marriage and the sanctity of the home and
marriage; by respecting religion, law and justice, and national feelings;
and by curbing the base emotions). Radio and television codes con-
ceive of ethical behavior as promoting the democratic form of govern-
. — --
ment_by enlightening the public, by promoting public morals (in essen-
tially the same way as the movies), and by keeping advertising in good
proportion and maintaining high standards for it.
According to the Commission on Freedom of the Press, those codes
are not enough to insure the sort of press that society requires. The
newspaper code was drawn up by employees, not by employers. Al-
though it would make newspapers responsible carriers of news and dis-
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 87

cussion if adhered to, the Commission says, it has not been and cannot
be enforced. The movie code is merely negative — it sets minimum
standards of acceptability, not of responsibility — and its goals are
not high enough, according to the Commission. Nor does the broad-
casting code have any sanction. The desire to reach the largest possible
audience has prevented radio from realizing its potentialities in serving
the needs of society.
What does society require from its press? "Its requirements in
America today are greater in variety, quantity, and quality than
those of any previous society in any age," the Commission says. One
reason is the heavy reliance which the American citizen places on the
press. He cannot experience much of the world at first-hand, and in an
urbanized society he lacks much of the face-to-face discussion which
characterized earlier societies. The Kansas farmer who would under-
stand a strike in Detroit, the Detroit automobile worker who would
understand the policy of the government regarding atomic energy, the
government worker in Washington who would understand the impli-
cations of adrought in Kansas — they all must depend upon the mass
media. And in ideas as well as in news, Americans must conduct much
of their discussion in the press instead of in small face-to-face groups.
Yet alongside this growing dependency of Americans on the press in
their transactions of public business, ownership of the media has
become concentrated into afew hands, and the consumer of news and
ideas is largely at the mercy of the operators of the media.

REQUIREMENTS OF PRESS PERFORMANCE

The Commission has listed five things which contemporary society

requires of its press, and together they provide a measure of press
performance. The standards were not original with the Commission;
as the Commission notes, they were drawn largely from the professions
and practices of those who operate the media.
M___fimtaegià=ent of the press in contemporary society, accord-
ing to the Commission, is to provide "a truthful, comprehensive, and
intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them
meaning." This requirement demands that the press be accurate; it
must not lie. It means, also, the Commission says, that the press must
identify fact as fact and opinion as opinion.
The press itself seems to be in substantial agreement with the Com-
mission that the media should be accurate and should separate news
_ _ _
88 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

and opinion. There is perhaps no better evidence of this agreement, no

better evidence of a growing fidelity to the public interest, than the
development of objective reporting, which Herbert Brucker has in-
cluded among thc outstanding achievements of the American news-
paper. In the early years of the nineteenth century, papers used the
news as apolitical weapon; it was distorted, biased, and suppressed to
meet the needs of the moment. Later in the century newspapers began
to confine their opinions to the editorial page; they strove to record
the news objectively, without personal intrusion and comment, and
to present not just one side but all sides. True, there were economic
reasons for the development of objective reporting, apart from a
growing sense of professionalism. But there was aphilosophical founda-
tion as well. For by separating news and comment, by presenting more
than one side, the press was expediting the self-righting process; it was
making it easier for the rational reader to discover truth. By the time
that the Commission issued its report in 1947, objectivity was no longer
agoal of the press; it was afetish.
But a truthful, comprehensive account of the news is not enough,
says the Commission. "It is no longer enough to report the fact truth-
fully. It is now necessary to report thf, trz Here
then is the suggestion that the press has developed a curious sort of
objectivity — a spurious objectivity which results in half-truths,
incompleteness, incomprehensibility. In adhering to objective re-
porting, the press has tried to present more than one side to a story;
but in doing so, the suggestion is, the media have not bothered to
evaluate for the reader the trustworthiness of conflicting sources, nor
have they supplied the perspective essential to a complete under-
standing of a given situation. Instead of assuming that two half-
truths make a truth, the Commission says in effect, the press should
seek "the whole truth."
On this point, too, the press seems to agree with the Commission,
although less wholeheartedly than with the assertion that the media
should publish the truth and should separate fact and opinion. Indeed,
it is because of its fidelity to the public interest that the press has been
reluctant, as the Commission puts it, to publish the truth about the
fact. Putting into the one-dimensional story the other dimensions
which will make it approximate the truth entails serious dangers,
according to Elmer Davis, the radio commentator, who has expressed
the dilemma of the press in this fashion:
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 89

I have seen some undeniably well-intentioned endeavors to put in those

other dimensions, but the dimensions were derived not from the evidence but
from the opinions or prejudices of the reporter; and if the practice were to
become general they might in some cases be derived from the opinions and
prejudices of the publisher, as they so often used to be. One Chicago Tribune
is enough. And even if a man's conscience is as rigorous, his mind as relent-
lessly objective, as the weights and measures in the Bureau of Standards, he
may still fall short of doing as accurate a job as he means to do because he
doesn't know all the angles, or hasn't time to get around to them under the
pressure of covering what is in front of him and writing a story about it
(67:173-74).
But despite the dilemma, Davis concludes, the press should do abetter
job of trying to put the news into proper context.
The good newspaper, the good news broadcaster, must walk a tightrope
between two great gulfs — on one side the false objectivity that takes every-
thing at face value and lets the public be imposed upon by the charlatan
with the most brazen front; on the other, the "interpretive" reporting which
fails to draw the line between objective and subjective, between a reasonably
well-established fact and what the reporter or editor wishes were fact. To
say that is easy; to do it is hard (67:175).
The nine newspapermen who attended Harvard as Nieman Fellows
in 1945-46 also support the Commission in its plea for the truth about
the facts. Like Davis, the Nieman Fellows acknowledge that "truth"
is elusive and that the pressures of producing a daily newspaper make
it— diffic—ult for a reporter to get all the facts requisite for a multi-
dimensioned treatment of the news. "Yet," they concluded, "there
arc dozens of disputes in each day's paper concerning which some
approximations to truth can be asserted." If Senator Byrd says that a
million government employees can be dismissed without impairing
the efficiency of the government, if the President says "Nonsense,"
who is right? "Clearly it must be the function of the press in a de-
mocracy to answer such questions," the Nieman Fellows say, "and to
answer them honestly" (79:27). The increase of interpretation in the
daily press in the past two decades and the attempts by such broad-
casters as Edward R. Murrow to put the news in context suggest that
a growing number of practitioners are subscribing to the view that
merely reporting the news is insufficient.
&second requirement of the press, according to the Commission, is
that it serve as "a forum for the exeh2nge_of comment and criticism."
This requirement means that the great agencies of mass communica-
tions should regard themselves as common carriers of public discus-
90 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

sion although it does not mean that laws should compel them to
accept all applicants for space or that the government should regulate
their rates or even that one can demand, as a right, that the media
disseminate his ideas. In simple—terms, it means that the
_ giants of the
press should carry views contrary to their own without abdicating
their own right of advocacy. The press should try to represent all
important viewpoints, not merely those with which the publisher or
Weiátot -agrees; and in doing so, it should carefully identify all
sources of news. The reason for this requirement is that control of the
press has become vested in fewer and fewer hands. No longer can the
individual with something to say reach the necessary audience with
the unaided human voice, no longer can he found a newspaper or
magazine, no longer can he issue his ideas in pamphlets which will
have the prestige that the mass media confer upon their contents.
On this point, too, the media operators seem to concur in large
measure with the Commission. Thus Norman Isaacs, managing editor
of the Louisville Times and 1952-53 president of the Associated Press
Managing Editors Association, has stated: "The one function we have
that supersedes everything is to convey information. We are common
carriers. The freedom of the press was given for that purpose — and
that purpose alone. Freedom of the press cannot mean the license to
keep people from knowing. And we keep them from knowing when-
ever we are backward and arrogant in operating our papers" (72:15).
Editors and publishers are fond of saying that the growth of one-
newspaper cities has been accompanied by an increased sense of duty
to their communities among the dailies which have survived. Spokes-
men for the Cowles newspapers in Des Moines and Minneapolis have
said that the one daily in a city has a greater responsibility than ever
to "help society inform itself and act intelligently" and that the
editorial page is an important medium for supplementing and com-
plementing the reporting of news. In both editorial content .and
advertising, the monopolistic trend in the newspaper field has put new
responsibilities on publishers, according to Edward Lindsay of the
Lindsay-Schaub Newspapers. "They have aresponsibility to minorities
in the publication of complete and objective news accounts," he
wrote in one of his papers. "They have a responsibility at the business
level. Newspaper publishers are denied the luxury of refusing to deal
with those whom they dislike or of using their control of a medium
of communication to punish those who patronize a competitor. ..."
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 91

In their code, broadcasters speak of exerting every effort to insure

equality of opportunity in the discussion of public issues; and the
television code advises stations to "give fair representation to opposing
sides of issues which materially affect the life or welfare of a substan-
tial segment of the public."
A third requirement of the press, the Commission states, is that it
project"a representative picture of the constituent groups in society."
Closely retied to the preceding two, this requirement would have the
press accurately portray the social groups, the Chinese and the
Negroes, for example, since persons tend to make decisions in terms
of favorable or unfavorable images and a false picture can subvert
accurate judgment. In principle if not in practice, most media oper-
ators would perhaps concur with the Commission. The movie, radio,
and television codes all contain statements urging the media to respect
national feelings and the sensitivity of racial and religious groups.
Newspaper and magazine workers probably would say that this re-
quirement is implicit in their conscientious effort to report the day's
intelligence truthfully and impartially.
A fourth requirement mentioned by the Commission is that thc.press
be responsible for "the_presentation and clarification of the g_oals and
values of the society." Again, practitioners would probably accept this
requirement with iiÜle hesitation. Newsmen would perhaps respond,
for instance, that one function of a good editorial page is just such
presentation and clarification. Movie producers and broadcasters could
point to their codes of performance, which urge the media to respect
accepted values and to portray the traditional virtues.
The final requirement mentioned Ily_the Commission is that the
press
_ provide "full_access to the day's intelligence," _Since the citizen
today requires more current information than in any earlier day, the
Commission notes, there must be a wide distribution of news and
opinion. The press would certainly agree. Apart from the attempts of
the press to reach as wide an audience as possible, there is evidence
of the agreement, for example, in the evolution of the concept of
"freedom of information." As newsmen became imbued with a sense
of responsibility, they contended that the public had a right of access
to information, had a basic right to be informed, and that the press
was the agent of the public in breaking down barriers to the free flow
of news.
The idea marked abreak with traditional theory, which assured the
92 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

citizen access to the day's intelligence only by protecting freedom of

expression. Traditional theory provided no legal tool for prying open
the lips of the silent. Yet during World War II and after, especially,
newspapermen complained of an increasing number of government
officials at local, state, and national levels who refused to release
information which might embarrass certain officeholders. Championing
the public's right to such information, the American Society of News-
paper Editors and other professional groups formed committees to
help open up the sources of news; and such newsmen as James Reston,
James Pope, and Erwin Canham repeatedly warned of the dangers of
censorship by suppression.

WAYS OF IMPROVING PRESS PERFORMANCE

Those, then, are the standards of performance outlined by the

Commission. Although the press itself seems to accept those standards,
the Commission detects a wide breach between the acknowledgment
of those standards by the press and its actual practice. For improve-
ment in_ press
_ performance the CDmrnission looks to three sources —
to the press itself, to the public, and to the government.
The press, to provide the variety, quantity, and quality_ of informa-
tion and discussion which the public requires, the Commission says,
should assume aprofessional spirit. "Whatever may be thought of the
conduct of individual members of the older, established professions,
like law and medicine," it notes, "each of these professions as awhole
accepts a responsibility for the service rendered by the profession as
a whole, and there are some things which a truly professional man
mil: not do for money" (66:92). Specifiçally, die_press should assume
the responsibilities of common carriers of information and discussion,
should experiment with high quality content which offers no imme-
diate promise of financial return should engage in vigorous mutual
criticism, and should seek to improve the caliber of its personnel. The
radio industry should take control of programming away from
advertisers.
But the public too has certain oblleions toward the press. What is
needed first is apublic awareness of the tremendous power enjoyed by
the mass media, power concentrated in too few hands; an awareness
of how far the press fails to meet the needs of society. Once the public
understands those things, it can act in three ways to improve the press.
Fil:
sl_usinprofiLinstitutieuz_should help the press carry out its required
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 93

tasks. For example, colleges might operate radio stations or produce

movies for audiences which the commercial media find it inexpedient
to serve. Second, educational institutions should create centers for
advanced study, research, and critical publication in the field of mass
communications; the present schools of journalism should give students
t e 1piucations. Third, an independent agency should be
established to appraise press performance and to report on it each year.
The government, recognizing that the press must remain a pri-
vately-owned business, can nevertheless help to give its citizens the
kind of communications system that they require. For instance, the
government can encourage new ventures in the communications
industry. It e_e adopt new legal remedies to rectify chronic, patent
abuses of press freedom. And it can enter the communications field
to supplement the_privately-owned media.

NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE FREEDOM

The social responsibility theory of the press rests on a foundation of

thought which has amended certain fundamental assumptions of liber-
tarian theory and which has largely rejected others. The concept of
liberty which it represents is fundamentally different from that which
traditional theory represented. Libertarian theory was born of a con-
cept of negative liberty, which we can define loosely as "freedom from"
and more precisely as "freedom from external restraint." The social
responsibility theory, on the contrary, rests on a concept of positive
liberty, "freedom for," which calls for the presence of the necessary
implements for the attainment of a desired goal. Let us explore this
point more fully.
In sum, negative liberty consisted of leaving the individual free to
work out his own destiny. If he were free from outside forces, he could
do so by using his reason to discover the unchanging laws of nature
which governed the universe and by bringing his institutions into
harmony with them. It was enough, then, to remove the restrictions
on man. And it was enough to remove all but a minimum of restric-
tions on the press; for if the press were unhampered, it would feed
information and ideas into the market place, and from their inter-
change truth would emerge triumphant.
The social responsibility theory is grounded in a school of thought
which sees a purely negative liberty as insufficient and ineffective.
Negative liberty, according to this view, is an empty liberty; it is like
94 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

telling a man that he is free to walk without first making sure that
he is not crippled. To be real, freedom must be effective. It is not
enough to tell a man that he is free to achieve his goals; one must
provide him with the appropriate means of attaining those goals.
Hocking, whose ideas are clearly discernible in the report of the
Commission as awhole, has said that true freedom must have both its
negative and positive aspects. "To be free," he says, "is to have the
use of one's powers of action (i) without restraint or control from
outside and (ii) with whatever means or equipment the action
requires" (69:54).
The Commission also says that effective freedom has its positive as
well as negative aspects. "As with all freedom," it says, "press freedom
means freedom from and freedom for." A free press is free from all
compulsions, although not from all pressures. It is free for achieving
the goals defined by its ethical sense and by society's needs; and to
attain this end, it must have technical facilities, financial strength,
access to information, and so forth (66:128). But the Commission is
concerned not just about freedom of those who own the media; it is
also concerned about citizens who possess a merely negative freedom
of expression. Freedom of the press, the Commission argues, is asome-
what empty right for the person who lacks access to the mass media.
His freedom, too, must be implemented — by a press which carries
viewpoints similar to his own; by media operated by government or
nonprofit agencies to provide him with the required services which
the commercial press does not provide.
Even the press itself has been edging away from aconcept of nega-
tive liberty as a result of its preoccupation with "freedom of infor-
mation." The press found that a system of negative liberty provided
no instruments for prying information from recalcitrant government
officials. In various states, the press has worked for the passage of
laws which would require certain official bodies to transact their busi-
ness in open meetings and to make their records available for scrutiny
by the press.

