Ethics and Integrity of Governance

NEW HORIZONS IN PUBLIC POLICY

Series Editor: Wayne Parsons

Professor of Public Policy, Queen Mary and Westfield College,
University of London, UK

This series aims to explore the major issues facing academics and practitioners
working in the field of public policy at the dawn of a new millennium. It seeks to
reflect on where public policy has been, in both theoretical and practical terms,
and to prompt debate on where it is going. The series emphasizes the need to
understand public policy in the context of international developments and global
change. New Horizons in Public Policy publishes the latest research on the study
of the policymaking process and public management, and presents original and
critical thinking on the policy issues and problems facing modern and post-
modern societies.
Titles in the series include:

The Internationalization of Public Management

Reinventing the Third World State
Edited by Willy McCourt and Martin Minogue
Political Leadership
Howard Elcock
Success and Failure in Public Governance
A Comparative Analysis
Edited by Mark Bovens, Paul t’Hart and B. Guy Peters
Consensus, Cooperation and Conflict
The Policy Making Process in Denmark
Henning Jørgensen
Public Policy in Knowledge-Based Economics
Foundations and Frameworks
David Rooney, Greg Hearn, Thomas Mandeville and Richard Joseph
Modernizing Civil Services
Edited by Tony Butcher and Andrew Massey
Public Policy and the New European Agendas
Edited by Fergus Carr and Andrew Massey
The Dynamics of Public Policy
Theory and Evidence
Adrian Kay
Ethics and Integrity of Governance
Perspectives Across Frontiers
Edited by Leo W.J.C. Huberts, Jeroen Maesschalck and Carole L. Jurkiewicz
Ethics and Integrity of
Governance
Perspectives Across Frontiers

Edited by
Leo W.J.C. Huberts
VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Jeroen Maesschalck
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium

Carole L. Jurkiewicz
Louisiana State University, USA

with a foreword by John Rohr

NEW HORIZONS IN PUBLIC POLICY

Edward Elgar
Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
© Leo W.J.C. Huberts, Jeroen Maesschalck and Carole L. Jurkiewicz, 2008

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

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is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Ethics and integrity of governance : perspectives across frontiers / edited by
Leo W.J.C. Huberts, Jeroen Maesschalck, Carole L. Jurkiewicz ; with a
foreword by John Rohr.
p. cm.
Articles originally presented at the conference ‘Ethics and Integrity of
Governance: Perspectives Across Frontiers’ held in Leuven in June 2005.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Political ethics—United States—Congresses. 2. Political ethics—
Europe—Congresses. I. Huberts, L.W. II. Maesschalck, Jeroen, 1975–
III. Jurkiewicz, Carole L., 1958–
JK468.E7E83 2008
172—dc22
2007047864

ISBN 978 1 84542 854 9

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall
Contents
List of figures vii
List of tables viii
Contributors ix

Foreword xv
John A. Rohr

1. Introduction 1
Leo W.J.C. Huberts, Jeroen Maesschalck and Carole L. Jurkiewicz

PART I PUBLIC SERVICE ETHOS, VALUES AND

INTEGRITY

2. The evolution of the British public service ethos: a historical

institutional approach to explaining continuity and
change 7
Wouter Vandenabeele and Sylvia Horton
3. A revolution in organizational values: change and
recalibration 25
Carole L. Jurkiewicz and Robert A. Giacalone
4. Ethical norms in public service: a framework for analysis 44
Carol W. Lewis
5. Judging a public official’s integrity 65
Frédérique E. Six and Leo W.J.C. Huberts

PART II THE INTEGRITY, RATIONALITY AND

EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNANCE

6. Ethical leadership and administrative evil: the distorting

effects of technical rationality 85
Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour
7. The Swiss Federal Administration in the context of
downsizing: public servants’ perception about their work
environment and ethical issues 101
Yves Emery and Carole Wyser

v
vi Contents

PART III ETHICS AND INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

AND INSTRUMENTS

8. Ethical governance in local government in England:

a regulator’s view 123
Gillian Fawcett and Mark Wardman
9. A paradigmatic shift in ethics and integrity management
within the Dutch public sector? Beyond compliance – a
practitioner’s view 143
Alain Hoekstra, Alex Belling and Eli van der Heide
10. How to encourage ethical behaviour: the impact of police
leadership on police officers taking gratuities 159
Terry Lamboo, Karin Lasthuizen and Leo W.J.C. Huberts

PART IV ETHICS AND INTEGRITY AND THE

POLITICS OF GOVERNANCE

11. Removing employee protections: a ‘see no evil’ approach

to civil service reform 181
James S. Bowman and Jonathan P. West
12. In defence of politicking: private, personal and public
interests 197
Robert P. Kaye
13. Perceptions of corruption as distrust? Cause and effect
in attitudes toward government 215
Steven Van de Walle

PART V CONCLUSION

14. Global perspectives on good governance policies

and research 239
Leo W.J.C. Huberts, Jeroen Maesschalck and
Carole L. Jurkiewicz

Index 265
Figures
4.1 Building the ethics landscape. (A) First set of variables
in ethics landscape; (B) second set of variables in ethics
landscape; (C) integrated view of ethics landscape;
(D) alternative integrated view of ethics landscape;
(E) comparative views of ethics landscape 52
5.1 Contrasting A’s judgment of B’s trustworthiness with
A’s moral judgment of B: (a) A’s judgment of B’s
trustworthiness and roles of both their norms; (b) A’s
moral judgment of B 71
5.2 A judging B’s integrity 73
8.1 Officers’ perceptions of organizational commitment to
fighting fraud and corruption 134
8.2 Officers’ perceptions of the impact this commitment is
having on reducing fraud and corruption 134
8.A1 The comprehensive performance assessment framework
from 2006 140
10.1 Research model effectiveness of integrity policies 164
10.2 The relationship between aspects of leadership and
employee integrity 174
13.1 Belgium in the Corruption Perceptions Index 217
13.2 Perceptions of corruption (TI) and justifiability of
accepting bribes (EVS) in the EU countries 219
13.3 Confidence in the civil service and perceptions of
corruption 231
14.1 Many related disciplines and aspects 252
14.2 Research orientation 253
14.3 Quality of governance criteria 256

vii
Tables
4.1 Landmark publications in the psychology of morality 48
5.1 Judging a public official’s integrity: who is judged, based
on what and by whom 76
8.1 Common standards and behaviours drawn from 21
public interest reports 129
8.2 Analysis of 38 governance local authority reviews –
common findings 131
8.3 Comparison of traditional audit skills against those
skills required to carry out an ethical audit 132
9.1 Compliance-based versus values-based approach 149
9.2 Explanations for the predominance of the compliance-
based approach 151
9.3 Moral reflection with regard to recruitment and selection 156
13.1 According to you, how many of your compatriots do
the following? Accepting a bribe in the course of their
duties? 218
13.2 Perceptions of unethical behaviour in the public sector
in Flanders 220
13.3 Perceived ethical treatment of citizens, correlations 221
13.4 Determinants of perceptions of ethical behavior: ordinal
regression models 222
13.5 The effects of political alienation on corruption, ordinal
regression models 226
13.6 Trust and corruption: correlations 229
14.1 CPI score of the 30 first countries that ratified the
UN Convention 247
14.2 Types of integrity violations related to police behavior 254

Box
5.1 Perspectives on integrity 66

viii
The contributors
Guy B. Adams is Professor of Public Affairs in the Harry S Truman School
of Public Affairs at the University of Missouri-Columbia, in Columbia,
MO, USA. He is co-editor-in-chief of the American Review of Public
Administration. His research interests are in the areas of public adminis-
tration history and theory, public service ethics, and organization studies.
He has over 60 scholarly publications, including books, book chapters and
articles in the top national public administration journals, and received the
2007 Marshall E. Dimock Award for the best lead article in Public
Administration Review. He earned his doctorate in public administration in
1977 from The George Washington University in Washington, DC.

Danny L. Balfour is Professor of Public and Nonprofit Administration at

Grand Valley State University in Grand Rapids, MI, USA. His research
and teaching interests are in the areas of organizational theory, social
policy, public service ethics, and the Holocaust. He has more than 30 schol-
arly publications, including two editions of an award-winning book, book
chapters, and articles in the top national public administration journals,
and received the 2007 Marshall E. Dimock Award for best lead article in
Public Administration Review. He served as managing editor of the Journal
of Public Affairs Education from 1995–2000. He earned his PhD from
Florida State University in 1990.

Alex Belling is a Coordinating Policy Adviser on ethics and integrity issues

for the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in the Netherlands.
He is the former coordinator of the National Office for Promoting Ethics
and Integrity in the Public Sector. Belling previously worked for the
Ministry of Justice as an HR policy adviser.

James S. Bowman is Professor of Public Administration at the Askew

School of Public Administration and Policy, Florida State University, in
Tallahassee, FL, USA. He is editor-in-chief of Public Integrity, a journal
of the American Society for Public Administration. His primary research
areas are human resource management and professional ethics. He is
author of over 100 journal articles and book chapters, in addition to two
recent co-authored books. Bowman has also edited five anthologies. He

ix
x Contributors

earned his doctorate in political science in 1973 from the University of

Nebraska in Lincoln.

Yves Emery of the University of Geneva, Switzerland, is a Professor at the

Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration in Lausanne (IDHEAP),
in charge of the department of Public Management and Human Resource
Management. He is a research director and consultant in public organiza-
tions. His primary research areas are work motivation, competency man-
agement and employability, rewards systems and training strategies in
public organizations. He is a member of the board of the Swiss Society for
Administrative Sciences.

Gillian Fawcett is a Senior Fellow working with the Office for Public
Management (OPM) Organisational Development and Policy Team in the
UK. She joined OPM from the Audit Commission, where she was a senior
policy adviser with expertise in corporate and ethical governance and
human rights. Prior to that, she spent a year outside the Commission in
Parliament as deputy head of the Scrutiny Unit, responsible for providing
professional support to Select Committees in the areas of finance, perform-
ance and governance. Fawcett is well-versed in working collaboratively with
other agencies to influence policy issues.

Robert A. Giacalone is Professor of Human Resource Management at the

Fox School of Business and Management, Temple University, in
Philadelphia, PA, USA. His research interests focus on the impact of work-
place spirituality and changing values on business ethics. He is also recog-
nized as an expert on behavioural business ethics, exit surveying and
interviewing, employee sabotage, and impression management. Giacalone
has authored over 100 articles on ethics issues, impression management and
exit interviewing, edited/authored seven books, and is currently co-editor
of the Ethics in Practice book series. He has served on several journal edi-
torial boards and as editor of several special issues. He has consulted and
trained for a number of organizations including the FBI, Carter-Wallace
Inc., and the US Department of Defense.

Alain Hoekstra studied public administration at Erasmus University,

Rotterdam the Netherlands. He is a Coordinating Policy Adviser on ethics
and integrity for the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in the
Netherlands. He coordinates the National Office for Promoting Ethics and
Integrity in the Public Sector. He has published several articles on integrity
and has a special interest in the organizational aspects of managing
integrity within the public sector.
 Contributors xi

Sylvia Horton is Honorary Principal Lecturer in the School of Education

and Continuing Studies, University of Portsmouth, UK. She is a convenor
of the Personnel Policies Study group of the European Group of Public
Administration (EGPA) and a member of the EGPA Steering Committee.
Her research interests are in the areas of public administration, public man-
agement and HRM with special reference to civil services. She has pub-
lished widely including books, book chapters, and articles in national and
international journals. She has worked with European colleagues on a
series of comparative studies including public managers, HR flexibilities,
competency management, staff participation in public management reform
and public service motivation. Her current research is in the area of lead-
ership development and training.

Leo W.J.C. Huberts is Professor in Public Administration and Integrity of

Governance at the Department of Public Administration and Organisation
Science of the VU University in the Netherlands and director of the
research group on the Integrity of Governance. From 1997 until 2004 he
was professor in Police Studies and Criminal Justice at the same depart-
ment. His research concerns political, administrative and police power and
power abuse (including corruption and fraud). He is author or editor of ten
books on integrity, corruption and fraud and published articles in journals
such as Public Integrity and Crime, Law and Social Change.

Carole L. Jurkiewicz is the Women’s Hospital Distinguished Professor of

Healthcare Management in the Public Administration Institute of the E. J.
Ourso College of Business at Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge,
LA, USA. She has published numerous articles and books in the areas of
organizational and individual performance, ethics, power and leadership,
bringing to her academic career many years’ experience as a key executive
in private and nonprofit organizations. She speaks across the US and
Europe on issues of ethics and organizational integrity, and has held key
leadership roles in the American Society for Public Administration.
Jurkiewicz has served as a consultant to many organizations including
IBM, US Postal Service, National Public Radio, American Marketing
Association, and many governmental departments at the federal, state, and
local levels.

Robert P. Kaye was Research Officer in Risk and Regulation at the

Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Centre for Analysis of Risk
and Regulation at the London School of Economics in the UK. He com-
pleted his doctoral thesis on the regulation of conflict of interest the British
House of Commons at the University of Oxford. Kaye has published on
xii Contributors

standards of public life in the United Kingdom and investigatory mecha-

nisms for allegations of misconduct against government, and on ‘innova-
tion’ in ethics regulation in the UK and the United States.

Terry Lamboo is Research Fellow on Integrity of Governance at the

Department of Public Administration and Organization Science at the VU
University in the Netherlands. Her research interests include integrity poli-
cies and integrity violations within the public sector and most specifically
the police. She is primarily focused upon the comparative research
approach. Lamboo earned her doctorate in public administration in 2005
at the VU University.

Karin Lasthuizen is Senior Researcher on Integrity of Governance at the

Department of Public Administration and Organization Science at the VU
University in the Netherlands. Her research interests include leadership
and ethics, the police and research methodology. She is currently working
on a dissertation on leadership and integrity.

Carol W. Lewis is a Professor of Political Science at the University of

Connecticut, Storrs, CT. Her research specializations are public service
ethics and public budgeting. She and Stuart C. Gilman authored The Ethics
Challenge in Public Service: A Problem-Solving Guide, 2nd edn, San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005.

Jeroen Maesschalck is a Lecturer at the Leuven Institute of Criminology in

the Law Faculty of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium. His
teaching and research interests include public sector ethics, criminal justice
administration and policy, and public personnel management. He is also
research fellow in Integrity of Governance at the Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam and co-chair of the Study Group on Ethics and Integrity of
Governance of the European Group of Public Administration (EGPA). He
has published in journals such as Public Integrity, Public Administration
and Western European Politics. He earned his doctorate from the KU
Leuven in 2004.

John A. Rohr is Professor of Public Administration at the Center for Public

Administration and Policy in Virginia Tech’s School of Public and
International Affairs in Blacksburg, VA, USA. In addition to his doctorate
in political science from the University of Chicago, Rohr also holds grad-
uate degrees in philosophy and theology from Loyola and Georgetown uni-
versities respectively. He has written and lectured extensively on the
constitutional foundations of public administration and on ethical issues
 Contributors xiii

that confront the career civil servant. He is the author of seven books and
over 100 articles and reviews. He has lectured at many universities and gov-
ernmental institutions throughout the United States and in Belgium,
Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Portugal and Thailand.
Rohr is associate editor of the scholarly journal Administration and Society
and a member of the editorial boards of The American Review of Public
Administration, Public Integrity, Public Organization Review and The
Political Science Reviewer. He received the American Society for Public
Administration (ASPA)’s prestigious Dwight Waldo Award in 2002.

Frédérique E. Six is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Governance and

Organisation at the VU University Amsterdam in the Netherlands. Her
research interests are the management of integrity and trust within the
public and private sector. She has published several articles, books and
book chapters on these topics. She earned her PhD in management in 2004
from Erasmus University Rotterdam. Prior to her academic career she was
a management consultant with McKinsey & Company and KPMG for 15
years.

Wouter Vandenabeele is a Researcher at the Public Management Institute,

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium. He is a member of the
European Group of Public Administration (EGPA) and American Society
for Public Administration (ASPA). His research interests are in the areas of
public human resources management and public administration ethics. He
has several scholarly publications, including book chapters and articles in
local and international public administration journals. He is currently
writing his doctoral thesis on public service motivation at the Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven.

Eli van der Heide is Senior Policy Adviser at the Ministry of Education,
Culture and Science in the Netherlands. He studied business economics
(cum laude) and law at Erasmus University in Rotterdam. He specialized
in the field of ethics and human resource management and has worked in
this field at the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom relations in the
Netherlands. His research interests are in the areas of applied ethics, human
resource management, organizational change, and the relationship between
ethical theory and law.

Steven Van de Walle is a Lecturer in Public Management at the Institute of

Local Government Studies, School of Public Policy, the University of
Birmingham, UK. His research interests are in trust in government, citi-
zens’ perception of bureaucrats and the public sector, comparative public
xiv Contributors

administration, and performance measurement. Publications include

articles in the International Review of Administrative Sciences, Public
Management Review, International Journal of Public Administration, Public
Performance and Management Review, Journal of Comparative Policy
Analysis, Public Policy and Administration and West European Politics. He
earned his PhD in the social sciences from KU Leuven in 2004, and cur-
rently is co-director of the European Group of Public Administration’s
Study Group on Performance in the Public Sector.

Jonathan P. West is Professor of Political Science and Director of the

Graduate Public Administration programme at the University of Miami,
Coral Gables, FL, USA. He is managing editor of Public Integrity. His
research interests are in the areas of American politics, public policy,
human resource management and ethics. He has over 100 scholarly publi-
cations, including books, articles and book chapters. He received his doc-
torate from Northwestern University and has taught at the University of
Houston and the University of Arizona. He served as a management
analyst for the US Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army.

Mark Wardman is a Senior Manager in the Audit Commission in the UK,

where he has taken a close interest in governance and accountability in the
public sector. He is the author of Audit Commission national study reports
on corporate governance, public trust, individual choice in public services,
and partnerships. In a predominantly research and policy-based career in
both the public and private sectors, he has worked for the National
Foundation for Educational Research, the London Borough of Sutton,
MORI, and was Head of Policy at the National Lottery Charities Board.
He has a Masters in Science in Organizational Behaviour from Birkbeck
College, University of London, awarded in 1993.

Carole Wyser is a Research and Teaching Assistant at the Swiss Graduate

School of Public Administration (IDHEAP). She is involved in a number
of research and teaching projects on the post-civil service. Holder of a
licence in sociology from the University of Geneva, she has collaborated on
various research projects touching thanatology and the sociology of relig-
ions, notably through the Observatory of Religions in Switzerland (ORS).
Her main research interests are related to the ethics and identity of public
agents, the public service ethos, the rupture of the physiological contract,
and motivation in the public service.
Foreword
John A. Rohr

It was with considerable pleasure that I accepted the kind invitation

from the editors of this book to write its preface. My pleasure was doubled
by the fact that I had delivered the keynote address at the opening session
of the Leuven conference on ‘Ethics and integrity of governance: perspec-
tives across frontiers’, from which this volume springs.
The chapters in this book are always instructive and at times profound.
Despite their many merits, however, they cannot recreate the authentic
spirit of international enthusiasm that permeated the conference itself, with
its host of scholars from no less than a dozen nations.
The Leuven conference was one of those all-too-rare ‘magic moments’
in academic life when staid, somber, serious professors set aside their
normal reserve and reveal their expertise in a subject with passion to people
who really care about what they are thinking.
It would be unfair to ask the fine contributors to this volume to recreate
that magic moment in early June 2005. All the props are gone, from the
chatty coffee breaks, to the remarkably efficient support staff, to the lovely,
old city of Leuven itself.
And yet Scriptum manet – the written words remain, as the old Romans
told us. This is true, of course, but its obvious truth misses a subtler and
more interesting one. To assert that the written word, including the words
written in this book, simply remain ignores the dynamic character of
writing. The written word does not remain in the flat sense that it simply
exists for a long time. Such a pedestrian interpretation of the old Roman
adage would rob it of the very richness of its meaning, which, in turn,
explains its long-lived relevance. In the context of the Leuven conference,
such an interpretation would shortchange the entire enterprise. The essays
in this book refresh the faltering memories of those of us who partici-
pated in the conference and stimulate the imaginations of those who
did not participate. Thus, the written word not only remains frozen in
time, but it also projects that moment into the future as it refreshes and
stimulates.
I dwell on these points primarily for the sake of those participants in
the conference whose papers were not selected by the editors for inclusion

xv
xvi Foreword

in this volume. Time, cost and editorial thematic imperatives demanded

that many fine papers presented at the conference could not be included
herein. No doubt the authors of the omitted papers are disappointed, as
are the editors because they could not include them, but the authors
should by no means consider their work as unworthy. They are just as
much revered as those whose essays we shall soon be reading because they
are vital participants in the same happy, academic event that these printed
essays embody.
In examining the essays that follow, the careful reader will surely ponder
certain themes and patterns that deserve close attention. For example, the
word governance appears time and again in this volume, starting with its very
title. What does this word add to our analytic tools? Is there a difference
between governance and governing? If so, what is it? Does the same distinc-
tion exist in other languages?
Is the discussion of ethics and globalism a bit premature? After all, we
still live in an international order based on the nation state. Or, conversely,
are we hopelessly late in addressing the ethical aftermath of globalism? The
United Nations, for all its warts and wrinkles, has been a significant actor
in this international arena for over half a century.
Considerable attention is given to values in this book. Some authors
even mention ‘main’ values, thereby implying some sort of pecking order,
with some values more valued than others. How do we make sense of this,
objectively?
Taking the argument beyond values, one of the more creative essays
addresses the question of ‘administrative evil’. Does administrative evil
allow for redemption? Is there an administrative equivalent to St Paul’s
assertion that where sin did once abound now grace does more abound?
Does this conceptualization of evil bring administration to the threshold
of metaphysical analysis? Recall the medieval distinction between some-
thing that was prohibitum quia malum (forbidden because it is evil) and
malum quia prohibitum (evil because it is prohibited).
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of a value-based ethic is its relation-
ship to the rule of law. Values are subjective, whereas law is objective; con-
sequently, the two approaches to ethical decision-making pull in opposite
directions. Those who would save the rule of law must explain which law
they have in mind – natural law or positive law. If positive law, do they mean
constitutional law, statutory law, administrative law, common law, or civil
law? And what of the myriad of legal systems and value hierarchies evident
from country to country? Although implicitly postulated, is an Aristotelian
ethic possible in today’s society?
 Foreword xvii

These questions just scratch the surface of the momentous issues that
await the reader of this excellent volume. These are issues that will frame
the debate for decades to come. Enough of prefaces, introductions, and all
the other bookish preliminaries. The main event is now at hand. Let us
read, study, and learn.
1. Introduction
Leo W.J.C. Huberts, Jeroen Maesschalck
and Carole L. Jurkiewicz

While the media and organizational discussions around the globe have been
abuzz with talk of public sector ethics, academic research in the field was,
until very recently, dominated primarily by American researchers focusing
primarily on American topics. This is of no surprise given that it is only in
the US that public sector or administrative ethics has developed as a separate
discipline and area of study within public administration. Consequently, the
vast majority of textbooks, courses, journals, and professional networks are
US-based and reflect the American culture. Yet, this has changed recently as
the debates on public sector ethics across the globe have also generated aca-
demic interest outside the US. This book represents these changes.
Born from presentations delivered at the first ‘Transatlantic Dialogue on
Ethics and Integrity of Governance’, held at the Public Management
Institute of the University of Leuven in Belgium in June 2005, the chapters
in this book represent a milestone. The conference was jointly organized by
European and American networks (the Study Group on Ethics and Integrity
of Governance of the European Group of Public Administration and the
Section on Ethics of the American Society of Public Administration, respec-
tively), representing transatlantic dialogue in the truest sense. It is a dialogue
of balance, integration, perspective and, ultimately, demonstrates an abiding
respect for perspectives from both sides of the Atlantic. A peer-reviewed
selection from amongst those myriad voices is presented in this book, chal-
lenging current suppositions, confirming mutual concerns, and challenging
everyone interested in public sector ethics to move to the next level of inquiry
and practice.
The book is organized in four parts. Part I addresses the moral qualities
of governance and government, its mission and demonstrated values.
Chapters 1 and 2 are empirically-grounded and emanate from a strong
theoretical foundation. Vandenabeele and Horton focus on the qualitative
aspects of integrity and ethics using historical institutionalism to frame
their argument: What is the public ethos of government in the United
Kingdom, how has that ethos developed, and which factors or institutions

1
2 Ethics and integrity of governance

had a significant influence on this evolution? Giacalone and Jurkiewicz pin-

point changes in basic societal values and extrapolate the significance of
these measured shifts on organizational values, focusing on the impact to
the individual. In the third chapter Lewis paints the ethical landscape with
elements that figure prominently in ethical decision-making, including the
psychology of moral development, emotions and context. The final chapter
of this part is of a more normative nature. Six and Huberts ask what
qualifies a public servant to be labeled as ethical or acting with integrity.
Can someone be his or her own judge, should the legal framework be deci-
sive, is it the politician’s values and preferences that should be followed or
is the citizen, in the end, the referee in this game of moral judgment?
Part II of the book addresses the dangers inherent in focusing too tightly
on rationality and effectiveness in government. Adams and Balfour suggest
that a central tension in present day public administration results when
administrators perform rationally in a technical sense but in the process
lose conceptions of moral responsibility that are essential for integrity.
Emery and Wiser also tackle contradictions between rationality and
effectiveness on the one hand, and morality and ethics on the other. They
argue that borrowing measures and approaches from the private sector for
use in the public sector could lead to unethical behavior, and draw upon
empirical data to assess whether that danger is real.
An important developing area in the field of ethics and integrity research
focuses upon identifying interventions that will lead to improved organiza-
tional integrity; that theme is addressed in Part III of this book. Fawcett
and Wardman map the ethical framework of local government in England,
reporting unexpected results from a study by the Audit Commission.
Hoekstra, Belling, and van der Heide describe the evolution of ethics man-
agement in the Netherlands, calling for the current paradigm of compli-
ance to be replaced by a more values-based approach. Finally, Lamboo
et al. focus on a single ‘instrument’ of ethics management: utilizing the case
study approach they assess the impact of leadership on unethical behavior.
Part IV addresses the relationship between ethics, integrity, and politics.
Bowman and West review appointments in the public sector and question
how definitive the criteria of merit and partisanship are, and should be.
They conclude that a new politicization of appointments could bode neg-
ative consequences for the ethics of governance. Robert Kaye, conversely
argues that conflicting demands within a democratic political system are
desirable and should be left to their own natural progression in resolving
the issues at hand; in other words, politicking is good. Next, Van de Walle
concentrates on a key power base of politics: the support and trust of citi-
zens. He tackles the chicken-egg question of whether perceptions of cor-
ruption affect the amount of trust citizens have in their government or
 Introduction 3

whether the amount of trust dictates perceptions of corruption. His con-

clusion challenges the hopes of many in that, in the final analysis, getting
things done may be more important to the populace than getting them
done with integrity.
The concluding part attempts to frame these multiplicative aspects of
ethics, integrity, and governance within the broader context of research and
practice. First, the burgeoning interest in ethics and integrity demonstrated
by global institutions such as the UN, World Bank and OECD as well as
NGO’s like Transparency International, is critically examined. The question
is addressed point-blank regarding whose interests are best served by all this
enthusiasm for ethics management. Second, epistemological and ontologi-
cal issues surrounding the research literature on ethics and integrity are put
into perspective: what do we know, how do we know it, and what does it
mean. It concludes with a summary of present research and policy agendas,
a challenge to the parochial paradigm which limits our understanding of the
truths we seek, and a slew of suggestions for the future of both scholars and
players.
The chapters in this book have been selected from over 90 top-notch
papers that were presented at the Conference, by a labor-intensive nomina-
tion protocol followed by a dual blind peer review process. We would like
to thank these thoughtful and attentive reviewers sincerely for their exten-
sive and very useful comments: Guy Adams, Frank Anechiarico, Daryl
Balia, Nathalie Behnke, Rob M. Bittick, Mark Bovens, Jim Bowman,
Richard Chapman, Gjalt de Graaf, Kathryn Denhardt, Patrick Dobel,
Mel Dubnick, Richard Ghere, Robert A. Giacalone, Annie Hondeghem,
Michael Johnston, Torben Beck Jorgensen, Emile Kolthoff, Terry Lamboo,
Karin Lasthuizen, Alan Lawton, Carol Lewis, Michael Macaulay, Donald
C. Menzel, Carel Peeters, James L. Perry, Terrell Rhodes, Robert Schwartz,
Frédérique Six, Dennis Smith, Trui Steen, Wouter Vandenabeele, Hans van
den Heuvel, Zeger van der Wal, Steven Van de Walle, Kathleen Vanmullem,
Patrick von Maravic, and Pieter Wagenaar. We also thank Sonja Wellens
and the publisher’s team for their administrative and editorial support.
Last, and most important, we want to thank all participants at the ‘First
Transatlantic Dialogue on Ethics and Integrity of Governance’. Their com-
ments and suggestions were of crucial importance not only to the authors
in transforming their presentations into the chapters in this book, but to
the beginning of a meaningful, substantive, and truly transatlantic dia-
logue. One that we hope will be the first of many.
PART I

Public service ethos, values and integrity

2. The evolution of the British public
service ethos: a historical
institutional approach to explaining
continuity and change
Wouter Vandenabeele and Sylvia Horton

INTRODUCTION

An important aspect of the British Home Civil Service throughout its

history has been the continuous presence of the Public Service Ethos
(PSE). Woodhouse (1997) describes PSE as ‘an amalgam of beliefs and
norms or conventions of behaviour [concerning public service]’. This ethos
serves as an ethical code for civil servants and public officials (Greenaway,
1995; O’Toole, 1997, 2000). In addition to a guidance function, it also has
a motivational aspect (Chapman, 1997; Reeves, 2004). Although some
authors contest the idea of PSE, it is generally accepted as a core element
of British public administration and its principles are defended by the
major political parties in the UK.
The aims of this chapter are threefold: first, to investigate the emergence
of PSE since the creation of the modern civil service in the mid 19th century;
second, to identify the elements of continuity and change in PSE through-
out the twentieth century and third, to explain variations in the content using
a historical-institutional theoretical framework. Our analysis spans 150
years from the origins of the modern civil service in 1853 to the present day.
The chapter is divided into six sections. Each section describes the historical
context and the key events impacting on the PSE, and then seeks to explain
the process using our historical, institutional, theoretical framework.

HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AS A
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theory of historical institutionalism offers an interesting framework

within which to analyse PSE. Peters (2000: 18) defines an institution as ‘a

7
8 Public service ethos, values and integrity

formal or informal, structural, societal or political phenomenon that tran-

scends the individual level, that is based on more or less common values,
has a certain degree of stability and influences behavior’. Institutions are
subject to ‘path dependency’ or what Peters (2000) calls, ‘the legacy of the
past’, as it focuses on the consequences of earlier events for those that
follow. Path dependent explanations make two fundamental assumptions.
First, contingent factors trigger a causal chain of events or institutional
patterns and, second, this causal chain is relatively deterministic (Thelen,
2003). Therefore, institutions are unpredictable, sensitive to earlier events,
demonstrate inertia and are difficult situations from which to exit.
Much of the work on historical institutionalism concentrates on how
and why institutions emerge and in particular on how institutions survive
(Thelen, 2003). According to historical institutional theory, survival is due
to self-reinforcing mechanisms. Once a process has been initiated and
invested in, it demonstrates benefits or returns because of coordination
effects, diminishing marginal costs, learning effects or adaptive expecta-
tions. Consequently, it will be reproduced because of increasing returns
(Pierson, 2000) or the utilitarian mechanism. Mahoney (2000) identifies
three additional mechanisms that can underpin reproductive processes;
these are functional, power and legitimation mechanisms. As in the
‘increasing returns’ mechanism institutions not only reproduce they also
capitalize on the reproduction, causing self-reinforcement.
These positive feedback mechanisms provide an explanation for the per-
sistence of institutions, but the theory also offers an explanation for insti-
tutional change. Whenever ‘critical junctures’ or points of discontinuity
occur the path is interrupted and branches appear. This results in disrup-
tive change in the institutional make-up (Cortell and Peterson, 1999).
Essentially, critical junctures are disruptions of the positive feedback mech-
anisms. Examples of critical junctures are: war, changing balances of
power, international treaties, technological change, elections and social
movements (Hall and Taylor, 1996).
However, this is only a partial explanation of institutional change as insti-
tutions change even without the occurrence of critical junctures. In contrast
to rapid or radical change, there is a more gradual type of institutional evo-
lution. Hall (1993) describes it as first or second order change, in terms of
the magnitude of change. First order change is incremental and the natural
response of institutions in adjusting to circumstances and organizational
learning but does not disrupt existing power, functional or legitimacy rela-
tionships. Second order change involves more significant change, which may
involve ‘the instruments of policy without changing the hierarchy of goals
behind policy’ (Hall, 1993: 282) or power relations. Both types of change
can be subsumed under what Thelen (2003) defines as ‘layering’. This type
 The evolution of the British public service ethos 9

of change is incremental, does not disrupt the positive feedback mecha-

nisms and is de facto in harmony with the institutional setting. Hall’s third
order change is radical and transformational.
In this chapter, we adopt a single case study method. Although not a valid
method for generalizing empirical data to the population, it is valid for
judging theoretical propositions on their merits (Yin, 1981; Rueschemeyer,
2003). The theoretical framework acts as a set of hypotheses or a ‘thick
hypothesis’ and is tested by matching with the database patterns found in
our case study (Yin, 1994). We also adopt a qualitative approach to our case
study that provides far more in-depth information on the actual processes
involved than is possible using quantitative methods (Miles and Huberman,
1994).
Our data collection is based on a review of the literature, for both our
dependent and independent variables, as we make a historical reconstruc-
tion. A problem arises from the fact that our dependent variable (PSE) is
an informal institution, so in contrast to a study of formal institutions we
cannot refer to substantive records such as legislation and official records
especially in the earlier periods. All value-laden elements that point to this
institution (set of values) are taken as an operationalizing of variables. In
particular norms, attitudes and roles are taken into account in order to
provide an overview of the elements that are incorporated in the PSE as
reflections of the values upon which PSE is based (Scott, 2001). Our inde-
pendent variables are historical events stated in terms of our theoretical
framework. To identify critical junctures, which fulfil a prime role in
explaining institutional change, we rely again on secondary sources refer-
ring to disruptions of the positive feedback mechanisms. A major prob-
lem implicit in this study is measuring institutional change. Our working
assumption is that for our core institution to be altered significantly, at least
one value must have appeared or disappeared compared with the previous
situation.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN CIVIL

SERVICE

In the middle of the nineteenth century central government consisted of a

collection of civil offices grouped together into departments of varying
sizes. It suffered from various problems including patronage, inefficiency
and incompetence (Parris, 1969) and reform was being demanded. Sir
Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan were invited to undertake an
investigation and report on The Organisation of the Permanent Civil
Service, which was published in 1854 (Northcote and Trevelyan, 1854).
10 Public service ethos, values and integrity

Their recommendations were radical and challenged the status quo. They
knew it would be difficult to get them accepted, because of the resistance
by vested interests (Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, 1980; Hennessy, 1989).
However, the first step towards implementation of the report was taken by
Order in Council in 1855, which created the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). It took 70 years before the modern civil service was finally estab-
lished and with it the ethical framework known as the PSE. The result was
a paradigmatic change.
The key characteristics of the new, modern civil service were a unified
service, open competition for entry and promotion based on merit; a career
service; and separation of private and public life. As the political system
evolved in response to the economic and social changes within society the
civil service took on a particular institutional form consistent with repre-
sentative democracy, constitutional monarchy and cabinet government.
This included accountability through ministers of the crown, the status of
‘servants of the crown’, anonymity and political neutrality. The behaviours
expected of civil servants were that they would be loyal and serve the gov-
ernment of the day, whatever its political composition, keep all matters of
government secret unless authorized to release information, would advise,
warn and to some extent influence governments and carry out the policies
of the government efficiently.
The Treasury’s power and its pivotal role within the civil service increased
after 1870 as it worked closely with the CSC and determined the subjects
to be examined for entry into the civil service. By the early twentieth century
an Oxbridge intellectual elite had emerged (Roseveare, 1968) with the gen-
eralist administrators, recommended by Northcote–Trevelyan, dominat-
ing. From the outset the higher levels of the civil service were drawn from
an exclusive social group not representative of the wider society. It was also
drawn from the same social strata as the politicians of the day. This enabled
a close symbiotic relationship between the bureaucracy and the political
executive to emerge and a ruling elite that was based on class.
Throughout the 70 years over which the modern civil service evolved so
too did a distinctive culture. It was within the group of generalist adminis-
trators, recruited on merit from the major universities that the PSE grew. It
was rooted in the idea of the ‘English gentleman’ and the playing fields of
the English public schools. It was characterized by trust, honesty, integrity,
mutual respect between politicians and civil servants (drawn from the same
backgrounds), not letting down the team and not least an intellectual
rigour in presenting and defending arguments. Fry’s (1969) seminal work
describes them as ‘statesmen in disguise’, defenders of the constitution and
the public interest. According to Hennessy (1989: 60) by 1914 the civil
service was:
 The evolution of the British public service ethos 11

A convention bound precedent laden, secretive society . . . dominated by an

administrative elite recruited from an exclusive educated class with a strong
espirit d’corps and sense of its own importance as servants of the crown, loyal to
the government of the day, bound by the Official Secrets Acts and committed to
a career of service.

From 1900 the changing role of the state, from a night watchman role to
a social service role, resulted in a major growth in the civil service (a growth
of 140 per cent between 1901 and 1914). This period saw the first challenges
to the institutions that had been evolving over the previous 70 years. Men
were choosing a career as permanent civil servants to be close to the centre
of power and able to influence policy. Because of their expertise, they had
as much, if not more, influence than their political masters
It is evident that the Northcore–Trevelyan report represented a critical
juncture in the development of the modern civil service. A stream of events,
which followed, saw the modern civil service gradually emerge accom-
panied by the PSE. The report disrupted the existing power feedback mech-
anism, by shaking up the existing balance of power. It was aided by external
events, in the form of the Crimean War, and pressure from the
Administrative Reform Association. As permanency, merit based entry
and promotion, ministerial responsibility and anonymity of civil servants
became institutionalized they were the accepted norms and values of the
service. After 1870 the growth of staff associations throughout the service,
put pressure on the government to standardize terms and conditions of
service across departments and disrupted the power balance in favour of
reforms but these changes were internally generated and in fact increased
the legitimacy of the system and further contributed to the power of the
Treasury. The election of the Liberal government in 1901, with its radical
programme caused an external shock to the power mechanism and the civil
service expanded significantly. This created a context in which a modern
unified bureaucratic civil service became a necessity, reinforced by the
further catalytic juncture of the First World War.

POST-WAR CONSOLIDATION 1920–40

At the end of the First World War, the Haldane Report (1918) on the
reconstruction of government confirmed the principles enshrined in the
Northcote–Trevelyan Report (Harcourt-Smith, 1920) and the modern civil
service was finally established. Three general classes (later called Treasury
classes) common to all departments saw the unification of the civil service
and this was reinforced by the introduction of joint consultative commit-
tees on labour relations known as ‘Whitleyism’ (White, 1933; Farnham and
12 Public service ethos, values and integrity

Horton, 1996). New departments and ministries were created based on a

functional division of labour (Mackenzie, 1957) and reflecting the priori-
ties of the government.
A major development during the interwar years was the gradual
increase of Treasury control. Headed by Sir Warren Fisher from 1919 until
1939, who was also Head of the Civil Service, the Treasury had the power
to approve expenditure on staff, to set down qualifications for entry and
the nature of examinations (although the CSC continued to be respon-
sible for recruitment), and to coordinate and control the work of all
departmental establishments (Farnham and Horton, 1996). This enabled
Fisher to impose his ideas on the civil service (Pilkington, 1999) and he is
generally credited with consolidating the administrative bureaucracy and
the PSE.
During this interwar period, we can see that the PSE slowly emerged as
a clear set of normative principles or ethics guiding the behaviour of civil
servants and the decisions they took. The underpinning principles were
political neutrality, loyalty, probity, honesty, trustworthiness, fairness,
incorruptibility and serving the public (Farnham and Horton, 1996). It was
being consolidated into the culture of the higher civil service and gradually
transmitted to the lower levels of the civil service through role models and
example as well as the growing establishment code or rules and regulations
set down by the Treasury.
During the 1920s and 1930s, higher civil servants became more respon-
sible for policy. The extended role of government compelled politicians/
ministers to leave more and more aspects of policy to their civil servants and
to rely more heavily on them for advice. They were anonymous, however,
and held accountable for their actions through the principle of ministerial
responsibility. This principle, which had emerged during the nineteenth
century (Parris, 1969), was defended on the grounds that civil servants
would only give free and honest advice to ministers if their positions were
safeguarded. In other words anonymity was the price of permanency.
Fisher and Haldane were key figures and change agents. They were also
important sources of what the PSE meant at this time. Haldane argued
that the function of the civil service was to provide the factors necessary
for continuity in administration and to strive always for excellence. The
common objective should be the service of the community in the most
efficient way practical. He argued that ‘virtue is its own reward’ (Haldane,
1923). He called for an esprit de corps based on the non-economic motive
of self-sacrifice, which is inculcated, he maintained, through tradition and
education.
Locating this period into our theoretical framework it is clear that the
end of war caused a critical juncture in both the functional and power
 The evolution of the British public service ethos 13

mechanisms. The wartime economy had to be converted back to a peace-

time role and the armed forces had to be demobilized. The immediate con-
sequence was the expansion of the civil service (Chester and Willson, 1968),
which disrupted the power balance. There was a relative lack of able min-
isters to control this change and to retain power over the civil service
(Brown, 1970). As a consequence new players filled the vacuum. Haldane,
who was a key figure in the development of PSE (Haldane, 1923) and
Fisher, who controlled the Treasury and the civil service for 20 years, had a
power base that enabled them to oversee the gradual standardization and
centralization of policy. No critical junctures occurred after 1919 although
there were many incremental and internally generated changes while the
principles of the PSE became firmly institutionalized and disseminated
through the processes of socialization and osmosis.

WAR AND POST-WAR CONSOLIDATION 1940–60

Once again, in 1939, war was a catalyst for change in the civil service. The
economy was quickly put on a war footing and conscription was imposed.
New departments and agencies were created and thousands of ‘irregulars’
were recruited into the civil service to run the command economy and the
war effort. The politicians who worked with civil servants during the war
were unanimous in their praise and neither Prime Minister Churchill nor
his successor Clement Attlee saw any need to disturb the civil service after
1945 and backed the Treasury in fending off reforms (Theakston, 1995). In
1945, a radical Labour Government was elected which nationalized and ran
the country’s major industries, introduced a welfare state and assumed
responsibility for managing the economy. This change in the role of the
state led to the creation of new departments and new activities and the
recruitment of large numbers of specialist staff. New systems of training
were introduced but not for the administrative class. They claimed that, in
spite of their extended policy and administrative role, on the job training
and development was sufficient. A combination of skill shortages, new
technology, and the rapid increase in work in the civil service led to con-
tinuous incremental changes although none represented significant depar-
tures from the traditional characteristics of the system first established in
the 1920s. In retrospect the end of the war was a missed opportunity to
restructure the civil service and retain the irregulars, who returned to civil
society. The administrative class in fact closed its ranks against reform and
reverted to recruiting traditional Oxbridge entrants (Hennessy, 1989).
International crises such as the Suez-crisis in 1956 and mounting eco-
nomic problems led to criticisms of the civil service. An internal report
14 Public service ethos, values and integrity

(Plowden, 1961) highlighted a lack of economic skills amongst Treasury

staff and a general lack of management skills throughout the service. The
response was to introduce more training and to review internal procedures.
Generally, however, the PSE and the generalist tradition of the adminis-
trative class remained undisturbed in the post-war era. Neither Labour
(1945, 50) nor Conservative (1951, 55) electoral victories were critical junc-
tures in the path dependent patterns of the civil service as no government
saw the need to review the machinery of government or its ethos. The ad-
ditions to the structures and roles, which accompanied the introduction of
the interventionist Keynesian/welfare state were built on the existing
arrangement and can be seen as examples of layering or first and second
order change rather than radical (Hall’s third order) change. At no time was
the legitimacy, function or power relationships between civil servants and
politicians challenged and each was important in resisting external threats
and pressures.

THE CIVIL SERVICE UNDER PRESSURE DURING

THE 1960s

At the end of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, criticisms of the civil
service grew (Balogh, 1959; Chapman, 1963; Fabian Society, 1964). In
1966, the Labour Government appointed the Fulton Committee to inves-
tigate the civil service. As Northcote–Trevelyan had highlighted nepotism,
patronage and departmentalism as the hallmarks of the nineteenth-century
system in need of reform, so Fulton highlighted the pervasive philosophy
of the generalist administrator, the rigid and complex class structure and
the isolation of the service from the community it was intended to serve as
the major defects. The career service and the social and educational com-
position of the service were also singled out as possible causal factors of its
incompetence. Fulton (1968) argued for a ‘new style’ civil service based
upon a new professionalism, a simplified structure, and the removal of
secrecy.
The government accepted Fulton’s 158 proposals with the exception of
‘preference for relevance’. It immediately created a Civil Service
Department (CSD) intended to challenge the power of the Treasury, a Civil
Service College to train civil servants especially in management skills, and
instructed the new CSD to implement Fulton as quickly as possible. Fulton
was clearly a challenge to the legitimacy of the service and to the power of
the administrative class. It also questioned the functions of the adminis-
trative class stating they should take on a managerial role as well as their
traditional policy role. The elite generalists reacted with particular skill in
 The evolution of the British public service ethos 15

responding positively to those recommendations that posed no threat to

their position and allowed to lapse those that they did not agree with. The
defeat of the Wilson government in 1970 meant that the reforms were left
for the service to implement and the incoming Conservative government
had other priorities.
Although the Civil Service was under siege during this period, neither the
machinery of government nor the PSE changed significantly. As Garrett
observed, ‘in general, the civil service of 1980 is not much different to the
civil service of 1968’ (cited in Theakston, 1995: 107). Although there was a
lot of criticism of its competency and its self-perception, the civil service
managed to retain the status quo. The Fulton report’s attack on the values
of the civil service was thwarted because of a lack of political support and
therefore was unable to disrupt the existing positive feedback mechanisms.
The loss of Wilson’s support after the initial changes had been imple-
mented, enabled a coalition of civil servants and mandarins to cooperate
against the reforms (Theakston, 1995). After the 1970 election, the Fulton
Report’s death warrant was effectively signed when Prime Minister Heath
left its implementation to the civil service itself. The election of a Labour
government in 1974 saw the service continue to evolve but still within its
system of ‘bounded rationality’ and sustained by its positive feedback
mechanisms.

THE CIVIL SERVICE FROM 1979–97

The election of the Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher in

1979 marked a new era for the civil service. In addition to being committed
to radical reform of the public sector she displayed a virulent anti-civil
service attitude (Theakston, 1995). She took control of the reform agenda,
actively exercised her role as ministerial head of the civil service and pro-
vided political clout. Her aim was to reduce the size of the civil service,
change its role and managerialize it. The initial assault involved imposing
cuts on staffing and expenditure, introducing the financial management in-
itiative (FMI), abolishing the Pay Review Body; facing down the first major
civil service strike in 1981; abolishing the CSD and engineering the early
retirement of Ian Bancroft, the Head of the Civil Service (Horton and
Farnham, 1993, 1996).
A transformation of the civil service unfolded over the 18 years of Con-
servative governments. There are many accounts of the details (Fry, 1984;
Drewry and Butcher, 1988; Metcalfe and Richards, 1990; Horton and
Farnham, 1999) but the essential features were the transformation from a
system of public administration, with its emphasis on procedures and rules,
16 Public service ethos, values and integrity

equity and fairness, mistake avoidance and careful stewardship of public

money, to public management with its emphasis on the economic and
efficient use of resources to achieve policy outputs. Private business was the
model for public management and private business practices, including
accountable management, performance management, output budgeting
and accrual accounting, were adopted. Where the private sector was
cheaper, departments had to contract out.
Between 1979 and 1997 the civil service fell by nearly 40 per cent. Over 150
agencies were created and nearly 80 per cent of civil servants were working
in them. The composition of the service had changed as new systems of
recruitment were introduced and many posts were openly advertised. Twenty
per cent of top posts were filled with people recruited from outside the
service. All personnel management responsibilities were devolved to agencies
and departments and only the Senior Civil Service of some 3000 posts
remained a unified and uniform system.
The response of the civil service to these changes was generally pragmatic.
The higher civil servants sought to influence those policies, which threatened
their interests but implemented the policies of the government as directed.
They continued to defend the traditional principles of the PSE (Butler, 1993;
Efficiency Unit, 1993) and the government’s consultative white paper
Continuity and Change (1994) was seen as a victory for the Office of Public
Service (successor to the CSD) and top officials in defending their position
as mandarins and averting some of the government’s more radical proposals
for reform (Massey, 1995). Once again there was a commitment to ‘sustain-
ing the key principles on which the British civil service is based – integrity,
political impartiality, objectivity, selection and promotion on merit and
accountability through ministers to parliament’ (ibid.: 1).
Not only was the civil service under siege from the government but also
its legitimacy was being severely challenged as a result of a series of scan-
dals especially the Arms to Iraq Scandal in 1992. The Scott Inquiry (1996)
revealed deceit and hypocrisy by both ministers and high-ranking civil ser-
vants (Barker, 1997) and it triggered several responses from Parliament in
the form of reports from its various committees including The Proper
Conduct of Public Business (Public Accounts Committee, 1994), The Role
of the Civil Service (HC Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 1994) and
Standards in Public Life (Nolan Committee, 1995). The latter recom-
mended a Civil Service Code of Ethics, in order to preserve the traditional
core values of the civil service. The Government responded in a further
white paper Taking Forward Continuity and Change (1995) by reiterating its
commitment to a permanent civil service based on traditional values and
accountable through ministers to Parliament. It proposed a Civil Service
Code and extended the powers of the CSC to ensure unbiased recruitment.
 The evolution of the British public service ethos 17

During the 18 years of Conservative governments there were clearly a

number of challenges to the PSE. First there was the impact of agenci-
fication, which fragmented the former unified service. Agencification also
opened the door to outside recruitment and to limited contracts for senior
officials. This resulted in a less permanent Civil Service, as outsiders entered
for short periods and ‘career’ civil servants began to manage their own
careers as they increasingly moved in and out of the service (Coxall and
Robins, 1998).
The second challenge came with the restriction of their policy role. From
the 1980s senior civil servants had to create a modus vivendi between their
policy role, which consisted increasingly of a gatekeeper function
(Campbell and Wilson, 1995) and a managerial role (Theakston, 1995;
Barberis, 1998). The use by ministers of policy advisers and their reliance
upon external think tanks curtailed the role of senior civil servants as the
main source of policy advice.
A third challenge was the introduction of market values into the civil
service (Stewart and Clarke, 1987; Butcher, 1997; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003).
Efficiency and quality have become the criteria of evaluation of ‘good gov-
ernment’ and are equated with performance targets and cost savings rather
than equity, fairness, procedure and political sensitivity, the traditional
criteria associated with public administration.
A fourth challenge has arisen from the greater openness and transparency
in the service, which has resulted in civil servants losing their anonymity.
Open government and greater transparency has removed much of the
secrecy previously associated with the civil service and people now have
rights to information and civil servants can be challenged in parliamentary
committees, committees of inquiry and the media. This increase in personal
responsibility of civil servants has weakened the shield of ministerial
responsibility, although that protection was wearing thin before 1979.
A fifth challenge has been to the unquestioned loyalty to politicians. This
has altered in part because of soured relationships between civil servants
and their ministers (Coxall and Robins, 1998) and the politicization of the
service. During the Thatcher governments there were a series of whistle-
blowing or leaking incidents, demonstrating how difficult the relationship
between civil servants and the government had become and reflecting in
part a clash of cultures or a fracture of the psychological contract. The
Ponting affair (Ponting, 1985) was only one of several incidents question-
ing the loyalty of civil servants to their political masters (Chapman, 1993;
Theakston, 1995) or to the public interest.
Although the election of the first Thatcher government was a key event,
the implementation of the FMI in 1982 could not capitalize on a critical
juncture able to disrupt the positive feedback mechanisms that were in
18 Public service ethos, values and integrity

place within the civil service. The Treasury was still in a position to impose
controls on managers implementing the FMI. Therefore, an increased focus
on the management role and the promotion of management values was at
first obtained by the process of ‘layering’ or Hall’s second order change.
Although managerial efficiency became an additional value, FMI did not
disrupt the power mechanism or challenge the existing PSE.
The Next Steps Initiative and the creation of agencies did, however, chal-
lenge and change the existing PSE as it promoted markets and economic
liberalism and an even stronger focus on management values. The third
consecutive Conservative electoral victory in 1987 provided the Thatcher
government with enough power to start this new initiative. Not only did the
government’s power increase but also internal opposition was weakened.
The Treasury could no longer impose detailed controls, as it was itself sub-
jected to the reform although it maintained some influence over financial
targets. In addition to a shift in the balance of power mechanism, the PSE
legitimacy mechanism was becoming more and more out of tune with the
prevailing values in society.
The Citizen’s Charter (1991) and Major’s Market Testing agenda con-
tinued the marketization assault but the new Prime Minister’s position was
relatively weak within an increasingly divided cabinet. The accusations of
sleaze and political corruption actually strengthened the position of the
civil service, slightly redressing the power balance again. This period was
characterized by more continuity than change or punctuated equilibria,
diminishing even further the capacity to disrupt the PSE.

THE MODERNIZED CIVIL SERVICE

In 1997, New Labour came to power. It promised a ‘Third Way’ of gov-

erning between the economic liberalism of the Conservatives and the state
socialism of Old Labour (Mandelson and Liddle, 1997; Giddens, 1998).
Whilst not rejecting the managerial reforms of the Conservative govern-
ments its focus was on better government through creating joined-up gov-
ernment (Richards and Smith, 2004). The Modernising Government (1999)
white paper set out a programme of radical reform of the senior civil
service whilst at the same time acknowledging the importance of the service
to the achievement of government policy. Many reforms have taken place
since 1997, which appear to be continuing many of the initiatives of the pre-
vious Conservative administrations.
Although Labour was committed to valuing the public sector generally,
and the civil service in particular, demands for strengthening and safeguard-
ing the traditional values of the civil service and formally institutionalizing
 The evolution of the British public service ethos 19

them in a Civil Service Act did not abate after the election. The House of
Lords Public Service Committee (1998) emphasized the importance and the
vulnerability of the traditional PSE. In 1999 the Cabinet Office finally issued
the long awaited Civil Service Code but parliament and the civil service
unions were demanding a Civil Service Act (HC Public Administration
Select Committee, 2002). The Labour Government eventually succumbed
and took the unusual step of introducing a bill for consultation in 2004 (CM
6373, 2004). The bill fell when the government resigned in 2005 and the new
Labour government elected in May 2005 has not so far reintroduced it.
In the period since 1997, the PSE has undergone two changes. First, there
has been a further loss of a policy role for the SCS and their role is now pri-
marily a managerial one. Whenever strategic decisions are made, special
advisers from outside the civil service are the main source of policy-advice
(Richards and Smith, 2004). Second, traditional civil service values and the
PSE have become more prominent again. Both during the final years of the
Major government and the first two terms under Blair there was an
increased focus on ethical behaviour of civil servants and on the values of
impartiality, accountability, trust, equity, probity and service. They are still
at the core of the British civil service in spite of the many changes in its
structure, composition and activities that have occurred over the last 50
years.
Taking civil servants out of the policy loop began in earnest in 1979 and
since 1997 Labour governments have continued the trend and accelerated
the process. With three consecutive landslide victories and adopting an
increasingly presidential style of government Blair, like Thatcher gained
control of the policy process and disrupted the power balance between min-
isters and their senior civil servants even more than under the Conservatives.
The resurgence of debates about civil service values and PSE, fuelled by
the Nolan and Scott reports, however, led Labour to publicly commit to
‘value the civil service, not denigrate it’ (Cm 4310, 1999: 13). Incrementally,
Labour has had to concede a Civil Service Code and a Civil Service Bill.
Public and parliamentary pressure and the resilience of the SCS have actu-
ally strengthened the legitimacy of the PSE although this has not prevented
its continual evolution.

CONCLUSION

Our first aim was to examine the emergence and evolution of the PSE.
Emerging alongside the modern civil service the PSE gradually took form
as the values and behaviours required of permanent career civil servants,
loyal to the government of the day and exercising a variety of functions as
20 Public service ethos, values and integrity

the state grew and took on a more interventionist role, became clear. By
1920 those characteristics of the British constitutional bureaucracy were
institutionalized.
Our second aim was to examine the process of continuity and change in
the PSE since its institutionalization. Throughout its history, PSE has
evolved to accommodate new values in response to the situational context
(Keynesian thinking in the 1940s; market values in the 1980s and 1990s).
Similarly, values have been removed from PSE as they ceased to fit the
context at the time (dominance of the generalists in the 1970s; closed
systems of recruitment in the 1980s, secrecy in the 1980s and dominant
policy role in the 1990s). However, the essential values of the Northcote–
Trevelyan/Haldane–Fisher philosophy are still part of the core PSE: selec-
tion and promotion on merit, political impartiality and accountability
through ministerial responsibility, integrity, objectivity and service to the
public.
Although the higher civil service was the locus of the PSE as it came to
reflect the values associated with the elite social and educational back-
grounds of its members it gradually cascaded down and was disseminated
throughout the growing lower levels. Public service motivation was never as
strong in the lower classes, where large numbers of women were employed,
but it was clearly in evidence throughout the period from 1920 to the 1960s.
Amongst the Treasury classes there was also a strong sense of being part of
a unified service as mobility was a condition of membership of the execu-
tive and administrative classes However, in the 1980s, agencification dis-
turbed this homogeneity as more and more of the service was fragmented.
Nowadays it is not clear to whom the ethos applies, as there are many types
of public servants and the boundaries of the civil service have become
blurred because of partnerships and contractorization. But with the
prospect of a Civil Service Act, this problem may recede and the PSE may
become formally institutionalized
Our third aim referred to the value of historical institutionalism as a
framework for explaining institutional change. Looking back on the analy-
sis, we can state that the persistence and disruption of positive feedback
mechanisms are able to explain a great deal of institutional change. In
particular functional, power and legitimation mechanisms proved to be
important in pinpointing causal relationships. On the one hand, critical
junctures, such as wars (Crimea, Boer, First and Second World Wars) and
electoral victories (Liberal 1905, Labour 1945, Conservative 1979) dis-
rupted these mechanisms causing path dependent change. On the other
hand, these feedback mechanisms also proved to be responsible for pre-
serving institutional arrangements (interwar period, 1945–79) whilst the
concept of layering and Hall’s first and second order change explain the
 The evolution of the British public service ethos 21

process of adding roles, functions and values without disrupting the

general structure and content of the organization and its culture.
When applying this theoretical framework, however, we observed that
the utilitarian mechanism was never able to disrupt other positive feedback
mechanisms, while conversely the power mechanism explains many of the
changes. This might be due to the fact that the civil service and PSE are sub-
systems of a larger political system. It can, therefore, be argued that in such
sub-systems political power prevails over utilitarian motives as the prevail-
ing causal mechanism. Because our research is only based on a single case
study, further research is required to test these conclusions.
Historical institutionalism has its limitations. It cannot explain why
some changes fail in implementation, why some take longer to achieve than
others and why termination of policies is so rare. Further, it cannot explain
the process of internally generated cultural change. Nevertheless, it is a
useful tool and draws attention to the importance of historical choices in
creating boundaries, which constrain subsequent choices and perpetuate
power structures, identities and cultures or paradigms that are difficult to
overthrow.

