The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation:

Unable to Resolve Hydropower

Development Threats to Mekong Water
Sustainability
Posted on September 17, 2018
Image Caption: Despite a new regional cooperation mechanism, sustainable
use of the Mekong River continues to be threatened by hydropower
development.

Running through China (the People’s Republic of China), Myanmar, Laos,

Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, the Mekong River constitutes a river
basin home to 70 million people.[1] Despite concerns about its impacts on
other water uses, hydropower development proceeds in the Mekong River
basin alongside other activities such as fishing and agriculture. The
Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), launched in 2015, offers new hope for
water sustainability by gathering the six Mekong countries to cooperate on
water resource management. To understand whether the LMC will
contribute to sustainable use of the Mekong, I identify how hydropower
development, undertaken without transboundary water governance,
threatens water sustainability. Then, I examine why transboundary water
governance has failed, and whether the LMC will succeed. Transboundary
water governance has failed due to differing national interests, regional
power asymmetry, and weak regional institutions. As platform led by China
and which is not designed for transboundary water governance, the LMC
leaves these factors unresolved. Therefore, the LMC does not support
sustainable use of the Mekong. My analysis draws primarily on academic
sources, with media commentaries to provide more contemporary insight on
the LMC.

As the Mekong region develops, so has hydropower to meet a rising demand

for energy. Hydropower development has proven to be a contentious issue
and a key threat to sustainable use of the Mekong. Although upstream dams
may alter water flow for downstream users and pose other changes to water
use in the basin, countries have nevertheless proceeded with dam-building.

In 2015, China launched the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) with the

other five Mekong river countries. The LMC appears to offer the potential to
address the conflict between hydropower development and sustainable use
of the Mekong, since all riparian countries are participants in this
cooperation mechanism that features water resources as one of its five
initial priority areas.[2] Despite this emphasis on sustainability, I argue that
the LMC will not improve water governance to resolve the conflict between
hydropower development and Mekong sustainability. Hydropower
development threatens the sustainable use of the Mekong as it poses
environmental and social consequences across the basin, and yet proceeds
without transboundary agreement. Transboundary water governance in the
Mekong has failed for several reasons: countries have prioritized national
interests, power imbalances exist among countries, and current regional
institutions are unable to adequately provide water management over the
entire river basin. The LMC, though improving basin cooperation, does not
address these problems because it is China-led and not designed to
facilitate water governance. Consequently, the LMC will not resolve the
threat hydropower development poses to the sustainable use of the Mekong.

Hydropower’s negative impacts threaten sustainable use of the Mekong.

Sustainability, as David Feldman’s book on freshwater sustainability
defines, is the ability to manage resources while maintaining the welfare of
people and other living organisms.[3] In the Mekong basin, people use the
river for freshwater consumption, agriculture, fishing, and transportation.
According to Osborne’s book on the Mekong River and its surrounding
politics, approximately 80 percent of the basin’s population depend on fish
or agriculture from the Mekong for subsistence.[4] Additionally, as
numerous sources explain, hydropower development threatens these uses,
in turn threatening sustainable use of the Mekong. The United Nations Food
and Agriculture Organization’s summary of the environmental and societal
impacts of hydropower development include negative impacts on the
ecosystem, negative impacts on water for uses in navigation and fisheries,
and adverse impact on water quality.[5] Kuenzer et al., who analyze the
impact of several planned hydropower projects, further detail these
impacts: dams can affect fish stocks by impeding fish migration and
blocking nutrient-rich sediment flows that sustain the Mekong’s
biodiversity.[6] Given these impacts on the important uses of the Mekong,
hydropower development is a risk to the sustainable use of the Mekong.