THE PRESS AND GOVERNMENT

As one might expect, the social responsibility theory also differs

from traditional theory in the view which it takes of the nature and
functions of government. Libertarian theory evolved during a period
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 95

in which the state was regarded as the chief foe of liberty. True, there
were other threats to it; John Stuart Mill recognized that the tyranny
of the majority, as surely as the hand of the state, could infringe upon
ail- individual's freedom. Yet by and large, freedom came to mean
freedom from the hold of the state, and the best form of government
Fame to be taken as that which governed least. Some government was
_
necessary to maintain internal and external security — to preserve civil
order, for instance, and to ward off aggressors — and thus to provide
a: climate in which freedom could exist. But the object of concern was
lreedom of the individual. If one assured the freedom of the indi-
vidual, then one assured the freedom of society.
Social responsibility _theory holds that the government must not
merely allow freedom; it must also actively promote. it. As under
traditional theory, one function of government is to maintain order
and personal security. But that is essentially anegative function which
leaves the exercise of freedom to chance, and it is not sufficient in
modern societies. Along with the community, the government, with its
virtual monopoly on physical force, is the only agency strong enough
to make sure that freedom can operate effectively. When necessary,
therefore, the _government should act to protect the_ freedom of its
citizens.
"'Government remains the residuary legatee of responsibility for an
adequate press performance," says Hocking, and his opinion seems
shared by the Commission as a whole. The government should help
society to obtain the services it requires from the mass media if a
self-regulated press and the self-righting features of community life
are insufficient to provide them. The government may act in several
ways. It may enact legislation to forbid flagrant abuses of the press
which "poison the wells of public opinion," for examPlr,—Qr it .may
enter the- field of communication to supplement existing media
(69: .182-93).
Even so, the press must still have afoundation in private enterprise.
The government should intervene only when the need is great and
the stakes are high, and then it should intervene cautiously. It should
not aim at competing with or eliminating privately-owned media.
In short, the government should not act with a heavy hand. Any
agency capable of promoting freedom is also capable of destroying it.
Since freedom of expression is the keystone of political liberty, it must
be _especially protected. Even a democratic government can infringe
96 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

the freedom of its citizens. Public officials, whose tenure in office

depends in large measure on public opinion, may be tempted to
control expression. Therefore,
If the freedom of the press is to achieve reality, government must set
limits on its capacity to interfere with, regulate, or suppress the voices of the
press or to manipulate the data on which public judgment is formed.
Government must set the limits on itself, not merely because freedom of
expression is a reflection of important interests of the community, but also
because it is a moral right. It is a moral right because it has an aspect of
duty about it (66:8).

THE RIGHT OF EXPRESSION

Freedom of expression is amoral right with an aspect of duty about

it, according to the social responsibility theory. The theory thus differs
from libertarian theory on the nature of the right. For under liber-
tarian theory, freedom of expression was anatural right, a right which
man was born with, a right which no one could take away, although
its exercise might temporarily be prevented. No duty was attached to
the right. As we have seen, the assumption was that free men would
voice their ideas and that other free men would listen. Men with
ideas were not obligated to speak, others were not obligated to listen;
but given the nature of man, it was inconceivable that they would not.
While free expression was a natural right, it also was grounded on
utility. It was justified because free speech and a free press would
promote the victory of truth over falsehood in the market place of
ideas.
Under social responsibility theory, freedom of expression is grounded
on the duty of the individual to his thought, to his conscience. It is a
moral right; and a moral right, in the words of Hocking, is "a value
which Iam not free to relinquish, as Iam free to relinquish apersonal
interest." If one claims free expression as a right, he claims it for
others as well as himself and he binds himself to respect their exercise
of it; if he yields his claim, he weakens the claim of others (69: 60-61) .
Freedom of expression is not something which one claims for selfish
ends. It is so closely bound up with his mental existence and growth
that he ought to claim it. It has value both for the individual and for
society. It is the individual's means of perpetuating himself through
his ideas. It is society's sole source of intelligence, the seeds from which
progress springs.
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 97

Besides being valuable to the individual and to society, free expres-

sion has an aspect of duty about it, for anyone with something to say
is morally bound to say it. "If aman is burdened with an idea," says
the Commission, "he not only desires to express it; he ought to express
it. He owes it to his conscience and the common good. The indis-
pensable function of expressing ideas is one of obligation — to the
community and also to something beyond the community — let us
say to truth. It is the duty of the scientist to his results and of Socrates
to his oracle; it is the duty of every man to his own belief. Because
of this duty to what is beyond the state, freedom of speech and of the
press are moral rights which the state must not infringe" (66: 8-9).
This duty to one's conscience is the primary basis of the right of
free expression under social responsibility theory. It is a basis which
the Commission sees as logically preceding the traditional justification
of free expression on the grounds of utility. For whatever discussion
arises from free expression is the result of this duty of the individual
to his conscience.
Although free expression is a universal right, the citizen cannot
claim the right to reach the audience of any of the mass media. He
cannot demand, as aright, that anewspaper or radio station transmit
what he says.
Freedom of expression under the social responsibility theory is not
an absolute right, as under pure libertarian theory. "The notion of
rights, costless, unconditional, conferred by the Creator at birth, was a
marvelous fighting principle against arbitrary governments and had
its historical work to do," says the Commission. "But in the context of
an achieved political freedom the need of limitation becomes evident"
(66:121). One's right to free expression must be balanced against the
private rights of others and against vital social interests.
On this score, traditional theory had been modified long before the
Commission on Freedom of the Press came along. In 1919, in the case
of Schenck vs. the United States, Justice Holmes formulated the
"clear and present danger" test for determining when free expression
may be abridged. "The question in every case," he wrote, "is whether
the words use .1 are used in such circumstances and are of such anature
as to create aclear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has aright to prevent. It is aquestion
of proximity and degree." The press itself acknowledged that con-
siderations of public welfare could override its right to free utterance,
98 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

as when it submitted to voluntary censorship in both of the world wars.

The conditional nature of free expression, in the Commission's line
of reasoning, arises from the basis of the right. Free expression is
grounded on man's duty to his thought. If man does not assume this
duty to his conscience, if on the contrary he uses his free expression to
inflame hatred, to vilify, to lie, if he uses it deliberately to contaminate
the springs of truth, then he has no claim to the right. He has amoral
right only if he assumes the concomitant moral duty.
The moral right to free expression does carry with it the right to
be in error. There are at least two good reasons for tolerating error.
One is that social responsibility theory, like the libertarian theory,
assumes that the search for truth and the spread of truth require
considerable freedom. As the Commission puts it, "liberty is experi-
mental, and experiment implies trial and error." A second reason is
that each individual has the right to be sure that he has found truth
through his own free discovery instead of having it imposed upon him
by some authority. But the moral right covers only honest error. Even
the individual who is wrong must be conscientiously seeking truth. One
does not have the right to be deliberately or irresponsibly in error.
In linking rights and duties, social responsibility theory bears a
closer resemblance to Soviet theory than to libertarian. Soviet theory,
like social responsibility theory, predicates the exercise of rights on
the acceptance of accompanying duties. But there is a profound
difference between the two theories. Under Soviet theory, the duty
is to the proletariat; under the social responsibility theory, the duty is
to one's own conscience.
Moreover, in Soviet theory, one forfeits his legal claim to the right
of free expression if he ignores the duty on which it depends. Not so in
social responsibility theory. Even if one sacrifices his moral right to
free expression he may still claim alegal right to it. The law is not a
fine enough instrument to measure how closely the individual serves
his conscience. It must assume that men in general are speaking in
good faith and in an earnest quest for truth. It is questionable that
the law should make free expression responsible even if it could. For
many individuals, lying is an experiment in morality, as Hocking has
noted, and society has some correctives against it. It is far more in
keeping with a free society that men achieve responsibility through
their own volition and self-control than through some external force.
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 99

Therefore, the law must protect some persons who do not assume
their moral responsibilities along with all of those who do.
But the legal right to free expression under the social responsibility
theory is not unconditional. Even libertarian theory imposed certain
minimal restraints on free expression such as laws dealing with libel,
obscenity, incitement to riot, and sedition. All of those restrictions, the
Commission has noted, were based on one common principle: "that
an utterance or publication invades in a serious, overt, and demon-
strable manner recognized private rights or vital social interests"
(66:123). The legal restrictions on press freedom, then, it argued,
might be justifiably extended if new abuses fall within this category.
Take for example degradation. If publications deliberately, con-
sistently, systematically pander in and exploit vulgarity, they have
sacrificed their moral right to free expression. Having abandoned their
moral claim to it, they have undermined their legal claim. True, there
might be a better means than the law of correcting such publications.
Yet society may decide that degradation is an invasion of its vital
interests against which it is justified in protecting itself. Therefore, it
might prohibit degrading publications. However, the burden of proof
that society's interests were harmed would rest with whoever would
extend the law to cover such new areas of abuse.

VIEW OF THE NATURE OF MAN

The social responsibility theory seems to differ fundamentally from

libertarian theory in its view of the nature of man. Under traditional
theory, man was regarded as primarily amoral and rational being who
was inclined to hunt for truth and to be guided by it. Every man by
nature wished to aid the quest for truth, and every man could serve
its cause, for even the most seemingly preposterous idea was worth
expression. Only if all men spoke freely what was on their minds, the
ridiculous as well as the sublime, could they hope to discover truth.
Given freedom to speak and to publish, men would express themselves.
They would do so temperately and without capriciousness. There was
no need to remind publishers of their public responsibilities; they
would assume them without exhortation because of the moral sense
which gave them their dignity. Nor need one worry about the occa-
sional publisher who, because of human frailty, lied or distorted.
Other publishers would find it profitable to expose him. His lies and
loo FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

distortions would be recognized, for the public would put his utter-
ances to the powerful test of reason.
The social responsibility theory, on the other hand, was developed
in the twentieth century, and it reflects the doubts which contem-
porary social science and contemporary thought have cast on the
rationality of man. The emerging theory does not deny the ration-
ality of man, although it puts far less confidence in it than libertarian
theory, but it does seem to deny that man is innately motivated to
search for truth and to accept it as his guide. Under the social respon-
sibility theory, man is viewed not so much irrational as lethargic.
He is capable of using his reason, but he is loath to do so. Conse-
quently, he is easy prey for demagogues, advertising pitchmen, and
others who would manipulate him for their selfish ends. Because of his
mental sloth, man has fallen into a state of unthinking conformity, to
which his inertia binds him. His mental faculties have become stulti-
fied and are in danger of atrophy. If man is to remain free, he must
live by reason instead of passively accepting what he sees, hears, and
feels. Therefore, the more alert elements of the community must goad
him into the exercise of his reason. Without such goading, man is not
likely to be moved to seek truth. The languor which keeps him from
using his gift of reason extends to all public discussion. Man's aim
is not to find truth but to satisfy his immediate needs and desires.
The skeptical view of man is even more pronounced in the media
codes except the Canons of Journalism than in the writings of the
Commission. The codes of the movie and broadcasting industries
regard safeguarding public morals as a chief concern of the media.
They do not in the least reflect the Miltonian ideas that man through
reason can distinguish between right and wrong, that he cannot be
regarded as truly moral unless he has been subjected to temptation,
and that he is better off learning of evil through the media than at
first hand.
The Commission puts a greater faith in man's morality than do
those codes. Indeed, on the surface the Commission seems to share the
faith that traditional theory placed in man's morality. But morality to
the Commission appears to be a different thing than morality under
libertarian theory. Traditional theory was based on the assumption
that man, as a child of God or of some creator, was an autonomous
creature of dignity who adhered to certain absolute principles of
ethical behavior. To express it loosely, he was true to himself; and
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 101

because he was true to himself, he was true to his fellow man. Morality
under social responsibility theory seems more relative than under
libertarian theory. Nor is it primarily duty to self. As a social being,
man owes a duty to his fellow beings; and morality is duty not
primarily to oneself but to the interests of the community.
The moral duties which were implicit in libertarian theory become
explicit in social responsibility theory. The citizen, under libertarian
theory, had the right to be uninformed or misinformed, but the tacit
assumption was that his rationality and his desire for truth would keep
him from being so. The Commission specifically states that the citizen
is no longer morally free not to read, not to listen. As an active and
responsible citizen, one has a duty to the community to be informed.
This is not to say that one must read or listen to any given segment or
product of the press. Like traditional theory, the new one recognizes
that the citizen's approval or disapproval is an effective control on
the media. The citizen is morally obligated to be informed; how he
becomes so is his own choice.
If a man has a moral duty to be informed, the Commission says,
one can logically hold that he has a right to information for carrying
out that duty. Hence it is no longer sufficient merely to protect the
press's right of free expression, as under traditional theory; it also is
imperative to protect the citizen's right to adequate information.
A press characterized by bigness, fewness, and costliness in effect
holds freedom of the press in trust for the entire population. Media
operators and owners are denied the right of publishing what pleases
themselves. Free expression being a moral right, they are obligated
to make sure that all significant viewpoints of the citizenry are repre-
sented in the press. They need not publish every idea, however pre-
posterous, of course; but they should see that "all ideas deserving
a public hearing shall have a public hearing." The public as well as
the editors and owners should decide what ideas deserve a public
hearing (66:119) .
But the Commission thinks it questionable that press performance
can be left to unregulated initiative alone. The citizen has a moral
right to information and an urgent need for it. If the press does not
of its volition fill his requirements, then both the community and the
government should protect his interests. They can do so by taking
the measures mentioned earlier in this discussion.
102 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

THE SELF-RIGHTING PROCESS

Social responsibility theory puts far less faith than libertarian theory
in the efficacy of the self-righting process. Milton would have subjected
all but primary assumptions to the test of free debate, and Mill and
Jefferson would have exempted not even first principles. Their con-
viction that truth will rise majestically from the clash of ideas is
scarcely justified in contemporary society, according to shapers of
social responsibility theory. Hocking asks, "If one makes it aprinciple
to commit all principles to the melting-pot of debate, what becomes
of the principles which decide debate, what way has he of emerging
from an endlessly renewed clash of hypotheses?" (69:15). In short,
debate becomes inconclusive; there is no one, as Hocking observes, to
pronounce victory or defeat.
Furthermore, Hocking continues, actualities do not support the
classical position. First, there is no assurance that idea will clash
against idea in any real contest. Second, few citizens genuinely search
for ideas which attack those they already hold. "What the existing
process does achieve," says Hocking, "is to elicit mental power and
breadth in those participants whom it does not baffle or confuse. As
long as the will to find truth is undiscouraged and lively, free expres-
sion tends to produce a stronger and more self-conscious citizenry.
It is less its truth product than its human product which we can
count on" (69:94-95).
One can only speculate on what the Commission regards to be the
nature of truth, for the word "truth" seldom enters into its discussion.
One gathers that the Commission does not regard the chief aim of
free expression to be the discovery of an absolute truth, as it was under
libertarian theory. Free expression was valued under traditional
theory because it led to the revelation of truth. To the shapers of that
theory, of course, truth meant different things at different times. To
Milton, truth was the will of a Puritan God; to Jefferson, it probably
was an understanding of the marvelous plan under which the uni-
verse operated. It was an absolute to both, capable of discovery
through the free interchange of ideas.
The Commission appears to value free expression chiefly because it
promotes the harmonious, fruitful society. Man, free to express him-
self, free to exchange ideas with his neighbors, grows in dignity and
develops to his fullest capabilities, as Mill suggested. If free expression
does not lead to the discovery of an absolute truth, it can at least lead
 THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE PRESS 103

to the discovery of anumber of lesser truths, tentative truths, working

truths, which enable men to lead rich and peaceful lives. The value
of free expression is that it raises social conflict "from the plane of
violence," as the Commission expresses it, "to the plane of discussion"
(66:113).
That, then, is the social responsibility theory as developed by the
Commission on Freedom of the Press. The reports of the Commission
have been called "unrealistic." In some of their specific recommenda-
tions, they well may be. Yet one significant point seems to have been
generally overlooked. The Commission has accepted the communi-
cations revolution and complex twentieth-century life and has tried
to solve the problems of the press within that context. Furthermore,
its recommendations in large measure accommodate themselves to
the emergent world view and the thought patterns resulting from it.
In one sense, therefore, few other critics have been so realistic; most
critics, like Morris Ernst in his The First Freedom (New York: Mac-
millan, 1946), have sought to recapture the happy ideal of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in a twentieth-century milieu.
This point may be comforting if one agrees with the Commission or
disturbing if one does not.
Whether or not one agrees with the Commission, however, one
conclusion is abundantly evident — pure libertarian theory is obso-
lescent, as the press as awhole has in fact recognized. Taking its place
is an emerging theory which puts increasing emphasis on the respon-
sibilities of the press, although it is still too early to discern what the
full-blown form of the theory will be. Individuals who still speak of
freedom of the press as a purely personal right are a diminishing
breed, lonely and anachronistic.
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST

THEORY OF

THE PRESS

WILBUR SCHRAMM 4

On the rare occasions when United States and Soviet newspapermen

come together to discuss mass communication, the talk is apt to be
both amusing and frustrating; for it becomes obvious in the first few
minutes that the two frames of reference are incompatible. The
American feels blessed with his free press, and is inclined to sympa-
thize with his Soviet colleague who groans under state ownership,
censorship, and propaganda. The Soviet representative, on the other
hand, claims that he is blessed with the only true freedom of the press,
whereas his unfortunate American colleague is compelled to serve a
press that is venal, controlled by special interests, corrupt, and irre-
sponsible. The American speaks proudly of the ability of his press and
wire services to bring him late news from all over the world, and the
ability of his mass media to entertain and amuse him. The Soviet man
expresses the opinion that late news is not a very important public
service, and that most of the entertainment in the American media is
"twaddle," unworthy of a great nation. And so it goes, until each
backs off — suspecting the other of being addled.
The purpose of this paper is to try to bridge the bewildering gap
between these two points of view. In order to understand the present
Soviet theory of mass communication, we shall try to trace it from its
106 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

roots in Marx through its mutations in the gardens of Lenin and

Stalin. We shall examine the present theory in some detail and look at
the communication system which has grown out of it. Finally, we shall
try to relate the Soviet theory to other theories that have grown up in
other parts of the world, including our own. And let us begin where
the Soviet idea began, with Karl Marx.