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3. A revolution in organizational
values: change and recalibration
Carole L. Jurkiewicz and Robert
A. Giacalone

INTRODUCTION
Inarguably, societal changes over the past 30 years have made the practice
of public administration in the twenty-first century dramatically different
from what it was in the past (Drucker, 1995). Reacting to and, in fewer
instances, preparing for the rapid shifts in technology and globalization,
coupled with the political instability challenging leaders and alliances
throughout the world has forced upon the public sector a culture that must
monitor change as a fact of existence. This monumental shift in traditional
bureaucratic orientation has led to numerous changes in the methods and
measurements by which we aspire toward the public good, many-well docu-
mented in the literature as deriving from specific tangible requirements,
such as budgets, transportation and administrative processes. Yet a near
invisible and certainly heretofore unarticulated challenge to traditional
practices may, it can be debated, have had an even more powerful influence
in shifting the practice and promise of public administration and is increas-
ingly worthy of both attention and accommodation.
Dramatic and wide-ranging values shifts have measurably and progres-
sively coalesced among industrialized countries since World War II
(Inglehart, 1997), leading some to conclude that we are witnessing a global
change in worldview (see Ray, 1996; Ray and Rinzler, 1993) and, concomi-
tantly, the expectations of the citizenry as well as those in the public employ.
Empirical evidence indicates that these values are gradually becoming pre-
dominant among postindustrial societies and being echoed in developing
nations (Abramson and Inglehart, 1992; Inglehart and Abramson, 1994).
Inevitably, changing expectations based on these values shifts are having
an impact on individual decision making (Conger, 1997) and behavior
(Hopkins and Prescott, 1983; Rokeach, 1972) in political, social and insti-
tutional settings across the globe (Inglehart, 1999). The label given here to
this potent constellation of shifting individual and social stakeholder

25
26 Public service ethos, values and integrity

values (Ray and Anderson, 2000) is expansive values. In comparison to

traditional values, which focus on quantifiable, materialistic goals and
short-term outcomes, expansive values refer to a constellation of values
that transcend materialism and self-interests, focus on the generative and
community impact of one’s actions, and accentuate the importance of indi-
vidual self-determination. While expansive values may appear as morally
seditious to those individuals and organizations whose stake in power is
rooted in the traditional values set, evidence of this more beneficent ethic
is welcome news to many.
There is evidentiary confirmation that expansive values are creating new
ethical expectations to the extent that they warrant organizational reassess-
ments of ethical standards (Giacalone and Eylon, 2000; McLarney and
Chung, 1999), with resultant administrative changes (Hammer and
Champy, 1993). As expansive values garner more widespread adherents
(Inglehart, 1997), they are creating new social constructions (Eisenstadt,
1990) to define appropriate organizational missions, standards and activi-
ties. As the ‘context of accountability’ redefines accountability proce-
dures and legitimates a broader array of decision-makers and outcomes
(McLarney and Chung, 1999), organizations would do well to proactively
determine the necessary changes in organizational structures, policies and
processes (Daft, 1998; Shenkar et al., 1995) that address and demonstrate
an understanding of the ethical issues these expansive values pose (Drucker,
1995). A failure to address these changes in ethical expectations can disad-
vantage organizations, making their leaders appear avaricious (Hirschman,
1990: 40) and lead the media and the citizenry to question the quality and
method of service delivery, integrity of administrative processes, and affect
the efficiency and effectiveness of their employees (Quinn, 2000; Thompson,
2000).
But a dearth of theory and research in the organizational sciences
demonstrates that management neither recognizes nor understands the
far reaching implications of these societal shifts (Abramson and
Inglehart, 1992) that other disciplines have wrestled with for more than 30
years (for example Inglehart, 1997). The intention here is to identify how
expansive values changes impact the ethical principles and practices
enacted in organizations. First, using literature from three different
research domains, the content of expansive values will be synthesized and
delineated and possible changes in ethical expectations will be outlined.
Second, the challenges organizations face in adjusting their ethical stan-
dards to these expansive values will be discussed. Finally, recommenda-
tions for designing research aimed at determining how scholars might
better understand the ethical quandaries in organizations facing expan-
sive values change will be offered.
 A revolution in organizational values 27

THE THREE FOUNDATIONS OF EXPANSIVE

VALUES

The content of expansive values is understood through theory and research

in three distinct research literatures: political science research on postma-
terialism (for example Inglehart, 1997), demographic profiling on integral
culture (for example Ray, 1996), and the interdisciplinary literature on
changing scientific, social, and organizational paradigms known as new
paradigm thought (for example Ray and Rinzler, 1993; Giacalone and
Eylon, 2000). Although developed within different intellectual disciplines
and traditions, they delineate expansive values and point us toward changes
in society’s ethical expectations for public sector organizations.
The most consistent explication of expansive values can be found in
Inglehart’s international values work (1997) at the Institute for Social
Research. Inglehart has identified and substantiated shifting individual
preferences for postmaterialist values globally. Though often misunder-
stood, postmaterialism is neither non-materialism nor anti-materialism
(Inglehart, 1997: 35), but is instead a value set characterized by an
increased emphasis on non-financial, humanistic outcomes for both self
and society.
Identification of the postmaterialist trend is based on data covering 70
percent of the world’s population, comprised of societies in both industri-
ally developed and developing democracies and non-democratic states
(Abramson and Inglehart, 1992; Inglehart, 1997), and with national mean
incomes ranging from $300 to $30 000 per year (Inglehart, 1997). The first
postmaterialist assessment (1970–1) found that materialists outnumbered
postmaterialists four to one, though by 1990, the ratio had shifted to four
to three (Inglehart, 1997: 35); essentially, during the period 1972–92, the
percentage of postmaterialists doubled (Abramson and Inglehart, 1992).
Despite the usual controversies and significant challenges that an emergent
trend elicits, models of this values shift projects nearly equal numbers of
materialists and postmaterialists in the following decade (Abramson and
Inglehart, 1992).
A second literature defining expansive values mirrors postmaterialist
data. While Inglehart’s work identifies expansive values primarily as social
values, the work of Ray (1996) indicates these are personal values changes
as well. Using a demographic approach, Ray (1996) found a value structure
that he labels ‘cultural creatives’. This values group, found in all regions of
the United States (but not assessed in other nations) comprises about 24
percent of the adult population, or about 44 million people. Much as the
core values of postmaterialism are humanistic social values preferences,
cultural creatives share the same values preferences but do so at the
28 Public service ethos, values and integrity

intrapersonal and interpersonal level as well, suggesting a deeper integra-

tion of professional/personal values among this sample.
New paradigm thought provides a third defining literature. Unlike post-
materialist and cultural creative research, new paradigm thought defines
the values changes across disciplines, using theory and research in religion
(Fox, 1994; Hawley, 1993), biology (Sheldrake, 1981; Sheldrake, 1988), psy-
chology (Frankl, 1962; Valle, 1989), ecological studies (Hawken, 1994),
futurism (Henderson, 1991), physics (Wheatley, 1992) and systems theory
(Capra, 1993). While adhering to the same humanistic postmaterialist and
cultural creative stances, new paradigm thinkers explicitly affirm what is
tacit in both postmaterialist and cultural creative values: values that are
predicated on individual, societal, and global interconnectedness and
interdependence. As such, expansive values are motivated by benevolent
humanitarian motives, and a sense of pragmatic mutuality which tran-
scends self-interest and materialism.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANSIVE VALUES

CHANGE

Changes consistent with expansive values have been demonstrated at

different levels. At a societal level, the social movements that brought
about increased ecological sensitivity, corporate social responsibility and
concern for ethical decision making (for example Hess et al., 2002) sur-
faced during the expansive values growth period and are consistent with it
(Ray, 1996; Inglehart, 1997). At the individual level, growing concern with
non-financial aspects of the workplace have employees leaving high
paying, pressure-laden jobs for lower-paying, more fulfilling positions,
particularly those found in the nonprofit and public sectors, creating what
some have labeled a downshifting phenomenon (Cherrier and Murray,
2002). Among those who remain with a proprietary organization, there is
a greater emphasis on quality of life, family-work balance, and childcare
(Emde, 1998).
From the standpoint of ethics, the adoption of expansive values has
changed both what is viewed as ethical issues as well as the moral essen-
tiality (Jones, 1991) of the issues themselves. In much the same way that
new ethical concerns emerged over the treatment of factory workers and
child laborers at the turn of the nineteenth century, current concerns
regarding environmental preservation, the ethical treatment of animals,
sustainable logging and living wages across the globe are examples
where formerly acceptable behaviors, thought to be fair and humanitarian
if given consideration at all, are increasingly viewed as irresponsible and
 A revolution in organizational values 29

unethical. It is believed this is just the beginning of an increasingly acceler-

ated movement in this direction directly attributable to growth of the
expansive values set.
Changing values also make existing ethical issues salient; concerns that
had heretofore been given cursory attention are seen as more important;
particular ethical issues are more questionable than was first believed.
These concerns include availability of healthcare and medicines to all in
need, gender equality, same sex partner rights, protection against genocide,
proliferation of nuclear weapons and global access to adequate food, water
and education. Both Ray (1996) and Inglehart (1997) concur that these
values are gaining increasing social consensus, which in turn is stimulating
new responses to ethical concerns. Using Jones’s (1991) synthesized model
of ethical decision making as a guide, the growing social consensus around
expansive values facilitates discussion of, and sensitization toward, the
globalization of ethical issues whose impact was heretofore considered situ-
ational or episodic. It is a pattern echoed in media efforts to analyse,
examine, probe and question administrators and that the current US gov-
ernment and less developed non-democratic administrations are trying to
quash. The expansive values drive is framing the appropriateness of ethical
decision-making, clarifying moral intent, and buttressing values priorities.
The result is an increasing likelihood that ethical concerns will be voiced
and that decisions consistent with these values will be made. Thus:

Proposition 1 The global increase in expansive values will require

organizations to recalibrate their ethical standards to meet shifting ethical
expectations.

THE CONTENT AND ETHICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF

EXPANSIVE VALUES CHANGE

The three literatures noted here further help us delineate expansive values
into three core values classifications driving the change: self-oriented core
values (general individual values, values regarding individual voice, indi-
vidual outcome variables); other-oriented outcome core values; and social
outcome core values.

Self-Oriented Core Values

Self-oriented core values focus on individual values lifestyle outcome pref-

erences. These can be divided into three sub-categories: general individual
values, individual voice values and individual outcome values.
30 Public service ethos, values and integrity

General individual values

The essence of expansive values lie in the individual’s transcendent values
of spirituality (Giacalone and Jurkiewicz, 2003) self-actualization (for
example Ray, 1996), and idealism (see Ray, 1996; Ray and Anderson,
2000). For expansive values adherents, the ethics of a decision are defined
in assessments that go beyond financial concerns and short time foci.
Expansive values adherents gauge the desirability of an action based on
its long-term systemic consequences for all stakeholders (Ray and
Rinzler, 1994). Essentially, the framework which judges temporal imme-
diacy (Jones, 1991) is enlarged. That is, while most discount the impacts
of the longer-term consequences of an act, emerging values adherents
take into account the consequences of an act within a longer time period.
Thus:

Proposition 2 In contrast to those holding traditional values, expansive

values adherents will gauge the ethical propriety of a decision or outcome
on long-term and non-financial ramifications for stakeholders.

Those adhering to expansive values are relatively less affected by exter-

nal forces designed to control their ethical judgment through persuasion
and manipulation (for example Lutz, 1989). Indeed, they are reticent to
focus disproportionately on social constructions of what is right or import-
ant and instead value and nurture internal (versus external) rewards (Block,
1993), and assess their behaviors and success via a process of self- (versus
comparative) valuing (Ferguson, 1993). Because expansive values adher-
ents see themselves apart from the mainstream (Ray, 1996), they are less
likely to take into account information that the general public believes to
be appropriate behavior or respond favorably to attempts by organizations
to spin-doctor ethically questionable behavior as more acceptable (Payne
and Giacalone, 1990). Thus:

Proposition 3 Expansive values adherents’ responses to the ethical issues

surrounding organizational decisions will be based more on their own values
and less on social consensus or manipulative social constructions.

Individual voice values

Over the past three decades, what has characterized expansive values adher-
ents is an increasing desire for greater voice in both personal and social decis-
ions (Inglehart, 1997; Ray and Anderson, 2001). While many point to the
fall of communism and the newfound motivation for self-expression and
freedom, the increasing value of personal voice has increased globally, and
most dramatically in industrialized economies (Inglehart, 1997).
 A revolution in organizational values 31

Progressively more of the world’s population is expecting and demand-

ing greater involvement in decisions that impact their lives, leading to new
political parties, new social movements (Ray and Anderson, 2000: 217),
lobbying, and the formation of non-governmental organizations targeting
questionable business practices (Goeksen et al., 2002). The value placed on
voice is paralleled by increased valuation of personal freedom (Inglehart
and Abramson, 1994), resulting in more freedom-focused movements (Ray
and Anderson, 2000: 112–25).
But the value of personal voice is about more than ‘big picture’ freedom
and environmentalism issues. For many, voice demonstrates one’s authentic-
ity as a human being (Ray and Anderson, 2000: 8). Expansive values adher-
ents have a strong proclivity to express who they are, both to demonstrate
their values (Ray, 1996), and to live their lives with meaning (Inglehart,
1997). At work, the values of personal voice manifest as an increasing desire
for involvement in both self-relevant and socially relevant issues. Thus:

Proposition 4 The increasing concern for voice among expansive values

adherents creates an ethical expectation for organizations to encourage and
foster increased participation and to respond to the issues raised.

Individual outcome values

Expansive values adherents’ unwillingness to accept socially endorsed
values on which there is social consensus (Ray, 1996) is particularly acute
in the case of positive, individual materialistic outcomes. While expansive
values do not dismiss positive, individualistic outcomes, their primary striv-
ings are not materialistic (Ray and Anderson, 2000).
Socially sanctioned outcomes are not valued by expansive values adher-
ents unless they are consistent with their life values and personal (generally
less financially defined) goals (Ferguson, 1993). They find socially prized
materialistic values unsatisfactory, and are not ‘consumption friendly’.
Their values warrant a balancing of materialistic and economic, quality of
work life, and social responsibility concerns (DeFoore and Renesch, 1995;
Inglehart, 1997; Ray, 1996). They are willing to trade money for quality of
life, (as witnessed by the downshifting phenomenon), and spend money for
causes that are altruistic and community-focused. An ethically desirable
outcome, therefore, does not have as strong a financial component (for
example stockholder rights) as would those holding more traditional ma-
terialistic values. Thus:

Proposition 5a Expansive values adherents will make ethical decisions

based less on materialistic values and more on quality of life impact and
non-economic social responsibility concerns.
32 Public service ethos, values and integrity

Proposition 5b Expansive values adherents will weigh the ethical appro-

priateness of a decision more heavily on non-economic factors.

OTHER-OUTCOME VALUES

The demarcation of self and others is less clear for expansive values adher-
ents, largely because they see a natural, recursive relationship between self
and other outcomes. As a result, they construe personal outcomes and the
outcomes of others as interconnected and have salient expectations for the
welfare of others. Expectations for good childcare, for example, result from
a keen sense of how poor childcare impacts families, community and
overall well-being, regardless of their personal circumstances.
Expansive values adherents value and work for positive outcomes for
others, using their values to bring these about. They believe that their decis-
ions and those of others must be founded on a procedural assumption:
mutually beneficial goals can be achieved through supportive rather than
manipulative relationships (Greenleaf, 1977). They bring about outcomes
by engaging in cooperate (rather than competitive) relationships and expect
that the preferred ethical outcome is one which is founded on a win/win
(versus win/lose) system (Maynard and Mehrtens, 1993). As a result, they
expect leaders to hold values that promote inclusive processes for decision
making, to shift from autocratic to inspirational and servant-centered
approaches (Block, 1993; Greenleaf, 1977). Thus:

Proposition 6a Expansive values adherents will judge an action as ethical

when a positive decision or outcome for internal and external stakeholders is
achieved through cooperative means and the possibility of win-win outcomes.

Proposition 6b Expansive values adherents will evaluate a leader’s

integrity based on the leader’s ability to bring about expansive values-based
outcomes through cooperative means that maximize win-win outcomes.

SOCIAL OUTCOME VALUES

Concern for others is also manifested in macro-level concerns for societal

outcomes. Success is simultaneously defined by personal and social expan-
sive values-based outcomes that are inclusive and focus on common needs
(Eisler, 1987). In contrast to individualistically and materialistically driven
values, expansive values are less concerned with outcomes which achieve
individualist/materialist gains and more concerned with group/values
 A revolution in organizational values 33

oriented gains (Capra et al., 1991; Fox, 1994). For expansive values adher-
ents, ethical decisions are characterized by generativity: a balance of indi-
vidual and community needs (Gozdz, 1995) across generations (Fox, 1994).

Responding to Expansive Values: The Challenging Road to Recalibrating

Standards

Because changing values are preconditions for behavioral changes and

social action, the increase in expansive values adherents is transforming
political, social and economic life (Inglehart, 1997), consumer choices and
shifts (Ray, 1996), expectations of what individuals want from their lives
(see Ray and Rinzler, 1993), medical choice (Ray, 1996,) family lifestyle
(Inglehart, 1997; Ray, 1996), and has altered the cultural composition of
our world (see Inglehart, 1997).
Despite downward shifts in economic prosperity, the increase in expan-
sive values adherents has shown no substantive reversal (see Inglehart,
1997). Given their growth, organizations would be remiss to ignore the
changing ethical expectations they bring. The growing concern with unethi-
cal administrative practices has taught organizations that if they ignore
stakeholder values, they will be saddled with damaged reputations and
widespread and entrenched distrust. These core expansive values, in turn,
are changing perceptions and expectations that require organizations to
begin recalibrating their ethical standards to align with these changes.
As changes in education and growing economic development result in
increased attention toward non-economic goals values, expansive values
became and continue to become more important than economic goals and
values (Inglehart, 1997). As more and more citizens shifted priorities,
aggregate social values were reapportioned, focusing away from economic
goals and values toward expansive goals and values. This reapportionment
of values priorities created a shift in both what is important and what
actions are ethically acceptable. Within a monetized values structure, the
desire to increase wealth takes on a direction that will accept ecological
destructiveness and even self-destructive activities (see Kasser and Ryan,
1993). As expansive values are given greater priority, such actions are seen
as unacceptable both individually and institutionally (Ray and Anderson,
2000), thereby creating new expectations for organizations.

THE CHALLENGE OF ETHICAL RECALIBRATION

The nature and scope of the values shifts necessitate more than a simple,
piecemeal response; it requires ethical recalibration: a reassessment of how
34 Public service ethos, values and integrity

values priorities can be translated into ethical standards and goals. The
concept of recalibration is introduced here as an extension of the expansive
values literature. It is predicated on the assertion that the forces driving
changes in values-based decisions at a personal and societal level are
impacted by two pivotal concerns: the reordering of values priorities and
the motivators that drive decisions toward adherence to expansive values.

Reordering Ethical Decision Making Priorities

Because expansive values adherence does not result in an abandonment of

materialist goals, organizations will be challenged to recalibrate toward an
integration of the two (Ray, 1996). Although the general ‘master values’ of
economizing (energy seeking to use in production of something valuable to
itself) and power-aggrandizing (power seeking) now dominating organiza-
tions will remain, the growth of expansive values forces decision makers
to enlarge their consideration of moral responsibilities, integrating new
ethical concerns into daily considerations.
The relative importance of expansive values (in comparison to more tra-
ditional values) is unclear. Some futurist research predicts an inversion of
people and financial organizational priorities (see Maynard and Mehrtens,
1993) over the coming century. While such an inversion may appear extreme
there is evidence that it has already started: a majority of citizens feel that
organizations owe something to both employees and communities, even if it
requires organizational sacrifice (Vamos, 1996). As the relative priority of
people and financial outcomes shifts, the reordering will change perceived
moral responsibilities. Accordingly, behaviors that are seen as irresponsible
to an internal or external community (Inglehart, 1997; Gozdz, 1995) are
seen as morally questionable by stakeholders at large. The result is that we
are seeing a moral expectation that organizations move away from interest
in stakeholder groups driven by financial impact estimates alone. For
example, relationships between and among employees will create ‘quality
standards’ that are directed at employee quality of life rather than output
quality (for example Eisler, 1995). The expectation of improvement, long
associated with continuous improvement, takes on a humanistic meaning
that resembles what Giacalone and Jurkiewicz (2003) have labeled work-
place spirituality.

Motives in Recalibration

With expansive values becoming more pervasive, ethical recalibration

becomes crucial to organizational legitimacy, survival and success. Because
a failure to recalibrate to changing stakeholder values could endanger an
 A revolution in organizational values 35

administration, an organization’s motives for recalibration may differ,

driven by pragmatic financial or political concerns, authentic alignment
with expansive values, or both.
Appropriately, Giacalone and Eylon’s (2000) typology provides two con-
tinua on which decision-maker motives can be classified for instituting
emerging values-driven ethical recalibration: Goals (Profits/Morals) and
Mindset (Business/Global). The ‘goals continuum’ reflects a motivation
based on relative priority of financial advancement or moral convictions.
At one extreme, recalibration is driven to increased concern for financial or
political advancement, while at the other end, it is strictly for ethical
reasons. On the ‘mindset continuum’, the motivation reflects a relative pri-
ority to have a positive organizational impact or a positive broad world
impact. In crossing these continua, four recalibration motivations emerge.
Darwinists, driven by efficiency and concerns for political longevity, are
motivated to recalibrate to achieve organizational effectiveness, legitimacy,
and survival in response to a growing stakeholder market segment; they
remain unattached to the expansive values themselves. Thus, when values
shift back and forth (as will be noted later), the Darwinist recalibrates
amorally according to projected personal reward.
Pragmatists, also driven by financial and political advancement as well
as efficiency, recognize and respect their interconnectedness to other global
social and ecological issues, apart from the pressing current financial or
political needs for resources and citizen approval. Ethical recalibration is
deemed important because expansive values show a demonstrable and dis-
cernable impact on the organization in the long term. Expansive values
become a ‘necessary evil’ when specific expansive values warrant new
ethical parameters that will bolster favorable output.
Missionaries’ motivation for recalibrating is also a function of the return
on investment mindset and in so doing, introducing new workplace values
with the goal of improving the overall quality of work life, educating others
regarding the environmental responsibilities of the organization, and so on.
While ROI-focused and outcome-centered, they see organizations as a
vehicle to create some greater good. Missionaries recognize that when
meaning and purpose is lost, there are negative productivity, social and
physical consequences (see Frankl, 1962); recalibration is based in a
mindset that makes meaning and purpose paramount for ethical and prac-
tical reasons.
Humanitarians’ motivations are based on an expansive values-driven
desire to improve the larger world context, regardless of borders and dis-
tinctions (cultural, national, ethnic, religious and so on) that may separate
people (see Maynard and Mehrtens, 1993). They espouse the ethics of a
metanoic organization (Fox, 1994), where there is a sense of collective
36 Public service ethos, values and integrity

empowerment, vision, and focus on the individual. Humanitarians prefer

building a better world than a more financially efficient or political expedi-
ent system, which they see as secondary. Futurist researchers predict such
expansive values-focused organizations will become the norm in the future
(see Maynard and Mehrtens, 1993, for a complete discussion).
Understanding these motives is important, for recalibration motivated
by authentic values alignment or pragmatic financial concerns moderates
long-term commitment to recalibration (see Ray and Anderson, 2000).
Recalibration for values alignment or pragmatic financial concerns may be
both instrumental in nature (to achieve the goal of living one’s values or
protecting the financial or political interest of the administration), but
because values alignment is transcendent, there is a greater likelihood that
relevant behaviors will not be swayed very much by economic or political
fortunes (Inglehart, 1997). Thus:

Proposition 7 Although expansive values may necessitate ethical recali-

bration within organizations, the extent to which organizations and
their employees do so will be a function of moral, financial, and political
motivations.

THE PROBLEM OF DISCONTINUITY AND

NARROWING CHOICES

But while reordering priorities and motivations are choices in response to

expansive values impacting recalibration, some factors are not chosen and
make recalibration more difficult.

Temporal (Pedomorphic) Discontinuity

Recalibrating organizational ethical standards is predicated on a substan-

tive discernment (see Gamson, 1975) of the magnitude and direction of
expansive values. But the organization’s discernment is significantly con-
strained by information access (Diani, 2000) which limits its ability to cor-
rectly interpret direction. In the case of expansive values, organizational
discernment is complicated by the non-linear growth of, and commitment
to, expansive values.
Henderson (1994) characterizes this non-linear growth and commitment
as a temporally discontinuous three-stage process. In the first stage, either
in response to the realization that increasing economic gains do not lead to
increased subjective well-being (Inglehart, 1997) (or alternatively as a func-
tion of environmental concerns (Capra, 1993), or spiritual development
 A revolution in organizational values 37

(Giacalone and Jurkeiwicz, 2003)), individuals shift their values and con-
sider behavioral changes to align with these values. Change is at an indi-
vidual level, making organizational recognition difficult.
In the second stage, these nascent values’ attempt to ‘live their values’
result in discordant, confusing behavioral responses. Salient motives for the
values change direct the scope of the behavioral changes seen. For example,
those driven to increase subjective well-being might move toward more
meaningful work and a moral responsibility to society, while those driven
by sustainability would shift from consumption toward voluntary simplic-
ity as a moral choice (Fox, 1994; Gozdz, 1995). This individual attempt to
align establishes the first signals to others that new values are being
explored.
But individuals find some alignments satisfying and others not so much.
The resulting frustration leads some back to stage one behaviors incon-
sistent with expansive values, a process known as pedomorphosis
(Henderson, 1994). This pedomorphic process can recur repeatedly until
expansive values adherents’ actions comfortably align their values with
ethical actions.
Sensing the stark contrast to dominant social values, expansive values
adherents often remain silent about their values, searching quietly for
others who share them. This reticence results in a slower coalescence as a
group and obscures the magnitude of change (Ray and Anderson, 2000)
over a long period.
What organizations discern is activity ‘on the radar screen’, but given
pedomorphosis, and the slow coalescing of adherents, they are unsure what
these actions signify, the extensiveness of the change, and how best to
respond. Pedomorphosis in particular sets a confusing tone because it pre-
vents a coherent information flow, leading organizations to incorrectly
attribute these behaviors to capriciousness, laziness or other individual-
level aberrations.
Identification of and recalibration toward these values under such con-
ditions is difficult, particularly given the growth rate. Even now, with evi-
dence pointing to a slow, steady growth rate of about one percentage point
each year (Inglehart and Abramson, 1994), the number of expansive values
adherents does not yet exceed the number of traditional materialists. But
by 2010, this imbalance will shift when the number of expansive values
adherents worldwide is expected to outnumber materialists (Abramson and
Inglehart, 1992: 227). Thus:

Proposition 8 Pedomorphosis undermines organizational recalibration of

ethical principles and expectations, making appropriate responsiveness
more difficult.
38 Public service ethos, values and integrity

Demographic Discontinuities

As a sizable social majority adheres to expansive values and behaves

accordingly, organizations will recognize expansive values patterns (Ray
and Anderson, 2000). Organizational leaders become interested in ethical
(and other) issues related to expansive values, ignore others, leading them
to make ethical decisions that foster or prevent particular outcomes and
activities consistent with expansive values (Brunsson, 1982).
The values demographics (percentage who adhere to expansive values) and
their level of power in the organization will impact organizations’ ability to
recognize these values changes, making demographic discontinues in the
adherence to expansive values by power holders a factor in how administra-
tors respond. Outside the organization, leading and lagging groups of expan-
sive values stakeholder groups sensitize and frame ethical concerns for
organizational leaders. The organization’s ability and desire to recalibrate is
therefore predicated on complex framing and counterframing among expan-
sive values adherents, non-adherents, the press, influential ‘spin doctors’ and
the organization (Wisler and Giugni, 2000). A recursive process develops in
which organizational leadership learns and responds to the information
framed before them. The values demographics of organizations whose inter-
nal and external stakeholders, particularly those at Henderson’s second stage,
will dictate whether there are issues advocates who will push these values in
self-interested ways (Scully and Creed, 1998) to management. Framing leads
to perceptions that expansive values are pro-institutional (when the demands
of the new values fit or can fit into the organization), counter-institutional
(when the demands of the new values do not fit or cannot fit into the organ-
ization) or unrelated to organizational functioning. Subsequent institutional
selectivity then legitimizes or represses expansive values (Wisler and Giugni,
1996) and uses political posturing to vilify or justify their recalibrations,
often through the application of sophisticated impression management
strategies (Rosenfeld et al., 2002,). Organizations without a strong sense of
where they stand may argue to a more limited recalibration, a process that
Giacalone and Eylon (2000) label ‘partial paradigm myopia’, resulting in
selective responses to some issues while ignoring others. Thus:

Proposition 9a An organization’s willingness to recalibrate will be a func-

tion of whether internal gatekeepers and leaders expect expansive values-
based ethical decisions are in their best interests.

Proposition 9b When the values of internal gatekeepers or external

stakeholders are inconsistent with expansive values, organizational decision
makers will delegitimize expansive values-based ethics.
 A revolution in organizational values 39

The composite framing that results as a function of demographic dis-

continuity, coupled with Henderson’s (1994) temporal discontinuities,
make ethical choices complex for organizations are forced to operate in an
environment where ethical acceptability is impacted by pedomorphosis: a
behavior may be ethically acceptable behavior today but potentially inap-
propriate six months later (Henderson, 1994). Such an erratic pattern of
acceptability creates considerable difficulties for administrators who are
trying to calibrate their organizational responses in alignment with expan-
sive values. Where psychological contracts with particular implicit values
were pivotal, the organization is left in an ethical quandary: Keep promises
made under previous values assumptions or adhere to the dominant moral
standard at the time of the decision.
These discontinuities make employee ethical socialization very difficult,
particularly when there is a reliance on the interpretation and under-
standing of normative principles such as ethical codes. An environment
of evolving values mandates repeated contextual re-evaluation, preclud-
ing ethical consensus in the organization, and increasing the likelihood of
personalized or phantom codes of conduct and impression management
strategies (Rosenfeld et al., 2002) that recast decisions in a more self-
serving light and allow employees to achieve organizational rewards.
Thus:

Proposition 10 Discontinuities will create values inconsistencies resulting

in the development of an extended period of ‘transition ethics.’

Non-Temporal Discontinuity: Uniqueness

Non-temporal discontinuity, based on the unique aspects of each organ-

ization (for example, structural, behavioral and service differences) will
create specific ethical challenges (Giacalone and Eylon, 2000) that will vary
according to organizational type. For example, organizations whose service
provision results in higher levels of pollution will have a more difficult time
responding to the more stringent environmental ethics that characterize
expansive values. Organizations and departments entrenched in traditional
values, such as those in accounting and finance, will experience greater
difficulty in understanding the ethical parameters of a worldview that does
not weigh financial concerns are predominant above all others. Further, a
larger set of organizations will likely be impacted due resultant to the
influence of the consumer economy. Thus:

Proposition 11 The degree of ethical recalibration will be a function of

the organization’s products/services tied to traditional values.
40 Public service ethos, values and integrity

ACTION STEPS FOR THE FUTURE

These propositions are both reactive, in that they are formulated articula-
tions of publicly-voiced concerns, and proactive in that they frame these
issues in a manner that facilitates scholarly inquiry. The directions for
future research in this area can be clustered into five action items.
First, is the degree to which the national culture is reflecting these new
values at a rate that exceeds the organization’s ability to cope. The focus
here is not that the organization lacks the means or skills to make these
changes, but that entrenched leadership, promotional and resource distri-
bution patterns cling to a reward system that benefited them in the past, but
does not fit with the new set of environmental challenges, technological
advancements and a dramatically different labor pool. Consequently, these
organizations are experiencing productivity declines, hiring and retention
problems, reputational deterioration, and increasing costs due to employee
alienation. The scope of these issues encompasses all sectors, industries,
and services, and speaks to a culture neither predisposed to learning or
change. Teasing apart the contributing factors as well as the anticipated
consequences would advance both our understanding of organizations and
provide insight to those who are called to effectively lead them.
Second, and an extenuation of the first action item, is an examination
of the values shift in organizations that are attempting to learn and grow
in concordance with the external environment. Examining what organiza-
tions are doing this well, and poorly, and how each approaches the task
would be highly illuminating. In addition to the basic questions of how,
where, who, is the weighted concern of when: at what point does an organ-
ization discern the difference between a fad or a true cultural values shift,
and how do they make this decision? Such a perspective is crucial in
moving this field of inquiry into the practical realm as organizations
cannot and should not reconfigure to reflect a passing sentiment, but must
and should transform to stay vital in a newly configured economic and
social order.
The third item for research is rooted in basic change theory but requires
an extension into the long-term consequences of an organization’s approach
to instituting a new value system. The degree to which the effort is compre-
hensive, or implemented only in certain segments of the organization and
the impact of these variations on organizational success is a key area for
inquiry. How does the organization develop the model for change, at what
level is the change initiated, and how is it communicated throughout organ-
izations large and small? Does the model for systemic value change differ
from change theory in general, and why? These are concerns of great value
to academics and practitioners alike.
 A revolution in organizational values 41

The fourth area focuses on measurable impacts of the change for the
organization. Quantifying these outcomes, both for the short and long
terms, is critical in understanding both the impact of the current values
shift as well as other environmental catalysts for widespread organizational
change that are sure to come in the future in various forms. Standard mea-
sures of productivity and performance; human resource acquisition, dis-
tribution and retention; and fiscal strength need to be examined alongside
issues of citizen satisfaction, consequences for the environment and
humanitarian impact. The establishment of criteria to measure success is
itself a process of reflecting the new values set to go beyond the limited
definition of successful organizations that defined mere existence as proof
of viability.
The fifth and final area of future research proposed here targets the indi-
vidual within the organization. What role does the individual play in insti-
gating, promoting, effecting, and incorporating the new cultural shift in
values? What idiosyncratic or demographic differences account for varia-
tions in both the roles adopted and the degree to which they are adopted?
What is the impact on the individual’s performance for the organization as
well as their physical and mental health? Once these causes and effects are
explicated, what type of model can be built for understanding this aspect
of organizational shift both in theory and as a guide for future practice?
Certainly the scope of inquiry is not limited to the foci listed here. Rather,
it is hoped they will serve as a compass for others to expand our collective
knowledge of this key and increasingly vital area in mapping the post-
modern organizational terrain.

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uated agency and contested legitimacy in the diffusion of domestic partner
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Sheldrake, R. (1981), A New Science of Life: The Hypothesis of Formative
Causation, London: Blond and Briggs.
Sheldrake, R. (1988), The Presence of the Past: Morphic Resonance and the Habits
of Nature, New York: Vintage Books.
Shenkar, O., N. Aranya and T. Almor (1995), ‘Construct dimensions in the contin-
gency model: an analysis comparing metric and non-metric multivariate instru-
ments’, Human Relations, 48, 559–80.
Thompson, C.M. (2000), The Congruent Life, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Valle, R.S. (1989), ‘The emergence of transpersonal psychology’, in R.S. Valle and
S. Halling (eds), Existential-Phenomenological Perspectives in Psychology, New
York: Plenum, pp. 257–68.
Vamos, M.N. (1996), ‘America: land of the shaken, Business Week, 11 March,
pp. 64–5.
Wheatley, M. (1992), Leadership and the New Science: Learning about Organization
from an Orderly Universe, San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.
Wisler, D. and M.G. Giugni (1996), ‘Social movements and institutional selectivity’,
Sociological Perspectives, 39, 85–110.
4. Ethical norms in public service: a
framework for analysis
Carol W. Lewis

INTRODUCTION

The purpose here is to construct a multi-dimensional framework for ana-

lysing ethical decision making by integrating the disparate literatures on
ethical norms and behavior in public service. Because the empirical evi-
dence from developmental management, psychology, decision theory, nor-
mative theory, and more suggests that ethical decision making is
multi-dimensional and variable across time and context, the synthesis goes
beyond an exclusive reliance on any single discipline or model. Depicted
graphically as the ethics landscape, the proposed framework shows vari-
ations in ethical decision making based on four bundles of variables (cog-
nitive development, grounding, normative basis and saliency) across
individuals, organizations and situations. The ethics landscape then is
applied in a development setting to an ethical dilemma in public service.

SOURCES OF ETHICAL NORMS

What is ethical behavior and, in particular, good conduct in public service?

There are numerous formulations of good behavior (drawing on, for
example, motivation or purpose, harm or benefit or mode of reasoning) and
its negatives, corruption (Huberts, 2003) and poor moral judgment. These
formulations include both empirical, behavioral models from the social sci-
ences that explain how and why decisions are made and normative or pre-
scriptive models that specify what decisions should be made and why. When
categorized by source or field, moral values and behavioral norms cluster by
source into six categories. (The Appendix shows the classifications in detail.)

1. Human universals, innate or natural, derived from natural rights

theory (for example, the US Declaration of Independence); develop-
mental psychology associated with, for example, Lawrence Kohlberg;1

44
 Ethical norms in public service 45

sociobiology and bio-behavioralism; and evolutionary psychology and

genetics.2
2. Cultural/social perspectives structured relative to experience with the
environment and represented by behavioral psychology (conditioning;
I. Pavlov, B.F. Skinner); situationalism (conditioning; J. Doris); devel-
opmental psychology (innate; J. Kagan); and socialization mechanisms
in anthropology, sociology, theories of civic virtue and moral charac-
ter (for example, the ancient Greeks); and, in its vulgar version, cultural
relativism.3
3. Rational analysis and cognitive processes that stress thought, reason,
and education are associated with deontology4 (I. Kant’s categorical
imperative, for example); teleology5 (John Stuart Mill, for whom utility
entails minimizing pain broadly defined and Jeremy Bentham, whose
calculus focuses on pleasure broadly defined); and vulgar teleology or
simplistic egoism with an exclusive focus on short-term self-interest
and sometimes deteriorating into self-indulgence.
4. Non-rational and needs-based perspectives include David Hume’s cri-
tique of moral rationalism; cognitive psychology’s emphasis on empiri-
cally identifiable universal principles with action related to perception,
anchoring, categorization, pattern matching and risk assessment
(‘Prospect Theory’ of D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, 1979); behavioral
social psychology (A. Maslow, J. Turiel), and human resource man-
agement.
5. Theological perspectives that posit moral values and behavioral norms
are god-given and therefore universal and immutable among believers
or adherents and knowable through revelation or natural law (Saint
Augustine).
6. Professional and bureaucratic roles and associated expectations of
appropriate conduct that are expressed in public-service ethics systems,
public opinion (for example, Transparency International, World
Values Survey (Inglehart, 2000 and Welzel et al., n.d.), and career aspir-
ations and secondary hierarchical relationships (Max Weber) that
generate both the potential for conflict of interest and its prohibition
and common core public-service values (Gilman and Lewis, 1996;
Lewis and Gilman, 2005a, Chapter 9; Lewis and Gilman, 2005b).

UNIVERSALS AND CONTEXT AS EXPLANATORY

VARIABLES

Clusters 1 and 5 listed above offer universals as the explanatory variable.

Some views in the normative tradition search for universal modes of
46 Public service ethos, values and integrity

reasoning generalizable to all people, and its empirical counterpart simi-

larly proposes a universal view.6 Denying that ethics is relative or subjective,
ethicist Peter Singer (1979: 10–11) tells us, ‘Ethics takes a universal point of
view’ and that ‘the notion of ethics carries with it something bigger than
the individual’. Altogether another approach denies that a universal per-
spective is either desirable7 or observable.8
Clusters 2, 3, 4 and 6 draw on contextual factors such as experience and
culture to explain ethical decision making and behavior. Behavioral psy-
chologist John Doris (2002) and his ‘situationalism’ and behavioral social
psychologist Elliot Turiel (2002) represent this contextual perspective as
does John Rohr’s formulation (1989) that stresses the importance of regime
values for defining good conduct in public service. Because context is often
defined in terms of culture (Kagan, 1998, 2000), these disparities make
inescapable the question of whether cultural differences induce differences
in ethical values and behavior.9 Overall, the evidence now tilts toward a per-
spective that argues culture and situation play central roles in defining
moral norms and behavior.
A view of culture as ‘the entire interactive symbolic environment in
which humans live and communicate’ (Donald, 2000: 23) makes culture
particularly important to an understanding of ethical norms and behavior
in public service for three reasons. First, public service itself may be con-
sidered as a subculture in which symbolic communication is both common
and crucial (for purposes of, for example, mobilization or compliance).
Second, organizations are the context for decision and action in contem-
porary public service and organizational norms and standard operating
procedures frame decision making by individuals. Third, public service is
affected by the advent of professionalism (included in the roster above).
This third factor suggests that, although tradition is enduring, it is not
immutable, and newly emerging trends may be moral traditions in their for-
mative stages.

MORAL TRADITION AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

What we know and/or believe we know about ethical norms derives from
two broad sources: moral traditions and emerging empirical findings.
Moral traditions – enduring, systematic, and widely held systems of
thought about right and wrong – are drawn from those sources designated
as normative, cultural or religious in formulation. The normative sources
of moral tradition include the philosophical perspectives associated with
using human reason (rationalism). Foremost among these are perspectives
primarily defining ethics either by: (a) universal principles and duties of
 Ethical norms in public service 47

good conduct; or (b) proper effects on others and the community.10 On the
roster of other normative sources is thinking grounded in natural rights,
virtue and moral character, and some approaches relating to common
sense and human emotion. Each tradition may generate different answers
or different reasons for similar answers to problems posed by ethical dilem-
mas that demand judgment, and it is the gray, problematic arena of moral
judgment that poses the most significant challenges to individual and
organizational integrity in today’s public service.
What is known about ethical norms draws on sources other than long-
standing moral traditions. As Table 4.1 suggests, research in developmen-
tal and cognitive psychology and economics has contributed a good deal to
our view of ethical norms in general and in public service more specifically.
For example, Kohlberg (1980: 92; 1981) identified the fifth stage as the
‘official morality’ of the US government and Constitution. Later research
sought to establish a ‘baseline measurement of moral reasoning’ among
public managers (Swisher et al., 2001). While some studies show a tendency
among US public managers toward the law and duty orientation of con-
ventional reasoning (Stewart et al., 2001), other research shows a tendency
toward post-conventional moral reasoning (Swisher et al., 2001). Some
scholars see continued research on moral reasoning among public servants
as especially important. ‘The first, and in some sense the most basic, con-
tinuing issue in assessing the moral stage theory approach in public admin-
istration relates to whether the underlying assumption of “principled
reasoning” as the normative ideal is the right assumption for public admin-
istration’ (Stewart et al., 2001: 473). Although many scholars acknowledge
the impact of selected empirical research on our thinking about ethical
norms in public service (White, 1999; 2003), other bodies of empirical
research in psychology and economics has yet to be brought to bear
directly. The framework presented below addresses this gap.

MULTI-DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK

Given the pressing challenges, complex environment, and multiple sources

of ethical values and behavioral norms, how do public servants sort
through them, weigh them and exercise an ethical choice? Analysing decis-
ions and behavior in terms of the sources of ethical norms is a fruitful
enterprise. It is widely accepted that decision makers use a framework to
sort and accept ethical claims. Analytic frameworks for moral reasoning
and behavior from psychology include: (a) focusing on universals in human
development as the key explanatory factor;11 (b) drawing on universals
from genetics and adaptation;12 (c) stressing contextual factors such as
48 Public service ethos, values and integrity

Table 4.1 Landmark publications in the psychology of morality

1891 First publication, On Aphasia, by Sigmund Freud (1856–1939, Austrian),

founder of psychoanalysis, who revolutionizes understanding of
personality with its unconscious mental processes including repression and
resistance and profoundly influences intellectual developments in ethics
and many other fields
1921 Publication of first article on intelligence by Jean Piaget (1896–1980),
Swiss cognitive psychologist, whose groundbreaking work on children’s
intelligence and moral development influenced Lawrence Kohlberg
1979 Publication of Prospect Theory by cognitive psychologists Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, whose findings undermine the rational-
actor model of decision making under conditions of uncertainty and
relate decision making to categorization, pattern matching and choice
heuristics
1981 Publication of Lawrence Kohlberg’s The Philosophy of Moral
Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice, an influential work of
developmental psychology that details moral reasoning at various stages of
cognitive development
1982 Publication of In a Different Voice by Carol Gilligan influences study of
women’s moral development and offers critical response to justice
perspective associated with Immanuel Kant, John Rawls and Lawrence
Kohlberg; critique developed by Martha Nussbaum, Susan Okin and
others; inspires development of ethics of care based on relationships,
contrasted with ethics of justice based on rights and principles
1984 Publication of Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral
Education by educator Nel Noddings, proponent of caring as basis for
moral action and relationships rather than principles as basis for moral
development, and inspiration for perspective termed ethic of care
1994 Journalist Robert Wright’s The Moral Animal, a work of popular science,
draws on evolutionary psychology to explain altruistic behavior
1998 Publication of Three Seductive Ideas by Jerome Kagan, the developmental
psychologist who refutes fallacies such as ‘infant determinism’ and argues
on behalf of humans’ capacity for change and growth and that humans are
motivated by a biologically-based concern for right and wrong and
empathy
2002 In The Culture of Morality, Elliot Turiel provides an empirical basis for
heterogeneity of social judgments with moral content and refutes the
dichotomy between collectivist and individualist cultures
2002 Publication of John M. Doris’s Lack of Character: Personality and Moral
Behavior, in which empirical studies support ‘situationalism’ and refute
moral character as basis of ethical behavior
 Ethical norms in public service 49

experience and culture to explain behavior;13 and (d) centering on cognitive

processes.14

THREE KEYS TO ANALYSIS

The analysis suggests three keys to understanding ethical reasoning in many

formulations. Universals are one key. Denying that ethics is relative or sub-
jective, Peter Singer (1979: 11) tells us, ‘Ethics takes a universal point of view’
and that ‘[f]rom ancient times, philosophers and moralists have expressed the
idea that ethical conduct is acceptable from a point of view that is somehow
universal’ (p. 10). Deontology is another example. Cognitive processes and
developmental psychology also offer a universal viewpoint. Building on the
work of Jean Piaget to examine moral reasoning, Lawrence Kohlberg (1981)
framed his theory of moral development solely in terms of reasoning, which
he saw as the basis for ethical conduct. Building on a construct quite different
from Kohlberg’s, Jerome Kagan (1998) ‘identifies the most powerful motive
for human beings as the desire to gain and maintain a feeling of virtue, the
desire to be “good” ’ (Shweder, 1999: 798). ‘We inherit, because we are
humans, a concern with right and wrong, and empathy with others. But the
specific actions that we regard as moral can vary with culture’, Kagan
explains (2000).
A non-rational dimension is a second key to explaining decision making.
According to ‘Prospect theory’, people confronting uncertainty do not
make decisions the way linear models of rational decision making would
have it (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). There is something going on other
than analytic processing and cognitive operations – something different
from a straightforward calculus of costs, benefits, probabilities and risks
(Kahneman et al., 1982). Decision makers bias their judgments and remem-
brances in predictable, systematic ways. ‘People edit their judgments with
moral criteria . . . they give more weight to losses than to gains of the same
amount; they bias remembered experiences by remembering peaks and end
points but not duration; they employ a positivity bias – and much more’
(Lane, 2000: 17–18).15 ‘Irrationally, people feel differently about losing than
they do about gaining, even if either choice produces the same outcome’
(Olin, 2003). Their decision biases toward seeking or avoiding risk depend
on their understanding of a situation. Because of this bias in decision
making, framing the issue as a gain or a loss affects the decision.16
Context is a third key to understanding decision making. Overall, the evi-
dence tilts toward central roles for culture, situation and experience in
defining moral norms and behavior. Because decision makers use cat-
egories drawn from their experience and pattern matching (‘anchoring’), it
50 Public service ethos, values and integrity

is imperative to recognize the ‘powerful impact of contextual factors on

decision making. . . . Risk taking, time discounting, and interpersonal
decision making . . . are much more a function of how people construe situ-
ations than of how they evaluate and weigh attributes’ (Loewenstein, 2001:
500–1, notes omitted). Decision makers draw on their experience and
expertise first ‘to figure out what kind of situation they are in and then
adopt choice rules that seem appropriate for that situation’ (Loewenstein,
2001: 503). In effect, decisions can be altered by altering or reframing the
situation from, for example, personal relationships to organizational or
professional obligations and by reducing risk by shifting from prospective
loss to retained gain.
Individuals make decisions and take action in a context rich with varied
interrelationships, responsibilities, perceptions, inferences, experiences and
interpretations. The context may be defined as the constructed situation
(along the lines of Prospect Theory) or organizational norms and proce-
dures and hierarchical rank that, coupled with cognitive limits, structure
decision making (Herbert Simon, 1948). As noted above, context often is
defined in terms of culture.

RELEVANCE TO PUBLIC SERVICE

Because of public service’s emphasis on separating the personal from the

public (reflected in the prohibition against conflict of interest, for example)
and its taking place in public organizations, two observations from social
psychology are especially meaningful for ethics in public service. Rejecting
both extremes – that culture wholly dictates or has no effect whatsoever on
moral development – and that societies and individuals are culturally
monolithic, Elliot Turiel (1994: 237) notes ‘several sides to cultural prac-
tices stemming from the different perspectives of people in different pos-
itions in the hierarchy’. Also, he finds, ‘In-group moral commitments are
often as important as the moral idea of general applicability. However, one
does not negate the other’ (Turiel, 1994: 4).17
Recognition of the determining influence of situations means that incon-
sistent behavior across situations is more likely than not (Doris, 2002:
Chapter 2).18 The recognition that individuals’ judgments and behaviors
are inconsistent or fragmented across situations leads to the rejection of
‘general evaluative categories such as “good person” and “bad person” ’
and to questioning the usefulness of character education that aims at cre-
ating ‘global character structures’ (Doris, 2002: 115, 122–5). Nonetheless,
because virtue ‘can be “socially sustained” ’ (Doris, 2002: 90), organiza-
tions can promote ethical behavior.
 Ethical norms in public service 51

Every framework has its strengths, weaknesses and problems. One

approach, erroneously associated with social psychology or anthropology,
may encourage some confusion between morality and convention and a
failure to recognize that all that is practiced need not be good. As they
center on moral reasoning, cognitive frameworks tend to downplay emo-
tional aspects of behavior. The rationalistic, normative frameworks may
be suitable for self-conscious analysis but are less useful for analyzing indi-
vidual and organizational decisions and behavior.

SYNTHESIS

Instead of opposing seemingly contradictory frameworks – irrationality

versus cognitive development or universals versus contextual factors, for
instance – and then dismissing the less preferred, it is possible to bring into
play the many different frameworks supported by empirical evidence.
Melding these frameworks into a flexible decision-making model highlights
the multi-dimensionality of ethical decision making and accounts for the
(a) inconsistency over time or across decision-making domains (that an
observer may label as hypocrisy), and (b) principled reasoning (that
nonetheless may appear erroneous or disingenuous).
Research on the effects of uncertainty, decision biases, social interac-
tions, experience and culture shows that ethical behavior draws on feeling
and thinking; emotion and reason both influence decisions and behavior;19
the ethical agent employs both emotion and reason (Cooper, 1987).20
Therefore, rather than dichotomizing emotion and reason and relying
solely upon one or the other, it is more useful to harmonize them when pos-
sible, recognize that both are in play, and to acknowledge that the ethically
mature person brings both to bear in making moral judgments.
Kagan (2000) says to policy makers that ‘at the moment, the gap between
the policies that legislators must make and science is so large that wisdom
on the part of the legislator is probably the most important ingredient’. The
more cautious approach to public policy may be to integrate them.

ETHICS LANDSCAPE

Figure 4.1 integrates step by step the numerous frameworks and suggests
interactions among four central factors. The figure progressively builds an
ethical landscape in three steps. First, in Figure 4.1a, moral development
brings to bear the stages of moral reasoning and is marked as variable no. 1.
Situational differences are represented by saliency (variable no. 2). Saliency
 A B
framin
g, anch
or s,
2 tion
Intensity of issue, value t radi
Saliency e n
principle, assessed risk rm
ativ lizatio
n No socia
atio
Situ Important

3 s
asi Principles
lB

52
ca
E thi Consequences
Common sense
o n Grounding n
oti so
R ea
Em 4
Ap
pe
Unimportant 1 al,
Moral Development Stage, time, ra
experience tio
na
Pre- Conventional Post- le,
ho
conventional conventional ok
 Ethical norms in public service 53

Figures 4.1 A–E: Building the ethics landscape. (Page 52) A, first set of
variables in ethics landscape; B, second set of variables
in ethics landscape; (above) C, integrated view of ethics
landscape; (page 54) D, alternative integrated view of
ethics landscape; E, comparative views of ethics
landscape
54
Source: © 2005. Carol W. Lewis. Reprinted by permission. Graphics by Brian Baird Alstadt.
 Ethical norms in public service 55

captures intensity (or triviality or significance of issues), value, principle, or

assessed risk.21 Alternatively, saliency may be taken to refer to the price tag
associated with a particular decision or behavior, and includes considera-
tions of career, cost, convenience, competence, commitment, and courage
(Lewis and Gilman, 2005a). In either case, the greater the saliency, the more
demanding is the question to be answered or the more pressing is the issue
to be resolved. Individuals, including those of moral character, are shown
sliding along a saliency vector as they attribute difference degrees of
saliency to an issue or principle or in response to their different assessments
of risk. Finnish experience illustrates this fluidity in practice: ‘the central
principles of civil service ethics in fact cannot be defined clearly and unam-
biguously; they differ according to official status and administrative
sectors’ (OECD, 2004: 232). Such experiences, coupled with Doris’s argu-
ments (Doris, 2002: Chapter 2) on behalf of inconsistent behavior across
situations, make saliency a central concern.
Figure 4.1a reveals how moral development and saliency might interact
to begin forming a decision-making landscape in which a specific decision
simultaneously turns on the decision maker’s moral development and the
saliency the decision maker attributes to the issue. Different places on this
landscape may be held by the same person at different times and under
different circumstances. Alternatively, these places may be held by different
people at the same time.
Two other factors – ethical basis and grounding – interact in the second
step to form another landscape. In Figure 4.1b, ethical basis (variable no. 3)
represents normative and social aspects. while grounding (variable no. 4)
accounts for the cognitive versus emotional grounds for ethical decisions
and behavior. Figure 4.1b demonstrates how a specific decision depends
upon the interaction between these two sets of factors on the part of the
decision maker.
The third step is to bring the two landscapes together; Figure 4.1c sug-
gests how the four factors might interact at a particular decision-making
point. The aim of the graphic is not to imply rigid relationships among the
four variables. Rather, the central point for analysis is that individuals draw
on a variety of influential factors when making an ethical decision and an
actual decision depends upon the interaction among these factors. Figure
4.1a–e provides a framework for envisioning how those factors might inter-
act for a specific person making a specific decision.
Figure 4.1d shows an alternative landscape for envisioning a different
decision or decision maker. The final step shown in Figure 4.1e compares
the two landscapes from Figures 4.1c and 4.1d. With its progressive versions,
Figure 4.1 admittedly is a complex graphic. The complexity mirrors possible
real-world interactions among four shifting variables. The bundling of
56 Public service ethos, values and integrity

factors influencing decision making already simplifies the decision-making

framework. (Note that Table 4.1 identifies six separate foundations of
ethical norms.) To reduce the framework to a factor or two misses the point:
ethical decisions and behavior are multi-dimensional and variable across
time and context.

ETHICS PARABLE

Figure 4.1 can be used for probing decision-making dynamics in different

organizations and different cultural settings. When used as an analytic tool,
Figure 4.1 helps move us from theory to practice and from the individual
to the organization. Highlighted behaviors related to specific cultures and
customs but antithetical to the public interest and public service values and
principles can be identified as candidates for repositioning . . . to be
anchored in public service imperatives and linked to universal, profes-
sional, and organizational moral claims.
To demonstrate the analytic potential of Figure 4.1, it is useful to draw
upon a time-honored tool in ethics, story-telling. Consider a young devel-
opment officer out in the field with the assigned task of getting a well dug
in a remote village. Figure 4.1c locates her place on the ethics landscape.
Ascribing more than average salience to her work, the officer frames her
task in terms of the norms of doing good (beneficence) and serving the
public interest. Keeping her emotional distance, she thinks about what
clean water means for the villagers’ health. Reasoning at a conventional
stage of moral development, the officer defines her work in terms of doing
her duty and she seeks approval from her superiors and peers in the devel-
opment community.
The immediate problem is that the local leader expects the customary gift
to express appreciation for his arranging the villagers’ cooperation. The
salience of giving a small but unauthorized gift is low; the risks are low
because no one beyond the village is likely to know. The token gift can be
seen as ceremonial rather than as an outright bribe. This reasoning illus-
trates how convention may be confused with ethics (and recalls the words
of the eighteenth-century pamphleteer, Thomas Paine, ‘A long habit of not
thinking a thing wrong gives it the superficial appearance of being right’).
She frames the issue as an isolated event by considering the consequences
of contaminated water to the villagers and ignoring the symbolic and
financial implications of ‘gifting’ over many such projects. Confronting an
immediate decision, she goes on gut feel and common sense. Figure 4.1d
locates her place on the ethics landscape in this situation. Figure 4.1e
compares the two scenarios.
 Ethical norms in public service 57

CONCLUSION

Figure 4.1 helps pinpoint the factors that enter into decisions and behavior
at different times, in different situations, and/or by different people. Because
more research is needed to specify their interrelationships and weights, the
proposed framework as yet disregards what is undoubtedly a crucial issue
on the future research agenda. The different landscapes possible from the
(as yet undifferentiated) factors in Figure 4.1 counsel that there is no single
key to unlocking the mystery of the shaping of ethical norms and behavior
for all people at all times. The evidence points to a multi-dimensional view;
a simplistic view is unrealistic, not fruitful for analytic purposes, and
designed for failure in practical applications. In order to confront the com-
plexity depicted in Figure 4.1, public sector ethics needs a multi-faceted
approach. H.L. Mencken articulates the alternative: ‘For every human
problem, there is a solution that is simple, neat, and wrong’.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This chapter is excerpted in large part from the author’s 2005 report to the
World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network. An
earlier version was presented at the conference, ‘Ethics and Integrity of
Governance: a Transatlantic Dialogue’, under the auspices of the Study
Group on Ethics and Integrity of Governance of the European Group of
Public Administration and the Section on Ethics of the American Society
for Public Administration and hosted by Public Management Institute of
the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, 2-5 June 2005. This work rep-
resents solely the views of the author, who is solely responsible for it con-
tents. The author takes this opportunity to express her sincere appreciation
to the many colleagues who contributed their thoughtful comments and
insightful suggestions to this work. They include Brian Baird Alstadt,
Daryl Balia, Bayard L. Catron, Stuart C. Gilman, Jeroen Maesschalck,
Morton J. Tenzer, Michael Rion, Richard Vengroff, Cyrus Ernesto
Zirakzadeh, and Leo W.J.C. Huberts who contributed detailed suggestions.
Any errors and oversights are, of course, the author’s.