The lack of transboundary water governance in the Mekong further

compounds threats to sustainability. Since the Mekong travels through
several countries, dam-building on an upstream part of the Mekong can
affect downstream users. Given the transboundary impacts of dam-building,
international cooperation on planning such projects is required in order to
achieve sustainability.[7] This demands participation from all riparian
countries too, as one of Feldman’s seven principles for sustainable water
planning affirms that all those impacted by water decisions must be
included in the decision-making process.[8] This is not the case in the
Mekong basin since riparian countries China and Myanmar are not part of
the Mekong River Commission (MRC), the main institution for regional
water governance. Furthermore, countries have proceeded with dam
projects without agreement from other countries.[9] According to Biba, who
examines China’s dam-building on the Mekong, China began unilaterally
constructing a series of eight dams in 1980s.[10] Even MRC members do
not heed the MRC’s guidance, as the Xayaburi Dam project showcases. Laos
has continued with the project, ignoring Cambodian and Vietnamese fears
of the project’s impacts on fishing and agriculture, and disregarding
recommendations from an MRC-commissioned 2015 Strategic
Environmental Assessment that countries delay mainstream dam-building
until 2025 due to the risks of irreversible damage.[11] These cases
exemplify how a lack of transboundary governance allows hydropower
development to proceed, despite concerns from other basin countries.
Without transboundary water governance that includes the input from all
basin members, hydropower development thus threatens the sustainable
use of the Mekong.

Transboundary water governance to address hydropower concerns has

failed in the Mekong basin for three reasons. Firstly, countries have
diverging interests with regards to hydropower development. Upstream
countries like China and Laos seek to take advantage of the mountainous
geography to generate hydropower.[12] Zhang’s study of Chinese
hydropower on the Mekong, known as Lancang in China, shows that
hydropower offers great benefits to China. To China, hydropower on the
Lancang is a source of renewable energy that supports economic
development and generates revenue for local governments.[13] Summers’
article on Chinese conceptions of the Mekong basin also concludes that
economic development is China’s priority for that region.[14] Downstream
countries, on the other hand, are vulnerable to changes in water flow
caused by dams upstream. These differences have hindered transboundary
water governance. For instance, the reason China has not joined the MRC is
that the MRC offers more advantages to downstream countries and
simultaneously constrains China, as Lu argues in an analysis of China’s
cooperation policies in the Mekong region.[15] As a result, China remains a
Dialogue Partner to the MRC, rather than subject to MRC attempts to
collaboratively manage water in the Mekong basin. Divergent national
interests subsequently cause transboundary governance to falter. It is
further exacerbated by a power asymmetry in the region.

The second factor inhibiting regional water governance over hydropower

development is the power asymmetry amongst countries. China is the water
hegemon of the Mekong region since it controls the source of the Mekong.
With control of water, China can influence other countries to forward its
own ends, rather than cooperating with them. In Han’s argument that
power asymmetry is a factor inhibiting collaborative governance of the
Mekong, Han describes that China has little incentive to cooperate with
downstream countries as China can use its control of water as a bargaining
chip.[16] Moreover, China is also a hegemon in terms of size and resources.
While a coalition of countries against regional hegemon Egypt helped
resolve management issues in the Nile Basin, Tong’s evaluation of the
potential for Mekong sustainable development determines such a solution is
impossible in the Mekong. China is not only water hegemon, but is also
significantly larger, more powerful, and has more resources than the other
Mekong countries.[17] This power asymmetry thus prevents an anti-
hegemon coalition from forming. With power asymmetry in its favour, there
is little motivation for China to support transboundary governance. In an
article analyzing asymmetry in Chinese southbound river basins, Kattelus et
al. concurs, saying that China joining a regional discussion essentially
eliminates the advantage China has, since “participating in a regional
discussion […] would most probably provide a less powerful position and
could even lead to situations where downstream countries create alliances
against China.”[18] Consequently, given the asymmetrical advantages
China enjoys as regional hegemon, there is little reason for China to
participate in transboundary water governance. Without participation from
all water users, transboundary water governance will not succeed.

