IN THE NICK OF TIME

SAVING THE KASHMIR VALLEY

1947-48

Colonel Ajay K Raina, SM

Other Books by The Author

Command in Line of Fire: Company Commander in Rashtriya Rifles
Cutting Edge: Being a Subunit Commander
A Soldier’s Faith: Country Above Gods
And Quietly Flows the Jhelum: 370 Degree Turn
Against All Odds: The Naushera-Jhangar Battles 1947-48
Hold at All Costs: The Siege & Relief of Poonch 1947-48
Ladakh Simplified: The Unofficial Handbook of Buddhist Ladakh (co-
authored)

Copyright - Colonel Ajay K Raina, Sena Medal @ Aj who reserves the

right to be identified as the author of this work. Author can be contacted at
[email protected]
Published by –Lay Publications, Leh (UT of Ladakh)
Distributed by –Bookmart Distributors, 210, Ansal Chamber II, Bhikaji
Cama Place, New Delhi-110066
email: [email protected] Tel: 011-26193636
Handset:+91-9810700039

First Printed circa 2020

© All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means
without the prior permission of the author, or be otherwise circulated
in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published.

Dedicated to
Saviours of Kashmir-
Indian Army, Indian Air Force, J&K State Forces, J&K Militia,
Civilian Pilots & Aircrew and Local Volunteers!
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 CONTENTS

Foreword ​ ​i
Prologue ​ ​01
Kashmir: Orientation ​ ​03
Historical background ​ ​10
Build up to 1947 ​ ​ ​ ​17
Macro picture: Mid 1947 ​ ​25
Intrigues and Conspiracies ​ ​30
Military Equations ​ ​36
The Invasion: 22 October ​ ​42
Stories that Need to be Told ​ ​48
At Another Level: 24 October ​ ​69
Political manoeuvring ​ ​71
First Boots ​ ​76
Moment of Glory ​ ​89
Defying the Odds ​ ​93
Arrival of a HQ ​ ​98
A Sniper’s Bullet ​ ​100
Threat Builds Up ​ ​103
Bogey Arrives ​ ​106
A Story that Continues to Inspire ​ ​108
Top Brass Appraisal ​ ​113
The Trap ​ ​117
Higher HQ ​ ​120
Gone with the Wind ​ ​123
Baramulla ​ ​130
Uri ​ ​132
Decision Dilemma: Army HQ ​ ​135
The Ball Gets Rolling ​ ​139
Another Story that Needs to be Told ​ ​145
Higher Directions ​ ​148
Early Winters ​ ​153
Domel or Not ​ ​155
Formulation of Plan for J&K ​ ​158
Tough Times ​ ​160
Taking Stock of the Situation ​ ​167
Winters of 1947-48​ ​171
Action Returns ​ ​176
Across the River ​ ​180
The Shuffle ​ ​189
Tough Ask ​ ​191
The Slog ​ ​208
Setbacks ​ ​218
Wargaming at HQ Sri Division ​ ​ 28
2
Decisions at the Highest Level ​ ​234
The Stress ​ ​237
Cooling Down ​ ​240
In the Wings​ ​242
The War Heroes ​ ​246
The Unfinished Task ​ ​267
The Equilibrium ​ ​271
Anecdotes of a Diverse Kind ​ ​278
Epilogue ​ ​310
Appendix ​ ​313
Bibliography​ ​317
References ​ ​319
 LEGENDS USED IN SKETCHES
Single, thick, lines ​ etalled roads
M
Dashes ​Unmetalled/ fair-weather roads
Dotted lines ​ ​Foot tracks

Double, parallel lines ​ ivers and streams

R
Single, thin lines ​Nalas
Round dotted lines ​ ​Ridges
Layers of lines/rings- ​ ​High grounds/Heights
Cross ​ ​Mountain Pass
Triangle- ​ ​Trig Heights
Asterix/shaded circles- ​Actual location of the landmark
Dots and Lines combo- ​IB/LC
Arrows- ​ irection of attack/move of troops
D
Rectangles- ​A symbol for a body of troops
COLLOQUIAL WORDS/SHORT FORMS /ABBREVIATIONS USED

AC ​ ​ shok Chakra
A
Agyat Vaas (Hindi) S ​ ecret habitat
CB (British) ​ ​Companion of (Order of) Bath
CBE (British) ​ ommander of the Order of the British Empire
C
CFL ​ ease Fire Line (later LC)
C
CIH ​ ​ entral India Horse
C
C-in-C ​ ​ ommander-in-Chief
C
CIE (British) ​ ompanion (class) of (Most Eminent Order of) Indian Empire
C
CO ​ ​ ommanding Officer
C
Darbar (Hindi) ​ ​ oyal Court/ Seat of power
R
DCO (British) ​ ​ istinguished Service Order
D
Devsthan (Hindi) ​ hrine
S
Dhar (Colloquial) ​ idge/hill/mountain range
R
Diwan (Hindi) ​ ​ rime Minister (pre-British times)
P
FOO ​ ​Forward Observation Officer
Gali (Pahadi) ​ ​Mountain Pass
GHQ ​ ​General Headquarters
GOC ​General Officer Commanding (a Division or a Corps)
GOC-in-C ​General Officer Commanding-in-Chief/Army Commander.
GR ​Gurkha (British spellings)/Gorkha (Indian spellings) Rifles
GT ​ ​General Transport
HQ ​ ​Headquarter(s)
(I) ​ ​Independent
IAF ​ ​Indian Air Force
IB ​ ​International Border
Illaqa ​ ​Principality/State
INA ​Indian National Army (founded by Subash Bose)
JCO ​ ​Junior Commissioned Officer
Jagir (Hindi) ​ ​Estate
Jihad (Arabic) ​ oly war/struggle towards self-betterment as per Islamic belief
H
Kabaili (Urdu) ​ ribal
T
Kanal (Hindi) ​ revenue measurement, 600 square yards
A
Kass/Kas (Colloquial)N ​ ala/narrow stream
KCB (British) ​ night Commander of (The Most Honourable Order of the) Bath
K
KCIE(British) ​ night Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire
K
KCSI (British) ​ night Commander of the Order of Star of India
K
Khukhri (Hindi) ​ recurved blade knife carried by Gorkhas
A
Lashkar (Persian) I​slamic army/contingent
LOC ​ ​ ine(s) of Communication
L
LC ​ ​ ine of Control (earlier CFL)
L
Mahajanapadas (Sanskrit) Great Kingdom
Maidan (Hindi) ​Big ground/open area
MBE (British) ​ ember of the Order of the British Empire
M
MC (British) ​ ​ ilitary Cross
M
MMG ​ ​ edium Machine Gun
M
MVC ​ ​ aha Vir Chakra
M
Naya (Urdu) ​ ​New
NCO ​ ​Non-Commissioned Officer
Ni (Poonchi) ​ ​Belonging to
OP ​ ​Observation Post
OR ​ ​Other Rank (NCOs and Sepoys)
Para ​ ​Parachute
Pir ​ ​A holy person
PM ​ ​Prime Minister
POJK ​ ​Pakistan Occupied J&K
Praja Sabha ​ egislative Council under monarch of J&K
L
PVC ​ aram Vir Chakra
P
‘R’ ​ s a prefix, denotes Royal (legacy of British Army), e.g., RIAF
A
(R+IAF) RIA (R+ Indian Artillery)
RSS ​ ​ ashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
R
RV ​ ​ endezvous
R
Sanad (Arabic) ​ ​Deed
Sarkanda ​ ​Reed
SC ​ ​Shaurya Chakra
Tac ​ ​Tactical
Tawi (Colloquial) ​River/Stream
TNT ​ ​Trinitrotoluene, an explosive
VrC ​ ​Vir Chakra

NOMENCLATURE AND IDENTIFICATION OF UNITS

Names of battalions and regiments have undergone changes since
1947-48. Same have been indicated at suitable places. An effort, however,
has been made to use the names and terms as were in vogue during that
period. There have also been changes in the staff duty work, when it comes
to use of capitals etc. To maintain the congruent consistency, this book has
used what was in vogue during the course of the mid-previous century.
The Princely State of J&K: The Largest of all!

An undated, ancient map of Kashmir

 i

FOREWORD
It gives me immense pleasure to write the Foreword to this
book that revisits the nail-biting events that happened in the
Kashmir Valley during the conflict of 1947-48. Making good use
of the benefit of the retrospection available seven decades after
the conflict, the author has diligently endeavoured to create a
linkage between the past and the present.
At one point, the situation had become a bit too critical for
the Kashmir Valley when the invaders, having decimated the
handful troops of the princely State, were well poised to enter
Srinagar while politics and inter-personal relationships were still
at play at Delhi. But a proactive approach and a very high
degree of professional soldiering by the men on ground, carried
the day for the country. A mere visualisation of the moments,
when Dakotas were circling over the Srinagar airfield, to make
sure there were no enemy on the rough strip before touching
down, gives us an idea of the extant state of mind of the soldiers.
Having had the privilege of commanding the Chinar Corps in
the Valley, I can vouch for the fact that what our soldiers did
during the autumn of 1947, was nothing short of pulling a
miracle and that too just in the nick of time.
Various acts of selfless bravery by Brig Rajendra Singh,
MVC (Posthumous), Chief of Staff State Forces, with his small
force and initiative by Lt Col DR Rai, MVC (Posthumous), CO
1 SIKH, as also the unrelenting stand taken by a company of 4
KUMAON under Maj Somnath Sharma, PVC (Posthumous) and
the hell brought down on the enemy at Shalateng through some
astute leadership, salvaged a near hopeless situation way back in
1947. The saga of the soldiers writing history in blood,
continued to be written throughout 1948 when troops slogged
against all odds to push the enemy out of the territory that
rightfully belonged to us.

ii
Many books have been written on the military and political
issues of that conflict. But, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, this book is the first one to have included details of
actions fought by State forces before the arrival of the Indian
Army troops in the Valley as also, of course, the actions fought
by the great Indian Army. Needless to say, the story of Kashmir
could never have been complete without such an inclusion and
amazingly, it has finally happened more than 70 years later!
Human sufferings are part of collateral in any war. Rapes and
massacres committed by invaders at Muzaffarabad, Uri,
Baramulla and elsewhere are still part of the public discourse.
This book has made a sincere attempt to include the first-hand
narrations by a few survivors of that era so as to present the facts
without any dilution or exaggeration.
Through a thorough research, meticulous synthesis and
collation, the author has been able to present a very objective
perspective on the military operations and political
undercurrents of that era. A special mention needs to be made
about the manual sketches that illustrate the amount of the hard
work that has gone into creating this book.
I am sanguine that the work will enable the readers, both in
uniform and in civvies, to understand the first campaign by our
army post independence, in great details. Being an objective
assessment, backed by some really detailed analytic work, this
book can be seen as a compendium on various facets of
operations in the Valley. The book is strongly recommended for
historians, researchers, military leaders and younger generation.
I am sure that because of the excellence of the material being
presented, the book shall find its due place on the shelves of all
libraries of the Indian Army and beyond.

I extend my best wishes to the work and its creator!

Gurugram (Haryana) ​ (Lieutenant General)

01 July, 2020 ​ Former GOC, Srinagar Corps

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 PROLOGUE
Who has not heard of the Vale of Cashmere,
With its roses the brightest that earth ever gave;
Its temples, and grottoes, and fountains as clear
As the love-lighted eyes that hand over their wave!
Thomas Moore’s fascination and admiration for Kashmir of 1820s,
as apparent in his composition above, describe how Kashmir, for many
centuries, has been perceived by famous and not so famous travellers,
observers, historians, visitors and intruders alike. A famous Farsi couplet
comparing heavens with Kashmir, thus, is just one of many similar
impressions that have been textualized by great composers during their
lifetimes. Those who have been fortunate enough to have visited Kashmir,
do simply vouch for the beauty of the Valley irrespective of the turmoil that
has been going on inside Kashmir for more than six centuries now.
Kashmir has had a troubled past and the situation is not very
different even today. Many observers, therefore, tend to draw comparisons
between its abundant natural beauty and its own man-made disasters.
Kashmir has been invaded numerous times and in different forms. From the
blood thirsty hordes of 14th Century to the gun totting infiltrators of 20th,
the intrusions into the Valley had inclined to follow more or less similar
subtleties. The land and its people, thus, continue to suffer. However, while
the events of 19th Century and prior to that era have had their shares of
impacts, one particular event that continues to affect the contemporary
Kashmir, had occurred around the middle of the 20th Century. The
accession of Kashmir in 1947 was a happenstance that continues to impact
the lives of people of the UT of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) seven decades
after that event.
Many books have been written about the invasion of Kashmir
Valley when thousands of Pakistan sponsored, Pakistan army led invaders
intruded into the princely State of J&K in 1947. Most of such works are
illustrious in their own rights and enable us to have a peep into the
chronicles of 1947-48. With the passage of time and with the events
revealing themselves during the decades that have followed, a re-visit to
those episodes around our independence would enable us to study those
events and their unseen, unpredicted impacts with the advantage of
hindsight.
This book, as a part of a series on sector-specific military history
works about the 1947-48 operations, is focussed on the political and social
developments in general and, the military campaigns within the confines of
Kashmir Valley per se. Other parallel military developments taking place in
other parts of the erstwhile State have been mentioned briefly with an aim
to offer a better understanding to the readers. The main point of focus,
however, remains at Kashmir Valley.
An effort has been made to connect the past with the later
developments when it comes to the identities of the units and formations,
leading military personalities and other entities, thereby, presenting a
holistic view of the events and resultant impacts. A deliberate effort has also
been made to put on record the gutsy fights that were put up by the State
forces prior to the landing of the Indian troops on 27 October 1947. Their
acts of gallantry and courage now stand amalgamated into the history of the
campaign as it stands recorded and reproduced in this work. To that extent,
this book may claim to be the first one to do so. By establishing an
authentic connect between the events prior to and after 27 October, many
myths also stand corrected or can be seen from a fresh and unique
perspective.
I sincerely wish and hope that the esteemed readers would enjoy
reading this book.
Happy Reading!!
Jai Hind!
​ uthor
A
​Circa 2020
Jhelum Valley Road in 1940s

KASHMIR: ORIENTATION
Kashmir, interchangeably referred to both as a valley and as a
region, lies in the Western part of the Union Territory of J&K. The Valley is
surrounded by high mountains from all sides. River Jhelum drains the
valley as it runs from East to West.
 Princely State of J&K (with region marked as Kashmir Valley) and State’s Neighbourhood
Kashmir is a long, flat valley, criss-crossed by numerous water
bodies. The Valley is distinctly basin- shaped, has a length of about 140 km
and a width varying from 53 to 55 km. The lowest point in the valley has an
elevation of 1600 m (5,200 feet) and the mean elevation is 1840 m (6,000
feet) above the mean sea level. The surrounding mountains vary between
1400m (4,600 ft) and 6200m (20,400 ft). Lidder, Sindh (or Kangan) and
Lolab Valleys together create what we call as the Kashmir Valley.
Kishanganga Valley, though technically, a separate valley by itself, is
considered as an extension of the Kashmir Valley by many. For this work,
Kishanganga Valley has not been treated as a part of the Valley per se,
except for Muzaffarabad area where Kishanganga (or Kishenganga or
Kishan Ganga) and Kashmir Valleys meet each other.
 Kashmir Valley
(Kishanganga Valley is technically not part of the Kashmir Valley per se though many people
consider the former a part of the latter. This book excludes Kishanganga Valley from the area under
focus)

During the rule of Maharaja Hari Singh (prior to 1947), the State
had important international boundaries. To the East was Tibet, to the North-
East lay the Sinkiang province of China and to the North-West was
Afghanistan. A tongue of Afghanistan territory, Wakhan, was North of
Gilgit and was West of the main route from Gilgit to Kashgar over the
Mintaka Pass. A few miles beyond, lay Russian Turkestan. NWFP and
British Punjab was to the West of the State. Within the State, the Valley of
Kashmir region shared its boundaries with Kishanganga Valley to the West
(part of the princely State), Gilgit and Baltistan to the North (leased out to
the British by Maharaja Hari Singh but still part of the princely State),
Jammu to the South and Ladakh to the East (both being parts of the princely
State itself).
 Kashmir Valley’s- Neighbourhood
(only some parts of other regions in touch with the Valley have been shown and the unshaded portion
inside the international boundary is what we refer to as Kashmir)

As on date, the Kashmir province of the Union Territory (UT) of

Jammu & Kashmir shares its boundaries with Pakistan occupied J&K
(PoJK) towards West and North, the UT of Ladakh on to its East and its
sibling province of Jammu to the South. There are ten districts in the
province with Srinagar1 being its biggest city.
1- ​Srinagar happens to be the summer capital of the UT while Jammu becomes the winter
capital every year. The tradition, called ‘Darbar Move’, had started in 1872 during the reign of
Maharaja Ranbir Singh. The first-ever instance of such a move, however was recorded in 1241 BC
during King Abhimanyu’s reign in Kashmir. The Court had been moved to Poonch once during that
year due to unprecedented snowfall in the Valley.
Mountain Ranges: Kashmir & Around
OceanofPDF.com
 Valley Floor sans its Mountains on the Periphery

Prior to the merger of the State with the Union of India in October 1947,
the only all-weather motorable connectivity of the Valley was via Rawalpindi; the
road entered the State at Kohala in Poonch area before being joined by another
lateral running from Abbottabad into the State at Domel (Muzaffarabad), West of
Uri and then reaching Srinagar to the East of Uri. That 200 odd km road, called
the Jhelum Valley Road, was metalled and an all-weather line of communication
(LOC).
Another motorable track2 joined the Valley with Jammu. It was about 300-
km long and was susceptible to weather-related interruptions. Towards the East,
connectivity with Ladakh was through a very narrow and unreliable 390-km long
caravan (non-motorable) track via Zoji La. The
2- ​Banihal Cart (BC) track, just a mule track during Maharaja Gulab Singh’s time, was realigned,
expanded and constructed between 1907 and 1922 during the rule of Maharaja Pratap Singh and was used
exclusively by the royals. It was thrown open to commoners in 1922. Even today, the stretch of that road
inside Jammu city is called BC Road. Prior to BC track becoming a cart/car track, the entire length of the
mule track had ‘Dak’ (mail) posts in form of simple thatched huts at an interval of about five miles. The men
neighbouring region of Gilgit-Baltistan was connected via a 370-km long fair-
weather track passing through Bandipora- Razdhan Pass3 -Gurez Valley-
Minimarg-Astor-Bunji (motorable4 only till Bandipora).
The Mughal road and Poonch-Uri track also connected the Valley with
Jammu region (basically Poonch-Rajouri areas) via Pir Ki Gali5 and Haji Pir Pass6
respectively. The lateral connectivity of Poonch region with Jammu town was
through a fair-weather motorable track. The only airfield of the Valley was at
Srinagar during 1947 conflict.
posted there were supposed to run on the double, irrespective of the time of the day, whenever mail bag
reached the posts. With most of the forested area in Jammu infested with panthers, they would carry wooden
torches during the night runs.
3- ​Also referred to as Razdhani Pass or Razdhianghan Pass.
4- ​Despite a 1932 Haardt-Citroen expedition having crossed on half-tracks by dismantling and
assembling the vehicles repeatedly.
5- ​Mughal Road running over Pir Ki Gali Pass (also called as Pir Panjal Pass) was primarily used by
the nomads and gypsies after passage of the last royal caravan under Aurangzeb sometime around 1700 AD.
Almost after 300 years, it got a new lease of life when a road was constructed connecting Rajouri (via Thana
Mandi) as also Poonch (via Bafliaz) with Shopian in Valley, via Pir Ki Gali in 2012.
5- ​The motorable track running from Poonch to Uri via Haji Pir Pass is also considered as an offshoot
of Mughal Road. The pass and some areas around the pass are now part of the PoJK.

The 1932 Haardt-Citroen Expedition

Topography of the Regions- Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, Gilgit-Baltistan (only some parts of other regions
in touch with Valley have been shown)
 KASHMIR: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
“Agar firdaus bar roo-e zameen ast,
Hameen ast-o hameen ast-o hameen ast”
(“If there is paradise on earth, it is here; it is here; it is here!” Amir
Khusro, cited by Emperor Jahangir while describing the beauty of the Valley of
Kashmir)
Kashmir holds the distinction of having its prehistoric past well
established and demystified to a large extent through many a scientific evidence.
Carbon dating carried out on human bones, unearthed in Kashmir1, positively
confirms the linkages to the Neolithic2 age of human existence. Further study of
tools, pottery, dwelling units and such like miscellanies confirm the presence of
human settlement in the area from Neolithic to early Historic age (3000 BC to
1000 BC).
The 6th Century text, Nilmat Purana, mentions Satisar, a huge lake that
existed in the area, we know as the Kashmir Valley today. The lake was believed
to have been drained through divine intervention when a water dwelling demon
had to be killed, by creating an opening near the present-day Baramulla. The
scientific explanation of the event lies in the assumption that a massive earthquake
had breached the lake at Baramulla some 100 million years ago. The destruction
of Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro civilisations is also attributed to the floods caused
in the process.
Among the earliest settlers, post draining of the lake, was the great sage
Kashyap Rishi and the Valley came to be known as Kashyap Mar (abode). Over
the centuries that followed, the name underwent many transitions to settle for the
name, Kashmir.
One of the most authentic accounts, Rajatarangini by Kalhana, written in
1148 AD, describes in detail the history of Kashmir and covers a great expanse of
time till mid of the 12th century. Preceding Kalhana, during his life and even
much later, i.e., till 1320, Hinduism remained the only religion in the Valley. Then
Mangols came calling under Zulqadar Khan ‘Dulcha’. But Islam essentially
arrived with the arrival of Sayed Sharfuddin
1- ​The archaeological site is at a place called Burzahom, 16 km to the Northwest of Srinagar on the
Naseem-Shalimar road. The first excavation was carried out in 1936.
2- ​Source: UNESCO/ https://whc.unesco.org.
Rehman (also referred to as Bulbul Shah) in 1327 AD. Soon, Rinchen, once a
refugee from Ladakh3, killed the last Hindu King and ascended the throne. Since
Kashmir was being dominated by Brahmins, he offered to get initiated as a
Brahmin with the aim of finding acceptance among the masses. However, his
request was not agreed to by leading Brahmins and he started to look for an
alternate but acceptable faith. At that point, Bulbul Shah came into the picture and
is believed to have convinced the king to embrace Islam. And then started a long
reign of terror against Hindus, the original inhabitants of Kashmir.
Next 200 years saw an absolute domination of Islam and atrocities on
Kashmiri Hindus, also referred to as Kashmiri Pandits. Rulers like Sultan
Sikander ‘Butshikan’ (the iconoclast), Sultan Ali Shah, Haider Shah, Hassan
Khan, Mir Shamasuddin Arqai and Qazi Chak left no stone unturned to kill,
convert and subjugate Hindus. All temples and architectural marvels related to
Hindu way of life were razed and destroyed.
A respite4, though brief, came with the arrival of Akbar’s army in 1586
AD. Akbar was tolerant and his rule brought in much needed peace and respect for
the Pandits. Mughals, in general, treated Kashmir well and were known to have
fallen in love with its beauty. Jehangir visited Kashmir 13 times and died during
one such journey. While he and his successor, Shahjahan got gardens like Nishat,
Shalimar and Chasma Shahi (the royal spring) laid, they treated Pandits with
contempt unlike Akbar.
Temples continued to be destroyed to build summer palaces and other
royal edifices for the two kings. Aurangzeb, however, tried to match the likes of
Sultan Sikander and brought the terror back into Hindu homes. Guru Tegh
Bahadur sacrificed his life in order to save the Pandits during that era.
Afghans arrived in 1753 AD and did no better as far as Hindus were
concerned. Their sufferings continued right till 1819 when the Sikhs conquered
Kashmir. By that time, almost everyone in the Valley had embraced Islam. Sikhs,
though, did their bit and rescued anyone who was
3. ​Some historians claim that Rinchen was from Tibet.
4. ​There had been a few other spells of peace and prosperity for Pandits off and on after the arrival of
Islam during the 14th Century but none as peaceful. Sultan Shahi Khan aka Zain-ul-Abidin whose philosophy
is thought to be an inspiration for Akbar, did rule for fifty years (1420-70) and his reign remains the longest
single spell of peace for non-Muslims in Kashmir.
still surviving from the Pandit community. Cow slaughter was banned and many
temples were restored over the next 27 years.
In between, Maharaja Ranjit Singh appointed Gulab Singh as the Raja of
Jammu in 1822. Five years later, Gulab Singh’s brothers, Dhyan Singh and
Suchet Singh were appointed as the Rajas of Poonch-Mirpur and Bandralta-
Sambha respectively. However, both the brothers were more comfortable doing
service of Maharaja at Lahore. While Dhyan Singh rose to be a Diwan (Prime
Minister) in the Sikh court, Suchet Singh was appointed the chamberlain to the
royal household.
After the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1839, anarchy and palace
intrigues took over the court at Lahore. Suspicion arose against Dhyan Singh
when Maharaja Kharak Singh, son of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, died due to lead
poisoning in 1840 AD. Dhyan Singh, his son Hira Singh and brother Suchet
Singh, were murdered soon afterwards. While a series of assassinations and
abdications were happening in the ruling Sikh dynasty, Poonch was impounded
by the Sikh rulers on the suspicion of Dhyan Singh’s action against the state.
The Sikh empire had started to crumble by then. Sikhs lost to British
during battles of Har-ka-Patta (13 December 1845) and then at Sobraon (10
February 1846). The year of 1846 saw two treaties being signed- first between
British and Sikhs at Lahore and second between British and Raja Gulab Singh5 at
Amritsar. The first treaty on 09 March 1846, besides territorial losses, resulted in
Sikhs being forced to pay Rupees one Crore (in Nanak Shahi6 currency) to the
British as war penalties or be ready to cede territory, in lieu, to the latter. The
complete tract of land between Indus and Beas then passed into British hands in
lieu of the cash.
5- ​Dogras ruled loosely over Jammu region but as small, competitive principalities for many centuries
before one chieftain, Raja Ranjit Deo who brought 22 other chieftains under his control at a time when
Mughals had started slipping into a decline. However, with Maharaja Ranjit Singh taking over the area, the
rule of Dogra dynasty got terminated. Gulab Singh was all of 16 years of age (and he belonged to the family
of Raja Ranjit Deo) when he fought bravely during the Battle of Gumat against the Sikh army in 1808. His
courage and skills with sword were recognised by Maharaja Ranjit Singh who took him and his brothers,
Dhyan Singh and Suchet Singh, under his care. Unlike his brothers, Raja Gulab Singh expanded his territory
of Jammu to include Reasi, Kishtwar, Rajouri followed by Ladakh, Gilgit, Baltistan and Zanskar by 1840.
Gulab Singh, an instinctive survivor, stayed away from the palace politics and refused to side with Sikhs after
the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. His action was dictated by the fact that the Sikh kingdom had been
disintegrating due to internal feuds as well as external threats emanating out of the British plans to annexe
the Sikh state.