NOTES

1. One essay observes that ‘cognitive science still proceeds as if culture did not matter. The
only major exception to this is developmental psychology’ (Donald, 2000: 20).
2. Evolutionary psychology argues that human nature is the result of adaptation and evol-
ution. The idea of a biological basis for morality dates back at least to Charles Darwin
58 Public service ethos, values and integrity

(2004 [1873]), who suggested that ‘sympathy’, the foundation of moral sentiment, is a
social instinct and biological force. E.O. Wilson’s Sociobiology (1975) sparked consider-
able controversy with its argument that most of social life including morality is best seen
in biological terms. This thesis was developed in a popular version by Robert Wright
(1995).
3. Cultural relativism ‘denies that any independent moral facts exist outside of a society . . .
all moral beliefs are proper or improper in relation to a society’s customs’ (Terkel and
Duval, 1999: 58, capitalization omitted).
4. Deontology is a philosophical perspective based on universal principles and duties with
intrinsic value and applicable to moral judgment.
5. Sometimes referred to as ‘consequentialism’, teleology is a philosophical perspective
whereby actions are judged instrumentally by their effects on the community.
‘Consequentialists start not with moral rules but with goals. They assess actions by the
extent to which they further these goals. . . . The classical utilitarian regards an action
as right if it produces as much or more an increase in the happiness of all affected by it
than any alternative action, and wrong if it does not’ (Singer, 1979: 3).
6. Some of these ideas about the foundations of ethical norms and behavior run counter
to common wisdom but had been percolating for many years before positive social
science addressed them. David Hume, the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher, came
down on the side of context rather than universals when he proposed ‘that causes and
effects are discoverable, not by reason but by experience . . .’ (Hume, 1980 [1751]: 28,
italics omitted). He also anticipated Prospect Theory to some degree when he wrote ‘all
arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our
knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all of our exper-
imental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to
the past’ and concluded, ‘From causes which appear similar we expect similar effects.
This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions’ (Hume, 1980 [1751]: 35–6). He also
addressed uncertainty: ‘If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change,
and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can
give rise to no inference or conclusion’ (Hume, 1980 [1751]: 37–8).
7. The normative denial often translates into advocating a particular end or conduct as
ethical under certain circumstances.
8. The empirical denial often is supported by mustering evidence for a situational
approach. For a classic statement on ‘culture-dependent differences in thinking and
acting’ (p. 8), see Culture’s Consequences by Geert Hofstede (1980).
9. On whether cultural differences induce differences in ethical values and behavior, see
Khalid al-Yahya et al., 2005; Cooper and Yoder, 2002; Donald, 2000; Doris, 2002;
Gilman and Lewis, 1996; Hofstede, 1980; Lewis, 2005; Lewis and Gilman, 2005b;
Moreno, 2002; Myers and Tan, 2002; Smith, 2004, Tayeb, 1994; Turiel, 1994, 2002; and
Welzel et al., (n.d.). On conceptual problems with ‘national culture’, see Al-Yahya et al.,
2005: 11–13; Myers and Tan, 2002; and Tayeb, 1994. Lewis (2005, Appendix B) exam-
ines the literature in development management and psychology (including Turiel, 1994,
2002 and Doris, 2002) and concludes that a definitive verdict is still out as to whether
there are meaningful differences in ethical values and behavior across cultures and, if so,
whether these differences are culturally determined.
10. Note the emphasis on an inclusive roster of stakeholders. Consequentialism invokes
more than exclusive, single-minded devotion to one’s self. It is the vulgar version of sim-
plistic egoism that considers only the short-term self-interest.
11. Developmental psychologists Lawrence Kohlberg (1981) and Jerome Kagan (1998) rep-
resent this view.
12. See, for example, work in evolutionary psychology as represented by E.O. Wilson and,
in its popular version, by Robert Wright (1994).
13. Behavioral psychologist John Doris (2002) and his ‘situationalism’ and behavioral social
psychologist Elliot Turiel (2002) represent this perspective.
14. The Prospect Theory of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979) is an example of
this approach.
 Ethical norms in public service 59

15. This directly counters the rational assessment claimed by utility theory. These findings
from cognitive psychology undercut the rational-actor model of decision making under
conditions of uncertainty. See Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Fischhoff et al., 1981;
Green et al., 1994; Green et al., 1998; Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; and Kahneman
et al., 1982.
16. Ethics and anti-corruption programs as well as organizational incentive structures would
be well served by taking these findings into account.
17. This suggests that organizations can effectively support ethical behavior by explicitly
linking it to moral commitments to organizational and professional colleagues, in add-
ition to obligations to the public.
18. John Doris’s evidence for ‘situationalism’ draws on Western and non-Western cultures
(Doris, 2002: 105–6).
19. See Hobson, 2005 for a popular rendition of current psychological research. On emo-
tional support for values, see Gaylin and Jennings (1996).
20. Doris (2002: 164) argues that a capacity for taking responsibility distinguishes the adult:
‘Moral maturity has much to do with acknowledging what one has done. . . . This exer-
cise is as much affective as cognitive; it centrally involves a capacity to have a certain sort
of emotional encounter with oneself.’
21. Because changing the ‘price’ (or incentive and disincentive, including risk) affects behav-
ior, both analysis and public policy would benefit from the application of decision-
making theory from cognitive psychology that relates risk of loss to the likelihood and
size of prospective benefit.

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 APPENDIX. SIX MAJOR SOURCES OF MORAL VALUES AND BEHAVIORAL NORMS

Source Field Example Method of Acquisition Characteristics

Human Universals
Developmental L. Kohlberg Moral development Universal stages of development,
psychology morality as generalizable, empirical
Natural rights US Declaration of Natural or God- Universal, immutable, normative
Independence given
Sociobiology, Genetics, E.O. Wilson, Innate Universal, evolutionary, empirical
bio-behavioralism, Robert Wright
evolutionary (popular science)
psychology
Cultural/Social
Behavioral I. Pavlov, B.F. Skinner Conditioning Relative to experience

62
psychology situationalism, J. Doris with environment, empirical
Developmental J. Kagan Innate motive, not Desire to be virtuous does not
Psychology behavior mean behavioral consistency
across cultures
Anthropology/ Socialization Relative to society, empirical
sociology
Civic virtue, moral Ancient Greece Socialization Relative to community, normative
character
Common sense Nurturer, adult care Socialization Applicable to moral choices (good
giver vs. bad), normative/empirical
Vulgar version Cultural relativism Socialization Only criterion is immediate social
worth
Rational (analysis,
cognitive processes)
Deontology I. Kant, S. Bok Thought, reason, Universal principles and duties
(popular version) education with intrinsic value, categorical
 imperative, applicable to moral
choice and moral judgment
(dilemmas), normative
Vulgar deontology Trump Exclusive focus on single principle
or duty
consequentialism John Stuart Mill Thought, reason, Actions judged instrumentally by
(teleology) education effects on community; utility
entails minimizing pain broadly
defined; applicable to moral choice
and moral judgment, normative
J. Bentham Calculus focuses on pleasure
broadly defined
Vulgar Simplistic egoism Exclusive focus on short-term
consequentialism self-interest, self, self-indulgence,
and pain, normative
Emotional (emotion

63
and/or needs-based)
Normative theory D. Hume Critique of moral rationalism
Cognitive D. Kahneman and Experience, expertise Empirically identifiable universal
psychology Tversky’s principles but action related
Prospect theory to perception, anchoring,
categorization, pattern matching,
risk assessment
Behavioral social A. Maslow, J. Turiel Incentives/ Hierarchy of relative prepotency of
psychology disincentives needs, including fear, guilt, shame,
pride, honor, attachments
HR Management, Training, incentives,
Theories X, Y, Z virtue
Religion
Theology Religious perspectives God-given, knowable Universal and immutable among
through rational/ believers/adherents, normative
 Source Field Example Method of Acquisition Characteristics
emotional processes
and/or revelation
Natural Law St Augustine God-given, universal, immutable,
normative
Professionalism (role)
Bureaucracy Max Weber Career, separation of primary and
primary relationships produces
potential for conflict of interest
Selected historical Prohibition against bribery; justice,
illustrations and public interest
Selected OECD, World Bank, Training, incentives, Core values and duties in value

64
transnational Inter-American virtue statements/codes
examples Convention (Art. III),
United Nations
Selected models – South African Public Training, incentives, Core values and duties
governmental Service Commission virtue
ethics systems Finland, Great Britain’s
Seven principles of
public life, other
Public expectations World values survey, Values and duties
transparency
international

Source: © 2005. Carol W. Lewis. Reprinted by permission.

5. Judging a public official’s integrity
Frédérique Six and Leo W.J.C. Huberts

INTRODUCTION

In most democratic countries the integrity of public officials is occasionally

questioned based upon allegations of misconduct or seemingly dubious
decisions. Allegations of being corrupt, or at least having acted without
integrity, are very serious allegations. They almost always are very damaging
for the reputation of the politician or public servant and can lead to the end
of his career. Because of this criticality, it could be expected that integrity
researchers would have directed their attention to providing theory-based
guidelines for judging a public official’s integrity. This, however, has not been
the case thus far.
The argument here is that the present line of research regarding the
integrity of public officials is incomplete. Greater clarity is needed in
defining the concept and addressing fundamental issues such as who is
judged by whom and on what basis? Menzel’s (1999, 2005) insightful
reviews of the existing public ethics and integrity literature showed that
most research to date has focused on examining public officials themselves,
the institutional ethical arrangements they are subjected to, and the
broader ethical environment in which they operate. Insofar as these
researchers have made judgments about a public official’s integrity, they
have relied either on legal convictions or on personal criteria/opinions
(Dobel, 1999; Holbrook and Meier, 1993). For example, Dobel (1999) pre-
sented a set of criteria to be applied in several stages for judging the
integrity of a public official prior to his or her appointment to office.
Another line of reasoning can be found in public attitude-centered corrup-
tion research, which has investigated public attitudes toward political cor-
ruption (Malec, 1993). However, the different research perspectives have
not been used to develop a more general theory-based framework for
judging public officials’ integrity.
The purpose of this study is to address this gap in current public
integrity research. The main research question is: How to judge the
integrity of a public official? We focus our research on the integrity of the
individual public official, not organizational or institutional integrity. A

65
66 Public service ethos, values and integrity

public official can be an elected official (for example, a member of parlia-

ment or local council), a politically appointed official (for example, a
cabinet minister), or an administrative official (for example, a police officer,
policy maker or health inspector) (Frederickson, 1993). This study is con-
ceptual in nature, filling the need for an objective and thorough theory-
based examination of this important topic.
We address these questions using concepts and results from the literature
on trust. The chapter is the result of discussions between integrity and trust
researchers. We begin our investigation with a review of the concept of
integrity, followed by a review of the way the trust literature deals with
similar questions. The latter review has helped sharpen our argument. We
proceed by addressing, respectively, who judges an actor’s integrity and
what criteria for judging integrity should be used. Next, we apply these
general terms to various types of public officials and develop propositions
for empirical research. We conclude with a summary of our argument and
implications for future public integrity research.

DEFINING INTEGRITY

Even though the focus here is on public officials, integrity is integral to all
professions and organizations. This does not mean, however, that the
concept of integrity is clear and uncontested (Montefiore, 1999; Chapman,
2000; Blenkert, 2004). The literature on ethics and integrity reveals a
number of differing perspectives (Box 5.1; Huberts, 2005).
One perspective defines integrity as ‘wholeness’ or completeness, a con-
sistency and coherence of a set of principles and values (in line with one of
the meanings of the Latin integras: intact, whole, harmonious). Montefiore

BOX 5.1 PERSPECTIVES ON INTEGRITY

1. Integrity as wholeness
2. Integrity as a specific value (incorruptibility) or a number of
values and norms
3. Integrity as the quality of acting in accordance with laws and
codes
4. Integrity as the quality of acting in accordance with relevant
moral values and norms
5. Integrity as exemplary moral behavior
 Judging a public official’s integrity 67

states, based on an inventory of the literature on integrity: ‘The association

with wholeness seems to be dominant’ (1999: 9). A disadvantage of inter-
pretations in terms of wholeness and consistency is the lack of what
Blenkert calls a moral filter: ‘integrity involves more than simply doing
what one says; what one says and does must also pass through some moral
filter’ (Blenkert, 2004: 4). McFall (1987) also points out the argument in her
distinction between personal and moral integrity. Many examples exist
where a person showed high internal coherence and therefore high personal
integrity, yet we would not readily grant him the general distinction of
having high integrity (McFall, 1987).
Other perspectives are, more than the consistency perspectives, charac-
terized by the relationship between integrity and what is right and wrong,
referring thus to morals. The second perspective sees integrity as either one
specific value or a collection of values. When integrity is one of the specific
values referred to in codes of conduct, it usually means incorruptibility or
righteousness. The official should not be guided by self-interest or group
or party interest, but should serve the interests of the organization or of
society. According to Dobel, a public official has to deal with three types of
obligations ‘obligations of office, personal commitment and capacity, and
prudence’ (1999: 20). Together they add up to ‘seven standards that I
propose as focal commitments for public integrity’, including ‘be truthfully
accountable to the relevant authorities and publics’, ‘address the public
values of the political regime’ and ‘demand competent performance
effectiveness in the execution of policy’ (Dobel, 1999: 21). Still other per-
spectives view integrity more as an umbrella concept, referring to sets of
values that are relevant for the official who is judged.
The third perspective considered here is the legal or constitutional one,
summarized by Rohr (1989: 4–5): ‘bureaucrats have an ethical obligation to
respond to the values of the people in whose name they govern. The values
in question are not popular whims of the moment, but rather constitutional
or regime values’. The constitutional interpretation of relevant values and
norms is attractive because it is clear concerning which matter and which
should be applied when we judge the integrity of a public official. The
problem, however, is that the law itself is not a very clear guiding principle
in actual decision-making and implementation processes in government
(let alone in other sectors such as business).
Further, sometimes the law is in conflict with the moral values and norms
of the population and, as a consequence, a broader interpretation in terms
of ‘complying with the moral values and norms’ seems more appropriate.
In this fourth perspective, integrity is a characteristic or quality of an actor,
for example a public official, meaning that what the official does (or does
not do) is in accordance with the relevant moral values and norms (and the
68 Public service ethos, values and integrity

laws and rules resulting from them) (Fijnaut and Huberts, 2002; Thomas,
2001; Uhr, 1999). This of course resembles ‘a general way of acting
morally’ and ‘morality’ (Blenkert, 2004, p. 5).
The fifth and final perspective stresses that integrity is something for
which one can strive. Van Luijk stated (2004: 39), ‘Integrity now stands for
complying in an exemplary way with specific moral standards’. Or even
stronger, integrity is the ‘stuff of moral courage and even heroism’ (Blenkert,
2004: 5).
In our research on the integrity of governance we are using the fourth
perspective, integrity as the quality of acting in accordance with relevant
moral values and norms. Basically, the arguments for that choice have
already been put forward. An integrity judgment always also brings in what
is considered right or wrong, the moral dimension. This dimension goes
beyond comparing the person’s behavior with one (or some) specific values;
an official can be said to have acted with integrity when it is ethical in a
more generic sense. In a democracy, laws and codes are a reflection of those
ethics, but the judicial framework is not always applicable to the behavior
that is judged. Much behavior is not regulated, for example private behav-
ior, and sometimes the law can contradict the dominant values in society
concerning a public official’s behavior. As a consequence, the perspective
has to include the more informal values and norms that are relevant for the
behavior to be judged. These values and norms clarify what is right and
wrong in given circumstances. They do not, in our view, state what is exem-
plary and admirable; to surmise that a person has acted with integrity, it
suffices that the behavior is right and defendable.
This fourth perspective is well-supported by a body of literature that con-
siders integrity as synonymous with being moral or ethical. What is less
common, however, is the attempt to clarify and specify the concept and per-
spective by answering a number of aspects or questions, as done in this
study. Before we address these questions, attention is paid to the literature
on trust and trustworthiness. We use these insights to sharpen our argu-
ment regarding how to judge a public official’s integrity.

TRUST, TRUSTWORTHINESS AND INTEGRITY

Largely following the growing consensus among trust researchers (includ-

ing Hosmer, 1995; Lane, 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998), we
define trust as a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vul-
nerability to the actions of another party, based upon the expectation that
the other will perform a particular action important to you. Since trust is
related to the positive expectation that it will not be taken advantage of, it
 Judging a public official’s integrity 69

requires the absence of opportunistic behavior by the trustee so that the

trustor can make himself vulnerable to the action(s) of the trustee. An
important antecedent of a trustor’s trust in a trustee is the trustor’s percep-
tion of the trustee’s trustworthiness. Mayer et al. (1995) refer to trust-
worthiness as a characteristic of a trustee that is responsible for trust. Trust
and trustworthiness are thus two concepts that ‘belong’ to different actors.
Trust is an attribute of a trustor and trustworthiness is an attribute of a
trustee. The trust literature is very clear regarding who judges an actor’s
trustworthiness. The trustor’s perceptions of the trustee’s trustworthiness are
what counts (Hardin, 2002; Lindenberg, 2000; Mayer et al., 1995; Six, 2005);
thus, an actor’s trustworthiness is ultimately determined by the other’s per-
ceptions. This has important consequences, because there are bound to be
differences in perceptions between the two actors (Hardin, 2002).
How does a trustor determine a trustee’s trustworthiness? Trust building
is a process in which an actor learns about the other’s trustworthiness in
different situations (Gabarro, 1978; Six, 2005). An actor’s perceptions of
the trustworthiness of another actor are thus based on learning, primarily
cognitively based and secondarily on forging emotional bonds (McAllister,
1995). Information of any sort, either directly through interaction with the
other actor or indirectly from third parties or the context within which the
interaction takes place, will be used as the basis for the judgment. The actor
probably always has information of some sort available, and at the same
time is usually limited in the capacity to ever achieve full knowledge of the
other actor and the other actor’s motives (Gambetta, 1988). Thus, errors of
judgment can occur because knowledge is necessarily incomplete (Hardin,
1993; Gambetta, 1988).
In sum, and applying it to a public official: a public official’s trust-
worthiness is relevant to another actor who is dependent on the public
official’s future behavior. The other actor is concerned with whether the
official is interested in maintaining a relationship. The other actor’s per-
ceptions of the official’s trustworthiness are what count for the judgment of
the official’s trustworthiness; not how the official views his or her own trust-
worthiness. The actor needs information about the other’s trustworthiness
upon which to base any judgment. This information is related to the actions
and motives of the official, and can be obtained through direct interaction
or indirectly from third parties, or the context within which the official
operates. Errors of judgment can occur because knowledge is necessarily
incomplete and the actor may interpret wrongly. If the actor has insufficient
information upon which to base a judgment of trustworthiness, this does
not imply that the official is untrustworthy. A judgment of untrustworthi-
ness, leading to distrust, needs to be based on information, just like a judg-
ment of trustworthiness.
70 Public service ethos, values and integrity

For trust and trustworthiness, the central relationship is one between two
actors and the criteria for judgment are the four dimensions of trustworthi-
ness: ability, dedication, benevolence and norm-acceptability (Six, 2005). A
trusts B (or not) and B is trustworthy in A’s eyes (or not). A is the judge of
B’s trustworthiness (Figure 1a). In comparing integrity and trustworthi-
ness, norm-acceptability is a key dimension. If B’s norms are unacceptable
to A, A’s trust in B is undermined. Whether B’s norms are acceptable to A
is strongly related to A’s own norms.
Even though trust and integrity are often used in conjunction with one
another, they are different concepts. Integrity is a concept similar to trust-
worthiness rather than trust. Both integrity and trustworthiness refer to
attributes of a specific actor – in trust terminology, the trustee – that make
that actor have higher or lower integrity or trustworthiness in the eyes of
another actor – again in trust terminology, the trustor. In both cases, it is
generally considered good to maximize the amount of each. The relation-
ship between integrity and trust is such that the higher an actor’s integrity,
the more he will be trusted by another actor.
Both concepts differ in important ways. Trustworthiness is restricted to
the specific relationship: is the other actor interested in maintaining a rela-
tionship with me? Is the other actor benevolent to me? Are their norms
acceptable to me? (Mayer et al., 1995). On the other hand, integrity, as
shown above, is based on a ‘relevant set of moral values, norms and rules’,
not what I, personally, may hold as values and norms, nor my personal
interests.

Judging an Actor’s Integrity

The review of contemporary trust research points to the importance of the

question, who judges an actor’s integrity? Can an actor be his own judge or
evaluator? Or, can another individual be the judge or evaluator based on
his or her own values or norms? The actor whose integrity is in question
will usually consider him or herself to be acting with integrity, considering
the circumstances; this belief is facilitated by psychological mechanisms
such as cognitive dissonance reduction (Dobel, 1999). As Srivastva (1988:
19) noted, ‘the intriguing fact is that very few of us see ourselves as lacking
in integrity, yet we can readily point to disintegrity in almost every institu-
tion in which we are involved’. Part of the explanation, as he proposed, is
that the other actor may see things very differently, also due to differences
in mental maps, worldviews, expectations and goal definitions (for example,
Weick, 1995). These differences, in turn, lead to different values and norms
(Schein, 1992). Thus, an actor’s integrity is ultimately determined by
another’s perceptions.
 Judging a public official’s integrity 71

Actor A Actor B

Norms Ability
Dedication
Benevolence
Norms

A’s judgment of B’s trustworthiness

Actor A Actor B

Moral values Moral values

and norms and norms

A’s moral judgment about B

Figure 5.1 Contrasting A’s judgment of B’s trustworthiness with A’s moral
judgment of B: (a) A’s judgment of B’s trustworthiness and
roles of both their norms; (b) A’s moral judgment of B

If it is the perception of the other that ultimately determines an actor’s

integrity, what are the implications? To elucidate our argument, we contrast
trustworthiness and integrity. A is the judge of B’s trustworthiness (Figure
5.1a). What is characteristic for integrity and judging integrity? How can
actor A judge B’s integrity? A first difference is that judging integrity is less
reciprocal or mutual than judging trustworthiness. There is no such thing
as mutual integrity, whereas there can be, and often is, mutual trust. It
is always only one actor’s integrity that is at stake or being judged. For A
to judge B, it is not very relevant how B judges A’s integrity. A second
difference between trust (and trustworthiness) and integrity concerns the
relevant criteria. Our choice to define integrity as acting in accordance with
relevant moral values and norms means that applicable criteria are those
72 Public service ethos, values and integrity

that address moral intention and character rather than the resources or
capabilities of an actor. When A judges B’s morals, A’s judgment of B is
based on A’s own moral values and norms (Figure 5.1b).
Every citizen or journalist can have a moral opinion about a public
official’s behavior. When the press photographs a cabinet minister as
coming out of a brothel, we form an opinion of this cabinet minister. In
Figure 5.1b this is called ‘A’s moral judgment of B’. Does this automatically
mean that the cabinet minister’s behavior lacks integrity? We think not
and this brings us to a last crucial aspect where integrity differs from
trustworthiness. Even when actor A, a citizen, condemns actor B, a politi-
cian, morally and with the utmost sincerity, this is not sufficient to conclude
that B is a public official who failed to show integrity. Somehow, integrity
brings in greater numbers of people and broader criteria that overrule one’s
own morals. The definition says ‘relevant’ moral norms, values and rules
and this introduces the question what, as well as whose, values and norms
matter. We discuss those ‘categories of integrity criteria’ below. Here, it is
important to stress the relevance of people other than the actors A and B.
A’s judgment of the integrity of actor B should take into account the rel-
evant publics. In Figure 5.2 the behavior of actor B, a politician, is judged.
The values and norms of ‘the public’ and of ‘organization/party’ are men-
tioned. These seem to be the relevant stakeholders to include. Actor A is
more than a judge in the strict sense; actor A is also an interpreter and
evaluator of the relevant moral values and norms of the relevant publics as
they apply to the behavior of actor B.
Thus, we argue that in contrast to judgments of trustworthiness,
integrity judgments need two types of information. First, similar to trust-
worthiness, information is needed about the actions of the other actor.
Second, integrity judgments require information about the content of the
‘relevant set of moral values, norms and rules’. This implies that before you
can make a statement ‘Mary has no integrity’, you need to somehow have
knowledge of the judgment of the majority of the relevant stakeholder
group regarding Mary’s actions. Therefore, there are stricter requirements
before a judgment of integrity or disintegrity can be passed than are
required for a judgment of trustworthy/untrustworthy.
But how to determine what the relevant stakeholder group is when the
integrity of an official is judged? A first possible answer is the group that
has granted the individual the discretion or power to act in ways that
affect others. For an elected official, the electorate is the relevant stake-
holder group. If the public official is appointed, then those who appointed
him or her are part of the relevant stakeholder group. However, public
officials perform a public task and, either directly or indirectly through
lines of reporting, have to be accountable for their performance to some
 Judging a public official’s integrity 73

Public Public
Organization
Public party Public

Relevant
set of moral
values and
norms
Actor A Actor B

A’s judgment of B’s integrity

Figure 5.2 A judging B’s integrity

representative body of the electorate (for example, Parliament).

Therefore, one could argue that for all types of public officials, citizens are
ultimately the relevant stakeholder group. A second possible answer is
that those who are affected by the public official’s actions should be part
of the relevant stakeholder group. This notion has its limits though.
Should the integrity of the US President also be judged by the Iraqi
people because they are directly affected by his decision to invade Iraq and
oust Saddam Hussein in 2003? It appears safe to state that those actors
who are affected by a public official’s actions and are part – directly or
indirectly – of the group that has granted the discretion or power, should
be part of the relevant stakeholder group.

Criteria for Judgment of Integrity

Who determines the set of relevant moral values and codes? In the case of
a public official performing a public task, ‘the public’ in principle would
have such authority. But referring back to ‘the public’ – citizens – and sur-
veying their opinion for every allegation of misconduct before passing
74 Public service ethos, values and integrity

judgment or before important appointments is impractical and undesir-

able. Other mechanisms are in place, or can be put in place, through which
the relevant set of moral values, norms and rules of the citizens can affect
such judgments.
Within the fourth perspective of integrity, three categories of integrity
criteria can be distinguished, from very strict and clear-cut to more open to
different interpretations and perceptions. First, allegations of misconduct
with regard to laws will be dealt with by the judicial system. Provided the
judicial system is seen as having high, or at least sufficient, integrity itself,
the judgments passed by the system will generally be accepted.1 Every
citizen and holder of a particular office covered by the law is required to
comply. In properly functioning democracies over time, laws are reasonably
in line with the majority of the moral values and norms of the citizens.
The next integrity criterion consists of the formal codes of conduct or
ethical codes produced by an organization or professional association, for
example, rules and codes of conduct for parliament or administration.
Members of the organization or profession are expected to comply with the
code. Allegations of misconduct with regard to the code will be dealt with
by either the employee’s (organizational) superior or a special committee
within the professional association. In the case of politicians, the relevant
representative body, such as parliament or local council, will act as judge.
Allegations of misconduct in this category are thus dealt with by self-
regulation and judgments can therefore be criticized by outside stakehold-
ers. If the code is too far out of line with the moral values and norms of the
majority of the citizens, the code cannot be the only framework for judging
integrity.
The third criterion is the usually informal moral values and norms by
which the stakeholders and citizens expect the public official to abide.
Because they are usually informal, they are open to differences in interpret-
ation and perceptions. Also, allegations of misconduct with regard to infor-
mal values and norms not covered by the two previous categories have, at
present, no explicit platform for discussion or judgment.
The actual content in these three categories of integrity criteria is subject
to changes over time and will vary from situation to situation, depending
upon the type of public institution or country. Because the content of the
two first categories is in written form and has been formally accepted by the
relevant representative body, all public officials can be required to abide by
these laws, regulations and codes. Because of the usually informal nature
of the values and norms in the third category, expectations are likely to
vary. Also, as values and norms vary by group of people, it is important to
know who will be the judge, evaluating the public official’s behavior, and
based on which criteria (whose values and norms).
 Judging a public official’s integrity 75

IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDGING PUBLIC OFFICIAL’S

INTEGRITY

As already mentioned, judgments of a public official’s integrity are relevant

when he or she is elected or appointed and when allegations are made of
moral misconduct while the official is in office. At each moment, other cri-
teria will also enter into the final judgment, such as competence and polit-
ical–administrative considerations.
For each type of public official – elected officials, politically appoin-
ted officials and administrative officials – we identify for each category of
integrity – laws, rules and codes, and informal moral values and norms –
what the criteria are and who the judge is. A summary is provided in Table
5.1. We also reflect on what common practice appears to be in most democ-
racies.

Elected Officials

Politicians need to abide by election laws and penal laws. Judicial courts are
the judge when allegations are made of misconduct regarding these laws.
In many democracies, political parties and parliaments (at all levels of gov-
ernment) have, furthermore, formulated codes regarding the conduct that
is expected of their members. If a politician is accused of breaching these
codes, his or her party or parliament judges the politician’s integrity. If a
politician is accused of moral misconduct, but has been cleared of breach-
ing the laws and formal rules and codes of conduct, his behavior may still
be considered morally wrong. Yet how is it possible to make such a judg-
ment? In most democracies there are no formal procedures for this situa-
tion, other than to wait for the next election and let the voters be the judges;
or to convince the politician to step down ‘voluntarily’. Our argument so
far would suggest that the informal moral values and norms of the relevant
stakeholder(s) should be the criteria for such a judgment. The relevant
stakeholders for an elected official are the citizens and parliament. A sys-
tematic inventory of the moral values and norms of citizens and parliament
regarding the expected conduct of elected officials is required as the basis
for a judgment of a politician’s integrity. As far as we know, very few, if any,
democracies have such a systematic inventory. Often opinion polls are held
after specific allegations are made public against a specific politician, but
then the results may be tainted by considerations other than the purely
moral (for example, I never liked him anyway, or I love her ideas). In
between elections, parliament is, we propose, the appropriate judge basing
its judgment on evaluations of the relevant set of moral values and
norms of key stakeholders. During elections, citizens will incorporate their
 Table 5.1 Judging a public official’s integrity: who is judged, based on what and by whom

Type of public Category of integrity criteria

official
Laws Rules and codes Informal moral values and norms
Criteria Judge Criteria Judge Criteria Judge
Elected Election and Court Rules and Party, Moral values and Parliament (while
official penal laws codes of party parliament norms of citizens in office), voters
and parliamenta and parliament (during election)

76
Politically Administrative Court Rules and Parliament Moral values and Parliament
appointed and penal laws codes of parliament norms of citizens
official and governmenta and parliament
Administra- Administrative Court Rules and Government, Moral values and Government,
tive official and penal laws codes of parliament norms of citizens, parliament
administration administration
and parliament

Note: a Parliament and government can be at any level: national/federal, state, regional or local.
 Judging a public official’s integrity 77

perception of the official’s integrity into their considerations when deciding

to vote for a candidate. Integrity is an important criterion when deciding
whom to vote for, but it is not the only criterion.

Politically Appointed Officials

Politically appointed officials also need to abide by the relevant laws, which
in their case are the administrative and penal laws. As with elected officials,
if allegations are made of misconduct, courts are the judge. If a politically
appointed official is accused of breaking the codes of conduct of govern-
ment or parliament, parliament is the judge. Even if both court or parlia-
ment clear the appointed official of (moral) misconduct based on the laws
and codes, his or her behavior may still be considered morally wrong.
Again, in most democracies there are no formal procedures for judging an
official’s integrity in this situation, other than to wait for the first opportu-
nity to sack the official or to convince the official to step down ‘volun-
tarily’. Our argument in this chapter suggests that the informal moral
values and norms of the citizens and parliament, the relevant stakeholders,
should be the criteria for such a judgment. Parliament can be considered as
the primary interpreter and evaluator of those values and norms and there-
fore is the appropriate judge of the politically appointed official’s integrity.
Again, as far as we know, very few, if any, democracies keep a systematic
inventory of the moral values and norms of citizens and parliament regard-
ing the (moral) conduct of politically appointed officials.

Administrative Officials

Civil servants also need to abide by the administrative and penal laws and
judicial courts judge any alleged breaches. They are furthermore expected
to abide by the codes of conduct of administration and any alleged breaches
will first be judged by their politically appointed superiors – government –
and in the second instance by parliament. Again, in most democracies no
formal procedures are in place for judging a civil servant’s integrity in situ-
ations where his or her behavior is considered morally wrong, but he or she
has been cleared of breaching any laws or codes. The superior may use other
criteria or considerations (such as political–administrative ones) to sack the
civil servant or convince him or her to step down ‘voluntarily’. In these situ-
ations the informal moral values and norms of the relevant stakeholders
are the criteria for a judgment of the official’s integrity. The relevant stake-
holders in this situation are citizens, administration and parliament. If a
systematic inventory of the moral values and norms of citizens, adminis-
tration and parliament regarding the (moral) conduct of civil servants is
78 Public service ethos, values and integrity

available, then government, as the primary judge, or parliament, as the sec-

ondary judge, can form an opinion on the civil servant’s integrity.
In sum, courts judge whether the official has acted in accordance with the
relevant laws. Acting in accordance with the relevant codes of conduct is
judged by political and administrative leadership; the party also has a say
in the case of the elected politician; and government has a say in the case
of the administrative official. While an official is in office, parliament judges
whether he or she has acted in accordance with the informal moral values
and norms of the relevant stakeholders – citizens and parliament (and
administration for administrative officials). For the administrative official,
government is also the judge. For the elected official during elections, the
citizens are also the judge.

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS

The purpose of this study was to develop a theory-based framework for

judging a public official’s integrity. The questions we addressed were: Who
is the judge? What are the criteria for judging? And what kind of informa-
tion is required for judging a public official’s integrity? These questions
were triggered by a comparison between the trust and integrity literatures,
which strengthened the analysis. Our argument is based on the assumption
that it is only valid in reasonably functioning democracies in which most
inhabitants are recognized and participate as citizens. The first part of the
argument was that of the five different perspectives on integrity present in
the literature, the view is preferable which sees integrity as the quality of
acting in accordance with relevant moral values and norms. This triggers
the questions: What is this set of relevant moral values and norms? Whose
formal and informal norms, values and rules should be included?
Next, we examined the consequences of this view for judging a public
official’s integrity. First, who is the judge? We argued that it makes no sense
that an official should be the judge of his or her own integrity; most of us
probably consider ourselves to be acting with integrity, considering the cir-
cumstances. Also, another individual basing his judgment on his or her own
moral values and norms can only have a personal moral judgment, but not
a judgment of the official’s integrity. A judgment of a public official’s
integrity is only possible if the judging actor refers to the set of relevant
moral values and norms, as determined by the majority of the relevant
stakeholders. In the case of public officials performing a public task, we
argued that the relevant stakeholders always include ‘the public’, citizens.
Thus, we argued that two types of information are required before
the integrity of a public official can be judged. First, like judgments of
 Judging a public official’s integrity 79

trustworthiness, information is required about the behavior of the public

official. Second, information is required about the content of the set of rel-
evant moral values and norms that it is expected he or she would abide.
A statement ‘Mary has no integrity’ is meaningless if it is based only on
one’s personal moral values and norms. Only if we somehow have knowl-
edge of the judgment of the majority of the relevant stakeholders – particu-
larly the citizens – regarding actions like Mary’s, can we make sound
judgments of Mary’s integrity.
However, surveying citizens’ opinions for every allegation of moral mis-
conduct before passing judgment, or before important appointments, is
impractical and undesirable. We proceeded to present three categories of
integrity criteria that nonetheless enable the relevant set of moral values
and norms of citizens to affect such judgments (Table 5.1). The first cat-
egory consists of the relatively clear-cut laws that are part of the local,
national or international legal system. Allegations of (moral) misconduct
with regard to these laws are dealt with by the judicial system (courts). The
second category consists of the formal codes of conduct produced by the
organization or professional association, such as codes of conduct for par-
liament. Allegations of (moral) misconduct in this category are usually
dealt with by the organization or professional association themselves, in
other words, by self-regulation. For example, parliament will be the judge
of any allegation of misconduct with respect to parliamentary codes of
conduct. The third category consists of the informal moral values and
norms by which citizens and other relevant stakeholders expect the public
official to abide. Due to their informal nature, these are open to differences
in interpretation and perception. Also, allegations of moral misconduct
with regard to the informal values and norms not covered by the previous
two categories usually have no explicit platform for discussion or judgment.
A judgment about a public official’s integrity is usually not made in isola-
tion. The situation is often such that the moral judgment (about the official’s
integrity) is one of several considerations for decisions regarding the official’s
(continued) appointment. Political and/or administrative judgments are
usually also involved. We urge researchers and practitioners to take more
care in separating these different judgments. Judgments about someone’s
disintegrity/corruptness are usually considered quite damaging, while polit-
ical or administrative considerations can more easily be overcome in future.
We have been somewhat surprised to find that, even though most integrity
researchers appear to agree that others should be the judge of someone’s
integrity, they have not acted on it, as most integrity research to date has
focused on studying public officials themselves. The clear implication of
this study is that research is needed on the content of the ‘relevant set of
moral values, norms and rules’, that is, what do citizens consider morally
80 Public service ethos, values and integrity

acceptable conduct on the part of public officials? In most democracies, the

first two categories of integrity criteria (laws, and rules and codes) are for-
mally written down and procedures are in place for dealing with allegations
of breaches. The quality of the laws, rules and codes, and the quality of the
procedures, across levels of government, across countries, and for each type
of public official, need to be studied systematically.
In theory, in a properly functioning democracy, laws, rules and codes of
conduct should, over time, be sufficiently in line with the ‘relevant set of
moral values, norms and rules’. However, when the first two categories are
not sufficiently in line with the majority of citizens’ expectations, discon-
tent may grow. And as a consequence, the third category of integrity crite-
ria may be invoked more often. This category of integrity criteria requires
that a systematic inventory is present of the (informal) moral values and
norms of citizens, parliament and administration regarding the expected
(moral) conduct of public officials. As far as we know, few, if any, democ-
racies have made such a systematic inventory, let alone update it regularly.
Public opinion polls abound after specific allegations have been made
against a specific public official, but these results are likely to be tainted by
considerations other than the purely moral. Corruption research focused
on public attitudes may provide a valuable starting point for creating such
systematic inventories, and making them operational for judgments of
public officials’ integrity.
Thus, systematic empirical research is needed into citizens’ perceptions
of public officials’ integrity, distinguishing at least the three types of
officials included in this study and the different levels of government.
Related to this, it is necessary to determine citizens’ expectations regarding
public officials’ integrity. What is the content of this ‘relevant set of moral
values, norms and rules’ for the different types of official in different situ-
ations (across levels of government and across countries)?

NOTE

1. The arguments in this chapter assume that a democracy is in place and no large groups of
inhabitants are excluded from citizenship (for example, the black inhabitants in South
Africa under the Apartheid regime, or slaves during the centuries that slavery was not
banned).

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PART II

The integrity, rationality and effectiveness of

governance
6. Ethical leadership and
administrative evil: the distorting
effects of technical rationality
Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour

INTRODUCTION

This is a tale of two leaders. Both owe their reputation and careers to their
membership in the Nazi party and their participation in the tragedy of the
Holocaust, yet they are remembered fondly, albeit for very different
reasons. One, Wernher von Braun, engaged in acts of administrative evil,
but managed to achieve considerable success in his career as a rocket sci-
entist. The other, Oskar Schindler, failed repeatedly in his professional and
personal life but is remembered as an ethical exemplar, a hero who saved
many lives. Their stories poignantly illustrate the paradox of ethical lead-
ership in modern organizations, in which ‘good’ leaders and managers need
not be ethical, and ethical leaders run the risk of being marginalized and
even ostracized. These cases show that how society judges an individual’s
ethical behavior is less a result of the behavior itself than of the social and
cultural context in which it occurs.

THE CHALLENGE OF ADMINISTRATIVE EVIL

We have written extensively on the nature and characteristics of what we

call administrative evil (Adams and Balfour, 2004). The central issue for
this chapter is that despite an extensive literature on public service ethics,
there is little recognition of the most fundamental ethical challenge in
modern organizations: that is, one can be a ‘good’ and responsible profes-
sional or administrator and at the same time commit or contribute to acts
of administrative evil. As Harmon (1995) has argued, contemporary pro-
fessional ethics has difficulty dealing with what Milgram (1974) termed the
‘agentic shift’, where the professional or administrator acts responsibly
toward the hierarchy of authority, public policy and the requirements of

85
86 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

the job or profession, while abdicating any personal, much less social,
responsibility for the content or effects of decisions or actions. There is little
in the way of coherent justification for the notion of a stable and pre-
dictable distinction between the individual’s personal conscience guided by
higher values and the socialized professional or administrator who intern-
alizes agency values and obedience to legitimate authority. In the dominant
model of both public service and business ethics, the personal conscience
is always subordinate to the structures of authority. The former is ‘subjec-
tive’ and ‘personal’, while the latter is characterized as ‘objective’ and
‘public’.
We believe that the ethical failures of leadership in modern organizations
are rooted in the unquestioned dominance of technical rationality (Adams
and Balfour, 2004: 29–36). Technical rationality is a way of thinking and
living (a culture) that emphasizes instrumental problem-solving based on
the scientific-analytic mindset and faith that technological progress will
lead to a better world for all (Barrett, 1979; Ellul, 1954). Donald Schon
(1990: 21) and others have argued that technical rationality has been the
most powerful influence on thinking both about the professions and the
institutional relations of research, education, and practice. Technical
rationality has unquestionably brought many benefits to humanity. At the
same time, the lack of any countervailing authority in professional prac-
tice, public affairs and business has made it difficult to perceive its short-
comings, especially as a basis for ethical behavior.
Administrative and professional ethics in the technical-rational tradition
draw upon both teleological and deontological ethics, and focus on the
individual’s decision-making process in modern, bureaucratic organiza-
tions and as a member of a profession. In the public sphere, deontological
ethics are meant to safeguard the integrity of the organization by helping
individuals conform to professional norms, avoid mistakes and misdeeds
that violate the public trust (corruption, nepotism, and so on), and assure
that public officials are accountable to the people through their elected rep-
resentatives. At the same time, public servants are encouraged to pursue the
greater good by using discretion in the application of rules and regulations
and creativity in the face of changing conditions (teleological ethics). The
‘good’ public servant and administrator should avoid both the extremes of
rule-bound behavior and undermining the rule of law with individual judg-
ments and interests. It is fairly self-evident that public (and private) organ-
izations depend on at least this level of ethical judgment in order to
function efficiently and effectively, and to maintain public confidence in
government (and business).
Yet confusion remains within the professions over behavior which
benefits a profession or an organization, yet can also be defined as ethical
 Ethical leadership and administrative evil 87

behavior. As both MacIntyre (1984) and Poole (1991) have argued, moder-
nity, thoroughly infused with technical rationality, has produced a way of
thinking – an epistemology – that renders moral reasoning superfluous.
Note how ethics is simply subsumed in professionalism in this statement by
Kearney and Sinha (1988: 575):

In a sense, the profession provides the professional administrator with a Rosetta

Stone for deciphering and responding to various elements of the public interest.
Professional accountability as embodied in norms and standards also serves as
an inner check on an administrator’s behavior. . . . When joined with a code of
ethics or conduct and the oath of office, professionalism establishes a value
system that serves as a frame of reference for decision making . . . and creates a
special form of social control conducive to bureaucratic responsiveness.

Professionals do not see the technical rational model of professionalism as

eschewing ethics, quite the contrary: They see the role model of ‘profes-
sional’ as satisfying the need for a system of ethical standards. To be pro-
fessional – that is, to be technically and rationally proficient – is to be
ethical.
The ethical failure, and moral vacuity, of this way of thinking is starkly
illustrated in the Third Reich and the Holocaust. Many of the administra-
tors directly responsible for the Holocaust were, from the technical-rational
perspective, effective and responsible administrators who used administra-
tive discretion to both influence and carry out the will of their superiors.
Professionals and administrators such as Adolph Eichmann and Albert
Speer obeyed orders, followed proper protocol and procedures, and were
often innovative and creative while carrying out their assigned tasks in
an efficient and effective manner (Keeley, 1983; Hilberg, 1989; Harmon,
1995; Lozowick, 2000). Ironically, the Schutzstaffel (SS) was very con-
cerned about corruption in its ranks, and with strict conformance to the
professional norms of its order (Sofsky, 1997).
As Rubenstein (1975) points out, no laws against genocide or dehuman-
ization were broken by those who perpetrated the Holocaust. Everything
was legally sanctioned and administratively approved by a legitimated
authority, while a number of key programs and innovations were initiated
from within the bureaucracy (Browning, 1989; Sofsky, 1997). Even within
the morally inverted universe created by the Nazis, professionals and
administrators carried out their duties within a framework of ethics and
responsibility that was consistent with the norms of professionalism
and technical rationality (Lifton, 1986). The professions were ‘everywhere’
in the Holocaust (Hilberg, 1989). Lawyers, physicians, engineers, planners,
military professionals, accountants all contributed to the destruction of the
Jews and other ‘undesirables’. Scientific methods were used in ways that
88 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

dehumanized and murdered innocent human beings. The moral vacuity of

professional ethics is clearly revealed by the fact that the vast majority of
those who participated in the Holocaust were never punished, and many
were placed in responsible positions in post-war West German government
or industry, and even within public and private organizations in the US.
If the Holocaust teaches us anything, it is that individual administrators
and professionals, far from resisting administrative evil, are most likely to
be either helpless victims or willing accomplices. The ethical framework
within a technical rational system posits the primacy of an abstract, utility-
maximizing individual, while binding professionals to organizations in
ways that make them into reliable conduits for the dictates of legitimate
authority, which is no less legitimate when it happens to be pursuing an evil
policy. An ethical system that allows an individual to be a good adminis-
trator or professional while committing acts of evil is necessarily devoid of
moral content, or even morally perverse. No public servant should be able
to rest easy with the notion that ethical behavior is defined by doing things
the right way. Norms of legality, efficiency and effectiveness – however ‘pro-
fessional’ they may be – do not necessarily promote or protect the well
being of humans, especially that of society’s most vulnerable and
superfluous members. We turn now to two historical cases which we believe
help illuminate how significant the public context is for understanding these
paradoxes of ethical leadership.

TWO NAZI LEADERS

Wernher von Braun became a leader as well as perhaps the world’s premier
rocket scientist during the 1930s and 1940s in Nazi Germany. The origins
of the Nazi rocket program were in the early 1930s. Walter Dornberger, an
Army ordnance officer, saw in the rocket a potentially fearsome weapon,
and importantly, a weapon system not banned by the Treaty of Versailles,
which ended World War I. Dornberger discovered the young von Braun,
who became one of the world’s pioneers of rocket science, made him a civil-
ian employee of the army, and financed his education, including the com-
pletion of his PhD in physics in 1934 from the University of Berlin which
he completed in a remarkable two years. In the mid-1930s, von Braun and
a staff of 80 worked on rocket development at Kummersdorf West, near
Berlin, Germany’s first facility for the development of rocketry.
In 1937, the rocket development facility at Peenemunde opened and the
entire team moved north to the Baltic coast (McElheran, 1995). It was there
that the design and testing of the V-1 cruise missile and V-2 rocket were
accomplished (Kennedy, 1983). Many other projects were pursued during
 Ethical leadership and administrative evil 89

Peenemunde’s eight year life; among them was the conceptual design of an
intercontinental ballistic missile (Klee and Merk, 1965). Dornberger, who
was to become a major general by the end of the war, commanded the facil-
ity, and von Braun was the technical director. The group of engineers and
scientists, later to be known as the von Braun team and who would follow
von Braun to the United States, was first assembled there.
As the V-2 rockets grew more successful and the Luftwaffe began to lose
effectiveness through continual attrition, attention at Peenemunde began to
shift from development to production (Garlinski, 1978). The first V-2 (or
A-4, as it was known in Peenemunde) rocket launch was in 1942, but
numerous problems delayed its readiness for full production. However, the
‘A-4 Special Committee’ was formed to ensure that full production could
get underway just as soon as the rocket was ready. The Peenemunde pro-
duction facilities had used prisoner of war (POW) labor from two camps in
the immediate area, Karlshagen and Trassenheide, whose prisoners were
primarily Polish and Russian POWs.
Throughout German industry from 1941 on, there were increasingly
severe labor shortages. The Russian front demanded more and more man-
power for the German army. In such difficult circumstances, the use of
POW forced labor – although lamentable – seems predictable enough. This
was the initial choice at Peenemunde for rocket production. The use of slave
labor was an entirely different issue. These were concentration camp pris-
oners (Haftlinge) under the control of the SS, and a part of the whole SS
system of concentration and death camps. It is important to note here that
other Nazi leaders, such as Albert Speer, Hitler’s Minister of Armaments,
were convicted of war crimes for the intentional use of slave labor. Wernher
von Braun was fully aware during this time of the use of SS-provided slave
labor in the production of rockets; indeed, the management team led by
Dornberger and von Braun explicitly discussed and adopted as policy the
use of SS-provided slave labor in rocket production (Neufeld, 1996: 187).
Slave labor had been investigated, promoted and then requisitioned by
Arthur Rudolph, a key member of the von Braun team (Piskiewicz, 1995:
96–7). Based on this policy decision, slave labor was also requisitioned for
the other V-2 production facilities, in particular the underground
Mittelwerk factory at the Mittelbau-Dora concentration camp.
Mittelbau-Dora was the last SS concentration camp to be formally
established, and it was the only one exclusively formed for the purpose of
weapons production. Dora was the site of the huge, underground
Mittelwerk factory that built the V-2 rockets for the Reich. Mittelwerk pro-
duced just about 6000 rockets and 20 000 deaths in its less than two years
of operation (Neufeld, 1996). Each V-2 rocket thus carried, at least sym-
bolically, three corpses with it to its final destination. During the beginning
90 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

and then again at the end of its short life, it was arguably among the worst
of the living hells produced by the SS concentration camps.
Dora was initially a minor appendage of the better-known Buchenwald
concentration camp. Only in 1943, when Hitler decided to make V-2 rocket
production the top armament priority, did Dora mushroom. In August
1943, after the extensive British air raid on Peenemunde, V-2 production
had to be moved to a place as secure from air attack as possible. An under-
ground location had become the preferred choice for all of German arma-
ment and industrial production at this time. All told, Mittelwerk
incorporated about 35 million cubic feet (9 91 090 cubic metres) of space.
At its peak, 10 000 slave laborers at a time lived and toiled in this massive
complex.
Later, after V-2 production was shifted to Mittelwerk, Dornberger,
Rudolph and von Braun attended a May 1944 meeting in which the use
of additional slave labor because of labor shortages was discussed and
agreed upon (Neufeld, 1996). Von Braun traveled a number of times from
Peenemunde to Mittelwerk, as did Dornberger and other members of the
team. Arthur Rudolph was among a number of personnel who moved full
time to Mittelwerk; he became the chief production engineer, with an office
on one of the main tunnels. Magnus von Braun, Werner’s brother, worked
under Rudolph on site. Another dozen members of the von Braun team
who eventually moved to the US also staffed Mittelwerk. No one could
have any illusions about a factory whose production mode during most of
its existence was quite simply to work its labor force to death, although
their roles may not have involved some of them directly in decisions
about, or relationships with, Haftlinge. Von Braun’s substantial involve-
ment, however, is quite clear (Neufeld, 1996: 228):

there is no doubt that he remained deeply involved with the concentration camps.
On August 15, 1944, he wrote to Sawatski (director of Mittelwerk) regarding a
special laboratory he wanted to set up in the tunnels. . . . The letter begins:
‘During my last visit to the Mittelwerk, you proposed to me that we use the good
technical education of detainees available to you and Buchenwald to tackle . . .
additional development jobs. You mentioned in particular a detainee working
until now in your mixing device quality control, who was a French physics pro-
fessor and who is especially qualified for the technical direction of such a work-
shop. I immediately looked into your proposal by going to Buchenwald, together
with Dr Simon, to seek out more qualified detainees. I have arranged their trans-
fer to the Mittelwerk with Colonel Pister (Buchenwald camp commandant), as
per your proposal.

In August 1945, the US initiated Operation Overcast, the aim of which

was to bring selected Germans over to participate in the production of
German-inspired weapons, including V-2s, to be used against the Japanese.
 Ethical leadership and administrative evil 91

Overcast included an assurance that if any committed Nazis were inadver-

tently brought to the US, they would be returned to Europe for trial. In
September 1945, von Braun and 118 members of his team moved to the US
under Operation Overcast, which was renamed as Operation Paperclip in
March 1946. Michael Neufeld notes that (1996: 271):

security reports for a number of individuals, including von Braun, had to be

revised or fudged to circumvent the restrictions that still existed. Some writers
have seen those actions as evidence of a conspiracy in the Pentagon to violate a
policy signed by President Harry Truman, but it really reflected a conscious
choice by the US government, approved up to the level of the Cabinet at least,
to put expediency above principle. The Cold War provided ample opportunity
after 1947 to rationalize that policy on anti-Communist grounds, but the cir-
cumvention of restrictions on Nazis and war criminals would have gone ahead
at some level anyway, because the German’s technical expertise was seen as indis-
pensable.

In spite of the fact that the Paperclip policy explicitly barred committed
Nazis and even more obviously, war criminals, the goal of technical superi-
ority was all the justification needed to move at least a handful of individ-
uals to the US, including von Braun, who participated in activities for
which others were convicted of war crimes.

WERNHER VON BRAUN AND ‘ETHICAL’

LEADERSHIP

Wernher von Braun’s subordinates, by all accounts, ranked him very high
as a manager and leader (Bilstein, 1980). Among members of the von
Braun team, this is perhaps not surprising, since it was his leadership that
rescued the group from the dead-end of post-war Germany, brought them
to a new land, and led them forward to great accomplishments. His knowl-
edge of technical detail was legendary, and he was a successful leader both
at Peenemunde and later within the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). From his mid-20s until his retirement in 1972,
von Braun held increasingly responsible management positions and exer-
cised clear leadership in all of them. His leadership inspired a Festschrift in
honor of his 50th birthday in 1962 (Stuhlinger et al., 1963).
Von Braun’s leadership style was expansive, and although quite func-
tional in the context of developing the Saturn and other rockets, it was also
a very controlling, even narcissistic, approach. He accepted large numbers
of public speaking engagements during the 1950s and 1960s; during the
latter decade, the number of engagements at least was in apparent violation
of NASA regulations. James Webb, the NASA administrator at the time, is
92 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

said to have told von Braun to limit these engagements (McConnell, 1986).
Von Braun, during the 1950s, developed a relationship with Walt Disney,
and even served as a consultant on three Disney, space-related films from
those years. He clearly saw himself as a visionary for space and its explor-
ation. We explore von Braun’s career as a leader in the United States to a
greater extent after introducing our second Nazi leader.

OSKAR SCHINDLER AS ETHICAL LEADER

Oskar Schindler was the Czech-born German entrepreneur who saved
about 1200 Jews from the Holocaust, most of whom worked for him in his
enamelware factory in Kracow, Poland. While historical research on the
Holocaust has uncovered numerous examples of ‘rescuers’ – those who in
one way or another saved Jews from the fate of the concentration camps,
only Oskar Schindler is known to have rescued such a large number of Jews
(Rittner and Myers (eds), 1986). Schindler’s family was both prominent
and prosperous in their home town of Zwittau, in the ethnically German
Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia, however, the economic depression
of the 1930s bankrupted their farm machinery plant. Like von Braun and
many other Germans, Oskar Schindler joined the Nazi party; he did so in
1938 after the Sudetenland was annexed into Germany. Sensing business
opportunities, he followed the German army into Poland in 1939.
Living in an apartment vacated by a Jewish family which had been relo-
cated to the Kracow ghetto, Schindler became an insider with the Gestapo
and was enlisted by German Intelligence (Abwehr) to spy on the Poles.
Schindler was quite successful in black market trading, and participated
actively in the system of bribery that determined one’s success as an entre-
preneur within the Army-run General Government of Poland (Keneally,
1982). His early successes in this environment enabled him to become the
owner and operator of a formerly Jewish-owned, enamelware factory,
Deutsch Emaliawerken Fabrik – known as Emalia to the Jews who would
work there. Schindler’s connections and bribes won Emalia a contract to
produce mess kits and field kitchenware for the German army.
Emalia was located very close to the Jewish ghetto, where most of
Kracow’s Jews had been moved by March, 1941. Because of their proxim-
ity and because he would not have to pay them much in wages, Schindler
employed Jews at Emalia. Oskar Schindler became rich, as do some entre-
preneurs in a wartime environment, and he was very visible in the local
social circles of the German military and SS in (and through his German
Intelligence/Abwehr bosses, had access to Berlin society as well). By all
accounts (Blair, 1983), Schindler had an expansive personality and loved
 Ethical leadership and administrative evil 93

a good time; he was a heavy drinker and having left his wife Emilie back in
Czechoslovakia, a frequent and unrepentant adulterer. As an individual, it
is an understatement to note that Oskar Schindler was far from a moral
exemplar.
Perhaps because of his family’s active Catholic faith, perhaps because his
best childhood friends were the two sons of the Jewish rabbi who were the
Schindler’s closest neighbors, or perhaps for other reasons we cannot
fathom, Oskar Schindler become increasingly and deeply uncomfortable
with the horror that was descending on the 25 000 Jews of Kracow, includ-
ing those who worked at Emalia. Concentrated first in the ghetto, these men
and women were removed in March, 1943 to Plaszow, a slave labor camp
similar to Mittelbau-Dora and run by the brutal SS officer, Amon Goeth.
The Emalia Jews were among those who lived within Plaszow, but were
transported to work every day at the factory. Schindler convinced Goeth,
perhaps through persuasion, perhaps through bribes, to allow the Emalia
Jews to live in a new subcamp, to be built within the compound of the
factory.
Living at Emalia was very different from Jewish existence in other places
controlled by the Nazis. At Emalia, the barracks were more like uncrowded
dormitories, and daily meals consisted of 2000 calories instead of 900 or
less in Plaszow. When it became clear that industry had to be redirected to
the war effort, Schindler ‘transformed’ Emalia to a ‘munitions’ factory,
which intentionally did not produce a single usable munition during its
seven-month run. He reclassified his Jews, including women and children,
as metal workers and machinists, ‘essential’ for the war industry. When
people died at Emalia, they were accorded a Jewish burial service.
In October, 1944, as the Russian army began to overrun Poland,
Schindler accomplished his most improbable feat. He was able to negotiate
and bribe German officials for permission to move not only his factory to
Brunnlitz in Czechoslovakia, but also his ‘essential’ workers, who were
written down onto ‘Schindler’s List’. When some 300 of Schindler’s women
were accidentally transported to Auschwitz, he succeeded in getting them
back out – the only such shipment to Auschwitz-Birkenau that was more
than ‘one way’. Those Jews who remained from the 25 000 in Plaszow were
transported to the death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau 60 km away, and
theirs was indeed a one-way trip. The best available estimates are that
Schindler spent about four million marks either directly or indirectly pro-
viding for and eventually rescuing Jews; it was his entire fortune from the
war (Furrow, 1988).
Schindler’s life after the war demonstrated none of the entrepreneurial
or leadership successes he had during the war. Interestingly, and in contrast
to von Braun, he applied for an entry permit to the US, and was denied
94 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

because he had been a member of the Nazi party. By 1949, he and his wife
Emilie had settled on a farm in Argentina. In 1957, he was bankrupt once
again, and leaving Emilie behind again, returned to Germany. In 1962, he
was honored as a ‘Righteous Gentile’ in Israel, and came to enjoy yearly
reunions in Israel with ‘his’ Jews, where he could once again be the old,
expansive Oskar Schindler who loved a big party. By contrast, he was
reviled and mistreated in Germany by those who recognized him. He died
in Frankfurt in 1974 at the age of 66. He had requested burial in the
Catholic cemetery in Jerusalem, and hundreds of ‘his’ Jews attended his
funeral in the Catholic Church in Jerusalem.
Oskar Schindler and Wernher von Braun had much in common as
leaders, all the more so when viewed from the technical-rational perspec-
tive of professional ethics. Both were expansive, larger-than-life personali-
ties and both were opportunists (or more kindly, entrepreneurs), who cut
many corners. Still, by conventional – or technical rational – ethical stan-
dards, von Braun was seen as the more ethical leader of the two. Von Braun
continued to meet those standards during the American leg of his career,
while Schindler’s fortunes were declining.

VON BRAUN IN THE US

Within a few years of the end of World War II, the uncomfortable moments
for the von Braun team had largely passed. The Army clearly had a vested
interest in them, and had shielded a number of them from having to testify
at the Mittelbau-Dora war crimes trial, held at Dachau in 1947 (Gimbel,
1986; 1990). Von Braun himself and other team members successfully
maintained the fiction that the use of slave labor had been the exclusive
province of the SS, and that they were rocket scientists interested in space
flight who had been forced to take a temporary detour into wartime
weapons development on the way to their real goal (Stuhlinger and
Ordway, 1994). They enjoyed a better than half-hearted acceptance, after a
time, by their adopted community of Huntsville, AL, and their colleagues
within NASA. Still later, they were rewarded for their great achievements
in the Apollo Program. Arthur Rudolph eventually received NASA’s
highest civilian honor, the Distinguished Service Award.
While stories and rumors persisted regarding the pasts of some members
of the von Braun team, it was only after most of them had left government
service in the early 1970s that the facts about their pasts were acknowl-
edged. Survivors of the French resistance who had been imprisoned at
Dora knew and spoke the truth all along (Michel, 1979). Americans were
much slower to recognize the unsavory history of some of these Germans.
 Ethical leadership and administrative evil 95

Still, based on the information we now have, it would be equally mistaken

to issue a blanket condemnation of all of the Germans who came over with
von Braun.
Of the 118 who originally came with von Braun, somewhere between
half and three-quarters had been members of the Nazi party (Piskiewicz,
1995). Certainly, most of these were only nominal members. Most also had
no direct involvement with slave labor and the policy decision to use it.
Only four were known to have joined the SS (Neufeld, 1996). Von Braun
himself was one of these, receiving his commission in 1941; put in context,
this is not an early membership which ordinarily would mark a ‘committed
Nazi’. He is reported to have worn his SS uniform only once, on the day
that Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS, visited Peenemunde to see
for himself how rocket development was going. Himmler rewarded von
Braun with a promotion to major. In this action and in many others, von
Braun appears as more an opportunist than a committed Nazi (much
like Schindler). Another SS member and an earlier Nazi adherent was
Kurt Debus who reportedly wore his SS uniform regularly at Peenemunde
and at one point denounced a colleague as anti-Nazi to the Gestapo
(Piskiewicz, 1995: 237). Debus eventually became the first Director of the
Kennedy Space Flight Center in Florida. Arthur Rudolph was a seriously
committed Nazi who joined the party in June, 1931 and had other early
Nazi affiliations (Neufeld, 1996).