The third reason why transboundary water governance has failed in the
Mekong lies in the region’s institutions. Numerous scholars recognize the
MRC and Greater Mekong Sub-region Initiative (GMS) as the two key
regional institutions that facilitate cooperation.[19] So far, neither has been
successful at facilitating transboundary water governance. The MRC aims
to jointly manage water while balancing economic development.
[20] However, the MRC is unable to impact its members’ national policies.
Grumbine et al.’s examination of governance challenges for Mekong region
hydropower identify the 1995 Mekong Agreement that established the MRC
as cause of this, as it allows members to ignore the MRC’s
recommendations.[21] Suhardiman, who examines transboundary
governance of the Mekong, concurs that the MRC “lacks power to direct
transboundary water governance issues in the region” and describes the
MRC as disconnected from national decision-making processes.
[22] Additionally, the way MRC does not include all riparian countries
undermines the MRC’s ability to govern the entire Mekong basin, as
discussed earlier. As such, though the MRC intends to manage water
sustainably, its inability to coordinate national policies from all riparian
countries towards this goal makes it an ineffective institution for
transboundary water governance.

The second regional institution, the GMS, also fails to provide

transboundary water governance. Launched by the Asian Development
Bank to enhance economic cooperation, the GMS includes all riparian
countries.[23] It fails to foster transboundary water governance though due
to its mission and the way it undermines the MRC’s mission. To Han, the
focus on improving economic cooperation limits the GMS and its ability to
be comprehensive enough to serve as a transboundary water governance
institution for the Mekong.[24] This GMS focus also causes it to favour
hydropower development for economic growth, regardless of the MRC’s
Strategic Environmental Assessment recommendations to halt construction.
[25] Thus, the GMS contrasts directly with the MRC’s efforts, and in fact
marginalizes the MRC. As a result, GMS fails to provide and undermines
transboundary water governance in the Mekong. With diverging national
interests, power asymmetries amongst countries, and weakness of existing
institutions, there is no transboundary water governance of the Mekong
that ensures its sustainable use.

Though the LMC promises greater cooperation on regional water use, it will
not overcome the obstacles to transboundary governance over hydropower.
The LMC gathers all Mekong basin countries and aims to facilitate data
sharing as part of cooperation on water resource management.[26] One of
the LMC’s three core purposes is to pursue economic and sustainable
development as well.[27] Nonetheless, the LMC will not succeed because
the LMC is a China-led mechanism that continues the regional power
asymmetry to further Chinese national interests. In an article studying the
LMC, Bunyavejchewin states that though there is conflict over whether
Thailand or China first proposed the idea, what remains clear is that China
has taken charge of it.[28] The LMC promotes regional cooperation to
further Chinese goals. Lu identifies the LMC as the centre of China’s recent
increased cooperation with the Mekong region. Through the LMC, China
aims to ameliorate relations amid the growing power disparity between
China and the other Mekong countries, while avoiding the unwanted effects
of China’s past approach of using economic cooperation to foster political
relations.[29] This does not mean the LMC resolves power asymmetries.
Fernandez’s analysis of the LMC says that the LMC only reflects a change in
China’s approach to a softer one, for the LMC offers China a way to “temper
downstream complaints concerning Chinese construction of large-scale
dams on the mainstream Mekong.”[30] This feature, along with the LMC’s
focus on sustainable and economic development, supports a continuation of
Biba’s argument that downstream resistance to Chinese dam projects is
minimal because China has successfully linked hydropower to wider
regional development.[31] Clearly, the LMC resolves neither diverging
national interests nor power asymmetry. China in fact has created a
multilateral mechanism that serves its own national interests. In this case,
since the LMC is an uneven playing field where China’s preferences will be
valued over others’ preferences, the LMC will not address the problems of
national interests and power asymmetry that inhibit transboundary water
governance.