Raja Gulab Singh who had played smart enough not to be handed over the
fate that had befallen his brothers, made an offer and the second treaty at Amritsar
on 16 March 1846, saw Britishers handing over all hilly tracts between Indus and
Ravi (and not Beas) rivers to Raja Gulab Singh for a sum of Rupees 75 Lakh7. He
was also elevated to the status of a Maharaja8. He was entitled to 21-gun salutes9
and was conferred the honorary rank of Major General in the British Indian Army.
Maharaja Gulab Singh was a tough administrator and through his style of instant
justice and brutal punishments, he raised the law and order to a commendable
state.
British sent an officer10 to ‘advise’ the Maharaja in 1852 despite the
The
latter not very amenable to the idea. After his death in 1857, his son,
6- ​By some accounts, the sum arrived at was Rupees 1.5 Crore. Nanak Shahi Currency was the official
currency in different metals during the reign of Maharaja Ranjit Singh who, unlike many others, didn’t name
any currency in his own name.
7- ​Roughly about 2,00,000 USD as in 2020 (without applying Net Present Value factor). Raja Gulab
Singh borrowed the money from Diwan Jawala Sahai (and not Sheikh Saudagar, as wrongly claimed by few)
and made him his first PM. Gulab Singh then paid the British in four instalments. The post of the PM then
became hereditary for many generations to follow. The British had earlier demanded Rupees One Crore (10
Million). When the treaty was finally signed, the territory of J&K included Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh and
Gilgit; but excluded Lahaul, Kullu and some other areas including Chamba which, for strategic purposes, it
was considered advisable to retain and for which a remission of Rs 25 lakh was made from the Crore
demanded, leaving Rs 75 lakh as the final amount to be paid by Gulab Singh. It is a matter of interest that
during 1947-48 conflict, an amount of Rupees 75 Lakh was spent by the armed forces to set up infrastructure
(huts, buildings etc only) in the State. While two amounts, spent almost 100 years apart, may not be
comparable in purely technical terms, the coincidence is simply remarkable.
8- ​As the matter got politicised much later, the likes of Sheikh Abdullah and other Kashmiri leaders
started referring to the treaty as ‘a sale deed in which Kashmiris were sold like cattle’. Such an argument has
been used repeatedly to subvert the minds of unsuspecting masses even though the fact remains that it was
only because of then Raja Gulab Singh that Sikhs had been able to keep Kashmir under control, especially,
during the period after the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Gulab Singh had also been part of the Sikh army
when it had marched into Kashmir in 1819 AD.
9- ​Only five rulers of princely states had the privilege of receiving such a grand salute, viz, the
Maharaja Gaekwad of Baroda State, the Maharaja of Mysore, the Nizam of Hyderabad (all since 1911) and
the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior and the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir (since 1921). The Viceroy was
entitled 31-gun salute while the Queen/King was entitled a 101-gun salute.
10- ​The British didn’t impose any secondary force on Gulab Singh. The political relations between the
British and the State commenced in the year 1849 and were conducted by the Punjab Government through the
Maharaja's agent at Lahore. Until the year 1852, no representative of the British had been placed in the
State. The first 'Officer on Special
Maharaja Ranbir Singh took over the reins. He sided with the British during 1857
war for freedom. However, having pitched Dogra Rajputs against Sikhs earlier,
the British started inciting the Muslims of the Valley against their Hindu ruler.
Sensing such a move, he shifted his capital to Srinagar to inspire the confidence of
the masses there and because of climatic conditions, formalised the tradition of bi-
annual Darbar move. The British also force-created Gilgit Agency in 1877 but
the same was closed in 1881. Maharaja Ranbir Singh died in 1885. His son,
Maharaja Pratap Singh didn’t have any issue of his own. His reign was marred by
his suspension between 1889 and 1905 by the British. On his death, brother, Raja
Amar Singh’s son, Hari Singh, took over the reins of the State.
 During Maharaja Hari Singh’s rule,
Kashmiri Pandits started playing a major role in shaping the policy making in the
State. The initial changes leading to the introduction of the policy of ‘state
subjects’ had been set into motion in 1912 by Maharaja Pratap Singh, on the
insistence of Pandits and same were to lead to insertion of Articles 35A and 370 in
Indian Constitution later. At that point in time, however, the idea behind bringing
in such a clause was to safe guard the interests of Kashmiri Pandits. Having
suffered the immeasurable mayhems at the hands of protagonists of virulent
strains of Islam over past six centuries, Pandits had been alarmed by the attempts
of Kashmiri Muslim activists to bring in Muslims from various parts of British
India to replace many non-local, non-Muslims who had been brought in by
successive rulers to run the affairs of the State. Maharaja’s attempts to take
everyone on board and indulge in a bit of appeasement had not been helping the
cause of Pandits who didn’t want another spell of atrocities to befall them or their
future generations. At that point of time, accession to India and even
independence of India was nowhere in the sight. The policy initiated almost 15
years ago, was further strengthened during that period.
Duty' (OSD) in the State was appointed in 1852. The OSD came to Kashmir only during the summer months
and then went back to return next year. In 1877, a permanent OSD was placed under the immediate orders of
the Government of India with instructions to correspond directly with them on all matters of political
importance. In 1885, after the death of Maharaja Ranbir Singh, the designation of the OSD was changed to
'Resident in Kashmir' who was permanently located in Srinagar. (VP Menon in his book, The Story of
Integration of the Indian States)
Maharaja Gulab Singh
 Maharaja Ranbir Singh (left) & Maharaja Pratap Singh (right)

Built by King Lalitaditya during 8th Century, the Sun Temple at Martand (Anantnag) was destroyed
on the orders Sikander Butshikan in 15th Century BC (now a protected monument)
Viceroy Lord Canning with Maharaja Ranbir Singh on 9 March 1860
(Chromolithograph by William Simpson, 1867(open source))
Lieutenant General His Highness Raj Rajeshwar Maharajadhiraj Maharaja Shri Hari Singh Ji
Bahadur Indar Mahindar, Sifar-i-Saltanat-i-Inglishia, GCSI, GCIE, GCVO, LLD became the
Commander-in-Chief of JAK Forces when he took over from his father, Raja Amar Singh in 1915

BUILD UP TO
1947
1927 was the year when, for the first time, the young Maharaja Hari
Singh allowed the recruitment of Kashmiris into State forces and other
departments. Many observers attribute such an unprecedented development to the
pressure exerted on the Maharaja by many Kashmiri Pandits in the high places in
his administration. The move also kick-started an informal process that would
finally lead to rise of the Muslim majoritarianism in Kashmir1.
With the demand of a Muslim nation to be carved out of British India
gathering steam in 1930s, the border areas of Poonch, Kotli, Mirpur and Bhimbar
in Jammu region started getting affected adversely. However, Kashmir remained
more or less unaffected during that decade. And yet, without aligning themselves
with the Muslim homeland demands, Kashmiris embarked on an equally
dangerous mission during those days.
 As early as in 1931, a political trouble started brewing inside Kashmir
Valley. The general resentment that had started on routine communal issues of
minor natures (for example a simple law and order issue created by some
Muslims, when dealt by Dogra soldiers as per law, would invariably lead to
communal tensions of varied intensities) was used cleverly by one, Abdul Qadeer
who was believed to be a man planted by the British for the specific purpose of
creating a deep communal divide in the
1- ​Many quarters repeatedly refer to ‘Kashmiriyat’ as the corner stone of communal harmony and
peaceful co-existence inside Kashmir Valley. While the term sounds and is projected as an all-inclusive,
absolutely tolerant way of life, the facts on the ground, very strongly point towards the contradictions
therein. Since the 14th Century AD, i.e. when Islam arrived in the Valley for the first time, barring a few
isolated periods of varying durations, Pandits have been on the receiving end of a hard, uncompromising
Islamic way of life and belief. The fact that the land with 100% Hindu demography saw many an exodus and
many conversions resulting in the reduction of the community down to 10%, can’t be simply wished away.
What happened during the 1980s and thereafter is again too fresh and too recent to be flounced aside. As
Colonel Tej Tikoo argues in his book, ‘Kashmir- its Aborigines and their Exodus’, if at all anything like
Kashmiriyat did exist, it was always subservient to the dictates of the radical elements within Kashmiri
Muslims. The inter-dependence of two communities, more so because of existence of no lower castes among
Pandits and resultant dependence on local Muslims for a number of lowly trades, did exist through the
centuries before the final exodus of Pandits towards end of the 20th century. In fact, the origin of this term
can be traced back to as recent a time as 1975, when Indira-Sheikh Accord took place. While a strong
Kashmiri identity has been in existence since long, the term, per se, was invented by JKNC (J&K National
Conference) leadership quite lately and apparently to gain political mileage.

State. The servant of a British Army officer posted at Peshawar, Abdul Qadeer
arrived in Kashmir (his own origin is debatable and is not accurately known)
towards the middle of 1931. He started fanning the sentiments and was finally
charged with the treason after a particular inflammatory speech in Srinagar on 25
June 1931. His trial commenced on 04 July and continued through the following
weeks. Crowds would assemble to witness the proceedings on the days of trial
and over days, such gatherings became too huge to manage. As a result, the trial
was moved to Srinagar jail. On 13 July2, a massive crowd tried to break into the
jail premises and a stand-off ensued between 5000-odd men raising religious
slogans and a small force deployed to protect the complex. During the scuffle, a
retired cop tried to snatch the rifle of a policeman but was shot dead by another
policeman. During the chaos that followed, 22 Kashmiri Muslims were killed in
the police firing.
The problems between the Hindu ruler and his team of non-Kashmiri
Muslim administrators began to spiral up with every passing day. There used to
be a system of bonded labour, called begaar, started by Muslim rulers, especially,
Afghans, to make people work on various projects and for ferrying loads to far-
flung areas in Ladakh and Gilgit. As a result, many would die or lose limbs
because of hard labour, non-availability of suitable clothing and shoes and
general lack of care on part of the ruling elite. The system was neither started by
Hindu rulers nor it targeted any particular community while sparing the other.
In fact, the Maharaja actually took steps to address the issues and yet the
issue was blown out of proportions, religion was brought in and Kashmiri
Muslims were led to believe that they were being specifically targeted because of
a different religion than that of the rulers. The rumour mills were working
overtime and communal divide became deeper and deeper. Such developments
suited the British agenda in the State.
In 1932, a young teacher of Government Islamia School, Sheikh
Abdullah resigned from his job and entered politics. Sheikh Abdullah had been
born at Soura in Srinagar in the family of a shawl dealer. He earned his Masters
in Chemistry from Aligarh Muslim University where the seeds of idea of Pakistan
had germinated to start with. Needless to say, having studied in the Islamic
College and then in the said university, he was highly
2- ​Despite the incident related to a hardened, religion-based ideology, a State holiday was observed in
remembrance of the incident and the day was celebrated each year as Martyrs’ Day by successive
governments right till 2019 when it was finally abolished by the Central government.
influenced by hard-liner Islamic ideology. He came back to Kashmir with a third
division grade and applied for a teaching job at SP College, Srinagar. At the same
time, another candidate, NN Kak, a gold medallist in Chemistry from Benaras
Hindu university, had also applied for the lone post. Finally, when NN Kak got
selected for the job and purely on merit basis, Sheikh Abdullah was forced to join
the government service as a teacher in Islamia School. In the years to come, he
used the process of selection as a propaganda tool highlighting the issue of denial
of jobs to Muslims by a Hindu ruler. Kashmiri leaders had, thus, taken over the
charge of spreading discontent from the British.
Having resigned, he launched a sort of rebellion against the Maharaja
with the tacit support of the British. The British had a few more reasons to do so
by now. The Maharaja had taken a hard stand against the British rule during the
First Round Table Conference in London and had also refused to hand over Gilgit
to the British. The proposed rebellion by Sheikh Abdullah was seen as yet
another opportunity after the 1931 incident, that had already alienated Kashmiri
Muslims from the Maharaja.
An informal group called the Muslim Reading Room Party had earlier
been established and was being used to fan Hindu-Muslim animosity in Kashmir.
In October 1932, the party was turned into J&K Muslim Conference (JKMC) by
Sheikh Abdullah who got himself the title of Sher-e-Kashmir (Lion of Kashmir)
and became the first president of JKMC. Starting with the assumed responsibility
of ensuring justice to Kashmiri Muslims, it soon became a frontline group
revolting against the Maharaja.
As a parallel development inside British India, a party called Arhar Party,
staged a revolt against the British in 1933. The party was a pure Islamic outfit and
many of its workers arrived in Kashmir to seek help and lend support to the
‘common’ cause of overthrowing non-Muslim rulers.
Facing the heat, and on advice of his British advisors, the Maharaja
constituted a 75-member Assembly in 1934 and called it the ‘Praja Sabha’
(Assembly of the People). Out of 75, 35 were to be nominated and 40 had to be
elected. However, only less than 10% of the populace could vote in the elections.
There were protests and the election of 1934 was set aside in favour of fresh
elections in 1936. JKMC won 19 out of 21 seats meant for Muslim masses. By
now, the rule of hereditary state subject had been implemented and was being
followed with utmost strictness.
The British, however, kept executing their plans. Many more British
officers were placed to look after various departments of the State and the British
continued to play the Muslims against their Hindu ruler. Such plots were to have
ill-fated implications in the years and decades to follow. In March 1935, British
took Gilgit3 on a 60-years long lease (the developments in Gilgit are not being
covered in this book).
3- ​In 1935, a civil war was raging in China and the Soviet Union acquired de facto control over the
province of Sinkiang, which had a long border with Jammu and Kashmir. In order to prepare for a possible
invasion sponsored by the Soviet Union, the British leased the Gilgit (illaqa) principality and its vassal
states from Maharaja Hari Singh for a period of 60 years. Gilgit was the last outpost of British India before
the landmass of Jammu and Kashmir merged with Sinkiang. To the South of Gilgit flowed the mighty Indus
as it meandered Westwards towards Punjab. To the North of Gilgit lay the Karakoram Range watershed and
Sinkiang. Of the eight known passes between Central Asia and the subcontinent, six passes lay within a
week’s march from Gilgit. From 1935, the leased region was treated as a part of British India, administered
by a Political Agent at Gilgit responsible to Delhi. As a result, the Rajas of Chitral, Hunza, Nagar Haveli,
Puniyal, Chilas Yasin, Yashkoman and Koh-e-Khizr (all existing vassals of the Maharaja of Kashmir) had
come under direct British rule. The newly leased territory was now called the Gilgit Agency. A crucial side
plot was being secretly hatched by the British to ensure that Pakistan retained a foothold in the state even if
the Maharaja opted for India after upcoming independence. In early 1943, the British posted a Pushto
speaking British Indian Army officer, Captain William Brown, to the Gilgit Agency where he spent the next
three years. He travelled widely throughout the Gilgit Agency in Hunza, Nagar, Yashkoman, Puniyal, Koh-e-
Khizr, gaining experience and invaluable local knowledge. While in the Gilgit Agency during that time, he
learnt Shina, the dialect of the region, as well as some Burushaski, the language of Hunza. As the date for
Independence neared, the British wanted to make sure that the Gilgit Agency went lock, stock and barrel to
Pakistan so that British strategic interests were secured. However, they wanted to keep their hands clean. On
01 August 1947, only 15 days before the transfer of power, the British rescinded the Gilgit Agency lease and
handed Gilgit back to Maharaja Hari Singh. The reason behind such a haste was that it was almost a
foregone conclusion that the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Ram Chandra Kak, a Kashmiri Pandit,
was pushing the state to accede to Pakistan. Lieutenant Colonel Roger Bacon, the British Political Agent
handed over the region to the Maharaja’s newly appointed Governor, Brigadier Ghansara Singh. However,
days before the handover, the British installed the newly promoted Major William Brown as the Commandant
of the Gilgit Scouts that had been raised by the British after taking the area on lease. Major Brown had
already spent the preceding four consecutive years in the region and was extremely familiar with the men
under his command and with the local Rajas. Days before Partition, the relations between Jammu and
Kashmir’s Prime Minister Kak and the Congress party became frosty. The British Resident in Jammu and
Kashmir reported that Kashmir was likely to stay out of the Indian Union. In his autobiography, Sheikh
Abdullah later revealed that Kak had good relations with the ruling circles in Pakistan. He claimed that Kak
had assessed that being a Muslim majority state, Kashmir was bound to accede to Pakistan and had
prepared a path to secure a place for himself in that eventuality. However, palace intrigues in Maharaja Hari
Singh’s court and Mahatma Gandhi’s views on Kak resulted in his dismissal from office on 11 August 1947.
The scales were now tilted in favour of Jammu and Kashmir remaining independent. The British plans for
Jammu and Kashmir were in tatters. Mountbatten,

Soon afterwards, a shrewd and cunning man that he was, Sheikh

Abdullah claimed to have got disenchanted because of radical Islamic approach
and theocratic thinking within the party. He also started facing ‘opposition’4 to his
efforts to give a secular colour to the party. Choudhary Ghulam Abbas, Sheikh’s
close associate and a senior functionary of the JKMC, emerged as the leader of
the hardcore faction and soon the party split. Sheikh Abdullah then formed the
All J&K National Conference (AJKNC or JKNC or NC) while Abbas became the
unchallenged head of JKMC. In the months to follow, NC started showing
leanings towards Indian National Congress while the JKMC (now popularly
referred to as MC) started toeing the line of Muslim League that had been
demanding a separate homeland for Indian Muslims. Clearly, two plans were now
being put into action in Kashmir. The hunger for power, however, did pitch the
two against each other during the days to ensue, and at some point, of time, it
appeared that the two parties really had two different ideologies.
With Pandit Nehru coming out in open support of the new ‘secular’ party,
many Kashmiri Pandits also joined the NC that, though despite inviting people
from all religions to join in, remained a Muslim -centric party on ground.
probably unaware of a revised British secret agenda being constructed behind his back, decided in a spirit of
fair play to lean on the Radcliffe Boundary Commission to award Gurdaspur district in Punjab to India. This
provided Jammu and Kashmir with a land link to India. The British now put alternate plan into action. On
the night of 31 October 1947, five days after Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession to
India, Brown and his other British junior officer, Captain Mathieson mutinied. They led their
overwhelmingly Muslim troops to imprison Governor Ghansara Singh and declared accession of Gilgit and
all the vassal states of the area to Pakistan. What was not in public knowledge at the time was that both the
British officers had already switched allegiance to the Government of Pakistan on 26 October 1947 without
informing the Governor. They were thus Pakistani officers masquerading as officers of the state of Jammu
and Kashmir. The coup was successful and on 02 November 1947, the Pakistani flag was raised in Gilgit and
all the accompanying vassal states. Interestingly in July 1948, Major Brown was awarded the MBE
(Military) by the British government with an unspecified citation; in 1994, President Leghari of Pakistan
posthumously awarded him Sitara-e-Pakistan, one of the nation’s highest awards. Many are convinced that
the illegal takeover of Gilgit and the vassal states, following the 22 October 1947 invasion of the state by
Pakistani irregulars, was a fallback plan hatched by the British and Pakistanis after both the dismissal of
Jammu and Kashmir’s Prime Minister Kak and the Maharaja’s accession to India. Ideally, they would have
wanted the entire state to go to Pakistan. (Text credit: Iqbal Chand Malhotra. Reproduced with due
permission of the author)
4- ​It is a well-known fact that the idea of creating a ‘secular-looking’ party out of JKMC, was a well-
thought of plan. JKMC, as it re-emerged, played a definite role in the ‘Plan B’ of Sheikh Abdullah. As the
developments in Poonch-Mirpur area during the years

1944 turned out to be an eventful year when Sheikh Abdullah launched

the ‘Naya Kashmir’ (New Kashmir) movement. While it got a huge support, a
dent was created amongst its ranks by the MC who invited Mohd Ali Jinnah to
preside over latter’s annual session. Many Kashmiri Muslims did leave the NC
and joined the MC. Sheikh Abdullah, while trying to reconcile and make peace
with Jinnah, lost his cool when Jinnah called NC a band of gangsters during a
joint public meeting. Sheikh then ordered his supporters to throw Jinnah out of
the Valley. Jinnah had to leave without any more public meetings. That
development would influence future events but that would happen a bit later.
In March 1946, Cabinet Mission arrived in India to finalise the transfer of
power. Nevertheless, no agreement could be arrived at because of Muslim League
insisting on a separate state and Congress opposing the idea of such a partition.
After due deliberations, the mission opined that while it would not be possible for
the British to handover a sovereign state to Muslims, there was a way out wherein
a new federal union of states would have limited powers over her states and such
states could be created by clubbing provinces of similar demography. The British
also made it very clear that irrespective of the outcome, the British would not
exercise any paramountcy over the new nation or her states post-independence.
Sheikh Abdullah’s NC immediately launched an agitation to protest
against such an argument citing violation of Treaty of Amritsar in which the
supremacy of the British Government had been accepted by Maharaja Gulab
Singh (and such a clause5 applied to his successors too). He called it the ‘Quit
Kashmir’ movement and launched it on 15 May 1946 after delivering a very
forceful but hateful speech.
Largely viewed as an anti-Maharaja movement, the protest had no takers
in Jammu or Ladakh region. Even inside Kashmir, the movement
to follow, were to illustrate, the whole game had been carefully crafted with a long-term perspective in
mind.
5- ​During the British rule, the territory of the Subcontinent was divided into two kinds of entities- the
British India and Princely states. While the British managed, governed and administered the British Indian
territories directly, the princely states enjoyed semi-independence under the suzerainty of the Crown. Such
states also enjoyed protection under ‘Paramountcy Doctrine’ in lieu of loyalty towards the Crown. Likewise,
the Article 10 of the Amritsar Treaty read as under, ”Maharaja Gulab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of
the British Government and will in token of such supremacy present annually to the British Government one
horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six female) and three pairs of Cashmere shawls”.

failed to attract any worthwhile response. Both the MC and People’s Conference
(an offshoot of Indian National Congress in J&K) didn’t support the move. Once
the State forces moved in, the agitation was quelled with an iron hand and Sheikh
was arrested. The arrest was preceded by violent clashes between the NC workers
and State forces, resulting in the death of six and injuries to ten civilians. The
agitation got over on 01 June 1946. Many reports of high-handedness by the State
troops were, however, reported by the NC. While many attributed such reports to
lies and propaganda generated and spread by the NC, Pandit Nehru was prompt
to condemn the firm hand reportedly used by the forces. Pandit Nehru, despite his
party staying away from the movement, also decided to go to Srinagar to argue
on behalf of Sheikh Abdullah in the court. The action suddenly shifted to Poonch
since he had decided to enter the state using the bridge over Jhelum at Kohala,
bang on the international border between British Punjab and Poonch region of
J&K State.
Maharaja’s administration banned the entry of Pandit Nehru into the
State. The District Collector along with a contingent of Garrison Police was sent
to Kohala with strict instructions not to use force and avoid provocation at all
costs. Only the Collector had been empowered to stop Pandit Nehru without
show of weapons and without using any physical force. A few metallic spikes
were spread on the home side of Kohala bridge to prevent the entry of the
vehicles carrying Pandit Nehru into the State. On 19 June, Pandit Nehru arrived
at Kohala Bridge and crossed over. The Collector tried to reason with him but he
refused to oblige.
NC’s local workers, carrying black flags, tried their best to provoke the
police who didn’t react. When pleas didn’t work, he was convinced to shed his
small caravan of four cars and move to Domel in an official car of the State. As
he obliged and boarded the car, a senior officer of JAK Forces (JAK as an
alternative for J&K) along with other senior civilian officials rushed to Domel to
receive him.
Once at Domel, Pandit Nehru refused to budge and made it clear that he
would proceed to Srinagar unless actually arrested by the administration. The
Collector obliged him with the understanding that once the arrest was made, he
would be free to turn back without going through the process of bail and release.
Two other advocates accompanying Pandit Nehru were allowed to proceed to
Srinagar while Pandit Nehru decided to stay at Domel where a car was kept at his
disposal. On 21 June, an appeal to Pandit Nehru was made by Maulana Abdul
Kalam Azad requesting him to return to Delhi for some urgent business and he
moved back, via Kohala, on 21 June itself6. In July 1946, Direct Action Day was
announced for 16 August by Muslim League. With the announcement,
lawlessness started to prevail throughout Punjab and the effect of the disturbances
started to affect life in the border towns and villages of Jammu region. Elections
to the State assembly were held in the month of November 1946. While the
elections went off smoothly, lot of hatred was created by loaded speeches by
political leaders of all shades throughout the region. December 1946 saw fresh
spate of communal violence in Punjab, forcing almost 1500 refugees into
Muzaffarabad. 8 JAK Infantry was deployed in Muzaffarabad-Domel at that time.
However, neither the riots in Punjab nor the influx of non-Muslim refugees from
across stopped and the process continued throughout the months that followed.
6- ​A month after the incident, Pandit Nehru was allowed to come to Srinagar and attend the hearing of
Sheikh Abdullah’s case since the situation had normalised by then. However, speeches against the Maharaja
made by Sheikh during the rallies, were sound proofs against him and he was finally charged for sedition
despite all the assistance rendered to him by the team of lawyers from Delhi. The whole episode, as was
revealed later, laid the foundation of a troublesome relationship between the Maharaja and the future PM of
India.

Main Players- Sheikh Abdullah, Lord Mountbatten, the Maharaja and Pandit Nehru

MACRO PICTURE: MID -1947

Muslim League’s activities, by mid-1947, had become too vehement to be
discounted. Possibly, sensing the trouble, the British government, having earlier
announced the date of independence as a day in June 1948, rescheduled the date to
15 August 1947. The development came in pretty late and while it was made
known in June 1947, the formal sanction from England came in only in the month
of July 1947. The chaos, because of such a short notice, was bound to happen. An
already fragile communal situation worsened and the border towns on either side
of Jhelum River in Jammu region became hopelessly embroiled in the resultant
strife. Ethnic cleansing began in many Muslim dominated towns and villages
along the international boundary (IB) and even in the hinterlands like Reasi.
Muslims were targeted in and around Jammu. Muzaffarabad started receiving
non-Muslim refugees in large numbers but no communal tension arose in Kashmir
Valley as such.
Lord Mountbatten advised the Maharaja to refrain from considering
independence and also assured him that his opting for Pakistan, if at all, would not
be taken as amiss by the future Indian Government. Maharaja, however, sent his
Deputy PM, Ram Lal Batra, to Delhi to get in touch with Pandit Nehru to move
forward towards a possible association with India. Pandit Nehru, himself, gave a
cold shoulder to Maharaja’s emissary and advised him to tell the Maharaja to
follow people’s wish. To the Maharaja, it was a clear indication of Nehru’s
support to wish of Sheikh Abdullah. Jinnah, in the meanwhile, approached the
Maharaja, asking him to join Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh, well aware of the
happenings across the IB and even inside the State, however, had no intention of
throwing his non-Muslim subjects into a sure shot crisis situation. Fortunately,
Sardar Patel came to know about the developments at Delhi and he opened the
channels with the Maharaja through latter’s emissary. That was how he, more than
anyone else in Delhi, set the ball rolling in the favour of India. That was in the
first week of July 1947. Unfortunately, while Delhi was now responding, many in
the close circles of the Maharaja had been working overtime to influence and
change his mind.
With the British paramountcy now out of the equation, it was the time for
Gilgit to revert back to the State after cessation of its lease. Brigadier Ghansara
Singh, Commander of Mirpur-Poonch Brigade, was ordered to move to Gilgit to
take over the control on 01 August 1947. A summary of
 The Bridge (as in 1904
(above) & in 1947 (below) over Jhelum at Kohala (The IB between British India and the Princely State of
J&K ran along River Jhelum South of Domel) now in PoJK
 Kohala Dak Bungalow in 1940s (left). Ambore Tunnel (now in disuse) in 1947, on Kohala-Domel Road
(right), now in PoJK

what happened in Gilgit, has already been given in the footnotes to an earlier
chapter. Further details of the developments in Gilgit are not being covered in this
book.
At the time of independence in 1947, J&K State was the largest princely
state within the boundaries of British India. The State, like all other similar states,
had been given an option to choose between India and Pakistan. However,
because of the reasons mentioned above as also the fact that the State depended
on West Punjab (going to be part of Pakistan soon) for its supplies, Maharaja Hari
Singh was not able to make up his mind even while the deadline had been fast
approaching. With the option of remaining independent no longer on table, he
offered a Standstill Agreement1 with both the future dominions of India and
Pakistan, as an interim measure, on 12 August 1947. While India sat undecidedly
on the interim proposal, Pakistan signed the agreement immediately. With the
agreement coming into force, all postal and telecommunications came under the
control of Pakistan with effect from 14 August 1947. Pakistan, on his part,
promised to let the existing arrangements of supplies to the State from West
Punjab (now in Pakistan) continue. It may be noted that due to a hazardous 300
km long dirt road connecting Jammu with Srinagar over Banihal Pass and a mule
track connecting Ladakh with Himachal as well as with Kashmir, the main
supplies of cloth, ammunition, fuels and lubricants for vehicles and machinery in
Kashmir were traditionally brought in via Domel-Kohala route that entered the
State astride Jhelum River. Jammu region had its supplies arriving via Sialkot to
Jammu and via Jhelum to Mirpur.
The trouble in Poonch-Mirpur belt had been brewing for long, more
because of unemployed ex-servicemen who had not been paid their dues by the
British (many had been laid off post the WW II) and heavy taxation regime
imposed by the Maharaja. MC had considerable following in that belt and as the
day of independence neared, anti-social elements, led by MC and with the open
support of Muslim League, started creating an ugly situation in that region. Some
sporadic attempts were made by few locals to hoist Pakistani flags in various
towns of Poonch and Mirpur Districts on 14
1- ​The provision for standstill agreement had been incorporated in the Indian Independence Act. The
object of the standstill agreement was to provide for the continuance of economic and administrative
relations between Jammu and Kashmir and two neighbours on the same basis as had existed before the
creation of the new dominions and normal amenities of life such as supplies, post office, communication etc.
could be maintained. It had been mentioned that the standstill agreement would guarantee, that till new
agreements were made, all existing agreements and administrative provisions would continue. In case of any
dispute in this regard, it would be settled by arbitration.