THE MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration was widely regarded in
the 1960s as the paradigmatic example of the successful, high-performing
organization, and especially so for a public sector organization (McCurdy,
1993: 2). The Apollo program and its great success punctuated by the moon
landing was clearly the principle reason (Brooks et al., 1979). The Marshall
Space Flight Center was created in 1960 and von Braun became its first direc-
tor. The von Braun Team at the Marshall Space Flight Center was an inte-
gral part of this success; it was their Saturn rockets which boosted all of the
crews into orbit and on to the moon (Graham, 1995).
The project manager in charge of the Saturn V Program Office was
Arthur Rudolph. Much as von Braun established himself as an outstand-
ing manager and leader in the US, Arthur Rudolph demonstrated out-
standing leadership with the Saturn Program Office. He developed the
concept of the ‘Program Control Center’, which essentially gathered rel-
evant information about all of the Saturn subsystems in one large confer-
ence room, and made them visually accessible. The Saturn Program Office
96 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

was used as a model for the Apollo Program Office at NASA headquarters
in Washington, as well as for other NASA centers and for prime contrac-
tors. James Webb, the NASA administrator during the Apollo program,
was so impressed that he sent a procession of academics and executives
from business and government to Huntsville to see the operation that
Arthur Rudolph put together (Bilstein, 1980: 291).
Arthur Rudolph, a clearly outstanding leader in perhaps the most suc-
cessful American public organization in modern times and earlier at the
Mittelwerk factory in the Third Reich, retired from NASA with its highest
civilian award. He was living quietly in retirement in San Jose, CA, collect-
ing his government pension, when he was confronted in the early 1980s by
the Office of Special Investigations, the Justice Department unit created by
Congress in 1979 for the express purpose of pursuing Nazi war criminals
living in the United States. Unsurprisingly, surviving members of the von
Braun team (von Braun himself died in 1977) were an early subject of OSI
investigations; some investigations continued over the next two decades
(Rosenbaum, 1997). In 1984, at the age of 77, Arthur Rudolph voluntarily
renounced his US citizenship and left the country after signing an admis-
sion that he could not contest the OSI charges; in effect, he admitted his
guilt.

ETHICAL LEADERSHIP IN A CULTURE OF

TECHNICAL RATIONALITY

The von Braun case illustrates the tendency of technical rationality to drive
out moral considerations, because it downplays and masks the interactive,
relational foundation of ethical behavior as well as its public context. We
will probably never know the extent to which those who crafted Operation
Paperclip knew of the slave labor and mass murder at Dora when they
placed responsibility for the program with von Braun and his compatriots.
Regardless of what they knew, once the program was under way, adminis-
trative processes and technical achievements – most of them consistent
with public service and professional ethics – progressively papered over the
wartime activities of von Braun, Rudolph, and others.
With the benefit of hindsight, Operations Overcast and Paperclip appear
to be examples of policies and programs absent moral considerations, or at
least ones in which those concerns were only rhetorical. While technical
superiority is still in evidence as a paramount American goal today, and
while national security is more than ever a valid rationale for many actions,
a justification for bringing committed Nazis and some individuals who
were directly implicated in the use of SS slave labor (a war crime) to the US
 Ethical leadership and administrative evil 97

is not easily provided. While the Cold War provided an after-the-fact

rationale for Paperclip, at the time this was primarily an affirmative exercise
– we wanted this expertise for ourselves. The principle of denying this
expertise to others could have easily been met in other ways. Those who
were guilty of war crimes could have been incarcerated, and they would
have been prevented from lending their expertise to the Russians or to
anyone else. There were plenty of ‘clean’ Germans to work on rockets for
the US, and their lives would not have been conflicted by the knowledge and
continuous anxiety of keeping the secret past. Arguably, the US could have
done without the Germans altogether. For example, there was a budding
group of rocketeers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California
(Neufeld, 1996). Granted, they were years behind the Germans, but would
it really have mattered in the greater scheme of things if the moon landing
occurred not in 1969, but in 1974 or even 1979? Did the US really need to
land on the moon carrying the symbolic baggage of 20 000 human beings
worked to death at Dora?

CONCLUSION

The contrasting cases of von Braun and Schindler suggest the moral short-
comings of professional and public service ethics under the norms of
technical-rationality. They further suggest that ethics has an interactive,
relational foundation (beyond the individual practitioner), and that the
public context within which they both acted is indispensable in judging
their respective cases.
Both von Braun and Schindler had promising starts to their careers in
Nazi Germany. Wernher von Braun’s successes in developing the rocket
program for Hitler were rewarded by the Nazi regime and later by the
United States, where he went on to become a leader and visionary as one
of the key progenitors of NASA’s space program. Both the space shuttle
and the space station – the leading-edge programs of the US’s current
national space policy – were originally a part of von Braun’s vision
(Neufeld, 1996). His ethical and moral failures while a member of the SS
and overseeing the living hell of Mittlebau-Dora did not impede his ascent
to the top levels of one of the foremost technical-rational organizations of
our times.
Oskar Schindler also began his career as a supporter of the Nazi party
and took full advantage of the opportunities afforded him by the Nazi
regime. He eventually followed a path very different from von Braun’s,
becoming an ethical and moral exemplar (although not in his personal and
professional life), but a failure as a businessman who was shunned by his
98 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

peers; even in his postwar years he was unable to sustain a successful busi-
ness. Yet he was lauded in Israel (and later in books and movies) as a moral
and ethical hero for having saved hundreds of Jews from almost certain
death while sacrificing his dreams of wealth and success. He was a pre-
eminent rescuer of Jews during a time when there were too few rescuers and
far too few rescued. But unlike von Braun, Schindler was denied entry to
the US and was treated with outright hostility back in Europe. As a prac-
tical matter, his ethical behavior and moral courage were of less value than
von Braun’s scientific contributions to a society bound by its cultural
attachments to technical-rational achievements.
These two examples show how modern organizational and professional
practice is rife with ethical paradox. A ‘good’ leader within a technical
rational system need not necessarily be ethical. Our admiration and praise
of ethical leadership masks the essential moral vacuity of modern, techni-
cal-rational organizations. Codes of ethics, rules and regulations are not
sufficient to prevent or punish unethical behavior. Individuals who take an
ethical stand are too often cast off by society (even as they are being
praised), while the unethical – in the rare instances that they are made to
account for their actions – are often rewarded with golden parachutes and
soft landings back into positions similar to the ones they disgraced. Ethics
is too often relegated to the sidelines as an afterthought, invoked only as an
antidote to the worst, most visible practices and then put aside as impedi-
ments to efficiency and effectiveness until the next abuse is uncovered. In
the culture of technical rationality, the ethical leader can quickly fall from
favor and become feared and even reviled as unreliable, a non-team player
who undermines the organization by not working within the system.
These two historical cases suggest that professionals in public life would
do well to reflect on the possibility that their systems and actions can con-
tribute to the worst kinds of human behavior, and that our ethical stan-
dards and professional training do not adequately address the potential for
administrative evil. There is no easy way out of the social and organiza-
tional dynamics that foster administrative evil. Rarely is one confronted
with an obvious up or down decision on ethical issues. Instead, it is more
common to follow a pathway of smaller, ambiguous choices until a series
of commitments and habits drive out ethics in favor of a comfortable mask.
Therefore, no profession should be taught, practiced, or theorized about
without considering the psychological, organizational and societal dynam-
ics that can lead those in public service to confound the public interest with
acts of dehumanization and destruction. Only a conceptual framework for
ethics that goes beyond the narrow vision of technical rationality and rec-
ognizes the interactive, relational foundation of ethics and its public
context can help us better understand and perhaps ameliorate – even if we
 Ethical leadership and administrative evil 99

cannot fully resolve – these moral paradoxes of ethical leadership in

modern organizations.

REFERENCES

Adams, Guy B. (2000), ‘Administrative ethics and chimera of professionalism: the

historical context of public service ethics’, in Terry L. Cooper (ed.), Handbook of
Administrative Ethics, 2nd edn, New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 291–308.
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7. The Swiss Federal Administration in
the context of downsizing: public
servants’ perception about their
work environment and ethical issues
Yves Emery and Carole Wyser

To tell public servants that they are highly valued at the same time as many of
them are being ‘let go’ may strike at least part of the audience as ironic, or
worse.
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004: 172)

INTRODUCTION

Long inspired by the Weberian ideal-type (Weber, 1971), the management

of public organizations has undergone a profound transformation, notably
through the development of new public management (NPM) (Pollitt and
Boukaert, 2003). The changes that have taken place since the early 1980s
are so profound that the foundations of the bureaucratic model are being
completely redefined, leading many analysts to speak of a change of para-
digm. In many OECD countries (PUMA, 2001; Reichard, 2002; Bossaert,
2005), the traditional conditions of civil service employment have been fun-
damentally challenged by the application of new public management prin-
ciples: the abolition of the ‘status’ of public servants, the introduction of
practices geared towards performance and new organizational values
emphasizing quality, competitiveness and public entrepreneurialism (du
Gay, 2000; Emery, 2000).
In this new environment, which one might call post-civil service (Emery
and Giauque, 2005), the added introduction of downsizing programmes
makes it difficult for employees to cope with the daily workload. All these
changes have a significant impact on the staff, and are likely to lead to
various ethical problems. However, there have been very few studies looking
at these dynamics (Knudson et al., 2003). There lies the main interest of this
contribution.

101
102 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The shift towards a post-civil service model which started with the intro-
duction of new public management policies immediately gave rise to
numerous critical comments (Hufty, 1992; Merrien, 1998; Knoepfel and
Varone, 1999; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). Many fears focused on the
reforms themselves and on the potential misuse of redundancies – impos-
ing this new regime on public servants who no longer benefit from guaran-
teed employment. Meanwhile, a number of OECD countries have had to
face a public finance crisis and have started to implement restructuring pro-
grammes aimed at cutting the number of employees in the public sector.
For Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004), continuous and repeated cuts in the
workforce destroy the foundation of trust and commitment. They also
curtail institutional memory, reduce the chances of survival of a ‘public
service ethic’ and, finally, result in a less efficient public sector. The promo-
tion of a management ideology (de Gaulejac, 2005) that tends to push civic
values into the background, can in fact give rise to major ethical problems
(Smith, 2003).
The greater part of the literature on ethical aspects in the public sector,
tackles the question from a theoretical rather than an empirical point of
view. Thus, the main themes identified by Menzel (2005) show that the most
common approach consists of evaluating the impact of ethical practices
on the functioning and performance of the organization. The evaluation of
the impact of performance on ethics has been far more rarely undertaken.
The author argues that the introduction of entrepreneurial methods brings
with it a significant ethical risk which should be analysed in more detail
(Menzel, 2005: 33). Besides, most prescriptive studies on the management
of ethical conduct recognize this problem and its importance for prac-
titioners (Baines et al., 1999).
Wittmer (2005) conceptualizes the influence of contextual variables on
ethical conduct, stressing the importance of rewards and sanctions, the key
role of the peer group, codes of conduct, and so on. However, other con-
textual variables such as structural characteristics or those related to the
scarcity of resources are only referred to in research that is now quite
dated.
The impact of restructuring programmes on the staff has already been
the subject of numerous research projects in the private sector, where
ethical issues were not of primary importance. From these studies it seems
that job security plays a vital role for employees, both in terms of its objec-
tive aspects and in the subjective perceptions linked to it (Büssing, 1999;
Klandermans and Van Vuuren, 1999). The main impacts of job insecu-
rity are:
 The Swiss Federal Administration 103

● reduced involvement in the work carried out and less organizational

commitment (Turnley and Feldmann, 1999; Allen et al., 2001;
Knudson et al., 2003);
● feelings of stress, burnout and illnesses that have lasting effects on the
well-being of the staff (Kinnunen et al., 1999); and
● a decline in qualitative and quantitative performance (Grunberg
et al., 2000).

All these aspects are possibly linked to non-ethical behaviour, although

this still remains to be proven. But what happens in public organizations
where job security was (and still is in a number of countries) raised to the
status of dogma (Bossaert, 2005)?
It has been nearly ten years since the OECD (OCDE, 1997) noted that
public servants subjected to modernization programmes suffer from a
‘weariness attributable to change’, a ‘loss of prestige’, as well as a feeling of
‘insecurity’ induced by their new work environment. The first empirical
studies focusing on the implementation of NPM-inspired practices and
their impact on the employees are now being published (Reichard, 2002;
Aubert, 2003; Duvillier, Genard et al., 2003; Giauque, 2003, 2004; Ritz,
2003; Leisink and Steijn, 2004; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Meyer and
Hammerschmied, 2005; Rondeaux, 2005). They portray a reality in which
public servants may be motivated in some instances, but are often bewil-
dered when faced with new practices and new values that are, at times, at
odds with their previous practices.
Looking at the impact of the abolition of employment security in the
State of Georgia (that state’s at-will employment system), Kellough and
Nigro have observed, on a sampling of some 2000 respondents, that the
attitudes towards the various reforms undertaken have generally been neg-
ative. It is to note that this negativism was less pronounced for at-will
employees than for protected employees. For these two categories of
employees, political pressures remain insignificant, even if we would have
to analyse this element further. Other aspects, relating to the neutrality and
productivity of public sector employees would also need to be explored
(Kellough and Nigro, 2005).
A review of the impact of 30 years of reform in different European coun-
tries (Lacasse and Thoenig, 1996) shows that ethical aspects are only
touched on as peripheral elements,1 as is the case with regard to the evalu-
ation carried out in Switzerland (see below), or simply mentioned as a par-
ticular impediment to reform.2
Frederickson is interested in the impact of downsizing programmes on
the ethical conduct of public servants. He reiterates the belief that such
programmes contribute to a decline in morale, institutional loyalty and
104 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

collective memory. The author deals with the question by highlighting the
relocation of the core bureaucracy away from the centre, and its relocation
within more peripheral organizations which may pursue interests at odds
with the public interest (Frederickson, 1996).
His conclusions are overtly pessimistic, predicting a period marked by
major ethical problems. Smith examines the impact of what he calls the
‘neo-liberal agenda’ on the problem of ethics. He believes that the impact
will be serious, particularly on ‘the ability of the public sector and public
employees to work according to shared values and a shared sense of
purpose . . . and to work collaboratively, effectively and accountably with
other sectors’ (Smith, 2003). However, the literature remains essentially
prescriptive, following the principles of the ethical architecture promul-
gated by the OECD (OCDE, 1998). Clear empirical research still needs to
be carried out on the subject.
The modernization programmes that have been implemented produce
a certain amount of confusion regarding the referential values of public
servants (Grant et al., 2003; Emery and Giauque, 2005; Meyer and
Hammerschmied, 2005; Rondeaux, 2005). These have a tendency to oscil-
late between opposites:

● the traditional values of the public sector, values of the bureaucracy,

the public service ethos (Brereton and Temple, 1999; Farnham and
Horton, 2005); and
● the ‘market values’ inspired by the private sector and the economy
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004).

This hybridization, which is a characteristic feature of the current situ-

ation of post-civil service, creates a new frame of reference and legitimiza-
tion that is hardly free from contradiction. At best, it produces problems
when it comes to adopting specific modes of behaviour; at worst, it creates
real confusion about what reference values should guide the actions of
public sector employees3 (Jurkiewicz et al., 1998). In this context, the
notion put forward by Menzel of ‘ethics-induced stress’ is an interesting
one, in that it is based on a dissonance between the public servant’s sense
of ethics and the types of values found in the workplace (quoted contribu-
tion, p. 26).
We start from the idea that, in a period of profound restructuring, the
stress induced by incoherent change is likely to provoke, or intensify, non-
ethical behaviours. That is where our main interest lies; understanding the
perception of public servants directly involved in service delivery.
 The Swiss Federal Administration 105

THE SWISS CONTEXT IN AN INTERNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVE

In Switzerland, with a large number of public bodies at all hierarchical

levels (the Federal administration, the cantons and communes), having
implemented major NPM-type modernization programmes and having
abolished security of employment, we are now witnessing increasing
amounts of job cuts and, in certain cases, redundancies (Mutter, 2004).
The trend noted in Switzerland, characterized by the ‘abolition of the
traditional status’4 of civil servants in conjunction with a strengthening of
the judicial framework of public law (Emery and Ueberhart, 1999), consti-
tutes a unique framework for analysing these two dynamics. This new
statute introduces an objective employee insecurity, which is likely to be fully
realized only when restructuring programmes are effectively implemented.
The administrative level chosen for this research, the Federal adminis-
tration, is undergoing a complete transformation as a result of the joint
introduction of reform and cost-saving programmes. The reforms, tested in
different agencies since 1997 (Leuenberger, 2005), are broadly inspired by
new public management theories: the use of new policy instruments such
as performance mandates, global budgeting and delegation of responsibili-
ties to agencies. Moreover, various sectoral reorganizations have taken
place. These have been implemented in the form of projects, some of which
are cross-departmental (for example, increasing efficiencies in purchasing,
reducing legislative density, and so on) and others specific to each of the
seven departments that make up the Federal administration. Thus, in the
units studied here, where job cuts or redundancies are expected (see
methodology), major restructuring programmes are now being imple-
mented. A number of cost-saving programmes, devised by Parliament, have
been progressively implemented in recent years. They have added a layer of
complexity to the reforms already underway. The current total workforce
(37 000 people in 2005) will be cut by approximately 4000 by 2010, mostly
by implementing rationalization measures and by abandoning certain
tasks.
Our investigation has been conducted in a public-sector organization
that is currently engaged in a number of ‘reorganization’ projects. To date,
few evaluations have been carried out on this subject in Switzerland. The
study, which evaluates ten years of New Public Management type reforms,
has not touched on ethical questions in any meaningful manner (Lienhard
et al., 2005). The evolving culture of Swiss administrations towards a more
‘client-oriented’ approach is noted without raising the ethical questions
linked to this particular choice. The ‘overall’ positive assessment of the
reforms must be weighed against the rise of new dynamics weakening the
106 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

State and the functioning of the public administrations. These new el-
ements may lead to a deterioration in motivation, commitment and pro-
ductivity of public servants, although these trends vary greatly depending
on the context. This observation is based on the emergence of a large
number of paradoxes (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Emery and Giauque,
2005), raising long-term questions of credibility about the discourse and
the objectives pursued by these reforms.
In the conclusion of his study, Schedler points to the potential contra-
diction between the entrepreneurial logic underlying NPM, which is sup-
posed to give greater autonomy to public servants and the intensification
and multiplication of control mechanisms. But even in this last chapter,
he does not deal with any ethical problems that might arise out of these
contradictions.

AIMS AND METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

This research aims at assessing the perception of federal administration

employees on the impact of objective employment insecurity (in a context
of downsizing) on work environment and ethical behaviour. To evaluate
this impact, we selected three units that are being subjected to increasingly
large-scale restructuring efforts. These efforts will constitute one of our
main independent variables.
Taking our inspiration to a great extent from Grounded Theory
(Baszanger, 1992; Strauss and Corbin, 1997; Strauss and Corbin, 2004) we
have conducted twelve in-depth interviews lasting on average two hours.
This inductive approach, which does not involve validating or invalidating
a hypothesis, consists of the systematic collection of empirical data which,
in a continuous two-way movement between facts and hypotheses, allows
us to build a theoretical construct of the studied subject.
This methodology pays great attention to the context of the action
which, according to Strauss and Corbin (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), covers
the global and general conditions, both close and distant, that influence
actions and strategies of interaction. Thus, the results of this research are
not only concerned with the effects of the loss of employment security –
experienced as a result of different levels of restructuring – but also with
the development of the work conditions which the units studied provide for
their employees.
Starting from the idea of constructing a theory based on facts, we pro-
ceeded to carry out comprehensive interviews according to the methods
developed by Kaufmann (2004). This approach to interviewing opens up the
possibility of freer interactions, allowing, among other things, a better
 The Swiss Federal Administration 107

understanding of the concerns of the interviewee. This systematic approach

enabled us to spontaneously tackle the independent variables mentioned in
the literature, but also to look at other variables which emerged through the
interview process. This process is carried on until interviewees start repeat-
ing themselves in the interviews. This then assures the qualitative validity of
the process.
This dynamic approach requires a ‘theoretical sampling’ (Strauss and
Corbin, 1998) which evolves during the research process. In accordance
with this principle, we asked the people interviewed to indicate which of
their colleagues they believed had a different or contrasting perception of
the situation. This approach maximizes the opportunities to compare
events and allows us to create clusters that vary according to various char-
acteristics and contexts. It is then possible to look for similarities and
differences with other events. This process reaches its conclusion when the
commentaries obtained start reflecting each another, thus allowing us to
establish a clearer contextual view of the elements under study.

CHOICE OF THE FIELD OF STUDY

In cooperation with the Federal Office of Personnel (Office fédéral du per-

sonnel OPFER), which has a global perspective of the reforms in each
department, we selected three units within the Federal administration, an
organization that has abolished the traditional civil service statute. The
selected units (U) represent contexts that are subject to the growing pres-
sures of reorganization: (U1) no job cuts planned; (U2) job cuts announced
or implemented; (U3) redundancies announced or implemented. The stage
of implementation of the reforms announced by the Swiss public adminis-
tration varies greatly from one department to another. Thus, the two units
most affected by the restructuring (U2 and U3) in the same department
were selected, since the situations had not yet reached a stage of comple-
tion in the other departments.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

It is important to recall that this is a piece of exploratory research which

focuses on a limited number of individuals. Thus, the trends noted and the
analyses that are derived from these cannot by any means be representative
of what occurs in the entire organization. Moreover, since the results are
based exclusively on the perceptions of those interviewed, they cannot be
corroborated with more objective measurements.
108 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

First, the most important aspects related to the work environment will
be addressed and, in a second section, the consequences as experienced by
our interlocutors in terms of ethical behaviour.

ASPECTS RELATED TO THE WORK ENVIRONMENT

The first observation concerns the loss of reference points, which can be
seen by a growing politicization, a confused, sometimes even absent, hier-
archy, and the appearance of market-driven values in the work place. In U1,
this predominance of the political debate in the management of public
affairs can be explained by very direct contacts with the political authority,
but also by a new management style that is more interventionist and aims
to ‘set an example’ in the organization. In such a context our interlocutors
have the perception that personal sympathies carry an increasing weight in
the organization. Also mentioned is a form of blackmail, based in part on
the currently poor conditions of the Swiss job market, and leading to the
imposing of decisions without any real process of discussion. In U2 and
U3, the prevailing feeling is that the political debates have a very direct
impact on the future of their units. This perception is all the stronger in that
the notion of hierarchy, which until recently represented a fundamental
structuring principle in these units, is completely disappearing. Three of
our interlocutors were not even able to identify their immediate superior;
the civil servants in these two units seem to suffer a form of anomie which
is highly disturbing.
We must also note the large-scale introduction of a market-driven
approach in the three units, leading civil servants to be concerned, first and
foremost, with issues of efficiency, productivity, cost-savings, and more
specifically for units U2 and U3, earning power and even profits. This last
point is not in itself a problematic element since in these three units, people
assert that they can also see positive elements in this frame of reference.
Second, we note a dramatic contraction of the time horizon in manage-
ment. In the first unit (U1), there are a growing number of uncertainties
with regard to the tasks and working conditions that will prevail. In the
second unit (U2), the reorganizations lead to a real rupture; the future is
reduced to a very short-term horizon (a few months). In unit 3, the future
is even shorter.
Third, the clarity and coherence of the working environment tend to
deteriorate. In U1, the least affected, people experience an increase of
demands being placed upon them, a growing push for flexibility and
responsiveness. Nevertheless, the conditions in which the work is being
done, the hierarchy and the responsibilities remain clear and are not leading
 The Swiss Federal Administration 109

to disruptions. For the people in U2 and U3, the picture is quite different:
whereas their duties and immediate work environment remain clearly
marked out; the rest of the structure is characterized by a general feeling of
chaos. Added to the loss of frame of reference as noted above, this chaotic
environment is experienced as highly destabilizing and even perceived as an
offence to the professional conscience of our interlocutors. In fact, they are
put in a situation where it becomes very difficult to do a good job; the objec-
tives are continuously elevated while the resources needed to carry them out
are being constantly reduced.
The dysfunctional nature of the control systems in the units studied must
also be pointed out. In fact, in U1 we can find a growing number of controls
being carried out on most work related aspects. If this trend continues, these
controls could become counter-productive and disrupt work performance.
In U2, the controls are carried out mainly in work teams or by the line
manager if present. A form of mutual control and self-regulation emerges
in line with the very noticeable concern of wanting to ‘do a good job’ and
of being able to retain a form of professional dignity linked to the quality
of the work accomplished. The immediate sphere of activity thus becomes
a form of protection. As for U3, controls have completely disappeared.
Several examples given by our interlocutors show that distinct dysfunctional
modes of behaviour exist, and that the hierarchy is in no way intervening to
correct the situation.
Finally, we want to refer to the mechanisms by which, based on increased
delegation to the operational units, various inequalities are emerging
among the staff (salaries, working hours and so on). This phenomenon is
amplified by a lack of transparency, which tends to increase the perceived
inequalities. All this is happening in an individualistic spirit, where each
one acts in its own sphere while being less concerned, or indeed not at all
concerned, about what the others are doing.

ASPECTS RELATED TO THE ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR

OF PUBLIC SERVANTS

While in U1, performing the work becomes more difficult because of the
changes in the work context; our interlocutors did not mention any new
problems of an ethical nature.
In the second unit, despite the absence of an ethical framework, the loss
of organizational references, the lack of orientation and of trust in the hier-
archy, of demands that are disproportionate to resources, the impossibility
of projecting oneself into the future, our interlocutors do not display, to
date, unethical behaviours towards clients or in the way they carry out their
110 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

jobs. Several times, the potentially explosive character of the near future
was mentioned. Nevertheless, their professional dedication and their
concern to continue to produce good work, prevails and helps to avoid
regrettable slippages. In the eyes of our interlocutors, the operational
methods that characterize the work environment are leading to a decline in
productivity and in the quality of work. In certain cases, the maintaining
of professional standards can only be met with difficulty, and with a sense
of responsibility that is surprising in people who find themselves in such
situations.
Although the conditions described in unit 3 constitute an unfavourable
framework for ethical behaviour, non-ethical behaviour is only present in a
very marginal way. These exceptions are comprised of individuals who
come and ‘punch in’ for work without actually working. Added to this is a
growing alcohol problem, affecting employees and line managers.
Trust in the hierarchy, whether remote or close, has been broken. This is
even more apparent as they are now considered as representing a counter-
example rather than a model to be emulated. As with unit 2, despite
unfavourable conditions the persons interviewed continue to produce high
quality work, attributable to their dignity and self-respect.
In contrast with the stability of the Weberian model, we can observe the
difficulty public servants have in projecting themselves into the future. This
seems to be linked to the seriousness of the reforms they are experiencing.
In each of the units job security and trajectory preoccupy employees, a
topic of considerable anxiety under the impetus of various, consecutive
restructuring programmes. In the first unit, it is clear that the people project
themselves into the future with a growing number of uncertainties. In the
second unit (U2) the people we met were unable to project themselves into
the future, although the ‘future’ may be a matter of mere months, employ-
ing such phrases as ‘disaster’, ‘charging into the wall’, and so on to describe
a job scenario dominated by apprehension and fear. As for the individuals
in Unit 3, they have similar perceptions to the people in U2, except that
their projection into the future is even shorter. The expectations of the
people in U2 and U3 are clearly of an existential nature: knowing what will
happen to their position, knowing about the decisions that will affect the
future of the organization, in short, being able to project themselves into
the future.
As regards the commitment of the public servants interviewed, a clear
gradation can be observed between the three units, reflecting the degree of
the transformations underway. The need for transparency and information,
which is felt to be lacking at present, emerges as an issue in all three units.
The propensity for individuals to leave the organization can be viewed as
resultant of the break up of a stable work relationship that was initially
 The Swiss Federal Administration 111

intended to be long-lasting. This was a key element of the former psycho-

logical contract between employer and employee. Evident in units 2 and 3,
this finding is also beginning to be valid in the first unit.
These last two observations raise the question of a cognitive dissonance
emerging between the personal values held by the public servants and those
advocated by the organization. This may indeed become a source of future
ethical dilemmas.

DISCUSSION
Despite a significant potential for non-ethical conduct resulting from the
organizational context described, we did not discover any real slippage.
This suggests that compensatory regulation mechanisms may be at work
and in this regard, three interactive levels of regulation are apparent. This
observation has special relevance given that our chosen method focuses on
the context which influences the actions and strategies of interaction.

The Level of the Organization

The regulatory influence is diminishing in this global context. It appears

that the existence of an ethics charter has almost no practical effect (Igalens
and Dehermann-Roy, 2004), especially when it diverges from employees’
immediate reality (Argyris and Schön, 1978). By contrast, we can point to
the reappearance of the typical problems which were present at the origin
of the bureaucratic model, that is, increasing intervention by politicians in
the administration and the phenomena of favouritism. In the absence of a
control group, it cannot be determined whether these problems are a con-
sequence of the current changes, or whether they existed before and now
have intensified following the abolition of the traditional status of public
servants. This danger is typically inherent in open civil service systems such
as that of Switzerland (Bowman et al., 2001), and has been observed in
other studies carried out in the Federal administration (Giauque, 2004).
As regards values, it is worth noting the disparity among the sources
included in the literature review. It is interesting to note that these ‘new’
values do not seem to be problematic in and of themselves, but rather it is
in their practical application and implementation that conflicts arise. As
pointed out in the Swiss literature regarding administrative modernization,
this conflict of values has not yet been really addressed, nor have the
associated ethical problems been confronted. An explanation for this may
be that the implementation of reforms is still at an intermediate stage
(Lienhard et al., 2005).
112 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

The Level of the Immediate Working Environment

The more immediate working environment takes on greater importance

because of the decentralization of responsibilities. This is true of unit 2 in
particular, where a type of ‘protective bubble’ formed, allowing people to
partly neutralize the effects of the chaotic organization surrounding the
unit. Other research also shows the strengthening of the protective role of
the team at a time of restructuring (Büssing, 1999; Knudson et al., 2003).
Added to this is the disappearance of the traditionally strong layer of
protection provided by the hierarchy, which used to act as a ‘shield’, pro-
tecting the staff from the higher political echelons. Considered no longer
credible, and no longer fully appraised of the realities on the ground, this
hierarchy appears like some sort of illusory and unpredictable phantom
which has lost its practical relevance. It is clearly no longer seen as a ‘model’
by its staff (Bass and Moulton, 2002). Lewis and Gilman stress the vital role
of managers in establishing a functioning ethical dimension (Lewis and
Gilman, 2005: 235ff ), but what can be done if, as we have observed, the
hierarchy ‘disappears’ and the basic professionalism and ethics of the staff
become the vital element?
Some of the more negative impacts from all the changes described above
might have been avoided if control mechanisms had been put in place to
ensure that the professional and technical requirements, and also those
relating to cooperation and the ethics of public service, were being fol-
lowed. This is, however, scarcely the case, even though in unit 1, the con-
trols are getting more stringent. When one looks more closely, these
controls revolve more around the procedural and contextual aspects of
work rather than its precise content. The situation is critical from a profes-
sional and ethical point of view, above all in U2 and U3, where the remain-
ing safeguards appear to be limited to a form of ‘intervision’, or
self-control, leaving the field open for all types of behaviours. This is all the
more noteworthy in that this is traditionally a unit where control mech-
anisms have been very much present.

The Individual Level

Apparently, no major dysfunction has been observed at this level to date.

This may be due to the strong self-control mechanisms exercised by our
interlocutors. These mechanisms themselves stem from, and we formulate
this as a hypothesis, the strong cultural ethic towards work itself within the
Swiss context, since the code of conduct that is in force in the organization
was not mentioned by our interlocutors. And since, due to the absence of
specific professional socialization for public sector workers in Switzerland,
 The Swiss Federal Administration 113

one cannot use the hypothesis of the existence of a form of ‘public servant
ethos’ (Mayntz, 1997), as put forward, for example, by Fisch (2000). This
finding would be in line with that made by Turansky and Rousson (2001),
who state that one should distinguish between the ethic of work and the
ethic towards work. While the former, which reflects the central role work
plays in society, is in sharp decline, the second is tending to re-establish
itself. The ethic towards work is defined as a ‘responsible commitment that
is based on a set of beliefs, values and principles such as responsibility,
pride, performance etc.’ (ibid: 293). Our respondents stressed their need to
deliver work they could feel proud of, illustrating a work ethic that com-
pensates for the dysfunctions present in the work environment. Linked with
the dimensions investigated by Büssing, who is interested in ‘control at
work’ (Büssing, 1999), the pre-eminence of this level of regulation over and
above the others could explain why the people we met maintain, despite the
objective difficulty of their situation, an astonishing level of personal
control. Equally, as suggested by Jorgensen (2005), one of the key factors
in the motivation of public servants is related to the work itself, showing a
form of ‘professional commitment’ which can explain some of the state-
ments collected in the present research.
According to our interlocutors, maintaining professionalism on the job
is a means of preserving self-respect, reinforcing an individual’s dignity at
work. It allows them to finish the day with a feeling of personal satisfac-
tion, having carried out a meaningful activity. As a response to the lack of
environmental clarity, this orientation is inherently unpredictable and is rife
with expectations that are increasingly difficult to decipher (De Witte,
1999). Both these elements are at the heart of the insecurity of employment,
and were found to play an important role in understanding the situation.
Similar to the isolation of certain public servants working ‘a long way
from the centre’, an issue dealt with by Kelso (2003), the public servants we
met are left to themselves and to their own codes of conduct. The form of
organizational ‘anomie’ we noted in our research echoes the concluding
remarks of Ghere. He underlined the need to develop some general models
of ambiguity that could offer predictive insight into circumstances leading
the person, as a moral agent, into dissonant, defensive or otherwise prob-
lematic behaviours (Ghere, 2005).
Of course, it remains necessary to examine in greater depth the dynamic
interaction between these three (systemic) levels of ethical regulations. Dicke
and Boonyarak (2005) show that the end of the bureaucratic model repre-
sents a major problem with regard to accountability: it was ensured by the
hierarchical structure yet is now dependent upon contractual relationships
with ‘few considerations and discussions about the potentially dangerous
consequences’ (quoted contribution, p. 187). But this accountability must be
114 Integrity, rationality and effectiveness of governance

based as much on an internalized sense of duty as on an externally imposed

set of requirements (p. 188). Monitoring and measurements of performance
alone would not be synonymous with accountability, especially as these
methods are far from being fully instituted. Doig takes the same view by
observing the difficulties inherent in the transition from an ethical system
based on (external) control to a system based on accountability, the latter
‘often abrogates individual responsibility or ignores the contextual or cul-
tural framework’ (Doig, 2003). In fact, a proper balance has to be found
between external and internal regulation, this being assumed because of an
implicit or explicit interest in public services (Doig, 2003: 113). Clegg and
Stokes (2003) go even further when they plead for a return to a curriculum
that details the classical tradition with particular emphasis on Aristotle
and Weber, to strengthen the character and the purpose of public servants,
to supplement the prevailing managerialism. For Switzerland, where social-
ization geared specifically to public sector organizations is virtually non-
existent, this argument is of fundamental importance.
For Bishop and Connors, a shift from ‘government to governance’ (Peers,
2003) does not imply a strengthening of ethical standards but rather a
different approach that brings together an enterprising spirit, freedom of
action and a sense of responsibility. Along with Caiden, we finally want to
assert that individual regulation, based on professionalism, expertise and
personal integrity, will continue to play a vital role in the State’s ethical
action (Caiden, 2005).

CONCLUSION
In this first analysis, we have taken an exploratory approach which has
allowed us to refine the method for the second phase of research. It is clear
that the research model adopted does not allow one to assess the impact of
the change in the status of employees as the principal independent vari-
able – this would require selecting organizations still operating with a tra-
ditional personnel statute. The phenomena observed could develop
differently in the longer term and are perhaps partly due to the particular
difficulties of the current phase of changes. Parker and Hartley (2003)
show, for example, that processes of strategic reorganization can end up
having a less forceful impact on the staff when they are looked at over a
longer period. They are then considered as involving a ‘rightsizing’ rather
than a ‘downsizing’ approach, helping to clarify roles and to introduce
innovative processes in carrying out the work.
It is obvious that at a time of profound change, feelings of insecurity
and anguish, which are sometimes of an existential nature, can develop. We
 The Swiss Federal Administration 115

nevertheless have the feeling that this is not a transitory state, but rather
reflects an enduring situation close to a ‘perpetual motion’ (Baruch and
Hind, 1999), which will no longer include periods of stabilization as defined
by Lewin (1951).
Nonetheless, the changes recorded make for a ‘post-civil service’ situ-
ation that is rather worrying – while noting, however, that the statements
made by our interlocutors are many and varied. All the changes highlighted
create a working context that has a significant potential for being dysfunc-
tional and the source of ethical problems, although to date this potential
has not yet really materialized. In the absence of an appropriate ethical
framework, the main safeguard seems to be a form of personal ethics in
carrying out the work. In the bureaucratic model, the frame of reference is
defined above all by the organization, whereas in the situations observed,
the standards and references that guide the activities become, in the most
critical units, above all personal ones. As Menzel (1996) stresses, public ser-
vants are very likely to find themselves in a stressful situation of cognitive
dissonance which forces them to choose between their own personal values
and those of their employer.

NOTES

1. Thus A. Matheson (Modernisation du secteur public: un nouveau programme pour les

pays de l’OCDE’ in Lacasse and Verrier, p. 213) points out that the managerial reforms
have underestimated their adverse effects, in particular with regard to corruption; but he
does not substantiate his claims.
2. As part of his analysis of the reform of the Italian government apparatus, the author men-
tions that ‘the principles of impartiality and neutrality . . . are often invoked in an unwar-
ranted way to avoid assessing the results and to protect the secure income from the
irresponsibility of inefficient senior public servant . . .’ Bassanini F.: Réforme de l’Etat: la
tronçonneuse ou l’anesthésie? Les leçons de l’expérience italienne, in Lacesse and Verrier
(2005), p. 76.
3. To illustrate this point, we refer to the early departure of the two leading managers at the
Swiss Federal Personnel Office who could no longer recognize their roles in the reform
programmes that were being implemented.
4. Since 1 January 2002, a new personnel statute has been introduced, based on the use of
contracts, which makes it easier to terminate working relationships.

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PART III

Ethics and integrity management and

instruments
8. Ethical governance in local
government in England: a
regulator’s view
Gillian Fawcett and Mark Wardman

INTRODUCTION

Overview

High-profile corporate failures underpinned by poor standards of behav-

iour and/or corruption (‘sleaze’) have brought ethical governance into
sharp focus in the United Kingdom in both the private and public sectors.
The need to increase public trust and hold managers and politicians to
account more effectively are recurring topics in debates about publicly-
funded bodies in the UK. Low levels of trust, it is argued, are caused or sus-
tained by poor standards of behaviour. There has been, therefore, a
growing emphasis on the need for officials and politicians to adhere to the
highest ethical standards to help increase the public’s trust in public bodies.

Trust is at the heart of the relationship between citizens and government. It is

particularly important in relation to services which influence life and liberty –
health and policing. But it also matters for many other services – including social
services and education. In these cases, even if formal service and outcome targets
are met, a failure of trust will effectively destroy public value (Kelly and Muesrs,
2002).

The qualities the public looks for in different leaders and professions varies
according to the nature of the role. Honesty and trustworthiness are the most
significant personal qualities for public leaders. In contrast, the public looks to
Civil Servants to be efficient, competent and honest, while experience in running
a business and professionalism are considered more important for business
people. Therefore, while honesty and trustworthiness are important qualities for
most leaders, they are more significant for public leaders (Duffy et al., 2003).

This chapter deals with ethical governance in local government and provides
a basis for discussion about the role of regulators in ensuring higher ethical
standards in local government in England. The Audit Commission (the

123
124 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

Commission) is an independent body responsible for ensuring public money

is well spent and delivers high quality public services. Its remit covers around
11 000 local bodies in England, which between them spend more than £180
billion of public money each year. The Commission challenges poor ethical
standards and inappropriate behaviour through its regulatory activities in
audit and inspection. Drawing from this work, this chapter explores:

● Benchmarking for ethical standards and behaviour – whether it is

possible to benchmark for ethical governance because of the softer
cultural issues involved.
● What is different about regulating for ethical governance – contrast-
ing the different approaches used for auditing ethical standards
against other auditing practices.
● The impact of ethical change in local government in England –
the impact of ethical standards on local government behaviour and
practice.

Research

The focus of this chapter is the ethical framework operating in local gov-
ernment in England. It draws upon data collected by the Commission in:

● ethical governance audits;

● corporate assessments of local authorities as part of their compre-
hensive performance assessment (CPA). The CPA assessment frame-
work from 2002–4 led to an overall rating for local authorities of one
of the following five categories: Excellent, Good, Fair, Weak or Poor.
In 2005 and 2006, the framework was revised and it now gives an
overall star rating for an authority’s performance: from 0 to 4 stars.
Further details of the CPA methodology are given in Appendix 8.1;
● corporate governance inspections (CGIs). Further details of the CGI
methodology are given in Appendix 8.1; and
● Public Interest Reports (PIRs).1 These address matters of import-
ance that need to be brought to the attention of the public.

Context

The Audit Commission does not define ‘ethical governance’2 but rather
situates it within its overall definition of corporate governance in the public
sector: ‘the framework of accountability to users, stakeholders and the
wider community, within which organizations take decisions, and lead
and control their functions, to achieve their objectives’. This definition
 Ethical governance in local government in England 125

recognizes that effectively governed organizations combine reliable ‘hard’

data from robust systems and processes with effective ‘soft’ characteristics
such as leadership, and ‘cultural’ attributes such as openness and trans-
parency in order to make sound decisions. Within this broad approach, the
importance of high standards of behaviour and ethics becomes clear. The
Commission assesses both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ attributes when making judge-
ments about a local authority’s performance.
The Commission’s approach to ethical governance has of course been
directly informed by other initiatives. Of the numerous national reports on
corporate governance and the proper conduct of public business, the
Cadbury report was particularly influential in establishing the principles of
openness, integrity and accountability in the governance of publicly
quoted companies (Cadbury Committee, 1992). In the public sector, the
Nolan Committee’s (Nolan Committee, 1995) seven principles of public
life – selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty
and leadership – remain the benchmark for behaviour and conduct in
running any public sector organization.
Part 3 of the Local Government Act 2000 introduced an ethical frame-
work for local government in England, which set out new structures to
oversee standards of behaviour based on the Nolan principles. Local
authorities are required to:

● adopt a new council constitution;

● adopt a code of conduct regulating the behaviour of elected
members, including a register of elected members’ interests, with a
separate code of conduct for officers; and
● appoint a monitoring officer and a local Standards Committee
to advise on the Code, monitor its operation, and promote high
standards.

The Act also provided for establishing two new, non-departmental public
bodies: the Standards Board for England, responsible for investigating
cases of unethical conduct by members; and the Adjudication Panel for
England, an independent judicial tribunal which hears and adjudicates on
serious matters concerning the conduct of elected members.
More recent developments include: the Department of Communities
and Local Government (CLG), previously the Office of the Deputy Prime
Minister (ODPM), has completed a review of the effectiveness of the
Standards Board for England (House of Commons ODMP, 2005); the
Independent Commission on Good Governance published a common
standard of governance for public services (Independent Commission on
Good Governance for Public Services, 2004); and the Graham Committee
126 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

(a successor to the Nolan Committee) published the tenth report on stan-

dards in public life, Getting the Balance Right – Implementing Standards of
Conduct in Public Life (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2005).
Continuing interest in these matters at a national level has inevitably led
to regulators like the Commission taking a close interest in ethical stan-
dards in the public sector. This chapter sets out the findings and conclu-
sions from the work the Commission has undertaken in this area among
local authorities.

BENCHMARKING FOR ETHICAL GOVERNANCE

For several years now, leaders have been encouraged to consider the impact of
material forces in organizations – culture, values, vision and ethics. Each
describes a quality of organizational life that can be observed through behav-
iour (Wheatley, 2001).

The majority of members and officers working in public services in

England adhere to the high ethical standards expected by citizens and the
users of services. Incidents of misbehaviour and/or corruption within
public services are isolated. Only 21 Public Interest Reports (PIRs) were
issued in the period between 1997 and 2005, and not all of these related to
poor ethical practice.
Similarly, the Standards Board for England has received 9648 complaints
about the conduct of elected members since it was established in March
2001, but these have resulted in only 240 sanctions against individual
elected members. Common categories of misconduct resulting in such
sanctions include breaches of the code of conduct, bullying behaviour,
misuse of council resources, bringing the council into disrepute and using
position for personal gain.
It is all too easy to identify the behaviours and factors that contribute to
corporate failure after the event, and to learn the lessons and benchmark
for them. For example, it is now recognized that the conditions which led
to the failure of public officials to prevent the death of an eight-year old girl
(Laming, 2003), the removal of body parts from deceased patients without
family consent (Redfern, 2000), and the high rate of death in children’s
heart surgeries (Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, 2001) were the conse-
quence of poor corporate performance. These cases highlighted numerous
governance failures to implement legislative guidelines by public officials,
or in some cases were a result of misconceived compliance with legislation.
More pertinent to ethical governance in local government is the example of
the recent failings that resulted in postal vote irregularities by councillors
prior to two local council elections in Birmingham.3 But it has proved more
 Ethical governance in local government in England 127

difficult for the Commission to identify at an early stage the underlying

factors and behaviours which could lead to corporate and/or service failure,
if they are not addressed.
This is despite confirmation from analysis of the Commission’s corpor-
ate governance inspection reports that there are indicators for poor
governance. The Commission has conducted 17 corporate governance
inspections in local government. These rare inspections are designed to
diagnose the root causes of poor organizational performance. The areas of
weakness common to poorly governed local authorities are poor working
relationships; low levels of internal accountability; a ‘closed’ culture that
does not accept external challenge and scrutiny; poor strategic risk man-
agement; lack of clarity about objectives, roles and responsibilities; poor
information for decision makers; and poor leadership. Sadly, however, it is
easier to see these in hindsight than to predict there may be trouble ahead.

EXTRACTS FROM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

INSPECTION REPORTS
Some members are seen to be antagonistic towards other organizations. The
Council does not treat its partners with respect in all circumstances and the Leader
has been cited by some partners as behaving in an unprofessional manner.

Partners told us that there was a lack of consensus amongst the politicians and
the bitterness which has developed between politicians presents itself to partners
as a culture of internal feuding rather than external community leadership.

It was not always possible to be clear about how and why decisions were
taken . . . members need high quality information from officers if they are to
make informed decisions. The quality of information provided to members at
times was observed as poor.

Progress in the past has been impeded by ineffective and sometimes abrasive rela-
tionships between councillors and officers. These relationships are now
undoubtedly much improved, but there remains some way to go.

It is important, however, to distinguish between malpractice or misman-

agement in poor governance and poor ethical standards. As noted earlier,
incidents of misbehaviour and corruption are isolated. But despite the low
numbers of public interest reports, it should be remembered that when the
public believes that governance standards have slipped, this can reduce its
confidence in public services. Research carried out by MORI for the
Commission in 2003 found that 64 per cent of the public said their
confidence in public bodies was reduced by major corporate failures (Audit
Commission, 2003b).
128 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

As required under the Code of Audit Practice (Audit Commission,

2004), auditors routinely assess the structures and processes underpinning
organizational performance. As part of this, they will assess the risks to
public bodies of failing to establish the structures and processes to support
ethical standards. A number of PIRs have highlighted what happens if
standards are not taken into account. For example, a PIR on a Borough
Council in 2003 showed that
in the absence of a standards committee, there had been serious failings in the
governance of the Council and in the conduct of the Leader of the Council and
some senior officers. There was a breakdown in the corporate controls and
systems of decision-making. The prevailing culture of the Council was one of
fear and blame, and as a result, there had been no challenge to inappropriate
conduct by senior officers and members.
The Commission has reviewed all PIRs against the Nolan seven prin-
ciples of public life. This review highlighted standards and behaviours
common to all which can be associated with failing services and/or fraud-
ulent and corrupt practices. It found that, in 21 PIRs, there were breaches
of the ethical code of conduct by members and protocols by officers, often
caused by the lack of an open culture and trust. Poor relations between
executives and non-executives were apparent, exemplified by intimidation
and bullying. This finding echoes those from a national taskforce set up to
look at the worrying problem of bullying within local government, which
found that 27 per cent of female and 19 per cent of male chief executives
reported being bullied or harassed by members (Whitehead, 2002). Table
8.1 highlights a number of common characteristics of poor behaviour
found across 21 PIRs and maps them against the Nolan principles.
However, it is the case that these behaviours and standards can also be
found in otherwise well-run organizations. For example, Westminster City
Council was considered a high performing organization at the time it was
pursuing an illegal policy of ‘homes for votes’ in order to advance the
prospects of the then ruling Conservative party at the 1990 elections. Several
recent PIRs highlight issues of poor standards of behaviour and conduct in
authorities that have been given Fair, Good and Excellent CPA scores by the
Commission in the period 2002 to 2004. Similarly, the ethical governance
reviews highlighted areas of weakness at authorities scored as ‘Good’ by the
then current CPA process. This is due in part to the fact that, until recently,
the ‘key lines of enquiry’ (KLOE) followed by assessment teams in corporate
assessments did not set out specifically to assess performance against stan-
dards of behaviour. Their focus was on good management practice in pro-
ducing high performance and good service and other outcomes for the
public. The revised approach to CPA from 2005 does address ethical
standards in more detail (see Appendix 8.1).
 Ethical governance in local government in England 129

Table 8.1 Common standards and behaviours drawn from 21 public

interest reports

Principles Common findings

Selflessness • Arrogance
Holders of public office should act • Full of self importance
solely in terms of the public interest. • Autocratic, dominant and
They should not do so in order to gain • dictatorial
financial or other benefits for
themselves, their family or friends
Integrity • Unofficial deals to get own way
Holders of public office should not
place themselves under any financial or
other obligation to outside individuals
or organizations that may seek to
influence them in the performance of
their official duties
Objectivity • Grants prejudicial benefits to
In carrying out public business, • individuals or groups because of
including making public appointments, • their own intolerance or
awarding contracts, or recommending • discriminatory views
individuals for rewards and benefits, • Threatens to influence the action
holders of public office should make • of others against the common
choices on merit • good
Accountability • Manipulative
Holders of public office are • Lack of working partnerships
accountable for their decisions and • Denies external challenge
actions to the public and must submit
themselves to whatever scrutiny is
appropriate to their office
Openness • Evasive or provides excessively
Holders of public office should be as • complicated answers to
open as possible about all decisions• questions
and actions that they take. They should • Reluctant to delegate
give reasons for their decisions and • Prone to secrecy
restrict information only when the • Lack of transparency in decision
wider public interest clearly demands it • making
Honesty • Grants prejudicial benefits to
Holders of public office have a duty to • individuals or groups
declare any private interests relating to • Makes decisions for their own
their public duties and to take steps • personal gain
to resolve any conflicts arising in a way
that protects the public interest
130 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

Table 8.1 (continued)

Principles Common findings

Leadership • Driven
Holders of public office should • Obsessed by performance standards
promote and support these principles • Engenders blame or fear
by leadership and example • Intimidates or bullies
• Workaholic
• Interferes in low level
• operational matters

Source: Audit Commission – There may be trouble ahead (2004).

Further research is needed to build up a greater understanding of how and

at what stage poor standards of conduct and behaviour can begin to have a
negative impact on the delivery of public services. In particular, it is import-
ant to know more about whether poor ethical governance will eventually
adversely affect performance: if so, it would be useful to know more about
the degree of governance problems likely to trigger service failures and the
timescales involved. For example, can performance only be maintained in the
short term, where some of the above attributes are displayed?
Public sector audit has traditionally focused on compliance and risk.
One charge has been that this leads to a ‘tick box’ approach that rewards
the existence rather than the application of structures, systems and
processes. The Commission recognizes this danger, and has developed
audit tools within its Changing Organizational Cultures (COC) toolkit that
test the operation of ethical standards and facilitate internal benchmark-
ing. The Commission regularly conducts workshops where practitioners
(officers and elected members) can self-assess their councils against the
standards and criteria contained in the COC toolkit.
The toolkit assesses members’ and officers’ understanding of the code of
conduct. It focuses upon the positive promotion of ethical standards and
helps those in authority to explore the cultural norms and standards of
behaviour that may place the organization at risk.
The implementation of the toolkit is at an early stage. As it is used more
widely by local authorities, the Commission will build up a national picture
of ethical standards operating across local governments. An analysis of
ethical audit reviews carried out at 38 local authorities in 2004 highlighted
a range of common issues resulting from the implementation of the ethical
framework. These are listed in Table 8.2.
The Commission’s findings highlight considerable variability in the way
the ethical framework is being implemented across the authorities surveyed.
 Ethical governance in local government in England 131

Table 8.2 Analysis of 38 governance local authority reviews – common

findings

Failure to monitor registers of gifts and hospitality

Members unclear whether or not they have signed a code of conduct
Unclear as to whether their authorities had a whistleblowing policy
No corporate drive to establish a set of positive values and behaviours across an
authority
Lack of pro-activeness of standards committees to address ethical issues
Little engagement with partners
Variability in views regarding whether or not ethical standards were making a
difference
Lack of resources to support ethical framework at a local level for the monitoring
officer and standards committee
Lack of integration of codes of conduct into other policies
Lack of further awareness raising about the negative impact of inappropriate
behaviour
Lack of communication regarding the code of conduct to external stakeholders

Source: Audit Commission ethical governance reviews (2004).

In part this has resulted from both a lack of resources and pro-active guid-
ance for authorities in areas such as how to develop an effective standards
committee and engage more effectively with partners. The Commission is
working with the Standards Board for England and the Improvement and
Development Agency to bridge this gap.
It is not certain whether or not the problems identified by these audits
will lead to service failure or poor quality services. The Commission’s 2003
report on corporate governance in the public sector (Audit Commission,
2003b) stated that

no one participating in this study suggested high service quality could be

achieved and maintained without a strong governance foundation in areas like
risk management, financial control and codes of behaviour. Nonetheless, not all
believe that these or others are necessarily the determinant of quality and some
felt that they might not even be the major factor in driving up service quality, or
failing to protect the organization from failure.

WHAT’S DIFFERENT ABOUT REGULATING FOR

ETHICAL GOVERNANCE?

The traditional skills for auditing governance and financial management

require auditors to have a good understanding of professional codes and
132 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

technical rules. These skills are usually acquired through professional train-
ing routes in the accountancy or other specialist professions. Although the
skills provide a good basis for auditors to assess compliance with regula-
tions and financial instruments, they do not necessarily equip them with the
ability to reach sound judgements about organizational culture and ethical
behaviour.
The complexities of auditing for ethical governance have led the
Commission to recruit people who are skilled in this area and to invest in
training to deliver ethical audits effectively. As well as specific knowledge
about regulatory provisions such as Codes of Conduct, auditors involved
in ethical audits need to have and apply some skills more frequently than
those required for traditional audits. Good communication skills are a
necessary attribute for all audit work, but ethical audits involve a greater
emphasis on personal contact and the ability to discuss potentially difficult
organizational and personal issues with care and rigour. The different
emphases in ethical audits compared with traditional audits are summar-
ized in Table 8.3.
The Commission has also had to refine its approach to reporting as
experience has shown that local authorities are not always receptive to
reports on these topics. For example, it can be particularly difficult to
engender understanding in local authorities as to why changes might need
to be made in the ‘softer’ aspects of organizational culture, and to explain

Table 8.3 Comparison of traditional audit skills against those skills

required to carry out an ethical audit

The skills emphasized in traditional audits The skills emphasized in ethical audits
Co-ordination skills Local knowledge of an authority’s
issues and organizational culture
Technical skills in accountancy and Ability to work at a corporate
corporate governance level with chief executives, senior
management and members
Planning and supervision of work Strong interpersonal and facilitation
skills
Building effective relationships at Record of maintaining credibility in
operational and senior a politically sensitive environment
management levels
Quality assurance skills Project management skills

Source: Audit Commission Ethical Audit Guide and Competency framework for auditors
(2005).
 Ethical governance in local government in England 133

that these can be important contributory factors to organizational success.

These ‘softer’ factors include the appropriate leadership style for the organ-
ization’s current and likely future performance; a degree of openness and
honesty in acknowledging poor performance or standards of behaviour; a
willingness to learn from mistakes; and being willing to accept external
challenge.
As well as providing a traditional audit report which is time-bound and
focuses on ‘hard’ issues, the Commission has found that long-term
improvement can follow a more facilitative approach to working with chief
executives and elected leaders. The Commission must be careful to ensure
that its independence and objectivity are not jeopardized through this
activity. But such an approach can lead to organizational change: in one
‘Fair’ council, for example, the audit involved working alongside the chief
executive, the chair of the standards committee and the monitoring officer
to improve their understanding of how standards of conduct affected
public confidence. As a result, the council adopted a new priority of pro-
moting public confidence through better and more professional conduct of
the chief executive, leader and standards committee, and by managing
elected members’ behaviour.

THE IMPACT OF ETHICAL CHANGE

Despite the clear focus on ethical standards in recent years, it remains

unclear what effect this has had on the overall quality of standards of
conduct in local government. There is no evidence that public interest
reports are either more or less likely to be issued than hitherto. There is no
indication yet that corporate assessments in CPA are finding evidence of
changes in this area and while overall performance is increasing, as meas-
ured through CPA, there is no evidence that this is primarily or in part
driven by higher standards of conduct.
Higher performance in service and managerial terms has, however, to be
set in the context of declining public satisfaction with councils as a whole
(as measured by the Best Value Performance Indicator 3).4 Whether this is
a function of ethical standards per se is not clear; there are many possible
variables affecting public satisfaction as the ODPM is currently investigat-
ing. It suggests, however, that at least any improvement in ethical standards,
if it exists, is not translating into higher public esteem.
There is some evidence from the results of the self-assessments under-
taken as part of the Changing Organizational Cultures toolkit. By March
2005, 1726 middle and senior managers from 38 local authorities had com-
pleted the COC exercise. These results show that, within this sample, local
134 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

government managers are generally positive about their councils’ commit-

ment to combating fraud and corruption (Figure 8.1).
Of those who are positive about their council’s commitment, the vast
majority believe this commitment is translated into positive outcomes
(Figure 8.2).
These data are not drawn from a representative sample of English local
authorities, however, so caution is needed; the Commission does not draw

My organization has made clear its commitment to fight

fraud and corruption
60

40
%

20

0
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
strongly slightly slightly strongly

Note: Base
1726 managers in local government in England – March 2005.

Source: The Audit Commission.

Figure 8.1 Officers’ perceptions of organizational commitment to fighting

fraud and corruption

This is making a positive difference

60

40
%

20

0
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
strongly slightly slightly strongly

Note: Base
1356 managers in local government in England who agree that their organiza-
tion has made clear its commitment to fight fraud and corruption – March 2005.

Source: The Audit Commission.