Furthermore, the LMC is not designed to facilitate transboundary

governance over water resources. One of its five initial priority areas is
supporting cooperation towards better water resource management.
[32] This falls short of joint management of Mekong water resources, let
alone guaranteeing country policies are harmonized with regional-level
agreements on water. In this sense, the LMC lives up to its promise of
complementing existing regional institutions.[33] The LMC will not replace
the MRC by taking up the MRC’s role of providing transboundary water
governance. Considering that the LMC consists of all riparian countries like
the GMS, the LMC may follow the GMS’ footsteps and actually contribute to
the marginalization of the MRC. Such an outcome would align with
Bunyavechewin’s evaluation that China developed the LMC to posit itself as
leader in the region by excluding powers like Japan that were dominant in
the MRC and GMS.[34] As a result of its design and purpose, the LMC will
not support sustainable use of the Mekong via facilitating transboundary
water governance. The LMC is China-led to fulfill Chinese purposes first and
foremost, and it does not aim to provide water governance, only water
cooperation.

In conclusion, the LMC will not contribute to the water governance

necessary to address the challenges to sustainability that hydropower
development pose. Hydropower development threatens sustainable use of
the Mekong as it impacts other Mekong users and is undertaken without
appropriate international agreement. Hydropower projects proceed
unchecked and threaten Mekong sustainability because lack of
transboundary water governance has persisted. Transboundary water
governance of the Mekong has failed due to three factors: Mekong
countries have contrasting national interests, a power asymmetry exists
among countries, and current institutions have proven unable to provide
transboundary water governance. The LMC does not resolve these three
obstacles to transboundary water governance in the Mekong basin. China,
leader of the LMC, in fact uses the LMC to moderate the basin’s countries.
This helps advance Chinese national goals and maintains the power
asymmetry. The LMC is also not effective for transboundary water
governance as it focuses on cooperation towards management, but not
management or decision-making itself. In addition, the LMC may detract
from existing institutions like the MRC that attempts to provide water
governance. Thus, the LMC, although a promising step towards regional
cooperation that could enhance sustainability, does not offer the
transboundary governance necessary to resolve the threats hydropower
poses to sustainable use of the Mekong.
About the Author

Verna Yam is from the unceded territories of the Musqueam, Squamish and
Tsleil-Waututh people, known to many as Vancouver, Canada. She
completed her Bachelor in International Relations at the University of
British Columbia and is now pursuing a Master’s in International Affairs at
Carleton University, where she focuses on Canada-Asia relations and
environmental cooperation.

Endnotes
[1] “Mekong Basin,” Aquastat – Food and Agriculture Organization, 2011,
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/basins/mekong/index.stm.

[2] Lancang Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting, “Sanya Declaration of

the First Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting” (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, March 23, 2016),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1350039.sht
ml.

[3] Feldman, Water, 3.

[4] Milton E. Osborne, River at Risk: The Mekong and the Water Politics of
China and Southeast Asia, Lowy Institute Paper 02 (Double Bay, NSW:
Published for Lowy Institute for International Policy by Longueville Media,
2004), 2.

[5] “Mekong Basin.”

[6] Claudia Kuenzer et al., “Understanding the Impact of Hydropower

Developments in the Context of Upstream-Downstream Relations in the
Mekong River Basin,” Sustainability Science; Dordrecht 8, no. 4 (October
2013): 568, 571–572, https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11625-012-
0195-z.

[7] Feldman, 125.

[8] Feldman, 31.

[9] Though Kuenzer et al. note that a variety of actors, including private
corporations, influence hydropower development, this paper will focus on
countries. As Feldman says in the context of water provision, although
private companies may be responsible for water provision, the state is still
involved as it may own or maintain dams and control water management.
Kuenzer et al., “Understanding the Impact of Hydropower Developments in
the Context of Upstream-Downstream Relations in the Mekong River
Basin,” 578; Feldman, Water, 95.

[10] Sebastian Biba, “China’s Continuous Dam-Building on the Mekong

River,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 42, no. 4 (November 2012): 604,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2012.712257.