August 1947 but same were not allowed by the State forces. By the end of August,
many more rumours started off when a crowd attempting to march towards
Poonch town was stopped at Bagh. The crowd, as per Major General HL Scott2,
then Chief of Army Staff of the State, had been incited to move towards Poonch
by a group of around 30 Pakistanis. The crowd, having swelled to an almost
10,000 in numbers, had started the march demanding their pending wages,
reduction of prices of food articles and such like issues. During the ensuing
scuffle, troops opened fire when the crowd tried to overrun the small garrison at
Bagh. While casualties were not many, rumours placed the figure of dead Muslims
in a few hundreds. As per Major General Scott, not more than 20 Muslims and an
equal number of soldiers of the State as well as civilian Hindus or Sikhs had
actually been killed.
In the meanwhile, Maharaja disposed of his left-leaning PM, Ram
Chandra Kak who had been pretty vocal about merger of the state with Pakistan.
Major General Janak Singh was appointed the interim PM of the State on 11
August 1947 (he was later relieved by Mehr Chand Mahajan3 on 25 August 1947).
Events in Poonch had apparently been bothering him and his decision to appoint a
pro-Indian National Congress Mahajan as PM indicated that he had made up his
mind to accede to India by that time4.
2- ​Brigadier HL Scott was a retired British Officer who had been appointed as the Chief of Staff of
J&K by the Maharaja and given the rank of Major General. He served the state for 11 long years and was
responsible for all the good things that had been achieved by the State forces under him. There have been
arguments in his favour as well as against him when it comes to absolute loyalty towards the Maharaja and
yet there is no evidence to doubt his intentions. After his release, on his way to England, he took a short
pause at Rawalpindi. As he was leaving Rawalpindi, he sent a cryptic message to the Maharaja, informing
him about a large number of men being trained for invasion of Kashmir, by Pakistan Army in and around
Abbottabad.
3- ​Mehr Chand Mahajan was a lawyer from Kangra (Himachal Pradesh) and was appointed the PM of
the State by Hari Singh on the request of Sardar Patel. He was also the Indian National Congress-appointed
member of the Radcliffe Commission, which was set up to demarcate the boundary between India and
Pakistan. Later, he rose to become third Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India in 1954.
4- ​Many scholars argue that accession to India was Maharaja’s Plan ‘B’ from the very beginning, i.e., if
independence would have been impossible to achieve. Much before the signing of the instrument, a news item
had appeared in Pakistan Times on 26 September 1947. The news item claimed that the sources had
confirmed that Maharaja had made up his mind to join India around two weeks back, i.e., around 10
September 1947. The owner of the paper was Mian Iftikharuddin, an ex-Indian National Congress leader-
turned-member of Muslim League and then Minister for Refugee Rehabilitation in Pakistan. Communist poet,
Faiz Ahmed Faiz was the Editor-in-Chief of the paper. Faiz was later arrested for his role in Rawalpindi
Conspiracy in 1951.
 The ‘Living’ Welcome
The Jhelum Valley Road was extended from Kohala to Baramulla in 1889. It finally reached Srinagar
only in 1896. Till 1896, therefore, all the visitors aiming to reach Srinagar had to either travel via the Mughal
Road to Srinagar via Shopian or reach Baramulla and then shift to boats to reach Srinagar via waterway of
the Jhelum. It used to be a full day journey.
Whenever any Royal or visiting dignitary landed at Baramulla, a procession of many boats would be
organised to escort the important person in a Royal barrage sculled by more than 50 oarsmen. The boats
would be decked up and musicians would invariably accompany the flotilla. Along the route, people would
cheer and wave at the dignitaries and at many places, folk dance would be on display.
The annual Darbar move of the Royals would take place via Baramulla till 1920 after which the
Banihal Cart Road came up and the move ritual started happening via that road. However, the Maharaja
would still indulge in the annual ritual but over a shortened distance, with an aim of having a look at the
subjects, in a ceremony called Daryai Jaloos (Procession on the River). The ritual stopped abruptly after
1947 but was revived briefly in 1950s and then stopped in 1970s when the last of it was done in the honour of
Mrs Indira Gandhi, then PM of the nation.
The picture above was taken by Reverend CE Tyndal Biscoe on 11 October 1912 when the Viceroy of
India, Lord Hardinge and his wife reached Srinagar, accompanied by Maharaja Pratap Singh. 16 boys had
positioned themselves about 30 feet above the water surface with the help of steel wires and planks to create
the ‘Welcome’ sign.)

INTRIGUES AND CONSPIRACIES

​ s mentioned earlier, the Kashmir Valley (and Ladakh region) had
A
remained largely peaceful during the turbulent and bloody partition. The situation
in the Jammu region except the Doda belt, though, was different. As a response to
the Direct-Action Day call by Jinnah for 16 August 1947, communal riots in the
border areas of Punjab had started and the repercussions were felt largely in the
Jammu region. The Jammu region was now facing heat both from Indian Punjab
and Pakistani Punjab. Once attacks on non-Muslims began in Hazara District (in
Pakistan) and killings began to happen, the fleeing survivors started entering the
Jammu region in huge numbers.
Following the riots in Pakistan on 15 August 1947 and more so after
announcement of Punjab Boundary Award on 17 August 1947, migration became
almost unmanageable. Muzaffarabad was now under stress.
Sardar Ibrahim Khan was a protégé of Raja of Poonch. He saw the
downgrading of status of Raja of Poonch, as also, new taxes levied on Poonch by
the Maharaja as something unfair and unjust. He had started mobilising the ex-
servicemen of the border belt of Mirpur-Poonch areas in the Jammu region much
before the arrival of the moment of partition. The MC from Kashmir also had a
huge base in the Poonch area. Ending August or beginning September 1947,
Sardar Ibrahim crossed over into Pakistan and set up a base at Murree in West
Punjab (portion of Punjab under Pakistan). He took many ex-servicemen and ex-
INA (Indian National Army of Subash Chandra Bose) on board and created a
council. They started fund raising for buying and smuggling the weapons into
J&K. Sardar Ibrahim Khan also appealed to the government of Pakistan to attack
Kashmir so that State was forced to move JAK State forces troops out of Poonch,
creating space for his rebels to take over Poonch before crossing over to hit the
rear of State forces in the Valley.
Sardar Ibrahim Khan then went to meet Jinnah who refused to meet him.
However, he met the owner of Pakistan Times and Minister for Refugee
Rehabilitation, Mian Iftikharuddin who promised to do something. It was Mian
who arranged a meeting between Sardar Ibrahim and Colonel Akbar Khan (who
planned and directed the invasion under a pseudo name General Tariq a few
weeks later) who was already busy planning the invasion of Kashmir. Ibrahim
Khan requested Colonel Akbar Khan to arrange 5,000
rifles for the revolt.
At that time, old rifles from the newly created Pakistani Army were being
re-distributed to local police forces. Colonel Akbar Khan, in his plan, proposed to
divert about 4000 such rifles1 and expired ammunition for the operations in J&K.
Colonel Akbar Khan’s plan was approved by the PM, Liaqat Ali Khan on 12
September during a meeting. Muslim League also proposed another plan
involving ex-INA soldiers and Muslim League National Guards and the same, too,
was accepted.
The broad plan included two forces attacking J&K State on either side of
Pir Panjal Range. Khurshid Anwar, the Chief of Muslim League National Guards
was to be commander of Northern forces attacking via Muzaffarabad and INA
Major General Zaman Kiani2 was to be the commander of Southern forces. The
two men were supposed to operate from Abbottabad and Gujrat respectively.
Further, to keep Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Gujrat districts under firm grip as also to
ensure a hassle-free flow of men and material across the affected districts, a
division was created including three districts. Khawaja Abdur Rahim was
appointed as the Divisional Commissioner of the newly created Rawalpindi
Division.
Initially, some assistance from Jamat-e-Islami and Ahmadiyyas was
received to cater for supplies and basic equipment. However, soon thereafter, the
final plan, code named Operation Gulmarg, was finalised and was then rolled into
action through a more formal set up created specifically for the purpose, by
Pakistani Army.
On 12 September 1947, the post office at Mirpur under Pakistani control
refused to accept insured covers and money orders. A week later, railway service
from Sialkot to Jammu was suspended. Very soon, Pakistan Post Offices within
the state refused to operate accounts of people.
1- ​Interestingly, when it came to the execution stage, the Punjab Police tasked to handover the rifles to
invaders, played smart and handed over many local rifles, called ‘Pathan Rifles’ manufactured in NWFP.
Many of the rifles, in fact, turned out to be modified ancient muzzle-loaders.
2- ​Major General Zaman Kiani was an alumnus of the Indian Military Academy from where he passed
out with Sword of Honour and Gold Medal in 1935. He was commissioned into 1/14 Punjab (now 5
PUNJAB of Pakistan Army). He was taken as a prisoner during Battle of the Malaya during the WW II in
1941. In 1942, he joined the INA and rose to be its Chief of General Staff in the rank of Major General (INA
rank). He finally surrendered to the British Army in 1945 after the fall of Rangoon. He was then arrested and
cashiered from the service. As per the folklore, the British would usually stamp all such ‘mutineers’ by
pressing a hot metal dye against their buttocks.

On 13 September 1947, the State requested the Indian Government for the
services of Lieutenant Colonel Kashmir Singh Katoch, MC3 (who happened to be
the son of Major General Janak Singh), on loan, to act as the military adviser to
the Maharaja. India obliged to the request. Major General HL Scott was then
relieved on 24 September and granted paid leave till termination of his contract on
01 November 1947. Maj Gen Scott’s departure also saw termination of another
British officer, Richard Powell who was the Chief of State’s police till then. Ten
days later, another set of demands were made to Indian authorities, requesting for
telegraphic and post as well as the road and air connectivity and the response from
Delhi was again positive.
Delhi and more than anyone else at Delhi, Pandit Nehru, was keen on
obtaining Sheikh Abdullah’s consent before any formal discussions on merger of
J&K with India could begin. The Maharaja, taking a suo-motu decision, released
Sheikh Abdullah on 26 September 1947 after obtaining a bond as an assurance of
loyalty from Sheikh Abdullah. However, post his release, Sheikh Abdullah kept on
shying away from giving his consent that was desired by the Indian PM.
Sheikh was, in fact, in touch with Pakistan Government and was showing
his willingness to merge with Pakistan if Sheikh was declared the leader of all
Muslims of the State and if the State could be granted a special status, akin to
sovereignty, after the merger. Jinnah, however, refused to entertain such
conditions while Pandit Nehru did start to show his inclination towards the same.
In an ironic development, Sheikh Abdullah reached Delhi in the first week
of October and held a press conference to appeal to both India and Pakistan not to
rush into any decision on the accession of the J&K State till a ‘responsible’
government was formed by ‘him’ in the State. With a legitimate ruler already in
power in the State, such a statement emanating from Delhi proved the bias that
powers at Delhi had against the Maharaja. To add insult to injury, the Government
of India expressed its willingness to
3- ​Passed out in 1936 from the Indian Military Academy, young Lieutenant KS Katoch fought in World
War II during which he was awarded the Military Cross (MC) for his bravery. When requisitioned by the
Maharaja, he was offered the post of Chief of Staff of State Forces but he declined the offer, citing his less
service and instead recommended Brigadier Rajendra Singh for the appointment. He was then appointed as
Military Advisor to the Maharaja. After the death of Brigadier Rajendra Singh, he became the defacto
commander of the State forces. After 1947-48 episode, he rose through the hierarchy to command 15 Corps
in Kashmir during 1965 Indo-Pak war and was awarded Padma Bhushan for his leadership during the war.
He retired as the Vice Chief of the Indian Army in 1970.

do so. Mir Sadiq, a close aid of Sheikh in the NC, took a similar message to
Pakistan. The turn of events, however, proved that Pakistan didn’t want to wait
any longer.
On the other side, across the western border, a massive conspiracy
involving British office bearers and high-ranking personnel in Pakistani
establishment was being put into operation even while assurances of continued
supplies and provisions were being given by Pakistan to Maharaja. With demi-
official letters personally signed by the British C-in-C (Commander-in-Chief) of
Pakistan, General Frank Messervy, KCSI, KBE, CB, DSO & Bar, starting to
reach various subordinate HQ across Pakistan, ‘Op Gulmarg’ began to take shape.
Two first-hand inputs4 about impending Pakistani operation to annex the State-
one by Major Onkar Singh Kalkat who had been posted as the Brigade Major at
Bannu Frontier Brigade Group HQ and who had managed to escape back into
India and another by Mr GK Reddy, a journalist- did reach Delhi; no action was
taken by the leadership in India nor was Pandit Nehru informed about the inputs.
Once gravity of the situation was realised and PM Nehru came to know
of the inputs, Major Kalkat was traced and brought to Delhi for briefing. As
narrated by Major Kalkat, every Pashtun tribe had been tasked to provide a
lashkar (Islamic army) of 1000 fighters for jihad in Kashmir. Once recruited and
concentrated all along the border, local brigade HQ were supposed to equip them
before placing each lashkar under command of one field rank officer (invariably
a Major), a subaltern or a Captain and ten odd Junior Commissioned Officers
(JCOs- Subedar/Naib Subedar). Many ex-soldiers and delisted personnel of
British Indian army had also been enrolled. Further, Gilgilt area was being ceded
to Pakistan with the explicit involvement of British officers. Colonel Akbar Khan
of Pakistan army, promoted to the rank of Major General and given a pseudo
name of
4- ​Inputs from other quarters had also been reaching authorities at different places. Please see chapter,
Invasion:22 October, ahead. In addition, as early as on 08 October 1947, a very renowned doctor at
Srinagar, Dr SK Atri, had been informed by some of his Pak-leaning patients that an invasion was in the
offing. He shared the inputs with authorities at Srinagar. Thereafter, some influential refugees, with deep
links with Pathan community, arrived from NWFP towards middle of October. They brought in the news of
large-scale recruitments happening in Swat Valley by Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan, in the name of liberation of
Kashmir. The NC, taking a clue, issued a handout immediately, asking for peace and self-defence as well as
the need to have a reliable government in Kashmir! Even George Cunnigham, then Governor of NWFP,
wrote a letter to Lord Mountbatten, sharing the information. What did Lord Mountbatten do with the
information, is not known but Sardar Patel did send Dewan Shiv Sharan Lal to Srinagar to discuss the issue
with the Police Chief, DIG Gian Chand Bali, at Srinagar.

General Tariq5, was the officer in charge of the operations and was stationed at
Pakistan army’s General HQ itself. His staff consisted of Brigadier Sher Khan6
and a few others. A huge logistic dump was being created at Abbottabad with the
aim to move that forward to Domel-Muzaffarabad once the operations advanced
towards Srinagar. The date of invasion by the hordes was going to be 22 October
1947.
As if to complicate the situation, raids7 from across the border and all
along the border, had now become too many and too violent. As done earlier,
State forces’ actions to counter such raids were labelled as an anti-Muslim
activity through a carefully orchestrated propaganda. Raids and the
5- ​Holding an acting rank of a Brigadier, he was one of the directors in the War & Equipment branch
of Pakistan GHQ. Code name given to the officer had a romantic tale associated with it. During the Arab
invasions of Morocco in 8th Century, General Tariq, also known as General Tarif-ibn-Zarca, was among the
most prominent persons to convert to Islam. He was later appointed as the Governor of Mauritania and
Tangiers. He was the man who led the Arab army during the conquest of Spain. It was in the commemoration
of General Tariq’s landing at Mons Cape that a fort built there was renamed as Gebel Tariq, meaning ‘The
Hill of Tariq’. That name then got corrupted by Spaniards into Gibraltar and is known by the same today. As
if proving an old adage right, on 09 March 1951, the Rawalpindi Conspiracy case was unearthed, wherein, a
group of army officers including this very Major General Akbar Khan had planned a coup in the country,
leading to widespread commotion and unrest in Pakistan. One of the main reasons for the attempted coup
was his dissatisfaction with the Pakistani government’s acceptance of ceasefire in Kashmir in 1949! He was
imprisoned for life but was later pardoned when their lawyer on the case, HS Suhrawardy, became the PM of
Pakistan in 1957. He was later appointed the Chief of National Security by Zulfikar Bhutto in 1971.
6- ​Brigadier Sher Khan, was the Director Military Operations of Pakistan at that time. There is some
amount of ambiguity about the inter-se seniority of two officers, Major General Akbar and Brigadier Sher
Khan! It is possible that Brigadier Sher Khan was the official face, being the Director Military Operations
(operations and intelligence branches were under him) while Akbar Khan was on covert mission with two
officers working together but without any mutual chain of command.
7- ​Pakistan’s twin pronged strategy envisaged stirring of trouble by sending in infiltrators, carrying out
raids and communalising of the whole affair as part of Phase 1 and sending in regular troops to exploit the
situation in Phase 2. However, in both the phases, regular troops were to be and were actually used; their
attire was the only misleading factor. Phase 2, however, was not allowed to be unleashed in full force because
of intervention of Field Marshal Auchinleck. Regulars kept on joining ranks and then started replacing tired,
frustrated tribesmen when the tides began to turn against the invaders, both in Kashmir and in Jammu. Few
accounts claim domination, in sheer numbers, by Pakistani Army between January 1948 and till ceasefire in
January 1949 while a few others mark the period between May 1948 and January 1949 as the time period
when Pakistan Army was fully and ‘officially’ involved in the operations.

acts of larceny kept on increasing in number throughout September 1947 as an

economic blockade was also put into force by Pakistan. Even before Pakistan
went back on his word to honour the Standstill Agreement, he had already started
asserting himself in the state, much to the dislike of the Maharaja. Pakistan
understood the leverage that he possessed because of the geographical status of
the state and he started to push forward his agenda aggressively. Since the post
and telegraph offices in Jammu and Kashmir state came under Sialkot circle,
Pakistan flags were hoisted on the post offices of the state. The Maharaja’s
government protested to Pakistan for what was described as a hasty action.
Once economic blockade had been put, Kashmir Valley started running out of
supplies. Maharaja appealed to Pakistan to maintain status quo as per the
Standstill Agreement. Pakistani rulers didn’t respond to appeals from Maharaja
and they simply went back on the promises given earlier. All the necessities of
life like salt, soap, sugar, cloth, food grains and gasoline and kerosene oil meant
for Jammu & Kashmir state used to be stocked in the markets of Rawalpindi and
Sialkot from where they were sent to Jammu and Kashmir in trucks. The Pakistan
government stopped the movement of these goods into the state. Even the
supplies for which payment had already been made, were not delivered. As if to
add an insult to the injury, the trucks sent from Srinagar to fetch the supplies were
confiscated by the Pakistani authorities.
The International Customs Check-post on Kohala-Domel Road

MILITARY EQUATIONS
Around that time, borders of the State on its western front, i.e. from
Gilgit to Suchetgarh, extended to over 550 km and were thinly manned with only
a few pockets having military presence of some measure. The total strength of
J&K State forces1, including army, Garrison Police companies2 and logistic units
was less than 9,000. Brigadier Rajendra Singh had taken over as the new Chief of
Staff of JAK State Forces on 24 September 1947. After the raising of Poonch
Brigade on 02 October, he had the following resources to organise the defence of
the State: -
-Army HQ under the Chief of Staff at Srinagar.

1- ​The history of the State Forces goes back to the Dogra Corps raised by Raja Gulab Singh in 1822.
At that time, he was governing under the suzerainty of Maharaja Ranjit Singh of the Sikh Empire. State
Forces, under General Zorawar Singh led tough but rewarding campaigns in Ladakh, Baltistan, Gilgit,
Hunza and Tibet. The Corps was re-designated as JAK State Forces in 1846. These forces were organized
into the Jammu and Kashmir Brigades. The Force comprised of a bodyguard cavalry regiment, two
mountain batteries*, seven infantry battalions, one training battalion and a transport unit consisting of both
pack and mechanized transport. The state forces fought as Imperial Service Troops in both the World Wars
under their own officers. The Regiment sacrificed 18 Officers, 37 Junior Commissioned Officers, 1194 Other
Ranks and 34 non-combatants and won 02 Maha Vir Chakras, 18 Vir Chakras and 52 Mentioned-in-
Despatches in the 1947-48 conflict. In the course of time, JAK Infantry units were amalgamated into the
Indian Army en-bloc, in recognition of work done by such units. Such a distinction was allowed only to the
State forces of J&K State while state forces of all princely states were merged under different names and in
different regiments of Indian Army.
(* JAK Forces had two artillery batteries, 1 and 2 JAK Mountain Batteries. Incidentally, 1 JAK and 22
Indian Mountain Batteries were the only Indian elements of the Artillery in support of the operations which
brought about the surrender of the Italians at Amba Allagi during World War II. After its actions at Keren
and in Abyssinia, 1 JAK Battery fought with the French and the Allied Forces which liberated Syria from
Vichy France. Both 1 and 2 JAK Mountain Batteries were later merged with British Artillery but all officers
and most of the men stayed back with the State forces; 1 JAK Mountain Battery equipment was reverted back
to JAK Forces based on an already existing request by the State towards the end of January 1948. The
battery was re-raised and then deployed initially in Beri Pattan and later in Tithwal Sector, using old
gunners.)
2- ​To police the long border, a number of "Garrison Police companies" were raised and equipped from
"ancient stocks" of weaponry. Lord Birdwood mentions the figure of new companies as twelve. The
companies were, by and large, manned by the ex-servicemen of the British as well as the State armies .

-Kashmir Brigade under Brigadier Faqir Singh at Badami Bagh. Two

companies of 7 JAK Infantry (still being re-raised), one squadron of Body
Guard Cavalry and a Training school were also located at Srinagar. One
battalion of Kashmir Brigade, i.e. 4 JAK Infantry (Fateh Shibji) was
deployed in Domel-Kohala-Keran area, along the western front of the
State while 6 JAK Infantry was deployed in the North from Bunji- Kargil-
Skardu to Leh.
-Jammu Brigade under Brigadier Khuda Baksh (Brigadier NS Rawat took
over command on 17 October 1947) with HQ at Jammu. Regimental
Centre of JAK Infantry was also co-located inside the cantonment at
Jammu. The units of the brigade, viz, 5 JAK Infantry, Body Guard
Cavalry less one squadron and a few Garrison Police companies were
deployed all the way from Kathua to Bhimbar.
-Mirpur Brigade under Brigadier Chattar Singh with HQ at Dharamsal,
Jhangar. 3 JAK Infantry minus two companies was at Mirpur while 2
 JAK Infantry minus three companies was at Naushera. Kotli and Sensa
had a company minus each of 2 JAK Infantry. Platoons were deployed all
along the front as outposts.
-Poonch Brigade under Brigadier Krishna Singh (erroneously referred to
as Kishen Singh in some accounts) with HQ at Poonch. 8 JAK Infantry
was in the process of relieving 1 JAK Infantry at Poonch itself while 9
JAK Infantry and two companies of 7 JAK Infantry were deployed in
Bagh-Rawalakot area.
All the above-mentioned units, HQ and training establishments were,
however, dependent upon HQ of Northern Command3 at Rawalpindi for the
supply of warlike stores. And even though there existed a system of ration, fuel
and such like supplies being procured from local traders based in the Valley, the
traders, in turn, were dependent upon supplies from Pakistan. The only wireless
link outside the State was with Rawalpindi.
By the beginning of October 1947, the activities of Pakistani army and
air force became too obvious to be ignored. Raids in Jammu region too increased
in frequency and intensity. The main issue being faced by the State forces was
shortage of arms and more so of ammunition. With the supplies from Pakistan
now shut, an indent was sent to Delhi, requesting
3- ​The HQ Northern Command of pre-partition British Indian Army went to Pakistan during the
partition. The infrastructure was used to house the GHQ of Pakistan in 1947.

for arms and ammunitions. The approvals for the same were immediately
accorded by the Home Minister and the Defence Minister but the release didn’t
happen till the actual invasion. It was later discovered that British officers had
sabotaged the process and had parked the file in some pending tray on some
unknown desk.
At that moment, Hindu-Muslim unity within the forces had not been put
under the lens. In fact, there was no reason to do so4. Troops had fought shoulder
to shoulder in the recently concluded World War II and there had been no reasons
to doubt the integrity of such soldiers. 4 JAK Infantry (Fateh Shibji Battalion),
then deployed at Domel-Muzaffarabad, had a 50:50 ratio of both the communities
and yet it was an example of the communal harmony. All soldiers ate from the
common kitchens where chefs and staffs from both the communities were
employed. Though 6 JAK Infantry, with 50% Muslim soldiers, had reportedly
shouted pro-Pakistan slogans while passing through the Valley on its way to
Bunji, the act had not been taken a serious note of.
Brigadier Rajendra Singh, the Chief of Staff of the State forces, reviewed
the existing deployment after taking charge. He was of the view that instead of
spread-out deployments in penny-pockets, units must deploy in strong bases over
extended fronts. Before the changes in the deployment and turn over process
could be completed, Pakistan struck on 01 October5 itself. Huge hordes of men
wearing all kinds of dresses and bastardised uniforms, attacked and encircled
three outposts at Thorar, Mange and Tain, to the West of Rawalakot in Poonch
area. The posts, however, held their ground. More incursions, followed by
capture of territory in Poonch region continued over next three weeks, starting
with
4- ​The first desertion South of Pir Panjal was reported on 18/19 October and over next 24 to 48 hours,
most of the Muslim soldiers in Poonch-Mirpur Sector had deserted along with arms and ammunition. The
first desertion in Kashmir Valley happened on 21/22 October and was followed by mass desertions over next
24 hours. The mutiny by Muslim soldiers, incited and led by British officers in Gilgit, happened on 31
October 1947.
5- ​Leaving aside hit and run raids aiming to loot and plunder, the actual invasion of the State happened
much before the generally agreed date of 22 October 1947. If Kashmir alone is looked at, 22 October was, in
fact, the date but at the level of the State, the invasion started during the night of 08/09 October 1947 when
the invaders, unlike ever before, came in, attacked, captured and held the territory in Owen Pattan-Sensa
area of Kotli in Mirpur-Poonch area. While Kashmir centricity can be attributed as the cause of such a
mismatch of dates, in one way, the contention of 22 October as the date of invasion can be accommodated
since it was on that day that the enemy did invade as a coordinated force on either side of Pir Panjal Range.
Operation Gulmarg: Outline Plan
capture of Owen Pattan on 08/09 October 1947. Details of that sector are not
being included in this work.
However, as a coordinated force, the tribal hordes finally invaded the
Kashmir Valley of the princely state of J&K on a wide frontage on 22 October
1947. The initial actions by invaders were in line with the outline plan for
invasion, codenamed Operation Gulmarg, as shared by Major Kalkat with Indian
authorities. The plan encompassed the following: -
-Ten lashkars (roughly 10,000 men) to launch attack against Poonch—
Rawalakot-Mirpur- Bhimbar area with an aim of reaching Jammu via
Rajouri-Naushera-Akhnoor.
-Six lashkars to advance to Srinagar via Uri and Baramulla and then
capture airfield at Srinagar and Banihal Pass.
-Two lashkars were to advance through Haji Pir Pass to Gulmarg, thus,
inserting this force between two thrusts.
-Two lashkars to advance along Tithwal-Nastachhun Pass for capture of
Kupwara, Handwara, Sopore and Bandipore.
-Azad Army utilising Muslims within JAK forces and ex-
servicemen/reserve list/de-listed personnel of Poonch, was to be raised
through a deliberate psychological operational plan
-7 Infantry Division of Pakistan army was to concentrate in Murree-
Abbottabad area by last light on a day prior to D-day, i.e. 21 October,
with an aim to exploit the gains made by lashkars and to take over
Kashmir Valley.
-One infantry brigade to be ready at Sialkot to capture Jammu.
-Invasion of Ladakh from Gilgit by using Gilgit Scouts and other such
forces, via Gurez Valley and Kargil.
JAK Forces had no armour and no artillery at that time. Some of the units
of JAK Forces had participated in the wars of the British Empire under their own
officers and had some battlefield experience but the standard of their training was
not particularly high. As a part of the British Empire, J&K State didn’t have to
worry about foreign invasions. The State’s army, as a matter of routine,
performed border security, constabulary and parade functions. A major problem
was that nearly one fourth of the personnel were Muslims, who sided with the
Pakistani forces during the initial days of the conflict itself. And yet the stands
taken by these forces, even when isolated and heavily outnumbered, deserve a
special mention.
Geographical Layout: Post Partition, showing IB

Deployment of State Forces in Domel-Bagh Area (22 October 1947)

THE INVASION: 22 OCTOBER

 ​ y 20 October, massive hordes had congregated across the IB, opposite
B
Muzaffarabad. Throughout the month, the refugees had been streaming in. But
the first military violation of the IB in the Valley happened on 22 October 1947.
​Domel1 was located on the home bank (South) of Jhelum River at the
point of confluence of Jhelum with Kishanganga River at the outskirts of
Muzaffarabad. There, Jhelum took an almost 90 degree turn and turned due South
towards Mirpur. South of Domel, the course of Jhelum River marked the IB
between Punjab of the newly formed Pakistan and the princely state of J&K. At
Domel, the road from Srinagar/Baramulla/Uri crossed over Jhelum River before
crossing another bridge over Kishanganga River to reach the heart of
Muzaffarabad that lay on the West bank of Kishanganga. Beyond Muzaffarabad
and the IB, it connected with Manshera, Abbottabad and further South inside
Pakistan Punjab. The main artery, however, took off from Domel, along Jhelum
towards due South. For about 38 km, the road ran hugging the IB/River Jhelum
before crossing over a bridge at Kohala, into Pakistan.
​ JAK Infantry was holding area Domel as part of the Kashmir
4
Brigade. The class composition was equally balanced between the Dogras (‘A’ &
‘B’ Companies) and Muslims (‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies). The deployment of the
battalion was as under: -
-Battalion HQ and a platoon of ‘B’ Company at Domel.
-‘A’ Company plus a platoon of ‘B’ Company and a detachment of 3-inch
mortars at Kohala.
-‘B’ Company less three platoons at Kupwara with one platoon at Keran.
-‘C’ Company less a platoon at Lohara Gali with a platoon at Ramkot.
-‘D” Company less two platoons at Domel, with one platoon each at
Gohari/Ghori and Dhub.
-A Dogra platoon of HQ Company at Bhattika and a mixed platoon at
Kotli2.
1- ​Domel, in colloquial language, means where two roads/river meet. At Domel in Uri Sector, two
roads from Islamabad and Murree – one via Bhurba and other via Abbottabad- met after crossing into the
princely State. Jhelum and Kishanganga Rivers too had a confluence at Domel.
2- ​Not to be confused with a town of the same name in Mirpur area, further South.