Figure 8.2: Officers’ perceptions of the impact this commitment is having

on reducing fraud and corruption
 Ethical governance in local government in England 135

wider conclusions at this stage. A number of smaller, local workshops have

sometimes produced more negative findings. There is still some way to go
to assess with accuracy whether the introduction of a number of codes of
practice and anti-fraud and corruption initiatives in the last ten years has
manifested itself in an ethical culture. Further research is required to
measure the extent to which local government in England is close to
fulfilling the requirement of the tenth report by the Committee on
Standards in Public Life that ‘embedding the right culture as well as the
right processes is key to achieving long-lasting improvements in the gover-
nance of public services’ (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2005).
Further evidence on ethics, and in particular on the impact of the New
Council Constitutions introduced in the 2000 Local Government Act, will
be available from research sponsored by the Department of Communities
and Local Government (CLG), previously the Office of the Deputy
Prime Minister (ODPM). The CLG has sponsored a major research pro-
gramme evaluating the different initiatives within the Local Government
Modernisation Agenda (LGMA), brought in by the 2000 Act, of which
New Council Constitutions and the Ethical Framework is one.5 Progress
reports from the long-term evaluation of the LGMA initiatives show that
it is too early to say what affect this and other measures have had on ethical
conduct in local government, or on public trust and confidence.6
Indications from CPA judgements for District Councils are that corpo-
rate assessment teams are recording more strengths than weaknesses in the
areas of leadership and standards of behaviour. This could itself be a func-
tion of the fact that the assessment framework addresses standards of
behaviour, on the basis that ‘what gets measured gets done’. Alternatively,
it could reflect the impact of other initiatives in this area. Councils that
score well in corporate assessment reports in this area demonstrate the pro-
fessional and sometimes non-partisan conduct of standards committee and
other meetings. They also indicate the perhaps indirect ways in which
effective ethical governance can affect service quality, as this extract from a
corporate assessment for an ‘Excellent’ council shows:

Decisions, challenge and robust debate are conducted in a non-political atmos-

phere of trust and respect. For example, the leadership team challenged the
current customer service performance in August 2003. As a result, there is now
council-wide customer care training, a corporate complaint monitoring system,
a £40 000 new budget to fund future customer services, and an overall improved
quality of service (Colchester Borough Council, 2004).

There will always be problems in ascribing cause and effect to specific in-
itiatives, particularly when the final outcome is itself notoriously difficult to
quantify. Corporate assessment judgements show that some councils score
136 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

well on monitoring elected members’ compliance with ethical codes, but

nonetheless do not achieve the highest performance ratings under CPA.
Nor is there yet any evidence that the ethical framework has had any effect
on improving public trust in local government, one of its key aims (House
of Commons ODPM, 2005).

CONCLUSIONS

It is encouraging that the overall incidence of major fraud and corruption

in English local government remains low. It is true that there are relatively
frequent instances of poor or inappropriate conduct that are dealt with by
local authority standards committees, and reported on occasion to the
Standards Board for England, but few such referrals result in serious con-
sequences. The Commission’s early evidence that local government officers
believe their councils are committed to preventing fraud and corruption,
and that such action is having a beneficial effect, is also encouraging.
But the issues of public trust and accountability show no signs of dimin-
ishing in importance in debates about public services. There is evidence to
suggest that inappropriate behaviour can damage public confidence. It is
less clear precisely what the relationship is between ethical standards and
service quality. High performing councils – as measured through CPA – can
display poor ethical standards, and some poorly performing councils have
high ethical standards. A revised approach to CPA 2005 that addresses
ethical governance in more detail may shed more light on this relationship.
As things stand, the Commission has a growing body of evidence that
shows that poor behaviour and relationships between officers and elected
members are often a component of poor organizational and service per-
formance. Whether they are a result or a cause is not always clear: that they
have to improve for the organization to recover is usually not in doubt.
Accordingly, the Commission’s revised approach to audit and inspection
focuses more clearly on standards of behaviour. For auditors in particular,
this requires a different emphasis from traditional audit. They need to
assess the risks involved in culture and individual behaviour, as well as
those more traditionally associated with structures, systems and processes.
Part of the problem in investigating this topic is the personal and subjec-
tive nature of what constitutes good or poor ethical standards. Fraud and
malpractice are clear wrongdoing, but ‘strong’ management and/or leader-
ship might be seen as bullying or harassment by some. The Commission
will support further research into this important topic.
It will also play its own part in influencing a changing ethical agenda. The
increased use of contracting and attention to meeting targets may mean
 Ethical governance in local government in England 137

that local public bodies will be distracted from proper controls and
processes, leading to greater opportunities for fraud and mismanagement.
At the same time, regulators like the Commission will have to adapt their
approaches to audit and inspection to take account of ‘cultural’ character-
istics such as leadership as well as systems and controls, and the ways in
which these affect service and other outcomes for the public.

NOTES
1. Section 8 of the Audit Commission Act 1998 requires auditors to consider:
(a) whether, in the public interest, he should make a report on any matter coming to his notice
in the course of the audit, in order for it to be considered by the body concerned or brought
to the attention of the public, and
(b) whether the public interest requires any such matter to be made the subject of an
immediate report rather than of a report to be made at the conclusion of the audit.
2. In 1994, Hansard (the Official Report of the proceedings in both Houses of Parliament)
included this statement: ‘Ethical governance is concerned about the standards of conduct
of all holders of public office, including arrangements in relation to financial and com-
mercial activities.’
3. In 2005, Election Commissioner Richard Mawrey QC upheld allegations of postal fraud
relating to six seats won by Labour in Birmingham in the local elections held in June 2004.
Six Labour councillors were convicted of postal votes fraud and the polls in two wards
were required to be rerun.
4. Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs) are measures of performance set by depart-
ments in central government. A ‘Best Value’ authority as defined in the Local
Government Act 1999 is one that must: ‘make arrangements to secure continuous
improvement in the way in which its functions are exercised, having regard to a combi-
nation of economy, efficiency and effectiveness’ (Section 3). Prior to best value, the Audit
Commission set similar measures of performance. BVPI 3 measures the percentage of
citizens satisfied with the overall service provided by their authority, based on a sample
survey of residents.
5. The published reports from this strand of the LGMA evaluation are available at the
website of the CLG: http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1137115.
6. At the time of writing, the CLG was in the process of publishing five progress reports from
the long-term evaluation of the Local Government Modernisation Agenda, on: Service
Improvement; Accountability; Community Leadership; Stakeholder Engagement; and
Public Confidence. For further details on the LGMA evaluations, see the CLG website at
http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1137781.

REFERENCES

Audit Commission (2003a), Corporate Governance: Improvement and Trust in Public

Services, London: Audit Commission.
Audit Commission (2003b), Trust in Public Services, London: Audit Commission.
Audit Commission (2004), Code of Audit Practice 2004, London: Audit Commission.
Audit Commission (2005a), Codes of Audit Practice, London: Audit Commission.
Audit Commission (2005b), CPA – the Harder Test, London, Audit Commission.
138 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry (2001), Learning from Bristol: The Report of the
Public Inquiry into Children’s Heart Surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary
1984–95, London: HMSO.
Cadbury Committee (1992), Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance, London: Gee Publishing.
Colchester Borough Council (2004), Corporate Assessment Report,
Committee on Standards in Public Life (2005), Tenth Report: Getting the Balance
Right – Implementing Standards of Conduct in Public Life, London: HMSO.
Duffy, Bobby, Philip Browning and Gidean Skinner (2003), Trust in public institu-
tions, London: MORI.
House of Commons Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Housing, Planning,
Local Government and the Regions Committee (2005), The Role and
Effectiveness of the Standards Board for England, London: HMSO.
Independent Commission on Good Governance for Public Services (2004), Good
Governance Standard for Public Service, OPM and CIPFA, London: CIPFA.
Kelly, Gavin and Stephen Muesrs (2002), Creating Public Value: An Analytical
Framework for Public Service Reform, Londen: Cabinet Office.
Laming, Lord (2003), The Victoria Climbie Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Lord
Laming, London: HMSO.
Nolan Committee (1995), First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life,
London: HMSO.
Redfern, Michael (2000), The Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry, London: HMSO.
Wheatley, Margaret (2001), Leadership and the New Science: Discovering a New
Order in a Chaotic World, 2nd edn, San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.
Whitehead, Alan (2002), Room at the Top?, Bristol: University of West England.
 Ethical governance in local government in England 139

APPENDIX 8.1 APPROACHES TO ASSESSING AND

INSPECTING ETHICAL
STANDARDS

Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA)

The CPA framework for local government in England was created in 2002.
It originally comprised a complex mix of service and corporate performance
information, brought together to reach a single assessment of overall
council performance: Excellent, Good, Fair, Weak or Poor. The information
was drawn from a corporate assessment, performance indicators, auditor
judgements on financial management, performance management and the
financial aspects of corporate governance, and service inspection judge-
ments, including judgements from the Audit Commission, Ofsted (the
schools and local education authority inspectorate), the Commission for
Social Care Inspection and the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate. The final assess-
ment category was reached using a combination of points and rules.
CPA was revised in 2005 (CPA – the harder test, Audit Commission,
2005b) and further revised in 2006 to reflect important changes in local gov-
ernment (including, for example, the shared priority objectives between
local and central government in the corporate assessment inspection frame-
work). The Commission also strengthened its approach to assessing a
council’s ‘Use of Resources’, to reflect a new focus on value for money in
public services and a stronger assessment of probity and stewardship of
public funds. The previous performance categories have now been replaced
with a ‘star’ rating, where four stars indicates the highest performance pos-
sible and no stars indicates a poorly performing council. The revised frame-
work is shown in Figure 8.4.
For more information about CPA, and the Commission’s proposed
new Comprehensive Area Assessment from 2008, please visit the Audit
Commission’s website at: http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/cpa/index.
asp?page=index.asp&area=hpcpa.
For ethical governance, the revised CPA framework focuses on the appli-
cation and achievement of ethical governance standards, rather than simply
the existence of structures and processes to promote them. In the corporate
assessment key line of enquiry 3.1 – Is there clear accountability and decis-
ion making to support service delivery and improvement? – in particular,
assessment teams address relationships between elected members and offi-
cers. This key question, among other things, requires assessment teams to
address how well councillors and officers work within the ethical framework.
A council that is performing well will meet the following standard on
the ethical framework: The standards committee and monitoring officer
140 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

Direction of travel
Improving strongly
Improving well
Improving adequately
Not improving adequately/
Not improving

Corporate assessment
Use of resources
CPA category Ambition
Financial reporting 4 stars
Prioritization
Financial management 3 stars
2 stars Capacity
Financial standing
1 star Performance
Internal control management
0 stars
Value for money Achievement

Children Social
and young care Housing Environment Culture Benefits Fire*
people (adults)
Service assessments
Level 1 services Level 2 services

Note: *Fire and Rescue Service assessment – applicable to those 16 councils with respon-
sibility for fire and rescue.

Source: The Audit Commission.

Figure 8.A1 The comprehensive performance assessment framework from

2006

promote and maintain high ethical standards, and have a high profile within
the council. An independent member chairs the committee. The council is
seen as upholding high standards of ethics and probity, efficiency and
integrity. Documents relating to standards and conduct are easily accessible
to members of the public and other stakeholders. The council has integrated
the code of conduct into its diversity policies and its duties under the
Disability Discrimination and Race Relations Acts. Linkages have been
made between the Human Rights Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the
Sex Discrimination Act and the code of conduct. The leader, chief execu-
tive, standards committee and monitoring officer actively promote the
importance of the ethical agenda.

Corporate Governance Inspections

A corporate governance inspection (CGI) is different from a corporate

assessment in both objectives and process. Whereas corporate assessment
 Ethical governance in local government in England 141

seeks to assess performance and identify improvement and good practice,

CGI takes as its premise that serious problem areas are likely to exist. The
objective of CGI is not to assess a council’s performance relative to its
peers, but to provide an opportunity, through recommendations, for the
council to address and rectify the identified problems. In the more serious
cases, a CGI can be used to obtain up-to-date evidence in order to estab-
lish whether there are grounds for referral to the Secretary of State (SoS)
under section 13 of the Local Government Act 1999. A referral is a rec-
ommendation by the Commission that the SoS gives a direction under
section 15 of the Local Government Act, which may include, for example,
a direction that the authority takes any action considered necessary, or that
a function of the authority be taken over by another body.
The CGI methodology has also recently been revised. From 2006 the
inspection framework comprises four modular themes:

● community focus – addressing access, communications and partner-

ships;
● structures and processes – addressing democratic accountability,
decision-making and planning;
● risk management and internal control – addressing financial, perform-
ance and risk management; and
● leadership, culture and standards of conduct – addressing commu-
nity, political and managerial leadership, member-officer relation-
ships, ethical standards and behaviour.

Using this modular assessment framework, inspection teams reach

judgement on two key questions:

1. How good are the council’s corporate governance arrangements?

2. What are the prospects for improvement in the council’s corporate gov-
ernance arrangements?

Further information about the methodology can be found on the

Commission’s website.
142 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

APPENDIX 8.2 EXTRACT FROM THE AUDIT

COMMISSION CODE OF AUDIT
PRACTICE (2005)

It is the responsibility of the audited body to put in place proper arrange-

ments to secure economy, efficiency and effectiveness in its use of resources
and to ensure proper stewardship and governance, and regularly to review
the adequacy and effectiveness of them. Such corporate performance man-
agement and financial management arrangements form a key part of the
system of internal control and comprise the arrangements for:

● establishing strategic and operational objectives;

● determining policy and making decisions;
● ensuring that services meet the needs of users and taxpayers and for
engaging with the wider community;
● ensuring compliance with established policies, procedures, laws and
regulations;
● identifying, evaluating and managing operational and financial risks
and opportunities, including those arising from involvement in part-
nerships and joint working;
● ensuring compliance with the general duty of best value, where
applicable;
● Code of Audit Practice 2005 | For local government bodies 13
● managing its financial and other resources, including arrangements
to safeguard the financial standing of the audited body;
● monitoring and reviewing performance, including arrangements to
ensure data quality; and
● ensuring that the audited body’s affairs are managed in accordance
with proper
● standards of conduct, and to prevent and detect fraud and corruption.

(Paragraph 19)
9. A paradigmatic shift in ethics and
integrity management within the
Dutch public sector? Beyond
compliance – a practitioners’ view
Alain Hoekstra, Alex Belling and Eli van der
Heide

INTRODUCTION

The chapter focuses on the development of ethics and integrity management

within the Dutch public sector. In the next section we describe, from a prac-
titioners’ point of view, how integrity became an important issue in the
Netherlands in the early 1990s and its subsequent development. The follow-
ing section presents a policy analysis and a theoretical framework, which
brings us to the conclusion that Dutch integrity policy has mainly been domi-
nated by what is known as the compliance-based approach. This approach is
based on the prevention of fraud and corruption by formulating rules and
regulations, whereby monitoring and punishing wrongdoers encourages
compliance with standards. Possible factors that contribute to the predomi-
nance of that specific approach are identified. The next section describes
which developments and trends emphasize the necessity to move beyond
compliance towards a more values-based approach, focused on stimulating
civil servants to act according to collectively defined organizational core
values, strengthening (moral) competence, and creating a culture of shared
responsibilities. The following section describes the first steps that have been
taken regarding this challenging task in the Netherlands. The last section
addresses the relationship between integrity and Human Resource
Management via the concepts of good employeeship and good employer-
ship. The chapter does not pretend to provide clear-cut answers as to how
organizations can arrive at a viable (more) values-based ethics program.
Rather, it illustrates the need for change and the complexities involved in
implementing such changes.

143
144 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

DEVELOPMENTS IN ETHICS AND

INTEGRITY POLICY WITHIN THE DUTCH
PUBLIC SECTOR

Before delving into developments that have occurred within the integrity
policy, a brief outline of the institutional setting and the specific role the
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations plays regarding integrity
policy is presented.
The Netherlands is a decentralized unitary state. As such, governmental
bodies – within the context of formal legislation as well as integrity policy –
possess a large degree of autonomy. This means that individual governing
bodies are themselves primarily responsible for formulating, implementing
and enforcing integrity policy within their organizations. The Minister of
the Interior and Kingdom Relations, however, retains a coordinating
responsibility for the overall public sector integrity policy, encompassing
both a steering and a stimulating role. By including specific provisions in
the Civil Servants Act, integrity-related aspects are made mandatory for all
public servants (steering). At the same time the minister fulfills a stimulat-
ing role by developing and providing practical and ready-to-use instru-
ments that are directive but not binding and allow for individual
applications of such models, tools and guidelines that assist government or-
ganizations in formulating their policies.

Developments in Dutch Integrity Policy: A Bird’s Eye Perspective

Before the 1990s, Dutch public administration can mainly be character-

ized by a technical orientation. The main questions were framed in terms
of the aims, means, instruments, planning and effects of governance.
There was far more attention paid to the techniques than toward the
ethics of governance (Huberts, 2005). This is not a situation unique to the
Dutch, as Adams and Balfour have described the same scientific and tech-
nical mind-set in public administration that drives out ethical considera-
tions in the USA (Adams and Balfour, 1998). Although integrity was not
a completely unknown concept in the Dutch public sector before the
1990s, it was by no means a hot topic placed high on the political and
administrative agendas. Certain events, however, increased the import-
ance attached to integrity in the early 1990s and it has remained an agenda
item ever since. This is evident given the growing number of questions
raised in the Dutch parliament in relation to the topic. An historic dis-
tinction can be made between roughly three periods in the development
of integrity policy.
 A paradigmatic shift in ethics 145

Awareness and agenda setting (1990–1995)

Concerns regarding integrity emerged in the early 1990s with the growth
of organized crime and its potential linkages with government. There were
also signals that criminal organizations tried to bribe civil servants and
attempted to infiltrate in key governmental positions, in order to corrupt
vital parts of the machinery of government from within. At the same time
a raft of larger integrity breaches occurred within several southern munici-
palities. As a result, the then Minister of the Interior, Mrs Dales, made the
theme of public sector integrity an explicit part of the political and admin-
istrative agenda at the end of 1992. Mrs Dales stressed that a government
of high integrity is an absolute prerequisite for the existence of democracy.
If the state or government is corrupt or acts immorally, this will negatively
affect the trust, support and the cooperation of citizens. This could lead,
as Thoreau pointed out, to civil disobedience and in the end possibly even
to the collapse of the democratic state (Thoreau, 1849). Shortly thereafter,
the Ministry of the Interior published its first policy document on
integrity.
Despite all this, one cannot speak of a substantial improvement of
integrity awareness and policy implementation within the Dutch govern-
ment. It is difficult to explain why nothing much changed during this
period, despite Mrs Dales’ cri de coeur. A possible explanation, though,
may be found at the end of her own argument in which she stated that
politicians and administrators are inclined to try to reduce integrity
breaches to incidents, and that people may simply look the other way in
embarrassment. After all, acknowledging that government integrity may
be subjected to structural damage does not correspond to the image of
the government as a bearer of the democratic constitutional state (Dales,
1992). Scholars in the field of public sector ethics and integrity, too,
observed that Dutch politicians and administrators tended to downplay
the seriousness of the problem (Van Hulten, 2002; De Haan and Van den
Heuvel, 2003).

Legislation and instruments (1995–2003)

The period from 1995 to 2003 was characterized by the development of
rules and instruments, and several provisions aimed at promoting integrity
were formally legislated. The Civil Servants Act (1997) included an obliga-
tion to declare outside activities that relate to the function of the official
concerned; the registration of activities that are permitted; and the prohib-
ition of certain activities that could pose a risk to the proper functioning of
the public service. Other provisions were added later (2003), such as the dis-
closure of registered outside activities; an obligation to declare financial
interests and stock exchange transactions; an obligation for government
146 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

bodies to draw up reporting procedures for suspected integrity breaches;

and a provision for protecting those who have reported any wrongdoing in
accordance with the procedure and in good faith.
In addition to an integrity hotline (General Intelligence and Security
Service), a number of instruments and guidelines were developed for
assessing integrity risks and guidelines for carrying out integrity audits.
Although the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom and Relations fre-
quently referred to the importance of enhancing awareness amongst staff
and the role of organizational culture, it was still unclear how to provide
clear structure and substance to this initiative. Specific instruments and
support were not yet available in this area. Nevertheless, first steps were
taken at a local level (see p. 153).

Increased attention and beyond compliance (2003 to date)

In 2003 the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee for the Building Industry
published its findings on large-scale fraud within the building industry,
that subsequently had an intensifying effect on the importance of pub-
lic sector integrity. It also fuelled new policy intentions and most re-
cently it led to an amendment of the Civil Servants Act (2006). This act
obliges government bodies to pursue integrity policy that must become a
permanent component of personnel policy. Moreover, all governmental
bodies are required to draw up a code of conduct for civil servants. Once
a year, these aspects are to be accounted for at the relevant democratically
representative body. All new civil servants will also have to take the oath
of office. And last but not least, the competent government body and the
civil servant will be obliged to act as a good employer and a good civil
servant.
But the most important contribution of the findings of the Par-
liamentary Inquiry Committee for the Building Industry was that it made
painfully clear that the main problem is the way staff perceives, under-
stands, and acts according to integrity policy. This led to the conclusion
that more effort should be put into improving integrity awareness and inter-
nalization of the values. Yet prior to 2003 there was hardly any experience
with such a cultural and values-oriented integrity approach. Specific
support in this particular area was simply not available. This led to a change
beginning in 2004 that in the view of the coordinating Minister for
Integrity, policy should no longer focus solely on rules and control-oriented
instruments. Although these are crucial instruments that can be used as a
basis for integrity policy, it became apparent that more attention should be
paid to support policy that goes beyond compliance alone. The establish-
ment of the National Office for Promoting Ethics and Integrity in the
Public Sector was viewed as an important step toward achieving this
 A paradigmatic shift in ethics 147

challenging task and encompasses an expansion from a basically legal and

structural approach to a more pedagogic, integrity-based approach (see
p. 153).

International Perspective and Domestic Research and Debate

In 2005 an international comparative study conducted by Transparency

International pointed out that the Netherlands dropped three places on the
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2005).
Although this indicates that the Netherlands is still perceived as relatively
incorrupt, it marked a substantial deterioration.
Recently GRECO, the Group of States against corruption, a working
party of the Council of Europe, adopted an Evaluation Report on
the Netherlands in its 25th plenary meeting. The report mentioned that
both Dutch public authorities and civil society believe that corruption is
not a major problem. This fairly positive self-image reflects with what
we stated on p. 145. The report also states that the image of the Dutch
public administration has deteriorated because of some past cases of
illegal and dishonest activities within the public administration and that
the authorities of the Netherlands remain, despite the traditionally low
corruption rates, aware of the potential dangers of corruption (GRECO,
2005).
In addition to the impact of the building fraud and additional legislation
which increased the attention paid to integrity, furtherance of the issue is
understandable in light of the rather disappointing outcomes of national
research on public sector integrity policy. Two governmental inventories,
along with research from Huberts and Nelen, illustrate that integrity policy
within the Dutch government still needs to be improved. The lower tiers
of government in particular lack the capacity and specific knowledge for
formulating effective integrity policy. There is considerable room for
improvement at the central level, too, as revealed by Huberts and Nelen in
their seminal research in the field of corruption and integrity within the
Netherlands. They conclude that most government organizations in the
Netherlands are rather naïve and put insufficient effort in trying to detect
corruption and other integrity breaches (Huberts, 2004; Huberts and
Nelen, 2005). They demonstrated that the problem is bigger than we wish
to think. Other scholars seem to disagree with this and argue that problems
with corruption and integrity are negligible and that we already pay too
much attention to it, which is costly, unnecessary, and provokes a negative
and distrustful image of the public sector. The debate is ongoing, but for
now Huberts cum suis seem to possess the stronger empirical evidence and
arguments.
148 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS AND

INTEGRITY POLICY

The preceding section outlined the development of Dutch integrity policy

over the past 15 years. From the outset it was clear that an effective
integrity policy ought to be a combination of a structure and rules orien-
tation on the one hand, and a cultural and awareness orientation on the
other. It was also observed that the first period was mainly characterized
by placing integrity on the political and administrative agenda. Most of
the efforts during the second period centered on formulating rules and
improving the organizational structure against violations of integrity.
The phase in which Dutch integrity policy currently finds itself can be
characterized as the search for a more balanced ethics program, which
implies more attention for the values approach in addition to compliance
approach.
This section will analyse the aforementioned development in greater
detail. The next subsection presents a theoretical framework that clarifies
the distinction between a compliance-based and a values-based approach.
The following subsection offers a number of possible explanations for the
predominance of the compliance-based approach, which has characterized
the second period.

Theoretical Framework: Compliance-based Versus Values-based

Approach

Paine introduced a theoretical framework that is based on the compliance-

integrity continuum (Paine, 1994). The compliance-based approach is
based on a narrow definition of integrity and focuses on the prevention of
fraud and corruption. The focus lies on the formulation of rules, guide-
lines and procedures, whereby punishing wrongdoers encourages compli-
ance with standards. The emphasis is placed on external controls on the
behavior of civil servants, and expanding checks and monitoring. Paine
called the other part of the continuum the integrity-based approach, also
known as the values-based approach, which we prefer to use. This second
approach is based on a broader definition of integrity and focuses on pro-
moting the principle of acting as a good employer and civil servant. The
related measures are characterized by reinforcing (moral) competence and
stimulating a culture of responsibility. The emphasis is placed on internal
self-control of individual civil servants, and encouraging them to take the
responsibilities associated with their position seriously and with care.
Table 9.1 provides a brief description of the governing principles of both
approaches.
 A paradigmatic shift in ethics 149

Table 9.1 Compliance-based versus values-based approach

Compliance-based Values-based
Rules and procedures Values and aspirations
Emphasis on rules, procedures, Emphasis on the creation of guiding
provisions, commands and values and aspirations and an
prohibitions environment that stimulates ethical
behavior
Unilateral imposition Multilateral formulation
The unilateral imposition of rules and The joint formulation and
guidelines by government bodies internalization of values. Joint
responsibility for honest behavior with
management playing the role of an
initiator
Prevent wrongdoing Promoting good conduct
The threat associated with checks, Trust of staff promotes moral and
monitoring and punishment must responsible behavior
dissuade staff from acting in a
dishonest manner
Negative perception of people’s Positive perception of people’s
motivations motivations
The assumption is that people are lazy The assumption is that people are in
and cannot be trusted. They must be search of job satisfaction and wish to
guided by rewarding good conduct and be responsible. Responds to human
punishing undesirable conduct. The impulses to act in a morally correct
disadvantage is that staff start manner and invites staff to strive
behaving according to the assumption towards good conduct
Narrow Broad
Formalistic and minimal moral-based Compliance with rules is no guarantee
on the ‘if it’s legal it’s ethical’ for ethical conduct. People must also be
principle able to handle situations that are not
(yet) governed by rules
Rigid Flexible
Laws and regulations are rigid and Values and aspirations are broader and
inflexible. Circumstances are usually provide a more robust system that is
too complex and variable to be laid better geared to changes
down in laws and regulations
Traditional Modern
Based on the traditional form of Dovetails with new developments in
government management: hierarchical, government management such as
directive, focused on rules and decentralization, privatization and
procedures increased complexity and policy
discretion
150 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

Explanations for the Predominance of the Compliance-based Approach

As mentioned before the focus during the second period was centered on
the formulation of rules, guidelines and procedures as well as strengthen-
ing the organizational structure’s defenses against violations of integrity.
The line of approach during this period therefore primarily featured a legal
and structural nature. Legal as well as structural integrity instruments are
necessary elements of an integrity policy and can be seen as exponents of
the compliance-based approach. The appeal of this approach lies in the fact
that through the unilateral and directive imposition of rules, and through
the focus on procedures and provisions relatively quick integrity wins can
be achieved. The process of jointly identifying values, creating a culture of
shared responsibilities and stimulating staff to act (morally) properly is a
more time consuming process and is perceived as ‘fuzzy’ and unmanageable
by some public managers.
There are several other explanations for the relative predominance of the
compliance-based approach. We assume that historical, managerial, polit-
ical and practical arguments and the occupational background of staff play
a role in this as well. Table 9.2 provides an overview of factors that influence
the compliance-based character of Dutch integrity policy (Karssing and
Hoekstra, 2004).
First of all, bureaucracy is strongly rooted in rules, checks, compliance
and the limitation of policy discretion for civil servants. Second, policy-
making officials in the Netherlands who are responsible for shaping
integrity policy often have a legal background that contributes to the pre-
dominance of the compliance-based approach. Occupational groups with
a different mindset such as psychologists, educators and philosophers are
under-represented in this field. Third, the government traditionally has
considerable experience with legislative and regulative instruments. We live
in a society where tremendous value is attached to rules as a steering mech-
anism. This leads to the almost natural reflex that integrity breaches mostly
lead to more of the same tried and trusted legal instruments. Fourth, the
New Public Management (NPM) philosophy is basically focused on
making policy measurable by translating it into quantifiable objectives and
products and by monitoring results. Values-based initiatives are more
difficult to operationalize in these terms. They are culture-oriented and are
perceived as ‘intangible issues of culture, values, human relations – matters
that many managers regard as fuzzy and unmanageable’ (Rainey, 1991:
251). The issuance of rules, the establishment of procedures, the imposition
of sanctions and counting integrity violations appear to fit in this context.
Moreover we live in an era in which monitoring, control and repression
prevail.
 A paradigmatic shift in ethics 151

Table 9.2 Explanations for the predominance of the compliance-based

approach

Factors Features
Bureaucracy Hierarchical structure
Clear definition of tasks, powers and responsibilities
Subjected to rigid, uniform discipline and control
Obedience/subordination toward management of the
department
Classic political-civil servant relationships (decision-makers vs.
executors)
Occupational Strong legal-technical background of the civil servants
background Under-representation of occupational groups that focus on the
stimulation strategy
Practical Familiarity with the application of the legislative and regulative
experience instruments
Tendency to use tried and tested instruments
Social trust in regulations
Issuing rules is an easy political approach to a problem
NPM Focus on hard, clear and quantifiable output indicators
Averse to soft values that are difficult to measure
Rules, procedures, sanctions and numbers of reports of integrity
violations are more tangible than the stimulation strategy that
is perceived as ‘soft’ and vague
Control and New magic words: monitoring, checks and enforcement
enforcement Contemporary spirit of the age aimed at prohibition, control and
penalizing non-complying conduct
Politicians can score points as ‘hardliners’

DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS: THE NECESSITY

TO MOVE BEYOND COMPLIANCE

The predominance of the compliance-based approach in the Netherlands

doesn’t seem to be unique. An effective integrity policy, however, is charac-
terized by a balanced combination of instruments from both approaches.
In the Netherlands the tide seems to be turning and it seems that the
integrity policy is moving beyond compliance. A number of developments
contributed to the need for this broadening.
In the first place integrity violations still occur within the Dutch govern-
ment despite countless rules, procedures, more stringent monitoring and
increased attention to the theme of integrity. The greater the number of
152 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

rules that are introduced, the more apparent it becomes that this alone
cannot suffice. The findings of the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee for
the Building Industry make it clear that integrity policy must fully be
understood, applied and become ingrained in staff. What is required is the
internalization of the values and standards of being a good civil servant.
And this corresponds better to the values-based approach.
In the second place the need for a more balanced integrity policy is
fueled by the worldwide New Public Management (NPM) trend (Osborne
and Gaebler, 1993). That trend also took place in the Netherlands NPM.
One of the consequences is that policy discretion for civil servants has
increased. This implies that civil servants have to be trained to handle
such discretionary privilege in a responsible and professional manner,
especially in new and complex situations for which rules and regula-
tions simply do not exist. Managing integrity via a strong rule and
procedure-oriented system is insufficient in such situations. What it really
entails is that the civil servant is able to act independently according to
the spirit of the values and standards of government. In this context the
OECD states that: ‘a country’s ethics management regime should be con-
sistent with its approach to public management in general . . . it would be
inconsistent to marry a strict centralized compliance-based ethics infra-
structure with devolved results-based management systems’ (OECD,
1996: 7).
In the third place rules and regulations are not the calibrated instrument
for restoring integrity. There are drawbacks to overly relying on legislation
in an ethics infrastructure: ‘It tends to encourage minimum compliance.
The enforcement of sanctions, while necessary, is designed to discourage
undesirable behavior rather than promote desired behavior. Because of its
conceptual reliance on absolutes and objectivity, the law can be an
inflexible tool for the day-to-day management of workplace ethical prob-
lems’ (OECD, 1996: 31). Merely focusing on the development of stringent
guidelines and procedures can therefore be regarded as counterproductive.
All the more so since working with rules and checks provokes the impres-
sion of distrust: ‘Designing “institutions for knaves” risks making knaves
of potentially more honorable actors, whereas a more trusting model
embodying a more direct appeal to moral principles might actually do a
better job of evoking high minded motives for action and of supressing
low minded ones’ (Goodin, 1996). A study by Anechiarico and Jacobs criti-
cizes excessive reliance on the compliance approach as well. They point
out negative consequences such as delayed decision making, excessive cen-
tralization, poor morale, and defensive management (Anechiarico and
Jacobs, 1996).
 A paradigmatic shift in ethics 153

FIRST STEPS

Although there is no established protocol to transform the integrity system

from compliance to values in the Netherlands, it is widely acknowledged
that more attention needs to be given to the values-based approach. This is
underscored in several policy documents of the Ministry of the Interior.
The establishment of the National Office for Promoting Ethics and
Integrity in the Public Sector in 2006 will support this challenging task by
developing values-based integrity policy and instruments. The focus is on
themes including improving ethical leadership and moral judgment,
designing multimedia dilemma training instruments, organizing moral
consultation and training management to discuss ethics and integrity in a
positive way. The office also organizes integrity platforms where all types of
governmental organizations jointly search for new instruments and
exchange best practices in this field. From this point of view one could say
that a bottom up strategy is followed.
Another trend worth mentioning is the pursuit of more coherence in
integrity policy. Integrity policy within Dutch government organizations
often has a fragmented character. For the most part, a cohesive integrity
policy does not exist. This can be explained by the fact that integrity-related
measures and instruments are managed by various disciplines and depart-
ments within the organization. The focus nowadays is placed on improving
internal coordination between various actors involved with integrity policy.
Therefore, government administrators are advised to appoint an integrity
coordinator to handle the internal coordination between these different
actors. These coordinators will also have an overview of the integrity poli-
cies and instruments that provide them with an agenda for addressing the
imbalance often witnessed between the compliance- and the values-based
approach.
The paradigmatic policy shift is already evident in some Dutch govern-
ment agencies; the city of Amsterdam is probably the best example. The
Amsterdam Bureau of Integrity employs some 15 people who are respon-
sible for a wide range of integrity instruments and policies. In addition to
using traditional compliance-based instruments such as risk assessments,
investigations into reports of (possible) integrity violations and the regis-
tration of integrity breaches, the Amsterdam Bureau also places a strong
focus on improving the moral competence of the cities’ public officials. The
approach used in which officials are trained by philosophers to analyse and
judge complex ethical questions can be qualified as both a unique and
promising way to stimulate civil servants’ ethical behavior. In the
Netherlands the Amsterdam Bureau is a good example of giving substance
to the values-based approach.
154 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

INTEGRITY AND HUMAN RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT (HRM)

Integrity management and HRM are closely related. First, integrity instru-
ments can be incorporated into HRM, which enables the promotion of
good employeeship. Second, good working conditions, fair salaries, an
open and motivating working atmosphere, well functioning and active
communications at all levels, and model role playing by political and
administrative leaders (Bossaert and Demmke, 2005) are all HRM instru-
ments which should be used in a fair manner, both because it is the right
thing to do and because it reduces breaches of integrity by employees. We
will explain that this is all part of good employership (p. 155).

The Application of Specific Integrity Instruments Within the Context of

HRM to Stimulate Good Employeeship

By now the link between good employeeship and HRM has been well estab-
lished. In integrity literature the central issue is how the employee relates to
the organization, its resources, colleagues and citizens in a decent, respect-
ful and fair manner. Via the application of specific HR integrity instru-
ments, management can try to influence employee behavior. This involves
the use of specific HR instruments to place integrity under the constant
focus of staff and members of management and to promote ethical
conduct. This use of HRM is aimed primarily at protecting the organiz-
ation, but also at protecting civil servants from integrity risks and tempta-
tions. It should be clear that an employee should act in a fair manner in
addition to being efficient and effective. For this reason, the task of man-
agement is to adequately equip the employee to act in a fair way. From an
HRM point of view this can be done in several ways. HRM can ensure that
the employee relates to the organization, resources, colleagues and citizens
in a decent, respectful and fair manner. The compliance-based approach
involves applicable HR instruments that relate to the formulation of rules,
guidelines, and procedures. The values-based approach focuses on HR
instruments that stimulate civil servants to take the responsibilities associ-
ated with their position seriously. Three of these – each with a strong
values-based focus – are mentioned below.
First, the HR function can ensure that the integrity of applicants
becomes a major focal point during the recruitment and introduction pro-
cedure. In addition to aspects with a compliance-based nature such as pre-
employment screening, checking résumés, certificates and references and
confidentiality statements, this procedure should also comprise important
values-based aspects focused on raising awareness such as mentioning in
 A paradigmatic shift in ethics 155

the job advertisement that integrity is a job prerequisite, including integrity

in the competence profile, informing the applicant about integrity-related
aspects in the new job, allowing integrity-related issues to be a part of
assessment procedure, let civil servants take the oath of office, paying atten-
tion to integrity in the introduction training for new members and having
discussions about the code of conduct.
Second, the HR function can stimulate every management member
within the organization to discuss integrity during structural contact
moments between management and staff. This includes work meetings, job
appraisals and exit interviews. This is not always the case in practice, and if
it is, it is not always done effectively. The HR function has a role in high-
lighting this obligation and explaining how integrity should be discussed in
a positive way during these meetings between management and the
employee.
Third, the HR function can ensure that management as well as staff take
training courses. Dilemma training can be useful for staff as well as man-
agement (Karssing, 2000). During these training sessions civil servants
learn to analyse morally complex situations and to make sound ethical
decisions. Participants can also be informed and discuss the integrity policy
of the organization and the applicable frameworks, for example a code of
conduct.
HR literature containing chapters on the use of integrity instruments is
scarce. For the above mentioned integration of integrity instruments in
HRM, further HR research is needed to ascertain the extent to which
integrity instruments have a place within traditional HRM.

Fair HRM for Good Employership

In the Netherlands the perspective of good employership is less commonly

used in relation with integrity. The central question is how the organization,
or more specifically management, relates to the employee in a decent,
respectful and fair manner. This is not only necessary from a moral per-
spective in that it is good to pursue a fair HR policy, but also because this
strongly influences the employee’s ethical behavior. Research carried out by
Trevino and Weaver reveals that if staff perceive the organization as being
‘unjust’, attempts to discourage unethical behavior become less effective.
Furthermore, the willingness of staff to facilitate integrity policy, for
example by reporting violations, also appears to decrease. Trevino and
Weaver conclude that organizations that implement an integrity policy
must focus on the fairness in which staff is treated (Trevino and Weaver,
2001). This entails, among other things, that not only the use of general HR
instruments such as remuneration, recruitment and selection, appraisal,
156 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

Table 9.3 Moral reflection with regard to recruitment and selection

• The selection of new employees is made based on objective and functional

criteria without discrimination;
• The applicant is treated with respect;
• Recruitment and selection policy proceeds along professional lines;
• Interviewers/selectors are trained to conduct interviews. Often it is not the
process itself but the incompetence of the interviewer that is the cause of
criticism about the application process;
• Interviews are conducted as consistently as possible. This means that the same
interviewer must interview the candidates and the style of interviewing must be
as similar as possible. This also entails interviewers must be aware of the way in
which they act towards applicants

exit policy, but also reorganizations, mergers and cutback operations must
be applied in a fair manner. Within the context of HRM, the (moral) stan-
dards and values of society must serve as criteria during the formulation
and application of HR policy, and each HR instrument must be used in a
fair manner (Paauwe, 1994). This offers protection for the employee in par-
ticular as well as the organization, for the temptation to (re)act in a unfair
way appears to arise quicker if staff perceives unfair treatment is taking
place. Table 9.3 gives an idea of possible results based on moral reflection
with regard to recruitment and selection (Spence, 2000). Such exercises can
be carried out for all HR instruments and they contribute to the integra-
tion of standards and values within HR instruments (Wistanley and
Woodall, 2000).
Further moral reflection on HR theory and HR instruments is necessary
to flesh out the concept of good employership. But first of all, research
should focus on the question as to what extent a paradox might exist
between the focus of HRM on productivity, effectiveness and efficiency and
the fair use of HR instruments.

CONCLUSIONS

The chapter describes the development of ethics and integrity management

within the Dutch public sector during the last 15 years. Three subsequent
phases can be distinguished with regard to this development. After the
phase of agenda setting in the early 1990s, the basis of integrity policy was
designed from a compliance point of view from the mid-1990s, and seems
to move toward a more balanced integrity approach by searching for a
viable values orientation in the new millennium. Although it was clear from
 A paradigmatic shift in ethics 157

the beginning that value aspects such as integrity awareness and organiza-
tional culture were important, it was still unclear how to give substance to
this and consequently remain terra incognita for the most part. Factors that
contributed to the predominance of the compliance-based approach in the
Netherlands are identified. This approach is based on the prevention of
fraud and corruption by formulating rules and regulations, whereby moni-
toring and punishing wrongdoers encourage compliance with standards.
The results of the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee for the Building
Industry in 2003, however, led to important changes, and can be seen as an
impetus for a paradigmatic shift toward a more values-based approach.
This approach is based on stimulating civil servants to act according to
collectively defined organizational core values, strengthening (moral)
competence and creating a culture of shared responsibilities. Other con-
tributing factors to this change include ongoing integrity breaches, the
increasing policy discretion of civil servants, the inflexibility and the
counter productiveness of rules and regulations, as well as the growing
attention to the relation between integrity and HRM concepts of good
employeeship and good employership.

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10. How to encourage ethical behavior:
the impact of police leadership on
police officers taking gratuities
Terry Lamboo, Karin Lasthuizen and
Leo W.J.C. Huberts

INTRODUCTION

The police are responsible for upholding the law and as a result are held to
a high personal standard. Behavior that is condoned in citizens, business or
other public offices, can lead to scandal if committed by police officers
(Elliston, 1985; Presidents Commission, 1967), such as the public’s reaction
to police officers receiving and asking for gratuities. Gifts and discounts can
be questionable or can appear to be questionable because they might
influence the decisions of police officers. As a consequence, many police
organizations formulated policies on gratuities in order to protect the
integrity of police officers, their organization and their profession. The
International Association of Chiefs of Police (1995), for example, took a
zero tolerance stance towards gratuities. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of
Constabulary (HMIC, 1999), however, simply advised that police leader-
ship in the United Kingdom should make clear under which conditions
gifts or gratuities could be accepted. Little is yet known of the effectiveness
of efforts of police associations, police forces and police management to
influence the practice of taking gratuities.
Empirical research on the Dutch situation can shed some light on this
issue. Gratuities construed as examples of corruption are not unfamiliar
occurrences to the Dutch police and contributed to a major scandal involv-
ing the Amsterdam police in the late 1970s (Van Laere and Geerts, 1984;
Punch, 1985; Koring, 2000), leading eventually to reforms within the
Amsterdam police force (Zwart, 1999). After this scandal, Dutch police
officers nonetheless continued to view discounts and small perks as a cus-
tomary part of the job. This changed in the mid-1990s when integrity
became a more important topic in Dutch politics and policing. On a
number of integrity issues, the opinions as well as the behavior of police

159
160 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

officers changed (Naeyé et al., 2004), and acceptability of gratuities was

among those issues. Lamboo (2005) reported the results of an extensive
study regarding how the integrity policies of Dutch police forces developed,
and what the consequences were for the views and behavior of police
officers. Here, those results are framed within the literature on behavior of
management, identifying key variables influencing the ethics and integrity
of employees (Ciulla, 1998; Dickson et al., 2001; Fulmer, 2004; Lewis, 1991;
Trevino and Nelson, 1999; Trevino et al., 2000).

THEORY AND CONCEPTS

Gratuities

The concept of gratuities is rarely defined, with the exception of Cohen and
Feldberg: ‘any goods or services which are given to law enforcement officers
because they are law enforcement officers, which are not part of their
regular remuneration’ (cited in Feldberg, 1985: 267). More generally, gra-
tuities are described using terms such as discounts, presents, gifts, perks,
services, and with specific examples such as a free cup of coffee, discounted
meals, holiday gifts, discounted goods from stores and business, and pre-
sents from citizens.
Thus, gratuities can take a variety of forms as detailed by the well-known
Knapp Commission (1972) report on the New York Police Department or
by the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (1997).
It includes the occasional unasked-for gift from citizens, the regularly
received discounts from frequented businesses or the extortion of goods
and services from clubs and premises where police have to enforce vice,
gaming, licensing and drug laws.
Gratuities are a hotly debated issue within police ethics. Do gratuities
involve a violation of accepted norms and can they be seen as a form of
corruption (Feldberg, 1985; Cohen and Feldberg, 1991; Kania, 1995;
Prenzler and Mackay, 1995; Kleinig, 1996; Jones, 1999)? Corruption is
often defined as ‘behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public
role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique)
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain
types of private-regarding influence’ (Nye, 1967, p. 419; Caiden, 2001;
Gardiner, 2002). Taking gratuities can be seen as the use of police
authority for private benefit and can influence the performance of police
duties; either refraining from upholding the law or giving inequitable
police protection. On the other hand, small gratuities can also be seen as
the result of maintaining good community relations (Feldberg, 1985;
 How to encourage ethical behavior 161

Cohen and Feldberg, 1991; Kania, 1995; Prenzler and Mackay, 1995;
Kleinig, 1996; Jones, 1999).
The discussion about the relationship between gratuities (or gifts) and
corruption (or bribes) is an interesting one. It is a central aspect of the lit-
erature on the economics of corruption with a focus on the relationship
between giver and recipient, the strategic choices to either give or accept a
gift or bribe depending on the expected outcomes (benefits and costs)
(Klitgaard, 1991). Additionally, research on gifts and bribes in an internat-
ional context often focuses upon whether gifts and favors are an important
element of the moral obligations of more traditional societies (Williams
and Theobald, 2000). However, the relationship between gratuities and
bribery in different cultures is not the topic of this chapter. The focus is
rather on the moral ambiguity of gratuities and how leadership might be
able to influence the opinions and behavior of employees on an integrity
issue.

Leadership

Although a number of relevant aspects of leadership influencing the ethics

and integrity of employees can be identified, we explore only three of the
most often cited qualities of ethical leadership in relation to integrity viol-
ations of employees: 1. role modelling of managers by setting a good
example for employees; 2. strictness of managers in applying clear norms
and sanctioning misbehavior of employees; and 3. openness of managers
to discussing integrity problems and dilemmas. According to Trevino et al.
(2000: 131, 134–6) these three aspects are necessary to develop a reputation
for ethical leadership; together they constitute the ‘pillar’ of the moral
manager.
Managers act as role models for employees (Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999;
Ciulla, 1999; Dickson et al., 2001; Ford and Richardson, 1994; Fulmer,
2004; Lewis, 1991; Price, 2003) and lead by the example they set. Based on
a case study they conducted, Sims and Brinkman (2002) assert that the
moral tone and example set by managers is the most important element of
an ethical organization. Their behavior reflects the norms of the organiza-
tion and conveys how things are really done. Subordinates are likely
to imitate supervisors since these individuals are significant others in the
organizational lives of employees.
The second aspect relates to the expectation that employees are more
likely to do what is rewarded, and avoid doing what is punished (Paine, 1994;
Butterfield et al., 1996). According to Trevino (1992), employees will refrain
from committing ethical violations if they can expect that such behavior
would be punished and that the level of punishment would outweigh any
162 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

potential reward. Furthermore ‘discipline for rule violators serves an

important symbolic role in organizations – it reinforces standards, upholds
the value of conformity to shared norms and maintains the perception that
the organization is a just place where wrongdoers are held accountable for
their actions’ (Trevino et al., 1999: 139). Managers should therefore be clear
on what is right and what is wrong, what is permitted and what is forbidden
(Bovens, 1998).
Openness in an organization is associated with a decreased likelihood of
employee misconduct (Trevino et al., 1999; Mason, 2004). In an open
organization, employees can be honest about mistakes, ask for advice when
confronted with issues related to integrity, discuss integrity dilemmas and
report deviant behavior. In a closed organization criticism is not tolerated,
delivering bad news is not appreciated, employees are not called to account
for their misbehavior, and employees are encouraged to keep quiet, close
their ears and avert their eyes (Bird, 1996; Trevino and Nelson, 1999;
Kaptein and Wempe, 2002). Managers should therefore take an open
stance and be willing to discuss integrity issues with their employees.
These three aspects give rise to the question: which of the three leader-
ship characteristics is most important in curbing integrity violations? In the
literature on this subject a distinction is made between a compliance-based
approach which focuses primarily on rules and sanctions, and an integrity
or value-based approach which concentrates on instilling values that
promote a commitment to ethical conduct (Paine, 1994; Anechiarico and
Jacobs, 1996; Anechiarico, 2002). The leadership characteristics ‘openness’
and ‘role modelling’ seem to coincide more with an integrity-based
approach, while ‘strictness’ is more consistent with a compliance-based
approach; the integrity approach is perceived as the more effective (Paine,
1994; Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996; Anechiarico, 2002). However research
by Lasthuizen et al. (2005) showed that setting a good example, strictness,
and to a lesser extent openness, were correlated with a lower perception of
the number of integrity violations within the organization. Nonetheless,
little is yet known about how this relationship takes shape in the daily prac-
tice of organizations. The aim of this chapter is to provide insights on the
roles of management and integrity policies, and the reactions to these by
police officers.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND INTEGRITY

Following World War II integrity became a silent issue within Dutch gov-
ernment (Vriends, 1999) until the late Minister of Interior, Ms Dales, rekin-
dled the subject with two speeches in 1992. This reinvigorated focus on
 How to encourage ethical behavior 163

integrity resulted from a major corruption scandal in Italy, a Dutch scandal

concerning corrupt relations between construction companies and munic-
ipal government (see Dohmen and Langenberg, 1994), and general worries
about the rise of organized crime and its potential corruptive influence
(Vriends, 1999).
Since 1992 a body of policies, regulations and laws relating to integrity
has been developed by the ministry of the Interior. At the same time, Ms
Dales and subsequent ministers have stressed that they have no reason to
doubt the overall integrity of Dutch government, including the police. This
is confirmed by the yearly Transparency International Corruption Index,
which places the Netherlands among the top ten of least corrupt countries
(Transparency International, 2005). Being thus, integrity policies devel-
oped by the Ministry are preventive in nature (Anechiarico, 1998) and are
targeted to different layers of government, including the police. The minis-
ter, after consultation with the Council of Police Chiefs, formulated several
measures that the police forces were required to implement, such as a
bureau for internal investigations, information campaigns and human
resource management (education, selection procedures and performance
evaluations) (TK 1994-1995, 23900 VII nr. 32 1995). Regulations regarding
gratuities were not an issue in this initial policy document.
In 1997 administrative law relating to sideline activities was changed and
at the same time extended with an article relating to gratuities: ‘Public ser-
vants are forbidden, except with the approval of proper authorities, to
accept or solicit money, gifts, services or discounts in relation to his official
capacity’ (Barp article 66a, 1997), indicating there is no absolute ban on
taking gratuities. The law refers to the role of proper authorities, main-
taining integrity relating to gratuities was seen as a responsibility of the
organization and not just of individuals.
Since 1997 the police have had a national code of conduct which includes
the two following references to gratuities in relation to the value of inde-
pendence of the police: 1. A police official should show restraint in accept-
ing gifts and ‘fixes’ within his official duties; and 2. no private-discounts on
the delivery of services or goods should be accepted. The code makes a dis-
tinction between discounts, which are always unacceptable, and gifts which
may be acceptable.

METHODOLOGY

At the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam several research projects have

focused on the integrity of the police (for an overview see Huberts and
Naeyé, 2005), of which the study reported here is one. This chapter
164 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

Policy
Policy Knowledge and Changes in
implementation:
content acceptability behavior
Leadership

Figure 10.1 Research model effectiveness of integrity policies

addresses the effect of leadership on gratuities and will primarily employ

the findings from a broad study by Lamboo (2005) on the integrity policies
of Dutch police and how their success or failure could be explained.
Intensive case studies were conducted which focused not only on the
content of seven specific integrity policies and measures (only one of them
on gratuities), but also on the implementation of these policies by leader-
ship, and the effect on police officers in terms of their knowledge and
acceptability of these policies as this is seen as a prerequisite for changes in
behavior (see Figure 10.1).

The Case Studies

In the Netherlands, a country with approximately 16 million inhabitants,

the police force totals more than 50 000 including officers and other per-
sonnel. In 1994, a major institutional reform took place, re-organizing the
Dutch police into 25 regional forces and one central force. The forces have
their own powers and policies, but the Minister of Interior bears an overall
responsibility for the quality of public administration, including the police.
Decisions and rulings relating to recruitment, training, salaries, uniforms,
and a large share of the equipment are made on a national basis. Also, the
national Council of Police Chiefs plays a role in developing national poli-
cies for the police forces, including policies on integrity.
For the study, three police forces were selected so that a diverse perspec-
tive of how integrity and integrity policies take shape in the daily practices
of the 25 regional police organizations could be assembled. The main selec-
tion criterion was whether formal integrity policies were implemented and
running for at least three years, in order to be able to investigate its
effectiveness. The case selection is therefore an example of ‘criterion sam-
pling’ (Patton, 1987: 56). The Amsterdam-Amstelland police region was
included as it is generally considered to be a forerunner in integrity policies
and thus is a ‘critical case’ (Patton, 1987: 54). Additional criteria for selec-
tion were size of the organization, urbanization (number of citizens per
km2), and location within the country. Based upon these criteria, the three
 How to encourage ethical behavior 165

police forces selected for this study were the regional police force
Amsterdam-Amstelland (5207 fte, in the western part of the country);
Fryslân (1443 fte, in the north); and Limburg-Noord (1147 fte, in the
south). Within each police force the police chief is responsible for opera-
tional matters; he shares this authority with one or more directors and
together they form the police force management. The police forces are com-
prised of districts and divisions. Within each of the three selected police
forces, three basic units (neighborhood teams) were sampled, located in
different districts.
The policies that were developed within the selected police forces over the
period 1995 (when institution of national integrity policies began) to 2001
(when this study was conducted) were documented. The content of the
integrity policies was reconstructed based on documentation and informa-
tion regarding implementation gleaned through interviews with func-
tionaries responsible for integrity policies, such as the head of the bureau
of internal investigators, as well as the chief of the police force, chiefs of
the three districts and the three basic units within each district. Most inter-
views were conducted within the basic units with sworn officers who were
selected by the researcher. In total 82 interviews were completed.
The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire
and were recorded on tape. Although some allowances for socially desirable
answers must always be made, honest responses were encouraged by
emphasizing that integrity policies were the central focus of the interviews,
not the respondents’ own or their colleagues’ misconduct. In addition,
strict confidentiality was guaranteed. Each respondent received a transcript
of the interview and was given the opportunity to make (factual) adjust-
ments if needed. Overall, respondents of all ranks talked openly about the
integrity policies and about the changes in attitudes and behavior that
resulted. This is less surprising as one considers that the topics – such as
gratuities, discounts, side line activities and (sexual) harassment – turned
out to be seen as relatively minor types of violations and that the officers
had experienced positive changes in relation to them.

CHANGES IN ACCEPTING GRATUITIES

In all three police forces it was not uncommon that shops and restaurants
would offer discounts or free goods. Stores traditionally provided the local
police station with ‘oliebollen’ (a kind of donut) on New Year’s Eve and in
earlier years with liquor and salads. There were restaurants and pubs
where police officers could eat the leftovers after closing time or paid with
a 10 guilder note and received change in two fivers. Some restaurants
166 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

located by a highway had a formal policy to give discounts to all uniformed

guests, benefiting in this way from the perceived extra security. In the more
rural police forces of Fryslân and Limburg-Noord it used to be common
for police officers to come home with bicycle bags filled with vegetables,
potatoes and meat from farmers. As a senior constable commented, ‘Let’s
be honest. I think that in the old days, certainly in the smaller municipali-
ties, police officers, but also the local general practitioners, had a lot of
benefits’.
Police officers from Amsterdam-Amstelland were the most open about
discounts. Every respondent of the Amsterdam-Amstelland regional police
force was familiar with the concept of ‘dalven’, the term refers to asking for
and receiving discounts from businesses and shops. This was a widespread
practice in the police force and management took part in it. Every basic
unit had its own places to eat where it could get discounts, with a prefer-
ence for Chinese restaurants and shoarma. At McDonalds police officers
received a discount of 50 percent which was supposed to be restricted to
employees. These discounts were not limited to the police, but also included
such municipal services as the local health service and the fire department.
According to the police officers, accepting discounts had not influenced
their behavior and they attempted to avoid situations where a reciprocal
favor could be expected (the complicating factor here, of course is that
when discounts are so widespread it is nearly inevitable that occasionally a
favor was expected or given in return).
According to the officers, discounts and requests for gratuities dimin-
ished in the mid-1990s (a finding echoed in Naeyé et al., 2004: 231–5, but
with the exception that some older police officers in Limburg-Noord and
Fryslân were still known for shopping in uniform), and they gave several
accounts for this change. At the level of society, police officers pointed at
the distance that has grown between authorities, including the police and
citizens, and that society looks more critically at the police. Also the eco-
nomic welfare of police officers has improved since ‘the old days’. At the
level of the police organizations and police work, it was stated that gra-
tuities used to be habit, officers were brought up with that behavior, and
considered it normal. Furthermore little attention was paid by police
management to these practices, and it was not unusual for lower manage-
ment to participate in these practices. Only later did police officers start
to realize that these practices were unethical and reflected back as to why
it was initially acceptable. An inspector from Amsterdam-Amstelland
states:
Police officers automatically received a discount at McDonalds. But
when a citizen standing behind me said ‘give me the same for the same
price’, then I did feel uncomfortable. Of course one could say that we did
 How to encourage ethical behavior 167

nothing, that we’re just ordering four hamburgers and pay with 10
guilders, and that it is the responsibility of the cashier how much change
she gives. That is one way to reason. But then citizens began to state ‘I’m
a police officer’ in order to get a discount. At a certain moment I dissoci-
ated myself from it and said ‘I no longer want to do that’. Just like every-
body else I’ve had my discounts, but it started to give me an uncomfortable
feeling.