1. BACKGROUND

THE MARXIST BASIS

"What was social science before Marx?" asked Andrei Vyshinsky,

and answered his own question thus:
"Pre-Marxian sociology" and historiography at best presented adesultory
assemblage of crude facts and a portrayal of separate sides of the historic
process. Marxism pointed the way to an all-embracing, omnifarious study
of the process of emergence, development, and decay of social-economic
formations. It contemplates the totality of all contradictory tendencies and
reduces them to precisely defined conditions of the life and production of the
various classes of society. It eliminates subjectivism and arbitrariness in
choosing or interpreting "master" ideas. It exposes, without exception, the
roots of all ideas and all different tendencies in the condition of material
production forces (116:82).
It seems almost as though Mr. Vyshinsky did protest too much.
Marx himself more than once expressed dissatisfaction with what his
followers were doing to his ideas. "Je ne suis pas Marxiste," he said
in disgust, and he might make another such disclaimer today if he could
see what has happened to his doctrine in Russia and the other Com-
munist countries. For the tradition of Marx has undergone profound
changes both in the hands of later custodians of the word and under
the pressure of events and situations which could not have been
foreseen when Marx wrote.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Marx contributed ageneral outlook and
at least three sets of ideas which have been the foundation stones for
everything his Soviet followers have built.
The outlook is not easy to state in a few words, and yet it is sug-
gested in the passage we have just quoted from Vyshinsky: Marxism
tries to be "all-embracing"; it "contemplates ...totality"; it "elim-
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 107

mates subjectivism ...in choosing ...ideas"; it tries to reveal

common roots of "all ideas and all different tendencies." In other
words, Marxism is a general philosophy of history, and it has the
overtones of doctrine. It is a neater, tighter system than democracy.
Democracy from the beginning has defended the rights of men to
disagree — with each other, with their government, with religions.
Democracy has developed in such a path that free men are often
unable to agree on common objectives, or even on the amount of
freedom men should have. Marx and his followers, on the other hand,
have placed an almost mystical value on "unity" — unity of the
working class, unity of the Party, unity of choice amongst alternatives.
"How could one of your elections possibly be free if the wrong side
won?" a Russian once asked me, and in so saying he was explaining
more clearly than we could possibly explain by pages of analysis just
what this Marxist outlook is. From the beginning, the Marxist tradi-
tion has displayed authoritarianism, fixedness, atendency to make hard
and sharp distinction between right and wrong, an amazing confidence
in explaining great areas of human behavior on the basis of a small
set of economic facts.
This inheritance from Marx takes on its true importance in the
hands of the Russian people, of whom Carlyle used to say that their
pre-eminent talent was the talent to obey, and who have become used
to authority through centuries of experiencing it. The ideal of unity
and generality derived from Marx is clearly related to the Soviet
policy of repression, the Communist habit of ignoring or explaining
away conflicting evidence, and the missionary-like zeal of many Com-
munist agitators. And in this general outlook inherited by Russians
from Marx we have the basis of much misunderstanding between the
Soviet Union and the United States. We are apt to think that people
must and should hold different ideas and values, and therefore to
encourage the arts of compromise and majority rule; the Soviet
Russians are apt to think that men should not hold different view-
points, that compromise is a sign of weakness, that there is one right
position to be found in Marxism interpretation and to be defended,
propagated, and enforced. To us, what Muller calls the "famed Rus-
sian unity" (105:310) seems reactionary and tyrannical. To the
Russians, our lack of agreement, our permissiveness toward argument,
compromise, and criticism, seem anarchy or chaos.
108 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

In the shadow of this general attitude, Marx developed his concept

of social change which we can describe in terms of its dynamics (the
dialectic), its motivation (materialistic determinism), and its goal
(victory of the working class and ultimately a classless, stateless
society).

The dialectic of social change

The relation of change to the changeless has always been a central

preoccupation of philosophers. The general trend — represented by
most of the great philosophers of Asia, and western philosophers in
the Platonist and Christian traditions — has been to concern oneself
chiefly with contemplating the changeless. But Marx, it must be re-
membered, grew up in a century and in a part of the world where
change was studied and dramatically exemplified. His century was the
time of evolutionary theory in biology, and of dramatic social change
resulting from the industrial revolution. He gloried in change, studied
the process, tried, as Brinton says, "to find in change itself the answer
to the riddle of change" (85:204).
He found his answer chiefly in FIeel's concept of the dialectic by
which two opposing fnrces (thesis and antithesis) resolve their differ-
ences in a synthesis. This synthesis in turn becomes a thesis which is
opposed by anew antithesis, from which grows a new synthesis — and
so on through history. Marx used this dialectic to interpret history as
asuccession of class struggles. For example, the struggle of the feudal,
manorial
_ class Ithees) with the new bourgeois class of merchants,
capitalists, and manufacturers (antithesis), began in the Renaissance
and culminated in the American _and _French Revolutions of the
eighteenth century which were complete victories for the new bour-
gek_(s3,n-thesis).
Marx felt, however, that these were not true revolutions and the
result was not atrue social synthesis, because they were political rather
than social revolutions; the result was achange of ruling power rather
than any profound social change. This latter he thought, would come
from the opposition of the working class (antithesis) to the bourgeoisie
(thesis), with the rè§ult being victory for the workers and the forma-
tion of a new classless society (synthesis). Whether the process of
dialectical change would stop_with this desless society, he does not
make clear. More important, however, is the difference between
Marx's and Hegel's viewpoints toward the nature of this dialectic.
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 109

The basis in materialistic determinism

Marx said:
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its
direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the proc-
ess of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea," he even transforms
into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real
world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on
the contrary, the idea is nothing else than the material world reflected by the
human mind, and translated into forms of thought. ...With him (Hegel)
it (dialectics) is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again,
if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell (103:25).
Marx's great contribution was to turn_ Hegers _dialectic "on its
head." He made it realistic, instead of idealistic. He argued that the
material conditions of life -- chiefly man's way of making his living
and the kind of living_ he makes — determine man's ideas. In other
_
words, economics, the system of productive forces and productive re-
the_centralTfactor of the life of man, the fact which, as
George Kennan put it, determines the nature of apublic life and the
physiognomy of society.
Reflecting on this determinism and studying the economics of west-
ern Europe, Marx arrived at a paradigm for social change which he
felt was inevitable. He believed that productive forces would always
change faster than productive relations, thus throwing society out of
balance. As he analyzed the situation, capitalism contained the seeds
of its own destruction. It would always have recurring depressions and
economic crises. These would broaden the gulf between rich and poor.
The rich would grow richer and the poor poorer. But the rich would
grow fewer and the poor more numerous and more desperate. The
last stage of capitalism would be imperialism, which would breed wars
and more misery. Finally, the working class would no longer be able
to contain their frustration. They would rise and take over the means
of production, liquidate the capitalists, and organize a new classless
society.
He makes plain that this change is much more than economic or
political. The arts, religion, philosophy, and all other components of
culture would likewise change. For his position is, as Jensen and
others point out, that inevitably the dominant ideas and institutions
of any society are the ideas and institutions of the dominant economic
class.
110 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

The goal: a classless, stateless society

Now let us look for amoment at the goal and end of all this social
change. When the proletariat takes over the means of production, said
Engels, when it "puts an end to itself as the proletariat, it puts an end
to class differences and class antagonisms, it puts an end also to the
state as state. ...The first act in which 1 r-
ward as the represen.tativ(e-ef--roaciety_ as a whole —the seizure of the
means of production in the name of society — is, at the same time,
its last independent act as a state" (89:410). From that moment on,
the state must "automatically wither away." The state, as Marx and
Engels see it, is merely a device for one class to exercise control over
others. With a classless society, therefore, the state is by definition
obsolete.
What an extraordinarily optimistic view of man this is! Not even
a fiery champion of democracy like Thomas Paine ever thought man
so nearly perfect that he could live without government! But there
is a flaw in the picture. Is man ready at once to play his appointed
part in this_golden aie_Marx -' it-iUiè7aré-
d-iE-
e he is not,lor he must
accept the leadership, even the dictatorship, of the Party. What is the
process, the/Irby-which man
is educated to his position just below
the angels" and the state is enabled to with-e
-i-a7irà-
y? -0-r
ice man has
-

been- nrzrized into "a machine to change societe as Stephen

Spender puts it (97), how shall he be turned into the godlike free
creature Marx apparently envisages? On this p- oiiii,- Béith Marx and
-

Engels have very little to say. They insist on the inevitability of the
golden age, but are not very specific about how it will be arrived at
once power has been seized. As we shall see later, their followers have
also had some trouble with the details of the golden age. Indeed, the
fact that the Soviet state has thus far shown no sign of withering
away, and instead has vastly multiplied its bureaucracy and its police
system, has caused some embarrassment to Communist apologists.
Although Marx almost never addressed himself to the problem of
mass communication, still the basis for the Soviet rationale is in what
we have been talking about. For one thing, it is clear that the Marxist
concept of unity and the sharp distinction between right and_wr-ong
positions, woukLnszt_permit the press to function as a Fourth Estate,
independently criticizing government or serving as_a forum _for free
discussion. Rather, the Communist press would be_conceived ns an in-
strument to interpret the doctrine, to carry out the policies of the
working class or the militant party. Again, it is clear from what Marx
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 111

wrote aboutinaterialistic _determinism that he felt the control of the

press would rest with_those—who_owned the facilities — the presses,
the paper, the broadcasting stations. So long as the capitalist class
controls these physical properties, the working class will never have a
fair access to the channels of communications. To have real access,
the wor_kinulals_imist own the means and facilities of mass communi-
cation,- for the_press, like other institutions of the state, is simply a
class organ. And similarly, he must have felt that real freedom of the
press could never exist except in the classless society, where the work-
ing class has -siized the material properties of communication and has
no more to far from control by bourgeois owners. There is good rea-
son to think that he did value such freedom, and wanted the condi-
tions of "true freedom" to be created. Finally, one might suspect that
freedom of the press must have been of less concern to Marx, as to
his followers, than responsibility of the press. All these points will re-
appearin the following_pages.
But since Marx has taken on the tone of gospel in many parts of the
world, it is only proper to record here that on many key points his
writings were incomplete or ambiguous, if not inconsistent. His am-
biguities or inconsistencies arose mostly from the duality of his person-
ality as scientist and evangelist. For even while he analyzed the
historical process and diagnosed it as materialistically determined and
inevitable, still he preached that through the right knowledge man
could control destiny, and, as Muller says, "his own influence on
modern history is the most spectacular example of the power of ideas
and ideals" (105:312). In speaking of truth, he was a relativist, and
many times argued the class bias of all thought; yet he insisted on the
unexceptionable truth of his own theory of history. On many doctrinal
points about which his followers speak with assurance and fire, Marx
said practically nothing — for example, about the use of mass com-
munication. But perhaps the most important of his omissions, in view
of what happened later, was his failure to provide the revolution with
apolitical theory, or even to say in any very specific terms what "dic-
tatorship of the proletariat" should mean. That left it up to Lenin
and Stalin to become architects of the Soviet state.
As this paper goes into proof, word comes of the address by Krush-
chev to the Supreme Soviet, denouncing Stalin. This is amost remark-
able development, and the question at once arises, whether it portends
any decisive change in the goals and architecture of the Soviet state.
More particularly, it is necessary to ask whether this policy will negate
112 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

any of the essential developments of the Soviet system which took

place during Stalin's time, and which we shall describe in these next
pages. We shall have to await developments, of course. But the indi-
cation now is that the fundamentals are left unchanged. The mood
of Soviet foreign relations will change, but the purpose of Soviet
foreign relations will not. The concept of "one leader" is probably
dead for awhile in the Soviet Union. The men in the Kremlin seem
to be distributing the tasks and decisions of government among them,
and it may well be that there will be some liberalizing of the amount
of participation and criticism permitted the lower echelons of Party
members. Additional contacts with the outside world will be encour-
aged, and it may be that surveillance will at least for atime be lessened.
These are signs and tendencies only; it will take several years to see
whether this new posture on the part of the Soviet leaders is a feint
or a really new look. Meanwhile it must be assumed that the basic
goals of the Soviet state and the basis of its control over communica-
tions, as developed under the long influence of Marx, Lenin, and
Stalin, are not going to change. One of the best pieces of evidence for
that assumption is a statement in Pravda for July 7, 1956: "The
Çommunistlra eaLand_ will be the only master of the minds
and thoughts,_th_upokesman, leader and organizer of the people in
their entire struggle for Communism." That would suggest that we
artilVdealijwith - th-
e— Marx-Lenin-Stalin pattern.

THE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH LENIN AND STALIN

Throughout all the_years of preparation for revolution, the attention

of Lenin and his followers had to be centered on the problems of
seizing power. There was little time to think of the form Socialism
would take after the revolution. George Kennan (in the essay he
modestly signed "X") has analyzed this period of transition very well,
and calls Lenin's ideas of the postrevolutionary future "for the most
part nebulous, visionary, and impractical" (98:104). Beyond the na-
tionalization of industry and the expropriation of large private capital
holdings, he says, there was no agreed program. They were extremely
vague on the treatment of the peasantry (who, in Marxist thought,
are not part of the proletariat), and indeed their policy toward the
peasants remained vague for many years after they came to power.
The Soviet state, therefore, developed slowly and uncertainly after
October, 1917, and with many abrupt changes of line. We can say,
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 113

from afew decades' vantage point, that the form and direction it took
were products of ideology and circumstances and personalities. The
ideology, of course, was inherited from Marx and Engels — the incom-
plete, ambiguous analysis of history in terms of material determinism
and class struggle. The circumstances were such as to make dictatorial
power a necessity. The Bolsheviks were never more than a tiny frac-
tion of the people of Russia. The first abrupt attempt to eliminate
private production and commerce was an abject failure. When controls
were even slightly relaxed, it became evident that large sectors of
society were waiting to step into the power and trade vacuum thus
created. From the beginning of the Soviet state until today, as Kennan
points out, this power has never been consolidated, and thus "the men
in the KT•efnlin
— have continued to be predominantly absorbed with
the struggle to secure and make absolute the power which they seized
in November 1917" (98:106). The nature of personalities in the
_
Kremlin has demanded that.
What kind of men were the leaders in the Kremlin? They were
insecure and fanatical. They were Promethean; indeed, perhaps never
before in history have so few men grasped such vast powers over so
many, in such confidence that they knew exactly how to lead their
subjects into the golden pastures. George Kennan has studied the
Lenin-Stalin group as carefully as any man. Here is what he has to
say about them:
Their particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-
Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage
any permanent sharing of power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of
which they had emerged they carried with them a scepticism as to the pos-
sibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces. Easily per-
suaded of their own doctrinaire "rightness," they insisted on the submission
or destruction of all competing power. Outside of the Communist Party,
Russian society was to have no rigidity. There were to be no forms of col-
lective human activity or association which would not be dominated by the
Party. ...And within the Party the same principle was to apply. The mass
of Party members might go through the motions of election, deliberation,
decision and action; but in these motions they were to be animated not by
their own individual wills but by the awesome breath of the Party leadership
and the brooding presence of "the word."
Let it be stressed again that subjectively these men probably did not seek
absolutism for its own sake. They doubtless believed — and found it easy to
believe — that they alone knew what was good for society and that they
could accomplish that good once their power was secure and unchallengeable.
But in securing that security of their own rule they were prepared to recog-
nize no restrictions, either of God or man, on the character of their methods.
114 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