- One Section of MMGs of 8 JAK Infantry, under command, at

Muzaffarabad.
Across the mighty Pir Panjal Range, was deployed the Poonch Brigade with
its HQ at Poonch. Two companies of 7 JAK Infantry (recently moved from
Srinagar) had been holding the area of Bagh to the South of Kohala. The lay of the
road network was such that Kohala, despite being at the Southern foothills of Pir
Panjal Range, was part of the Domel battalion.
4 JAK Infantry was a war-experienced battalion. Most of the officers and
soldiers as present during October 1947, had fought together in the World War II.
The battalion had a reputation of being a battle-hardened, professional outfit.
Amongst the tasks given to the battalion by the brigade HQ, countering a
possibility of enemy aggression was below the other two tasks, i.e. aid to civil
administration and counter-infiltration, especially of the Muslim League cadres.
And the reason was simple- Poonch and South had been on a boil for quite many
months, from March 1947 onwards to be precise, while it had all been quiet to the
North of Pir Panjal except for inflow of the non-Muslim refugees. Even earlier
troubles in the areas South had never affected the proceedings around Domel and
further North.
The higher HQ had issued a caution earlier on 15 October. The refugees
flowing in from across the IB had brought in the reports of many tribal hordes
arriving and camping between Muzaffarabad and Manshera. They had also shared
the fact that open claims of capturing Srinagar were being made by those men
who were more than 5,000 in numbers and gaining numbers by day. Having
received the cautionary note from the HQ, the CO, a Dogra Rajput from Jammu,
had tasked the company commander at Lohara Gali, Captain Azam Khan to check
on the facts on ground. The officer had reverted calling all those reports as false
and mere propaganda. A die-hard ground soldier that Lieutenant Colonel Narain
Singh Sambyal was, he chose to believe the ground report being filed by his own
trusted officer.
However, having heard about the concentration of raiders across
Muzaffarabad from the refugees who had met him in person, the PM of the State,
Mehr Chand Mahajan had informed the Maharaja about the inputs. The Maharaja
had then sent a cable to British PM, Clement Attlee about the fact but never
received any response. On 18 October, the Maharaja sent communication to
Jinnah, as well as, the Pakistani PM, Liaquat Ali Khan. In the meantime, all
British subjects who had been holidaying in Kashmir, were evacuated on 19
October, except the missionaries at Baramulla where a serving British officer of
the Indian Army had also been staying in connection with the delivery of his wife
(Details later). While Liaquat Ali wrote back, accusing the State of atrocities
against Muslims, Jinnah’s reply offered a way to resolve the crisis. Jinnah had, in
his reply, invited Mehr Chand Mahajan to Lahore for an amicable resolution
through talks. The Maharaja, now fed up with the Pakistani leadership, declined
the invitation. Next day, i.e., on 21 October, the Maharaja and his PM left for a
brisk tour of the border belt of Mirpur to have a first-hand feel of the situation
after the fall of Fort Owen Southwest of Poonch.
The next warning that came from the HQ was about Muslim officers and
soldiers of the battalion being contacted by enemy agents. As per the reports,
Muslim soldiers of the battalion had been meeting some inimical elements on the
pretext of offering namaz (Islamic prayers) in the local mosques. The CO, once
again brushed aside the report citing the camaraderie that the Muslim soldiers had
exhibited more than once during the WW II. When a subtle suggestion was made
by the State Army HQ to send the Muslim elements back to Srinagar on the
pretext of internal security duties for the time being, he refused to concede and
went on to offer his resignation if any such move was forced on him.
The CO, without the benefit of retrospection, was not too wayward in his
argument without a reason. As mentioned earlier, 4 JAK had a tradition of
common kitchens manned by chefs and helpers from both the communities. And
then was the basic tenant of mutual faith and trust between commanders and
soldiers! On ground, Domel had a major obstacle in the form of Jhelum River to
its front with a bridge over it connecting Domel with Muzaffarabad towards
Pakistan border. The area beyond Muzaffarabad was overlooked by two well-sited
and fortified posts at Lohara Gali and Ramkot. Any chance of the enemy taking
defenders by surprise was remote in the CO’s appreciation. However, he had
ignored the fact that Poonchi Muslims, more than others, had been exposed to
issues back home after the culmination of the WW II. And that if own were to
become treacherous, no amount of tactically sound deployment can help. Captain
Azam Khan was one such man.
Sadly, the reports about concentration of tribal hordes as also Muslim
officers and soldiers of 4 JAK Infantry conspiring against the state were true. The
CO and many, including the State itself, had to pay a huge price for such a faith
that, post the incident, looked absolutely misplaced.
Invaders came in huge numbers, as reported earlier by the refugees,
and were received by the Muslim soldiers of 4 JAK at the IB on the night 21/22
October. They were then guided to Muzaffarabad. Troops at Muzaffarabad were
relaxed and had no reasons to be alarmed since one full company was holding
defences in front. Invaders came with weapons of all kinds including automatics
and mortars.
On the morning of 22 October 1947, as the residents lay asleep in their
beds, a huge column of invaders attacked Muzaffarabad. Muzaffarabad was
looted, raped and then put to sleep before people had any chance to react. The
MMG section, however, fought bravely but the odds were too high. Despite the
heavy odds, the section kept on inflicting casualties on to the invaders who had
been raping females in the streets of the town.
The CO, Lieutenant Colonel Narain Singh, was alerted by the sound of
firing from across the bridge. A soldier from Domel also reached the CO at around
that time3. However, even before he could be questioned in detail, invaders were
at the gate of the camp, having followed the soldier closely. The CO ordered his
adjutant, Captain Ram Singh to open the armoury and take out all the available
ammunition and weapons. However, there was no time gap between the gun shot
sounds and attack on the camp. With deserters now on the enemy’s side, they had
been reduced in numbers and had insiders pitched against them. Captain Ram
Singh rushed towards the armoury but anticipating such a move, his own Muslim
troops had already taken positions to interdict any such move. As he ran through
the volley of bullets, he was killed. By now, the battalion strength had been halved
because of the Muslim troops crossing over.
On the other side of Jhelum, at Muzaffarabad, invaders had moved on by
the afternoon, leaving behind a large group to continue with the plunder but the
MMG section kept on engaging any target that could be seen. In the evening, a
survivor from Domel reached them and broke the news of the happenings at
Domel. By evening, a mile-long convoy of vehicles could be seen approaching
Muzaffarabad. Now clear in mind that they were fighting a futile battle, the
MMG section broke contact and melted into the hills4.
3- ​As per an account by Major Brahma Singh, in his book, History of Jammu & Kashmir Rifles, one
injured Sikh soldier from Muzaffarabad had been able to reach the Battalion HQ and had alerted the CO.
Major General DK Palit, VrC, in his book Jammu & Kashmir Arms, gives the name of the soldier as
Havildar Nar Dev Singh, a Dogra.
4- ​The MMG Section under Havildar Bishan Singh had been left behind at Domel by 8 JAK Infantry on
its way to Chirala in Poonch a few days back. Shortage of transport had forced the battalion to move on to
reinforce Poonch Sector after leaving the MMG Section behind. Fortunately, the section managed to survive
as they reached Srinagar in a bad

The CO and remnants of his HQ and mortar platoon, however, stood their
ground and fought bravely for over next 12 hours. Completely surrounded and
having been left with only 14 men in some condition to walk, they abandoned the
location after the last light. It was a sad situation.
Even though the bridge over the Jhelum could not be held nor it could be
demolished because of lack of reaction time5, the CO was able to inform the HQ
at Srinagar about the developments even while bullets had been flying around
him. During the moment of distress, he was able to keep his cool and was able to
share the actual inputs without any panic. He admitted that he was not very sure
about the strength and profile of the enemy but the bridge had already been taken
by the invaders.
As the night fell, all the posts and picquets, including the survivors under
the CO, broke contact at respective places and withdrew. The platoon at Battika,
however, was not that fortunate. The platoon at Kotli6 faced the desertion but
fought on bravely. They not only survived but were also able to escort about 500
refugees back to Uri with the enemy chasing and attacking them enroute.
The CO and his 14 men7 who had withdrawn from Domel and taken to hills
towards rear, were never heard of again. However, their gallant stand had resulted
in two things – firstly, invaders had been delayed by one full day; and secondly
the setback had jolted the invaders who had been expecting the whole operation to
be just a cakewalk!
state after about a week. They had escorted many refugees all along to Srinagar via Tithwal and Chowkibal.
5- ​There existed a plan of preparing the bridges along the border for demolition but the same could not
be executed because of lack of proper equipment and explosives.
6- ​Please see the chapter, “Stories that need to be told” ahead.
7- ​By another account, they were not able to extricate themselves. As per that account, the Muslim
soldiers inside the camp at Domel had the prior information and had tied up with the invaders. Before the
invaders could even reach the bridge, those soldiers had taken out weapons and machine guns from the
strong room and had opened heavy fire on the barracks in which lay asleep the CO and other Dogra
soldiers. They were killed during those moments. However, such a version is debatable. The CO had been
able to make it to the wireless room and was able to pass the message back to the HQ. Also, the fact that the
braves had delayed the invaders and kind of upset their time plan and upbeat mood for one full day, goes
against this account. Yet another account (see the chapter, “A Story that needs to be told” ahead) claims that
the CO and his party were able to get away but were ambushed on their way to South.
Lieutenant Colonel Narain Singh Sambyal, OBE, a soldier to the core, paid a heavy price for reposing
absolute faith in his soldiers

This Dak Bungalow at Domel had six rooms with attached washrooms; Pandit Nehru was ‘detained’
here in 1944

Kishanganga (Neelum) River flows next to Muzaffarabad Fort as it meanders its way to meet Jhelum
at Domel. This 1940 picture shows a timber yard on the home bank

STORIES THAT NEED TO BE TOLD

 1- KOTLI ENCLAVE
Kotli was about six km to the South of Domel. There was a small piece
of land across Jhelum as the river swung East at that place, creating an enclave
towards Pakistan, a bit North to the confluence of Kunhar River with Jhelum. The
platoon-defended picquet was across the river and there was one rope-based
suspension footbridge to access the picquet from the road that connected Kohala
with Domel.
As had been happening elsewhere, on the night of 21/22 October,
Muslim soldiers of the platoon simply walked off1 with their weapons and
ammunition. There were well over 2/3 Muslims in the platoon and yet for the
reasons unknown, they left without causing any bodily harm to the Hindu soldiers
who slept blissfully unaware of the sentries and others vanishing from the
picquet. It was certainly not out of any affection, since, even if there were any,
same did vanish soon.
Post desertions, the platoon at Kotli was left with only nine Dogra
soldiers, including one section commander, Naik Sant Ram who found himself to
be in charge of the handful of force at Kotli. In view of the threat to non-Muslim
residents in the border belt, a few locals had been issued antique muzzleloaders to
defend themselves a few days back. All those Hindus and Sikhs were summoned
to the post when the communications broke and desertions were discovered on
the morning of 22 October itself. Having heard the battle noises emanating from
Domel area and after having unsuccessfully tried to contact the battalion HQ,
Naik Sant Ram decided to evacuate but not before gathering all the refugees in
the area. Suddenly, they were attacked by their and also by the invaders who,
were more than 500 in numbers. They fought back and repulsed two attacks over
the next four hours.
Soon, ammunition was running low even though no casualties had been
incurred during two engagements. Having repulsed the second attack and making
use of the lull, Naik Sant Ram led his men and all the refugees
1- ​Many accounts doing rounds in Pakistan press and literature of that period paint a picture wherein
Muslim soldiers had walked off from posts and picquets more out of fear than anything else. That is clearly
an attempt to paint the story white. The desertion by Muslims was part of the plan and had been executed as
per that plan.
out of the enclave and as the last of the group got across the bridge, the rope
bridge was unhinged and one end dismantled, enabling them to break the contact
with the enemy who had started following the group by then.
 Evacuation of Kotli Picquet and Village
Following his natural instincts to converge at the battalion HQ at Domel,
Naik Sant Ram ordered a forced march towards the North. However, suddenly
they spotted a large group of invaders and deserters headed down towards South.
The group, because of the refugees, couldn’t afford to get into a fight with the
invaders. Naik Sant Ram, making a quick decision, led the group across the road
and they melted into the hills to the East of the road, without getting detected or
noticed by the invaders. Having walked non-stop through the day and the better
part of the night, the group hit Baramulla-Uri-Domel (Jhelum Road) road at a
place called Garhi where it came across a small force under Captain Prithi Singh,
headed towards Domel. The soldiers then directed the refugees to continue
towards Uri/Baramulla and turned around to be a part of the column. The Chief
of Army, Brigadier Rajendra Singh was in command of the small force and was
organising the defence along the road. The survivors then fought as part of the
force and almost all the braves of Kotli, too, perished defending their motherland
over the next few days.
 2-URI-MAHURA-BUNIYAR-SERI
​The news of invasion and plunder at Muzaffarabad had personally been
conveyed by Lieutenant Colonel Narain Singh, on the wireless to the HQ at
Srinagar. The officer on the other end was Captain Nasib Singh, a staff officer at
the HQ. About an hour later, the next message was received wherein the CO
shared the details about the attack on the battalion HQ and officers’ mess as also
the fact that they had not been able to take out weapons from the armoury.
​ here was a long gap in communication after the second message as the
T
senior officers at the Army HQ went into a firefighting mode. Information was
scanty and incomplete since the sender himself had had no reaction time to react.
In the afternoon, the final message came from Domel and as per that, the CO had
moved towards the barracks and the HQ had been surrounded from all the sides.
The last line of the message read, “I am going to destroy my (radio) set.” That was
the last communique from the command elements of 4 JAK Infantry.
​ y that time, some decisions had been taken between the Chief of Staff,
B
Brigadier Rajendra Singh, Military Advisor to the Maharaja, Lieutenant Colonel
KS Katoch, MC and the Maharaja. The dire need for further information was
addressed by sending Captain Nasib Singh with five men to Domel to see, report
and await further orders. However, when the small party reached Uri, they were
ordered to return immediately and await further orders after reaching Baramulla.
I​ n the meanwhile, at Srinagar, the Maharaja summoned his Chief of
Staff and informed him that the informal negotiations with Delhi had been opened
and he had made up his mind to accede to India. He further shared the information
that he had requested Delhi to send in troops. He then directed Brigadier Rajendra
Singh to collect all combatant personnel he could find in the Badami Bagh
Cantonment and rush to the front, so as to hold the enemy on the Muzaffarabad-
Uri Road until the arrival of the Indian troops1.
​There were not enough troops available though. The cantonment could
finally be squeezed to muster up a force of about one hundred soldiers2. Two
platoon and a detachment of 3-inch mortars of 8 JAK Infantry (the battalion had
already been rushed to Poonch), one platoon of 1 JAK Infantry (rest of the
battalion being relieved at Poonch, was stuck at Poonch because of gravity of the
situation there) and a few men of 7 JAK Infantry (they were actually the line
maintenance party to ensure communication between the Army HQ and Kohala-
Poonch area) and from the training school (mainly recruits and a few staff
members), were all that could be assembled. It had been because of such a
development that orders for Captain Nasib Singh had been passed to fall back to
Baramulla and await further instructions.
Because of the blockade imposed by Pakistan, there was a shortage of
petrol in Srinagar city. The force under the Chief of Staff was, thus, forced to
move in few military vehicles and civil buses and trucks. The column left Srinagar
at 1830h and slowly made its way to Baramulla through a heavy,
1- ​As per an account in the book, Jammu and Kashmir Arms, Major General DK Palit, VrC mentions
that during the said interaction between the Maharaja and his Chief of Staff, Maharaja had been sitting
wearing his full military uniform. He had first ordered Brigadier Rajendra Singh to organise a reinforcement
column which he, the Maharaja, would personally lead into the battle to stop the enemy’s advance. “It was
after some argument and only upon Brigadier Rajendra Singh’s assurance that he would go forward himself
that the ruler was dissuaded from his resolve.”
2- ​Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) LP Sen, DSO, in his book, Slender was the Thread, makes a
mention of a large number of soldiers who were discovered inside the barracks at Badami Bagh Cantonment
later. However, the sequence of events as also the total number of troops available in the State forces, don’t
support his claims. Major Brahma Singh, in his book, “History of J&K Rifles”, also strongly refutes the claim
of Lieutenant General Sen and supports his argument with plausible evidence. He writes, “…coming as it
does from a commander who should have been in the know of things, certainly needs to be commented upon.
Without casting aspersions on the truthfulness of General Sen, it may be mentioned that all State forces’
officers, including Brigadier Faqir Singh, the Kashmir Brigade Commander, who were present in Srinagar at
that time, have vehemently denied that the State troops were ever paraded before General Kalwant Singh, as
claimed by General Sen in his book. In this connection, it is also pertinent to note that in the second week of
December, not more than 200 men could be mustered from the Badami Bagh Cantonment for the relief
column sent to Skardu under arrangement of (HQ) Jammu & Kashmir Force (Indian Army). It is also on
record that all such State troops in the Cantonment were organised into ‘B’ Sector (under Indian Army) which
was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Sher Singh of JAK Body Guard Cavalry. Who then were those 2000
odd men idling away in the barracks at Srinagar? Obviously, there has been some mix-up somewhere. There
is a suggestion that they could be the Garrison Police companies of the State (which were raised with ex-
servicemen) that had just then been rushed to Srinagar for internal security duties.”

incessant rain. A short meeting was held between the Chief of Staff and the local
civil authorities at Baramulla. The column, then, moved on and reached Uri
around midnight. Besides Brigadier Rajendra Singh, there were three more
officers- Captains Prithi Singh (ADC to Maharaja), Khazan Singh and Nasib
Singh.
​ he news of the long convoy carrying marauders and news of loot, rape
T
and plunder had already reached Uri by then. The town was at its tenterhooks and
the first thing that the Chief of Staff did was to re-assure the locals before
organising a blocking position alongside Uri Nala. Next morning, Captain Prithi
Singh was sent ahead to establish contact with the enemy. Two platoons went
along with him while the rest of the force got busy with preparing a defensive
position at Uri.
​ he first reliable sources of information were encountered by Captain
T
Prithi Singh at Chakothi on the morning of 23 October. A wounded JCO, Subedar
Munshi Ram and three men from 4 JAK Infantry had been walking from Domel
after the fall of Domel. They could only share details of what had happened at
Domel but were not sure about the CO and had no clue, at all, about the treachery
at Lohara Gali, Ramkot and elsewhere outside Domel. Having taken four men
abroad, the column resumed the move.
​ t Raghi, they came across civilian refugees fleeing from Domel and
A
around. Having briefly interacted with them, the column moved ahead. A little
short of Garhi, they came across a small team of soldiers under Naik Sant Ram,
escorting civilians from Kotli. The refugees were told to proceed to Baramulla
while the team from Kotli too joined Captain Prithi Singh’s force. Just then shots
were heard from the area ahead. Captain Prithi ordered his men to disembark and
they started moving ahead tactically.
​ few moments later, a bus came around the bend. For a moment, there
A
was a bit of confusion before tribal men started to jump out of the bus. Just then, a
few more buses arrived and halted behind the first bus. Captain Prithi Singh
ordered his men to open fire and the exchange of fire started. Over next two odd
hours, one soldier had lost his life and the Captain had been wounded. The enemy
was also seen crossing Jhelum over the foot bridge at Garhi and assessing a threat
developing from a flank or rear, Captain Prithi decided to break the contact.
​ he vehicles had been turned around by that time and the force fell back
T
to Hatian Bala. The enemy, however, followed up fast and another engagement
ensued at Hatian Bala. The force then broke contact once again and rushed to Uri.
​ ased on the fresh inputs brought in by Captain Prithi Singh as well as
B
the civilians descending on to Uri from neighbouring areas, Brigadier Rajendra
Singh quickly carried out an appreciation.
It was now clear that the enemy had crossed over to the far (Northern)
bank at Garhi and would try to make use of another foot bridge at Mahura to
outflank their position at Uri. Also, reports of the enemy moving East on Pir
Kanthi Ridge on Pir Panjal in the South, were being received. Uri was likely to be
outflanked and encircled or simply bypassed. Fortunately, the enemy had no
option but to bring up his logistics and the vehicles and for that, the road had to be
cleared by the enemy. Defenders, therefore, had to deny the road while watching
flanks and own rear. Unfortunately, there were not enough men for the same.
There was a steel bridge short of Uri (towards Baramulla) and the terrain
around the bridge provided protection from sniping from top of mountain ridge to
the left (South). A quick decision was taken and the bridge was prepared for
demolition by improvising upon whatever explosives and mines were available.
Defences were then taken on the home side of the bridge. Such a layout meant
leaving Uri settlement unguarded but there was no other choice. The enemy hit the
village on the night of 23 October and set houses to fire. The demolition was not
activated since the refugees had been pouring in and were crossing the bridge
while the enemy indulged in looting and rapes inside Uri.
During the night, Brigadier Rajendra Singh updated Brigadier Faqir
Singh, the brigade commander of Kashmir Brigade and instructed him to send
forward whomsoever he could. He further ordered him to move the ‘B’ Company
of 4 JAK Infantry from Kupwara as also one company from Poonch to join him at
Uri at the earliest. Captain Prithi Singh and other wounded were evacuated back
to Srinagar while reinforcements in form of 70 more men under Captain Jwala
Singh were sent ahead from Srinagar.
The Maharaja, by now, was monitoring the situation in the capacity of the
C-in-C. He handed over a written order to Captain Jwala Singh for Brigadier
Rajendra Singh, ordering the Brigadier to hold and fight last man, last round. It
was around 0300h on 24 October that Captain Jwala Singh reached Uri.
Throughout the night, the enemy had been trying to breach
Delaying Action by JAK Force
defences at Uri while attempting to outflank the location. A very effective
machine gun fire played a big role in keeping the enemy away throughout the
night. By the early morning, it was confirmed that the enemy had surrounded the
locality and was tightening the grip around the defences.
Just after the first light, the enemy buses were seen approaching the
bridge and the demolition charge was fired in the face of the enemy. With the
bridge destroyed and the enemy denied the road for now3, the column was ordered
to fall back to Mahura to fight a delaying battle there. The pulling out began after
the last light on 24 October. However, by now, Brigadier Rajendra was clear about
the hopelessness of the situation and the fact that whatever he may do, his small
force would not be able to stop the enemy for too long.
There was a power station at Mahura and it supplied power to Baramulla
and Srinagar and areas in between. As the first vehicle of the column reached
Mahura at around 2200h, the staff there panicked and cut off the supply. Suddenly,
Srinagar plunged into darkness4.
Soon, the defenders took up hastily prepared positions at Mahura. An
additional MMG Section and two detachments of 3-inch mortars of 5 JAK
Infantry, married up with the force at Mahura in the night.
The enemy contacted Mahura locality on the morning of 25 October.
When a number of waves failed to dislodge the determined band of few brave
men, the enemy resorted to outflanking manoeuvres. By noon, Captain Nasib
Singh and one JCO, Subedar Rasila Ram of 7 JAK Infantry had also been
wounded. They, however, continued to fight.
3- ​The bridge took two days to become functional and that too with the engineering support provided by
the Pakistani army engineers. In the end, that delay of the two days was to prove vital for Srinagar. Most of
the tribal commanders had refused to proceed without their vehicles because they were being left with nothing
to carry the bootie back home if vehicles were to be abandoned. The bootie, after all, had been the single
most important motivating factor for them in the overall scheme of things.
4- ​At that moment, Dussehra celebrations were on at Srinagar. Despite the threat building up, the
Maharaja didn’t want the panic to set in. The customary holding of the court had just got over and the guests
were moving in for the dinner when the lights went off. While the generator was started to enable the dinner
to be served in the palace, many senior functionaries in the know of the things realised that the enemy had
reached Mahura at that moment. As per the accounts of local residents of Baramulla, the man-in-charge of
the power station, had left the town in the morning, declaring that if he saw the enemy coming, he would cut
off the electricity and that would be a confirmed signal to the locals to flee and save themselves. Obviously,
the man had panicked but he was not too wrong in his approach; the enemy was close behind the State forces’
column.
 The Demolition of this bridge at Uri happened on 24 October and the action imposed a delay of two
days on invaders

Brigadier Rajendra Singh ordered Captains Jwala Singh and Nasib Singh
to destroy two footbridges at Rampur and Buniyar. Same was done but the enemy
was all over by that time5. The enemy was now in the process of laying
roadblocks to the rear of force at Mahura with the apparent aim of isolating the
force before destroying them. Brigadier Rajendra Singh ordered evacuation and
falling back to next position at Rampur near Buniyar. There were a few hours of
daylight left and he wanted to make use of the same to site the next delaying
position. By 2100h, a new position had been occupied and no further assaults
were made. However, realising the fact that the troops would be vulnerable to
sniping from the dominating heights to the South of the road during the day,
waist-high stone sangars (improvised bunkers) were constructed during the night.
The troops had had no break since their departure from Srinagar on 22 October
evening. But they slogged and were ready when the enemy snipers opened up the
next morning.
The slopes looked as if infested with the tribal men. 3-inch mortars and
machine guns had a field day and the invaders bought numerous casualties. No
assault came in during the day and the enemy was kept at bay.
5- ​In fact, the column of enemy had halted at the blown-up bridge at Uri and the attackers at Mahura
were those who had crossed over Jhelum at Garhi and had crossed back over at Mahura before the bridge
could be destroyed.
However, fighting patrols sent to seek information brought in the news about trees
being felled to create roadblocks for ten odd buses and trucks that the force had
with it. Sensing the trouble yet again, Brigadier Rajendra Singh ordered the
withdrawal with the instructions to rush such obstacles and take up a new position
at Seri, close to Baramulla.
The move got delayed a bit and the force started the road move after
midnight. The invaders had been holding virtually every meter of the ridge that
dominated the road. The column was interfered with continuously and the men
inside the vehicles were getting hit without any break. Captain Jwala Singh was in
the fourth vehicle while Brigadier Rajendra Singh and Captain Khazan Singh
were in the second last vehicle. The orders for the first two vehicles were to rush
through the roadblocks and if need be, clear the roadblocks with next two vehicles
providing the covering fire.
All went off well while the first roadblock between Rampur and Seri was
crossed. The enemy kept on firing but the column moved on. The driver of the
leading vehicle was hit as the vehicle reached the second obstacle. The column
came to a halt. Captain Jwala Singh got down and realised that the drivers of first
three vehicles had been hit dead. He got the vehicles pushed aside and rushed
through the second obstacle and reached the high ground at Seri. Soon, three more
vehicles arrived and no other vehicle was seen approaching after that. Most of the
soldiers inside the four vehicles were either dead or had been injured.
At the second obstacle at a place called Dewan Mandir, Brigadier
Rajendra Singh’s driver had also been killed and the Brigadier had taken the
wheel. But almost at the same time, he too had been hit in his leg, thus, rendering
him incapable of driving. There were vehicles stuck in front too. Captain Khazan
Singh and troops travelling in his jeep had got down and taken him out and started
carrying him on the back. The going was very slow and firing from the hills was
taking its toll. Brigadier Rajendra Singh, realising a huge delay that would be
incurred while carrying him on foot, forcefully ordered them to leave him and
move on. He was then left with his revolver under a culvert and rest of the group
melted into the broken ground along the river. That was the last that was heard of
the brave officer6. That was in the early hours of 27 October.
6- ​One may call it destiny at play or sheer bad luck but the fact remains that unknown to everyone
during those fateful moments, the last vehicle of the column had survived too. It had been delayed a bit at the
first obstacle because of the heavy firing by the enemy but when it reached the second obstacle, it had driven
through after nudging the abandoned vehicles stuck on the road. The JCO in the vehicle, Subedar Swarn
Singh had no clue about

Through his leadership and courage, he had been able to inflict so much
of delay on a numerically superior enemy that help from Indian Army could reach
and stall the advance of the enemy just in time7.
Brigadier Rajendra Singh had set a unique example wherein a Chief of an
army had led a handful of his men to achieve a higher purpose. He was awarded
India’s second highest gallantry award, MVC, posthumously and he became the
first recipient of the award after independence.