FORMAL POLICIES
The three police forces studied here had limited written rules regarding the
accepting of gratuities by police officers and those appeared only within the
context of regulating sideline activities, wherein a brief reference was made
to article 66a of the administrative law. The Amsterdam-Amstelland police
force extended this notation to include that in most cases the basic unit
supervisor would be able to decide whether specific gratuities were admiss-
ible. But the lack of rules doesn’t necessarily imply a lack of (informal)
policy, as Amsterdam-Amstelland and Limburg-Noord demonstrate.
According to the Amsterdam-Amstelland police force, it had deliber-
ately forgone a formal written policy about gratuities. The police force man-
agement stood for the principle that gratuities were not acceptable, but at
the same time the police force had to avoid being ‘allergic to society’
because the police are in service to society. The police force stated: ‘When
in contact with the police citizens give their judgments, sometimes critical,
but often positive and thankful. They show their gratitude in letters, flowers
or cake. These are not registered, but for the police officers involved such
gratuities are unforgettable.’ This means that gifts from citizens as a true
kind of gratuity are acceptable.
The police chief of Limburg-Noord took a different stance in the book
A Hazardous Profession (1995), which was developed with two other police
regions, and which discussed several integrity-related subjects. The stance
towards gratuities was one of zero tolerance. The book proposed that gra-
tuities could be accepted only to be transferred to, for example, an elderly
home. The same year, at the request of the management team, an inventory
was made of discount arrangements resulting in a diverse range of shops
and businesses offering discounts to the police, such as passes for free swim-
ming in the Centre Parcs holiday center, passes for a retail supermarket, dis-
counts at cafeterias, bakeries and several shops. In response to this
inventory the policy document ‘Discounts’ was formulated in 1996, but was
not approved. The police chief thought a guideline was not necessary and
could lead to calculated behavior.
168 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

ROLE OF MANAGEMENT

Strictness of the Manager

In the mid-1990s, in all three police forces, the norms about gratuities were
tightened. In Limburg-Noord norms became stricter directly following a
major reorganization in 1995. In the perception of the police officers this
change was made overnight by the police management who declared that
no gratuities were accepted, including gifts from citizens. The previous year
the Amsterdam-Amstelland police management stated very specifically
which practices it no longer tolerated. These included free copies of the
newspaper de Telegraaf that could be picked up early in the morning at the
company’s main office in Amsterdam, discounted meals, and fraudulent
expenses claims. In a basic unit, management stated that police officers were
not allowed to have a night out within their working area (an entertainment
district), not allowed to frequent certain bars, and could not shop during
lunch breaks. Certain shops were announced to be prohibited areas because
police officers had received (unsolicited) discounts. Some managers even
went to these shops to report this new policy. These new norms were
enforced and violations resulted in internal investigations, which frightened
the police officers into changing their perspective. An inspector reported:
‘You don’t risk your job for 100 guilders [50 euros]. It is not worth it. At
several basic units three, four or even six police officers were suspended.
And when you hear why, then that does bring about a shock effect.’
Formulating the norms and applying them went hand in hand.
The new strictness included gifts from citizens in all three forces and
caused resentment from police officers. They thought the new policy went
‘too far’, that police management was so tight that it became ‘silly’ and
‘childish’. They could not understand why being ethical meant taking such a
straight line to the extent that the cake or flowers from a grateful citizen had
to be refused. According to these officers, managers didn’t understand the
notion that refusing such gifts can be very upsetting, insulting the giver.
Several police officers had experienced that leadership had them refuse the
gift that thankful citizens brought to the local police station. Some did refuse,
or left it to the group supervisor to make the refusal. Police officers were not
always sure whether the zero tolerance strictness was intended by police man-
agement. In spite of their criticism, police officers thought a positive side
effect of the strict norms was that management was on top of the issue.
The initial strictness that extended to gifts from citizens dissipated and
that witnessed at the time of the interviews (around 2001–2) varied
amongst the leadership. This was not out of line with the formal policies of
the police forces. Amsterdam-Amstelland had for example explicitly stated
 How to encourage ethical behavior 169

that the basic unit supervisor should decide on which gratuities were
acceptable. Specifically in Amsterdam-Amstelland the rules at the basic
units depended for a great part on the reputation of the district chief. The
stricter district chiefs would place greater emphasis on the issue in instruct-
ing their basic unit supervisors. The basic unit supervisors were supposed
to ensure that all the inspectors within the unit took one and the same posi-
tion. Even if this did not succeed entirely, police officers did know at large
what was, and what wasn’t allowable.
In Limburg-Noord most respondents thought that the police chief took
a zero tolerance position and that the police chief did appear as if he was
strict. Other respondents thought that the police chief used to be strict, but
had become more balanced. According to the police chief himself the zero
tolerance position was outside the social order: ‘I have one golden rule:
police officers should report all gratuities to their superior. It is the superior
that decides. It is important that personnel don’t decide for themselves, but
involve another person.’
Within the police force at Fryslân the new strictness had not resulted in
clear norms. Not only police officers, but also the supervisors and lower
management had little knowledge of the opinion of the police management
about gratuities. Some thought that the police chief would take a black-
white stance: no single gratuity would be allowed. This expectation was not
based on concrete announcements of the police chief on this subject.

Openness of the Manager

One can assume that discussions developed around the new strictness on
gratuities. The respondents remembered a lot of discussion around gifts
from citizens, as the temporary zero-tolerance policy had resulted in
conflict. There was almost no reference to discussions about discounts and
other types of gratuities. Apparently it was understood and accepted by
police officers that these were not allowable, even if not everyone (had)
adhered to this norm.
Police officers thought the stricter norms had a positive side effect as the
subject became debatable and resulted in a dialogue about what was accept-
able. Gratuities became a subject of conversation more often, while this was
rarely the case before 1995. Openness was also part of the new norms as gifts
had to be reported: ‘That it gets reported is progress. I think that before, it
would have been taken and eaten.’ Whether a gift was acceptable or not was
judged on the extent to which it could be brought out in the open, or as they
say ‘whether it could be published in the newspaper your mother reads’.
As gifts from citizens were usually delivered to the station, management
generally used these instances for an informal discussion about the norms,
170 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

such as during holidays when management would address the situation

with recipients of unsolicited Christmas boxes. Basic unit supervisors
noticed a change following these interventions regarding how police
officers dealt with gratuities. Police officers began approaching them with
questions about the acceptability of certain gifts, and one police officer
reported to his supervisor that he was offered a discount at a Chinese
restaurant after which the supervisor went to the restaurant to prevent it
from happening again. However, when it was felt that the strictness had
gone too far, and was foreign to their own norms, there were instances
where police officers sought their own way. For example they wouldn’t tell
where the cake came from until it was shared with the team. This example
illustrates how strictness can also lead to a lack of openness.
The case of Fryslân shows that a lack of clear norms can also result in a
lack of communication. Police officers felt that the group supervisor or the
district management should facilitate a discussion about gratuities. At the
same time a member of the district management admitted that he avoided
discussion with his own officers on the subject, because he didn’t know
which norms he had to espouse:
The district management team doesn’t speak about the subject. One reason is
maybe that I myself don’t have a clear notion of the subject and that the subject
only leads to huge discussions. So I just assume that the group supervisors know
where to put the line. That’s why there should be an outline, because that would
facilitate discussion. Even though rules and regulations wouldn’t cover all situ-
ations, it would provide some certainty.
Discussion without clear norms led to feelings of uncertainty and distrust.
A sergeant referred to training on integrity by the bureau of internal inves-
tigations and the following discussion that developed about gratuities:
They don’t say what is and isn’t allowed, but in the meanwhile one gets the
impression that it is not allowed. They say that you know for yourself what’s
right and wrong. But what if that doesn’t correspond with their norms? Then the
result is that there is something wrong with your norms and values, while the
organization just never dared to provide clear rules.
This suggests that police officers are open to discussion, but within some
kind of notion of the position of the organization.
The discussions were seen in a twofold manner by police. They were seen
as an indication of the changes that had occurred, and at the same time as
a cause of (further) change.

The Manager as Role Model

The officers of the three police forces gave almost no examples of exemp-
lary behavior on the part of their supervisors and managers, although a few
 How to encourage ethical behavior 171

managers gave examples of how they set a good example for employees.
One chief of neighborhood policing from Fryslân said that he had dis-
cussed with his group supervisors a gift he’d received. A district chief from
Amsterdam-Amstelland:

There is this image that I am stricter than the Pope. [. . .] I am constantly aware
of the question whether certain behavior is acceptable for a manager. For
example, I don’t shop within my own district because I don’t want to give the
impression that I am shopping during working hours. Also in my former district
[containing an entertainment district], I would not have a drink at a terrace
within the district.

Another district chief from Amsterdam-Amstelland that was known for

his more informal manners stated:

It is a subject that cannot be strictly regulated. Some say that even a free cup of
coffee is not allowed. I think that it is allowable [gives an example]. What do you
do in a situation like that? I don’t want to hurt someone’s feelings. [. . .] You have
to resolve such issues in such a way that everyone can keep his dignity.

These examples demonstrate that managers can be role models in different

ways.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Integrity is an important subject for the police. One of the subjects belong-
ing to the ethics and integrity of daily police work is the acceptance of gra-
tuities by police officers. The acceptance of gifts and favors by citizens and
businesses can threaten independence and impartiality, and thus the incor-
ruptibility of police functionaries and the police organization. In the
Netherlands, accepting gratuities has become a subject of occasional fierce
discussions within the police. This study showed that the actual behavior of
police officers has changed during recent decades.
Members of the three police forces acknowledged that receiving and
asking for gratuities used to be common practice and were unanimous in
their opinion that this practice has now almost disappeared. What caused
the changes?
The research showed that none of the three Dutch police forces had a
formal written policy regarding gratuities. According to the forces a formal
policy would only lead to calculated behavior from the police officers.
Instead the police forces relied on management. They had to enforce the
national rules that discounts were unacceptable while gifts from citizens
could be acceptable, at the discretion of management and police officers.
172 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

Management mainly used strictness to curb the widespread practice of

accepting gratuities. A clear definition of the norms was most effective as
shown by the knowledge of police officers of the norms and policies of their
organization and of their management. The research also demonstrated
that punishing employees is a strong means to communicate new norms.
The interviews did not indicate that rewarding employees was used as an
instrument. Strictness, or more specific clarity of the norms, was combined
with openness. Management had a strong view on openness: they generally
encouraged discussion of the subject and were open to police officers for
advice. Openness was also part of the norms: police officers had to report
gifts from citizens and other gratuities.
A side effect of these strict norms was tension between management and
executive officers. Zero tolerance was not accepted by police officers.
Refusal of a cake or flowers from citizens was perceived as alien to main-
taining good contact with the public. As such there has been a lack of
acceptance of some parts of the new norms. Over time the norms became
less strict concerning small gifts from citizens, although there are still
stricter and more lenient managers.
Additionally, the research showed that the police commissioner played
a central role. When the ‘boss’ is clear, this top-down clarity influences the
whole organization. In two of the three police forces’ lower management
had no clear view of the police commissioner’s position and was there-
fore uncertain about the rules they had to enforce. Because of this uncer-
tainty they were also less open, as they did not know which norms to
discuss with their officers. The uncertainty also created resentment and
unease between the hierarchical levels, which inhibited the effective-
ness of the organizational integrity policy on gratuities. Change is by
definition a period of moral uncertainty. Police officers did experience it
as such and looked at management for advice and for a clear stance on
the subject.
Police leadership influenced police officers taking gratuities but the posi-
tive changes respondents experienced in their police force cannot be attri-
buted to leadership alone. Some other factors seem to be important, too.
Internal reorganizations were pointed out by the respondents as they pro-
vided a ‘window of opportunity’ for change. It was also felt that it has to
do with more general changes in police culture (resulting from the growing
numbers of female police officers). Other explanations laid beyond the
scope of police forces, such as social changes – improving economical cir-
cumstances and fewer close relationships between authorities and citizens
in smaller communities, and national developments within policing and
government – especially the major reorganization of the police in 1994 and
the growing national attention on integrity since 1992.
 How to encourage ethical behavior 173

Discussion

Although we should be careful not to over exaggerate the importance of

our findings, it is useful to note some implications.
First the results add new insights to the literature about police culture
(Crank, 1998; Skolnick, 2002). The literature is rather pessimistic about the
possibilities for cultural change within police forces as a type of organiz-
ation that very much relies on professional freedom as well as loyalty
towards colleagues and the organization. Our study showed that change in
values and behavior did occur within the Dutch police, justifying some
optimism about the possibility for change.
Second, there are possible consequences for existing knowledge about
the strategies to protect the ethics and integrity of an organization and its
members. It has been supposed that the integrity of organizations can best
be improved by leadership that uses openness and role modeling, whereas
strictness might be less effective. However, the results of this study sug-
gested that the changes in behavior and values were primarily brought
about by strict norms. As such a compliance approach seems to be more
effective than an integrity approach, which counters the current dominant
discourse.
Moreover this research focused on how the three aspects of leadership
take shape in the daily practice of organizations. It was shown that strict-
ness does not exclude openness and role modeling. Rather, they not only
reinforce each other, but are mutually dependable. It was shown that open-
ness without clear norms to discuss only led to uncertainty. As such the rel-
evance of openness should not be exaggerated to the expense of the
contribution of strictness. Even introducing norms that are too strict in the
eyes of employees might be stimulating for the process of rethinking stan-
dard practices, although it may lead to conflict. When this strictness is only
temporary, it might have the benefit of discussion without leaving lasting
resentment between officers and management.
The main new hypothesis is that for management to influence the
integrity of their employees, strictness is a first prerequisite, but that it
needs to be reinforced by openness and role modeling. Part of role model-
ing is that management is open about their actions and dares to discuss
them with employees. This hierarchy between the three aspects of leader-
ship is depicted in Figure 10.2.
Of course, such a hypothesis will have to be tested in further research,
especially in organizations other than police organizations. This can be
done by qualitative as well as quantitative research and should also involve
other types of integrity violations and views. Our findings are based on
the studies of gratuities that were not only widespread, but also readily
174 Ethics and integrity management and instruments

Employee integrity: behavior

and values

Strictness

Role modeling Openness

Figure 10.2 The relationship between aspects of leadership and employee

integrity

acknowledged by police officers as they involve a less serious kind of

integrity violation. Therefore other direct and indirect relationships might
be found for other violations such as bribery, sexual harassment and private
time misconduct.

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PART IV

Ethics and integrity and the politics of

governance
11. Removing employee protections: a
‘see no evil’ approach to civil
service reform
James S. Bowman and Jonathan P. West

INTRODUCTION

Ethics in public service is influenced by two norms – political exchange and

civic culture – that co-exist in varying degrees and at different times in many
Western democratic societies. The first is premised on contracts, favors and
jobs in exchange for political support; it is susceptible to corruption
because it feeds an environment of cronyism, sycophancy, favoritism and
waste. In contrast, a civic culture is one in which the commonweal is the
central value; it is based on universally applicable rules, equal treatment,
professional ethics and stewardship of public resources. Promoting the
public good, not personal gain, is the objective (adapted from Rosenbloom,
1998: 536–8; also see Schlesinger, 1986).
Civil service systems, reflecting such tensions, confront competing
demands for political responsiveness and professional competence. In the
last generation, the emphasis between these two traditions has shifted in
most democracies from a public service imbued by civic culture norms
toward one of political exchange. The New Public Management (NPM)
movement (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1990; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004)
challenged the long-standing merit system model, characterized by non-
partisan public servants, as inflexible and unresponsive to contemporary
needs.
To improve effectiveness, reduce expenditures and enhance accountabil-
ity, reform deregulated personnel systems, defunded agencies, downsized
staff, privatized services, augmented managerial discretion, empowered
citizens and strengthened political control. Such actions often included
reforms in financial management (emphasizing results and performance),
civil service (relaxing rigidities), organizational structures (mandating
decentralization) and service delivery (seeking competition in the name of
higher quality and less cost). For administrators tasked to fulfill these

181
182 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

expectations, reforms frequently meant increased job insecurity, the need to

learn new skills and greater workloads.
In the process, the character of the employee relationship with govern-
ment has undergone a metamorphosis: the transfer of many of the risks of
management decisions and market fluctuations, previously borne by the
organization, to employees (Stone, 2004). In particular, the long-standing
public employee-employer covenant – modest pay in exchange for job
security – is being eroded by removing safeguards against partisan
influence. The most sweeping measure is the use of at-will employment (and
its equivalents) to eliminate the defining component of merit systems: job
protection from political intrigue.
Because the quality of the public service is central to the field of ethics
and integrity of governance, this chapter focuses on the contemporary
debate over civil service reform.1 It begins by examining the origin and
nature of the at-will employment doctrine. An analysis of its use in gov-
ernment follows, first in the United States and then in the United Kingdom,
two nations that differ in interesting ways, but are part of the ‘core NPM
group’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 98).2 The discussion closes with con-
clusions about the future of public service in democracy. The management
of human capital reflects societal norms and clashing values. It is at the core
of governance. As such, the integrity of civil service systems is a matter of
profound importance for citizens, scholars and public officials alike. If
these systems do not work, then neither does government. As Franklin D.
Roosevelt stated so clearly, ‘A government without good management is a
house built on sand.’

EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL

Early American labor-management law was based on British master-

servant law which assumed employment would last one year. However, con-
sistent with laissez-faire capitalism of the Industrial Revolution, the
English approach was abandoned for the American Rule near the end of
the nineteenth century. Under this rule, employees work for an unspecified
period of time at the will of the employer (www.workforce.com/Hugh; also
see Hogler, 2004; Werhane et al., 2004; for an interpretation emphasizing
legal, not economic, developments, see Morriss, 1994). The relationship
would be defined by the freedom to contract where neither party was com-
pelled to create the affiliation and either party could terminate it at will. The
discipline of the free market would ensure the societal efficiency of these
individual voluntary agreements as both parties would have incentives to
recover their investments in each other (Epstein and Rosen, 1984).
 Removing employee protections 183

In concept, the absolute right of the employer to discharge a worker

coincided with the sovereignty doctrine in the public sector. Because
employment was a privilege, not a right, it was subject to terms specified by
government. Government is sovereign; it is inappropriate to dilute its man-
agement rights (for example, no person has a right to a public job). Indeed
for much of the nineteenth century – the last time that at-will employment
was used in US public service – the spoils system dominated personnel
policy. Citizens sought a position not on the basis of character or compe-
tence but on political connections, and they could be terminated on the
same basis. Public office was perverted into a private fiefdom as arrogance,
greed, and opportunism prevailed over honor, openness and prudence.
Favoritism, cronyism, intimidation, corruption, waste, scandals and
rampant dismissals were widespread in that squalid era. Rather than
emphasizing good government and policy, the system encouraged mediocre
governance; its highest priority was to reward its friends, to grant favors for
favors given. To protect the legitimacy of the state from private interests
and to cleanse public service of partisan interference, English merit prin-
ciples (including entrance examinations, job tenure, career service political
neutrality) were adopted in the 1883 Pendleton Act (and state ‘mini-
Pendleton’ laws) as well as the 1912 Lloyd-LaFollette Act. A merit-based
civil service – as a moral guardian of democracy – would shield employees
from politically inspired employment actions. Public servants would be
loyal to the system of government, not to a particular political party. They
would only give free and candid advice if their positions were safeguarded.
In fact, job security facilitated government responsiveness by ensuring
efficient and uninterrupted service delivery. Clean government would mean
effective government. Competence would be the foundation of moral
public management; government would be run like a business when organ-
ized by administrative principles, led by an executive, and staffed by non-
partisan employees protected from unscrupulous politicians.
Although the US merit system was created to ‘clean up government’ by
eradicating spoils, it is not surprising that with the passage of time the past
would be forgotten. Toward the end of the twentieth century, a simpler,
private sector-inspired employment system gained favor. New Public
Management, while not always clearly defined in the literature, is identified
by four models according to Ferlie et al. (1996): the drive for efficiency,
‘downsizing and decentralization’, the search for excellence, and a public
service orientation. Variously called ‘managerialism’, ‘market-based public
administration’, or ‘entrepreneurial government’, the emphasis was on
‘letting managers manage’ by increasing their discretion and using private
sector management styles to ensure improved performance and results
(Pollitt, 1990; Lan and Rosenbloom, 1992; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).
184 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

Relaxing traditional job protections for civil servants has been seen as a key
method to accomplish these objectives. Indeed, at-will employment is now
seen as solving, instead of causing, public management problems, as there
seems to be little appreciation of the ethical context of the merit system.
Proponents of change support the removal of controls over organiz-
ational processes and elimination of employee safeguards in order to
enhance political responsiveness. Given the history of the American civil
service reform as one of battling partisan corruption (Ingraham, 1995),
expanding the number of personnel susceptible to unfettered administra-
tive discretion raises concerns – apprehensions that have been greeted with
indifference or incredulity, and largely dismissed by ideologically driven
reformers with anti-government views. Running government like a business
and giving priority to increasing efficiency, reducing waste, adding
flexibility, and conserving resources may, as Hood (1991) suggests, come at
the expense of other values such as ‘honesty and fair dealing and the
avoidance of bias’. Indeed, ‘marketizers’ and ‘anti-state minimizers’ favor
substituting permanent government employees with their hard-won job
protections for contract workers who are obliged to provide specific
outputs with few, if any, job guarantees (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004;
Sulieman, 2003). These developments, together with the emergence of con-
tingent and part-time workers as a large, growing proportion of the nation’s
workforce, suggest that employees are increasingly seen as disposable
commodities.

CONTEMPORARY REFORM IN THE UNITED

STATES
Fueled by entrepreneurial strategies, budget cutbacks and devolution,
the contemporary reform movement (Condrey and Maranto, 2001) has
gained exceptions from merit systems across the nation by expanding
management prerogatives and restricting employee rights (Kellough and
Nigro, 2006). In recent years, a variety of federal departments received
full or partial waivers from Title 5 of the US Code which defines the
merit system. Further, in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the
Transportation Security Agency established at-will employment for its
personnel. Subsequently the departments of Homeland Security and
Defense were authorized, in the name of the ‘war on terror’, to create new
human resource management systems that generally strengthen adminis-
trative discretion and diminish employee protections. Today, reformers are
seeking to use these untested approaches as templates for government-
wide change.
 Removing employee protections 185

At the state level, major reform examples exist: Texas nullified its merit
system in 1985, making all state employees at-will; a 1996 Georgia law man-
dated that all new civil servants be hired on an at-will basis; and in 2001
Florida eliminated job tenure for most incumbent middle managers
(Walters, 2002). South Carolina and Arkansas recently abolished their
merit systems; less dramatically, many states (for example, Indiana,
Delaware, Kansas) are reclassifying career service positions to unclassified
ones as a consequence of reorganizations, reductions-in-force, and/or attri-
tion. Such strategies are often mutually reinforcing in a manner that pro-
motes the on-going deterioration of career public service; the effect is that
the status and role of the public employee today is not too different than
that found in business (Hays and Sowa, 2006).
More broadly, and as a result of reform, the concept of merit today is
increasingly associated with corporate-style performance pay plans in lieu
of public interest values and civil service responsibilities. Unfortunately,
there is little evidence that these monetary incentive programs have resulted
in desired outcomes in either business or government (Lane et al., 2003:
138; also see Berman et al., 2005, chapter 6). In the private sphere the
systems are so problematic that they are the subject of a recent Harvard
University Press book entitled Pay Without Performance (Bebchuk and
Fried, 2004).
In the public sphere, ‘the jury is still out on how the [federal] govern-
ment’s 7100 senior executives have fared under a performance-based pay
system that took effect last year,’ according to one labor leader. ‘To admin-
ister [it] . . . is not easy. If you can’t do it for this small of a population, it
does not bode well for doing it well for the entire workforce’ (Carol
Bonosaro, quoted in Kaufman, 2005, 25 July, 6). With respect to pending
changes affecting the rest of the federal workforce, one employee said:

[C]ivil service employees are somewhat ‘buffered’ from politically motivated

actions of top management. Employees can openly disagree with the policies
and proposed actions of their agencies (within limits, of course) . . . With ‘pay
for performance’ I wonder if I should just please my boss rather than fight for
what I believe is right . . . I will need to balance feeding my family against
fighting for the public interest (quoted in Barr, 2005c, p. B2).

It would be especially useful to learn why numerous past performance

initiatives, including pay for performance, failed (Milkovich and Wigdor,
1991; US Office of Personnel Management, 1992). Echoing scholarly
studies on performance pay, a union spokesman pointed out reform-
ers, ‘have no data whatsoever to indicate that this (change) will improve
organization performance’ (Brian DeWyngaert, quoted in Lee, 2005,
p. A2).
186 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

The linchpin of civil service reform, according to Office of Personnel

Management Director Linda Springer, is a ‘rigorous’ personnel appraisal
system as managers will be asked to ‘do the right thing’ and not inflate
evaluations (Rutzick, 2005a or b). One employee asked, ‘Who believes
that performance ratings will be realistic and avoid grade inflation?’
(quoted in Barr, 2000b, p. B2). In brief, because the conditions for success
for these programs – the nature of output produced, the type of person-
nel who do the work, and the kinds of organizations where it is done – are
usually not met in the world of industry or government (Bohnet and
Eaton, 2003: 241), predicting success is hazardous. One suspects that the
root problem is not technique or system, but rather aspects of human
nature such as risk aversion and cognitive limitations (Berman et al., 2006,
chapter 9).
Perhaps in recognition of these concerns, the president’s top advisor on
management policy expressed doubt about pay for performance because
‘it sounds like we are on a commission basis here. We’re not. It suggests
that the entire raise is going to be based on performance. It’s not’ (Clay
Johnson II, quoted in Barr, 2005a, p. B2). Indeed, the US Government
Accountability Office has had performance pay for years and confronts not
only ‘evaluation inflation’, but also budget constraints, both of which
undermine pay for performance (Rutzick, 2005a or b). The Bush
Administration maintained that a large part of raises under civil service
reform will not be based on performance, but rather on market rates
(Kaufman, 2005b, p. 1).3
To summarize, changes reducing or abolishing job security (and other-
wise altering basic merit system tenets) have occurred across the country.
While little evidence exists on the benefits of these programs, the most
prominent vestige of merit today is found in pay-for-performance plans.
Available research demonstrates that these plans are often more efficacious
in the abstract than in practice. Hollowed out of the meaning and content
of merit, reformers have attempted to use the symbols of merit to legit-
imate change. As Joel D. Aberbach (2003) observes, difficulties arise, ‘in part
because the very features that make the US political system resemble a
market make it difficult to apply many of the features of NPM . . . and in
part because of problems with some of the NPM ideas themselves’ (p. 57).
Globalization trends suggest, however, the confluence of organizational
policies across boundaries. Although the United States has been an outlier,
the rest of the developed world uses International Labor Organization
standards which, for example, forbid unjust dismissal. Yet to the extent that
American-style capitalism is emulated in other countries, management
practices like employment at-will and performance pay may also be
adopted elsewhere.
 Removing employee protections 187

REFORM IN EUROPE: THE UNITED KINGDOM

CASE

The penchant toward a business-oriented approach to public administra-

tion (namely, ‘managerialism’ with its emphasis on regionalization, decen-
tralization, marketization, restructuring and modernizing to enhance
management rights and reduce government size) is evident not only in the
United States, but in Europe as well. While generalizing about the nature
of civil service reform is difficult given the differing legal frameworks and
practices in each country, some converging organizational structures and
guiding principles can be identified. An initial distinction between an
employment system and a career system found in northern and southern
Western Europe is a useful starting point.4
An employment system is modeled in the private sector where those with
special skills are hired for specific posts and lack job security. A career
system, in contrast, is composed of those who spend their entire working
life in the civil service and have stable employment and job protection.
While most countries are hybrids or mixed systems of these pure forms,
the distinction can be useful for classification purposes. The employment
system in northern countries (for example, the United Kingdom,
Switzerland, Denmark, France, Sweden and the Netherlands) is favored
whereby public employees generally lack job protections beyond those per-
sonally or collectively negotiated. The career system is predominant in
southern nations (for example, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) with
greater civil servant rights, protective mechanisms and guarantees
(Committee on Economic Affairs and Development (CEAD), 2003). The
risks of civil service politicization are greater in predominantly employ-
ment systems where loyalty to the government in power receives more
emphasis than in a career system.
To varying degrees, countries throughout Europe are experiencing reforms
promoting greater flexibility and modernizing human resource management.
The New Public Management reform that took place during the 1980s and
1990s, was modeled on corporate management with its emphasis on compe-
tition, efficiency, privatization, contracting, assessment and results. These
changes are especially evident in England under the governments of Prime
Ministers Margaret Thatcher, John Major and Tony Blair.
Thatcher era reforms of the 1980s reflected the NPM concentration on
eliminating waste, reigning back bureaucracy and introducing market
forces. This was part of a wider consideration of industrial relations and a
commitment to reduce trade union power, especially in the government
sector. It was also propelled by a desire to save public monies and improve
efficiency by introducing private sector practices and attitudes. Initially
188 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

using unflattering slogans (‘deprivilege the civil service’, ‘rolling back the
frontiers of the state’, ‘jam the bureaucracy’ and characterizing unions as
the ‘enemy within’) to propel her ‘Next Steps’ reforms, advocates later toned
down their rhetoric and focused on the nuts and bolts of organizational
change. Their diagnosis: the problem was with systems, not with civil ser-
vants; their solution: reduce civil service numbers and powers, provide
‘value for money’, cultivate a managerial culture and increase political
control. Distinctions were drawn between ‘political’ tasks (those in the min-
ister’s purview) and ‘managerial’ tasks (day-to-day administration), with a
‘framework document’ outlining the responsibilities, objectives, budget and
evaluation criteria of ‘executive’ agencies. In other words, ‘steering’ was
decoupled from ‘rowing’, flexibility was enhanced, job security was com-
promised, authority was decentralized and devolved, and results were
emphasized (CEAD, 2003; Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler, 2003; Dillman, 2005;
Pilkington, 1999; Osborne and Plastrik, 1997; Toonen and Raadschelders,
1997).
Agencies were audited, evaluated and ‘market tested’ on a regular basis
to determine whether they were to continue or to be partially or fully pri-
vatized. In the process, civil service tenure was denied for chief executives,
budgets and staffs were cut and efficiencies were scrutinized. In 1988, local
public services, organized under the employment system, were required to
compete with private companies under a controversial Compulsory
Competitive Tendering (CCT) system. While a certain amount of con-
tracting had been used previously, local governments and health author-
ities were obliged to contract out services and minimal service levels were
established by the central government. The main attraction of CCT and
market testing was cost-cutting based on cheaper labor. Often the same
workers did the same tasks as before, but under less favorable conditions.
In some cases pay was reduced, but frequently it was other employee
benefits that were cut.
NPM tools were used to prompt changes: contracts, public/private com-
petition, performance-related pay, customer surveys, total quality manage-
ment and process engineering. Between 1988 and 1996 the civil service was
reduced by 15 percent (Osborne and Plastrik, 1997), and it is no surprise
that opinion polls in the mid-1990s showed a significant decline in the
morale of public servants and growing skepticism regarding the reforms
(Pilkington, 1999: 97). Unfair dismissals accounted for the largest number
of complaints regarding employment rights (Newmark and O’Brien, 2000).
Privatization initiatives continued as John Major succeeded Thatcher, by
ending tenure for civil servants and making them at-will. Job security was
now dependent on delivering results negotiated with ministers. His gov-
ernment stressed the quality of services, establishing customer service
 Removing employee protections 189

standards and authorizing compliant agencies to display the ‘Charter

Mark’ as a sign of their accomplishments (this initiative was seen as a pub-
licity stunt and was later dropped). The Labor government of Tony Blair
did not reverse most of the NPM initiatives (for example, market testing,
contracting out, customer focus), however it did cease CCT extension.
Indeed, in a key 2004 report titled, Delivery and Values, there was an
emphasis on the need to shift away from ‘the traditional concept of a career
for life’ toward officials possessing ‘the abilities needed by the business’
and who could ‘stay ahead of a changing environment’ (cited in Dillman,
2005: 12).
Civil service reform is not without it critics. Vernon Bogdanor (2001), in
particular, lamented the absence of public inquiry, analysis and legislative
involvement preceding reforms. He observed, ‘The agenda for Civil Service
reform has been set by politicians, businessmen and management consul-
tants, and much of it has been implemented by non-legislative means after
discussions in closed arenas’ (299). His criticisms focused on the substance
of reforms as well as the process by which they were adopted. Bogdanor
contended that the civil service became the ‘scapegoat for perceived eco-
nomic underperformance’ and that reform is premised ‘upon a view of the
corporate world which is quite inaccurate’ (p. 299). He worried that the
infusion of outsiders makes it difficult to ensure both that standards are
maintained and that the civil service does not become politicized. The
efforts to decentralize and ‘incentivize’ employees via pay for performance
to achieve the reformers’ goal of agency and individual responsibility, in
Bogdanor’s view, work against fundamental notions of holistic govern-
ment, interdependence and shared responsibility. Finally, he questioned
whether a persuasive case was made warranting a change in the traditional
contract whereby ‘civil servants are offered job security in exchange for
levels of pay generally lower than they could command elsewhere’ (298).
In the initial rush to reform, European NPM advocates extolled the
virtues of managerialism, but seemingly turned a blind eye to the unin-
tended consequences of proposed changes. In more recent years, the temp-
tations of politics and money, the increased risks of politicization, the
erosion of a public service ethic, and the altered relations between the
public and private sectors as well as between public servants and politicians
led both to scandals and to increased reports of conflict of interest and cor-
ruption in civil service systems (CEAD, 2003; Ridley and Doig, 1995; Doig
and Wilson, 1995). Instances of illegal, unethical and inappropriate behav-
ior have highlighted the need for preventive mechanisms and ethics man-
agement strategies.
Such responses have taken different forms in various places. In those
countries lacking a statutory framework that protects employee rights and
190 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

specifies duties, a code of conduct for civil servants was often adopted
similar to the one approved in the United Kingdom in 1996 (Dillman,
2005). In other countries, the necessary legal protections (constitutional,
legislative, regulatory, case law) render adoption of a code of ethics less
essential. Nonetheless, nations are using multiple techniques to ensure
ethical behavior, including legal requirements (for example, disclosure
requirements, conflict of interest restrictions), professional socialization
activities (seminars, training, publications), and efforts to create an ethical
organizational environment (grievance procedures, whistle-blowing protec-
tion) (Shim, 2001; Lawton, 1998).
To summarize, civil service reforms and reductions in job security are
found in Europe as well as the United States. The appeal of managerialism
has spread, although making comparisons of developments across coun-
tries is difficult because the state and administrative traditions are very
different (Toonen and Raadschelders, 1997). While restrictions on individ-
ual rights are more limited in Europe than in the United States, the quest
for employer flexibility has resulted in fewer employee protections.
Variations in labor laws and practices among countries make harmoniz-
ation unlikely in the near term. However, the ‘just cause’ standard for ter-
minations is more likely to be upheld on the European Continent than in
American and English settings. Nonetheless, with diminished job protec-
tions, the decline in career employees and decentralized authority, public
servants are more vulnerable to political machinations and erosion of a
public service ethos – a problem which points to the need for ethics man-
agement mechanisms to prevent undesirable forms of behavior.

CONCLUSION

The nature of public service is changing, and in many ways and in selected
places it already has changed. Since the rise of merit systems more than 100
years ago, personnel practices recognized the signal import of professional
competence. In recent years, however, those demanding accountability have
been successful in bringing about change. The delicate balance between the
norms of civic culture and political exchange in democratic governance is
shifting from the former to the latter. The crucial concern, as Green et al.
(2006) note, is how much politicization is desirable.
Reformers demand that officials have the ‘freedom to manage’, resulting
in the deterioration of the traditional employer-employee relationship as
well as personnel safeguards from partisan pressures. Whether through
ignorance or arrogance, seldom are the ramifications of these changes con-
sidered as advocates seem blind to abuse brought on by a mix of power,
 Removing employee protections 191

aspiration and sycophancy. Politically connected special interests or poli-

tically protected appointees can intimidate career staff, alter checks and
balances, dismiss whistleblowers and create a modern-day spoils system.
New personnel policies, usually without the benefit of evidence from
demonstration projects, promote management myths (such as the impossi-
bility of employee termination) and impose heavy-handed solutions
(notably, tenure elimination and performance pay) and the management by
fear that they engender.
Such initiatives needlessly endanger non-partisan public service, a price-
less asset in democracy. For example, NPM-style management ‘flexibility’
in the US to capriciously hire, reassign and fire employees has emboldened
commercial interests to ‘inappropriately induce reversal or withdrawal of
scientific conclusions’ through political intervention (Smith, 2005). It is no
surprise, then, that personnel at the Defense Department believe that
reforms ‘give managers too much authority to adjust salaries and change
work assignments, strip workers of basic rights and protections, and will
destroy morale’ (Kauffman, 2005a: 11). Not unexpectedly, there has been
an increase in blatant retaliation against military officers, Medicare experts,
climate change scientists, procurement professionals, public health phys-
icians, and other administrators who question the suppression or manipu-
lation of public information (New York Times, 1 September 2005).
Officials already face difficult circumstances in determining what might
be appropriate behavior in today’s public service. The civil service reform
movement adds to these challenges by emphasizing managerialism at the
expense of employee protections. Corporate monetary incentives like pay-
for-performance, for example, can easily be used to reward political
loyalty. Radical reform, writes George Frederickson, ‘will almost cer-
tainly result in less ethical government’ (1997: 194). Over time, the public
service ethos – the ideal of a politically neutral, expert, permanently
staffed civil service devoted to the greater good – will surely wane. The
blurring of boundaries, which produces many different types of public
servants in various sectors of the economy, has been corrosive to such an
ethos. More and more employees, ‘seeing no evil’, will not ‘speak truth to
power’ when witnessing pernicious activities that put the public interest at
risk (Roehling, 2003).
Meaningful work supports the dignity of human beings as moral agents
(Bowie, 1998) through management that strengthens – not weakens – ratio-
nal capacities and moral development. An organization that imposes
unilateral, autocratic work practices like unjust dismissals that lack
accountability is inconsistent with democratic norms. Indeed, the doctrine
is reminiscent of the Soviet management command-and-control system
that compelled obedience and suppressed participation (Radin and
192 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

Werhane, 1996). As civil service reformers and their ideal of a corporate-

run state spreads, the human resource management problems in demo-
cracies will intensify. The idea seems to be, writes Jonathan Walters (2001),
‘that if you can fire people with impunity, and reward or punish them with
pay, then public servants will be whipped into shape just like employees at
all those corporations that have been mired in corruption and/or lost
market share in recent years’.
The controversy over civil service reform is not about better services for
citizens at less cost; changes such as terminating tenure have less to do with
their validity than with the political power of the dominant party that
establishes them. Since there is little evidence of a business case for reform,
advocates seldom consider the dysfunctional impacts of change or include
evaluative mechanisms in reform. What seems to be more important is that
simplistic changes are politically popular and divert citizen attention from
substantive issues.
Using heroic assumptions about the transformatory character of public
management, Pollitt and Bouckaert point out NPM proponents have
sought to redefine policy weakness as managerial failure (2004: 157). The
irony is that political officials may claim that the problem is the adminis-
trative system, but the citizenry believes that it is the political system, and
holds elected representatives responsible. In fact, voters seem to care less
about management and more about the failure of leaders to uphold ethical
standards. If so, the authors continue, reforms – absent any effort to
enhance the recruitment, training and integrity of politicians – are unlikely
to contribute much to public confidence in government. And, given the
difficulty in evaluating NPM reforms, it is doubtful that the benefits gained
in selected new administrative procedures can be expanded to sweeping
assertions of better government overall. Indeed, not only may management
changes fall short of hoped-for benefits, but they may produce effects
that render processes worse than before (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004,
Chapter 1).
The real questions, then, that the civil service reform debate raises are,
‘which bureaucracy, operated in whose interests, with what capacity, and
held accountable to democratic values in what way?’ (Durant, 2001: 6). The
decisions made in response to these concerns will be critical for the quality
of the world’s democracies in the years ahead. Reforms such as removing
job security and instituting performance pay encourage raw political decis-
ions at the expense of neutral competence in public service. The United
Nations Convention Against Corruption requires that the public service be
based on merit and equity. If the critique of civil service reform in these
pages is correct, then at some distant point in the future, a new movement
will emerge to restore ethics and integrity in government.
 Removing employee protections 193

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank Mark Jeffery, Universitat de Catalunya

Barcelona, Spain, for helpful suggestions on selected parts of the paper,
portions of which are incorporated here, and Herman Siebens, Flemish
Network for Business Ethics, for comments on the overall manuscript. Our
gratitude does not imply that they endorse the interpretations here.
Appreciation is also expressed to Shreya Agrawal for her assistance.

NOTES

1. As Green et al. (2006) point out, there are few systematic data on ethics and civil service
reform. Little attention is devoted to the topic in Cooper’s (2001) authoritative examin-
ation of administrative ethics. Menzel’s (2005) literature review of ethics and integrity in
governance also found that the subject is seldom addressed in public affairs journals. In
the civil service reform literature, ethics is not a central concern in the United States
(Kellough and Nigro, 2006) or Europe (Lawton and Doig, 2006).
2. The book contains 12 descriptive country profiles in an appendix that forms the basis for
the analysis in the body of the work.
3. In any case, overall pay levels would have to change if a public employer does not offer job
protection against arbitrary dismissal (for example, ‘Someone might as well work for busi-
ness for more money as there is no security in government,’ according to an anonymous
Florida state agency supervisor; personal communication, February, 2005). Yet, increas-
ing remuneration appears to be an unrealistic expectation because most American juris-
dictions have historically used a below-market compensation strategy. ‘Let’s not be naïve,’
a union official stated, ‘They (the reformers) are not going to use pay-for-performance to
increase federal pay’ (Kauffman and Sullivan, 2005: 6).
4. An analysis of selected reforms on the Continent is available from the authors. NPM-type
reforms are evident as well in Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Committee on
Economic Affairs and Development (CEAD), 2003). It also should be noted that while
the American at-will doctrine is not often explicitly referred to in the European literature,
the trends described in the text are consistent with the spirit of the doctrine. On dismissal
policies in Europe see for example, Baker and McKenzie, 2000.

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12. In defence of politicking: private,
personal and public interests
Robert P. Kaye

INTRODUCTION

In the 1990s the British political system experienced profound ethical

change. Prompted by concerns about the behavior of backbench MPs,
political appointments to quangos, and the revolving door between gov-
ernment and private industry, the Government appointed a specialist
Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL), initially under Lord
Nolan, which set about examining – and reforming – areas of government
that gave rise to concerns over public integrity. Nolan was not an
attempt to start from first principles. Its reforms were designed to work
within the framework of institutional opinion. Nonetheless the ensuing
reforms were not immune to an ‘ethics backlash’. Just as writers such as
Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996) and Mackenzie and Hafken (2002) have
pointed to ways in which ethics measures can act antithetically to good
government and stymie public administration, so in the last three to four
years post-Nolan reforms1 have been criticized as excessive, burdensome,
disproportionate, outmoded, irrelevant – a critique that has resulted in a
rolling back of the ethics regime for Members of Parliament and a CSPL
report on ‘getting the balance right’ in the rules for local councillors and
public appointments.
This chapter uses examples from the new ethics regimes in British local
government and the House of Commons in an attempt to provide a more
theoretical understanding of the limits of public integrity policies. By con-
centrating on institutions with legislative functions, the cases bring into
sharp focus the potential clash between public integrity and democratic
representation; between independence and neutrality; and between public
administration and politics.
In particular, it suggests that a neat distinction between private and
public interests is singularly unhelpful. Ethics regulation needs to recognize
that the ‘unencumbered official’ is illusory, that interests may cohere as well
as conflict, that there is no single ‘public interest’ but different ‘publics’, and

197
198 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

hence a variety of ‘public interests’ which must compete within a political

system.
I start by examining the idea of ‘encumbrance’, arguing that elected
officials will inevitably possess a variety of ‘interests’ (broadly defined) that
are unique to them as individuals; some will be relatively personal to the
individual, some will be widely shared. Some will be relatively selfish, others
broadly altruistic. Since these ‘interests’ fall along a continuum, it is not
even theoretically possible to conceive of the ‘unencumbered legislator’.
Furthermore, I argue, this continuum highlights the absence of a clear
‘public interest’. I then highlight some cases where ‘public interests’ have
been treated as encumbrances and examine the extent to which to do so
involves intolerable intrusions into democratic accountability. I suggest
that the answer is to avoid a ‘compliance-based’ approach which seeks to
distinguish between permissible and impermissible conflicts and activities,
and instead to adopt a system of regulation in which interests are pro-
actively managed using a range of tools, strategies and regimes.

CORRUPTION, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND

THE MYTH OF THE UNENCUMBERED
LEGISLATOR

I assume for the purpose of this chapter that ‘ethics measures’ are imposed
in order to counter a number of potential problems that arise from what is
loosely termed ‘conflict of interest’:

1. Outright corruption in which a public office is abused for personal

profit (although in truth simple ethics regulation can do little against
the most egregious forms of corruption).
2. ‘Gray’ forms of corruption (Heidenheimer, 1978) in which officials
subvert the official duties out of personal interest or other ‘private-
regarding’ considerations (Nye, 1967).2
3. Unconscious but nonetheless impermissible influence on the actions of
legislators and officials caused by conflicts of interest (Stark, 2000:
36–59; Thompson, 1987: 111–16).

At the same time, it should be recognized that there is an empirical

problem in ascertaining whether an official has been motivated by an
improper interest; we have no way of observing how the official would
have behaved absent that interest. For this reason it is usually considered
legitimate to control both conflict of interest and the appearance of
impropriety, regardless of whether that interest actually does exercise an
 In defence of politicking 199

impermissible influence over the official. Philp (2001: 358-9) defines polit-
ical corruption as follows:

Core cases of corruption [emphasis added] involve four key components:

– an official (A), who, acting for personal gain,
– violates the norms of public office, and
– harms the interests of the public (B)
– to benefit a third party (C) who rewards A for access to goods or services
which C would not otherwise obtain.

This is essentially bribery. But corruption may occur in a variety of ways.

Although Philp’s definition would include both regular bribes proffered,
and extortive bribes (or ‘facilitation payments’) demanded by officials, it
would not include some other situations in which public office was abused
for personal gain, what Key (1936) refers to as graft. For instance, some
corruption scenarios, such as misappropriation or abuse of confidential
information to make a profit do not require a third party.
More satisfactory may be Johnston’s (1997: 62) definition of corruption
as ‘the abuse of public roles or resources or the use of illegitimate forms of
political influence by public or private parties’. Johnston acknowl-
edges that the word, ‘abuse’, ‘illegitimate’, ‘public’ and ‘private’ all need
unpacking.
However, when unpacked the idea of ‘private’ interests (or influences) is
an elastic concept. Nye (1967) points out that ‘private-regarding’ consider-
ations might include the interests of one’s own family or small cliques. The
operation of government in the interests of a particular sector, group,
sector or tribe might constitute corruption. At one extreme, one can argue
that ‘pork-barrelling’, subverting the wider national interest to parochial
concerns is a form of institutionalized corruption. But with each stage, we
move further from direct private benefit; and with each it becomes more
arguable that the official was acting for ‘the public’. An element of self-
interest never goes away, but likewise only the most maladjusted of polit-
icians will act without any regard to the position of others.
One could think, therefore, of a series of ‘interests’ radiating outwards
from an official:

(a) private, personal gratification;

(b) dependent family (spouse, dependent children, siblings or parents);
(c) other family;
(d) friends;
(e) social groups and societies;
(f ) political parties;
(g) community and supported interest groups;
200 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

(h) constituency; and

(i) ‘causes’.

All of these might have a bearing on the actions of an official. Where

exactly, is the line to be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate sources
of influence?
This dilemma becomes more profound if it is accepted that there is no
single ‘public interest’. The Third Report of the CSPL (on local govern-
ment) talks of membership of lobbying groups as public interests (plural).
A councillor may also be involved with a particular interest group, or
may be concerned with a particular cause. A councillor may well take a par-
ticular standpoint on an issue that divides the community . . .
In such situations, even though the councillor has direct contacts with
organizations, the interest is a public interest, not a private one.
That is to say, Nolan draws the public/private distinction somewhere
above (h) in the list at the beginning of this section. Implicitly, he rejects the
idea of a single ‘public interest’. If we do so, it seems that the public inter-
est must be recast as the product of a well-functioning political process; not
as the aim of it.
With the notions of public and private interest blurred, there is scope for
much greater disagreement and uncertainty as to the conditions in which
an action might be said to be improper. Consider the following scenarios:

‘Westminster Homes for Votes’

Porter was the Conservative party leader of Westminster council. Along

with a group of Conservative colleagues, she formulated a strategy of
shoring up political support for the party by targeting the forced sale of
council houses at marginal constituencies. These homes were sold at a con-
siderable (and legitimate) discount. In 1996 the District Auditor concluded
that the policy was illegal and that Porter and five other councillors were
liable for the resulting losses – £27 million. The issue with which the appeal
courts had to grapple was this: is a political decision unlawful because it is
pursued for party advantage; does it, in fact, legitimate a political decision
that those involved believed it would reap political advantage; or does the
truth lie somewhere in between?

The Skateboard Park

A councillor took part in decisions relating to proposals to build a new

skateboard park. His mother led the campaign against the skateboard
park. However, she did so as a ‘public-spirited campaigner’ and had no
 In defence of politicking 201

personal, private interest in the proposal. The Standards Board, which

investigated local government behavior, held that the son had broken the
Code of Conduct by not withdrawing. The issue for the adjudicating tri-
bunal was whether the mother’s involvement amounted to an interest on
the part of the councillor, and if so, whether it was ‘prejudicial’ and, thus,
requiring the councillor to withdraw.

The McConnell Case

In 2002, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, who investigates

complaints about the ethical conduct of Members of Parliament, received
a complaint from a Labour MP, John McConnell. McConnell said:

Since 1999 I have opposed . . . the City of London (Ward Elections) Bill . . .
[T]he promoter of the Bill in the Commons invited me to meet him and repre-
sentatives from the City Corporation to discuss amendments to the Bill . . .
[The promoter] stated that if I dropped my opposition to the . . . Bill it would
enable him to obtain for me a place on the [Northern Ireland] Committee.3

Although the Commissioner found the facts as alleged unproven, he would

otherwise have had to come to a conclusion on whether this amounted to
the offer of an improper advantage to a member.
None of these cases, however, rests on a clash between the politician’s
representative duties and direct, private, personal, pecuniary advantage.
The situation was far more complicated, involving questions of mixed
motivation, procedural propriety and conflicting public or quasi-public
interests. In the following sections I want to discuss the difficulties of trying
to incorporate three potential sources of influence as ‘interests’ within an
integrity regime: ‘electoral’ and constituency ‘interests’; tradable political
positions; and causes, preferences and other ‘biases’.

ELECTORAL ‘INTERESTS’

Electing officials is not a neutral act with regard to circumstances involving

conflict of interest. On the one hand, electing officials may help resolve or
reduce the potential for officials to be influenced by private interests. Some
writers have suggested that a communion of interests is necessary for
effective representative government (Madison, 2006 [1788]; Burke, 1792).
Some also take this as an argument for an official having private personal
interests which reflect those of their constituency or constituents. However,
electing, and in particular re-electing, officials obviates the need for this.
Ideally, election creates a communion of interests between officials and
202 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

their constituents. Realistically, this relationship is blurred by factors such

as the electoral system, the cultivation of swing voters, and so on. The elec-
toral system may not perfectly aggregate voters’ interests. But it is likely to
do so at least as well as hoping for an advocacy representative.
However, depending on the normative basis of the political system, con-
siderations such as electoral advantage and the interests of one’s con-
stituents might be considered as improper influences. Degenerate forms of
legitimate concern might include clientelism and pork-barrelling.
In the UK, the balance between national and constituency interests is
left undefined. The Code of Conduct for MPs recognizes the Members’
‘special duty to their constituents’. Presumably these various constituency
interests can be aggregated at the collective level. As one Speaker of the
House of Commons put it, ‘this place is all about interests’; while Reeve
and Ware (1991) note that geographical constituency boundaries have
often been drawn specifically in order to represent particular sectoral
interests. However, when a House of Commons committee considers
private legislation, usually relating to a specific organization or promul-
gated on behalf of a particular authority, MPs are required to declare
that neither they nor their constituents have any special interest in the
legislation.
For the most part, the House of Commons however allows an exemption
for constituency interests from conflict of interest rules:

Irrespective of any relevant interest which the Member is required to register or

declare, he or she may pursue any constituency interest in any proceeding of the
House or any approach to a Minister or servant of the Crown, except that: where
the Member has a financial relationship with a company in the Member’s con-
stituency the [usual rules applying to companies] shall apply.4

The ‘flip-side’ of seeing election as creating a communion of interests

between representative and constituents is that local interests become per-
sonal interests. This creates a tension between democratic pressures for rep-
resentation of local interests and public integrity pressures for disinterested
decision-making. As Thompson (1987: 113) puts it, ‘representation does
not readily accommodate autonomy’. This tension is also evident in the
words of Nick Grenier, cited by Philp (1997: 437), who was acquitted of
corruption offenses in Australia after apparently appointing an MP to a
public office as an act of patronage:

Under the English common law very serious obligations to act in the public
interest are placed on those elected to public office, and yet our highest public
officials are at the same time, part of a political system which is about what is in
many ways a largely private interest in terms of winning or holding a seat.
 In defence of politicking 203

The ‘integrity’ position involved, here, however needs unpacking. It has

become detached from concerns about conflict of interest, and instead
attached to a more general concern with ‘neutrality’. It certainly cannot be
based on the notion of conflict of interest, because the public and private
interests in question are the same. This is not a mere coincidence: it is not
just a shared interest between representative and constituency; it is a
common interest. (One possible analogy might be to think of the difference
between two people who own shares in a company, and a married couple
owning property jointly.)
The Westminster Homes for Votes case is illustrative here because it
seemed at times to be suggested that it was improper for councillors to
allow electoral considerations to play a part in their decision-making. This
was something of a red herring, but seemed to occupy an amount of the
judges’ attention as the case first went to the Divisional Court, which
upheld the auditor’s conclusions, was overturned in the Court of Appeal,
and was finally reinstated in the House of Lords.5 Kennedy J for instance,
argued:

Some of the submissions advanced on behalf of the auditor have been framed in
such a way as to suggest that any councillor who allows the possibility of elec-
toral advantage even to cross his mind before he decides upon a course of action
is guilty of misconduct. That seems to me to be unreal. In . . . politics many if not
most decisions carry an electoral price tag, and all politicians are aware of it.6

Schiemann LJ was somewhat more on target:

It is legitimate for councillors to desire that their party should win the next elec-
tion. Our political system works on the basis that they desire that because they
think that the policies to which their party is wedded are in the public interest
. . . There is nothing disgraceful or unlawful in councillors having that desire . . .
[T]o hold otherwise would depart from our theory of democracy and current
reality.7

For Schiemann, electoral considerations merely reflect valid local con-

siderations. The Court of Appeal therefore concluded that the Homes for
Votes policy was not unlawful.
The House of Lords, however, disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s
approach. For instance, Lord Bingham, said:

Elected politicians of course wish to act in a manner which will commend them
and their party . . . to the electorate. Such an ambition is the life blood of democ-
racy and a potent spur to responsible decision-taking and administration.
Councillors do not act improperly or unlawfully if, exercising public powers for
a public purpose for which such powers were conferred, they hope that such
204 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

exercise will earn the gratitude and support of the electorate and thus strengthen
their electoral position. The law would indeed part company with the realities of
party politics if it were to hold otherwise. But a public power is not exercised
lawfully if it is exercised not for a public purpose for which the power was con-
ferred but in order to promote the electoral advantage of a political party.8

Bingham appears to be arguing for a ranking of motivations: electoral

advantage can be a subordinate but not a primary motivation.
For Lord Scott meanwhile,

there is all the difference in the world between a policy adopted for naked polit-
ical advantage but spuriously justified by reference to a purpose which, had it
been the true purpose, would have been legitimate, and a policy adopted for a
legitimate purpose and seen to carry with it significant political advantage.9

Hard cases, it is said, make bad law. In this case, while paying lip service to
the idea that there is nothing wrong with courting approval, the courts
seemed too content to conclude that local authorities were, ultimately,
officials rather than representatives. What both the Appeal Court and the
House of Lords failed to grapple with was that a key consideration in the
Westminster case was the nature of the impact of electoral politics. Porter,
et al. were not pursuing the policy because they thought it would be popular,
would reap votes, would therefore keep them in power and able to pursue the
Conservative policies that they thought were good for Westminster. They
were trying to change the composition of the electorate for electoral gain to
undermine and to supplant, not to benefit, the existing electorate. Electoral
considerations could not be used to justify the councillors’ actions given the
essentially anti-democratic nature of their policy. Porter, et al. realized that
the interests of the constituents and the Conservative party were categorically
not the same – that was precisely why they were trying to change the compo-
sition of the constituencies! They were acting as agents of the Conservative
party, whose interests conflicted with those of the relevant public, thus con-
stituting what Scott LJ rightly described as ‘corruption’. But it was what
Thompson (1995) described as ‘institutionalized corruption’ where the
benefits were political, not personal. And it was what Thompson (1993) and
Johnston (1996) describe as ‘mediated corruption’ – the ‘short-circuiting [of]
an open, accountable democratic process’ (Johnston, 1996: 332).
At the same time, however, one assumes that Porter’s motivation for
retaining Tory control of Westminster was not entirely selfish; that she
thought it in Westminster’s interests (regardless of what Westminster resi-
dents may have thought). One could even argue she was following Burke’s
injunction, ‘Your representative owes you . . . his judgement . . . and he
betrays [you] if he sacrifices it to your opinion’ Burke (1854) [1774].
 In defence of politicking 205

Unfortunately, by allowing the issue to be turned into one of conflict

versus communion of interest, the courts established judgments which
seemed to imply that one could have regard to party considerations, so long
as they weren’t paramount (theoretically questionable), when the real issue
was whether party interests were – in a particular case – really an illegit-
imate sectoral interest, or a legitimate means of divining a public interest.

HORSE-TRADING, MIXED MOTIVATIONS AND

THE AGGREGATION OF INTERESTS
A further difficulty in the Westminster case, however, was what Thompson
(1987: 11–69) calls the problem of many hands. Legislatures are collective
bodies, composed of individuals with varied motivations. In Westminster,
some of those who initiated the policy, and knew its partisan motivation, were
not on the committee that formally implemented it, and most of those who
were on that committee did not know of its origin. As Lord Scott observed.

There were twelve members of the housing committee. Seven of them voted in
favour . . . Five voted against. Of the seven, two . . . were found guilty of mis-
conduct by the auditor . . . As for the other five . . . who voted in favour of the
resolution, they so voted because the resolution was Conservative party policy.
They did not know that the purpose of the resolution was to obtain electoral
advantage in the eight key wards.10

Scott LJ went on to describe the votes of the five as ‘valid’ – overturning

previous findings which had viewed them as tainted by the partisan con-
siderations contributing to their becoming party policy.11 Likewise
Schiemann LJ noted:

A vast number of decisions come before local authorities at each meeting and it
is simply not practicable for each councillor to have examined the merits of each
decision. In practice the immediate motivation of the councillors voting for it
will often be that the proposal has the support of members of their party some
of whom will have carefully considered the merits of the proposal in the light of
general values which a particular councillor member of that party will broadly
share.12

This problem of mixed motivations is not just theoretical. It is a real

consideration because there comes a point where it might be difficult to
disentangle legitimate aggregation of interests from improper pressures.
Politicians inevitably have mixed motivations: on a particular issue, some will
likely be considering the issue in isolation, some will be following a party line,
some will be accepting some form of political compromise or deal – and most
206 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

will be aggregating a number of these considerations. This mixed model of

representation means that a single model of legislative ethics is not possible.
The issue of ‘horse-trading’ came to the attention of the Courts in the
Westminster case, where it was given tacit acceptance. The quote from
Schiemann above continues:

[C]ouncillor A will frequently vote for the sewage scheme proposed by his party
or by councillor B because councillor A wishes to persuade his party and coun-
cillor B to vote for councillor A’s education proposal.13

A theoretical model of legislative ethics which blindly assumes every

official takes every decision ‘on the merits’ (see Bauer, 1996, for a discus-
sion of ‘the merits’) in isolation from all other decisions and extraneous
considerations is frankly unrealistic. Political decisions invariably have
wider consequences, for example, vote for the sewage scheme, and there will
be less in the budget for the education policy. Political interaction, com-
promise and trading are necessary components of the aggregation of inter-
ests. Thompson (1987: 113) acknowledges that ‘legislators could still trade
votes on legislation they think less important in order to win passage of
legislation they think more important – but only if such logrolling did not
prevent consideration of the more important measures on their merits’.
The danger is that such horse-trading becomes log-rolling and pork-
barrelling: the type of activity Thompson has in his sights in Ethics in
Congress (Thompson, 1995) and legitimate behavior will fall into institu-
tional corruption. Thompson argues, similar to the judges in the
Westminster case, that a necessary component in identifying institutional
corruption is procedural impropriety. The difficulty is that it is not always
clear what constitutes legitimate versus illegitimate considerations and,
consequently, determining what may be legitimately traded?
This issue was played out in the McConnell case. As noted, the
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards found McConnell’s allegations
unproven. Assume, however, that the Chairman of the Select Committee had
made an offer of a committee position explicitly conditional on McConnell
dropping his opposition to the Chairman’s bill. The Commissioner chose to
approach the case under a ‘catch-all’ provision of the Code of Conduct
requiring that MPs do nothing that would bring the House into disrepute.
But he also noted that ‘as the Code in addition provides that Members shall
not accept any reward in connection with the promotion of, or opposition
to, any Bill, it might also be argued that no Member should offer another
Member such a consideration’.14
The offer is fascinatingly ambiguous. To begin with, it demonstrates the
difficulty of disentangling personal and political considerations. Was the
 In defence of politicking 207

inducement the private, personal advantage of a seat on the committee in

question? If the offer of a position on the Northern Ireland Committee is
taken as a purely personal inducement to the MP then it might be seen as
corrupt. But as the quotation from the MP makes clear, the value for the
MP was the political value that lay in being able to influence Northern Irish
affairs. Unless an MP is politically interested in a matter, committee mem-
bership is often thought of as a chore. ‘Horse-trading’ therefore falls into a
morally ambiguous gray area in which legitimate, public policy trade offs
segue into self-serving inducements.
But even if the inducement was political, was it wrong for the bill’s pro-
moter to link the two issues? There was, on the face of it, no reason why the
membership of the Northern Ireland committee had any bearing on elec-
tions to the Corporation of London. From an administrative point of view,
Northern Ireland had no relevance to the City of London Elections bill,
and therefore to mix the two involved irrelevant considerations, illegitimate
reasons and hence a decision ‘not on the merits’. However, from a political
point of view, such horse-trading is simply the stuff of politics, without
which a parliament cannot perform its essential function of aggregating
interests. The practice may be somewhat unedifying and slightly distaste-
ful, but it might also be argued that a legislature cannot operate without it.
British politics sees nothing wrong with party managers using patronage as
a tool of political loyalty. Indeed, the Ministerial Code – which governs the
ethical behavior of ministers – compels a minister to resign if s/he votes
against the Government’s policy. Had the Commissioner upheld the
McConnell complaint, it could have been argued that the Government was
constantly in contempt of parliament.
Crucial to an understanding of the case, is to realize that had the pro-
posal been agreed upon, McConnell would have been able to pursue his
interests on the Northern Ireland Committee, which presumably he would
have considered more important than blocking the bill, while the other
MP would have gotten his bill through, which presumably he considered
more important than blocking McConnell. To all concerned it would, in
public policy terms, have been a more optimal position. These various
interests would have been aggregated, one of the core functions of a
legislature.