And until such time as that security might be achieved, they placed far down
on the scale of operational priorities the comforts and happiness of the peo-
ples entrusted to their care (98:105-06).
ilieàiein gn
erit;iteencini%. eology, circumstance, and personalities
combined to create on Russian soil one of the most complete dicta-
torships in modem history. This dictatorship emphasized such parts
of the ideology as met its needs, and which instead of withering away
as Marx had foreseen, has immensely expanded its bureaucracy and its
instruments of surveillance and control. The elements of Marx it has
come to emphasize have been the innate hostility between capitalism
and socialism, and the infallibility of the leaders who have "the word"
— that is, the Marxian word. It is obviously necessary for them to
keep alive both the sense of danger and the sense of leadership. The
part of the ideology which it has been most convenient to ignore_is
the famous _picture of the withering away _of the state once the pro-
letariat has see Mut *elD_ases _ of
_ power.
_ Lenin himself never
goriFoiind to correcting Marx on this point, and the job was finally
left to Stalin who thus had the exceedingly embarrassing task of cor-
recting both Marx and Lenin. He did so by saying that Lenin wrote
his famous volume, The State and Revolution, with the intention of
defending and clarif in Marx and En eh; and had intended to write
asecon volume of that work, summing up eprincipal lessons of—the
Russian experience. "There can be no doubt" (said Staliizl_"that
Lenin intended in the second volume of his book to elaborate and
develop the theory of the state on the basis of his experi--en-ii-gained
during the existence of Soviet power in our country: Death, -Wowev.
prevented him from carrying this task into exec-tition. But what Lenin
did not manage to do should be done by his disciples" (113:658).
Thus "under the protection of Lenin's ghost," as Hans Kelsen ex-
presses it, Stalin stated the new doctrine of the Soviet state, which
was essentially that in astrong state, military and police power would
be needed as long_as the Soviet Union is surrounded ly capitalist pow-
ers. After the last remnants of the capitalist system had been eliminated
in Russia, after acultural revolution had been brought about, after a
modem arm — y had been formed for defense of the country, still the

need for astrong government remained, said Stalin, because pi ti

In place of this function of suppression the state acquired the function
of protecting Socialist property from thieves and pilferers of the people's
property. The function of deknding--tite-zountry from foreign-attack- fully
remained; consequently the Red Army and the Navy also fully remained, as
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 115

did the punitive organs and the intelligence service, which are indispensable
for the detection and punishment of the spies, assassins, and wreckers sent
into this country by foreign espionage services. The function of economic
manization and cultural education by the state organs iTsii-Tet— naines_li and
waï-dei-ieoped to the full. Now the main task of our state inside the country
is the work of peaceful economic organization_Ind cultural education. As for
our army, punitive organs and intelligence service, their edge is no_12tt_ger
turned to the inside-of our country but to the outside, against the external
enemies (113:661).
Side by side with the concept of anonwithering Bolshevik state de-
veloped the concept of what might be called the Bolshevik ideal per-
sonality. In part this is amirror image of the leaders, in part asynthe-
sis of the same elements which went into the designing of the state.
Margaret Mead has written incisively of it, and anyone who is inter-
ested may profitably read what she has to say in Soviet Attitudes toward
Authority (104). This "Bolshevik ideal_personality," she concludes, is
a combination of eastern and western characteristics. To a certain
extent, the Bolshevik ideal has characteristics in common with the
untan a ers o wng an and with many other relieous groups
at periods That is, the Bolshevik ideal personality is highly
goal-oriented, has a driving "conscience," and is able to produce an
extremélY—high level of activity without external proddii2g. His per-
formance is expected to be focused and meaningful, and his private
feelings must be subordinated to the chief goals he serves. Even rest
and relaxation are suspect, to a Bolshevik. So far, this is a not un-
familiar personality pattern. lut the Bolshevik personality demands
also a complete subjection 9f the individual to the control of the
Party. Although the individual, says Dr. Mead, "is to have a strong
internal conscience, yet the perception of the correct line of action is
delegated to asmall group of leaders and the will of the individual is
to be used first for the voluntary act of initial subjection and then to
execute this truth perceived by the leade_rskie_ (104:29). Deviation
from this path is regarded as peculiarly horrific, and abroad machin-
ery of self-criticism and mutual criticism is set up to prevent and cor-
rect deviations. This is the kind of personality which the men around
Lenin and Stalin have tried to build around them.
We have taken time to suggest these developing lines of Soviet
ideology, government, and personality because it is manifestly impos-
sible to understand the present situation in the Soviet Union solely
on the basis of Marxism or solely on the basis of what Lenin and
Stalin contributed to the Marxist tradition. Furthermore, it should
116 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

be emphasized that Soviet mass communication was developing, dur-

ing the period we have been talking about, as an integral part of the
Soviet state. In the Soviet system, there is not atheory of the state and
a theory of communication; there is only one theory. Nothing could
be farther from Soviet thinking than our concept of the press as a
Fourth Estate to watch and report on and criticize the first three. Mass
communications, from the beginning of the proletarian revolution,
were conceived of instrumentally. Itwas Lenin who said that the news-
paper should be a "collective propagandist, collective agitator ...
collective ugardzef_Lgoz:A.,_La›.. The media were therefore instru-
ments to_4e_contralled by the state (on behalf of the people) through
control of the material facilities of communication; private media thus
went out of existence very early in Soviet history. The media should
be used as instruments to conve_y the "word" as interpreted by the
Kremlin. The media should be used as instruments of social change
and social control, in a tightly unified, closely drawn frame of—refer-
ence. Finally, the media should be instruments of serious purpose.
Their use for recreation is considered an unworthy u -se, -seinewhat as,
in the case of the Bolshevik man, relaxation is suspect. In other words,
the Soviet media have grown so as to reflect the Soviet official ideol-
ogy, the Soviet state, and the Soviet "ideal personality," as we shall
see in the next pages.

2. FOREGROUND

THE THEORY NOW

Let us now try to describe the Soviet concept of mass communication

as it has emerged from this long history. And let us remind ourselves
that this concept of communication is integral with the concept of the
Soviet state. Therefore, our first task must be to look at the more
general theory.

The source of power

Ii Soviet theory, as Ihave elsewhere said (110), power is social,

resident in_p_ccplc_, latent in soclal institutions, and generated in social
action. This power is at its maximum _ta) when it is joined with
natural resources and the facilities of production and distribution,
and (b) when it is organized and directed.
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 117

Thus Lenin said, "The proletariat has no other weapon in the fight
for power except organization ...the proletariat can become and
will become adominant force only because its intellectual unity created
by the principles of Marxism is fortified by the material unity of organ-
.

ization which welds millions of toilers into an army of the working

class."

The source of leadership

The Communist Party possesses this power of organization. It there-

fore considers that it has the right to serve as advance guard and
leader of the mass. As Vyshinsky says, "The political basis of the
USSR comprises — as the most important principle of the worker-
class dictatorship — the leading and directing role of the Communist
Party in all fields of economic, social, and cultural activity. The works
of Lenin and Stalin develop exhaustively the theoretical and organi-
zational practical aspects of this matter" (116:159). But yet, as Selz-
nick points out (112), the Party does not merely insert itself in aposi-
tion of leadership of the masses; in a very real sense it creates the
masses by organizing them — by establishing organs of access and con-
trol which transform a diffuse population into a mobilizable source
of power.
The Party thinks of itself, therefore, as a kind of general staff for
the mass of workers. It is custodian of basic doctrine, eyes and ears for
the mass, guide into action (see 110) .There is no doubt that the role
of the Party has become more important, the role of the mass more
passive, since the 1920's. When the mass accepts this guidance, it must
also accept strict control. It has been observed that the Party operates
on the Bonapartist assumption that delegation of authority to leader-
ship places the leadership in unlimited control during its period of
office. Therefore, attacks against leadership are equivalent to treason
against the state. Purges are an accepted tool of governing. And the
political apparatus must provide whatever control structure is neces-
sary to mobilize and direct the energy of the mass.
How does the Party in practice exercise its leadership? Says
Vyshinsky:
Practically, the party's guidance of the Soviets is actualized as follows:
(1) First of all, the party seeks to advance its candidates into the basic posts
of state work in our country at elections for Soviets — its best workers, de-
voted to the concerns of socialist building and enjoying the broadest con-
fidence of the popular masses. In this the party succeeds. ...(2) "The
Party verifies the work of the organs of government and the organs of author-
118 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

ity correcting unavoidable mistakes and shortcomings, helping them develop

the decisions of the government and trying to guarantee them support of the
masses — and not a single important decision is taken by them without
corresponding directions of the Party." (3) "In developing aplan of work
of a given organ of authority — whether along the line of industry and
agriculture or that of building trade and culture — the Party gives general
guiding directions defining the character and direction of the work. ..."
(116: 160).
As the mass must submit to the dictatorship of the Party, so the
Party must submit to the dictatorship of its central bureaucracy and
leaders. Here as elsewhere appears the Bolshevik faith in organization,
deriving from the need to organize in order to seize and maintain
power. Lenin, for example, tells how he and his circle "suffered to the
point of torture from the realization that we were proving ourselves
to be amateurs at amoment in history when we might have been able
to say. ...'Give us an organization of revolutionists and we shall
overturn the whole of Russia!'" The kind of organization for which
the Bolsheviks felt the need was a strictly monolithic party. No com-
peting power structures, no substantial deviations in ideology, are per-
mitted. Indeed, no other kind of structure could withstand the changes
of tactics and the ceaseless combat required of the Party. As Stalin
said, "the unexampled unity and compactness of our Party ...made
it possible to avoid a split on the occasion of a turn as sharp as the
New Economic Policy. Not a single (other) party in the world ...
would have withstood such a sharp turn without confusion, without
asplit" (113:221).
The truth and the line. How is the "truth" derived for expression
in ffiélme"( ihrou• hout tEIiere has been amarked change
in this respect. In the early_years of Soviet power, as Margaret Mead
notes .(104121L it was assumed that the truth was arrived at through
collective deliberation of the Tarty. Therefore, each Party member
was supposed to have full freedom of discussion until aParty Congress
had reached adecision. As early as the 10th Congress, in 1921, how-
ever, Lenin expressed grave doubts about the efficiency of this system.
During the 1920's control passed rapidly from the broad discussion
and Party Congresses to the small group of top Party leaders. Before
the end of the 20's — and ever since — Party Congresses are called
chiefly to approve decisions already made. "The appropriate behavior
of the Party member today," says Dr. Mead, "is to know the principles
of Marxism-Leninism and to apply them as directed by the Line, not to
think about them" (104:21).
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 119

One effect of this development is, therefore, to put basic responsi-

bility for all mass _communications in the hands of a small group of
top Party leaders. All the mass media in the Soviet Union become
speaking trtunpets f c>i•
- - these leaders, and the editors and directors

listen anxiously for the latest Olympian rumblings of "the truth."

4.second effect is to create a somewhat changeable line, with re-
sulting insecurity in every_Party member, for, as_ it_ has often been
reniarked, behavior which was true and loyal yesterday may be branded
as false and disloyal tomorrow. As a student of Russia has observed,
"a man whose particular scientific dogma has been in disgrace for a
period of years may be suddenly brought back from an ignominious
sojourn on the periphery — a mild form of exile — and made the
head of an important institute or bureau. He may be publicly described
as being entirely good, while the man he replaces, who may have re-
ceived the same appointment with a comparable statement of his
absolute loyalty and goodness five years before, is now unmasked as
having been an `enemy of the people,' or whatever the official terms of
vilification may be. ...The assumption that every human being is
potentially and continuingly wholly good and wholly bad throughout
life is grounded in traditional Russian character and complements
political practice very neatly" (104:33).
Still athird result is to create what appears to the otits;dr, at
as a double standard of truth. On the one hand, the basic laws are
considered absolute and unassailable. As Lenin said, "the teachings of
Marx are immovable because they are true (yerno)." Antagain,
"truth (istina) is what corresponds to reality." Thus, basically the
Soviets are committed to a material determinism, and to a concept
of class struggle which must inevitably end with the victory of the
proletariat. On issues like this, the idea of compromise, in our sense,
is simply incomprehensible to the Soviet leadership. Thus, one Ameri-
can negotiator reported: "During negotiations they feel that appeals
to public opinion are just abluff. If American public opinion is con-
trary to what they want to do, our government or some hidden body,
a capitalist Politburo, must be manipulating it. We think of com-
promise as a natural way to get on with the job, but to them com-
promise is usually coupled with the adjective rotten. They are puzzled
by our emphasis on the desirability of compromise" (quoted, 104:15).
Sovietues-
tion." There are onl a focused and an unfocused lens on reality.
120 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

Thus, while on the one hand the basic concepts and goals are re-
garded as absolute and unchangeable, on the other hand communica-
tions tend to be judged not on the test of their objective truth but on
the test of their impact. Do they contribute to the basic goals? Bolshe-
vik doctrine, as Leites says, thus opposes the old tendency of the Rus-
sian intelligentsia to stress "sincerity" (100:123). Soviet spokesmen
are expected to do what Tolstoy had reproached women for doing —
use words, not to express their thoughts, but to attain their ends.
Soviet diplomats are, in fact, expected to retreat at strategic moments
(for example, to sign a treaty with Germany or to advocate world
peace and coexistence) if those retreats are intended to contribute in
the long run to basic goals. Soviet media are expected to change their
line overnight, to denounce a man they previously lionized, or advo-
cate apolicy they had previously excoriated, if top leadership informs
them that this is the new line. In the sense in which our newspaper edi-
tors talk about it, truth is irrelevant in the editing of a Soviet news-
paper. On the other hand, compromise, majority opinion, a"middle of
the road policy," all of which are so important to our communicators
and political representatives, are questionable if not reprehensible to a
Russian editor or politician.
The nature of the state. We are about to define Soviet mass com-
munication as a spokesman' lor the line and an instrument of the
state. Before taking up the mass media directly, therefore, we should
properly say afew words about the Soviet state as it has evolved.
We have already said enough about the state to make clear its gen-
eral nature — a dictatorship in which the power pyramid rises very
sharply from the proletariat to a select Party to a select few leaders.
There is no sign of the predicted "withering away" of the bureauc-
racy. As might be expected, it maintains tight controls over the re-
sources, facilities, and relationships of production.
We should add that the Soviet state operates by simultaneous and
coordinated programs of coercion and persuasion. The persuasion is
the responsibility of agitators, propagandists, and the media. Lest it
be thought that coercion would be inappropriate and persuasion un-
necessary in the "Soviet socialist" society, the Soviet leaders point out
that the present is a"transition" period. Thus Vyshinsky:
Suppression and the use of force by the state are still essential during the
transition period — force, however, exerted by the exploited majority upon
the exploiting minority, different in type and new in principle. ...
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 121

The new Soviet state is amachine to crush the resistance of exploiters, to

do away with exploitation and class domination by exploiters, to reinforce
the class dominance of the proletariat and its leadership of the rest of the
toiling masses to the end of finally liquidating classes in general and passing
into communism. ...
Hence follow the specific tasks of crushing the enemies of socialism and the
particular significance of such methods of exposing and annihilating them
as intensification of the revolutionary vigilance of the toiling masses and
organs of proletarian dictatorship, intensified guard of the boundaries of the
USSR, intensification of measures to thwart counterrevolutionary activity,
and so on (116:3).