Baramulla in 1903- a picture by Fred Brenmner

the fact that while he was negotiating the roadblock on his way to Seri, Brigadier Rajendra Singh had been
lying injured close by. Such are the tragedies of war!
7- ​Captain Jwala Singh, left with hardly a man fit enough to walk, decided to abandon the plan to take
up the delaying position at Seri. He, instead, drove on and was met by the company of 4 JAK Infantry moving
from Kupwara. The company and the survivors then took up a defensive position short of Baramulla.
The order for Brigadier Rajendra Singh was signed by the Maharaja and was handed over to Captain
Jwala Singh for further handing over to the Chief of Staff
 Brigadier Sher Khan, MC,
the DMO of Pakistan Army, is seen distributing arms to the Tribal Leaders sometime in October 1947

3-BHATTIKA
​There was a platoon locality at Bhattika, to the North of Muzaffarabad,
along the IB. The approach to the platoon was via the track connecting
Muzaffarabad with Tithwal further to the North/Northeast and along the river
Kishanganga. A foot track at Maira connected the post with the main track. The
platoon, consisting of Dogra soldiers and a few Muslim ones- all from 4 JAK
Infantry- was being commanded by Subedar Hukma Singh, a veteran of the WW
II.
​ here was another platoon post, in depth, at Gohari under the command
T
of a Muslim JCO, Subedar Mir Waz from 4 JAK Infantry itself. That platoon had
Muslim soldiers of ‘D’ Company.
​ o attack or fire assault happened against the post on 22 October.
N
However, from his commanding position, Subedar Hukma Singh could see smoke
pillaring up at Muzaffarabad and then at Domel. Long bursts could also be heard
intermittently. The JCO tried to establish contact with his company HQ that was
co-located with the battalion HQ at Domel but to no avail.
 ​Sometime during the afternoon, he received an urgent call from Subedar
Mir Waz, requesting for reinforcement and help since, as the caller alleged, his
platoon post was under attack from all sides. There was, however, no sound or
firing or any such noise though Gohari post was much closer than Muzaffarabad.
Guided by his intuition, Subedar Hukma Singh politely refused, stating that his
post too was under attack and everyone was committed. During the night 22/23
October, all Muslim soldiers, except one, of his platoon simply walked away.
​ he platoon commander, now isolated and with no communication with
T
his superior, kept the morale high of his platoon throughout the day on 23 October
and made up his mind to exit via North to Tithwal. However, at 1700h, about 500
invaders, including Muslims of his own platoon, surrounded the post and asked
for the surrender. The platoon fired back as a response to their call. Soon, all hell
broke loose with the platoon getting plastered with 3-inch mortar fire. The Dogras,
however, held their nerves and repulsed the attack. It was dark by then and the
enemy pulled back into the dominating hills around, leaving seven dead behind.
Many soldiers, too, had been wounded but were in a position to walk.
​ y now, the ammunition had reached a critical level and at about 2300h,
B
he ordered his platoon to evacuate the post. The platoon moved out silently and
was soon out of the loose circle created by the invaders around the post. The
platoon took a cross-country route so as to maintain surprise. However,
somewhere near Bafal, the lone Muslim soldier, Sepoy Lal Din, slipped away and
ran to the post at Gohari, without anyone coming to know about his exit. He
updated Mir Waz about the state of ammunition, plight of the wounded and plan
of the platoon to head towards Tithwal.
 Attempted Break-out by the Platoon at Bhattika

J​ ust before the first light on 24 October, the platoon was ambushed near
Pahalakar. Among the attackers were many men of Mir Waz’s platoon. A bitter
fight ensued but soon the platoon ran out of the ammunition. Most of the men,
including Subedar Hukma Singh were caught alive and marched down to the river
bed. They were made to line up, stripped to the underwear, humiliated and then
shot in the cold blood one by one. One sepoy, Sansar Singh, however, decided to
take his chances and dived into the freezing and fast current of Kishanganga River
before he could be shot. He was washed away but managed to emerge out of the
river on the opposite bank about a mile downstream. He then made it back to
safety and lived to tell the tale of an unparalleled treachery and inhuman treatment
meted out to the unfortunate platoon.

4-KOHALA
 Lieutenant Labh Singh of ‘A’ Company 4 JAK Infantry was the local
commander at Kohala and had a company of Dogra Hindu soldiers and a platoon
of ‘B’ Company (totalling about 110 men) under him. The problem, however, was
the presence of about 9,000 refugees who had come to him, asking for shelter and
protection. In the fluid and unpredictable situation that prevailed during those
days, he took upon himself to protect the refugees.
The deployment of his subunit was as under: -
- ‘A’ Company less a platoon at Barsala.
- No 3 Platoon ‘A’ Company at Kohala Bridge.
- No 4 Platoon ‘B’ Company at Bagla Sikan
- A platoon of Garrison Police (local Sikhs) under an NCO of 4 JAK
Infantry at Bagla Sikan, alongside No 4 Platoon of the ‘B’ Company.
On 22 October, as 4 JAK Infantry fell to treachery in Domel-Muzaffarabad
area, some vague information had reached the officer but before any orders for
the future action could be obtained from the CO, the communication link had
broken down. Being a soldier that he was, Lieutenant Labh Singh decided to wait
for the events to unfold while holding the locality entrusted to him.
In the meanwhile, he moved his company from Barsala to Dangli Hills that
dominated the area to the West right till Jhelum. A contingency position had
already been prepared on Dangli Hills. Nothing happened over next two days
until two British officers of the Pakistan army crossed the bridge at Kohala and
asked for the company commander on 24 October. Lieutenant Labh Singh went
and met the officers and recognised them to be a Brigadier and a Lieutenant
Colonel. The Brigadier tried to throw his weight around and told the young
officer that since the invaders had already overrun the battalion HQ at Domel, an
attack on the company at Kohala was likely at any moment. He further advised
that the company might need to move out before such a withdrawal was made
impossible by the attackers. As a matter of gesture, he offered to escort the
company to Rawalpindi from where troops earmarked to join the Indian Army
were being sent to India. As a pre-condition to such a passage, he wanted the
troops to surrender first.
 Withdrawal from Kohala to Bagh

Lieutenant Labh Singh declined the offer saying that he would like to stay
and fight at Kohala itself rather than surrender to anyone. His JCO, Jemadar Suraj
Prakash who had gone along to the bridge, also concurred with his company
commander. The officers then told him sarcastically that they wouldn’t be seeing
one another ever because the future of Lieutenant Labh Singh and his men was
now well known to them. With sarcastic smiles on their lips and having made
such a portentous statement, the duo had then crossed back into Pakistan.
Once back from the brief and unpleasant meeting, a quick brainstorming
was carried out by the senior appointments of the company. Soon thereafter, men
were gathered and spoken to. There was unanimity that they would stay and fight
and in an event of a withdrawal forced on them, the company would withdraw to
Bagh (to South) even if that involved fighting all the way!
The same evening, Pakistani troops were seen congregating across the
bridge, erecting some kinds of defence works. The enemy action was now
imminent and troops, determined and motivated, prepared for a hard fight. The
night, however, went off without any action. On the morning of 25 October, three
weary men walked into the company locality in an extremely fatigued state. They
revealed their identities as members of the local Garrison Police at Domel. They
narrated the whole story of action at Domel. They further claimed that they had
managed to escape in the company of the CO, 4 JAK Infantry, Lieutenant
Colonel Narain Singh on the night of 22/23 October but had been ambushed on
the way to Kohala. They also added that, all others, including the CO, had been
killed in the ambush. As per them, enough invaders had been left behind by their
leaders proceeding to Uri, for attacking the company at Kohala and to take the
bridge intact.
The fresh inputs were discussed amongst the appointments of the company
and it was decided to withdraw to the rear since holding a post with changing
dynamics in the rear made no sense. In the absence of explosives, the idea of
blowing up the bridge was discussed and discarded. It was decided to move out
after the last light on 25 October itself. However, enemy contacted the company
locality in the afternoon and suddenly, it became evident that withdrawal was
now not going to be easy.
A platoon had already been moved to Topa feature to cover the withdrawal.
But the enemy, well guided by the insiders of the battalion, first attacked Topa
that dominated the route of withdrawal. Another platoon was rushed and as the
night drew, all the elements of the company pulled out and congregated at Bagla
Sikan. Topa, however, stood in the way and it was decided to climb the feature
between Dangli and Topa and surprise the enemy. With the benefit of the
knowledge of the terrain, troops climbed up the feature through the gap and then
assaulted the unsuspecting enemy who was too shocked to react. Topa was taken
and many rifles and ammunition rounds were recovered. Encouraged by the
success, troops charged Dangli where the enemy had taken up the main position
after abandonment by Dogras. The enemy was routed and finally, the troops
could achieve a clean break.
It was decided not to follow the only route that passed below Sudhan Gali
where the enemy had reportedly been holding defences in strength. A detour was
taken and the column, along with refugees reached Awera on night 26/27
October. It took a harbour there for some time and was preparing to move on
when a few Sikhs arrived from a nearby village where, as per them about 6,000
refugees had been fighting Muslim crowds and were under stress. The column
took a detour and reached the village. Weapons recovered from the enemy at
Dangli and Topa were then distributed among Sikh volunteers and the advance
resumed.
 Over the next two days and nights, the column was attacked thrice and had
to fight its way through but, not without suffering casualties. The cremation of the
dead comrades was carried out in situ and the wounded were taken along while
the refugee column kept on swelling, despite quite a few of them too, getting
killed in the crossfire.
On the evening of 30 October, the column reached Bani Pasari, a small
settlement about five kms short of Bagh. Lieutenant Labh Singh could have
pressed home to Bagh the same evening but decided against it since the status of
Bagh base, itself, was not very clear. Rumours about fall of Bagh and Rawalakot
were already doing rounds.
​ owever, soon after they had started to settle down, the column was once
H
again encircled. Like it had been happening enroute, the mob was made up of
Pakistan regulars, tribesmen and local civilians carrying both automatic weapons
and rudimentary ones. However, instead of opening the fire, an attempt was made
by the hostiles to establish a contact with some of the refugees. Once the contact
had been made, an offer was made by the representative of the hostiles to allow
safe passage of the refugees to Poonch in lieu of cash payment. One fellow from
amongst the refugees fell for the trap and sneaked out. He was taken to the leader
of the mob who took away his money and then beat him up. During the
interrogation, that man painted a very dismal picture about the state of weapons,
ammunition and wounded in the column. The leader, hearing the inputs, became
so confident that he walked into the camp’s perimeter with a few supporters,
demanding an immediate and unconditional surrender.
One sad fact about the attacks and attrition of the column during the
withdrawal, related to the presence of deserters amongst the crowds that had
consistently been turning upon hapless refugees and small body of troops. The
deserters were mainly from 4 JAK Infantry to which belonged the troops. There
were deserters from the Garrison Police company too and there were survivors
from the same company in the column being attacked. The huge column had
suffered a lot during the past few days and soldiers had been running low on
ammunition.
As the leader of the horde, along with a few of his close aids walked in, the
perimeter protection force under a JCO, didn’t try to stop him and allowed them a
smooth entry into the camp. Another group, a larger one, had followed the leader
and had sat down just beyond the unmarked perimeter. The JCO redeployed his
men in a way that the group waiting outside was well covered by fire and
observation.
 Once inside, the leader shouted to the officer, asking him to drop his
weapon. The buddy of the officer, before anyone could react, shot the leader in
his head. As all other members of the gang were being shot, the JCO on the
perimeter launched a fire assault, killing most of the invaders without allowing
them any reaction time.
The news of their arrival, in the meanwhile, had reached Bagh from where
a company was dispatched immediately to bring the column from Kohala to
Bagh. With the hostiles pushed back and with an increased strength and
firepower, the column reached Bagh at 1430h on 31 October 1947. With almost
9,000 refugees and only a handful of soldiers1 who had been running low on
ammunition and food, the column had been able to fight its long way through
over past seven days and their arrival at Bagh was no less than a miracle. It was
simply a saga of unmatched bravery and courage that deserves to be told to the
soldiers and readers of the future generations.
1- ​Bagh was later evacuated and the troops and refugees were moved to Poonch. Once back at Poonch,
survivors of Lieutenant Labh Singh’s group were airlifted back to Jammu in the month of February 1948.
They then formed the core group and the nucleus around which 4 JAK Infantry* was re-raised.
(*4 JAK Infantry, The Fateh Shibji Battalion, was re-raised and it got a chance to settle scores in 1956.
Punjab had got flooded around the end of 1955 and a part of Hussainiwala Headworks, to the West of
Ferozepur (Punjab) and bang on the IB, had got damaged and needed to be repaired. There was an ongoing
dispute about the alignment of the IB and Pakistan was not happy with the alignment around Sutlej River at
Hussainiwala.The headworks had been awarded to India but there was a raised bund that Pakistan wanted
for himself. Pending resolution of the dispute related to the boundary award, it had been decided to allow the
India authorities to look after the headworks, including its repairs, while the bund (the point of contention)
was to be left free of any military presence by both the nations in the interim. When Indian engineers went in
to repair the breach after the floods in February 1956, Pakistan objected to drudging of earth from a
particular point in the vicinity of the bund by Indian engineers. 4 JAK Infantry was moved up to
Hussainiwala area to give protection to the engineers in March 1956. Pakistan, suddenly, moved an infantry
brigade into the area. 4 JAK was ordered to deploy tactically while leaving out the bund. Such a restriction
actually made the defence layout weak and vulnerable. Pakistan, showing no regard to the commitments
already made, simply walked over and occupied the bund. What followed were a series of skirmishes during
which Pakistan brigade was uprooted and thrown back. An accidental fire in the dried grass also burnt down
the camp of the brigade and Pakistan, having tried to counterattack Indian positions (now on the bund)
unsuccessfully, ended up losing more than 500 men. 98 bodies of the dead who had been left behind by
Pakistan army, were handed over by 4 JAK during the ceasefire meeting. 4 JAK had suffered four dead and
about 20 non-fatal casualties. Having been deceived by own in 1947, the action of 1956 was taken as an
opportunity to pay back by the battalion. It was no mean feat that one battalion (supported by mortars of
Ferozepur brigade and one artillery battery) had taken on an enemy brigade that had a field regiment and a
squadron of tanks in support. The battalion was awarded one each of Ashoka Chakra Class I,II and III and
two Sena Medals along with many commendation
cards.

The First Day Cover released on 27 October 1999 on the Birth Centenary of Brigadier Rajendra
Singh, MVC
A combination of Pandit Nehru’s closeness to Sheikh Abdullah and his aversion towards Maharaja
Hari Singh, was, in view of many commentators, responsible for many issues related to the Kashmir
Problem
His self-claimed title of Sher-e-Kashmir was used intelligently to sway public opinion of the gullible
masses: Sheik Abdullah
Sardar Patel played a crucial role not only in taking the Maharaja on board but also during the fateful
days that followed the landing of Indian Troops at Srinagar.

AT ANOTHER LEVEL: 24 OCTOBER

Soon after the attacks commenced, the Azad Kashmir government was
formed under the leadership of Sardar Mohd Ibrahim Khan of Poonch on 24
October 1947. The areas of Poonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad seceded from the
State in the process. In fact, earlier, on 04 October, Azad Kashmir government
had been announced after the revolt in Poonch too. However, since that
government had been based in Pakistan, it lacked credibility to an extent1. The
announcement on 24 October, therefore, was made from Pallandri that lay in
State’s territory now out of control of the Maharaja’s forces2,3. As a result, now
two governments existed in the state, both individually claiming full dominion
over the complete region but none of the two in complete control of the territory.
1- ​Sardar Ibrahim claimed later on that he had been woken up in the dead of night on 23 October by
the Divisional Commissioner of Rawalpindi, Khawaja Abdul Rahim, and was told that it had become
necessary to reconstitute the government with himself as the president.
2- ​On 24 October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh faced multiple crises. The Kashmir Valley had been
invaded and the invaders were not far from Srinagar. The town of Pallandri (in Poonch) was now the seat of
a puppet government of the so-called Azad Kashmir. The entire province of Jammu was in the grip of
genocide. The Government of India was only willing to come to his rescue if he surrendered power to Sheikh
Abdullah and signed the Instrument of Accession. A fifth challenge in the form of the Gilgit rebellion was
around the corner.
3- ​During those fateful days, a journalist by the name of GK Reddy used to be the Resident Editor of
Kashmir Times (he was one of the sources, as mentioned earlier, besides Major Kalkat, to have informed the
Ministry of Defence at Delhi about impending Operation Gulmarg). He reported to Malik Tajuddin at
Lahore. Reddy was interned when he tried to enter J&K via Domel on 05 October 1947. After ten days, he
was taken across the State, and then expelled at Pathankot. He went back to Lahore and filed a story that
became a hot news in Pakistan. Realising the potential of the controversy, Sardar Ibrahim Khan declared
Reddy to be the Deputy Director of Public Relations, the Azad Kashmir Government. On 21 October Reddy
received a call from one Colonel Alavi, who was the Public Relations Officer of the Pakistan Army. He
shared the fact that Ramkot and Lohara Gali posts of JAK Forces would be attacked the following night. He
then directed Reddy to file the story as if coming from Azad Kashmir HQ at Pallandri. The officer went on to
tell him that while all future press releases would be released by the GHQ, Reddy would do well to mention
Pallandri as the place of origin of all such news items. Reddy, as it was, reviled the Maharaja and he
arranged to play along, even though he had no other choice too. On 26 October, during a detailed interview
to a Lahore-based daily, ‘Civil and Military Gazette’, he described the ‘mad orgy of Dogra violence against
Muslims in Jammu’. His interview continues to be cited by anti-India propaganda machinery even today.

On 24 October itself, the Government of India came to know about the

invasion for the first time4. The intimation, surprisingly, had come from the
Pakistan GHQ, addressed to the Supreme Commander of two nations, Field
Marshal Auchinleck. The message read, “Tribesmen estimated 5,000 Afridis,
Wazirs, Mahsuds, Swatis attacked Muzaffarabad and Domel capturing both on 22
October. Tribesmen reported approaching Srinagar. Kohala in danger of being
attacked. Tribesmen in large numbers expected to go to Kashmir”. Same day at
2300h, an SOS message was received from the Maharaja, requesting military
assistance to save Kashmir from the invaders.
The gravity of the situation didn’t allow any time to be wasted. While the
process was initiated to have the Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja,
plans were made to send in armed forces. The problem was the fact that almost
435 km of track between Indian border at Madhopur/ Lakhanpur (near Pathankot)
and Srinagar was in a bad shape and entailed a huge but unaffordable time delay.
The airfield at Srinagar was very basic and ill-maintained and it was a big risk
trying to land a loaded aircraft on such a surface. And then there was the issue of
availability of troops since the nearest formation was fully embroiled in internal
security duties in Punjab, where the situation was highly volatile.
On 24 October, warning instructions were issued to Indian Army HQ to
plan the induction of troops into the Valley.

4- ​This date of first information as per the official history of the war, however, contradicts many
accounts that claim that the Maharaja had informed Delhi on 22 October itself. In fact, when the Maharaja
and the PM of the State returned from a quick tour of Mirpur on 21 October, the Maharaja was believed to
have spoken to Sardar Patel and shared his concerns as well as likely need of the military assistance.
5- ​The Ministry of States was a department, responsible for dealing with the princely states and
manage their relationship with independent India. It was constituted in May 1947 when the erstwhile
Political Department of the British Government was disbanded in view of the upcoming independence.
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who was to be the first home minister of India, was also made the Minister of
States. V.P. Menon was appointed the administrative head of the department. The department’s principal
responsibility was bringing about the political integration of India by securing the accession of the princely
states to India. Subsequently, it supervised the conduct of their affairs, their democratisation, and their
administrative integration into India.

POLITICAL MANOEUVRING: 25 & 26 OCTOBER

​ he Maharaja was in an unenviable position with things fast getting out
T
of his hands. Delhi, Pandit Nehru to be precise, had laid conditions for rendering
the much-needed assistance. He had already released Sheikh Abdullah much
against own wishes and was now being pressurised to give an official status to his
nemesis by none other than the PM of India. He, however, shilly-shallied and as
if to make a statement, he had his PM, Mehr Chand Mahajan, issue a declaration
claiming that troubles in Poonch would be over within a week. All that was
before the fateful day of 22 October when the Valley was first invaded.
​ he invasion of the Valley and the progress of the invaders, however,
T
left no more space for the Maharaja to manoeuvre around. In fact, having failed
to reach any understanding with Pakistan, even Sheikh had been taken aback by
the invasion on 22 October, because his emissary, Ghulam Mohd Sadiq was
already in Pakistan since 18 October, busy negotiating with the Muslim League.
​ s the invaders neared Baramulla and as the last of resistance by
A
Brigadier Rajendra Singh and his band of Dogra soldiers crumbled, the civil
administration in the Valley simply collapsed. Most of the senior functionaries
were from Jammu and beyond and they started preparing to leave. When the
Maharaja left on 25 October1, a kind of exodus began towards Jammu.
Hindus and Sikhs started moving out to Jammu. There was panic in the
main city of Srinagar and other areas around and the inevitable seemed to be just
around the corner. Shops were now shut and the streets looked deserted since
possibility of anti-social elements taking control to loot the city even before the
arrival of the invaders had become a distinct possibility. During those days of
utter distress and hopelessness, Sheikh’s NC rose to
1- ​India’s Home Minister, Sardar Patel’s Principal Secretary, VP Menon virtually ordered the
Maharaja to leave the city for the relative safety of Jammu on 25 October. With his entire family, the
Maharaja left for Jammu that night by road. As VP Menon lay asleep in Srinagar that night, he was woken
up by Mehr Chand Mahajan who had heard the rumours that some infiltrators had infiltrated into the city.
He requested Menon and party to leave immediately. They then flew out early in the morning on 26 October.
However, as already mentioned, the band of soldiers under Brigadier Rajendra Singh had been holding the
invaders back during that time.

the occasion. The NC had raised a small volunteer group called the NC Peace
Brigade in the recent past. In anticipation of the partition-triggered communal
riots spilling over into the Valley, the group had been formed to spread the
message of peace and communal harmony. That group was now converted into
National Militia and equipped with whatever could be found. From .303 rifles to
sticks and axes, everything that could be used as a weapon, was collected and
handed over to the volunteers. As the administrative machinery shattered, the
National Militia took over and started marching in the streets to boost the
confidence of masses. They didn’t have to fight since they were prohibited from
doing so once Indian Army landed but their role during those crucial days
deserves all the appreciation. A women’s wing, too, was raised and many women
volunteers took up training in arms so as to be able to fight when the situation so
demanded. It was a strange fervour of patriotism and apprehensions, all
thoroughly mixed up.
​ hings were moving swiftly at Delhi too. On 25 October, the Defence
T
Committee met for the first time, under the chairmanship of the Governor
General, Lord Mountbatten. While the committee agreed on the need to send in
the troops, it decided to wait till a word was received from VP Menon who would
be flying to Srinagar later that day.. Once VP Menon landed back at Delhi on 26
October and the Committee re-assembled, it was decided that the aid could only
be provided if the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession. VP Menon flew
back to Jammu on 26 October itself.
I​ n the face of the tangible threat, Maharaja signed the Instrument of
Accession with India on 26 October 19472 at Jammu. And with that, J&K
2- ​Many theories and stories have been weaved around the signing of the instrument on 26 October.
Many in Pakistan and those with leanings towards Pakistan claim that the instrument was never signed; not
at least on 26 October. Such a claim is nothing short of a ridicule. The fact is that the Maharaja signed it on
26 October and put the same date while handing over the document back to VP Menon who flew to Delhi
that night. Mountbatten accepted the instrument on 27 October by signing on it with date, once the document
was put up to him. However, the timelines as given in the memoirs by Mehr Chand and VP Menon, are
contradictory and such a contradiction is quoted by those who claim that the Instrument was not signed on
26 October. There is another issue about the special status attached with the instrument. It may be noted that
the instrument had been same for all the princely states (in fact, Lord Mountbatten had to amend the month
(in the date column) in his own ink because the common print had been taken out for signatures by all
Princes in the month of August itself). All states, therefore, had acceded after signing the same instrument.
However, in the case of J&K, Lord Mountbatten (British had their own plans, as already summarised), in a
letter sent to Maharaja Hari Singh on 27 October 1947, accepted the accession with a remark, “It is my
Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Jammu and Kashmir and her soil
cleared of the

State became an integral part of India. With that, Pakistan lost the reason to
invade the State but since Pakistan had washed his hands off claiming the whole
episode as the doing of Tribesmen out of love for their Muslim brethren in
Kashmir, it made no difference to his covert efforts to annex Kashmir by force.
Lord Mountbatten and the Defence Committee gave a go-ahead to the Indian
Army the moment VP Menon’s message was received at Delhi on the evening of
26 October.
Brigadier Kalwant Singh who was officiating as the Chief of General
Staff (CGS), initiated the battle procedure to dispatch troops to Srinagar post-
haste. HQ Delhi and East Punjab Command3 was issued orders well after the last
light. At 2200h, Lieutenant General Sir Dudley Russell, KBE, CB, DSO, MC
spoke to his staff officers and tied up the command and control issues. The main
decisions taken and conveyed, during the conference that had been preceded by a
similar one at the Army HQ, included the following issues:-
-The conduct of operations in J&K State would be controlled directly by
the Command HQ.

invaders, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.” The above
remark is cited by Indian baiters as a promise made by the Government of India. The moot question,
however, is what prompted Mountbatten to attach such a not? The Maharaja never asked for it! The British
ploy gets highlighted in the process. Coming back to the book, Looking Back, by Mehr Chand Mahajan, the
memoirs have many errors and possibly so because Mehr Chnad had taken over on 15 October and by that
time, the State had already been invaded at Owen Pattan in Mirpur. Naturally, the pace of events for a
person who had just landed from outside, must have been too fast to allow him time to comprehend every
single issues. In his book, he claims that the Chief of Staff of Dogra Army was a Muslim who had shifted his
family to Pakistan. That is a claim that could not be substantiated despite a thorough research. However, VP
Menon’s book, to that extent, appears to be pretty well-written with finer details. Between the two, therefore,
more credence is on Menon’s book. As per Menon’s account, the Instrument of Accession was signed on 26
October at Jammu! Even from a layman’s point of view, the British who wanted Kashmir to go to Pakistan
(Mountbatten’s visit to Kashmir in June 1947 and his insistence that military assistance could only be
rendered once the Instrument had been signed), why would they allow the troops to start flying out to
Srinagar before obtaining Maharaja Hari Singh’s signatures!
3- ​The HQ, established only in mid-September 1947, had been set up to exercise command and control
over two independent area HQ- Delhi and East Punjab- that had been established on 01 September when
division of responsibilities were clearly delegated to two nations. Later on, this HQ was to become HQ
Western Command. Indian troops in J&K were also placed under its command from the day One.

-One battalion to fly out to Srinagar on 27 October early morning.