PREJUDGMENT AS BIAS

Perhaps the most tangible threat to representative forces from avowedly

ethical measures comes from Common Law rules against bias applicable to
local councillors. These precede the new ethical environment.
208 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

In British administrative law, bias can involve not only cases of actual or
apparent bias arising from personal gain, but also from prejudgment.
Subsumed within the leading authority on bias, ‘Locabail’,15 was Timmins
v Gormley16 in which the defendant of a claim for negligence successfully
argued that the judge in that case should have disqualified himself because
he had published articles in which he had consistently supported claimants
in personal injury cases, and written in trenchant terms against defendants
and their insurers.
Similar constraints apply in local government – and they are especially
problematic when applied to councillors who are involved in political lob-
bying groups. The difficulty arises from two conflicting principles. As the
Standards Board for England (2004, pp. 2–3) acknowledges, ‘It would be
wholly unreasonable to expect [councillors] to be devoid of general views
about a range of local issues. In fact, [they] may well have been elected
because of [their] views on those issues’. At the same time it advises coun-
cillors, ‘your statements and activities should not create the impression that
your views on a matter are fixed, and that you will not fairly consider the
evidence or arguments presented to you when you are making a decision’
(ibid., p. 3).
Here, one should turn to the Third Nolan Report which prompted the
creation of the new ethics regime in local government. As noted previously,
Nolan refers to lobbying organizations, and so on, as public interests – that
is to say, he draws the public/private distinction somewhere above (h), refer-
ring to the list on p. 199.
A councillor may also be involved with a particular interest group, or may be
concerned with a particular cause. A councillor may well take a particular stand-
point on an issue that divides the community . . .
In such situations, even though the councillor has direct contacts with organ-
izations, the interest is a public interest [emphasis added], not a private one. The
important principle is that everyone concerned should know that the councillor
approaches the matter from a particular standpoint, so that his involvement with
discussions and decisions can be weighed by colleagues, the press and the public,
against that background.

It is argued here that Nolan’s approach is more realistic than that of the
courts. Different conceptions of the public interest exist and the place for
those interests to compete is at the ballot box. Such attitudes are not
‘private interests’ opposed to the public interest, rather, they reflect the indi-
vidual politician’s conception of the public interest. That is, they are ‘con-
stitutive of his subjective capacity for political judgment, not [. . .] an
encumbrance’ (Stark, 2000: 253).
Guidance from the Standards Board highlights the problems that impar-
tiality requirements place on politicians.
 In defence of politicking 209

Campaigning about a particular issue does not, in our view, indicate a possibil-
ity that you will not fairly consider the evidence and arguments presented.
Simply approaching the issue from a particular point of view does not make an
interest prejudicial. This is particularly relevant to budget issues and matters of
broad policy . . . [I]t is highly unlikely that campaigning on issues of this kind
will amount to a prejudicial interest. One may need to consider policy decisions
and their implementation more carefully. Here, specific decisions are being made
about specific places, individuals and organizations.
. . . [Y]ou should adopt a particularly cautious approach to planning and
licensing matters. Membership of a group that campaigns for or against a par-
ticular planning or licensing application may well constitute a prejudicial inter-
est. You should avoid committing yourself on any matter that may fall to be
decided by you as a member of a planning or licensing committee. (Standards
Board, 2004: 4–5)

This guidance is unfortunate and may be driven as much by an attempt

to ‘judge-proof’ decisions as to ensure ethical behavior. The Board has
conflated the rules on bias and remaining free of prejudice with the rules
on interests, which may become so significant as to be prejudicial. The two
sources of prejudice (prejudgment and personal interest) are separate, but
the Board appears to have ‘read backwards’ and concluded that if a coun-
cillor is prejudiced (or a well-informed member of the public might reas-
onably think so), then they must have a personal interest. But even if such
biases are, as Stark (2000: 148–51) suggests ‘self-generated encumbrances’,
they are very different from the sorts of interest that give rise to conflict of
interest concerns.
Moreover, in making sure that councillors retain an open mind, one may
undermine the value attached to campaigning; one may also undermine the
value attached to electing officials if, once in power, the very fact that they
have been elected to pursue a policy is an obstacle to them pursuing that
policy. Consider a real-life scenario from the Standards Board:

If you were a vocal member of the No More Incinerators group, and sat on a
planning committee to determine an application for a new incinerator, you
would have a personal and prejudicial interest in the matter.

One might equally argue that if you were a vocal member of No More
Incinerators, had been elected on that platform, and had been appointed
to the planning committee by your colleagues on that basis, it would be
invidious to prevent you from participating on that basis. Your opposition
to incinerators does not represent a ‘private’ interest, it represents your
view of the public interest and no problems of conflict of interest thus
arise.
The point is that local councils are not simple administrative units – as
the ‘decision-maker’ approach of the courts would have it. They are very
210 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

deliberately democratic bodies – their members are elected, and represent

local interests.
Surprisingly, the Board also suggests

if you made a particular issue a centrepiece of your election campaign, or were

elected on the basis of a single-issue campaign, but are not a member of a related
lobby group, you will not have a personal or prejudicial interest under the Code
of Conduct. However, you still need to consider whether you are genuinely open
to persuasion about the matter. (Standards Board, 2004: 9)

It would appear that membership of the group, not the individual’s own
opinion, is determinative of whether the individual is genuinely open-
minded. But this is frankly ridiculous: one is no more nor less prejudiced
because one is a member of No More Incinerators than if one’s election
slogan was ‘No More Incinerators’. Being a member of a group is neither
here nor there – except that membership of a group is an ‘interest’ under
the Code of Conduct, whereas campaign slogans are not.
If treating positions as interests is questionable, the problem is exacer-
bated in the ‘skateboard’ scenario, where the Board tried to argue that the
councillor’s mother’s ‘interest’ as an objector, amounted to a ‘family’ inter-
est extending to the councillor. There was a strong case for saying that the
fact that the lead campaigner was one councillor’s mother was relevant, and
a potential source of influence, and should have been declared. She did not
have a direct, financial interest; nor did it affect her personal well-being. As
the adjudicating tribunal found, if she did not have an interest, then neither
could her son. Problematically, however, the Board had tried to argue that
the mother had an interest because she would want her campaign to be
successful, therefore success would affect her well-being. As the tribunal
noted, any position to which a person became publicly committed would
therefore constitute an ‘interest’. The clerk advising the planning commit-
tee in question had gone further – advising that any councillor who had
been lobbied should withdraw. Apart from circumscribing participation to
an impractical extent, such a stance would turn ‘autonomy’ into ‘decision
making in a vacuum’; and risk removing vital political activity from polit-
ical decision-making.
Treating political positions as encumbrances becomes even more per-
verse when confronted with ‘dual-hatted members’, that is, those who sit
on more than one body. (In local government this may happen because
one body nominates members of another.) In many countries, such
‘incompatibilities’ are the basic stuff of conflict of interest legislation.
What is perhaps more problematic is when such relationships are permit-
ted but regulators attempt to squeeze them into an unsuitable ethical
straitjacket.
 In defence of politicking 211

Consider this example:

The Code of Conduct does not automatically prevent you from considering the
same issue at more than one tier of local government, including speaking and
voting in both tiers . . .
So, for example, if an issue comes up for discussion at both the parish and dis-
trict level, and you sit on both authorities, you should:
● at the parish level, make it clear that you will reconsider the matter at the dis-
trict level . . .
● at the district level, declare a personal (but not prejudicial) interest arising
from your membership of the parish council which has already expressed a
view on the matter, and make it clear that the parish council’s view does not
bind you and that you are considering the matter afresh. (Standards Board,
2004: p. 15)

This position is neat theoretically – the primacy of deliberation in both

assemblies is maintained – but hardly tenable in practice. A simple state-
ment that one will keep one’s mind open is valueless: as the Locabail ruling
concluded, such a statement is made worthless by the ‘insidious nature of
bias’. It is suggested here that the correct answer to the problem of dual-
mandates could well be that adopted at Westminster – to ignore them.
Membership of local councils and the European Parliament require dis-
closure but do not trigger any recusal provisions. This strikes a balance
between the administrative need to ensure open, transparent decision-
making, and the democratic arguments for allowing representatives to rep-
resent their constituents’ interests.

CONCLUSION

It should not be concluded from all this that imposing ethical rules on leg-
islators is futile or counterproductive. There is a place even within the most
politically charged environments for ethical rules. Nor is it the case that any
restriction on the ability or choice of candidates for a particular con-
stituency is inherently anti-democratic. To go back to Burke [1774], con-
stituents elect not a member of Bristol but a member of Parliament –
legislators exercise power generally and collectively, not locally and indi-
vidually. This gives non-constituents a legitimate interest in the behavior of
others’ representatives. To hold otherwise would be to legitimate the worst
excesses of clientelism.
However, it is suggested that conflict of interest regulation requires a
finely balanced matching of risks to regulation – nuanced enough to catch
most problematic behavior without embracing its counterpart, and simple
enough to comprehend and implement.
212 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

In ethics discourse, compliance is often seen as the ‘low road’ to ethics,

to be compared with the arguably softer strategies of integrity assessment.
But in the regulation literature compliance is often identified with crime-
control strategies that aim to eliminate or at least reduce a proscribed activ-
ity, or conversely to ensure a prescribed activity. In contrast, regulation
involves ‘sustained and focused control . . . over activities that are valued
by a community’ (Selznick, 1985). By implication those activities also give
rise to concerns that necessitate regulation. In that sense, once it is recog-
nized that ‘conflict of interest’ may be a necessary evil, regulation seeks to
mitigate, to control, to manage but not to eliminate it.
Ethical norms must start from an understanding of legislators as indi-
viduals, what they do, and their professional and personal roles. The rules
must work to augment and buttress the normative environment in which
politicians work, not to counter and undermine it. In the UK both
Members of Parliament and local councillors are elected. They are there to
represent, to respond, to articulate and aggregate interests; they are poli-
ticians. The rules for MPs generally recognize this fact. The rules applying
to local councillors, especially the archaic Common Law rules on bias, treat
councillors as apolitical administrators. They set standards for local rep-
resentatives that differ little from those for judges. But councillors are not
judges. They are politicians and the ethics infrastructure needs to take
account of their need to politick.

NOTES
1. It should be recognized that the reforms implemented have on a number of occasions
differed considerably from the CSPL’s proposals.
2. Heidenheimer’s distinction between ‘black’, ‘gray’ and ‘white’ corruption is based on
elite and mass attitudes. I use the term here to refer to situations that are ethically objec-
tionable but qualitatively and quantitatively less severe – and less ‘clear cut’ – than out-
right bribery, such financial relationships that reinforce an official’s existing disposition
to a particular decision; or payments designed to foster a degree of mutual obligation
rather than an explicit quid pro quo.
3. 2001/02: HC 1147, Appendix, Annex A.
4. House of Commons, The Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament and the Guide to
the Rules.
5. For clarification, ‘the House of Lords’ in this context means the Judicial Committee of
the House of Lords, composed of senior British and Commonwealth judges, sitting as
a court.
6. Porter v Magill [2000] 2WLR 1444 (CA).
7. Porter v Magill [2000] 2WLR 1449 (CA).
8. Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, para. 21 (HL).
9. Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, para. 144 (HL).
10. Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, para. 154 (HL).
11. Porter won a pyrrhic victory on this point, pyrrhic because Scott pointed out that five
valid votes would be insufficient to win without the casting vote of the Chairman, which
 In defence of politicking 213

was tainted because he was privy to the secret policy. There was, therefore, no valid
autonomous vote by the Committee to break the chain of causation between Porter and
the losses caused by the policy.
12. Porter v Magill [2000] 2WLR (CA).
13. Porter v Magill [2000] 2WLR (CA).
14. 2001/02: HC 1147, Appendix, para. 4.
15. Locabail (UK) Limited v Bayfield Properties Limited [2000] 2WLR 870.
16. Timmins v Gormley [2000] 2WLR 870.

REFERENCES
Anechiarico, F. and J.B. Jacobs (1996), The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How
Corruption Control Makes Government Ineffective, Chicago, IL and London:
University of Chicago Press.
Bauer, R.F. (1996), ‘Professional ethics and the concept of the “merits” ’, Journal of
Applied Philosophy, 13, 21–30.
Burke, E. (1854 [1774]), ‘Address to the electors of Bristol’, in E. Bohn, The Works
of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, vol. 1, pp. 446–8, republished in P.B.
Kurland and R. Lerner (1986), The Founders’ Constitution, ch. 13, document 7,
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, also accessed at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s 7.html.
Burke, E. (1792) ‘On the subject of the Roman Catholics in Ireland’, letter to
Sir Hercules Langrishe, accessed at www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboard/shop/
burkee/extracts/chap 18.htm.
Heidenheimer, A. (1978), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis,
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Johnston, Michael (1996), ‘The search for definitions: the vitality of politics and the
issue of corruption’, International Social Science Journal (English version) 149,
321–36.
Johnston, Michael (1997), ‘Private officials, public interests, and sustainable democ-
racy: when politics and corruption meet’ in K.A. Elliott, Corruption and the
Global Economy, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,
pp. 61–82.
Key, V.O. (1936), The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States, Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Mackenzie, G. Calvin and M. Hafken (2002), Scandal Proof: Do Ethics Laws Make
Government Ethical?, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Madison, J. (2006 [1788]), The Federalist 57, Atlanta, GA: Emory University
School of Law.
Nye, J.S. (1967), ‘Corruption and political development: a cost-benefit analysis’,
American Political Science Review, 61(2), 417–27.
Philp, M. (1997), ‘Defining political corruption’, Political Studies, 45, 436–62.
Philp, M. (2001), ‘Access, accountability, and authority: corruption and the demo-
cratic process’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 36 (4), 357–77.
Reeve, A. and A. Ware (1991), Electoral Systems: A Comparative and Theoretical
Introduction, London: Routledge.
Selznick, P. (1985), ‘Focusing organisational research on regulation’ in R. Noll (ed.),
Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences, Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, pp. 363–8.
214 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

Standards Board for England (2004), Lobby Groups, Dual-hatted Members and the
Code of Conduct, London: Standards Board for England.
Stark, A. (2000), Conflict of Interest in American Public Life, Cambridge, MA and
London: Harvard University Press.
Thompson, D. (1987), Political Ethics and Public Office, Cambridge, MA and
London: Harvard University Press.
Thompson, D. (1993), ‘Mediated corruption: the case of the Keating Five’,
American Political Science Review, 87(1), 369–81.
Thompson, D. (1995), Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional
Corruption, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
13. Perceptions of corruption as
distrust? Cause and effect in
attitudes toward government
Steven Van de Walle

INTRODUCTION

A foreigner moves to Belgium, and needs a telephone line in his new apart-
ment. His Belgian friends wish him good luck, telling him it will take
months, unless he has some connections in the public telephone company,
or knows a politician who could intervene for him. The foreigner, not being
well-connected, reluctantly decides to follow the standard procedure, and
visits the telephone company’s office the next day. To his surprise, he is the
only customer there and is able to file his application within 20 minutes,
helped by a very friendly employee. One day later, his telephone is con-
nected. His friends are amazed. Pleasantly surprised about this fast service,
he goes back to the telephone company’s office, taking a bottle of his native
country’s wine for the friendly and helpful employee, and asked the
employee how comes his telephone was connected that fast, while everyone
told him it would take months. The employee smiles and tells him, ‘well,
you know, you were the first customer in weeks following the normal pro-
cedure, and not having some local politician call us. We really appreciated
that, and decided to connect your telephone right away.’
This joke, emergent from the 1980s, illustrates how political and other
‘connections’ have been a central element in the functioning of public ser-
vices in Belgium. Belgium has had an image of being a corrupt country for
a long time (Maesschalck, 2002; De Winter, 2003). A number of high-
profile corruption scandals in the 1980s and 1990s has contributed to this
image, and the structure of the party-political system has been a major
factor in some of these cases (De Winter, 2000). Recently, however, there
appears to have been a positive evolution (Van de Walle, 2004b).
In this chapter, we use a representative survey of 3168 Flemish citizens
to analyse the determinants of perceptions of administrative and political
corruption. We will show that citizens’ perceptions of corruption are

215
216 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

embedded in general attitudes toward government and that subjective cor-

ruption indicators may be heavily influenced by predispositions toward
government, and therefore do not reflect the respondents’ personal experi-
ence with corruption. Because many citizens do not have frequent personal
experience with corrupt practices, the answer they give in surveys is
influenced by other factors. The absence of an experiential basis allows
respondents considerable freedom to take certain other attitudinal aspects
into account. This creates problems of comparability and invites respon-
dents to broaden their frame of reference to whatever factor they wish
when giving an opinion on corruption. Perceptions of administrative cor-
ruption, hence, both contribute to the general attitudes toward adminis-
tration and government as well as being a consequence of them (Van de
Walle, 2004c).
In the first section we briefly present some of the available survey mate-
rial on citizens’ perception of public sector corruption in Belgium. Using
data from a general survey administered in Flanders in 2003, we subse-
quently analyse determinants of general perceptions of corruption and
unethical behavior. We show that these perceptions are to a large extent
influenced by feelings of political alienation and general attitudes toward
government. It is therefore difficult to distinguish cause and effect between
trust in government and perceptions of corruption. We then will show that
general perceptions of corruption should not be seen as an expression of
individual experience. Parallels become apparent with how citizens evalu-
ate government services, where a disconnection seems to exist between gen-
erally positive personal bureaucratic encounters and more negative
attitudes toward public services in general. We end by reviewing possibil-
ities for avoiding ‘contamination’ of perceptions of corruption by general
attitudes toward government, and for developing indicators that better
measure actual corruption.

PERCEIVED CORRUPTION IN BELGIUM

By means of an introduction, we briefly present some of the available

survey data on citizens’ perception of corruption in Belgium. The 1995
ISPO General Election Study (Beerten et al., 1997) revealed that 29 percent
of Belgians thought politicians to be more corrupt than other individuals,
while 65.5 percent did not see a difference. This study also revealed that citi-
zens have more problems with politicians who demand bribes or payments
for granting government contracts than with politicians who accept money
for a contract. A politician using bribes for funding his or her personal elec-
tion campaign is considered more reprehensible than is a politician who
 Perceptions of corruption as distrust 217

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
88 5
2
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
–8
–9
80

Source: Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index.

Figure 13.1 Belgium in the Corruption Perceptions Index

transfers the money to his or her political party, although 73.9 percent of
respondents overall viewed accepting bribes as unacceptable.1
The best-known source for corruption indicators is the Transparency
International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Figure 13.1). This
index ranks countries based on perceived corruption among politicians and
public officials.2 Even though the CPI does not lend itself to making time-
series comparisons, the trend for Belgium in recent years is quite clear:
Since 1999 there has been an unambiguous positive trend (the lower the
score, the higher perceived corruption). The score does not return to the
1980s level, but this is probably due to changes in the method of measure-
ment and the fact that data for Belgium and Luxembourg have not always
been disaggregated. Luxembourg generally ranks higher than Belgium.
In 2005, Belgium ranked 19th among the least corrupt countries (in a
total of 133 countries). This puts the country on a par with Ireland and
higher than, for example, Spain and Japan. Still, Belgium performs worse
than many other EU15 countries, including its neighboring countries.
Compared to 2004, the country declined in the rankings, even though this
change is probably not large enough to be significant.
Additional information on Belgian citizens’ attitude toward corruption
can be found in the 1999–2000 European Values Study. One question was
about the perceived occurrence of taking bribes. Table 13.1 shows the
218 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

Table 13.1 According to you, how many of your compatriots do the

following? Accepting a bribe in the course of their duties?

Almost all (%) Many (%) Some (%) Almost none (%)
BE 4.8 23.0 63.5 8.7
AT 2.4 30.4 63.3 3.9
DE 5.1 27.9 61.2 5.8
FI 2.3 20.3 64.5 13.0
IT 7.4 43.8 46.5 2.3
LU 0.9 9.7 38.1 33.0
UK 1.8 29.4 60.0 8.7

Source: European Values Study, only results for EU15 countries (Halman, 2001).

answers in a series of European countries and indicates significant

differences between countries. In Belgium, 27.8 percent of the respondents
report that almost all or many of their compatriots accept bribes. This per-
centage is comparable to that in Austria, Germany and the UK, yet higher
than that found in Finland or Luxemburg. In Italy, however, this percent-
age peaks at 41.2 percent.
Another question was asked as to what extent citizens considered it
justified for someone to accept a bribe in the course of his or her duties. The
percentage of respondents that considered accepting a bribe to never be
justified was 77.7 percent in 1981, 78.6 percent in 1990 and 84.1 percent in
1999. Figure 13.2 illustrates how the Transparency International and
European Values Study findings are related.
Considering bribes to be unjustified does not lead to perceptions of cor-
ruption to be lower in a particular country, though there are exceptions.
Perceptions regarding accepting bribes is actually quite similar across most
countries, despite differences in CPI scores. In only a few Central-European
countries is accepting bribes considered to be somewhat more justified, yet
the differences remain small.

WHAT DETERMINES PERCEPTIONS OF

CORRUPTION? AN ANALYSIS
For this section, we use data from the Werken aan de Overheid survey
(WADO-Working on Government), which was administered as part of a
research project commissioned by the ministry of the Flemish Community
(2000–4, www.kuleuven.be/trust). The questionnaire dealt with citizens’ atti-
tudes toward the public sector and contained items on socio-demographics,
 Perceptions of corruption as distrust 219

10 FI
DK SE
NL
9 LU
Corruption Perceptions Index 1999

GB

8 IE AT DE

7 ES
PT
FR

SI
6 EE

BE HU
GR
5 IT
CZ
PL
LT
4 SK
LV

2
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Accepting bribes justified, never (1) – always (10)
Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 1999, where ‘10’ means
that corruption is perceived to be very low; European Values Study (1999–2000 wave). ‘Please
tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never
be justified, or something in between. Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.’
Scale 1 (never) to 10 (always), mean score (Halman, 2001).

Figure 13.2 Perceptions of corruption (TI) and justifiability of accepting

bribes (EVS) in the EU countries

citizens and public services, citizens and politics, and citizens and society.
Participants were inhabitants of the Flemish Region (aged 18–85). Three
surveys were administered: a face-to-face survey (2002, n
1248, response
rate 68.2 percent), an initial mail survey (2002, n
2166, response rate 63.5
percent), and a second mail survey (2003, n
3168, response rate 61.9
percent).3 We will only report data from the 2003 survey here (Van de Walle
et al., 2004). Questionnaires were sent with two-week intervals. Fifteen suc-
cessive waves covered a period of half a year (third and fourth quarters of
2003). In this way the impact of events on citizens’ opinions could be meas-
ured and long-term impacts and evolutions analysed. We do not, however,
analyse trends in this chapter. Respondents each received three mailings: an
introductory letter, the questionnaire with postage-paid return envelope and
220 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

Table 13.2 Perceptions of unethical behavior in the public sector in

Flanders

Totally Disagree Not agree, not Agree Totally

disagree (%) (%) disagree (%) (%) agree (%)
Civil servants are more 8.4 28.7 38.2 19.0 5.7
corrupt than other
people
Politicians are more 3.0 18.4 36.2 29.4 13.1
corrupt than other
people
You need ‘connections’ 2.1 11.3 30.5 40.5 15.7
to get something
done by government
or the public
administration
All users of public 10.9 40.2 26.1 16.7 6.1
services are treated
equally
Users of public services 7.8 35.4 35.5 18.6 2.7
always get what
they’re entitled to

Source: Werken aan de Overheid (WADO) 2003, n
3168.

a reminder. As an incentive, a limited number of gifts (approx. 0.5 to 1

percent of respondents) was given to respondents by means of a lottery.
The survey contained a number of issues related to corruption and
favoritism, five of which are analysed here in greater detail. Three of these
are articulate corruption-related issues, the other two focus on issues of
equal treatment.
Surprisingly, 56.2 percent of the respondents believe an individual needs
connections to get something done from government or public administra-
tors; only 13.3 percent disagree. The results are somewhat more encourag-
ing in response to the question regarding corruption: just under a quarter
of respondents believe that civil servants are more corrupt than other
people. Politicians, however, are perceived to be more corrupt than other
people by 42.4 percent of participants in the survey. Responses to these
three questions are strongly correlated.
The correlation table along with a factor analysis confirm that the items
are measuring different dimensions of ethical treatment. While opinions on
corruption are quite moderate, there is evidently something wrong with
 Perceptions of corruption as distrust 221

Table 13.3 Perceived ethical treatment of citizens, correlations

Users get Civil Need Politicians

what servants connections corrupt
entitled to corrupt
Users treated equally 0.51a 0.08a 0.17a 0.13a
Users get what entitled to 0.07a 0.16a 0.11a
Civil servants corrupt 0.43a 0.40a
Need connections 0.36a

Note: a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; Kendall’s tau b.

equal treatment. Just one out of five respondents agrees that users of public
services are treated equally and get what they’re entitled to, while over half
of the respondents disagree.
In the next step, we attempt to explain these attitudes by socio-
demographic characteristics, social attitudes, voting behavior, and media
exposure. Socio-demographic variables are gender, level of education (six
levels), and age (six categories from 18–24 to 65). Social attitudes are indi-
vidualism (based on two items: ‘Humanity, brotherhood and solidarity are
all nonsense. Everybody has to take care of themselves first and defend their
own interests’ and ‘People should always pursue their personal pleasure, and
shouldn’t think too much about others’), and authoritarianism (also based
on two items: ‘Obedience and respect for authority are the two most import-
ant virtues children have to learn’ and ‘What we need is strong leaders who
tell us what to do’). Voting behavior is based on the question ‘Suppose there
are national elections next Sunday. Which would be your preferred political
party?’ This variable has been recoded into seven dummies, each referring to
one of the main parties; AGALEV (greens), CD&V (Christian-democrats),
N-VA (Flemish nationalists), SP-A (social democrats), Spirit (Flemish
nationalist and social democrat), Vlaams Blok (extreme right) and VLD
(liberals). The three media variables measure whether an individual reads
reputable newspapers, watches the news on public television, and/or watches
news on commercial television. The five dependent variables have been
recoded into trichotomous variables. Table 13.4 gives the results of the mul-
tivariate ordinal logit regression models.
The strongest models are these explaining attitudes towards the items
‘civil servants are more corrupt than normal people’ and ‘politicians are
more corrupt than normal people’. Opinions about political corruption
are strongly influenced by party preference. Extreme right wing voters are
more likely to think that politicians are more corrupt than other people.
Just 8 percent of extreme right wing voters disagree with the statement that
222 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

Table 13.4 Determinants of perceptions of ethical behavior: ordinal

regression models

Civil Politicians Need All Get what

servants corrupt connections treated entitled
corrupt equally to

SEX (0
male, 1
female) 0.185* 0.050 0.21**
0.024 0.143*

(0.074) (0.074) (0.077) (0.074) (0.073)
EDUCATION
0.128***
0.082*
0.115***
0.020
0.073*
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
AGE 0.021 0.012
0.001 0.007 0.032
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
AUTHORITARIANISM 0.041** 0.025 0.038** 0.047*** 0.050***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
INDIVIDUALISM 0.159*** 0.142*** 0.096***
0.002 0.048***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
PARTY: agalev 0.041
0.027
0.514* 0.036 0.266
(0.23) (0.225) (0.229) (0.232) (0.228)
PARTY: cd&v
0.348**
0.174
0.297* 0.193 0.233
(0.132) (0.132) (0.139) (0.133) (0.131)
PARTY: n-va
0.103 0.152 0.009
0.258
0.080
(0.213) (0.213) (0.221) (0.223) (0.215)
PARTY: sp-a
0.172
0.475***
0.392** 0.373** 0.343**
(0.131) (0.132) (0.138) (0.132) (0.131)
PARTY: spirit 0.356
0.128 0.174 0.201 0.361
(0.212) (0.217) (0.238) (0.212) (0.208)
PARTY: vlaams blok 0.393** 0.617*** 0.265
0.067
0.241
(0.142) (0.152) (0.16) (0.146) (0.144)
PARTY: vld
0.188
0.671***
0.238 0.115 0.167
(0.129) (0.131) (0.138) (0.132) (0.129)
QUALITY
0.166
0.190
0.240* 0.009
0.098
NEWSPAPERS
(0.108) (0.105) (0.107) (0.107) (0.106)
TV NEWS public TV
0.137 0.019
0.233 0.185
0.064
(0.134) (0.138) (0.145) (0.135) (0.133)
TV NEWS 0.152 0.295* 0.087 0.252 0.043
commercial TV
(0.132) (0.135) (0.141) (0.133) (0.132)
valid N 2742 2747 2749 2731 2735
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.148 0.143 0.098 0.017 0.040

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p0.05, ** p0.01, *** p0.001

 Perceptions of corruption as distrust 223

politicians are more corrupt than normal people. Social-democrats and

liberals are less likely to think politicians are more corrupt than other indi-
viduals. At the time of data collection, these were the two main parties in
the regional and federal governments, but an alternative explanation could
be that certain traditional voter segments of these parties have defected
rather early to the extreme right. Respondents with individualistic atti-
tudes are more likely to label politicians as corrupt, as is a lower education,
and a propensity to watch the TV news on a commercial TV channel,
rather than on public TV.
Perceptions of administrative corruption tend to be influenced by being
female, lower educated, scoring higher on individualism, and a somewhat
higher authoritarian attitude. As is the case for perceptions of political cor-
ruption, a party preference for the extreme right leads to a higher perceived
corruption. Voting for Christian-democrats leads to lower perceived
administrative corruption. Despite the number of explanatory variables,
the models for political and administrative corruption explain just 14.3 and
14.8 per cent of total variation.
The models for equal treatment and for getting what one is entitled to
have very low R squares, yet there are a number of significant relationships.
Stronger authoritarian attitudes co-exist with stronger beliefs in equal
treatment. Individualism leads to a higher belief that everyone will in the
end get what they’re entitled to when interacting with public services.
Perceptions and expectations of equal treatment are higher among sup-
porters of the social-democratic party, a party whose ideology stresses
equality. There are some effects of education and gender: females and lower
educated persons are somewhat more inclined to believe that public service
users will get that to which they are entitled.
Christian-democrats, Greens and Social-democrats are less inclined to
believe connections are needed to get something done, while individualism
and lower education leads to a higher perceived need of connections, just
as does being female. Those reading reputable newspapers do not agree that
connections are needed. Overall, again, the model’s explanatory power is
quite low.
When we look at only the three models directly dealing with corruption
(administrative and political, and the perception that connections are
needed), lower education, high individualism and a preference for the
extreme right are important determinants. All these variables are frequently
encountered in the research on political alienation. It is thus likely that,
instead of reflecting opinions on or experiences with corruption, the depen-
dent variables could in fact be considered as expressions of this alienation.
Stating that connections are needed, or that civil servants are corrupt may
therefore be the result of actual experienced corruption, but it may also be
224 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

part of a general (negative) predisposition toward government. We expand

our model, to include a number of political alienation variables. All alien-
ation variables load on a single factor:

● voting is useless; the parties do what they want to do anyway;

● most politicians promise a lot, but don’t do anything;
● most of our politicians are competent people, who know what they
are doing;
● parliament can best be abolished, since it does not solve any problem;
● the present political system is rotten; and
● to what extent do you trust government?

All variables have been recoded from five to three categories. Because
media exposure was not relevant in the basic model, we drop it here.
In all three cases, almost all alienation variables are significant determi-
nants for the corruption and ethics perceptions. In one of the two cases
where relationships are not significant at the p0.05 level, there is border
significance. Adding the alienation variables leads to a substantial and even
sometimes very substantial increase in explained variance (R2). Together
with some party preference variables, alienation accounts for most of the
variance in the corruption and ethics perceptions. The impact of extreme
right voting, which was relevant in the basic models, disappears, possibly
due to the fact that this voting behavior is partly determined by alienation.

WHAT ABOUT CAUSALITY?

The classical, mechanistic explanation for this kind of finding is that citi-
zens feel alienated from their political or administrative system because
they perceive it as being corrupt. In this chapter however, we defend the
hypothesis that perceptions of corruption are in fact expressions of a more
general attitude towards government. A further implication of this view-
point is that the attitudes as measured in our survey cannot be considered
as adequate reflections of actual corrupt practices. We briefly return to this
second point toward the end of the chapter.
In previous research on citizens’ perceptions of public services and on
citizens’ trust in institutions we have shown that there is a substantial degree
of generalization in respondents’ answers to quite general questions (Van
de Walle, 2004c). Trust in a certain institution quite often coincides with
trust in most institutions. Dissatisfaction with government in general often
coincides with dissatisfaction with a broad range of issues. A person with
a negative attitude toward government is also more likely to complain
 Perceptions of corruption as distrust 225

about high taxes, corruption, or administrative inefficiency. Certain

general predispositions toward government influence most attitudes
toward government-related aspects.
This has important implications for the interpretation of survey findings
like the ones we have presented above, and for building explanatory models.
Failing to recognize this generalization of negative or positive attitudes
toward government often results in models that are very good at proving
what one wanted to prove in the first place. Correlations between general
negative attitudes toward government and more specific elements of dis-
satisfaction (taxes, corruption . . .) do not necessarily mean that high taxes
or high levels of perceived corruption are to be seen as causes of or expla-
nations for this dissatisfaction. Instead, these specific elements could be
interpreted as expressions of this general attitude. It would thus be prema-
ture to look at the models in Table 13.5 and to consider citizens’ political
alienation as resulting from high levels of corruption. Instead, perceived
corruption and perceived unethical behavior are an expression of this polit-
ical alienation. By presenting the perceptions of corruption and unethical
behavior as dependent variables, we have further illustrated our point.
Proving causality, however, is not common in social methodology, and
often is simply impossible. Yet, causal constructions are an important
rhetorical device. Hence Ruscio’s criticism on the all-too-easy prescriptions
for restoring citizens’ trust in government:

Reactions to the decline (of trust, . . .) have certainly not been lacking, but they
typically follow a predictable formula: an analyst’s alarmed response which is
used to justify a set of prescriptions favored by the analyst. Trust can be restored
by – take your pick – term limits, balanced budgets, regulatory reform, rein-
venting government, campaign reform, responsible journalism, stronger polit-
ical parties, a third political party, vigorous state and local government,
constraints on lobbying or an end to divided government. (Ruscio, 1997: 454).

Limiting corruption and the introduction of an ethics infrastructure could

easily be added to this list.

DO GENERAL PERCEPTIONS REFLECT PERSONAL

EXPERIENCE?

For citizens, it is not easy to base their perceptions about or attitude toward
corruption on personal experience. Fragmented evidence suggests that
actual individual acts of corruption are quite limited in most Western coun-
tries. In the International Crime Victims Survey for instance, a question is
included on actual experienced corruption in relation with, for example,
226 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

Table 13.5 The effects of political alienation on corruption, ordinal

regression models

Civil servants Politicians Need

corrupt corrupt connections
SEX (0
male, 1
female) 0.233** 0.108 0.244**
(0.074) (0.078) (0.079)
EDUCATION
0.108**
0.025
0.072*
(0.031) (0.033) (0.032)
AGE
0.049
0.035
0.061*
(0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
AUTHORITARIANISM 0.044** 0.012 0.041**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
INDIVIDUALISM 0.116*** 0.078*** 0.041**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
PARTY: agalev 0.400 0.621*
0.156
(0.232) (0.241) (0.231)
PARTY: cd&v
0.112 0.055
0.088
(0.132) (0.139) (0.141)
PARTY: n-va 0.029 0.244 0.140
(0.215) (0.224) (0.225)
PARTY: sp-a 0.322* 0.302* 0.124
(0.134) (0.141) (0.143)
PARTY: spirit 0.726** 0.359 0.547*
(0.214) (0.228) (0.244)
PARTY: vlaams blok 0.238 0.283 0.001
(0.142) (0.158) (0.161)
PARTY: vld 0.329* 0.090 0.301*
(0.131) (0.138) (0.141)
VOTING USELESS 0.093 0.207*** 0.146*
(0.051) (0.053) (0.054)
POLITICIANS PROMISE 0.205** 0.894*** 0.264***
(0.066) (0.068) (0.065)
COMPETENT
0.226***
0.426***
0.120
(0.056) (0.060) (0.061)
ABOLISH PARL. 0.344*** 0.255*** 0.250****
(0.058) (0.063) (0.065)
SYST. ROTTEN 0.245*** 0.595*** 0.404***
(0.062) (0.064) (0.065)
TRUSTGOV
0.512***
0.347***
0.607***
(0.069) (0.071) (0.071)
N 2840 2852 2842
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.256 0.421 0.238
R2 increasea 0.118 0.286 0.149

Notes: a increase compared to basic model without media variables.

Standard errors in parentheses: * p0.05, ** p0.01, *** p0.001.
 Perceptions of corruption as distrust 227

customs officers, police officers and inspectors or other government

officials.4 Frequencies for these items are generally low to extremely low
(Van Kesteren et al., 2000). In our own survey, we included an item on poli-
ticians’ constituency service and the extent to which citizens have approached
a politician during the last four years for solving a personal problem.5 Just
2.5 percent of respondents mentioned more than one contact, while 9.6
percent of respondents admitted having approached a politician in the four
preceding years. Using politicians’ constituency service does not equal cor-
ruption. Other methods frequently used to measure actual corruption rather
than perceptions are household surveys, where personal stories of corrupt
experiences are shared and recorded within specific groups. The method is
less often used in developed countries, probably because of the lower occur-
rence of corrupt acts, and costs of collecting meaningful data.
Absence of personal experience forces survey respondents in general
surveys to relate to other elements or information to form their opinion on
corruption. The number of respondents whose answers are related to cor-
ruption based on recently experienced corruption is likely to be extremely
low. Reactions to a statement such as ‘you need connections to get something
done from government’ do not necessarily have a specific referential basis,
but more probably refer to information about government in general that is
present in the respondent’s mind (Zaller, 1996). Most probably this informa-
tion concurs with general attitudes towards government and with the general
stereotypes of government and administrations (Van de Walle, 2004a).
Here, a parallel with research on citizens’ perception of public services
surfaces. For several decades, scholars have repeatedly stumbled on a
number of apparent contradictions in citizens’ opinion about public ser-
vices. One contradiction deals with process. Citizens dislike inefficiency but
are equally dissatisfied when delivery of services is ruthlessly efficient (Blau,
1956: 14). Citizens complain about cumbersome red tape and paper-based
interaction, but wouldn’t like either that the official would forget precious
details about the specific encounter (du Gay, 2000). Both vices and virtues
of bureaucratic systems are used to fuel the traditional dislike of the
bureaucracy (Hill, 1992): corruption itself as well as the bureaucratic
impersonality that results from anti-corruption measures may give rise to
dissatisfaction. An inefficient police force creates dissatisfaction, but so
does a police force that is too eager issuing parking tickets. Two dominant
images prevail: the lazy, incompetent bureaucrat versus the power-hungry,
manipulative civil servant. It is not quite obvious how these two images may
reasonably co-exist.
The other contradiction, perhaps more important here, deals with evalu-
ation. While many citizens dislike public administration in general, they
are actually quite satisfied with many concrete services. Citizens generally
228 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

evaluate specific and concrete services in a more positive way than is the case
for government in general or for general concepts such as ‘the public admin-
istration’. The general image of bureaucracy does not correspond to the
evaluation citizens make about their own experience with public services
(‘bureaucratic encounters’). Public administration scholars started to write
about this in the 1970s. One of the earliest extensive studies on the issue was
a large-scale study by Katz et al. (1977) on differences in the evaluation of
public and private services. They asked respondents to evaluate public and
private sector services in general, as well as a recently used public and private
sector service. When respondents had to compare public and private sector
services, they indeed rated private sector services higher. However, when the
comparison concerned the private and public sector service that was used
most recently, differences between the evaluation of public and private
sector services disappeared. Goodsell devoted an entire book (The Case for
Bureaucracy (1983)) to the issue of divergence between evaluations of con-
crete bureaucratic encounters and the general public attitude vis-à-vis
bureaucracy. Most of Goodsell’s observations are echoed in other research
and articles as well (Grunow, 1981), and his theoretical explanations do not
differ greatly from Katz et al.’s research on bureaucratic encounters. Klages
(1981) referred to German research indicating differences in citizens’ evalu-
ation of civil servants in general and employees who provide specific public
services. Hill (1992: 20), in his chapter entitled ‘Taking bureaucracy
seriously’ wants to know why citizens state they were treated fairly by the
administration, while they don’t think governmental offices are giving fair
treatment. Although Hill uses some new survey material, his approach does
not introduce much more than Goodsell. Hill’s evidence found that citizens
tend to agree with negative statements about bureaucracy when these are
unrelated to bureaucratic performance and vague enough to serve as an
outlet for the stereotypical anti-bureaucratic images (Hill, 1992: 22). The
explanation lies therefore not in the degree of generalization, as can be con-
cluded from reading Goodsell, but rather on the symbolic content of con-
cepts and objects and not on the level of abstraction:

The conventional wisdom in political science and social psychology has been
that abstract attitude objects are processed differently than concrete ones. The
simple symbolic politics view assumes that processing of political symbols
depends on the evaluations associated with them, not on the symbol’s level of
abstraction (Sears, 2001: 20).

The abstract objects studied in public administration (government, bureauc-

racy, civil servants) often bear negative symbolic content, and this content
is being reflected when respondents are asked to give an opinion on the
administration or bureaucratic ethics and corruption. Because of the high
 Perceptions of corruption as distrust 229

level of abstraction of the concept (public administration) or the low level

of personal experience (corruption), respondents form an answer that is
plausible because it is compatible with the general symbolic content and
their own general attitude toward government.

WHAT ABOUT PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION?

How do we find these processes in perceptions of corruption? In our

WADO survey, we also asked respondents to indicate their level of trust in
a series of institutions (1
very little; 5
a lot). At the beginning of the
questionnaire, a general item on trust in government was also included.6
Table 13.6 shows how the general opinion on corruption correlates quite
strongly with trust in government in general and with trust in more general
and diffuse institutions, while correlations with rather specific institutions
are considerably weaker. The correlation between perceptions of corrup-
tion and general trust in government is the highest, directly followed by the
quite generally phrased items such trust in the Flemish administration,
Federal administration and municipal administration. At the bottom of

Table 13.6 Trust and corruption: correlations

You need connections to get something done

Trust Correlation Trust Correlation
coefficient coefficient
Government (general) 0.31 European Commission 0.17
Flemish administration 0.26 Police 0.17
Federal administration 0.25 Courts/justice system 0.15
Municipal administration 0.23 Educational system 0.12
Flemish Parliament 0.20 Public transport (bus, 0.11
tram)
Flemish Government 0.20 Flemish employment 0.10
agency
Belgian Parliament 0.20 Public television 0.10
Belgian Government 0.20 Refuse collection 0.08
Flemish political parties 0.18 Army 0.06
Walloon political parties 0.18 Postal service 0.06
College of mayor and 0.17 Railway company 0.05
aldermen

Source: Werken aan de Overheid (WADO) 2003, n
3168, Kendall’s Tau b, all correlations
significant.
230 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

the list are very specific services such as the railway company, the postal
service and so on, where correlations are very small, yet still significant. A
traditional explanation would be that citizens tend to associate institutions
such as the Flemish or Federal administration more with corruption than
is the case for services such as the postal service or the national railways.
It would be incorrect however to infer from these findings that citizens
experience or have experienced more frequent occurrences of corruption in
these non-specific institutions (‘the administration’, ‘government’). In fact,
these correlations merely confirm what we have described earlier. Even
though we have not measured perceptions of corruption in very specific
and concrete governmental institutions, we can quite confidently state that
survey respondents will report lower corruption in many specific institu-
tions than they will for the public administration or government in general.
Exceptions to this ‘general rule’ will then probably be services where there
have recently been corruption scandals or services that traditionally had a
very negative image. This means that the opinion on corruption is prob-
ably part of a general opinion about government and not so much the result
of actual experience. General surveys do not distinguish whether these
opinions are part of the general attitude towards government or resultant
from actual experienced corruption.
The relationship between general opinions about corruption, and
general attitudes towards government are also visible in a more inter-
national analysis. Figure 13.3 shows the levels of confidence in the civil
service in the EU countries (excluding Malta and Cyprus), as measured in
the European Values Study, and these countries’ scores on the
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index in the same
year. Even though imperfect, there is a strong correlation between both
indicators (Pearson correlation
0.506).
Again, this figure may be seen as indicating that corruption drives down
confidence in the civil service, but it can also be interpreted as supporting
our view that both perceptions of corruption, and confidence in the civil
service, are derived from a general view of government. There are no reli-
able criteria however, to decide whether and when a corruption perception
indicator reflects generalized views of government or actual experience
with corruption.

A NEED FOR BETTER MEASUREMENT OF

CORRUPTION?

While perceptions of corruption as a factor of general attitudes toward

government are an interesting indicator for researchers, most practitioners
 Perceptions of corruption as distrust 231

10 FI SE DK
NL
LU
9 GB
Corruption Perceptions Index 1999

DE
8 AT IE

7 ES FR PT

SI
6 EE

BE HU
GR
5 CZ IT

PL
LT
4 SK
LV

2
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
% Confidence civil service, EVS 1999

Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 1999 and European

Values Study 1999: % ‘a great deal’ and ‘quite a lot’ of confidence.

Figure 13.3: Confidence in the civil service and perceptions of corruption

and policy-makers are interested in actual corruption. This chapter clearly

showed that general items on perceived corruption risk to be ‘contami-
nated’ by general predispositions toward government. Generally, there are
two possibilities for isolating citizens’ perceptions of corruption from
general predispositions toward government. One is to avoid broad and
general questions and instead to focus on specific and concrete situations.
The other is to do away with measuring perceptions altogether and to step
up efforts to develop objective indicators of corruption.

Specific Measurement

We have shown that general perceptions of corruption correlate with

levels of trust in quite general institutions. The more specific an item in a
questionnaire, the narrower the respondent’s framework of reference for
answering the question becomes. This may help in filtering predispositions.
232 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

A general question such as ‘is the public administration corrupt’ invites

respondents not only to think about recent experience, but also to think
about all possible administrations, about bureaucratic stereotypes, even
about politicians, and so on. A more narrowly defined question such as ‘did
you personally experience corruption in service Y during the past three
encounters’ drastically confines the framework of reference to service Y and
helps to exclude many of the general predispositions toward government or
administrations. Specific measurement of corruption should therefore dis-
aggregate the general corruption items and ask questions on corruption
with regard to many different specific services and with regard to many
different expressions of corruption. Some examples are the Transparency
International Global Corruption Barometer, where respondents were asked
to give their opinion on the presence of corruption in a series of sectors.
They also could indicate the amount of bribes paid by one’s household, and
the reason why this was done (www.transparency.org). The barometer did
not, however, link actual behavior to specific sectors. Even more detailed are
household surveys, some also conducted by Transparency International. In
these surveys, detailed questions about corrupt practices and experiences
are included. These questions refer to concrete interactions with govern-
ment services and officials. For policy makers such a specific measurement
is also important, because it shows them where and how corruption is mani-
fest and hence facilitates action. Policymakers who use general corruption
indicators can in fact only use this information to decide on general meas-
ures to combat corruption, without being able to establish priorities for
action. Most of these very detailed surveys are conducted in developing
countries. Lower occurrence of corrupt practices in developed countries
would require very large samples to gather significant data, thus rendering
them somewhat more impractical.

Objective Measurement

Possibilities for measuring corruption objectively are sparsely reported in

the literature. One approach counts the number of cases related to cor-
ruption before the courts. In Belgium, Yante (2003) analysed the number
of lawsuits related to corruption. Despite the often-defective judicial stat-
istics, he did find a decrease and also observed a tendency for more severe
punishment in corruption cases. This relatively easy approach negates
certain aspects, because corruption is essentially an illegal and hidden
activity (Kaufmann, Kraay et al., 2003). A falling number of lawsuits may
also suggest decreasing judicial oversight or more hidden corruption.
Essentially, effectively measuring corruption is de facto combating
corruption.
 Perceptions of corruption as distrust 233

Kaufmann et al., in their Governance Matters III working paper, refer to

a small number of studies that attempted to measure corruption directly.
They mention Di Tella and Shargrodsky (2003), who measure variation in
procurement prices for medical supplies, where high variation suggests
there is corruption involved, and Golden and Picci (2005), who compare
expenditures for public infrastructure with existing inventories, where high
discrepancies may hint at corruption.
A third approach is to map incentives and opportunities for corruption
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999), influenced by the demand and supply in the
citizen-official encounter. Opportunities for asking or giving bribes may be
influenced by the level of discretion exercised by civil servants or political
decision-makers. Incentives are influenced by factors such as the likelihood
of being caught, and the savings in time and money to be had by circum-
venting customary procedures, especially when the customary procedure is
long and expensive with unpredictable outcomes.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we analysed determinants of subjective perceptions of cor-

ruption in Belgium. Belgium, a country with a somewhat corrupt image,
seems to have made some progress in dispelling such negative perceptions
during the last decade, as demonstrated by the country’s Transparency
International rankings. In an analysis of survey data, we found political
alienation to be one of the main determinants of citizens’ perception of
political and public sector corruption and of unethical behavior in the
administration. This had important implications for both the interpret-
ation of the causal link between corruption and other attitudes toward gov-
ernment, and for the practice of measuring corruption. General surveys
revealed that opinions on corruption and unethical behavior are embedded
in more general attitudes toward government. Unlike the reportedly wide-
spread personal experience with public corruption in Belgium, citizens of
Western countries hear about corruption but research has demonstrated
that firsthand experiences remain limited, thus emphasizing the geograph-
ical and cultural limitations of this study.
Still, general perceptions of corruption are often used as measures of
corruption in a country. These general perceptions are useful indicators for
attitudinal research, and also have a value in mapping a country’s image.
There is a need however for the development of more objective indicators
of corruption, and when surveys are used, very specific questions are to be
asked, rather than general queries. Finally, because perceptions of corrup-
tion seem to be an expression of general attitudes toward government, we
234 Ethics and integrity and the politics of governance

can no longer simply use surveys to prove that low levels of trust are a con-
sequence of corruption. Rather, high levels of perceived corruption are
probably a reflection of low trust. An implication of this is that declines in
actual corruption will not immediately have an impact on citizens’ general
perceptions of the occurrence of corruption.

NOTES

1. ‘Hardly acceptable’ and ‘never acceptable’. Of the remaining respondents, 17.8 percent
stated this is ‘sometimes acceptable’, and 5.4 percent stated that accepting money and
giving it to one’s party is ‘completely acceptable’.
2. www.transparency.org, note that CPI scores cannot just be compared on a year-to-year
basis, as composition has changed a number of times.
3. In the 2003 survey, ages 25–44 are underrepresented, ages 45–60 tended to return the ques-
tionnaire more often, and the 70 category is again underrepresented. Response was
higher in rural areas.
4. Q290: ‘In some countries, there is a problem of corruption among government of public
officials. During 1999, has any government official, for instance a customs officer, a police
officer or inspector in your country asked you, or expected you to pay a bribe or his or her
services?’ Answer
yes/no. In Belgium there were nine ‘yes’ answers on 2501 respondents
in the 1999 survey.
5. ‘People sometimes call on politicians for solving personal problems. Did you during the
last four year call on a politician’s constituency service for solving some personal
problem?’ We use the Dutch word ‘dienstbetoon’, which is generally translated as con-
stituency services, but which is in fact something more specific. ‘Dienstbetoon’ refers to
the waning Belgian politicians’ habit for holding office every week or month somewhere
in their constituency to meet individual citizens. Traditionally, this practice has been asso-
ciated with corruption, for example because citizens visited politicians to arrange jobs for
family members or to get building permits. Nowadays, however, the practice has evolved
into some kind of front-office social work, where politicians are considered easier to
approach than are certain national administrations. Politicians are now believed to limit
their ‘dienstbetoon’ to showing citizens the correct administration they should contact
with a certain problem or to referring citizens to the ombudsman. Of the respondents in
our survey who had approached a politician, 33.9 percent stated it helped solving the
problem, while 49.9 percent declared it did not. The others (29.9 percent) took a neutral
position.
6. General question near the start of the survey: ‘To what extent do you trust government’
(1–5 scale).

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James L. Newell (eds), Corruption in Contemporary Politics, Houndsmills:
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Nomos Verlaggesellschaft, pp. 24–43.
Maesschalck, Jeroen (2002), ‘When do scandals have an impact on policy making?
A case study of the police reform following the Dutroux scandal in Belgium’,
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Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1999), Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences,
and Reform, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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PART V

Conclusion
14. Global perspectives on good
governance policies and research
Leo W.J.C. Huberts, Jeroen Maesschalck and
Carole L. Jurkiewicz

INTRODUCTION
Moral challenges have confronted every society, regardless of locale or
state of industrial development. Every political institution and civil society
has had to contend with questions of ethicality. The failure to effectively
resolve these challenges is not new. What is novel, as suggested here, is a
shift in the public’s capacity and desire for scrutiny and insistence upon
adherence to moral standards defined by appropriate behaviors from those
holding public authority and the public trust. These individuals are being
held to increasingly higher standards in the past decade and this has fueled
a concomitant interest in public ethics research.
This chapter will reflect on both the practice and study of ethical gover-
nance from a global perspective. The intent is to provide an overview of
common dilemmas as well as a framework for continued theory develop-
ment and empirical research. First, a synopsis of the scope and breadth of
current research in this area will be examined along with its impact on
policy development and its beneficiaries will be presented. Second, a
overview of what aspects of good governance comprise the focus of current
research, what areas are under-analysed, and how efforts should be directed
in order to address these inadequacies in theory development. Further, this
research will be examined within the context of practical application to
countries experiencing a range of corruptive factors at all governmental
levels; what does and can research do to address these problems directly, in
a manner that is of value to those administrators faced with these chal-
lenges on a daily basis.
This purview of inquiry is important not only on a circumscribed level,
but is essential to the international policy debate as well. It is frequently
presupposed that there is agreement on the basic values of governance
characterizing liberal democracies with private enterprise and market
economies, though this remains to be proven. Similarly, the effectiveness of

239
240 Conclusion

anti-corruption and integrity policies and institutions shares a presumed

agreement without substantiation. These underlying assumptions beg to be
examined in light of current and future research. The trend toward cultur-
ally integrative and empirically-based research is encouraging and will no
doubt play an essential role in further articulation of both the issues and
the methods of inquiry used to examine them.

ETHICS AND INTEGRITY IN INTERNATIONAL

POLICY
It can be argued that increasing attention has been paid to issues of ethics
and integrity in politics, administration, economy and society on a global
scale. Following the cyclical nature of such things, good governance
appears to be back on the agenda of politicians, administrators, managers,
interest groups, the citizenry and members of the research community in
general. Stimulated by widespread reports of corruption typifying the era
beginning in the 1990s, few countries have escaped the intensified oversight.
The Italian political party system exploded in the early 1990s because of
revelations of corruption. The regimes of Marcos in the Philippines and
Suharto in Indonesia imploded for the same reasons (Klitgaard, 1988;
Rose-Ackerman, 1999), as is happening explosively today in Bulgaria,
Thailand, and to a lesser extent among factions in the United States. In
point of fact scandal seems the norm and ethicality the exception, and the
only variances among nations appears to be scope, size of impact and
novelty of the violation. As few countries have been untouched by public
scandals in the twenty-first century it must be asked whether corruption
and scandal are endemic to all governmental systems and, if so, is it pos-
sible to enact change. Certainly there are no easy answers and any solutions
must address the issue from both a macro- and micro-level. There are a
number of global and international initiatives tackling this problem that
are worthy of note.

United Nations

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Corruption in 1997

reaffirmed its commitment to address the problem of the adoption of
the International Code of Conduct for Public Officials. The effort was
expanded in 2001 during the UN Convention against Corruption at the
Second Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity
at the Hague. Adopted by the General Assembly in October 2003, it com-
pleted the ratification process and was entered into force in December 2005,
 Global perspectives on good governance 241

to be monitored and evaluated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and

Crime (UNODC).1 As United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said
in his statement on the adoption by the General Assembly of the United
Nations Convention against Corruption:
Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended
for development, undermining a government’s ability to provide basic ser-
vices, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment
and aid.

Readers can access the full text of the Convention at http://www.unodc.org/

unodc/en/corruption.html. The points included in the Convention are
intended to be both comprehensive and a statement of international con-
sensus. These include a description of the values to be promoted among
public officials, policies for prevention, legal remedies for violations and a
clause promoting asset recovery from individuals convicted of using public
funds for personal gain.
Annexed to a General Assembly Resolution of 12 December 1996 was
the Code of Conduct for Public Officials,2 whose general principles include:

1. A public office, as defined by national law, is a position of trust, implying a

duty to act in the public interest. Therefore, the ultimate loyalty of public
officials shall be to the public interests of their country as expressed through
the democratic institutions of government.
2. Public officials shall ensure that they perform their duties and functions
efficiently, effectively and with integrity, in accordance with laws or admin-
istrative policies. They shall at all times seek to ensure that public resources
for which they are responsible are administered in the most effective and
efficient manner.
3. Public officials shall be attentive, fair and impartial in the performance of
their functions and, in particular, in their relations with the public. They
shall at no time afford any undue preferential treatment to any group or
individual or improperly discriminate against any group or individual, or
otherwise abuse the power and authority vested in them.

Other articles of this Code encompass conflicts of interest, disclosure

of assets, acceptance of gifts or other favors, handling confidential infor-
mation, and engaging in political activities. Collectively, this effort on behalf
of the UN is an optimistic initiative in combating a deeply entrenched
global problem, that of mandating ethics and integrity in governance.
Yet the ubiquitous nature of corruption is, sadly ironically, evidenced in
the administration of the United Nations itself as the subject of accusa-
tions of corruption and various integrity violations (Rosett, 2006). The
most prominent of these was the 1996 Oil-for-Food Program scandal
ensuing when, under UN auspices, over $65 billion worth of Iraqi oil was
242 Conclusion

sold on the world market in violation of the provisions that it was to be sold
in quantities necessary only to exchange for food, medicine and other
humanitarian needs. The Program was discontinued in late 2003 amidst
allegations of widespread abuse and corruption when it was revealed by the
Volcker investigation that the excess sales allowed the regime to rebuild its
military in the wake of the first Gulf War. The Program director was sus-
pended and then resigned from the UN when it was concluded he had
accepted bribes from the Iraqi regime.
Beyond the UN in toto, Kofi Annan’s son was implicated for allegedly
procuring UN Oil-for-Food contracts on behalf of a Swiss company,
Cotecna, in exchange for personal gain and India’s foreign minister was
removed from office because of his alleged direct role in the scandal.
Ethical policy developments almost always consequent to scandal and,
true to form, the UN established an Ethics Office in 2006 with independent
external oversight and auditing, as well as expanded provisions governing
whistle-blowing and staff financial disclosures. Announcing the new office,
Mr Annan stated:

Staff members expressed concern about the ethics climate within the United
Nations in the 2004 integrity perception survey. Similar concerns were raised by
the report of the Independent Inquiry Committee on the oil-for-food pro-
gramme. In addition, recent events have created the imperative to establish new
mechanisms to improve ethics within the organization. The creation of an ethics
office is central to this effort.