Mass communications in the Soviet state

We come now to the point where we can leave the background and
the political framework and begin to talk directly about mass com-
munication in the Soviet Union. And the first direct statements we
have to make about Soviet communication will help to illustrate
why it has seemed necessary to sketch in so much political and histori-
cal background. For in trying to define the present Soviet concept of
mass communication, we have to say that
Mass communications are used instrumentally — that is, as an in-
strument of the state and the Party.
They are closely integrated with other instruments of state power
and Party influence.
They are used as instruments of unity within the state and the
Party.
They are used as instruments of state and Party "revelation."
They are used almost exclusively as instruments of propaganda and
agitation.
They are characterized by astrictly enforced responsibility.
Let us talk about those points, one by one.
Instrumental use of mass communications. Marx undoubtedly
dreamed of the press as free of the state, serving as areal spokesman of
the people. And if the state had withered away, as predicted, after the
revolution, perhaps his dream might have come true. There are ves-
tiges of the dream even now, for example in the practice of Soviet
leaders in operating their newspapers with very small professional staffs,
apparently on the theory that "amateur" newspaper writers are to be
encouraged. But actually the mass communication system in the pres-
ent Soviet thinking is about as much an instrument as a typewriter
or amegaphone. There is no place in the Soviet concept for the idea
122 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

of the press as a clear and independent mirror of events. Nothing is

farther from Soviet intention than giving mass communication units
any of the responsibility for originating public opinion or pushing the
state into a policy decision. A "personal paper," like the Chicago
Tribune under Colonel McCormick, an independent critical journal
like the New York Times, or opposing opinions on the same radio
station such as one can hear in this country on ABC, are not within
the Soviet concept. The communication system, like e=i.ler system
in the Soviet state, exists to do a job specifically assigned it by the
leaders of the state. Over-all, this lob is to contribute to the advance
of the working_class and world Communism in the class struggle, and
to maintain and advance the _power of the Soviets. Specifically, the
media are assigned certain tasks within that large assignment, which
we shall now talk about in more detail. The point is, that Soviet mass
communications do not have integrity of their own. Their integrity,
such as it is, is that of the state. They are "kept" instruments, and they
follow humbly and nimbly the gyrations of the Party line and the
state directives.
Mass communications are integrated with other instruments. This
makes it possible for the mass media to be integrated into the function-
ing of the state in a way which would be quite foreign to our own
media. We tend to think of anumber of parallel forces acting on Amer-
ican public opinion. These range from the interpersonal discussion
within the primary group, through the organizations and the media re-
porting and discussing events, to the actions of the government. It is
sometimes hard for us to grasp that in the Soviet state these forces are
not parallel; they are one. That is, the group meetings at the block
level, the youth meetings in school, the school system, the unions, the
lower echelons of the Party, the papers, the broadcasts, the publishing
industry, and the police and surveillance system of the government are
different instruments with a single purpose. They are all saying the
same thing.
Stalin defined_politkal leadership as "the ability to convince the
masses of the correctness of the Party's policy." But both Lenin and
Stalin heaped scorn on Party members who depended on words alone.
They insisted, in Lenin's words that "the dictatorship of the proletariat
was successful because it knew how to combine compulsion with per-
suasion." Prsilpaganda, agitation, organization, and coercion represent
an unbroken continuum in their thiriking. The media are designed
specifically, not only to inform the people, but also to serve the agi-
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 123

tators who are organizing the masses, the Party leaders in the com-
munities, the industrial groups who use the papers for oral readings,
the schools who use them on many occasions as textbooks. There is a
great deal of sameness about the content of Soviet media on any day,
and this is regarded as astrength, rather than aweakness. And the lead-
ers of the state are in no doubt as to the limits of the effective use of
the media. Lenin said: "As long as the question was (and insofar as
it still is) one of winning over the vanguard of the proletariat to
Communism, so long, and to that extent, propaganda took first place;
even propaganda circles, with all the imperfections of the circles, are
useful under these conditions and produce fruitful results. But when
it is aquestion of the practical action of the masses, of the dispositions,
if one may so express it, of vast armies, of the alignment of all the
class forces of the given society for the final and decisive battle, then
propaganda habits alone, the mere repetition of the truths of 'pure'
Communism, are of no avail" (quoted, 112:9).
Mass eommunicationç as instruments for unity. From what we have
just said it is apparent that one of the most prized abilities of the mass
media in the Soviet state should be to contribute to the unity of the
state. We have already mentioned how the Bolsheviks valued their
"famed unity." The media are their swiftest
_ instruments for _athieving
unity of knowledge within their own country. That is why the leaders
have gone to such great troubles to establish controls and censorship
over their own publications, broadcasts, and films, and to keep foreign
publications, broadcasts, and films out of the country. That is also why
the sameness of the Soviet media is regarded in the Soviets as a sign
of health.
Mass communications as instruments of revelation. One special job,
and one general job, are assigned the communicators of the Soviet
state. We shall talk about the general task presently. The special job
is to make "political revelations in every sphere." (The words are
Lenin's.) WI a
-t does he Pusan hy_these. "revelations"? Domenach, who

saw some of them at first hand, says they "consist of_probing behind
the façade of sophisms with which the ruling classes cloak their selfish
interests, the time nature of their desires and the actual basis of their
power, and of giving the masses a `true_picture of them" (88:266).
He then quotes Lenin on revelations: "The worker will not be able
to get this true picture from books; he will not find it in any current
accounts, in sti11-Éresh explanations_ of things _ha_ppening at any given
124 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

moment, about which we speak or whisper among ourselves and which

are reflected in such-and-such facts, figures, verdicts, etc. These polit-
ical revelations, embracing all spheres, are the necessary and funda-
mental conditions of preparing the masses for their revolutionary
activity" (102:1, 22).
words the job of and the agitator (and the
mass communicator) is to look at events from the Marxist-Leninist-
Stalinist standpoint, go behind the appearance to the reality (reality
_ _
being always defined in terms of the class struggle), and interpret the
'real meaning' of events to the masses. In so doing he grounds his ex-
planations in real and believable tensions. He begins with details which
are or seem verifiable. He proceeds from small irritations to interpre-
tation on a grand scale. Domenach records how the French Commu-
nists "demonstrated" the "evils" of the "imperialist" Marshall Plan
from the tiniest instances — a scarcity of some kind of goods, the
closing of a factory, the reduction of water supply in a rural commu-
nity. A strike, a political scandal, an instance of discrimination, an
unwise statement by a public figure, a yearning for peace that will
bring the young men home from military service — all these provide
a chance for the communicator to work from the sp_ecific ta the gen-
eral doctrinal meaning, in the words of their own instructions to "tear
_
the mask from the enemy."___
This is the function which, in the Soviet concept of the mass media,
largely replaces our own function of news gathering and news writing.
Mass communications as agitator, propagandist, organizer. The
basic job of the mass media is, as we have suggested, to serve as col-
lective agitator, propagandist, and organizer. Plekhanov is the author
of the famous distinction, so often quoted, between agitation and
propaganclaropzg_atrlist he said, presents many ideas to one or a
few people; an agitator presents only one or a few ideas, but to a
mass of people (108). Commenting on this distinction, Lenin said that
the agitator will fasten his iiiión a concrete injustice "engen-
dered by the contradictions inherent in capitalism," and against that
background "will endeavor to rouse mass discontent and indignation
against the crying injustice, leaving to the propagandist the responsi-
bility of giving a complete explanation_ for the contradiction. This is
why the propagandist works principally through the written word and
the agitator through the spoken word" (102:1, 226). In Communist
thinking, therefore, there_is_ no sharp dichotomy between apit_a_tº1•—._aria-
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 125

propagandist. They_ areboth needed in the combat parti and their

words and their deeds fit into the organizing _activities of the party.
Thus, the Soviet mass communication system is charged with work-
ing on three levels. It is to provide the popularized "revelations," by
which to contribute to the political consciousness of the masses. It is
to provide the doctrinal explanations by which to inform the leaders
of thought. And by carrying a great deal of official information, it is
to contribute to the smooth functioning of the Party and the organiza-
tion of the workers._
Mass communications as responsible instruments:_ responsibility
and freedom. There is no doubt that a high degree of responsibility
is required of the operators of Soviet mass communications. Since this
concept of responsibility i elpsely related to the _Soviet concpt of
-freedom, and since the Soviet use of these terms is somewhat different
from ours, we arc going to devote the whole following section to the
relation of freedom- and responsibility in Soviet media.
To us, the Soviet mass media look like closely controlled instru-
mentalities of the state. To the Soviet mind, our media are closely
controlled instrumentalities of a capitalist class. In our view, the
Soviet media are far from free; but the Soviet official position is that
they are the freest in the world. What lies behind this fundamental
conflict of opinion?
Let us begin with Article 125 of the Constitution of the USSR,
which reads as follows:
In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to
strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the USSR arc guaranteed
by law:
(a) Freedom of speech;
(b) Freedom of the press;
(c) Freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
(d) Freedom of street processions and demonstrations.
These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working peo-
ple and their organizations, printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings,
the streets, communications, facilities and other material requisites for thc
exercise of these rights.
Probably the best exposition of the meaning of this article from the
Soviet point of view is by Andrei Vyshinsky, in The Law of the Soviet
State (116:539ff.). Alex Inkeles also has some able comments on the
meaning of the article, from our point of view, in Public Opinion in
Soviet Russia (95:136ff.). These treatments are too long to quote,
126 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

and in any case something may be gained by attempting a new ap-

proach which will draw on both these sources but handle the matter
in asomewhat different way.
The key to the problem is obviously what the Soviets mean by the
word freedom in this article, and whether there is a difference be-
tween their overt and covert viewpoints. From Marx to Bulganin we
have a series of defenses of "freedom." For example, here is what
Stalin said to Roy Howard in an interview:
Implicit in your question is the innuendo that socialist society negates in-
dividual freedom. That is not so. ...We have not built this society in order
to cramp individual freedom. We have built it in order that human person-
ality might feel itself actually free. We built it for the sake of genuine per-
sonal freedom, freedom without quotation marks. What can be the "personal
freedom" of an unemployed person who goes hungry and finds no use for
his toil? Only where exploitation is annihilated, where there is no oppression
of some by others, no unemployment, no beggary, and no trembling for fear
that aman may on the morrow lose his work, his habitation, and his bread
— only there is true freedom found (113).
Stalin in that passage, of course, is arguing the material basis of
freedom. Bearing this in mind, let us try to put down a few state-
ments about the Soviet concept:
1. From the Soviet point of view, absolute freedom is impossible.
As Lenin wrote, "to live in asociety and be free from this society is
impossible." "Truth is partisan," he said at another time. Therefore,
the Soviet spokesmen consistently argue, as Inkeles recalls, that "in a
society based on money, there can be no freedom from money"
(95:136). They contend that papers in a capitalist society must nec-
essarily exp—ress_ _capitalist doctrine. They arg-ue_ that any idea of
objective news is nonsense and hypocrisy; by objective news we mean,
they say, news that is slanted to maintain the capitalist status quo.
Indeed, Russian communicators are sternly warned against "objec-
tivity," which is thought to be turning from the one true line. Inkeles
quotes Lenin as saying that the Soviet press would be free in that it
would be free of "capital, careerism, and bourgeois anarchistic indi-
vidualism." Nevertheless, it would make no claim to independence,
but would be quite openly tied to the proletariat. In "one of those
characteristically Bolshevik turns of phrase," says Inkeles, Lenin then
stated that "the independence of the Bolshevik press rests in the closest
dependence on the working class" (95:136). Thus we have good
reason to suspect that the true and covert belief of the Communists is
simply that no press is free. Their arguments about the freedom of
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 127

their own press would appear to be strictly for official consumption.

2. From the Soviet point of view, what is worth while is freedom to
say what they conceive to be truth.
That is they say that th 1reedo we bpst of is purelypegative
one: it is a freedom from interference by the state. The Soviet
people, on the other hand — their apologists say — have freedom
to express themselves within the bounds and limits of the state. As Mul-
ler noted, the Soviets say that for them "the state is not a necessary
evil against which the individual must be protected: it is apositive
good, agreat co-operative_enterprise that alone makes possible afuller
life for the individual" (105:317). According to this viewpoint, then,
the difference is that the Anglo-American world_is seeking freedom
from the state; whereas the Soviet citizen is enjoying his freedom
within the allegedly beneficent state which protects him in doing
"whit is good for him." As has—been several times remarked, anyone
can seem free even in an authoritarian system if he accepts the postu-
lates and practices of the state. But from our point of view, no one
can really be free unless he is free to question the basic postulates of
the society in which he lives.
3. Therefore, in the Soviet Union no freedom against the state can
be permitted.
Says Vyshinsky: "In our state, naturally, there is and can be no
place for freedom of speech, press, and so on for the foes of socialism.
Every sort of attempt on their part to utilize to the detriment of the
state — that is to say, to the detriment of all toilers — these freedoms
granted to the toilers must be classified as a counterrevolutionary
crime. ...Freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of meetings,
of street parades, and of demonstrations are the property of all the
citizens of the USSR, fully guaranteed by the state upon the single
condition that they be utilized in accord with the interests of the
toilers and to the end of strengthening the socialist social order"
(116:617).
The Soviet spokesmen are quite candid about this matter. They feel
it is their duty to protect Soviet citizens from all influences which
would interfere with their living within and being content with the
true doctrine and the beneficent state, as set forth by Party leaders.
The Iron Curtain follows quite naturally from this point of view. So
also does the liquidation or disfranchisement of the remnants of
the bourgeois class. They feel they must protect their citizens, as
Muller says, "from powerful, irresponsible men who want to promote
128 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

their own selfish interests at the expense of others, and who in the
democracies largely own the 'free' press. Its gifted citizens, one might
add, will also be free from the romantic fallacies of the west, such
as André Gide's dictum that the great artist is necessarily a noncon-
formist. Its artists and intellectuals will work better because, like the
Greeks, they are working with and for the community" (105:308).
runs the theory, on paper," he adds. What seems to them a
"positive" freedoin_leems_ to us a negative conformity which is en-
forced, and which permits only the tiniest deviations from political,
social, and cultural viewpoints closely controlled by a few men in the
Kremlin. How far _this caretaker and guide concept is below Marx's
vision for man!
4. By owning the facilities, the Soviet guarantees access, and elimi-
nates concealed class controls.
The Soviet spokesmen call our press not a free press but rather a
class-dominated one. Vyshinsky scoffs at the "bourgeois public law"
concept that absence of preliminary censorship guarantees freedom of
the press (116:612-13). He points out that in the United States and
England, where precensorship has long been abolished, "the bond
between press and capital, the enslavement of the press by capital,
appears perhaps more closely than in any others." He mentions a
number of examples — the London Times which he says is "the organ
of banks, connected through its directors with Lloyd's bank, with the
largest railroad companies, with insurance companies. ..." He pays
his respects also to the Hearst papers, the head of which, he says, is
"a big American capitalist, connected with industry, banks, and con-
cerns which are exploiting the countries of Latin and South America.
...[and which] Carry on a bloodthirsty agitation against the Com-
munist Party, the revolutionary workers' movement and the USSR."
Freedom of the press, Vyshinsky concludes, "consists essentially in the
possibility of freely publishing the genuine, not the falsified opinions
of the toiling masses, rather than in the absence of preliminary cen-
sorship" (116:613).
It is clear that this emphasis on majority-class control of the facili-
ties of publishing is merely official viewpoint, since the Bolsheviks
always knew that the majority was not on their side, but claimed that
history made them the proper agents of the majority. For overt argu-
mentative purposes the Soyiet contends that freedom Of communica-
tion goes with ownership of the physical prqperties of communication.
It is contended that this ownership is held by only a few in the
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 129

United States, by most in the Soviet Union, hence (by this reasoning,
at least) the Soviet press is a great deal freer. On the other hand, we
point out that our press has the right to talk about the government in
a way that no Russian paper can. "But your press is not free to talk
freely about the working_ class and the world revolution," the Russians
answer. It is the old argument of Marx vs. Mill, and there -is little
meeting place between the extremes.
5. Freedom and responsibility are inseparably linked in Soviet
they
Recall that Article 125 of the Soviet constitution, which we have
just quoted, began by saying freedoms were granted "in conformity
with the interests of the working peple and in order to strengthen
, -
the socialist system." The results of communication are always in the
Soviet eye. As Inkeles says, we in this country tend to value the right
of freedom of expression, the right itself in the abstract; and we
usually permit no consideration except the most serious matters of
national security or other human rights to limit us in the exercise of
that right. That is why the Soviet spokesmen call ours an irresponsible
press. We call theirs acontrolled press because someone other than the
communicator determines what is "in conformity with the interests
of the working people" and "what strengthens the socialist system."
First-of eed com elled —
to be responsible. First_ of all, the Anglo-American press is expected —
indeed, enjoined — to speak freely,As_Iialseles_says_in_s_umming up
this distinction,
.—
it is declared to be the responsibility of the press in the Soviet Union to
see that elections are a success for the party, that the labor productivity
of the people is high, and so on. If in serving these ends the press also pro-
vides an opportunity for people to enjoy freedom of the press, well and
good; but this consideration of freedom is secondary in the Soviet Union to
the responsibilities of the press, and may be sacrificed if need be. In the
United States the emphasis is placed on freedom rather than on responsi-
bility. Freedom of expression is the absolute value, at least for those who
have the means to express themselves; if in so doing they advance the com-
mon weal or otherwise act to advance certain social goals and fulfill responsi-
bilities to the society, that too is well and good. But this consideration of the
common good is secondary to the freedom of expression and may, if need
be, be sacrificed to that freedom (95:138).