-One brigade group, by road, to Jammu.
-The total strength of the force in Valley to be one brigade group before
the onset of winters.
-All civilian Dakota aircraft were being requisitioned by the Director
General Civil Aviation and same would be available for air movement.
The battalion that Lieutenant General Russell picked up was the one that
he had visited on an inspection a few days back. The first impression about the
battalion in the mind of the Army Commander was the obvious reason and then
the battalion did certainly live up to the expectations of the General officer.
 A warning order was issued to 1 Sikh4 that was located at Gurgaon (now
Gurugram) around midnight. The subunits of the battalion had been deployed
spread over a radius of about 50 miles, doing internal security duties. The CO,
Lieutenant Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai was ordered to be ready with his battalion
less two companies at Palam airfield5 by 0400h on 27 October. The warning
order6 further directed the CO to be ready to fly on ‘an’ operational mission while
the rest of the battalion were to follow on 28 October. As regards the
administrative issues, the battalion was told to collect ammunition, rations and
warm clothing at the airfield itself7.
4- ​One of the highest decorated units of Indian Army, 1 Sikh traces its history back to the First Anglo-
Sikh war of 1846. With two PVCs and more than 340 gallantry awards, it is also the highest decorated unit
among all the units of Commonwealth countries. The first living recipient of India’s highest gallantry award,
Param Vir Chakra (PVC), Lance Naik Karm Singh belonged to this very battalion. The battalion converted
to a mechanised infantry battalion in 1979 and was rechristened as 4th Battalion The Mechanised Infantry
or 4 MECH (1 SIKH).
5- ​The official history mentions that the first flight took off from Safdarjung airfield instead of Palam
while all follow up flights during the day were flown from Palam. However, Major (later Lieutenant General)
SK Sinha who was the Grade-2 Staff officer at the Command HQ and who actually delivered the operational
instructions to the CO at Palam on the early morning of 27 October, mentions that all flights on 27 October
flew from Palam and from 28 October, flights were flown from Willingdon (Safdarjung) airport (His book,
Operation Rescue).
6- ​HQ 50 Para Brigade too was ordered to get ready to move by road to Jammu.
7- ​There was no rear airfield maintenance organisation at Delhi at that time and an adhoc cell was
created under the GSO-2, Major SK Sinha, to regulate despatch ex Delhi.
 The Instrument of Accession (Pages 1 (bottom) & 2 (top))
(As can be seen, the month in the date was amended by Lord Mountbatten since a common format, printed
just before Independence, was being used for all the Princely States; The Maharaja signed it on 26 October
at Jammu and the Governor General did it on 27 October at Delhi)

FIRST BOOTS: 27 OCTOBER 1947

Not many dates in the history of Indian Army have been as eventful as 27
October 1947. The major events of the day have been summarised in the
following paragraphs.

1- SERI & PATTAN

Brigadier Rajendra Singh must have certainly been alive when the enemy
got to him finally in the wee hours of 27 October since his injuries were limited
to his limbs- both upper and lower! There is no record of what happened to the
gallant soldier after he was left under the culvert at Diwan Mandir while bullets
were flying all around the roadblock. Even the conjecture about him being alive
is a matter of speculation. But he did keep the word he had given to his King, i.e.,
allowing enemy forward only over his dead body.
There were very few survivors and almost none without an injury- that
was the state when Captain Jwala Singh took hold of the situation at Seri, at the
outskirts of Baramulla. By that time, the enemy’s strength was well-known and
another fight by such a small group, running low on ammunition and without any
defence works, appeared to be pointless endeavour to the officer. He, therefore,
decided to abandon the plan to fight at Seri and rush to Srinagar to update the
higher authorities about the ground situation. Many, including him, were also in
the need of medical aid of some kind.
As the group crossed Baramulla, they came across the ‘B’ Company less
a platoon of 4 JAK Infantry that was on its way from Kupwara to Uri, via Sopore,
as per the orders issued earlier. Captain Prabhat Singh was the Company
Commander who took charge of the situation and after a short discussion with
Captain Jwala Singh, he decided to deploy about two miles East of Baramulla. As
per their joint assessment, the enemy would have already reached Baramulla and,
so rather than fighting inside the town with numbers heavily in favour of the
invaders, they decided to fight and block the enemy at the ground of own
choosing. Jhelum was about 400m to the North and offered the locality flank
protection from the right. It was about to be the first light and two platoons of the
‘B’ Company and few survivors took up a defensive position along the main road
connecting Baramulla with Srinagar via Pattan. Captain Jwala Singh moved on to
Srinagar with wounded and the dead in his care.

2- BARAMULLA

​ he invaders had reached the outskirts of Baramulla in the early hours

T
of 27 October. It was a Monday morning but with a difference. There had been no
electricity for past couple of nights and a general sense of panic had gripped the
town.
​ aramulla was an important trading town on the Jhelum Valley road. It
B
had a native population of around 15,000. A place known for its wide alleys,
houses of rich and famous and for its hotels hosting people from all over the
world, it was a prosperous town inhabited by Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and
Christians. River Jhelum flowed right through the town, bisecting the town. The
river had been dredged during Maharaja Pratap Singh’s times so as to ensure that
yearly floods could be contained. Jhelum, before that, had a shallow bed.
​ ver past two days, a few Muslim men had been assembling in the
O
streets, making small groups and discussing the future course of action. The NC,
as well as, the MC workers had also been going around. While the NC workers
were appealing for peace and control, the MC cadres were asking locals to get
ready to welcome the ‘liberators’. Many locals had already locked up their houses
and had left after the power was cut at Mahura as a signal. Those Hindus and
Sikhs, who could not leave for some reasons, were now huddled inside their
homes, awaiting their fate.
 ​ wo injured soldiers of the State forces walked into the town, early on
T
the morning of 27 October. They were badly wounded but were able to walk. A
man, on his way from the local bakery, handed over a loaf of bread to them. The
soldiers had then moved on. Suddenly, the chaos set in and invaders reached the
town. Soon, the acts of Muzaffarabad and Uri began to be re-enacted. There was
a ceaseless plunder and looting that followed. Hardly anyone was spared though
Hindus and Sikhs were targeted specifically. Even Muslims who tried to
intervene or were found protecting others, were killed. As a general trend, co-
operative Muslims were spared the ordeal.
​ o Hindu or Sikh woman or girl was spared. There were rapes that
N
were followed by loading the females into the buses and lorries, to be sold in the
markets of Rawalpindi and Peshawar. Some of those unfortunate ones were also
taken to unnamed places in the NWFP. Even a catholic church, its nuns and
menfolk were not spared. Some accounts indicate rape of nuns while others claim
that nuns had been shot and thrown into the well inside the church courtyard
(please see the Chapter, ‘Anecdotes of a Diverse Kind’ ahead).
​ y evening, most of the houses belonging to those who had left, had
B
been set on fire. All the shops had been looted and while those who could, did
escape to the hills, many were hunted down in the neighbouring villages and
orchards. With the urge to accumulate as much of wealth as possible and pick up
as many females as available, the idea of jihad took a back seat for a while. Many
tribal leaders decided to go back, dump the newly acquired possessions in their
own areas in Pakistan and NWFP before returning again to wage further war
against the infidels. Two full days were consumed as the town burnt and invaders
satiated their hunger for flesh and meat. That act, coupled with the delays
inflicted on them by CO, 4 JAK Infantry, Brigadier Rajendra Singh and his small
force as also a battalion that awaited them a little to the East, were to finally spell
doom for those blood thirsty hordes1.
1- ​As the events, narrated earlier and to follow ahead, would prove, while many marauders stayed back
at Baramulla for two days and quite many returned to drop the loot, a big chunk of the invading force,
especially, all the regulars and many in direct control of tribesmen, did move out of Baramulla on 27
October itself. However, 1 Sikh delayed them by another day. It was, in pure technical terms, therefore,
because of one day’s delay at Domel by the CO and men of 4 JAK Infantry (22 October), four days’ delay
inflicted by Brigadier Rajendra’s men (23-26 October) and near two days of delay caused by gallant Sikhs
and State forces East of Baramulla (27 and 28 October) that had enabled India to build up adequate forces
at Srinagar. Though the plunder at Baramulla has been quoted for two days’ delay, the fact remains that
while invaders had committed gruesome and inhumanly acts at Baramulla, the delay at Baramulla was
insignificant in the overall scheme of things.
It also needs to be noted that during the days that were to follow, large scale acts of loot, man-
slaughter and rape, victimising more than 60,000 non-Muslims at Mirpur and Rajouri took place. Strangely,
those events were side-lined in favour of the massacre of a few hundred at Baramulla, by historians
belonging to various schools. The reasons could vary from remaining fixated to Kashmir or the fact that
unlike at other places, a few Muslims and Christians too were subjected to torture and murder at Baramulla,
to simply a matter of convenience, to avoiding narration with definite communal angles. In any case, all acts
of such violence are condemnable and what happened at Muzaffarabad, Domel, Uri, Baramulla and beyond,
remains a blot on the humanity!

3-DELHI

The operational instructions were hand-delivered to the CO, 1 Sikh at

Palam at 0400h on 27 October by the G-2 of the Command HQ. The information
was sketchy and the battalion had been tasked to fly to Srinagar on 27 October
and 28 October with the aim of securing the aerodrome and civil aviation
wireless station. The secondary task, subject to ‘feasibility’ was to drive away the
enemy from the vicinity of the city and help the civil administration in restoring
law and order. The CO was further instructed to circle the airfield and scan the
countryside before landing and if he were to find invaders in control of the
airfield, he was to fly back immediately and land at Jammu instead.
The airport staff had, by that time, put floodlights to facilitate the
operations at Palam. Brigadier Mellsop, the Brigadier General Staff of the
Command HQ, came to see off the battalion.
The first flight of six civil Dakota, being piloted by a mix of RIAF (Royal
Indian Air Force) pilots and civilian aviators and carrying the Tac HQ of 1 Sikh,
one company of 1 Sikh and one composite company of 13 Field Regiment1, RIA
(Royal Indian Artillery) took off from Palam at 0530h. 22 Dakotas of RIAF too
joined operations. While one civilian Dakota could carry 15 men, each with
personal arms, bedding and supplies weighing about 225 kg, the RIAF Dakotas
had a capacity for similarly equipped 17 soldiers.
In addition to 1 Sikh, the following were also flown to Srinagar on the
first day: -
- Brigadier (later Major General) Hira Lal Atal2 as the liaison officer for
the coordination with Army HQ (Dogra)3.
1- ​There was a shortage of troops and additional troops had to be located to make up the strength of 1
Sikh. 2 & 13 Field Regiments had Sikh troops too and a company worth of gunners from 13 Field and 2
Field Regiment was formed as the fifth and composite company of 1 Sikh. Captain RL Chauhan of 13 Field
Regiment was the company commander of the the company. The gunners operated in the infantry role,
donning the uniform of Sikh Regiment till the 3.7-inch guns were handed over to them at Srinagar during the
first week of November 1947. 13 Field Regiment holds the battle honours of Chushul and Gadra City.
2- ​Later Major General and the first Adjutant General of Indian Army, Brigadier HL Atal (originally
from 16 CAV) was posted as Director Personal Services at the Army HQ when he was personally appointed
as the Liaison Officer by Pandit Nehru and sent to
 -One intelligence officer from Directorate of Military Operations and
Intelligence.
-One liaison officer from the Ministry of States.
-One officer and two NCOs of Royal Indian Engineers (RIE) for handling
and training State troops in demolition tasks.
-A medical detachment of two officers and 10 men.
-Three cipher operators.
Pandit Nehru had briefed Brigadier HL Atal to travel in the first aircraft
and make sure that the aircraft was made to fly low over the city so that the locals
could realise the fact that Indian troops were landing on the day when the locals
were celebrating Eid. Further, Brigadier Atal was to send a code, LION (meaning
successful landing and requirement of more troops) or JACKAL (meaning the
situation was hopeless and beyond any remedial action). On the air field, when
Brigadier Atal conveyed the directions of the PM to the BGS, Brigadier Mellsop,
the latter made some inappropriate remarks about the PM. Air Commodore
Subroto Mukerjee4, however, salvaged the situation and made sure that Brigadier
Atal boarded the first Dakota being flown by an RIAF pilot.
Just before the establishment of an air-bridge between Delhi and
Srinagar, a reconnaissance of the road Srinagar-Baramulla had also been
undertaken by RIAF5.
Srinagar. Major Kak, a veterinary surgeon with the State’s forces, was appointed as his local guide. The
younger brother of Brigadier HL Atal, Brigadier KL Atal, was awarded the MVC while in command of 77
Para Brigade during the operations across Zoji La in 1948. Kashmiri Pandits by birth, their father, Major
(Doctor) PL Atal, had died during the WW I in France, while serving as Medical Officer with 6/13 FF, the
same unit in which Brigadier KL Atal was later commissioned.
3- ​For the ease of understanding, the two Army HQ- one that of India and another of J&K State- were
referred to as Army HQ and Army HQ (Dogra) respectively.
4- ​Later Air Marshal, Air Commodore Subroto Mukerjee, OBE, was the first Indian C-in-C of IAF
when he took over the appointment in 1954. During the conflict, he flew with Air Commodore Mehr Singh
when the latter made the first ever landing at the narrow air strip at Poonch. Popularly known as the Father
of IAF, he was given a four-year long extension in 1958. However, he died at the young age of 49, because of
choking on his food while having a meal at Tokyo, where he had gone to attend the opening ceremony of a
direct Air India route between the two nations.
5- ​As per a veteran Air Warrior, Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam, Wing Commander HN
Chatterjee and Flight Lieutenant NK Shitoley were summoned to Delhi in their slow-moving Oxford recce
aircraft from Ambala, and briefed to carry out a recce of the Srinagar-Baramulla road to ascertain whether
there was a window of opportunity to reinforce the airfield before the invaders came within a striking
distance. So, off they went, refuelling at Amritsar and flying across the Pir Panjal ranges before confirming
to Delhi that the invaders were still at Baramulla. However, it is not clear whether the aerial recce took
place on 26 October or on 27 October. (source: The Print, 26 October 2018)
 Last minute briefing : Officers of RIAF, led by Wing Commander KL Bhatia and those of 1 SIKH
discussing plan just before taking off on 27 October

4-SRINAGAR-BARAMULLA

The first Dakota with Lieutenant Colonel Dewan Ranjith Rai, CO 1 Sikh
on board and being flown by Wing Commander KL Bhatia1 entered airspace
beyond Pir Panjal at about 0820h. Having made a circle over the airfield and
having made a successful radio contact with the civil aviation wireless station, the
first Dakota touched down at 0830h. Lieutenant Colonel Rai’s first message to
Delhi through the aviation wireless station came as a big relief back at Delhi.
The CO, on landing, was surprised to see a few soldiers already deployed
on the airfield. As was revealed to him by the officer-in-charge there, an infantry
battalion and a battery2 of artillery from the Patiala State Forces had been the first
to reach Jammu City and Srinagar Airport respectively on 17 October3. The
Patiala Gunners at Srinagar, however, were without dial sights that had been left
behind through an oversight. Nevertheless, the guns had been deployed with open
sights to take on the enemy in a direct firing role if the situation so demanded.
1- ​The Kashmir Operations ended with Wing Commander KL Bhatia being made the Station
Commander at the Agra Airbase. No 12 Transport Squadron operating under him had won 13 out of 19 Vir
Chakras awarded to the IAF for the heroic deeds of the Air Warriors in the Kashmir Operations. Himself a
recipient of the coveted Vr C, the air hero died young at the age of 34 years due to complication arising out
of a shrapnel that had been stuck undetected in his lung since an injury inflicted during this very conflict.
2- ​Earlier a part of the Patiala State Forces, 75 Patiala Mountain Battery was merged into the Indian
Artillery during the conflict itself. At the time of independence, there were a total of 25 mountain batteries.
Pakistan got eight while 17 stayed back. Out of the 17, five were converted into field batteries and six were
put into suspended animation for the time being. The balance, i.e., six batteries were kept as such and were
used to raise 22 and 24 Mountain Regiments. In 1954, three state forces artillery batteries, i.e. Patiala, J&K
and Gwalior Batteries, were used to raise 23 Mountain Regiment. During the conflict, Patiala Mountain
Artillery fought as a mounted horse artillery. As regards the presence of the artillery battery at the airfield,
there is a bit of contradiction. As per Colonel Harbaksh Singh (please see ahead), only two guns had been
brought by an officer from Patiala Forces, by air, for delivering to Srinagar since those two guns had been
loaned to Patiala State by J&K State during WW II.
3- ​“Patiala forces were legally part of India army after August 15, 1947.” Writes Alastair Lamb,
“Somewhere around the second week of October the decision was taken in New Delhi to send actual troops
…some units from Patiala state army…were transported to Jammu and Kashmir….the movement was
complete by October 18,….this intervention took place at the personal request to Maharaja Yadavindra
Singh by Jawaharlal Nehru.” Alistair Lamb in ‘Birth of a tragedy-Kashmir 1947’.

With three companies, including the composite company, on the ground4,

Lieutenant Colonel Dewan Ranjith Rai had to take a decision even though there
was no concrete information available about the enemy beyond the input that said
that there were tribesmen in thousands. There were two choices: either sit tight at
the airfield (that being the primary task assigned to his battalion) and await the
arrival of the enemy and then fight him close to the airfield; or move ahead, seek
the enemy and give him a fight away from Srinagar! Being a soldier that he was,
he opted for the second option.
A semblance of a squadron of the State’s Bodyguard Cavalry was
available at Srinagar and the same was sent ahead to reinforce the two platoons of
4 JAK Infantry near Baramulla by Lieutenant Colonel Rai. One company of 1
Sikh also went along with the Cavalry. His message to Delhi at 1200h, read,”
About 500 enemy and 2000 locals near Baramulla cannot be held by State forces.
So will undertake task 1 and reinforce State troops to prevent break-through.
Build-up must be expedited.”
Leaving one company at the airfield and after placing Patiala Gunners
under command of own company commander, he proceeded ahead towards
Baramulla with the remaining company. Short of Baramulla, he came across the
last of State troops deployed alongside the main road. Captain Prabhat Singh,
pleasantly surprised to see Indian Army, briefed him about the enemy even
though he, himself, had not been in contact with the enemy till then. The CO
deployed major chunk of his force alongside 4 JAK Infantry company and then
moved ahead with a strong escort.
At 1500h, he sent another message to Delhi and it read, “Baramulla fallen
and in flames. In all some 700 men available. Not enough to prevent enemy from
bypassing during the night; need at least two companies to patrol and protect
flanks.”
Meanwhile, inside Baramulla, the tribesmen were busy looting and
raping and setting buildings on fire. The regulars of Pakistan army, however, had
moved ahead towards the Eastern edge of the town by the afternoon. Both the
groups, i.e., Indian Army troops and invaders, were actually surprised to see each
other. The firefight started immediately and many invaders from the town joined
those on the outskirts.
4- ​A total of 28 Dakotas flew in and out of Srinagar airfield on the very first day itself, thereby,
enabling more troops to land than what had been planned earlier. It was a great achievement through joint
efforts of RIAF and civilian pilots.

Lieutenant Colonel Rai was taken aback to see the kind of weaponry the
so-called tribesmen were holding and the kind of tactics that were being
followed. Contrary to what he had heard till then, the enemy was better equipped,
was being led by regulars and was far too superior in numbers. Pakistan regulars
and the tribesmen, on their part, were equally surprised to see the Indian troops so
early into the action. Their belief that the highway to Srinagar stood open for
them, was immediately shattered.
Sensing his weakness as the enemy started outflanking the Sikhs, the CO
ordered the withdrawal and the small force broke contact and fell back by about
two miles5. The enemy, however, didn’t follow up that night, probably, shaken up
by the sudden appearance of the Indian troops and awaiting instructions from the
controllers in Pakistan. It was decided by the CO to halt the enemy there and then
chase him out of Baramulla. The enemy, however, didn’t show up. The patrols
operating on the flanks6 too didn’t report any enemy activity during the night.
5- ​Various accounts differ about the location where defences were taken up on the night 27/28 October.
By another account, it was at a location about 10 miles short of Baramulla. Yet another account claims that
the locality for the night was different than the one occupied by the JAK State forces and was further ahead
where everyone else was ordered to move during the night. This input appears to be debatable. It needs to be
noted that Captain Prabhat Singh, coming from Kupwara, via Sopore, was already near Baramulla when he
had been met by Captain Jwala Singh. The point where the Sopore road met the main road, was about 06
miles to the East of Baramulla. Since Captain Prabhat Singh had already crossed that junction and was
closer to Baramulla, he could have reached anywhere between two to three miles of the town. It was, thus,
unlikely that 1 Sikh would have deployed further ahead, ignoring a hill-based defended locality just in the
rear. Initially, CO, 1 Sikh was not planning to fight a delaying action but was planning to give a good fight
and then chase the invaders out.
6- ​On the Southern or the left flank of the combined force of 1 SIKH and JAK force, invaders were
targeting villages enroute. Barring command elements from Pakistan army, there is little evidence to prove
that the bulk of the invaders’ force had any clue about the tactical scenario beyond loot and plunder all the
way to and including Srinagar. Tucked into the foothills of Tosha Maidan meadow on Pir Panjal range (to
the Southeast of Gulmarg), lay a Sikh village by the name Icchama. There were about 60 families and many
men of the village were ex-soldiers of the JAK State forces. Over the past few days, many displaced Sikh and
few Hindu families fleeing from Muzaffarabad, Baramulla, Kupwara and such like areas, had gathered
inside the gurudwara of the village. The men of the village had decided to fight the invaders at Icchama if
the situation so warranted. A community kitchen had been set up and many prosperous Kashmiri Pandits
from the surrounding areas too had come into the village with adequate rations and provisions. However,
beyond a few rifles and muzzle loaders, there was hardly any weapon worth the mention. Ladies and men
who had no such weapons, prepared themselves with swords and sabres. On the night of 27/28 October, the
smoke could be seen billowing out of many villages between Icchama and Baramulla. Next night, about 200
invaders reached the

Brigadier Hira Lal Atal, as a liaison officer, had no command over the
troops in the Valley. After passing the code, LION, he sent a message informing
Army HQ that many refugees7 had been thronging the airfield and at least one
brigade was required to defend the city and the Valley.
Army HQ replied to Lieutenant Colonel Rai at 2305h, informing him that
the air strafing would be carried out on 28 October and a Tac HQ of the brigade,
one additional battalion, followed by another battalion would be flown in over the
next two days. Little did the Sikhs know that their Centre Commandant, Colonel
Dykes (on leave) and his wife had been murdered at Baramulla earlier that day.
Wing Commander KL Bhatia, instead of flying back to Delhi, took off for
Baramulla for aerial reconnaissance. Soon, he was back with the report that while
the road Srinagar-Baramulla was virtually empty, Baramulla had been burning.
During the reconnaissance from a low altitude, his aircraft had been hit by a
bullet of .303 rifle but he was able to land back at Srinagar. After in-situ repairs
by a team from Delhi, he flew back to Delhi later.
A few other aircraft that went into a wider circle were also hit by hostile
fire but no damage was grave enough to ground the aircraft.
village and men put up a brave fight till a point when the ammunition began to run out. Soon, 300 more
joined the invaders and the situation started to become grave. As a last resort, the old priest of the
gurudwara instructed ladies and girls to get ready for self-immolation. There was a multi-storeyed
Dharamshala building there and ladies were instructed to get inside. Women and kids were crying and
weeping as they entered the building that had to be set on fire soon. By that time, many men had fallen and
ammunition too, was almost over and yet, invaders had been kept at bay. The old priest told the man tasked
to start the fire, to hold for ten more minutes before setting the building on fire. Suddenly, the firing stopped
and an uneasy quiet took over. A raider entered the compound and was fired upon by a man who had one
bullet left. Though injured, the man kept on walking, asking the ladies to come out and surrender. Suddenly,
a few ladies leapt out of the building and dragged the raider inside before lynching him with swords and
bare hands. Nothing happened thereafter and it was decided not to proceed with self-immolation. The enemy
was still around but the village was not being attacked at that moment. The village was then abandoned and
the column of refugees and villagers, moved out with a few able-bodied men escorting the column all the way
to Shalateng (see ahead) where the Indian Army took them under protection. The invaders, in the meanwhile,
coaxed to leave plundering for a while by their commanders, had started to move towards Badgam. They
had orders to lie in wait, without getting close to the airfield, for the build-up to com plete before making an
attempt to take over airfield at Srinagar.
7- ​The British citizens had already been evacuated by road, and yet Srinagar still had many Europeans.
They were then evacuated along with the other British citizens who were being evacuated via BOAC aircraft
hired by the UK High Commission in India.

An Associated Press picture showing 1 SIKH deployed to the East of Baramulla

 Wing Commander Kirori Lal Bhatia, VrC (left);
Srinagar Airfield lacked basic infrastructure and the runway was just a gravelled surface that was
prone to high wear and tear due to prolonged operations (right)

5- LAHORE

The Indian government had been keeping the Pakistan government

posted about the movement of Indian troops into J&K. The unexpected landing of
the Indian Army had upset the plan to annex Kashmir by force and many in
Pakistan had been surprised. At this juncture, the Governor General of Pakistan,
Jinnah, decided to send in regular army into Kashmir to out-manoeuvre Indian
forces and take over Kashmir. When he called up General Gracey1, Chief of
Pakistan Army, to convey his decision, he was advised by General Gracey against
such a move. As he was briefed, while it might have been possible to rush two or
three units to Srinagar to secure the Valley but such a move would have left
Lahore undefended in the face of a likely Indian reposte. General Gracey, then
tactfully explained a technical difficulty wherein he couldn’t issue such an order
without informing and taking permission from the Supreme Commander of both
the forces, Field Marshal Auchinleck.
1- ​General Sir Douglas David Gracey KCB, KCIE, CBE, MC & Bar became the first Chief of the
General Staff and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army before succeeding General Frank
Messervy as Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army on 11 February 1948. Many contradictory stories
about his standing with Jinnah have been debated in Pakistani circles for many years. His role in Kashmir
invasion too remains a subject of debates, but the fact remains that he, as the officiating C-in-C of Pakistan
Army during the days prior, during and after the launch of Operation Gulmarg, did play a pivotal role in the
overall scheme of things.

6-DELHI
 I​ t was definitely a long day and the action was still not over yet. HQ Delhi
and East Punjab Command was ordered to establish a proper line of
communication between Pathankot and Jammu. Pathankot was the last Indian
military station till a day ago. While air bridge between Srinagar and rest of the
country had been successfully established, the ratio between the resources
available versus the demand was heavily tilted. Supply and build up via land
route were the only options but there were difficulties involved in executing the
logistics. With Pathankot emerging as the hub for all supplies and logistics for
troops in J&K, the need of the hour was to have a functional road link connecting
Pathankot with Srinagar via Jammu and Banihal Pass. The existing 400 km dirt
track was not only unfit for sustained traffic, it was also prone to enemy attacks,
especially the first 100 odd km between Pathankot and Jammu where the enemy
could interfere both by laying ambushes and through mortar and artillery.
However, for reasons that defy tactical acumen, while the invaders kept on
breaching borders along that stretch at will and yet instead of interfering
meaningfully with the troops’ movements, hordes kept on going back with stolen
cattle and abducted women. Abductions were a gim reflection of the sad state of
affairs prevailing at that point of time.
To compound the problems further, there was no bridge over Ravi River at
Madhopur i.e. at the State border between Kathua and Pathankot, during those
days. As a result, troops had to be ferried across in boats that were only two in
number. A crossing site was soon reconnoitred and finalised for bridging
operations over Ravi but that would happen over the next few days1.
1- ​Two boats had the capacity to ferry one battalion and about 30 jeeps across the river in one day.
However, the Engineer-in-Chief of Indian Army, after the recce, reported that River Ravi could be bridged
near Kathua by one 55-metre-long Bailey Bridge and same could be ready by 07 November.
A Copy of the Warning Order Issued to 1 SIKH (courtesy: 4 MECH 1SIKH)) (left) & The Braves of
1 SIKH* onboard to Srinagar (right)
(*Andrew Whitehead, in his book, Mission in Kashmir, however, claims, citing a description on the reverse of
the original photo, that the men in the photo belonged to Patiala Forces. Beyond the debate about
identification of the unit, it is noteworthy that while men from 1 SIKH had been rushing to save Kashmir,
more than 100 among the rank and file, had no clue whatsoever as to what fate had befallen their own family
members who had been stranded on the wrong side of a recently created line called International Boundary)

MOMENT OF GLORY: 28 OCTOBER 1947

 1-BARAMULLA-MAGAM
​ ieutenant Colonel DR Rai, having spent the night waiting for the
L
enemy, was contemplating to attack Baramulla, once more troops could arrive at
his location. The enemy, however, making a lazy start, contacted the defenders at
around 1000h. The combined forces put up a brave fight and forced the enemy to
halt in his tracks. The fight continued for about four hours while the RIAF fighter
jets flew over the area. With no clarity about the forward line of own troops, the
pilots played safe and strafed many buses and lorries in the vicinity of Baramulla
and between Baramulla and Uri. However, the enemy was far too superior in
numbers and he started to outflank the locality. By now, his tactics was well
known and as the defenders positively discerned the enemy’s attempts to outflank
them, a decision was taken to fall back by a few miles.
​ he CO, with a small recce party, moved out and selected a site at the
T
outskirts of Pattan. He rushed back and ordered the withdrawal. The troops,
skilfully broke the contact and started moving back in the buses that had brought
them there. As the last of the lot was about to move out, a stray bullet hit the
gallant officer in his head, killing him instantly. Lieutenant Colonel Rai had
decided to stay till the very last of his men had withdrawn and paid the price for
being a die-hard ground soldier1,2. Six more men had been killed by then.
Already under stress from a numerically superior enemy, the troops were
demoralised once news of their CO’s death spread through the rank and file of the
battalion. It is not clear as to who took the decision and who
1- ​A special mention was made about his gallantry in the parliament of the country and a homage was
paid to the officer. A grateful nation awarded him with the second highest gallantry award of the country,
MVC, posthumously.
2- ​As one of the officers present on the spot there, Captain Kamaljit Singh, was to narrate later, “The
withdrawal had started well. Moving back through one another, the platoons were soon across the road and
heading for the RV. Colonel Rai had been standing on the lower slope of the feature held by 7 Platoon. I had
begged him not to expose himself needlessly but the Colonel had shrugged off my plea. By now, groups of
invaders had begun to fire at us with automatic weapons. I had been following the Colonel, moving at a fast
pace through a paddy field. When we were about 500 yards beyond the road, Lieutenant Colonel Rai seemed
to stumble and fell. He had been shot through the head and must have died instantly.” (source: Lest We
Forget by Captain Amarinder Singh)

gave the orders but the whole lot of combined force fell back to Srinagar airfield
instead of staying back at Pattan. Fortunately, Major Sampuran Bachan Singh3,
the Second-in-Command of 1 Sikh, had arrived by then. He gathered his troops,
boarded the buses and led them back all the way to Pattan where defences were
taken up. Enemy, true to his reputation, instead of following the withdrawing
troops, had decided to plunder all the villages astride the main road and didn’t
make contact with defended locality on the night 28/29 October4.
3- ​He was an officer from a Territorial Army (TA) battalion and had recently been posted after moving
out of the British officers. During the hours between the death of the CO and the assumption of command by
Lieutenant Colonel Sampuran Bachan Singh, the senior-most company commander, Major Harwant Singh
had taken over during the retreat to Srinagar. The decision to fall back to the airfield was possibly taken by
Major Harwant Singh though nothing can be said with certainty at this juncture.
4- ​The choice made by Lieutenant Colonel DR Rai had merit and it proved so. By moving forward, he
had not only been able to gather the information first hand and delay the enemy by almost two days, he had
also, and more importantly, made sure that Srinagar was kept out of the reach of the invaders. One can
imagine a scenario wherein even if the whole battalion at the airfield were able to defend the aerodrome, the
invaders would still have run into the city. They had been too many for one battalion to pin down. Also,
having reached so close to the city, the morale factor would have heavily been in the favour of the invaders
with own troops fighting with backs to the wall. Even from a point of view of the residents, battle noises so
close to the city would have added to the panic that had already set in courtesy rumours and hearsay. In
doing what he did, Lieutenant Colonel Rai was able to achieve much more than the task given to him and
had made sure that force build up continued while he and his troops roughed it out at some unnamed places
East of that unfortunate town called Baramulla.