[11] “Lies, Dams and Statistics,” The Economist, July 26, 2012,
https://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/07/mekong-river; Mekong
River Commission, “Strategic Environmental Assessment of Mainstream
Dams,” Mekong River Commission, accessed November 25, 2017,
http://www.mrcmekong.org/about-mrc/completion-of-strategic-cycle-2011-
2015/initiative-on-sustainable-hydropower/strategic-environmental-
assessment-of-mainstream-dams/.

[12] Kuenzer et al., “Understanding the Impact of Hydropower

Developments in the Context of Upstream-Downstream Relations in the
Mekong River Basin,” 568.

[13] Yan Zhang, “Accelerating Sustainability by Hydropower Development

in China: The Story of HydroLancang,” Sustainability; Basel 9, no. 8 (2017):
2–3, 5–6, 9–11,
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.3390/su9081305.

[14] Tim Summers, “China and the Mekong Region.,” China

Perspectives 2008, no. 3 (September 2008): 75.

[15] Guangsheng Lu, “China Seeks to Improve Mekong Sub-Regional

Cooperation: Causes and Policies,” Policy Report (S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, February 2016),
5, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PR160225_China-
Seeks-to-Improve-Mekong.pdf.
[16] Heejin Han, “China, An Upstream Hegemon: A Destabilizer for the
Governance of the Mekong River?: China and the Mekong River,” Pacific
Focus 32, no. 1 (April 2017): 36, https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12085.

[17] Linh Tong, “Is Sustainable Development Along the Mekong

Possible?,” The Diplomat, October 31, 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/is-sustainable-development-along-the-
mekong-possible/.

[18] Mirja Kattelus et al., “China’s Southbound Transboundary River Basins:

A Case of Asymmetry,” Water International 40, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 131,
https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2014.980029.

[19] Han, “China, An Upstream Hegemon,” 6; Lu, “China Seeks to Improve

Mekong Sub-Regional Cooperation: Causes and Policies,” 15; Summers,
“China and the Mekong Region.,” 69–70.

[20] “About MRC,” Mekong River Commission, accessed November 27,

2017, http://www.mrcmekong.org/about-mrc/.

[21] R Edward Grumbine, John Dore, and Jianchu Xu, “Mekong

Hydropower: Drivers of Change and Governance Challenges,” Frontiers in
Ecology and the Environment 10, no. 2 (2012): 95.

[22] Diana Suhardiman, Mark Giordano, and François Molle, “Scalar

Disconnect: The Logic of Transboundary Water Governance in the
Mekong,” Society & Natural Resources 25, no. 6 (June 2012): 582–583,
https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2011.604398.

[23] Summers, “China and the Mekong Region.,” 70.

[24] Han, “China, An Upstream Hegemon,” 35.

[25] Suhardiman, Giordano, and Molle, “Scalar Disconnect,” 581–582.

[26] Lancang Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting, “Sanya Declaration of

the First Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting.”

[27] Lancang Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting.

[28] Poowin Bunyavejchewin, “The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC)
Viewed in Light of the Potential Regional Leader Theory,” Journal of
Mekong Societies 12, no. 3 (2016): 55.

[29] Lu, “China Seeks to Improve Mekong Sub-Regional Cooperation:

Causes and Policies,” 4.

[30] Victor Fernandez, “The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Framework:

China’s Real Motivation,” Mekong Eye (blog), October 11, 2017,
https://www.mekongeye.com/2017/10/11/the-lancang-mekong-cooperation-
framework-chinas-real-motivation/.

[31] Biba, “China’s Continuous Dam-Building on the Mekong River,” 605.

[32] Lancang Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting, “Sanya Declaration of

the First Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting.”

[33] Lancang Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting.

[34] Bunyavejchewin, “The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Viewed in

Light of the Potential Regional Leader Theory,” 50, 60–61.

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