Here, as at so many other points, we have a theoretical difference

which is all but insurmountable. But the difference can be understood.
And perhaps the essential point to remember is that the mass corn-
130 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

munications which seem to us to be highly authoritarian dosel

controlled, can be made in Soviet terminology to look like a free an
iisponsible system because the majority class has the right and_privi-
lege of using them to express the "true Line" and to accomplish
results which are allegedly for the good of his class and his state.

THE SYSTEM GROWS OUT OF THE THEORY: 1. THE PRINTED MEDIA

Before the October revolution of 1917, there were less than 1,000
newspapers in Russia. There are now more than 7,000, in addition to
hundreds of thousands of typewritten and handwritten newspapers
posted on walls or handed out in groups. There has likewise been a
great increase in the number of magazines. The Soviet book industry,
which was very modest indeed in the days of the Tsars, has now be-
come one of the largest in the world, and this year will produce more
than one billion books in more than 100 of the languages of the
Soviet Union. It is clear that the Soviet press has taken seriously
Lenin's injunction that it should be collective agitator, propagandist,
and organizer for the masses.
In many respects, Soviet newspapers look strange and unfamiliar
to aperson who is used to the American press. For one thing they are
a specialized press. Our newspapers are, for the most part, a general-
ized press. 1 There are in the United States a few labor papers, a few
religious papers, but most of our newspapers are distinguished only
by virtue of being large or small, daily or weekly. In the Soviet Union,
almost half the newspapers are agriculture papers. Nearly 200 papers
exist wholly for young people and children. There is a large Party
press, amilitary press, a trade union _press, a factory press.
One _thing to remember is that this Soviet press is a planned press.
Ours has "just grown." More precisely, it has grown according to .the
laws of public demand and private enterprise supply. But the Soviet
press has been carefully distributed over the Union so as to serve the
largest number of readers in the largest number of specialized ways.
That is to say that the press is specialize—d both horizontally and
vertically. Vertically, as we have pointed out, there are different kinds
of papers to serve different kinds of affiliations and occupations.
Horizontally, newspapers form into a huge pyramid, at the top of
which are such all-union papers as Pravda (the organ of the Central
ITY'v>. 1

Our magazine press, on the other hand, is more extensive and specialized
than the Soviet one.
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 131

Party Committee) and lzvestiya (the organ of the Supreme Soviets),

which circulate throughout the Soviet Union. At the next level are
provincial papers which circulate throughout the territories and
regions. Still lower on the pyramid are the local papers, serving dis-
tricts and cities, state farms and factories. And at the very bottom are
the wall and bulletin board newspapers. The number of newspapers
increases, as we go down the pyramid. That is, there are only about
25 all-Union newspapers, about 500 provincial papers, and about
7,000 local papers. Circulations, however, decrease as we move down
the pyramid, from Pravda (between two and three million) to_ihe
shop newspaper which may be typed out in only one copy for the
bulletin board -
Resist the temptation to shrug your shoulders at anewspaper which
has a circulation of one. The Soviets do not shrug their shoulders at
it. They count and review these wall newspapers, and consider them
an important part of their planned structure. And indeed they are,
because they represent the farthest step the press can take in relating
the central Line to the rob-1 errif a locality or agroup. These wall
---

nes_umpers are assignesta job which is too specific for Pravda; they
are to translate Pravda and Marx-Lenin-Stalin into the words and
worries of a few hundred Soviet citizens. The editor of Pravda may
know Marx better. The editor of the wall newspaper will know his
audimce better.
The Soviet press is not only meticulously organized and spread over
the Soviet Union; it is also meticulously supervised and controlled.
This we must look at in some detail.

Control of Soviet print

Chief responsibility for control of the Soviet press belongs .to the
Party. Significantly it does not belong to the government. The govern-
ment has a division of censorship, called Glavlit, an abbreviation of
The Russian titre of Cffiet Administration for Literary Affairs and
Publishing. Glavht, however, slpts_ not censor the publications of the
Pany—al—ány léVer, nor the books of the Unified State Publishing
House (0).-- ,nor— iFé7nian of the Supreme Soviets (hvestiya). This
obvTiisTy iffininates Most of the Soviet press from the ministrations
of Gtavlit.
As amatter of fact, the government does not even have a depart-
ment of public information. This function is carried on by the
ment of Propaganda and Agitation of the Party. There is a central
132 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

Department under the immediate supervision of the Central Com-

mittee in Moscow, and subsidiary Departments at each level of the
Party.
The reason why this responsibility is given to the Party rather than
the government is completely in accord with theory. The government
is supposed to wither away. The press is supposed to belong to the
people, whose representative the Party is. Furthermore, the Soviet
leaders have always placed very high importance on the Party as a
custodian of values and determiner of goals, and on the press as "a
transmission belt between the masses and the Party." Stalin said,
"The press is the prime instrument through which the Party speaks
daily, hourly with the working class in its own indispensable lan-
guage. No other means such as this for weaving spiritual ties between
Party and class, no other tool so flexible, is to be found in nature."
The_f_%rty, exercises its control in three ways. In the first place its
De_par_tngits_o_f_Eropaganda and_ Agitation at various levels appoint
editors and the Central Committee's Depªrtment of Propaganda and
---
Agitation confirms the appointments. Their first consideration is, of
course, to get a politically reliable appointee. At the beginning of the
Soviet Union, when editorial skills were scarce, it was usually neces-
sary to put Party members into editorial jobs almost wholly on the
basis of their political reliability and knowledge of Marxism. Although
the professional level of the Soviet press has greatly improved, still
there is no doubt that political rather than professional reliability is
the basic qualification for a Soviet editor. Inkeles quotes the names
of the courses offered Soviet newspapermen, and the chapter titles
of their textbooks, in order to demonstrate that what we think of as
"editorial skill" is a very small part of the training of a Soviet editor.
Rather, his training is in Marxist theory, Party history, and world
politics.
In the second place, the Party issues, through its Department of
Propagaglta-tion, a very large num-ber of directives as to
what materrifTs- to ippar in the press and how it is to be handled.
A considerable part of the content of the press is what we would
call handouts — letters to and from leading figures in the Party
hierarchy and the government, public addresses, and official docu-
ments. Directions for handling other subjects are often in great detail.
In the third place, the Party reviews and criticizes the press. This
responsibility is ta en very senous y. teach level of the Party, there
is a committee which samples and criticizes the press of its corre-
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 133

szinding level. Pravda maintains arunning criticism of the press. The

top Party papers of various specialized kinds often criticize the lower
levels of specialized press; for example, the top trade union or military
papers criticize the lesser ones. Add to this formal criticism the con-
stant samokritika — self criticism by the Soviet people — which is an
old and honored Soviet custom, and which keeps a flow of letters
finding fault with the performance of the press in a given instance,
and you have asituation in which the Soviet press is under constant
and thorough scrutiny.
It has often been pointed out that the position of a Soviet editor
is by no means entirely enviable. His responsibility is to apply the
Line to problems and audiences as he knows them. The larger his
prTiiDen
— T—— ToTFcame
— Fi
T"— t heregions. oviet
Re ublics the more likely he is to deviate or to run inta_a_situation
in which the Line is not together clear. Furthermore. he has to be
nimble to keep up with some of the gyrations of the official Line. One
serious mistake, and his career is over.
iniiiIFMTITiFri at
-i .n
-)7-Soviet editors operate under con-

siderable tension. But beyond that, what do they think of the job of
editing a "people's paper"? What is it like to edit a paper where one
is concerned not with facts but with dialectic, not with timely events
but with the "Line"? One of the best descriptions of that experience
comes from Arthur Koestler. "Gradually I-learned to distrust my
"mechanistic preoccupation with facts and to regard the world around
me in the light of dialectic interpretation," he said. "It was a satis-
factory and indeed blissful state; once you had assimilated the tech-
nique you were no longer disturbed by facts; they automatically took
on the proper color and fell into their proper place. Both morally and
logically the Party was infallible: Morally, because its aims were
right, that is, in accord with the Dialectic of History, and these aims
justified all means; logically, because the Party was the vanguard of
the Proletariat, and the Proletariat the embodiment of the active
principle in History."

Content of the Soviet press

The Soviet newspaper press looks strange to us, for one thing, be-
cause it carries almost zioaclyei, as might be expected in a
country where private enterprise does not exist. It looks even stranger
because of its editorial content. In our sense, it can hardly be called a
newspaper at all. News to us means recent events. News to the Soviet
134 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

editors means interpretation of social processes. As Inkeles points out

in his lucid discussion, our focus is on the event; the_fl_o91=_Its
is what our . ers mirror; and the triviality of the event can some-
times be compensated for by its timeliness or by what we call "human
interest," On the other hand, quoting Inkeles again, "the major, and
in a sense virtually the only, news item in the Soviet Union is the
process called socialist construction, that is, the general effort to build
up Soviet society."
Events are regarded as news only in so far as they can meaningfully be re-
lated to that process. -Thus, the Soviet press in the nireffifities could— foi
months devote the major part of its total space to discussions of the Stak-
hanovite movement, because of the importance which rationalizing produc-
tion was held to have for increasing labor productivity. Or, to take an
example from the field of ideology, it is literally beyond conception that a
newspaper like the New York Times would devote almost half of its column
space for a week to a national conference of biologists which had met to
formulate a basic "ideological" policy for the "scientific" work of American
biologists and to affirm the essentially American character of the environ-
mental as against the hereditary approach to genetics. Yet this is precisely
what Pravda did during one week of August, 1948, in relation to a confer-
ence of Soviet biologists (93:139-40).
The brutal truth is that providing timely news is avery small part
of the work of a "collective propagandist, agitator, organizer," which
is what the editor is trying to be. To the Soviet mind there must be a
great sameness about events. The editor can pick and choose amongst
his reports as he needs them to illustrate the social process he is trying
to teach his readers. He need not present a given event soon after it
occurs, because other events may just as well illustrate what he is trying
to teach. A great deal of his paper is not news at all: it is "service"
material for the Party, for factory and farm workers who are expected
to increase productivity, for "reading hours" in local communities or
schools. In avery real sense, the Soviet editor must feel that he is in
control of events, whereas teAmerican e nor feels at the mercy of
events. The American editor will tear up his pages in order to insert
an important story as late as a few minutes before press time; the
Soviet editor, on the other hand, can often plan his "content and lay-
out one month in advance," and ...have 50 per cent of each
current issue set in type and made up several days before the issue
date" (95:140-141).
American observers are often astonished at the smallness of Soviet
newspaper staffs. As we have already suggested, this has two reasons.
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 135

One is the large amount of_ mpluiel furnished and_the frequent direc-
tion giv_ en by Central Committee sources. Another is the importance
placed by the Departments of Propaganda and Agitation on using a
large amount of material written by "amateurs." And it is true that
a typical Soviet paper may derive as much as a quarter to one half of
its copy from individuals who have no connection with the staff what-
soever, but who contribute samokritika, interpretive articles, or dis-
cussion of Mandan theory.
According to the Soviet official viewpoint, therefore, their press is
a magnificent experiment in creating "the people's press," owned and
controlled by the representatives of the people, and used to make a
better society for the people on the "One True Model." From our
viewpoint (and possibly, the covert viewpoint of the Soviet leaders) it
is a tightly controlled press used, not to serve the people but to do
things to them, not to let them choose and decide, but to decide for
them and then convince them without giving them an opportunity to
choose otherwise.

THE SYSTEM: 2. BROADCASTING

Of all the media, only radio and television are younger than the
Soviet Union. Broadcasting, therefore, is the only part of mass com-
munication which the Soviet government has had an opportunity to
develop entirely according to its own blueprint. The nature of this
development is consequently of considerable interest to us.
Broadcasting in the Soviet Union is alarge system as European and
Asiatic systems go. There are somewhere in the neighborhood of 15
million receivers, counting crystal sets, and a sufficient number of
national and regional stations to serve all these. Television is still at an
early stage of growth. This growth has been rapid in the last year,
however, and there are now about one million sets and about 25
transmitting stations.
But the interesting thing to us is the kind of use the Soviets make of
their broadcasting. To get the full flavor of it, let us recall the various
reactions when radio or television is about to come into an American
community. The citizens of the community are looking forward to
high quality entertainment in their own homes, to a quick source of
news, to "reserved seats" (in their own living rooms) at special public
events, plays, and operas, and — at least a few of them — to the kind
of information we deal with in "educational broadcasting." The adver-
 136 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

tisers are looking forward to a new market. The government is not

particularly concerned at all, except in the distribution of channels
and in making sure that none of the neighboring channels are being
violated. But let us now suppose that radio or television is coming into
a Soviet community. The advertiser is not interested, because there
is almost no advertising. The citizen is interested, but not chiefly for
the reason that the medium will provide entertainment, because enter-
tainment is not the chief purpose of Soviet broadcasting. The Soviet
radio will bring in a quantity of good music, and television will carry
concerts, ballets, and plays, but for the most part Soviet broadcasting
will talk to its audiences. It will be the voice of the Party and of the
government in the home. And, therefore, it is the Communist Party
and the Soviet government which are chiefly concerned with the ex-
pansion of broadcasting in the Soviet Union, for they recognize the
power and convenience of beitele to communicate directly and
instantly with so many of their people.
When we read the radio "decisions" — by which we mean the direc-
tives issued to the broadcasters in the Soviet Union — we find a great
similarity to the tone of press "decisions." Radio, like press, is con-
ceived of as having an instrumental, rather than a service function.
For example, here is what the Party tells the broadcaster who is just
taking up his new responsibility: "Possessing an audience of millions
and penetrating to the most far-flung and `deaf corners of our im-
mense country, the Soviet radio must carry to the widest masses the
teachings of Marx-Lenin-Stalin, must raise the cultural-political level
of the workers, must daily inform the workers of the success of socialist
construction, must spread the word about the class struggle taking
place throughout the world" (95:264) .Broadcasting is expected also
to contribute to the general education and improvement of the Soviet
citizen, especially "in the realms of hygiene and sanitation, basic
science, and techniques of production." And finally, it is expected to
"provide the population with a positive and constructive means of
relaxation" (93:263) .
What is a "positive and constructive" means of relaxation? That is
the yardstick which has determined whether many aSoviet broadcaster
and publisher should be publicly criticized and deposed. Inkeles quotes
Tamarkin, in his review of Soviet radio, as saying: "We renounce the
broadcast of material whose only purpose is to divert the radio listener
without consideration of the significance of the content of the given
fact. Such things we regard as unhealthy trickery." He goes on to cite
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 137

the Rostov station which "seemed unable to find time to broadcast

certain 'glorious revolutionary news' from Spain, but seemed to have
no trouble in finding a spot for some 'twaddle' about a man living
somewhere in Africa who had reached the age of 146 years" (95:
266). In other words, what we think of as "human interest" is not
positive and constructive in the Soviet sense. Neither are radio nor
television comedians, unless they are satirizing the capitalist system.
Neither are soap operas, unless they are on the theme of "socialist
construction." In other words, here is deadly serious_brgadcasting,
missionary broadcasting. It carries _good music. But chiefly it is a
teacher and a lecturer. It tells millions what the agitators would tell
them face to face, if it were possible to reach them. When it talks
about individuals, they tend to be heroes of the Soviet state, or villains
of the opposition. When it talks about business or economics, it ex-
plains the Marxist view. When it talks about events which have local
or colorful interest, it tries always to relate them to the basic processes
of society as Marxists understand those processes.
In this respect, broadcast practice is exactly like press practice. The
broadca
- sTer
., -1ike the ech or, is taug t t at events un ess related to
broad Marxist inter .retation of histo are "trivia." Timeliness, even
with broadcasting,is_seconda fnens. is_ always on the broad
stream of history interpreted in terms of the class struggle.