2-LAHORE
On 28 October 1947, Field Marshal Auchinleck, having been informed by
General Gracey about Jinnah’s order to send the Pakistan army into the Valley,
flew to Lahore where he warned Jinnah that since the accession of J&K to India
was absolutely legal, any misadventure by the Pakistan army would entail
withdrawal of all the British officers and troops from Pakistan army at once.
Jinnah was now left with no choice; he withdrew the order and quietly ate
humble pie1.
1- ​Even though the involvement of the British officers of the Pakistan army in the conspiracy to annex
state of J&K by force has been well-established, the fact remains that neutrality displayed by the Supreme
Commander, Field Marshal Auchinleck did help India salvage an almost hopeless situation in J&K. There
were six British officers commanding three forces of both the nations at that time. All of them had been
mandated to keep the Supreme Commander updated on the military matters. When the Field Marshal came
to know about the movement of initial advance of invaders from the Pakistan GHQ, he immediately passed
the information to the Indian Army HQ. Such a gesture did help the Indian establishment to handle the
situation deftly rather than getting shocked at the last minute. Field Marshal Auchinleck had a chequered
relationship with the newly appointed Government of India wherein he had once reported against the Indian
Cabinet, claiming, "I have no hesitation, whatever, in affirming that the present Indian Cabinet are
implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on
firm basis……..Since 15th August, the situation has steadily deteriorated and the Indian leaders, cabinet
ministers, civil officials and others have persistently tried to obstruct the work of partition of the armed
forces”. However, his stand against Jinnah’s decision to send in the Pakistan Army did ensure that an ugly
situation was prevented from developing.

3-DELHI
 ​ ll available transport aircraft kept on flying throughout the day.
A
Between 28 of them, they did 56 sorties1. One Dakota had to force-land at Jammu
because of some technical issue with the engine while another Dakota, having
been hit over Kotli (Mirpur), managed to fly back to Delhi.
​ he civil pilots had been flying non-stop and made sure that the RIAF
T
pilots and planners didn’t have to look back over their shoulders. The ground
crew had been doing its bit too, by keeping the airfield at Srinagar going despite
lack of navigational aids and other minimum necessities. The nation had risen to
the call of the hour!
​ ack at the Army HQ, it was now very clear that the threat to the Valley
B
had been much graver than what had initially been thought of. Ground inputs
from Lieutenant Colonel DR Rai had changed the visualisation at the level of the
highest decision making in the country. As a consequence, an order was issued to
HQ Delhi & East Punjab Command to execute Phase 2 of Operation JAK.
The second phase involved the despatch of one brigade HQ, one
battalion, one signal section and one platoon of Medium Machine Guns
1- ​Major (later Lieutenant General) SK Sinha fondly remembers the incident when an audit objection
was raised by an auditor about two years after the operations. The wise auditor had blamed Major Sinha for
the negligence that had amounted to the loss of many Lakhs of Rupees to the Nation since Major Sinha had
not obtained financial concurrence from a competent financial authority before exceeding the limits of
expenditure on air move! (Operation Rescue by Major General SK Sinha)

(MMGs) to Srinagar, by air and move of one infantry brigade group to Jammu by
road. The inductions were to start with effect from the next day, i.e., 29 October
and were to be completed by 30 October. Orders were passed to HQ 50 Para
Brigade2 Group (for Jammu) and HQ 161 Infantry Brigade3 Group (for Srinagar)
to prepare for the move immediately.
​ t the same time, urgent messages were flashed to all command HQ
A
across the country, asking about the details of troops that could be spared
instantly for operations in J&K.
2- ​In 1945, the Parachute Regiment of the British Indian Army was disbanded as part of cost cuttings
post WW II. However, the division and brigade level formations continued. At the time of partition, 2nd
Indian Airborne Division had three Parachute Brigades – 14, 50 and 77 Para Brigades. 14 Para Brigade
went to Pakistan while 77 Para Brigade was later re-organised as an infantry brigade (1952) but not before
seeing action in Kashmir and Ladakh during 1947-48. The word, ‘Independent’, was added to 50 Para
Brigade’s name in 1952.
3- ​Raised as 161 Indian Infantry Brigade in late November 1941 from the reformed British 161st
Infantry Brigade (originally Essex Brigade- 1888), it was renamed as 161 Infantry Brigade after
independence. The formation had been deployed for internal security duties in Indian Punjab when it was
ordered to move to Srinagar.
Field Marshal Sir Claude John Eyre Auchinleck, GCB, GCIE, CSI, DSO, OBE, Supreme Commander
of Indian and Pakistan Forces (left) & a picture of the portrait of Lieutenant Colonel DR Rai, MVC
(Posthumously), 1 SIKH (right) {The portrait hangs proudly in the Officers’ Mess of 4 MECH (1
SIKH)}
{Lieutenant Colonel DR Rai’s Picture courtesy 4 MECH (1SIKH)}

DEFYING THE ODDS: 29 OCTOBER 1947

1- PATTAN
​Major Sampuran Bachan Singh was promoted as Lieutenant Colonel
and he took over the command of 1 Sikh. The enemy tried to achieve surprise by
trying to outflank the defended locality at Pattan during the wee hours of 29
October. At the same time, a large force attacked the locality at Pattan. By then,
the total strength at Pattan included 1 Sikh less ‘D’ Company but with the
Composite Company, an MMG platoon of 3/15 Punjab1 and about 60 men of
State forces. The troops fought back but were outnumbered and as the enemy
started outflanking manoeuvre, the defenders fell back to Mile Stone 16 near
Pattan at 0630h.
The enemy didn’t break contact and launched another attack at the new
location at 0930h. The new assault was preceded by heavy bombardment by 3-
inch mortars. It was a difficult situation since the Indian troops had been caught
in the open. It was getting critical now. ‘D’ Company of 1 Sikh was relieved at
the airfield by a company of 1 (Para) Kumaon2 that had just landed at Srinagar
and was rushed forward to join the rest of the battalion. The situation was brought
under control with the reinforcements arriving and with the MMG gunners doing
a great job with their machines.
Not to relent, the enemy started building up inside and around Pattan
once again while many were seen moving to Magam to the South.
1- ​The Punjab Regiment in the British Indian Army had six regiments: the 1st Punjab Regiment, the
2nd Punjab Regiment, the 8th Punjab Regiment, the 14th Punjab Regiment, the 15th Punjab Regiment and
the 16th Punjab Regiment. At the time of independence in 1947, all except 2nd Punjab Regiment went over to
the newly raised Pakistan Army. In addition, Sikh and Hindu troops from other regiments were repatriated to
India as ‘Indian Elements’ before they were absorbed into regular units during the days to follow. The Indian
Elements of 3rd Battalion of 15th Punjab (converted to a Machine Gun battalion before independence) were
flown down to Srinagar to take part in the operations.
2- ​1 Kumaon, originally raised in March 1813, was converted to the airborne role in 1946 and re-
designated as 1 (Para) Kumaon. However, after the disbandment of 2nd Airborne Division, such battalions
had been carrying out parachute duties while still wearing the uniforms of their own parent regiments except
the headgear (maroons). Word, ‘Para’, was added to their titles for the ease of distinction. It remained a part
of the Kumaon Regiment until April 1952 when it was formally inducted into the Parachute Regiment as 3
PARA. In 2000, the battalion was converted to special forces and renamed as 3rd Battalion (Special Forces),
the Parachute Regiment, or 3 PARA (SF).

Situation as on 29 October Last Light

The RIAF came to the rescue when two Tempest fighter aircraft from Ambala hit
the skies over Pattan at around 1510h. Before invaders could react, a total of 815
rounds of 20mm canons had been pumped into the mobs below. With lorries
destroyed and many of them lying dead and wounded all around, tribesmen broke
into jitters and were reported as running helter-skelter all over the countryside.
To make matters worse for the hordes, two Spitfires3 arrived after an hour
and repeated the act, thereby, making sure that enemy’s will to
3- ​Spitfires and Tempests were being flown from bases outside the State since Srinagar airfield was
deemed to be unfit for landing of such high velocity machines. When the Spitfires came over Pattan, they
couldn’t find any smoke signal by the troops on ground and couldn’t engage targets. Two young pilots, Flight
Lieutenant (later Group Captain) Roshan Suri and Flying Officer (later Air Vice Marshal) J.J. Bouche,
surprising everybody, then landed at Srinagar for briefing by the officers at the airfield before taking off
again to strike at the invaders at around 1630h. The two pilots set a precedence of something that had been
thought as impossible because of lack of basic infrastructure at Srinagar airfield. Their initiative soon saw
two Spitfires permanently based at Srinagar for a quicker response and better coordination. There were
times when the fuel won’t be available and they had to go on missions after pumping out fuel from Dakotas
but they never let the ground troops down. It is funny though, that the Auditors raised an objection on fuel-
flying hour mismatch in respect of the RIAF’s machines at a later date.

attack was broken, at least for the time being. The troops on the ground were now
in high spirits. Fighting patrols were sent all around with the horse mounted
cavalry troops sweeping wide and deep. No infiltration was reported in the areas
around Pattan, i.e. Magam to the South and area till Jhelum in the East. In the
meanwhile, 1 (Para) Kumaon also started sweeping from Narbal towards
Tangmarg and Pattan. Lieutenant Colonel Pritam Singh, MC, sensing the need to
prevent bypassing and encirclement of 1 Sikh at Milestone 16, deployed a
company of his battalion, 1 (Para) Kumaon at Narbal, seven miles behind 1 Sikh.
Major UC Pant was the Company Commander.

2- SRINAGAR

​The tactical HQ of 161 Infantry Brigade Group landed and started

functioning from the airfield at Srinagar itself. The day also saw the balance of 1
Sikh troops (50 odd) landing and one company of a new battalion, 1 (Para)
Kumaon, starting to build up. The company of 1 (Para) Kumaon relieved ‘D’
Company of 1 Sikh as the latter married up with rest of the battalion at Pattan, as
narrated earlier.
​Brigadier JC Katoch1 took over the command of 161 Infantry Brigade.
Indian elements of 1/1 Punjab2 too were flown in on this day. By the end of the
day, a total of 950 men were on ground in the Valley. By now, one officer, one
Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer (VCO3) and more than 11 soldiers had been
killed. The situation was still delicate but 900 plus pairs
1- ​Later Major General. During the course of war, he got evacuated twice- once while in command of
161 Infantry Brigade (at Srinagar) and then while in command of 163 Infantry Brigade (Kupwara-Trehgam).
2- ​1/1 Punjab went to Pakistan leaving behind Sikh and Jat soldiers who were referred to as Indian
Elements and were later absorbed into Indian Army units.
3- ​The VCOs were also known as Indian officers or native officers (now called JCOs or Junior
Commissioned Officers). Though they were treated in almost all respects as commissioned officers, they had
authority only over Indian troops and were subordinate to all British King's (and Queen's) commissioned
officers and King's commissioned Indian officers. They were meant to act as a link between officers and
troops since a language barrier did exist between the native troops and officers of non-Indian origin in most
cases. They had the designations of Jemadar for all arms (now a Naib Subedar) and Risaldar (armoured
regiments)/ Subedar (other arms) (continued post-independence) and Risaldar Major/Subedar Major.

of boots on ground did mean a lot.

There were, however, many administrative issues that were becoming too
tough to overcome. With no electricity in the city after switching off of Mahura
power station, the flour mills were not running and suddenly, there was an acute
shortage of flour in the city. Fuel and lubricants were in short supply because of
ongoing economic blockade by Pakistan. The civil buses that had been
commandeered, too were running out of fuel. Batteries of such vehicles, in any
case, were all unreliable and in poor state due to a drop in ambient temperature.
​ aw and order situation in the city was under control with the NC
L
workers taking charge of the same.

3- DELHI

​ he staff at Army HQ and HQ Delhi & East Punjab Command had

T
been working overtime to find ways and resources to push in at least 180 days’
worth of supplies to Srinagar since winters had already arrived and weather-
related disruptions were expected soon. Confirmation of available troops were
also received on 29 October from HQ Eastern and Southern Commands. Rolling
stocks were now being placed and troops were issued warning/move orders based
on availability of transport/rolling stock.
I​ t was also decided to move two troops of armoured cars and one
battalion out of 50 Para Brigade Group to Srinagar first. 7 Cavalry1 was
nominated by HQ Delhi & East Punjab Command. Troops were to carry ten days’
worth of rations and fuel as also two first lines of ammunition.
1- ​Raised in 1784 as 2nd Regiment of Madras Native Cavalry, 7 Light Cavalry underwent five re-
designations before finally getting this name in 1922. The present name of the regiment is 7 CAVALRY or 7
CAV.
 4- GILGIT

Gilgit, in the meanwhile, was in turmoil because of the deceit and

treachery by the British. (Please see a footnote to an earlier chapter, ‘Historical
Background’. Since the area is out of Kashmir Valley, more details, barring some
brief references, are not being covered in this book).

5- ELSEWHERE
​Trains and road-based transport had started moving from various
locations, carrying units and troops to Pathankot and Delhi. In the meanwhile,
sappers had been working overtime to make sure that the Bailey Bridge over Ravi
River would get ready by 01 or 02 November instead of 07 November as planned
earlier.

The above photo was taken somewhere inside NWFP by KC Mehra, sometime before the beginning of
the conflict. The caption speaks for itself and brings forth the fact that control of armed crowds by
religious fanatics was very much prevalent during those times too!

ARRIVAL OF A HQ: 30 OCTOBER 1947

 ​ he main HQ of 161 Infantry Brigade Group reached Srinagar on 30
T
October and started to get functional. By that time, the picture was becoming a
little clearer courtesy the troops in contact, long patrols, aerial surveillance as
also the NC workers and refugees streaming into Srinagar. One of Pakistan’s
radio stations, claiming to be based out of Muzaffarabad and calling itself as
Radio Azad Kashmir, announced to the world that invaders had already entered
Srinagar and taken over the city!
​The initial assessment of the situation led to the following deductions: -
-A three-pronged advance by the enemy was expected. With the central
thrust along the main road Pattan-Srinagar, Western axis was expected to
be along Tangmarg/Magam-Badgam-Srinagar while the Eastern one was
expected to be along Ganderbal axis.
- While opening of the central axis was a compulsion for the ease of
logistics and to enable numerous lorries and buses that invaders had been
travelling along, the enemy was not expected to get bogged down due to
slow or no progress along the central axis during initial days.
-Local sympathisers, especially the cadres of MC were expected to help
the invaders while the NC cadres (200 of them had been armed by now)
could be used to counter the actions of the MC workers.
With more and more inputs flowing in, the enemy’s disposition and likely
commitment on various axes appeared to be as under: -
-About 500 invaders, the ones with the best weapons and possibly
including many regulars, were trying to push hard along the main road
(the central axis). Mortars, machine guns and light as well as heavier
transport was also reported as part of the column.
-About 1500 invaders had reportedly taken a long and circuitous route via
Sopore-Bandipore- Ganderbal to reach Srinagar via Eastern axis.
Apparently, instead of crossing Jhelum on boats and footbridges and
slogging on foot, they had opted for vehicle-based travel.
-About 300 invaders were trying to outflank Pattan from the West and hit
Pattan-Srinagar Road at Narbal.
​With whatever little was available, the Indian troops were well poised
to meet the above threat. 1 Sikh and other elements were holding Pattan and had
already beaten back a couple of assaults. 1 (Para) Kumaon had its company at
Narbal to intercept any move from West or South. There was no immediate worry
about the Eastern horde since the route was long and the RIAF was now effective.
Troops were being flown in and the threat from the Eastern thrust could be met in
time. However, by the evening on 30 October, the inputs had painted a different
threat scenario. About 200 lorries were seen headed towards Pattan, carrying in
the excess of 2,000 invaders. At 1900h, a small convoy of three vehicles, carrying
troops, was ambushed beyond Narbal wherein three soldiers of 1 (Para) Kumaon
were killed and two civilian drivers were wounded. The enemy had hit and run
and own patrols couldn’t trace the attackers. At 2000h, the defended locality at
Pattan was attacked by more than 1000 invaders. 3-inch mortars and
machineguns were used liberally by the attackers as they managed to reach within
55 metres of the forward most trenches. In the end, the assault was repulsed with
heavy casualties to the enemy.

​During the day, 236 men of 1 (Para) Kumaon and 80 of 1 Mahar1 and a
few others, totalling 394, had landed at Srinagar. Indian forces were building up
but the danger was still far from over. The invaders had started announcing the
names of the ‘officials’ who had been appointed to run the administration of
Srinagar City since the city had been ‘captured’ by the jihadi lashkars! Radio
stations in Pakistan and posters inside Kashmir were being used to push such a
propaganda.
1- ​One of the victims of flawed and ill-intended Martial Race theory of the British, the Mahar troops
came back after demobilisation when 1 Mahar was raised in 1941. The battalion converted to an MMG
battalion in 1946. Presently: 1 MAHAR.
The old Bridge over Jhelum at Baramulla (circa 1945)

A SNIPER’S BULLET: 31 OCTOBER 1947

​ he day passed off without any major enemy activity. Having got a
T
beating at Pattan for the third time, the enemy was still smarting from the loss of
face and morale when the RIAF struck on the morning of 31 October. The long
convoys both on the central axis and the Eastern route were strafed and many
lorries were destroyed with their occupants stuck inside. There were reports of
about 300 odd invaders moving from Magam, possibly to outflank the defenders
at Pattan but nothing concrete could be established.
​ rigadier JC Katoch had left for Pattan in the morning to visit 1 Sikh
B
and see the state of their defences for himself. During the inspection, a sniper
bullet hit him in the leg. He was brought back to Srinagar and evacuated. 161
Brigade was now without a commander.
​Brigadier Kalwant Singh1 and Wing Commander Mehr Singh2 visited
Srinagar during the day to take stock of the situation. ‘D’ Company of 4 Kumaon3
under Major Somnath Sharma (with his left hand in plaster), balance of 1(Para)
Kumaon4 and 3 Field Ambulance also landed at Srinagar during the day.
1- ​Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Kalwant Singh was originally from 1st Punjab. He had the
distinction of commanding the Western Command as an Army Commander over two terms, i.e., between 01
September 1953 and 24 March 1954 and again between 15 May 1955 and 14 May 1959. In 1957, when he
was the Army Commander and the second senior-most officer after Lieutenant General Sant Singh,
Lieutenant General KS Thimayya who was third in the seniority, was elevated to be the next Chief of the Army
Staff. While Lieutenant General Sant Singh resigned, Lieutenant General Kalwant Singh opted to continue
and retired later.
2- ​Popularly known as Baba Mehr Singh, Air Commodore Mehr Singh, DSO was the Air Officer
Commanding RIAF operating inside J&K during the conflict. He was the first pilot to land his Dakota at
Poonch and also at Leh and was awarded MVC for his gallantry. He, however, resigned soon after the
conflict and was later killed in a crash while flying a commercial aircraft, belonging to a royal family.
3- ​4 Kumaon shares its origin, i.e., Nizam and Hyderabad Army days of 18th Century, with its sibling
battalions in the regiment. Later, as part of 19 Hyderabad Regiment, 4/19 Hyderabad became 4 Kumaon
after independence.
4- ​Lieutenant Colonel Pritam Singh, MC had been promoted on the night of 30 October while he was in
Delhi, on a long leave after his daring escape from a Prisoners of War (POW) camp during WW II in Burma.
He was instructed to move straightway to Willingdon Airport at Safdarjung and take over 1 (Para) Kumaon
that was in the process

Along with 485 men in total, about 46,240 kg of supplies had also been
delivered by the RIAF and civilian pilots. A total of 36 Dakotas flew during the
day (3 of RIAF and 33 civilian ones). Dakota MA965, piloted by Flt Lt Clifford
Joseph Mendoza crashed near the Banihal Pass, killing a total of 25 personnel.
​ ased on the experience gained by Spitfire pilots and the inspection by
B
Wing Commander Mehr Singh, four Spitfires and two Harvards were now placed
at Srinagar. Tempests kept on flying from Ambala and kept the pressure on the
enemy throughout the day.
​ t the end of the last day of the month, the disposition of Indian forces
A
inside J&K State was as under: -
-​ Kashmir Valley ​-HQ 161 Brigade at Airfield.
​-Liaison Cell.
-Three Infantry Battalions, viz., 1 Sikh, 1(Para) Kumaon &
4 Kumaon.
-Elements of 1 Mahar, 1/1 Punjab and 3/15 Punjab.
-One battery of 13 Field Regiment.
-One Field Ambulance.
-Four Spitfires and two Harvards.
-Jammu ​- One Infantry Battalion (3 (Para) Rajput).
​-One Company of MMGs (1 Mahar).

Far away from Srinagar, Gilgit fell to traitors on 31 October. The

Emergency administration at Srinagar, took over on 31 October. Its operational
office was set-up in Palladium Talkies in Lal Chowk, while the formal offices
were in Old Secretariat.
 of getting inducted into the Valley. Later, he
and his battalion were to pull out a military miracle of sorts when they defended an isolated garrison at
Poonch for over a year.

History nailed to a tree at the royal residence, Gulab Bhawan (now Hotel Lalit Palace), Srinagar
Appreciated Enemy Options and Disposition of Indian Forces as on 31 October 1947
Invaders, focussed on plunder and women, would refuse to budge without their lorries. Such an
attitude did cost them the ultimate dream, i.e., of capturing Srinagar

THREAT BUILDS UP: 01 NOVEMBER 1947

The previous night had passed off more or less incident free, without any
major battlefield engagement. The enemy kept on sniping at Pattan but no
casualties were reported. Colonel Harbaksh Singh1 arrived in the morning and
took over as the Commander of 161 Infantry Brigade. 184 men of 1 Sikh landed
at Srinagar, thereby, bringing up the strength of the battalion. 1/2 Punjab2 also
landed during the day.
The first action of the day happened at 0830h when a patrol of 1 Sikh was
ambushed near Pattan. The Sikhs, having been taken by surprise, fought back and
the engagement carried on till 1230h when the enemy fled, leaving behind 12
dead and one live man. Five more had been wounded while 1 Sikh lost five as
killed while one was injured. It was a little setback but could have been a disaster
had good reaction by the troops not come to the rescue.
A patrol of 1 (Para) Kumaon too had a fleeting engagement between
Narbal and Pattan. They killed two invaders and captured one local alive. At
1300h, a massive attack came on to Pattan locality and the fighting continued for
two hours before the invaders were forced to withdraw. There was no casualty to
own troops.
By afternoon, however, around 2,000 invaders started surrounding the 1
Sikh locality. As the fight broke out, the CO called up Colonel Harbaksh Singh to
inform him about the threat, shortage of ammunition and the tactical scenario. 1
Sikh at that point had been cut off from Srinagar. He also requested for the
reinforcements. Colonel Harbaksh Singh ordered CO 1 (Para) Kumaon to tie two
artillery howitzers behind two jeeps and send the guns to Pattan where gunners
from 2 and 13 Field had already been deployed
1- ​Later Lieutenant General and Army Commander Western Command, the officer was awarded Padma
Vibhushan, Padma Bhushan and Vir Chakra during his long career. He was commissioned into 2nd battalion,
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and then moved to 4 SIKH. At the time of his posting to the Valley, he was
posted as GSO-1 at HQ Eastern Command and had volunteered to take over 1 SIKH after the death of
Lieutenant Colonel DR Rai. Captain Amarinder Singh, the Chief Minister of Punjab had served as his ADC
during the 1965 war.
2- ​1/2 Punjab, tracing its roots back to 1760s, was a part of the 44th Airborne Division till 1946 when
44th Airborne Division was disbanded. It was called 1st battalion, 2nd Punjab Regiment (Para). After the
raising of Para Regiment in 1952, it was re-designated as 1st battalion, Parachute Regiment (Punjab). Post
its conversion to special forces, it was renamed as 1st Battalion (Commando), the Parachute Regiment and
later 1 PARA (SF).
 Disposition: 01 November 1947
in the infantry role.
Probing patrols from 1 (Para) Kumaon were sent to Ganderbal and
Sumbal area but they didn’t come across any enemy or any news of enemy’s
presence in the area.
At the end of the day, troops were disposed as under: -
-HQ 161 Brigade and Liaison Cell at Airfield.
-1 Sikh less one company at Pattan along with ancillary troops; one
company at Airfield.
-1 (Para) Kumaon less a company at Airfield; one company at Narbal.
-1/2 Punjab at Shalateng.
-One company of 4 Kumaon at Airfield.
 ​ he Tac HQ of 50 Para Brigade Group also reached Jammu. 3 (Para)
T
Rajput, the only battalion of the brigade was deployed with one company each at
Jammu, Samba and Madhopur; the battalion HQ and one company were on the
way to Jammu from Gurdaspur. One company of 1 Mahar (MMG) was also at
Jammu.

This pamphlet was printed in 1948 as a tribute to Women Militia of the State

BOGEY ARRIVES: 02 NOVEMBER 1947

 ​Brigadier LP Sen1 arrived on 02 November and took over the command
of 161 Brigade. Colonel Harbaksh Singh became the Deputy Commander of the
formation2.
​ he new commander was welcomed by a quieter day. 1/2 Punjab that
T
had deployed at Shalateng the previous day, had sent one company to the East,
across Ganderbal where it had deployed in anticipation of the arrival of invaders
via the Eastern approach. Another company was deployed between Anchar Lake
and Baramulla-Srinagar road. Areas around Ganderbal and Sumbal were then
swept aggressively by fighting patrols of 1/2 Punjab and 1 Sikh but no enemy
activity was discovered.
I​ nputs of movement of a large horde to the West of Srinagar-Baramulla
road and trying to outflank the airfield were received through the NC sources. It
appeared that those invaders were headed towards Badgam that lay about 15km
Southwest of Srinagar and just 4.5 km from the airfield. Such a move appeared to
have merit since once at Badgam, the enemy could swing North and Northeast
and enter the city while pinning down the troops around the airfield. Alternatively,
the enemy might try to over-run the airfield as was being instructed from their HQ
in Pakistan. Own patrols, however, didn’t meet any enemy and fell back to the
bases.
The build-up at Srinagar continued with one more company of 4 Kumaon
landing at Srinagar. Supplies were also brought along to the tune of 68,000 kg.
Spitfires from Srinagar airfield as also Tempests from Ambala kept on
bombarding the invaders and their lorries throughout the day. The rough airstrip,
however, was now getting rougher with every landing and take-off. Huge clouds
of dust could be seen after landing and take-off.
1- ​Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Lionel Protip "Bogey" Sen, DSO was commissioned into 16/10
Baluch and then shifted to 8 GR during independence when Baluch Regiment went to Pakistan. He was
posted at Military Intelligence Directorate when he was promoted and given the acting rank of a Brigadier
and sent to the Valley. He was to earn Mentioned-inDespatches during the war. He commanded the Eastern
as well as Southern Commands before retiring in 1965.
2- ​161 Brigade had actually seen four commanders in a short span of three days. After the evacuation of
Brigadier Katoch, Lieutenant Colonel Pritam Singh, MC, CO of 1 (Para) Kumaon had taken over for a day
before the arrival of Colonel Harbaksh Singh. The arrival of Brigadier Sen finally put an end to the musical
chair like command scenario.