The ethics office would foster a staff culture of transparency and account-
ability and set standards for training and appropriate professional conduct,
the report adds. It would lead and manage the UN ethics infrastructure by
taking such steps as administering the financial disclosure program, which
would encompass about 1000 staff members, and protect the staff against
retaliation for reporting misconduct.

The Word Bank and IMF

Mirroring ethics growing importance in the world of politics, major

international financial and economic institutions like the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund3 have also embraced corruption-
prevention techniques as central criteria when determining questions of
developmental aid and debt release in international relations. Essentially,
the focus is on whether assisting a country will ultimately facilitate
profiteering of the elites through bribery and fraud. The WB, in concur-
rence with the IMF, has identified corruption as among the greatest ob-
stacles to economic and social development, distorting the rule of law,
 Global perspectives on good governance 243

and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth

depends.4 As corruption sabotages policies and programs that aim to
reduce poverty, confronting it is critical to the achievement of the WB’s
overarching mission of poverty reduction. The WB’s anticorruption strat-
egy builds on five key elements: increasing political accountability,
strengthening civil society participation, creating a competitive private
sector, mandating institutional restraints on power, and improving public
sector management. As summarized by former World Bank President,
Paul Wolfowitz5 in April 2006:

In the last half-century we have developed a better understanding of what helps

governments function effectively and achieve economic progress . . . It is essen-
tially the combination of transparent and accountable institutions, strong skills
and competence, and a fundamental willingness to do the right thing. Those are
the things that enable a government to . . . raise their national incomes by as
much as four times . . . The World Bank first acknowledged corruption as a
major impediment to development only ten years ago. But since then, it has been
leading the development community in coming to grips with this very serious,
but long-ignored problem. Fighting corruption is a long-term commitment, and
results will not come overnight . . . That is why fighting corruption requires a
long-term strategy that systematically and progressively attacks the problem,
and . . . requires the commitment and participation of governments . . . citizens,
and . . . businesses alike.

In 2006 the World Bank brought together ‘over 250 leaders, thinkers,
development practitioners, and youth from over 70 developed and devel-
oping countries’ for what was termed a World Ethics Forum.6 Discussions
focused on strategies to promote ethical leadership and public integrity as
tools for better governance and accelerated development. Its goal was to
develop, empower and support leaders at all levels who are committed to
integrity. By raising awareness of and enhancing the capacity to recognize
the issues, forming action coalitions across nations and sectors, engaging
in capacity-building for ethical, effective leadership, and providing
resources to facilitate these ends the Forum sought to operationalize
many of the over-arching goals first articulated a decade earlier.
The Global Integrity Alliance is but one of many products emerging from
the Forum. Said Sanjay Pradhan, Director for Public Sector Governance
in the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Vice Presidency at
the World Bank: ‘The dynamics of ethical leadership are under-analysed,
under-appreciated, and under-emphasized by the international commu-
nity. Ethics and integrity are critical factors for development, and the
World Ethics Forum allowed the exchange of views among public,
private, and civil society leaders to create new joint initiatives and
partnerships.’
244 Conclusion

OECD

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, com-

prised of 29 Member States representing the industrialized world, has
made anti-corruption initiatives and ethics and integrity policies an
important aspect of its work. Its main contribution has been the 1997
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions. The Convention, signed by all member
countries and a number of non-members, came into force in 1999 and for
the first time made bribing a foreign public official a criminal offense.
Another area of focus is evident in the OECD Guidelines for Managing
Conflict of Interest in the Public Service which offers the first international
benchmark in the field. A ‘conflict of interest’ was concretely defined as
involving ‘a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public
official, in which the public official has private-capacity interests which
could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and
responsibilities’.7 The Guidelines state that the proper objective of an
effective Conflict of Interest policy is not the simple prohibition of all
private-capacity interests on the part of public officials, but rather to main-
tain the integrity of official policy and administrative decisions and of
public management generally, recognizing that an unresolved conflict of
interest may result in abuse of public office. To achieve this objective public
bodies must possess and implement relevant policy standards for promot-
ing integrity. These include effective processes for identifying risk and
dealing with emergent conflicts of interest, appropriate external and inter-
nal accountability mechanisms, aggressive management approaches that
ensure that public officials take personal responsibility for complying with
both the letter and the spirit of such standards.

Civil Society

Transparency International, based in Berlin, is the best known and

most ubiquitous example of an international non-governmental organiza-
tion fighting corruption. With branches in 99 countries (2006), TI favors a
holistic approach to a national integrity system (Pope, 2000; Transparency
International, 2001). Although each country or region is unique in its own
history and culture, its political system and its stage of economic and
social development, similarities do exist and experience and lessons
are often transferable. TI proposes a National Integrity System as a com-
prehensive method of fighting corruption. It comprises eight interdepen-
dent pillars for research, action and dialogue: public awareness, public
anti-corruption strategies, public participation, watchdog agencies, the
 Global perspectives on good governance 245

judiciary, the media, the private sector and international cooperation.

Emergent from this initiative is the popular Corruption Perception Index,
whereby countries are scored on a continuum based upon surveys among
business persons and analysts. Additionally, TI monitors a Corruption
Barometer which tracks public opinion on bribery and corruption and
issues an annual report (TI, 2005). Collectively, those measures offer a
glimpse of both the breadth and awareness of corruption in a sampling of
countries across the globe. According to TI, the sectors most affected by
corruption are political parties (especially in high income countries), and
the legislature and the police (in many low income countries). When asked
if corruption had gotten better or worse in their countries over the past
three years, 57 percent of respondents stated corruption had increased,
and 27 percent said it had stayed the same. While some regions (for
example Africa) appear to be optimistic about the future, overall 44
percent of respondents expect corruption will increase over the next three
years.

Conclusion

To the extent it is possible to summarize this sampling of initiatives and to

generalize from those findings, one might conclude the following. First,
international organizations over the past ten years have demonstrated a
growing commitment to fight corruption. The topic holds a prominent
agenda position in international politics and administration and is seen as
essential in safeguarding integrity to promote political and economic
progress. Second, an extensive framework of conventions, rules, monitor-
ing guidelines and sanctions has been built and continues to grow. Third,
these policies and practices are exercising increasing influence among the
decision-making bodies determining who receives financial assistance, debt
reduction, developmental aid, and political and economic favors; countries
who seek such support and do not abide by nor recognize these anti-
corruption initiatives are regarded much less favorably on the whole.
Fourth, there appears to be a growing awareness among the international
community that issues of integrity and ethics of government and gover-
nance encompass aspects beyond curbing and sanctioning corruption.
Expanded interest in defining what good governance is on a global scale,
integrating principles of ethical leadership across cultures and sectors and
overcoming political and economic barriers to acceptance of global initiat-
ives characterizes work in this field today and into the foreseeable future.
The anti-corruption effort is in its infancy and as such is widely flawed, but
areas seen as lacking are viewed as more urgent in the current move to align
economic, political, and ethical philosophies.
246 Conclusion

CRITICISM OF THE DOMINANT GLOBAL POLICY

FRAMEWORK

While efforts to combat corruption and enhance ethicality and integrity are
growing in scope and popularity, criticism regarding who has the right to
establish such precepts and who really benefits from the intended outcomes
abounds (Caiden et al., 2001; Fijnaut and Huberts, 2002).
A key question is whether the UN, WB, and IMF are the right organ-
izations to address these questions, especially given the scandals those
organizations face themselves; they advocate transparency, accountability,
disclosure standards, and so on yet appear to violate their own dictates
(Everett et al., 2006: 8). Is it possible or even desirable to seek global con-
sensus on what constitutes ethical political and public administrations?
Since much of the existing research in this area was derived from Western
thought, the frameworks may or may not represent the political and social
best practices of the rest of the world (Benaissa, 1993; Punch et al., 1993;
Pieth and Eigen, 1999). While the moralist approach contends that all cor-
ruption is undesirable, the functionalist approach argues that there are con-
ditions when bribing and corruptive acts are good for a society and that
political, economic and social relationships might suffer if such behaviors
are extinguished (Johnson, 2004: 155–63; Bardhan, 1997). Certainly more
objective data is needed to make these determinations.
On the question of who are the beneficiaries of such efforts, one group
states it is a win-win outcome for everyone from rich industrialized nations
to developing countries. The other side of the argument states that institu-
tions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund contribute
to the development of a global free market capitalism which ultimately
harms the poor and powerless and, thus, address the ethicality of forcing a
developing country in the direction of a market economy and private enter-
prise (Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2002; Pieth and Eigen, 1999; UNDP,
1998). Doubt also exists regarding the purity of interest in anti-corruption
efforts from countries with varying political agendas, from developing
nations where dictators control public funds to international super-powers
who use their economic might for political and military ends, to those in
the middle of the global hierarchy who seek advantage over others of their
ilk seeking economic development assistance. Are anti-corruption efforts
simply a new, seemingly virtuous packaging of tools to exercise individual-
ized agendas? Table 14.1 addresses that question in part.
The table presents the Corruption Perception Index scores of the first 30
countries among the full 159 to ratify the UN Convention against
Corruption. The CPI score ranges from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly
corrupt). Perhaps surprisingly, only two countries have a score above 5.0
 Global perspectives on good governance 247

Table 14.1 CPI score of the 30 first countries that ratified the UN
Convention

Country 2005 CPI score Country rank

Algeria 2.8 97
Belarus 2.6 107
Benin 2.9 88
Brazil 3.7 62
Croatia 3.4 70
Djibouti Not on list
Ecuador 3.5 117
Egypt 3.4 70
El Salvador 4.2 51
France 7.5 18
Honduras 2.6 107
Hungary 5.0 40
Jordan 5.7 37
Kenya 2.1 144
Libya 2.5 117
Madagascar 2.8 97
Mauritius 4.2 51
Mexico 3.5 65
Namibia 4.3 47
Nigeria 1.9 152
Paraguay 2.1 144
Peru 3.5 65
Romania 3.0 85
Sierra Leone 2.4 126
South Africa 4.5 46
Sri Lanka 3.2 78
Togo Not on list
Turkmenistan 1.8 155
Uganda 2.5 117
United Republic of Tanzania 2.9 88

(France and Jordan), and only five belong to the 50 least corrupt countries
in terms of CPI. The more corrupt a country is perceived, the more quickly
it acted to ratify the anti-corruption measure. Is this because the effort was
viewed as a legitimate method to combat a pervasive evil in their society, or
because the mechanics of ratification under a dictatorship are decidedly
more efficient than under democratic regimes, or because these countries
are eager to adopt a veil of proactivity in order to position themselves
favorably in requesting economic relief ?
248 Conclusion

Another key point of criticism lies in the anti-corruptive methodology.

At the forefront in this regard is the Corruption Perception Index of
Transparency International (Johnston, 2005; Sampford et al., 2006). As
these reputational scores are primarily based on the impressions of inter-
national business persons and risk analysts it is necessarily imprecise.
Skeptical by nature, these individuals may not register as significant a
country’s effort to combat corruption with new policies or legislation, but
may relatively overreact to new reports of scandals or convictions.8
Additionally, as the countries are ranked, an increase in one country’s score
forces a reduction in the score of another country although the downward
placement and concomitant negative effect on economic aid may not be
warranted. Further, most proposals and frameworks are based upon
firsthand reports by anti-corruption practitioners rather than scientific
evaluation. Although empirically-based knowledge in this area is increas-
ing, rational policy choices simply cannot be supported at this time in the
field of good governance9 (Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2001; Everett et al.,
2006).

ETHICS, INTEGRITY AND CORRUPTION THEORY

Theoretical models addressing the concepts and processes of ethical

administration in the public sector are developing concomitant with the
research in best practices referenced above. Cooper (2004), stresses that in
order to frame the significant research questions and allow for sustained
and systematic inquiry, the following precepts need to be clarified:

1. What are the normative foundations for PA Ethics? (constitutional

thought, social equity, virtue or the public interest).
2. How do American administrative ethical norms fit into a global
context?
3. How can organizations be designed to support ethical conduct?
4. When is it acceptable to treat people equally and when unequally?

While research in this area has generally adopted this set of unifying
themes, the global intellectual community has understandably taken issue
with the second question as posed by Cooper, an American. The question
itself provides fodder to those who criticize efforts of the WB, IMF and UN
as being simply the implementation arm of Western ethical culture. Setting
aside that argument for the moment the question will be rephrased to one
asking if there is a global context with which all countries’ administrative
reforms align.
 Global perspectives on good governance 249

Toward that end Cooper and Yoder (2002, 2005) examined a large
number of international treaties, pacts, agreements, conventions and pro-
grams going back to the 1970s. They attempted to identify the core values
explicitly advocated or implicitly assumed and examined the reasoning
underlying such values. They surmised their findings suggested an ‘emerg-
ing global standard for public ethics’ that consists of five core values:

1. The right to self-determination (with transparency as a requisite for

people to secure this right individually and collectively).
2. Freedom (including freedom of information, autonomy of economic
choice, and autonomy of political choice).
3. Honesty by government (making accountability possible).
4. Trust as the essential glue that holds democratic governance and
market economies together (in essence a product of freedom and
honesty).
5. Stability (and predictability), as a by-product of freedom, honesty, and
trust.

Recognition of an increasingly interdependent world and a growing global

commitment to market economies and democratic governance were the
reasons given to support the five recurring core values.
Other scholars heeded Cooper’s call and strove to replicate and expand
this research in other venues. Menzel (2005) reviewed and assessed the
research on ethics and integrity in governance published in ten US print
journals from 1999 till 2004. He identified five interrelated themes: ethical
decision-making and moral development; ethics laws and regulatory agen-
cies; organizational performance; ethics management; and the ethical
environment.
Frederickson’s and Ghere’s (2005) book, Ethics in Public Management,
organized the seminal research to date in this area into four clusters: organ-
ization designs that support ethical behaviour; market forces that compro-
mise administrative ethics; unintended outcomes of anticorruption
reforms; and administrative ethics in global perspective. The themes indi-
cate that greater attention is being paid to the interconnection between
market and government ethics, and that further development of integrity
and ethics policies is needed. Ghere (p. 352) concludes:

the prospect of adopting a global ethic – a framework for defining right and
wrong that knows no social, economic, or political borders – remains far in the
future. In the meantime, public administrators can reprofessionalize their ethics
in a manner that incorporates global humanitarian concern. To do so, practit-
ioners need researchers to map globalization’s ethical terrain and to recommend
approaches for globally pertinent actions that are just, prudent, and feasible.
250 Conclusion

Lawton and Doig (2006) reviewed the body of European ethics research
much in the same way Menzel did, focusing on journals articles published
between 1999 and 2003.10 Common themes identified were the public
service ethos; regulation of individual (ethical) behavior; role of profes-
sionals; and cultural and political influences. They found the literature rife
with real-world accounts (by the European Commission, the OECD and
others), contributing to a plethora of descriptive studies on a broad range
of topics. They concluded that what is needed for the next step is enhanced
comparative research and a method of unifying the knowledge thus far col-
lected, such as is being enacted by the EGPA Study Group established in
2003.11
Bossaert and Demmke’s (2005) effort mirrored in part that of Cooper
and Yoder in their examination of EU member policies regarding ethics
and integrity. Their main conclusions address the challenges faced in the
microcosm of assimilation EU states are experiencing with attempts to
develop a uniform European Code of Ethics. Issues regarding reconcilia-
tion of differing views, who has the authority to oversee the effort, and what
force should be incorporated into any potential code are all questions
facing such a project. They advocate that a first step might be to establish
a voluntary, non-legally binding European code of ethics to increase aware-
ness of the issues at hand and stimulate dialogue. One surprising similarity
they report is that, despite differences in general ethical perceptions, the
obligations of civil servants regarding ethical behavior are remarkably
similar in all 25 national public services of the enlarged EU. This is
evident in the ethical requirements determined by laws as well as in disci-
plinary actions. Moreover, the traditional values of national civil services
(neutrality, respecting the rule of law, confidentiality, impartiality, avoiding
conflicts of interest, etc.) have remained unchanged for decades. These
values are echoed in Palidauskaite’s (2006) research on Eastern European
countries that concludes the values purported for public servants are legal-
ity, serving the public, loyalty to the constitutional government, impar-
tiality, competence, professionalism, honesty, integrity, disinterestedness,
political neutrality, transparency and openness.
The study of ethics is not, of course, limited to US and EU researchers
and it would be informative to have a global perspective on these and
other issues (the significant contributions of Australian scholarship, to
name just one additional country, such as Miller et al. (2005); Preston and
Sampford (2002); Sampford and Preston (1998); Sampford et al. (2006)
should be noted here). This text, however, will not attempt to speak for
the worldwide community but does offer some unique insights into inte-
grating a cross-Atlantic dialog on ethics in the public service. Those
insights have emerged from a conference in 2005 jointly sponsored by the
 Global perspectives on good governance 251

EGPA group and the Section on Ethics of the American Society for
Public Administration.12

PERSPECTIVES ON ETHICS AND INTEGRITY OF

GOVERNANCE

An overview of the research presented at this joint conference offers the fol-
lowing new perspectives to add to the summaries of research and action
provided above.
First, the international academic dialog on these subjects has become
more cooperative, intellectually challenging, vigorous, and substantive. The
field is yet dominated by American scholars and American themes (Cooper,
2001; Frederickson and Ghere, 2005), although a shift toward greater
balance is evident. This bent toward American research is in part a reflection
of the sheer number of scholars at work in that area in comparison to the
European academic community, as well as the history of scholarship on
which the Americans can build. But it is also a function of the international
academic community where English is the dominant language, American
journals proliferate, and the American ethos of publish or perish motivates
US authors to aggressively pursue publications in the few international jour-
nals that do exist. This book and other like-minded symposia (Menzel and
Jurkiewicz, 2006), we hope, effectively demonstrate that the non-American
voice is essential in advancing scholarship for all ethics researchers. As the
World Ethics Forum and the Global Integrity Alliance illustrate, there is a
trend toward global networks and the international academic community is
well-positioned to be in the forefront of developments involving politics,
economics, health, education and ethics.
In addition to bridging geographical and cultural boundaries, creating a
collective knowledge base requires the integration and clarification of some
key dimensions. One is the integration of varying disciplines into the ethics
arena, as illustrated in (Figure 14.1). The need to speak a common language
goes beyond English to the nuances a specialized vocabulary of terms if
ethics researchers are to be able to unify their work and generalize their
findings. Some examples here may accentuate this need.
Kaye, a political scientist, wonders why ethics researchers neglect the
significance of politics, while Lewis searches for the foundations of ethics
in a rich variety of disciplines, and Vandenabeele and Horton are histo-
rians and institutional theorists, Hoekstra et al. symbolize the link between
public and proprietary administration, and Emery and Wyser focus on
integrity in governance. Each of these scholars is engaged in related
research yet each area of study is defined by a separate paradigm and
252 Conclusion

Philosophy, ethics
Public administration
policy studies Law,
criminology

Sociology
Business
administration Ethics and
integrity of History

Political science Psychology

Economics

Figure 14.1 Many related disciplines and aspects

bodies of publication and theoretical concepts. Speaking English is clearly

not enough to bring these different theoretical dialects together and in syn-
chronicity moving in the same direction. It is that goal toward which the
efforts presented in this book as well as at the conference focus, to advance
a multidisciplinary and eventually interdisciplinary cumulative theory of
ethical administration. It is the challenging conclusion of the scholars and
practitioners previously cited to do just that.
So, how to begin? First, it is necessary to reach an agreement upon which
of the many research topics available should be chosen for intensified inter-
national and multi-disciplinary cooperative work. Thus, initiatives such
as the ‘Transatlantic Dialogues’ have been undertaken, but much more
needs to be done in this regard. Second, the collective research process
needs organization and resources, meaning that individual researchers need
to reach out to colleagues in other disciplines and countries to work
together on mutually beneficial projects. Again, conferences such as the
Transatlantic Dialogue meetings provide an opportunity to meet potential
fellow researchers and discuss commonalities of interests and resources.
Interestingly, in Lawton’s and Doig’s (2005) synopsis one would expect that
European scholars at this conference would focus on theoretical, concep-
tual, and definitional issues, and based upon Menzel’s (2005) claim we
would anticipate American scholars would emphasize the empirical. Yet as
Figure 14.2 illustrates the scholars’ contributions to this book contest that
theory. Europeans in this book are more focused on empirical research
while the Americans seek to explain and develop theory. Not to say that
 Global perspectives on good governance 253

CONCEPTUAL,
THEORETICAL EMPIRICAL
Adams, Bowman, Emery, Fawcett, Hoekstra,
Giacalone, Kaye, Lamboo, Van de Walle
Lewis, Six

Figure 14.2 Research orientation

observation is problematic. On the contrary, it offers greater evidence of the

need for cross-dialog and a shedding of preconceived limits on what we
need to know and how we should go about knowing it.

A SHARED LANGUAGE: TOWARD CONCEPTUAL

CLARITY

Fruitful social science requires that the problem first be delineated and,
given the ambiguous nature of ethical studies, this must begin with a
definition of terms. Communication can be challenging enough when
speaking the same language, and to be able to forge a common rubric for
research and dialog the field needs to come to an agreement regarding
terms. Conceptual clarity is essential for public debate, policy-making and
theory development in ethics on an international level, particularly with the
commonly relativistic interpretations of concepts such as corruption,
integrity and governance. A review of the more commonly used terms and
their definitions is useful here.
The concept of corruption is often at the heart of the debate about the
moral quality of government and it can be understood to mean any number
of things. The legal definition states it is acting in the interest of an actor
because of the advantages promised or given. Pope (2000) suggests it
should include all abuses of office for private gain, such as fraud and theft.
Yet another defines corruption as synonymous with all types of wrongdo-
ing by functionaries, thus encompassing all vices, maladies, and weaknesses
of politics and bureaucracy. Referring to bureaucracies, Caiden once dis-
tinguished 179 types of what he called bureaupathologies, including cor-
ruption, deceit, discrimination, fraud, injustice, mediocrity, red-tape and
waste (Caiden, 1991: 490).
Employing the word integrity can represent a range of perspectives by
both the author and the reader (Montefiore and Vines, 1999; Dobel,
1999).13 Integrity can be seen as ‘wholeness’ or completeness, as one
specific value (incorruptibility or righteousness), as acting in line with
254 Conclusion

constitutional or regime values (Rohr, 1989), as complying with the rele-

vant moral values and norms, or as complying in an exemplary way with
moral standards. Typologies of integrity violations are frequently used as
well, resulting from theoretical and empirical analyses of particular pro-
fessions. Such typologies generally include behavior both internal and
external to the organization and contain a range of relevant (laws, rules,
codes, informal norms). Table 14.2 illustrates an integrity typology for
police conduct, with nine distinct clusters. Each integrity violation is asso-
ciated with a continuum of behaviors from most to least serious, as deter-
mined by how far these behaviors are from normative value expectations.
Corruptive behavior such as bribing, for instance, can vary from cents to
billions, and also the impact of the decisions taken in exchange for the bribe
can differ enormously (for example, from doing a friend a favor by sharing

Table 14.2 Types of integrity violations related to police behavior

Corruption: bribing
misuse of public power for private gain; asking, offering, accepting bribes
Corruption: favoritism (nepotism, cronyism, patronage)
misuse of public authority to favor friends, family, party
Fraud and theft
improper private gain acquired from the organization (with no involvement of
external actors)
Conflict of (private and public) interest
personal interest (through assets, jobs, gifts and so on) interferes (or might
interfere) with public interest
Improper use of authority (for noble causes)
to use illegal/improper methods to achieve organizational goals (within the
police for example illegal methods of investigation and disproportionate
violence)
Misuse and manipulation of information
lying, cheating, manipulating information, breaching confidentiality of
information
Discrimination and sexual harassment
misbehavior towards colleagues or citizens and customers
Waste and abuse of resources
failure to comply with organizational standards, improper performance,
incorrect or dysfunctional internal behavior
Private time misconduct
conduct in one’s private time which harms the publics trust in
administration/government

Source: Huberts et al., 1999: 449–51.

 Global perspectives on good governance 255

a tidbit of information, to shoddy policies and projects with disastrous

economic consequences for populations). Sexual harassment, for example,
can vary between a sexist remark and rape.
Typologies can be especially useful in comparative research. For
instance, central integrity problems in the Netherlands might be very
different from those in Italy or the US (or the UK as Fawcett and Wardman
clarify Chapter 8 of this book). By applying a typology, scholars can define
the integrity issues such that even while speaking cross-culturally apples are
being compared to apples and oranges to oranges, so to speak.
The word governance is frequently used in contemporary social sciences
with a general understanding that it refers to something broad in scope
and includes a division of power and authority (Van Kersbergen and Van
Waarden, 2004; Pierre and Guy Peters, 2000; http://europa.eu.int/comm/
governance). Frederickson and Smith (2003: 210) summarized as the
central question of governance as being ‘how can public-sector regimes,
agencies, programs and activities be organized and managed to achieve
public purposes?’ Common agreement surrounding the term is that it
speaks to the political and administrative process and institutions and
does not encompass policies and results. The ethics and integrity of gov-
ernance addresses the morality of those who govern rather than evaluat-
ing the quality of the decision or policy. To use a current example,
questions of governance do not concern themselves with whether the inva-
sion of Iraq was ethical, but instead examine the decision-making
processes that led to the invasion of Iraq and make determinations as to
whether the decision-makers and involved public servants acted with
integrity.
Integrity is but one aspect of governance, although one that permeates
almost every other aspect. It is necessary, for the sake of scientific inquiry,
to separate the application of moral principles to the conduct of officials in
organizations and other areas of competence such as financial, legal, or
democratic principles (Thompson, 2001: 79, 91). This framework for the
qualities of governance is summarized in Figure 14.3 (based on Bovens et
al., 2001). We realize that integrity is interconnected with democracy, law-
fulness and economy, but the attractiveness of the framework as a heuris-
tic device is that it points out a number of dilemmas in the study of the
integrity of governance. Such a model enables practitioners and scholars to
reflect more systematically on the limitations as well as possibilities of the
mentioned criteria, including integrity.
Underpinning this model is the presumption that those who govern can
make errors and demonstrate incompetence in any one of the four criteria,
but violations in only one of the four areas constitutes the potential for evil
(Adams and Balfour, 2004). Simply put, an individual can do wrong
256 Conclusion

Responsiveness, democracy Effectiveness, efficiency

What public administrators

and politicians should do

Lawfulness Integrity, morality

Figure 14.3 Quality of governance criteria

without committing an integrity violation. Blurring this distinction is not

uncommon, particularly in cultures where politics and religion are inter-
twined, but doing so can lead an organization to lose sight of what is
morally important and what is not. This can have very negative conse-
quences such as employees becoming so afraid to take any risk for fear of
committing a moral violation and are thus paralyzed into inaction. No one
wants their integrity questioned on the basis of a technical inefficiency.
They are also more likely to cover up errors when they occur, potentially
compounding the problem for the organization into the long-term, but pro-
tecting their individual reputation at the time.
As a consequence, organizations need to clearly define their central moral
values and norms; these will serve as the basis for determining whether or
not to initiate an integrity investigation. This is never an easy endeavor, but
it is an important one for organizations that take ethics and integrity seri-
ously. As a start for those organizations to whom this is foreign, Caiden
(1999) had elucidated principles such as the provision of public benefits,
enforcing the rule of law, ensuring public responsibility and accountability,
setting an example, improving professional performance and promoting
democracy that may prove helpful. Reviewing these or those suggested by
OECD, ASPA, or another associative body, or by engaging in a dialog with
your organization (Jurkiewicz, 2001), the process can provide key elements
in the development of a mission, goals and ethical standards that reflect the
organization as a dynamic and honorable institution.
Some of the questions that frustrate ethics researchers can be interpreted
in terms of this framework. In this book for example, Adams, Balfour,
Reed, Emery and Wyser concentrate on the possible tension between
economy and effectiveness (including technology) and integrity. Kaye
points out the limitations of integrity when the logic of politics and re-
 Global perspectives on good governance 257

sponsiveness is taken seriously. Bowman and West confront the logics of

politics and integrity regarding employment and appointment in the public
sector. Six and Huberts attempt to relate the norms of the public, legal
norms, and the norms of the political system with the integrity of public
functionaries. In all cases, clarity of language can serve as a common
denominator in discussing and measuring these variables which can lead to
new directions in the study of ethics and governance.

NEW DIRECTIONS: INTEGRITY AND ETHICS

MANAGEMENT
Management issues have been among the topics most extensively
researched and debated in administrative ethics. What strategies and instru-
ments are available to protect the integrity of an organization and its
members? What institutions succeed in curbing corruption within and
stimulating the integrity of a country’s civil service system? Questions
regarding leadership and management styles; codes, procedures and rules;
training and education (the pedagogy of ethics); and national integrity
institutions were all addressed at the Leuven Conference. Additionally, a
number of chapters in this book describe and evaluate the development of
integrity policies, such as Hoekstra et al., Maesschalck, Lamboo et al.
How to evaluate the state of the art in ethics management research? After
numerous attempts to present inventories of policies and policy instru-
ments, the time seems ripe to move into the study of the effectiveness of
those policies. What has caused changes in values, views and behaviors?
How have changes in the actual integrity of a public organization, a poli-
tician or a civil servant impacted the trust of the people in the individual
and his or her organization?
These are key questions for the future. Research models will need to be
developed that separate the strategic and effectiveness dimensions.
Strategies can be compliance or value based (to simplify the types of inter-
vention), and effectiveness can be assessed by recording values and views as
well as actual behavior.
One of the important issues here is the relationship between the integrity
of governance and the public trust in governance. Van de Walle’s chapter
in this book demonstrates that this relationship is complex and that the
directionality of effect remains unknown: do perceptions of trust deter-
mine views on integrity and corruption or does corruption and disintegrity
determine level of trust? Fawcett and Wardman give voice to the common-
sensical notion that inappropriate behaviors by those who govern can
damage public confidence.
258 Conclusion

NEW DIRECTIONS: LINKING THE GLOBAL POLICY

AND RESEARCH AGENDA’S

A lot has been said to this point regarding global integrity policies on the
one hand and the development in the research on (global) ethics and
integrity of governance on the other hand.
These two developments are interconnected, as evidenced by the fact that
international organizations do or subsidize much of the empirical research
that has been done. This relationship of course encourages reflection on
whether we as researchers tailor our questions or methodologies and
findings to address their concerns or do we speak truth to power. This ques-
tion is becoming more urgent now that the international community seems
to realize, more than in the past, that the integrity and ethics of government
and governance has other implications beyond curbing and sanctioning
corruption. There is more interest in attempting to define what good gov-
ernance is as more than simply a lack of corruption. Attempts to focus
more on integrity, values, and leadership are indicative of this development.
Given the above, four clear areas of research present themselves. First is
what constitutes good governance in an international context. The
research to date assumes the universality of the values of western demo-
cratic market economies and has been used to justify a top-down approach.
This is in line with much criticism on cultural relativism as a justification
of corruption in ‘non-western’ contexts. International treaties, conven-
tions, policies and conferences have been studied to establish a basis for
common values and principles, and has concluded that much commonal-
ity is present. Not surprisingly, then, research on the values of the elite has
led to support for the values articulated by that elite. Although cultural
relativism is not adequate in itself to frame the discussion of what consti-
tutes good governance, credible evidence for cultural monism let alone cul-
tural imperialism is lacking as well. As some chapters in this volume argue,
we will have to explore further what the populations, ideologies, and re-
ligions of this world really see as good governance. Bottom-up research is
necessary, with empirical as well as theoretical work. What do people in
developing countries see as good governance when they are able to decide
themselves?14 What of Asian nations? We know that Europeans appear to
be more pluralistic than Americans in their orientation toward good gov-
ernance, which should not be surprising given the diversity of countries
(transitional in Eastern Europe, varying political systems in Western
Europe, and fundamental differences in political systems and administra-
tive traditions between the North and the South). These differences need
to be acknowledged and addressed in moving forward toward a synthesis
of understanding.
 Global perspectives on good governance 259

Second, is the measurement of corruption and integrity (Sampford et al.,

2006). It is rather easy as well as justified to criticize the corruption per-
ception index, but what might replace that score? What would be a more
accurate way to determine the content of a national iceberg of integrity vio-
lations? (Huberts et al., 2006).
Third, the extensive framework of international conventions, rules, moni-
toring and possibly sanctioning that has been built over the past decade
needs to be examined. The number of instruments that have been produced
to measure corrupt practices and regimes is impressive, but no objective
study has been done on their validity, reliability, or effectiveness. Clearly
there are times when policies with good intentions resulted in bad out-
comes, but why this is the case remains unexamined. Studies on the
effectiveness of anti-corruption and integrity institutions and policies are
very much needed in the present state of policy development.
The fourth topic concerns what is known about the extent of corruption
in countries and the effectiveness of national anti-corruption methods and
strategies. Most proposals and frameworks are based on the experiences
and knowledge of anti-corruption practitioners and not on scientific evalu-
ation. Although systematic inquiry has intensified, what scant evidence
there is available does not seem to permit or support rational policy choices
in the field of national, regional and local good governance. This, of course,
stands in contrast to the far-reaching policy prescription to which inter-
national organizations adhere.

CONCLUSION
In summary, research on public sector ethics is essential to the understand-
ing and practice of good governance. Further, such research is dominated
by the American perspective and, although progress has been made, much
more effort is required on both sides of the Atlantic to achieve a balance
between the European and American perspectives and beyond to include
the voice of nations across the globe. Finally, we need a common language
as a basis to bring about this fusion of ideologies and epistemologies toward
the end of substantive, generalizable research. Summarized here is a
reflection on the practice and study of good governance from a global per-
spective as it exists today, along with suggestions on where it needs to move
into the future.
Anti-corruption activities were a reactionary and necessary first step to
address ethics in governance on a global scale. The discipline must now
move beyond that toward collective theory-building based on empirical
evidence. The most important first step in this regard is to connect the
260 Conclusion

international policy and research agendas more explicitly. The communities

of researchers and policy makers are committed to contribute toward
curbing corruption and safeguarding integrity. For researchers it is at the
same time important to keep some distance from policy makers and insti-
tutions, to protect their independence and to be eager to question what
seems obvious.

NOTES
1. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption.html.
2. http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/resins.htm with Conventions, Declarations and
Other Instruments Found in General Assembly Resolutions.
3. While both organizations are significant to the global shift in corruptive awareness, the
emphasis given the World Bank herein over the IMF is due to their scope of operations:
‘The IMF places great emphasis on good governance when providing policy advice,
financial support, and technical assistance to its 184 member countries. It promotes good
governance by helping countries ensure the rule of law, improve the efficiency and account-
ability of their public sectors, and tackle corruption. In so doing, the IMF limits itself to
economic aspects of governance that could have a significant macroeconomic impact. The
IMF also has strong measures in place to ensure the integrity of its own organization.’
Since 1996, the IMF’s role in promoting good governance has expanded considerably,
while still being limited to economic aspects of governance that could have a significant
macroeconomic impact. http://www.imf.org/external/np/gov/guide/eng/index.htm (15
May 2006). Significant macroeconomic impact. http://www.imf.org/external/np/gov/guide/
eng/index.htm (15 May 2006).
4. www.worldbank.org -> anticorruption website.
5. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK: 20883752~
pagePK:34370~piPK:42770~theSitePK:4607,00.html.
6. Forum details can be accessed at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20885902~menuPK:34463~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSite
PK:4607,00.html.
7. OECD Guidelines Art. 10.
8. Alternatives such as the Public Integrity Index of the Centre for Public Integrity cannot
really compete with the TI Index for only a limited number of countries are indexed
(www.publicintegrity.org).
9. For an interesting exception with an evaluation of World Bank strategies concern-
ing African countries, see: Klein Haarhuis, 2005 and Klein Haarhuis and Torenvlied,
2006.
10. For more on this topic see: Chapman (2000); Della Porta and Vanucci (1999); Heywood
(1997); Lawton (1998).
11. For more information on the Study Group on Ethics and Integrity of Governance of the
European Group on Public Administration (EGPA), see: www.egpa-ethics.eu.
12. The conference program and presented papers are accessible through: www.egpa-ethics.
eu (go to previous conferences, Leuven, 2005) as well as through http://soc.kuleuven.
be/io/ethics/ (May 2006).
13. See Six and Huberts (Chapter 5 this volume).
14. Within administrative ethics more attention is being paid to the relationship between
ethics and religion or spirituality (Giacalone and Jurkiewicz, 2003) but this is much
less the case for the exploration of the relationship between non-Christian and non-
western religion and spirituality on the one hand, and views on good governance on
the other.
 Global perspectives on good governance 261

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Index
A-4 rocket see V-2 rocket authoritarianism 221
accomplices, willing 88 authority
accountability 10, 19, 113–14, 129 decentralization 188
of local government 136 improper use 254
mechanisms 244 autonomy
of public officials 86, 87 of choice 249
to users 124 of public servants 106
accounting and finance 39
Adjudication Panel for England 125 behavioral norms, major sources 47,
administrative class 14 62–4
administrative ethics 1, 86 behavioral psychology 45, 46
administrative evil 85–99 behaviour
Administrative Reform Association 11 of elected members 125
administrators as victims 88 poor standards 123
agencification 17, 20 Belgium, public services 215
aid and corruption 245 benchmarking for ethical standards
alcohol problem 110 124
altruistic behavior 48 Bentham, Jeremy 45
American dominance 251 Berlin see Transparency International,
American perspective 259 Berlin
Amsterdam Best Value Performance Indicators
police scandal 159 (BVPIs) 137
Vrije Universiteit 163 bias in local government 207, 208
Amsterdam-Amstelland police force biology 28
164–7 black-market trading 92
Amsterdam Bureau of Integrity 153 Blair, Tony 19, 189
animals, ethical treatment of 28 Braun, Wernher von 85, 91–7
Annan, Kofi, UN Secretary-General rocket scientist 88, 89
241, 242 bribery 174, 199, 254
son in contracts scandal 242 of civil servants 145
anonymity 10 and corruption 161
of civil servants 11, 12 as criminal offence 244
loss of 17 bribes from politicians, Belgium
Apollo Program Office, NASA 95, 96 216–20
Arms to Iraq Scandal, 1992 16 British Home Civil Service 7
assets, disclosure 241 Buchenwald concentration camp 90
audit and evaluation 188 building industry, Netherlands 146
Audit Commission Act 1998, UK bullying 126, 128, 130
123–4 137, 142 bureaucracy 151, 187, 227, 228
audit of governance management 131–2
audits, traditional versus ethical 132 cabinet government 10
Auschwitz-Birkenau 93 Cadbury Report, on openness 125

265
266 Index

campaigning 209 Code of Audit Practice (Audit

capitalism, laissez-faire 182 Commission), 2004) 128
career public service 17, 185, 187 Code of Conduct for MPs, UK 202
causality 224–5 Code of Conduct for Public Officials
change and growth, capacity for 48 241
change in expansive values 28 codes of conduct 67, 102, 125
Changing Organizational Cultures breaches 126
(COC) toolkit 130 formal 74
chaos, feelings of 109 cognitive development 51
childcare 28, 32 cognitive dissonance reduction 70
citizen satisfaction 41 cognitive psychology 45, 47
Citizen’s Charter 18 coherence in workplace, deterioration
citizens 108
as judge 77, 78 Cold War 97
opinions of 73, 74 collective memory, decline in 103–4
as stakeholder group 73 commitment to job 103
City of London Elections bill 207 deterioration in 106
civic culture 181 Committee on Standards in Public Life
civil disobedience 145 (CPSL), 2005 16,
civil servant status, abolition 105 19, 125–6,197
Civil Servants Act, Netherlands 144–6 committee reports 16
civil servants common sense 47
ethical code 7 communication skills 132
responsibility of 12 Communities and Local Government,
in Swiss Federal Administration 108 Department (CLG) 125
civil service community relations 160
in 1960s 14–15 competition 101, 188
beginnings 9–11 compliance 212
ethics 55 minimum 152
expansion 11, 13 compliance-based approach 148–54
merit-based 183 predominance 150, 151
numbers, reduction 188 Comprehensive Performance
politicization 189 Assessment (CPA) 124, 133, 139
reform 18, 181–93 judgments 135
American 184 Compulsory Competitive Tendering
Europe 187 (CCT) 188, 189
Switzerland 105–15 concentration camp labor, Germany 89
system, ethics in 257 concern for others 32
tenure 188 conduct, appropriate 45
transformation 15–16 conduct, higher standards 133
UK, The Organisation of the confidentiality 250
Permanent Civil Service 9 conflict of interest 45,198, 210–12, 241,
values 19 254
Civil Service Act 19, 20 Conflict of Interest policy 244
Civil Service Code of Ethics 16, 19 conscription for war 13
Civil Service Commission (CSC) 10, 16 Conservative Government 15
Civil Service Department 14 challenges to public service ethos
civil society 244–5 17
classical tradition, Aristotle 114 constituency interests 202
class, ruling elite based on 10 constitutional monarchy 10
 Index 267

context 49–50 Darwin, Charles 57–8

contractual relationships 113 deaths in hospitals 126
contradictions in opinions 227–8 deceit and hypocrisy 16
control decentralization of responsibilities 112
and enforcement 151 decision making, explaining 49
control mechanisms 112 dedication 70
dysfunctional 109 dehumanization 87, 88, 98
intensification 106 delegation of responsibilities, agencies
convention and ethics 56 105, 109
Convention on Combating Bribery of demobilization 13
Foreign Public Officials 244 democracy 80, 256
cooperative relationships, 32 and integrity 145
core values 29 representation 197
corporate failures 127 demographic discontinuity 38–9
corporate governance inspections deontological ethics 58, 86
(CGIs) 124, 127–31, 140–41 Department of Communities and
corporate management 187 Local Government (CLG) 125,
corporate social responsibility 28 135
corruption 44, 147 departmentalism 14
in Belgium 215–17 Deputy Prime Minister, Office of
in Bulgaria 240 (ODPM) 125
concept of 253 destruction, acts of 98
and economic growth 243 developing countries
in Indonesia 240 and good governance 258
in Italian political parties 240 values 25–6
measurement of 230–33, 259 developmental psychology 45, 47
perceptions of 218–25, 229–30 dictators, and public funds 246
in Philippines 240 Disability Discrimination 140
in public office 198, 199 discipline for wrongdoing 162
in Thailand 240 discontinuity 36
in United Nations 241 discounts or free goods 165, 166
Corruption Barometer 245 discrimination 254
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) dismissals, unfair 188
147, 217–23, 231, 245–8 Doris, John M., behavioral
corruption scandal psychologist 46
in Italy 163 Lack of Character: Personality and
cost savings 17, 105 Moral Behavior 48
council constitution 125 Dornberger, Walter 88, 89, 90
council houses, forced sale 200, 203–6 downsizing 103, 183
council resources, misuse of 126 drug laws 160
courts as judge 77, 78 Dutch corruption scandal 163
Crimean War 11 Dutch Council of Police Chiefs 164
crime, growth of organized 145 Dutch ethics and integrity policy 144–7
critical junctures 8 Dutch public sector 143–57
cronyism 181 see also Netherlands
crown 10 dysfunctionalism 115
cultural differences 46
cultural relativism 258 ecological issues 28, 35
cultural values, shift in 40 economic development, and
Czechoslovakia 92 corruption 242–3
268 Index

education level 221 Ethics and Integrity Policy,

efficiency and inefficiency 183, 227, 256 Netherlands 148–51
Eichmann, Adolf, administrator 87 European Code of Ethics 250
elections 8, 75 European Values Study 217, 218
of officials 201–5 evolutionary psychology 45
electoral advantage, and public interest excellence, search for 12, 183
203, 204 expansive values 26–32, 34–6
electorate, stakeholder group 72 expense claims, fraudulent 168
Emalia, enamelware factory 92
emotion and reason 51, 69 fair treatment of staff 155–6
employees family-work blance 28
as disposable 184 farmers, gifts to police from 165
protections, removal 181–93 favoritism 111, 181
quality of life 34 federal administration employees 106
relationship with government 182 financial advancement 35
rights, restriction 184 financial management initiative (FMI)
safeguards, elimination 184 1982 15, 17, 18
employeeship, good 154, 155 First World War 11
employer-employee relationship, Fisher, Sir Warren, Head of Civil
changes 190 Service 12, 13
employership, good 154, 155 fragmentation 20
employment frame of reference, loss of 109
abolition of security 103, 106 fraud and corruption, fighting 133–6,
as privilege 183 148
system 187 free copies of de Telegraaf newspaper
entrepreneurial methods 102 168
environmental concerns 28, 36 freedom 249
equity 19 Freedom of Information Act 140
‘ethical’ leadership 91–2 free gifts to law enforcement officers
ethics 28, 46 160
audits 124, 132 free market capitalism 246
basis and grounding 55 French resistance 94
behavior 44, 109–11 Freud, Sigmund 48
of civil servants 19 Fryslân police force 165, 166
perceptions 222, 229–30 Fulton Committee investigation 14
change in local government 124 Fulton Report, lack of political
codes 7, 39 support 15
decision making 30, 34 functional mechanisms 8
expectations 27 futurism 28
governance 125
as impediments 98 gaming laws 160
integrity in politics 144–7, 240–45 gender 221
judgment 86 gender equality 29
landscape 51, 53 General Intelligence and Security
leadership 98, 153 Service 146
norms and behavior 44–59 genetics 45
problems 104 genocide
relationships 48 laws against 87
standards 26, 33, 34, 47 protecton against 29
inspection of 139–41 German Intelligence (Abwehr) 92
 Index 269

German weapons, US using 90–91 honesty 129

Gestapo 92 by government 249
gifts from citizens 167, 168 in public leaders 123
gifts, acceptance of 241 ‘horse-trading’ in politics 206, 207
to police 159–72 House of Lords Public Service
global budgeting 105 Committee 19
global consensus on ethical policies humanitarian concern 35–6
246 global 249
Global Integrity Alliance 243, 251 human resource management 45,
globalization of ethical issues 25, 29 154–6
global perspective on ethics 239–60 Human Rights Act 140
Goeth, Amon, SS officer 93 Hume, David
governance moral rationalism 45
failures 126 on reason and experience 58
good 240, 258
integrity of 68 identification of values 37
as judge 77, 78 impartiality 19, 250
Government white paper (Continuity incentives for corruption 233
and Change) 16 independent action of civil servants
government 152
joined-up 18 Independent Commission on Good
negative attitudes 224, 225 Governance for Public Services
sovereign 183 125
Graham Committee see Committee on India and Oil-for-Food scandal 242
Standards in Public Life 125–6 individualism 221
gratuities 160–61 individual values 30
moral ambiguity 161 Industrial Revolution 182
for police officers 159–74 information need 36, 72, 110
GRECO, states against corruption institutional change 8
147 institutionalism, historical 7–8, 20
group values 32–3 integral culture 27
growth, non-linear 36 integrity 68–74, 129, 253–4
Guidelines for Managing Conflict of criteria for judgment 73
Interest in the Public Service definitions 66
244 emphasis in recruitment procedure
Gulf War 242 154–5
policies for police 165, 171
Haldane Report (1918) 11, 12, 13 policy in Dutch government 153
harassment 128, 130 of public officials 65–6, 76–80
health 123 violations 151–2, 254
healthcare and medicine 29 integrity management, Netherlands
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 143–57
Constabulary (HMIC) 159 intellectual rigour 10
hierarchical structure 85, 113 interest groups 200, 208
absence of 108 interests, private 197, 198
historical events, dependent variables International Association of Chiefs of
9 Police 159
Holocaust 87, 92 international business transactions 244
Homeland Security and Defense, US International Code of Conduct for
184 Public Officials 240
270 Index

international cooperation 245 lawfulness 256

International Crime Victims Survey laws 74
225, 227 lawsuits on corruption 232
International Labor Organization leadership 130, 136
(ILO) 186 ethical 161–2
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and openness 173
242–4, 246 legal background of policy makers 150
international treaties 8, 249 legal instruments 150
interpersonal decision making 50 legislation, Netherlands 145
interviewing techniques 155 legislative guidelines 126
intimidation 128, 130 legitimation mechanisms 8
investment, return on 35 licensing laws 160
Iraq, invasion of 73 life and liberty 123
Iraqi oil bribery scandal 241–2 Limburg-Noord policy force 165, 166,
irrationality 51 167
ISPO General Election Study, Belgium Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 1912 183
216 lobbying groups, membership 200
local authorities in UK 123–37
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 97 Local Government Act 2000, UK 125,
Jews, employment of, at Emalia 92 135
job cuts 107 local government framework, England
job protections, relaxation of 184 123–7, 139–41
job security 102, 103, 110, 183 Local Government Modernisation
lack of 186, 187 Agenda (LGMA) 135
and results 188 logging, sustainable 28
judgments of integrity 71, 75 loyalty
judicial system 74, 245 of civil servants to politicians,
judicial tribunal 125 challenge to 17
justice, ethics of 48 decline in 103

Kagan, Jerome, developmental Major, John 18, 19, 188

psychologist 48, 49 malpractice 127
Kahneman, Daniel, Prospect Theory management ideology 18, 102
48 management issues 257
Kant, Immanuel 48 management, ‘strong’ 136
categorical imperative 45 management style, interventionist 108
Kennedy Space Flight Center, Florida management training courses 155
95 manager as role model to police
Knapp Commission report 160 170–71
knowledge of motives 69 managerialism 114,
Kohlberg. Lawrence in Europe 183–90
moral development 49 managers and employees 161
The Philosophy of Moral market economy 246
Development 48 market ethics and government ethics
Kracow, Jews of 92, 93 249
market forces, introduction of 187
labor-management law, American 182 ‘marketizers’ 184
Labour Government, UK 1945 13 Market Testing agenda 18
law and conflict 67 market values
law enforcement officers 160 in civil service 17
 Index 271

of private sector 104 nationalization of industries 13

in workplace 108 National Office for Promoting Ethics,
Marshall Space Flight Center 95 Netherlands 153
master-servant law, British 182 natural rights 47
materialistic values 27, 31, 37 Nazi party 92, 95
McConnell case, UK 201, 206–7 Nazi rocket program 88
media 221, 245 Nazi war crimes 96, 97
Mencken, H.L. on human problems 57 ‘neo-liberal agenda’ 104
merit, concept of 185 nepotism 14, 254
merit system, US 183, 184 Netherlands police force 164
military agendas 246 gratuities 159, 160
Mill, John Stuart 45 neutrality 250
Minister for Integrity, Netherlands 146 of MPs 203
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom New Council Constitutions 135
Relations 144, 146 New Labour 18
misconduct 74, 126 New Public Management (NPM) 101,
mismanagement 127 102, 181, 187
misuse of information 254 philosophy 150, 151
Mittelbau-Dora SS reforms 105
concentration camp 89–90 New York Police Department 160
war crimes trial 94 Next Steps Initiative 18
Mittelwerk factory, 89, 90 Nolan Committee see Committee on
monetary incentives 185 Standards in Public Life
monitoring officer 125 non-governmental organizations 31
moon landing 95 non-profit sectors 28
morals 67 non-workers 110
character 45, 47, 256 norm-acceptability 70
considerations 47, 51, 68, 96 Northcote, Sir Stafford 9
convictions 35 Northcote-Trevelyan report 11
development and reasoning 49, 50, Northern Ireland Committee 207
52, 54 nuclear weapons 29
judgment 47, 72, 153
poor 44 obedience to legitimate authority 86
misconduct 75, 77, 78, 79 objectivity 129
principles, appeal to 152 obligations of bureaucrats 67
responsibilities 34, 37 occupational background 151
values 45, 68, 73, 74 Office of Public Service 16
major sources 62–4 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
of population 67 (ODPM) 125
morale, decline in 103 officials, administrative 77
motivation 44 elected 75–7
deterioration in 106 integrity of 72
re-ordering 36 politically appointed 77
munitions factory, Emalia 93 Oil-for-Food Program scandal, 1996
murder of Jews 88 241–2
openness 129
National Aeronautics and Space in employment 162
Administration (NASA) 91, 94, 95 on gratuities 169
national culture and new values 40 Operation Overcast 90–91, 96
National Integrity System 244 Operation Paperclip 96, 97
272 Index

Organisation for Economic political connections for public office

Co-operation and Development 183
244 political control, increase 188
OECD countries 101, 102, 103 political instability 25
organization, behavioural 39, 40, 41 political loyalty, rewards for 190
organizational life 126 political trading 206
organized crime, rise in 163 politicians
outside activities 145 corruption 65, 199
Oxbridge intellectual elite 10 as ‘hardliners’ 151
intervention by 111
Paine, Thomas, on right and wrong politicization 17, 108
56 pollution and environmental ethics 39
paradigms, changing 27 Ponting affair 17
Parliamentary Enquiry Committee for population norms 67
the Building Industry 146, 152 Porter case, UK 200, 203–6
parliament as judge 77, 78 postal vote irregularities 137
party interest 67 Birmingham 126
path dependent patterns 8, 14 post-civil service environment 101–4,
patronage 14 115
pay for performance 185, 186 post-industrial societies, values 25–6
Pay Review Body, UK 15 post-materialism 27, 28
Peenemunde rocket development, post-war consolidation 11–14
Germany 88–90 poverty reduction 243
penal laws 75 power balance disruption 13
Pendleton Act 1883 183 power of civil servants 11
perceptions, differences in 70, 71 power seeking 34
performance-based pay 185, 186, 188 priorities, re-ordering 36
performance in job, decline 103 prisoner of war labor, Germany 89
performance mandates 105 private enterprise 246
performance practices 101 private interests 199–200
personal conscience 86 of public official 244
personal contact 132 private sector 245
personal experience of corruption 227, in UK 123
232 private time misconduct 174, 254
personal problem solving 234 privatization 188
personal reward 35 probity 19
physics 28 problem-solving 86
Piaget, Jean, on intelligence and moral productivity
reasoning 48, 49 of civil servants 106
Poland, German army 92 decline 40, 110
police officers 159–74 and performance 41
and gratuities, Netherlands 159–74 professional associations 74
formal policies on 167 professional commitment 110, 113
integrity, research projects 163–5 professional ethics 86, 87
perks 159 professions in the Holocaust 87
professional freedom 173 profits, concern with 108
police forces, regional, study 165 programme downsizing 101
policy advice from special advisers 19 ‘prospect theory’ 49
political agendas 246 protection by hierarchy 112
political alienation 226, 233 psychology 28
 Index 273

Public Accounts Committee 16 religion 28

public administration and ‘principled reorganization 107
reasoning’ 47 representative democracy 10
public bodies, public trust in 123 reputation loss 40
public good, promotion 181 rescuers of Jews in Holocaust 92
public interest 56, 197, 198, 208 Oskar Schindler 98
Public Interest Reports (PIRs) 124, resources, scarcity of 102
126, 128 respect for rule of law 250
public money, expenditure of 124 responsibility 86, 148
public officials restaurants, gratuities for police 165
duty of 241, 244 rewards 40
integrity of 65–80, 197 and punishment 161
and moral values 67–8 and sanctions 102
and personal responsibility 244 rights and principles 44, 48
public organizations management 101 risk assessment 45, 153
public satisfaction, declining 133 risk identification 244
public sector risk taking 50
audit 130 rocket development in Germany 88
employees 102, 104 Rohr, John 46, 67
organizations 27 role modelling 173
UK 123 managers as 161, 162
values 104 roles of peer group 102
public servants 109–11 Royal Commission on New South
decline in morale 188 Wales Police 160
and gratuities 163 Rudolph, Arthur 95, 96
modernization programmes 103 rules and regulations, absence of 152
‘status’ 101 rules, imposition of 150
public service 46, 56, 183
and ethical norms 44–59 Saint Augustine, natural law 45
motivation 20 saliency 51, 52, 54, 55
values 45 Saturn V Program Office 95
Public Service Ethos (PSE) 7, 11–20, scandals 240
104 Schindler, Oskar 85, 92–4, 97–8
erosion 189, 190 Schindler’s List 93
and values 47, 48 Schutztaffel, corruption 87
public trust in governance 136, 257 Scott Inquiry 16, 19
punishment security of employment, abolition 105
lack of, for Holocaust 88 self-determination 249
of wrongdoers 148 self-expression 31
self-interest 45, 67
quality of life 28 selflessness and public interest 129
self-reinforcing mechanisms 8
Race Relations Acts 140 self-respect in work 113
rationalism 45–7, 105 Senior Civil Service 16
redundancies 102, 107 loss of policy role 19
reform movement in US 184 service of the community 12
reform versus tradition 13 Sex Discrimination Act 140
regime values 46 sexual harassment 174, 254
regulating for ethical governance 124 simplicity as moral choice 37
relationships 69 Singer, Peter, ethicist 46, 49
274 Index

slave labor Thatcher, Margaret

Germany 89 anti-civil service attitude 15
US 96 reforms 187–8
‘sleaze’ 123 theological views 45
social and cultural context 85 Third Reich 87
social attitudes 221 ‘Third Way’ 18
social consensus 30, 31 time horizons, contraction in 108
social issues 35 trade union power, reduction 187
social movements 8, 28 traditional status of public servants,
social outcome 32–3 loss of 111
social psychology 50 traditional values 39
social responsibility 31 Transatlantic Dialogue 252
sociobiology 45 Transparency International (TI) 147,
socio-demographic characteristics 217–19, 231, 244–5
221 Corruption Index 163
space shuttle 97 Transportation Security Agency, US
Speer, Albert 184
administrator 87 Treasury 10, 16
war crimes conviction 89 challenge to 14
spiritual development 36 control increase 12
spying 92 power 11
stability 249 Trevelyan, Sir Charles 9
staff trust 19, 249
hiring problems 40 lack of, in hierarchy 109, 110
inequalities among 109 low levels in UK 115
training courses 155 and trustworthiness 68–74
Standards Board for England 125, 126, trustworthiness, in public leaders
209, 210 123
stress in job 103 Turiel, Elliot, social psychologist 46, 50
strict norms 173 The Culture of Morality 48
strictness on gratuities 169 Tversky, Amos, Prospect Theory 48
success measurement 41
Sudetenland 92 uniqueness 39
Suez crisis 13 United Kingdom code of conduct
superpowers, international 246 190
Swiss company, Cotecna, Oil-for-Food United Nations 246
scandal 242 United Nations Convention Against
Swiss Federal Administration Corruption 192, 246
101–15 United Nations Ethics Office 242
Swiss job market 108 United Nations General Assembly
Switzerland, new public management Resolution on Corruption 240
105 United Nations Office on Drugs and
sycophancy 181 Crime 241
systems theory 28 universal perspective 46
United States Declaration of
technical orientation 144 Independence 44
technical rationality 86, 96–8 utilitarian motives 21
technological change 8
technological progress 86 V-1 cruise missile 88
technology 25 V-2 rocket 88, 89
 Index 275

value preferences 27 Westminster City Council, London

value priorities 33 128, 200, 203–6
values 67 white paper, Modernising Government
changes in 20, 37 (1999) 18
constitutional 67 ‘Whitleyism’, labour relations 11–12
and ethical actions 37 Wilson government defeat 15
implicit 39 wisdom of legislator 51
of self 30 women, employment of 20
traditional 30 women’s moral development 48
values-based approach 148–54 work
vested interests 10 conditions 106
vice laws 160 ethic 113
violence, disproportionate 254 quality, decline in 110
von Braun, Wernher see Braun, relationships, unstable 110–11
Wernher von working environment 112
voting behavior 221 Working on Government, Flemish
Community 218–19, 229
war 8, 13–14 World Bank 242–4, 246
waste of resources 254 anticorruption strategy 243
watchdog agencies 244 World Ethics Forum 243, 251
weapons production 89–90 World War I, rockets in 88
Weber, Max 45, 114 worldview, global change 25
welfare state 13
well-being, increased 36 zero tolerance on gratuities 167, 168,
western democracy 258 172