The system and Its controls

The nature of the system need not detain us long. A group of Mos-
cow stations, beamed to various parts of the Soviet Union, broadcast
nearly around the clock, and act as network headquarters. Inkeles
points out that their function is about like that of London to the BBC,
or the New York station to United States networks. Most of the repub-
lics and regions have their own stations, which relay some of the
Moscow transmissions and add some programs of their own. In par-
ticular, these regional stations are responsible for serving the many
language groups within their receiving areas. Any of these stations may
be received either directly on an individual receiver, or by the master
receiver of a radio-diffusion network. These radio-diffusion networks
represent really a third level_ of broadcasting_ They _consist-ef-a-mas-
ter receiver, an amplifier, and wires which lead to loud speakers in
homes, places of work, and public squares. The persons in charge of
the master receiver may originate a certain number of their own pro-
138 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

grams and thus, like the local and wall newspapers, come as close as
possible to meeting the specific needs of local listeners. But principally
the radio-diffusion network is an ingenious device for putting radio
(and perhaps television also) into the maximum number of places at
the lowest cost ancLunder the most see-tire control. There are millions
of wired speakemin the Soviet Union.
It is obvious that the diffusion networks are easier to control than
other listening because the listener has no choice of program. He can-
not tune his receiver. In this and other ways, the Party goes to even
greater lengths _toinsure its control of broadcasting than to insure its
control of the press. Broadcasting is under the supervision of an All-
Union Radio Committee, which is in turn controlled by the Party.
At the republic and regional levels, and again at the level of the diffu-
sion network, there are similar Radio Committees, in charge of broad-
casting on their levels. The Party__s_T.I_trols all broadcasting, by the
same three means we have already described in terms —oI ire-Tiress —
that is, by inserting its ow-ri rdaTe meiae-Wii-- Cal.Fk-
ey appointments,
by issuing a large number of directives and instructions, and by con-
stant_ review and cr.-
fire-
WI-
1;Threats and persuasion are used to keep
the Soviet listener from tuning in foreign broadcasts. And in case any
Soviet listeners should still be tempted, a vast network of jamming
stations — estimated at more than 1,000 in the Soviet Union and her
satellites -- is at work day and night trying to blot out the foreign
signals coming over the Iron Curtain.

THE SYSTEM: 3. FILM

It would be easy, in discussing the Soviet film, simply to write

"ditto" under what has already been said about Soviet press and
broadcasting. But the situation is not quite the same, for the Bolshe-
viks recognized from the beginning the essentially artatature of the
film. Lenin spoke of its "spiritual influences," which seems an unlikely
phrase to come from that source. And there has been a long history of
experimentation in which Soviet propagandists and producers have
tried to harness the aesthetic element in the film to the Marxist re-
sponsibility enjoined on all Soviet communications.
All the Soviet leaders have emphasized the teaching quality of the
film. Inkeles quotes Lenin as saying that the film must deal with
science and production as well as with comedy and drama, "and all
this must be directed toward a single unitary goal — the struggle for
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 139

the new life, for new customs, for a better future, for the blossoming
of science and art." He called the film a "pictorial publicist," "a pic-
torial public lecture," and "artistic propaganda for our ideas in the
form of an absorbing picture" (95:307). Stalin said the film is "a
great and invaluable force ...aiding the working class and its
Party to educate the toilers in the spirit of socialism, to organize the
masses ...and to raise their cultural and political battle-fitness"
(95:307). In other words, the basic assignment to the film was the
same as that of press and broadcast — to serve as propagandist, agita-
tor, organizer.
But the aesthetic element has continued to present a special prob-
lem. Comedy, for one thing, has always been hard to handle. The
Minister of Cinematography admitted that "it is unquestionably very
difficult to produce comedies which are simultaneously both gay and
sapient" (95:311). In practice, it has often been found safer not to
attempt comedies or other light films. And indeed the subject matter
of Soviet films has shifted in away that would make avery interesting
study by itself. These shifts have apparently come from related forces
— the trends and currents in art literature, the trends in audience
tastes (it is notable that Soviet audiences have been reported as stay-
ing away from documentary films), and, most important, the shifting
ideas of the Central Committee on the particular needs at the moment.
Inkeles has a good review of this changing pattern of subject matter
(95:308-09).
The Party controls films by the same means as press and broadcast.
The central responsibility is given to the Agitprop Department of the
Central Committee, and to the subsidiary groups at each Party level.
These criticize, review, instruct the film makers, and also control the
influx of foreign films and the choice of films to be shown. Cooperative
associations of producers at the national and regional levels are well
infiltrated by Party members, and in any case subject to the control
and direction we have mentioned.

RELATION TO OTHER AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEMS

From our point of view, at least, the Soviet system is an authoritar-

ian one — indeed, one of the most closely controlled systems in history.
The question, therefore, arises: how is it different from the author-
itarian systems discussed earlier in this volume, and from such modern
authoritarianism as was represented by Nazi Germany?
 140 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

The most obvious thing to say, in comparing Soviet authoritarianism

with the authoritarianism of England before the Enlightenment, or
with the modern survivals of that authoritarianism in many Free
World countries today — the obvious thing to point out is that in the
Soviet system the media are state-owned, whereas in the other author-
itarian systems they are for the most part privately owned. Broad-
casting systems are often state-owned, and occasionally one of the
authoritarian countries will control the book industry or publish papers
or magazines of its own. But typically the media in these countries are
priyªe_minuLthough carefully controlled by patents, licensing,
gu_ildAfiovernment pressure and censorship. The resta.y_be ap-
Proximatqly the same, so far as the political content of tkinedia
goes;_ the Soviet system, as we have seen, is controlled by ownership,
Party personnel in key positions, directives, review,criticism, and cen-
sorship. But in the authoritarian systems outside the Soviet countries,
the me m and to that extent,
less exclusively an instrument of the_govenunent. The okler_authoritar-
ian media were in bond_age to the state, whereas the_Saldeta are
itLand_ of the stnte.
But that is not enough to explain the very real differences between
these systems and concepts. Let us recall some other, and perhaps more
significant differences:
I. The Soviet system has removed the profit motive from_publishing
and broadcasting. Thus the media are free to do their duties as instru-
ments of the state and Party, rather than as competitors for public
favor. The rewards of ownership are not in advertising and circulation
returns, but in effects on the public mind. The rewards of management
are not in the by-products of prosperity, but in the by-products of
orthodoxy and skill in propaganda. The decision as to success or fail-
ure tends to rest, not with the public, but with afew custodians of the
Line and the Power.
e 2. The Soviet system has defined the function of mass communica-
tions positively; the older authoritarianism limited it negatively. That
is, in typical authoritarian countries, the press is not permitted to do
a number of things, largely related to criticism of the regime. In the
Soviet system, the emphasis is rather on requiring the press to do cer-
tain things. The Soviets have moved beyond forbidding the press to
criticize the regime, to the point actually that they are fairly free in
inviting criticism of the minor functioning and functionaries of the
regime. But the emphasis is on what the press is required to do — for
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 141

example, to increase the "political awareness" of the masses, to rally

the population in support of the leaders and their program, to raise
the level of efficiency of the workers, etc. In other words, the Soviet
communications are wholly instrumental; in the older authoritarian-
ism, the media were permitted, within limits, to determine their own
level of service and function.
; 3. More than the older authoritarian systems, the Soviet system was
built as a part of change, and to help accomplish change. The tasks
of "exposing" the bourgeois, aiding in "socialist construction," "elevat-
ing" the workers, revealing the "evil machinations" of capitalism and
furthering the final overthrow of capitalism and the coming of the
classless society, have always been assigned the mass media. The older
authoritarian systems, on the other hand, were primarily controlled
with the idea of maintaining the status quo. The regime in power was
anxious to avoid criticism and exposures which might affect its posi-

y
tion. It is true that the Soviet system was to maintain the Soviet status
u, but always in acontext of change and development.
.There is amore general way for stating some of these differences.
That is to say simply that the Soviet reasons for an authoritarian policy
toward the mass media were considerably different than those of the
older authoritarian states. The Soviet actions were based on economic
determinism, rather than divine right. The Soviet authoritarianism
was built on aconcept of class warfare, and aimed at the dominance
of one class, and ultimately at aclassless society. The older authoritar-
ianism, as we have previously said, was based on astrict class system
which was intended to persist, with lower classes paying desired service
to the ruling class. And the Soviet system has in it the seeds of change.
The system is so designed that if the state were really to wither away,
mass communication could continue under the guidance of the Party
or whatever organization represented the single class. There was no
such provision for change in the older systems.
e
íit .Finally, it is obvious that Soviet mass communications are inte-

grated into the total communication system and into the total govern-
ment, in a way that authoritarian systems never were. The Soviet
system is a planned system; the older ones, controlled systems. Soviet
mass communications blend smoothly into Party and auxiliary organ-
izations, word of mouth agitation, control and surveillance machinery.
The chief newspaper of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is
thus like a soldier in the ranks of the Soviet state, who takes orders
through established channels, marches with the other soldiers, and
142 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

derives significant color and personality from the whole army. In the
older system, on the other hand, few of the mass media were integrated.
The chief London paper in the seventeenth century would have had
its own private personality, limited only by what it could discuss. In a
sense it was an instrument of the regime, but was integrated into the
activities of the regime as in no such sense is the Ukrainian paper.
That kind of integration was a device that came to be accepted and
perfected only in our own century, and the Bolsheviks and Nazis
showed the way.
That leads us to talk briefly about Nazi mass communications. It is
too easy and not very helpful to lump the Nazi and Soviet systems to-
gether under the term "totalitarian." If one thinks of the three chief
systems discussed in this book — the old authoritarianism, the libertar-
ian, and the Soviet — as three points of a triangle, then the Nazi
system belongs somewhere on the side of the triangle between old
authoritarian and Soviet. In some respects it is more like one, in other
respects more like the other. Let us compare some aspects of the Nazi
authoritarianism with the Soviet.
1. Obviously, the two systems operated under widely different philo-
sophical assumptions. The Soviet system was built on Marx and
Engels, with Hegel's dialectic "inverted," and some admixture of older
Russian thinking. The Nazis built on Hegel (not inverted), on Kant's
philosophy of duty, and Fichte's nationalism. In place of the mate-
rialistic determinism of the Soviets, the Nazis had a kind of mysticism
about their thinking, a somewhat foggy reliance on spirit, racial in-
heritance, and the "right idea" which compares and contrasts interest-
ingly with the Soviet confidence in having the "right Line" direct from
Marx. It is noteworthy, however, how often these systems started from
completely different sources and came out with identical tactics. Thus,
for example, the Nazis were as scornful of "objectivity" as are the
Soviets. Hadamovsky, Goebbels' deputy, said: "`Impartiality' is a
threat to any weak character. The 'objective press' is 'all in favor of
anything national' ;but ...not for those who want to realize nation-
alism by uniting under some name or other. ...The kind of press
which bred this kind of men (it calls itself free, independent, neutral,
non-partisan, supra-partisan, and objective) must either change or dis-
appear from the German scene. There is only one object worthy of the
great effort of the press, namely, the nation" (92). And of the
Volkische Beobachter, the official Nazi paper, he said: "Contrary
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 143

to the ambitions of the liberal newspapers who think that the world
revolves around them, the National-Socialist propaganda organ is
neither trying to be a news sheet, nor does it care to be objective,
free, and independent" (92). The vocabulary is different, but the
sentiment is familiar.
2. For the most part, the Nazis permitted their mass media to re-
main under private ownership. In this respect, they were more like
the older than the Soviet authoritarianism.
3. On the other hand, the Nazi system was more like the Soviet in
that it was an instrumentalized and more closely integrated system.
Like the Soviet system, too, it was used to bring about change — to
bring the Nazis into power, to re-educate and re-mold the German
people, to aid the Nazi armies. The Nazi system was inevitably differ-
ent from the Soviet because of the difference in the way it came into
being, and the circumstances of its use. Thus, the Bolsheviks came
into power by means of quick and violent revolution. They had to
fight for power, but were in a position to establish a system of control
and aplanned communication network. The Nazis, on the other hand,
came into power gradually and for the most part through orderly
means. They inherited a communication system much more fully de-
veloped than the Soviet system. The fact that for along time they had
little access to the mass media led them to perfect the technique of the
mass meeting. Like the Bolsheviks they early saw the importance of a
party organization, and developed a militant combat party. But for
the most part they were in aposition of trying to take asystem already
developed, and use it as an instrument of state. The Bolsheviks were
able to build such asystem, and more fully integrate it.
4. The Nazis, like the Bolsheviks, came to depend on acombination
of coercion and persuasion. The Nazi phrase was "ideas, propaganda,
and power." Many of their control devices were precisely parallel to
those of the Bolsheviks — for example, inserting Party members into
key communication jobs, issuing policy directives, threats, surveillance.
They made sure of dominance of the "arteries" of communication —
for example, the wire news service and the radio networks. The press
bothered them in a way it never bothered the Soviets, probably be-
cause the Nazis never took over the press, and the German tradition
of a free and outspoken press was too strong to be silenced by threats
and minor coercion alone. Hadamovsky and Goebbels shouted at the
press. They argued, like the Soviets, that "true freedom and objectivity
are possible only in the service of a great cause." But they never
 144 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

reached the level of totalitarianism which would have made the entire
press areal instrument of the Nazi Party and government.
5. The Nazi concept of "the political type" contrasts interest-
ingly with the "Bolshevik type," about which we have had something
to say in the preceding pages. The Nazis said that aresurgent Germany
required the creation of a "political type" "fashioned after the model
of the leader (Hitler) and racially selected according to certain guid-
ing principles." "The formation of this type must be attempted with
all means available for the shaping of public opinion" (92). Like the
Soviets, the Nazis brushed aside the concept of afree and spontaneous
public opinion. Like the Soviets they rewrote the history books and
the political textbooks, and like the Soviets they depended on the
generation of youth to produce most of the desired "political type." It
is interesting to see these two systems come out with essentially the
same idea: that the mass communication instrument must mold citi-
zens into the nation-instrument.
6. Finally, it should be pointed out that on both sides there has
been a considerable amount of Prometheanism. The Party leaders in
Russia have taken on themselves an almost frightening responsibility
for giving 200 million people the "Right Line," permitting neither
deviation nor discussion, and banking all the resources of the Union on
the rightness of their perception. The Nazis also sought to create a
new nation in the image of "the leader." They reinterpreted history.
In fact, they staked all of Germany's resources on their new interpreta-
tion. In neither case were the Promethean leaders hesitant about sacri-
ficing vast numbers of men on the altar of their belief — although one
worshipped the somewhat irrational and misty deity of Kant, Fichte,
Hegel, and Hitler, and the other the down-to-earth materialist, but in
some respects equally irrational, deity of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and
Stalin.

THE SOVIET CONCEPT AND OUR OWN

And finally, what shall we say of the relation of the Soviet concept
and system to our own?
The question is rather, what should we add; for we have referred to
this comparison through this paper, and our system has been quite
fully explicated earlier in this volume.
The concepts and systems are so unlike, as we have tried to point
out, that it is hard for people brought up in them to find common
 THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY OF THE PRESS 145

ground even to talk about them. The philosophies behind the two
systems are vastly different — on the one side, Marxist materialistic
determinism and class struggle; on the other, the rationalistic, natural
rights philosophy of the Enlightenment. The concepts of man are
wholly different — on the one side, man as a mass, malleable, unim-
portant in himself, in need of Promethean leadership; on the other
side, man as intelligent, discriminating, perfectly able to purchase by
himself in a "free market place of ideas." The concepts of the state
are nearly opposite — on the one hand, an elected democracy con-
ceived of as governing best when governing least; on the other, aself-
appointed dictatorship, conceived of as "caretakers" of the people
against untrue or misleading ideas. The concepts of truth are corre-
spondingly different — on the one hand, something to be arrived at
by argument and confrontation of evidence; on the other, something
to be derived by straining events through a ready-made theoretical
sieve. The concept of control is likewise wholly different — on the one
side, extreme and complete control by ownership, Party membership,
directives, censorship, review, criticism, and coercion; on the other
side, the self-righting process of truth in the free market place, with the
tiniest minimum of government controls. On the one side, there is a
heavy emphasis on responsibility; on the other, on freedom. And the
difference in basic concept is never better illustrated than by the pic-
ture of both systems going forward under the banners of "freedom,"
although by that term they mean quite different things.
But if we were to select two differences from the long list, and Et_
them at the end of this peer, to be remembered, Ithink we should
choose_the following two.
In the first_place, we should remind ourselves that basically_ the dif-
ferences between the Soviet tradition and ours are the differences be-
tween Marx and Mill. Both these philosophers were concerned with
the greatest E92s1 9f the meatest number. But Marx would improve
man by improving society — indeed, would use man as an eneme to
improve society to improve man. Mill, on the other hand, would im-
prove society by first improving man. And so throughout the two tradi-
tions we have parallel but opposite concepts. On the Soviet side,-they
h_me_t.a_d£L.saritLimproving society: the rights of the working class, the
classless society, etc. On our side, they have to do with improving_the
lot of the individual: the rights of man, individual freedom, etc.
In the second place, I think we should recall that in the Soviet
146 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

Union mass communication is essentially an instrument to be plªyed

upon, by direction of afew Promethean leaders, for apreset result. In
our system, mass communication is a service rathr— dian an instru-
ment, and is used — not for preconceived ends — but rather as the
voice of social and public needs, interests, tastes, and ideas, as observed
and interpreted by the owners and managers of the media, for the
purpose of selling auseful
— 1
Mct.
rod ToSoviet observers, our me& — are

therefore irresponsible and disorderly. To us, the Soviet mass media

are "kept" and "servile." To the Soviets, the multidirectional quality,
the openness, the unchecked criticism and conflict in our media rep-
resent aweakness in our national armor. To us, they seem our great-
est strength. The next few decades will tell which is the better
estimate.

vp c)

-
- ô .0 \D
\
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. THE AUTHORITARIAN THEORY

Modern writers have produced very few expressions of the theory of au-
thoritarianism. For the basic ideas underlying the practices of authoritarian
and totalitarian governments, one must go to the writings of such philoso-
phers as Plato, Hobbes, Hegel, Treitschke, Machiavelli as well as Rousseau,
Carlyle, and Troeltsch.
The writings of Hitler and Mussolini and their apologists contain much
material on the theoretical basis as well as on the practical workings of
authoritarian principles.
Many of the books listed below contain bibliographies.
1. Boswell, James, Boswell's Life of Johnson. Edited by G. B. Hill, re-
vised and edited by L. F. Powell; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934.
Vol. 2.
2. Brown, Robert U., "IAPA Vows to Fight Political Oppression," Editor
eg Publisher, 88 (April 2, 1954) 12.
3. Catlin, George, The Story of the Political Philosophers. New York:
Tudor Publishing Co., 1939.
4. Catlin, George, "Thomas Hobbes," in Edwin R. A. Seligman, editor,
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan Co.,
1935. Vol. 7.
5. Childs, Harwood L., and John B. Whitton, Propaganda by Short Wave.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942.
6. Ebenstein, William, Man and the State. New York: Rinehart and Co.,
1947.
7. Fuller, B. A. G., A History of Philosophy. Revised edition; New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1945.
8. Harley, John E., World-Wide Influences of the Cinema. Los Angeles:
University of Southern California Press, 1940.
9. Hitler, Adolph, Mein Kampf. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1937.
10. Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1950.
11. Johnson, Samuel, Lives of the English Poets. Edited by G. B. Hill;
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905. Vol. 1.
 148 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

12. Kiefer, Alexander F., "Government Control of Publishing in Germany,"

Political Science Quarterly, 57 (March 1942) 73-97.
13. Krieg, Ugo, La Legislazione Penale Sulla Stampi: Manuale Teorico-
Practico. Milano: A. Guiffrè, 1942.
14. Lopez, Salvador P., Freedom of Information, 1953. Report submitted
to United Nations Economic and Social Council. New York, 1953.
(Its Official Records, 16th Session. Suppl. no. 12.) Doc. E/2426.
15. MacIver, Robert M., The Web of Government. New York: Macmillan
Co., 1947.
16. Mussolini, Benito, The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism. Eng-
lish translation; London: Hogarth Press, 1933. Quoted in William
Ebenstein, Man and the State. New York: Rinehart and Co., 1947,
pp. 303-04.
17. New York Times, July 5, 1954, p. 10, col. 2.
18. New York Times, Dec. 25, 1955, p. 4, col. 1.
19. Political and Economic Planning, The British Film Industry. London:
P E P (Political and Economic Planning), 1952.
20. Rex vs. Tutchin, 14 State Trials (1704).
21. Shepard, W. J., "Government. History and Theory," in Seligman,
editor, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. 7.
22. Siebert, Fredrick Seaton, Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952.
23. Sington, Derrick, and Arthur Weidenfeld, The Goebbels Experiment:
A Study of the Nazi Propaganda Machine. London: John Murray,
1943.
24. Stephen, Sir James Fitzjames, History of the Criminal Law of England.
London: Macmillan Co., 1883. Vol. 2.
25. Stephen, Sir James Fitzjames, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1882.
26. United Nations, Yearbook on Human Rights for 1952. New York:
United Nations, 1954.
27. Williamson, George Ed, "IPI Vows Full Publicity Attack on Press
Enemies," Editor fe Publisher, 88 (May 21, 1955) 74.
28. Zimmern, Alfred, editor, Modern Political Doctrines. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1939.

2. THE LIBERTARIAN THEORY

29. Antieau, Chester, "'Clear and Present Danger' - Its Meaning and Sig-
nificance," Notre Dame Lawyer, 25 (Summer 1950) 604-45.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 149

30. Antieau, Chester, "The Rule of Clear and Present Danger; Scope of
Its Applicability," Michigan Law Review, 48 (April 1950) 811-40.
31. Becker, Carl L., Freedom and Responsibility in the American Way of
Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945.
32. Becker, Carl L., New Liberties for Old. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1941.
33. Becker, Carl L., Progress and Power. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1949.
34. Blackstone, Sir William, Commentaries on the Law of England. Chi-
cago: Callaghan, 1899. Vol. 2, Bk. iv, Sec. 152.
35. Brucker, Herbert, Freedom of Information. New York: Macmillan
Co., 1949.
36. Burstyn vs. Wilson, 72 S. Ct. 777 (1952).
37. Cassirer, Ernst, "Enlightenment," in Edwin R. A. Seligman, editor,
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan Co.,
1935. Vol. 5.
38. "Censorship of Motion Pictures," Yale Law Journal, 49 (November
1939) 87-113.
39. Chafee, Zechariah, Jr., Freedom of Speech in the United States. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1941.
40. Chafee, Zechariah, Jr., Government and Mass Communications. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1947. 2vols.
41. Chenery, William L., Freedom of the Press. New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 1955.
42. Cross, Harold L., The People's Right to Know. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1953.
43. Editorial, "El Tiempo," Editor Ce Publisher, 88 (Aug. 13, 1955) 36.
44. Gerald, J. Edward, The Press and the Constitution 1931-1947. Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1948.
45. Gildersleeve, Virginia Crocheron, Government Regulation of Eliza-
bethan Drama. New York: Columbia University Press, 1908.
46. Howell, Thomas B., compiler, A Complete Collection of State Trials.
London: 1704. Vol. 22. (Erskine's defense of Paine for publishing
The Rights of Man.)
47. Inglis, Ruth, Freedom of the Movies. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1947.
48. Jefferson, Thomas, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by
Andrew A. Lipscomb; Memorial edition; Washington, D.C.: Thomas
Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904. Vol. 11.
49. Laski, Harold J., The Rise of European Liberalism. London: G. Allen
and Unwin Ltd., 1936.
50. Lopez, Salvador P., Freedom of Information, 1953. Report submitted
to United Nations Economic and Social Council. New York, 1953.
(Its Official Records, 16th Session. Suppl. no. 12.) Doc. E/2426.
150 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

51. Meiklejohn, Alexander, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Govern-

ment. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.
52. Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty. Edited by Alburey Castel!; New York:
F. S. Crofts and Co., 1947.
53. Milton, John, Areopagitica. Edited by George H. Sabine; New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951.
54. Mock, James R., Censorship, 1917. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1941.
55. Mott, Frank L., Jefferson and the Press. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1943.
56. National Association of Broadcasters, Broadcasting and the Bill of
Rights. Statements Prepared by Representatives of the Broadcasting
Industry on the WHITE BILL (S. 1333) to Amend the Communi-
cations Act of 1934. Washington, D.C., 1947.
57. Schenck vs. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
58. Siebert, Fredrick Seaton, Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952.
59. United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information, Geneva, 1948
- Delegates from the United States, Report of the United States
Delegates with Related Documents. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1948.
60. U.S. - Federal Communications Commission, Public Service Responsi-
bility of Broadcast Licensees. (Blue Book) Washington, D.C., 1946.
61. Waples, Douglas, editor, Print, Radio and Film in a Democracy. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.
62. White, Llewellyn, The American Radio. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1947.
63. Willey, Malcolm M., and Ralph D. Casey, editors, "The Press in the
Contemporary Scene," Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, 219 (January 1942).
64. Yeager, W. Hayes, and William Utterback, editors, "Communication
and Social Action," Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, 250 (March 1947).

3. THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY

For apresentation of social responsibility theory as developed by the Com-

mission on Freedom of the Press, the best sources obviously are the reports
sponsored by the Commission (items 65, 66, 69, 70, 81). Most important is
A Free and Responsible Press. Hocking's book is an excellent companion
volume, since it enlarges upon many of the principles on which the joint
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 151

work is based. Those two books give an adequate expression of the Com-
mission's ideas, but Chafee's two volumes also are worth special attention.
No single work pulls together social responsibility theory as it is being
developed by the press itself. However, such periodicals as Nieman Reports
and Quill regularly carry articles in which practitioners discuss their duties
to the public.
65. Chafee, Zechariah, Jr., Government and Mass Communications. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1947. 2vols.
66. Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947.
67. Davis, Elmer, But We Were Born Free. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
Co., 1954.
68. General Council of the Press, The Press and the People. London:
General Council of the Press, 1954.
69. Hocking, William Ernest, Freedom of the Press: A Framework of
Principle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947.
70. Inglis, Ruth, Freedom of the Movies. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1947.
71. Irwin, Will, "The American Newspaper," a series of fifteen articles in
Collier's between Jan. 21, 1911, and July 29, 1911.
72. Isaacs, Norman, "A Small Town Paper Has One Supreme Ethical
Duty-To Print the News," Quill, 41 (December 1953) 7-8, 15-16.
73. Jensen, Jay W., "Toward a Solution of the Problem of Freedom of the
Press," Journalism Quarterly, 27 (Fall 1950) 399-408.
74. National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, The Tele-
vision Code. Washington, D.C.: National Association of Radio and
Television Broadcasters, 1954.
75. Pulitzer, Joseph, "The College of Journalism," North American Review,
178 (May 1904) 641-80.
76. Royal Commission on the Press, 1947-49, Report. London: His
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949.
77. St. Louis Post-Dispatch Symposium on Freedom of the Press. St.
Louis: The Post-Dispatch, 1938.
78. Schramm, Wilbur, editor, Mass Communications. Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1949. "Canons of Journalism," "The Broadcaster's
Creed," "The Movies Production Code," 236-56.
79. Svirsky, Leon, editor, Your Newspaper: Blueprint for a Better Press.
New York: Macmillan Co., 1947.
80. U.S. - Federal Communications Commission, Fifteenth Annual Report.
Washington, D.C., 1949.
81. White, Llewellyn, The American Radio. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1947.
82. Whitehead, Alfred North, Science and the Modern World. New York:
New American Library, 1948.
152 FOUR THEMES OF THE PRESS

4. THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THEORY

Just as the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin are the basic texts for filling
in the background of this subject, so also it is necessary to indicate two con-
temporary books to which this paper is in debt and, indeed, without the use
of which it would be a much more difficult task to write the Soviet concept
of the press. One of these is Andrei Vyshinsky's Law of the Soviet State,
which explicates the Soviet viewpoint. The other is Alex Inkeles' Public
Opinion in Soviet Russia, which is the most complete and impressive treat-
ment we have of the Soviet mass media. Too late to cite or make use of in
this paper have appeared a noteworthy volume by Raymond A. Bauer, Alex
Inkeles, and Clyde W. Kluckhohn, entitled How the Soviet System Works
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956) and an insightful paper by
Paul Kecskemeti, "The Soviet Approach to International Political Com-
munication," (POQ, Spring 1956). Among the works used and in many
cases referred to in this paper are:
83. Barghoorn, Frederick C., The Soviet Image of the United States. New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950.
84. Bauer, Raymond A., The New Man in Soviet Psychology. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1952.
85. Brinton, Crane, The Shaping of the Modern Mind. New York: New
American Library, 1953.
86. Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Moscow:
Foreign Language Publishing House, 1947.
87. Crossman, Richard, editor, The God That Failed. New York: Bantam
Books, 1952.
88. Domenach, Jean-Marie, "Leninist Propaganda," Public Opinion Quar-
terly, 15 (Summer 1951) 265-73.
89. Engels, Friedrich, Writings. New York, 1915-21.
90. Fainsod, Merle, How Russia Is Ruled. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1953.
91. Farago, Ladislav, "Soviet Propaganda," United Nations World (Sep-
tember 1948) 18-24.
92. Hadamovsky, Eugen, Propaganda und National Macht. Oldenburg,
1933.
93. History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks).
Short Course. New York: International Publishers, 1939.
94. Hook, Sidney, International Communism. Montgomery, Ala.: U.S.
Air Force, 1952.
95. Inkeles, Alex, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1950.
96. Kecskemeti, Paul, "Totalitarian Communication as a Means of Con-
trol," Public Opinion Quarterly, 14 (Summer 1950) 224-34.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 153

97. Kelsen, Hans, The Political Theory of Bolshevism. Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1949.
98. Kennan, George F., American Diplomacy 1900-1950. New York: New
American Library, 1952. (Includes the well-known paper by "X"
from Foreign Affairs.)
99. Lasswell, Harold D., "The Strategy of Soviet Propaganda," Proceedings
of the Academy of Political Science, 24, 214-226.
100. Leites, Nathan, A Study of Bolshevism. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press,
1953.
101. Leites, Nathan, The Operational Code of the Politburo. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1951.
102. Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, Collected Works. New York: International
Publishers, 1927.
103. Marx, Karl, Capital. Chicago: Kerr, 1909.
104. Mead, Margaret, Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1951.
105. Muller, Herbert, The Uses of the Past. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1952.
106. Nemzer, Louis, "The Kremlin's Professional Staff," American Political
Science Review, 44 (1950) 64-85.
107. Peters, J., The Communist Party- A Manual on Organization. New
York: Workers Library, 1935.
108. Plekhanov, G. B., Sochineniya (Works). Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe
Izdatel'stvo, 1927.
109. Rostow, W. W., The Dynamics of Soviet Society. Cambridge, Mass.:
Technology Press, 1952.
110. Schramm, Wilbur, The Soviet Concept of "Psychological" Warfare.
Washington, D.C.: USIA, 1955.
111. Schramm, Wilbur, and John W. Riley, Jr., "Communication in the
Sovietized State as Represented in Korea," American Sociological
Review, 16 (1951) 757-66.
112. Selznick, Philip, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik
Strategy and Tactics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952.
113. Stalin, Joseph, Problems of Leninism. Moscow: Foreign Language
Publishing House, 1940.
114. Stalin, Joseph, Sochineniya (Works). Moscow: State Publishing
House, 1946-52.
115. Trotsky, Leon, History of the Russian Revolution. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1932.
116. Vyshinsky, Andrei, The Law of the Soviet State. New York: Mac-
millan Co., 1948.
 - II

Ai
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I
Communications / Political Science

FOUR THEORIES
OF THE PRESS
by Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm

Presented here are the four major theories behind the 'unctioning of the
world's presses: (1) the Authoritarian theory, which developed in the late
Renaissance and was based on the idea that truth is the product of a few
wise men; (2) the Libertarian theory, which arose from the works of men
like Milton, Locke, Mill, and Jefferson and avowed that the search for
truth is one of man's n-iural rights; (3) the Social Responsibility theory of
the modern day: equal radio and television time for political candidates,
the obligations of the newspaper in a one-paper town, etc.; (4) the Soviet
Communist theory, an expanded and more positive version of the old
Authoritarian theory.
These theories, analyzed in the light of modern thought, summarize the
conflict among the major approaches to communication since Plato's day.
<`. ..offer a wealth of thought and factual information ...prepared in
connection with a study of that vitally important question, the social re-
sponsibility of mass communication. .. ."— Journalism Quarterly.
.`. ..a scholarly and illuminating summary of the evolution of thought
and government and journalism." — Editor Ce Publisher.
4‘ . . a valuable document representative of the best thinking that is
coming from leading scholars in journalism." — Quill and Scroll.
‘`. ..a meritorious job of reporting in presenting a wealth of valuable
information." — Christian Science Monitor.

This book won the 1956 Research Award presented by Kappa Tau Alpha,
national honorary society in journalism.

FRED S. SIEBERT, dean emeritus of the College of Communication

Arts, Michigan State University, is also the author of Freedom of the •
Press in England, 1476-1776. THEODORE PETERSON, dean of the •
College of Communications, University of Illinois, has also written Maga-
zines in the Twentieth Century. WILBUR SCHRAMM, director of the
Institute for Communication Research, Stanford University, is also the
co-author of The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, Mass Com-
munications, and The Impact of Educattonal Television.

AN ILLINI BOOK FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS

ISBN 0-252-72421-6