​ One company of 4 Kumaon under Major Somnath Sharma3 was being

used both for the local protection of the airfield and for unloading the aircraft. 1/2
Punjab, 1 (Para) Kumaon and 1 Sikh were now guarding likely enemy ingress
routes. However, barring some reserves at the airfield, there were no troops
deployed to the West to deny the enemy any opportunity to storm the airfield
and/or Srinagar city. Brigadier LP Sen had sent in request for more troops to cover
the approach.

Situation as on 02 November 1947

3- ​Major SK Sinha, the G-2 at HQ Delhi & East Punjab

Command had visited Srinagar for liaison and interaction on 01 November. In his memoirs, he mentions that
Major Somnath Sharma had been feeling a bit disgusted because of the fact that his plastered hand had been
the reason for his company to be deployed for local protection and unloading duties. He was, as per the
author, then waiting for the rest of the battalion to arrive so that he could be sent ahead to fight the enemy in
direct combat. His wish would be fulfilled within the next 48 hours and history would be written because of
his eulogic deeds (Operation Rescue by Major General SK Sinha).

Brigadier (Later Lieutenant General) LP Sen, DSO, Commander 161 Infantry Brigade

A STORY THAT CONTINUES TO INSPIRE

​ he inputs about enemy building up to the West and Southwest of the
T
airfield were now flowing in regularly and the intelligence had been corroborated
and confirmed. Brigadier Sen decided to despatch one company of 1 (Para)
Kumaon and two companies (‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies) of 4 Kumaon to reconnoitre
and engage the enemy, if encountered, in Badgam-Magam area on 03 Nov 1947.
Two officers, Major Somnath Sharma of 4 Kumaon and Captain Ronnie
Wood of 1 (Para) Kumaon were personally briefed by the Brigade Commander in
the morning, at the HQ of 161 Infantry Brigade. As per the plan, the company of 1
(Para) Kumaon was to pass through the companies of 4 Kumaon, contact 1/2
Punjab at Magam and return to the airfield.
Both the companies of 4 Kumaon left the airfield, followed a bit later by
the company of 1 (Para) Kumaon. ‘A’ company of 4 Kumaon took up a temporary
defence position towards Southeast of Badgam while t he other subunit, ‘D’
Company of 4 Kumaon, under Major Somnath Sharma, got deployed in a
temporary defensive locality just to the North of Badgam. The patrol of 1 (Para)
Kumaon, having passed through 4 Kumaon held area, did not come across any
enemy till 1300 hours and moved on to Magam.
The Brigade HQ then ordered Major Somnath Sharma to start thinning
out. ‘A’ Company now started withdrawing to the airfield at 1300h after no
activity was reported around Badgam.
‘A’ and ‘D’ Company had swept the area, including Badgam village after
their arrival at the location by sending strong patrols around. With no unusual
activity to report1, ‘D’ company was now awaiting further orders. A few men had
been seen in a nala that lay some distance from the company
1- ​It was discovered later that an ex-officer of the British Army, Major Khursheed, the Commander of
the armed wing of Muslim League, had arrived in the area with some 100 odd invaders the previous evening.
He had ordered that till the point a strength of about 1,000 men was built up, invaders would lie low and
away from Badgam but within the striking distance of the airfield. When ‘D’ Company of 4 Kumaon had got
up to leave the locality, it was seen as a possible advance towards the area where the invaders had moved in
by that time. Though the Major was still short by about 300 men, he was forced to act and he ordered his men
inside Badgam to open fire to distract the Indian troops. As Kumaonis were getting deployed facing the
village, a three-pronged attack was launched by 700 odd men. Khursheed was wounded during the battle and
but since no arms were seen on them, they had been perceived as civilians out for
work or such similar chore. In fact, many civilians had been working in their
fields with no signs of any trouble. Soon, the orders were received for the
company to withdraw to the airfield but then the company was reordered to stay
on for another half an hour.
At 1430h, the company was once again ordered to move back. It was in
the process of reeling back when it drew fire from a few houses inside Badgam
village2. Conscious of the likelihood of collateral damage, Major Somnath Sharma
ordered his men to hold fire and take position facing the town3. The civilians in
the nala suddenly started rushing up while taking out their weapons that had been
hidden under their loose cloaks. Major Somnath informed the Brigade HQ about
the developments. Suddenly, the company was surrounded from three sides and
came under attack by a large horde of approximately 700 men. Heavily
outnumbered, 1:7, the company put up a brave fight. The enemy, having reached
so close to the airfield – their obvious target- was not willing to give in either and
used 2-inch and 3-inch mortars liberally to bombard the Kumaonis caught in the
open.
Major Somnath Sharma requested for the reinforcements when the
enemy’s strength became evident and as the first platoon started to be overrun.
Sepoy Dewan Singh, who was in charge of a light machine gun, seeing the enemy
encircling his platoon, stood up and blazed away with his machine gun at the
enemy personnel rushing in towards the platoon. Several invaders fell. His
boldness stopped the enemy long enough for his platoon to withdraw. Dewan
Singh was hit in the shoulder but continued to hold his position to cover the
withdrawal of his platoon till he fell to a burst of
returned to Pakistan a few days later.
2- ​As per an account, it was a mortar bomb that had landed suddenly, to start with, as if from nowhere,
as the company had got up to move out. The firing had then started immediately after the first bomb (Valour
Triumphs: A History of the Kumaon Regiment by KC Praval).
3- ​The firing from inside the village was a ruse to distract him and allow the 700 odd invaders to get
behind the company. Not aware of such a development at that moment, Major Somnath had decided to avoid
collateral damage. The significance of such an action can be understood if a hypothetical situation is played
out. If, for example, instead of holding the fire, had he ordered his company to retaliate and then flush the
invaders out (there were not many inside the village at that time), the company or part of it would have
entered the village that would have provided them with some defensibility of sorts. In that case, they could
have fought longer! But unadulterated soldiering doesn’t follow such a thought process since it would have
involved endangering the lives and properties of the civilians.
 Battle of Badgam (Nothing else stood between Airfield and the Invaders)

machine-gun fire. For his outstanding gallantry he was posthumously awarded

with an MVC.
A company of 1 (Para) Kumaon was rushed by the brigade along with a
vehicle carrying ammunition for the troops in contact. The strikeaircraft took off
immediately and struck the enemy seven times over a short spell of time. Air
strikes helped the company, now down to one-third of its strength, hold on a
while. Major Somnath Sharma, despite one hand in the plaster, led his men
bravely, shuttling from section to section, carrying ammunition boxes and
reshuffling weapons with utter disregard to his own safety. With two platoons
written off, the last message radioed by Major Somnath Sharma to the HQ of 161
Brigade was, “The enemy are only 50 yards from us. We are heavily
outnumbered. We are under devastating fire. I shall not withdraw an inch
but will fight to the last man and the last round.”
​ ajor Somnath Sharma finally fell as a mortar bomb caught him before
M
the arrival of the reinforcements. With one hand in the plaster, he had been filling
ammunition into LMG magazines to ensure continuity of fire when the moment of
glory finally came. 1 (Para) Kumaon found it hard to join the battle since most of
the men of 4 Kumaon were either dead or injured and the company had been
overrun. Some enemy emerged from inside Badgam, attacked the tail of the relief
company and looted the ammunition vehicle. However, soon, the Indian troops
broke through the enemy lines to the North of the village and the enemy fled
leaving more than 200 dead4.
It had been a bitter battle that came down to hand-to-hand fighting while
strafing was happening from the sky. Out of approximately 90 Kumaonies who
faced 700 odd invaders, 20 braves, including Major Somnath Sharma and Subedar
Prem Singh Mehta lost their lives while 26 were injured5; half of the subunit had
been written off. Major Somnath was awarded the nation’s highest gallantry
award, PVC, posthumously and he became the first recipient of the prestigious
award. Through their grit and determination, they had been able to save the
airfield. The enemy also started withdrawing from Badgam area, apparently,
frustrated by the sequence of events wherein a handful of soldiers had given them
a taste of a bitter defeat.
While the action was happening in the vicinity of the airfield, Dakotas
were landing as per the schedule. One Mountain battery, balance of 4 Kumaon,
one signal detachment and supplies were brought in successfully. Ammunition for
3.7-inch howitzers of Patiala Battery also arrived and gunners from 13 Field
Regiment, fighting as the composite battery of 1 Sikh, were ordered to switch
back to their original role of providing fire support to the troops in contact.
Pakistan, in line with the innocence that he had been feigning, sent a
signal to Delhi, informing the Army HQ that a coup had taken place at Gilgit on
31 October and the State’s machinery had been overthrown there. The signal
further went on to state that the region had passed under the
4- ​Badgam was re-occupied by the enemy later that night after the withdrawal of Indian troops from the
area.
5- ​Few writers have claimed that Major Somnath Sharma’s body was recovered three days later in a
disfigured state beyond recognition and his body had been identified by means of the leather holster of his
pistol and a few pages of the Bhagavad Gita in his chest pocket. However, as per Colonel Harbaksh Singh,
his body was retrieved the same day and sent to Delhi the next day (book, In the Line of Duty). He was 25 at
the time of his gallant sacrifice.

control of Azad Kashmir Government! The RIAF paid the compliment for such a
favour by visiting Kohala Bridge over Jhelum that evening.
His last communication continues to inspire generations of soldiers- Major Somnath Sharma, PVC (P)
 Major General (later Lieutenant General) Kalwant Singh, GOC, JAK Division, retired after
commanding a Field Army (left); Sardar Baldev Singh, a prominent Sikh leader who opposed the
partition first but seeing the inevitable, sought assurance of the British Government about the safety
and security of Sikhs likely to get stranded in Pakistan and their move to India. Placed alongside his
picture is a part of his letter, addressed to Lord Mountbatten on the issue (right)

TOP BRASS APPRAISAL: 04 NOVEMBER 1947

​ adgam was now under the enemy’s control and the bloody battle of the
B
previous day had left no doubt in the minds of the defenders about the intent of
the enemy. It had been a close call and the danger was still lurking nearby. The
action also called into attention the top leadership of the country. The Deputy PM,
Sardar VB Patel and the Defence Minister, Sardar Baldev Singh landed at
Srinagar on 04 November to see the things for themselves and take stock of the
situation in consultation with the commander on ground.
​ rigadier LP Sen briefed both the senior leaders about the situation and
B
the shortage of troops in particular and other resources in general. At the end of
the meeting, Sardar Patel gave clear instructions that Srinagar had to be saved at
all costs1. While such an order didn’t change anything about the defence of the
airfield, that being an imperative for any action in the Valley, the instruction did
imply that the security of the city was more important than going after the
invaders at that moment. While saving the city would have implied routing the
invaders too, but then that would have been the case if there were adequate troops
and resources. Given the constraints on ground, it was a decision that Brigadier
LP Sen had to take.
1- ​Brigadier LP Sen remembered that briefing vividly. “On arrival, I led them to the Operations Room
and briefed them on the situation. I explained what had happened at Badgam and stressed that it was only
sheer good fortune that had seen us through this crisis. I then emphasised that Srinagar must now be viewed
as being very definitely threatened. Sardar Baldev Singh was wide awake and had taken in all that I had said.
Sardar Patel had, however, closed his eyes; I assumed that he was feeling the effects of the flight journey and
had fallen asleep. The briefing completed, I therefore looked at Sardar Baldev Singh and asked him a direct
question: “Am I expected to eject the tribesmen from the Valley regardless of the fate that may befall
Srinagar, or is the town to be saved?”
Sardar Patel stirred. The Tiger had not been asleep, and had heard every word of the briefing. A
strong and determined man, and one of few words, “Of course Srinagar must be saved,” he snapped. “Then I
must have more troops and very quickly,” I answered, adding: “And if it is possible, I would like some
artillery.”
Sardar Patel rose. “I’m returning to Delhi immediately,” he said, “and you will get what you want as
quickly as I can get them to you.” On reaching the vehicle park, I called forward my jeep and asked him
whether I would drive him to the airfield. “No, Brigadier,” he replied, “don’t bother to come to the airport to
see me off. You have got more important things to do than wasting your time doing that.” He then climbed
into his own vehicle and with a wave of his hand, was off” (Slender Was the Thread).

Once back in Delhi, Sardar did what he was best at doing – put across his point
with conviction. That evening orders were issued for the despatch of two
battalions of Infantry, one squadron of armoured cars and a battery of field
artillery to the Valley, by road. The Sappers had already launched the bridge over
Ravi at Madhopur/Lakhanpur and had bridged the numerous culverts on the road
from Pathankot to Jammu by now. It had been a herculean task, requiring utmost
skills and raw dedication and the RIE personnel had risen to the occasion. The
Valley could now receive large bodies of troops by surface transport. This was a
heartening news, as the airstrip was beginning to look like a ploughed field by
now and needed urgent maintenance and repairs. Sardar Patel had lived up to his
reputation as a man of action.
​ he same evening, Army HQ asked HQ Delhi & West Punjab
T
Command to carry out a detailed military appreciation of the task in the Valley,
keeping in mind the logistics and likely interruptions during the winters. A protest
from Pakistan had been received regarding aerial bombing of Kohala Bridge that
lay across the IB the previous evening. India replied that no such bombing had
been ordered and investigations were now being launched to find the facts!
However, that day onwards, RIAF was forbidden to fly within five km of IB
without prior and express permission from the Air HQ2.
While decisions were being taken at Delhi, Brigadier Sen, too, made up
his mind after considering all the issues and the term of reference about the safety
of Srinagar. By now, the inputs (more from the workers of the NC and the IAF
reconnaissance than anything else) were coming in- painting a dim picture.
Invaders were now fanning out in the countryside and were getting into villages
and hamlets in small groups. Atrocities were continuing too.
​ ackling such a spread-out force was a massive task. Troops could not
T
be lifted from their locations for an effective clearance of such a vast belt
2- ​ any critics, with merit in the argument, have criticised such a defensive approach by the decision
M
makers at the highest level. Pakistan had not only violated the IB but had planned and executed an attack
across the IB and India had been exercising restraint. One reason given for such an approach was the
technical fact that two countries were not officially at war with each other yet! Pakistan had been smartly
washing his hands off the whole issue and India, to an extent, was buying that argument by making such
choices. However, the order had a way around it and sorties into such areas were carried out during the
months to come, after due sanctions.

since such an action would endanger the defended localities. The flat Valley floor
offered no obstacle to the invaders and groups could sneak in from any direction.
At the same time, chances of some groups sneaking into the city itself could not
be ruled out. In simple terms, countering a spread-out enemy by spreading own
troops was not the answer! Had there been more troops, the situation could have
been tackled differently. After all, killing the dispersed enemy piecemeal was not a
bad option if the resources could support such a modus-operandi.
​ decorated veteran of the WW II, Brigadier Sen decided to change the
A
goal post. He decided that the only way to move ahead would be by ensuring that
enemy got concentrated once again and presented a big target both to the ground
and the air forces. To do that, he decided to offer Srinagar to the enemy as a bait3!
He appreciated that the invaders had no love lost for the Valley or their
co-religionists there. All they had been trying to do was to rape and to loot. That
was evident by the manner in which they had been burning village after village
while advancing and were getting involved in looting and pillaging. Such traits of
the invaders had led Brigadier Sen to conclude that if the invaders were allowed a
free run right from Baramulla to a point closer to Srinagar than Pattan, they would
come with their lorries from Baramulla as they would be in a hurry to reach
Srinagar. To do that, they would congregate back at Baramulla first and then drive
down to Srinagar, leaving the countryside at peace for a while. In a hurry to reach
Srinagar, the invaders were expected to attack the defences blocking the route to
Srinagar. If a strong defensive layout could be arranged at the outskirts of
Srinagar, the resistance to the invaders would lead to a road jam like situation and
that would provide an opportunity to make a kill.
In order to create the trap, he decided to pull 1 Sikh back from Pattan and
offer a chance to the enemy who, encouraged by such a ‘retreat’ might like to rush
to Baramulla and come back with his lorries and buses so as to carry the plunder
back. Srinagar, after all, was a prosperous town and had many material goodies to
offer.
Another implication of such a deployment would be a close, coordinated
defensive ring around the airfield as well as over the arteries leading into the city.
A distinct possibility of 1 Sikh getting isolated or simply
3- ​Colonel Harbaksh, however, records in his book, In the Line of Duty, that it was he who had not only
taken the decision but had passed the message to 1 Sikh by airdropping the order to avoid radio intercept by
the enemy.
bypassed at Pattan would also be avoided by ordering such a move. He, therefore,
ordered the withdrawal of 1 Sikh from the strong locality of Pattan to a location
close to Shalateng. Such a decision was contested by CO, 1 Sikh, Lieutenant
Colonel Sampuran Bachan Singh but the Brigade Commander didn’t budge4.
Air activity was increased during the late hours with the IAF jets
engaging targets all around Pattan. As the night fell, 1 Sikh and allied troops at
Pattan began to withdraw to the new location. The enemy was either clueless or
had been hit so badly a few hours prior to the withdrawal that he didn’t interfere
with the move5. The battalion took up defences by the first light. One
good news to cheer was the fact that a squadron of 7 Cavalry under Major Inder
Rikhye, had started by road from Jammu. Another positive development was the
fact while many inputs about a possible attack on the airfield or other localities
kept on pouring in, no such attack actually materialised.
4- ​Books written by soldiers who were there on ground during 1947-48, clearly throw up inter-personal
relationships between such writers. Brigadier Harbaksh Singh and Brigadier LP Sen too had a frosty
relationship and their respective books/comments highlight the bitterness that they had because of whatever
reasons. An attempt has been made to rely on the official history while including important bits from such
authors to add value to the work.

5- ​1 Sikh had heavy stores and ammunition to be ferried

back. With no transport available, Sikhs got hold of horse carts (tongas) but sans the horses, loaded them
with ammunition and heavier stuff and then pulled and pushed all those carts, on the doubles, all the way to
Srinagar. They were met by Colonel Harbaksh Singh near Shalateng and were guided to the localities that the
latter had selected for them to redeploy.
 Pandit Nehru crossing Ramban Bridge on foot in May
1948, on his way to Srinagar (left); the motorable track, Banihal Cart (BC) Road, descending from
Banihal Pass (right). It was a fair-weather road with a narrow and weak bridge at Ramban (more
about it in a later chapter)

THE TRAP: 05 NOVEMBER 1947

​ rigadier LP Sen had taken the decision to pull back 1 Sikh without
B
consulting anyone. Major General Kalwant Singh who had been nominated as the
GOC, JAK Division, came to know about the move at Jammu only when the
pulling back had already started. HQ 161 Brigade had sent in a signal to adhoc
HQ of JAK Division informing about the withdrawal. Major General Kalwant
Singh arrived at Srinagar on 05 November to discuss the matter with Brigadier
Sen and possibly to express his reservations to the Brigade Commander. That was
also the day when HQ JAK Division was to start functioning at Srinagar.
​As per the account by Brigadier Sen, the GOC1 was pretty upset and
wanted to know why he had not been consulted before ordering such a move that
actually meant allowing enemy to close in while giving up a well defended
locality. There were some reservations that had been expressed by the civilian set-
up headed by Sheikh Abdullah2 (who had been appointed as the Administrator/Co-
PM of the State) about the move that had put many villages into the hands of the
enemy.
On arrival, the GOC was briefed by Brigadier Sen but he was not in
agreement with the rationale being put forth. The GOC plainly told Brigadier Sen
that he entirely disagreed with the latter and didn’t really expect that the invaders
would ever move towards Baramulla. However, since the order had already been
executed and nothing much could be done at that stage, the GOC went on to meet
Sheikh Abdullah to calm the latter’s nerves.
 In the morning itself, about 400 men of 6 Rajputana Rifles3 (6 Raj Rif)
landed at Srinagar. 7 Cavalry was also on its way to Srinagar. However,
1- ​“…… and that my opinion was not a calculated risk but sheer suicide. He made it very clear that as
JAK Division Headquarters had not been approached before the order was issued, I must accept full
responsibility for what I had done. Further, he insisted that I give it to him in writing, and in triplicate, that I
had withdrawn 1 Sikh without his approval and without consulting JAK Division Headquarters. This I did,
and having placed the three copies in his pocket he stormed out of Headquarters and drove to Srinagar to
make a courtesy call to Sheikh Abdullah.” (Brigadier Sen in Slender was The Thread)
2- ​As per Brigadier Sen, because of the insistence by Sheikh Abdullah who had been very upset because
of many villages falling into the enemy’s hands and because of letting the enemy to move towards Srinagar,
Pandit Nehru had agreed to change Brigadier LP Sen and send in a new commander. However, Sardar Patel
had come to his rescue and made sure that Brigadier Sen was not sacked. (ibid)
the development of the day was the input that the invaders were rushing back to
Baramulla. The tactics employed by the Brigade Commander seemed to be
working. A patrol from 1 Sikh was sent ahead and it clashed with the invaders at
Gund, about three km Northeast of Pattan. The clash resulted in 18 invaders
getting killed while the Sikhs drove back in three of the lorries they had captured.
A medium-sized village, Khag, reportedly under control of invaders, some 16 km
West of Badgam, was strafed by Tempests and Spitfires. There were casualties
though the exact figures were never known.
One Harvard, based at Srinagar, was sent down South to spot 7 Cavalry
squadron since there was no way of communicating and checking the progress of
the squadron. The armoured cars were spotted on the other side of the Banihal
Pass. It was later learnt that the squadron of Daimler armoured cars had got stuck
at the suspension bridge at Ramban. The bridge was not strong enough to take the
load while an aggressive Chenab River flowed underneath. The cavalrymen
unloaded whatever could be unloaded and then dismantled the armaments and
other removable attachments before attempting to cross the bridge. They did
succeed finally but by then, as per the reports, each and every nut and bolt of the
bridge had taken a beating and many had actually developed cracks.
At the end of the day, disposition of the forces was as under: -
- Airfield -​ HQ 161 Brigade Group
​- Liaison Cell
-1 (Para) Kumaon
-6 Raj Rif
-Company 1 Mahar
- Squadron 7 Cavalry
-32 Field Battery
-06 Fighter Jets
- 1 Sikh ​ -​ Battalion less two companies at Rambagh
-One Company each at Parimpur and Malshaibagh
-4 Kumaon ​- Area Takia Arif Shah
-1/2Punjab ​-Battalion less one company at Humhom
​-One company at Shekhpur

3- ​Tracing its roots to the first raising in 1775, Rajputana Rifles came into being as a regiment in 1921
during re-organisation of the British Indian Army. 6 Rajputana Rifles (6 RAJ RIF) is the only PVC battalion
of the regiment.

Deployment Post Withdrawal from Pattan

The deployment now looked compact and ready to take on the enemy
trying to enter the city or the Airfield. With the presence of two battalions at the
Airfield, the brigade finally had much needed reserves of at least a battalion size.
There had been a bit of a misunderstanding between Brigadier Sen and
Sheikh Abdullah and his closest man, Bakshi Ghulam Mohd on 04 November.
The duo had come to the HQ while Brigadier Sen was seeing off Sardar Patel. On
his return, Brigadier Sen had seen two civilians inside the operations room,
peering over the map on the wall. Without a second thought, he threw them out.
Later on, the liaison officer disclosed the identity of the two men and also told him
that he was the one who had brought them into the operations room. On 05
November, Brigadier Sen went to the city to meet the two leaders and to clear the
misunderstanding. With that done, a major irritant had been taken care of4.
4- ​Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohd were to have another similar experience with Brigadier
Pritam Singh, MC at Poonch a few months later. There, because of the protests by the locals, they had to be
extricated from a public meeting and had to be hurriedly put into an aircraft for their safety. Sheikh Abdullah
never forgot that experience and took it as a personal insult affront.

HIGHER HQ: 06 NOVEMBER 1947

Two NC workers were shot dead by 1 Sikh when they had started running
when challenged by the sentry during the previous night. Abdullah was pretty
agitated and sought to meet Brigadier LP Sen. During the short meeting, he saw
the logic when the situation was explained by Brigadier LP Sen and further
elaborated by Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. However, the battalion was shifted as a
result and a part of Srinagar stood exposed from the Southeast. Such issues would
serve as a side dish during the months to follow.
​ he day started with an action happening in Parimpur area where a
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company of 1 Sikh had been deployed. There was a bridge being manned by a
section of the company and the same was attacked at around 0130h. With the
reinforcements rushing from a platoon not in contact, the enemy was held back
but the fighting continued. At 0630h, a troop of 7 Cavalry was sent to Parimpur to
assist the defenders as one company of 1 Sikh also rushed forward from
Rambagh. 1 (Para) Kumaon then followed up and the attack was finally foiled
after a heavy fighting that lasted for over seven hours.
​ ith the attack foiled, it became clear that defences were now almost
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impregnable with sufficient reserves, fire support and armoured cover. On the
other hand, the enemy’s jubilations post withdrawal of 1 Sikh, was short-lived.
They were just about eight-odd km from the heart of the city and yet so far. Even
if the inputs of about 5,000 invaders in the vicinity of the city alone were to be
believed, with 3500 soldiers defending the city and the airfield, Srinagar was now
safe!
​ ith the city secured to a large extent, it was time to forge the civil
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military coordination. Workers of the NC had done a great job in maintaining the
peace and harmony in the city. While the MC had been guiding and helping the
invaders, the NC workers had been acting as eyes and ears in the countryside.
About 200 of them had been armed, as mentioned before. While they were
allowed to keep their weapons, they were not to fight alongside troops since such
a requirement was not felt at that stage. In fact, there had been no such battlefield
co-operation- beyond guidance and intelligence- till date but now any such
possibility had also been nipped in the bud. The NC members were to keep doing
what they had been doing under the direct control of the Administrator, Sheikh
Mohd Abdullah.
​ t the same time, as per the instructions from the Army HQ, Home
A
Guards and militia (NC’s armed wing) was to be trained and if there was a need to
supress any communal riot, army would pitch in to support such civilian agencies.
Lady volunteers were trained by the NC and other organisations too.
​ ajor General Kalwant Singh was now settled at Srinagar and his HQ
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had started functioning. However, a mountain of problems awaited him there.
There was only one signal section with the brigade HQ and the load on the small
signal centre was enormous. With a Division HQ now coming in, the centre had to
handle in/out messages of two HQ and five battalions. The second issue was about
messing. Officially, J&K State had not been declared an operational area and no
field messes had started yet. There was also a general shortage of bivouac and
capes with the units and given the nature of operations during the winters that had
already set in, difficulties were expected.
​ here was an acute shortage of men, including JCOs and clerks were
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badly needed to man the office desks. Basic office equipment, like typewriters,
lockers, furniture etc were not available. Availability of petrol was another issue.
Vehicles had been taken on loan from the State but there was no fuel to run those
vehicles. Drivers were in short supply and so were postal services-that were
actually non-existent. Even the maps had been taken from Hotel Nedou’s and
Srinagar Club since Army HQ had no maps of J&K State1.
A bit of rehashing in deployment also took place by the end of the day
after the fight got over at Parimpur. Shalateng area was now strengthened since
the enemy appeared to be focussing all his might in that area. Shalateng sat at a
junction where the enemy, in case of a successful battlefield engagement, had
options to press into the city or threaten the airfield from the Northeast in
conjunction with the invaders already present in and around Badgam. Two
companies of 1 Sikh, one company of 4 Kumaon, a troop of artillery and one
troop of 7 Cavalry were now awaiting
1- ​British Indian Army did have all the maps. Given the fixation of British with Gilgit and Russians,
maps of territories much beyond the subcontinent had been available. However, Brigadier Sher Khan, the
first head of intelligence of Pakistan Army, was the man in-charge of all intelligence files and such assets in
the British Indian Army prior to the independence. With his mind made up to move to Pakistan, he gradually
moved all such files to Pakistan, leaving behind routine files having no intelligence value. Indian Army was
left to operate in dark while the invaders and their military leaders had the updated maps and terrain data.
CO, 1 SIKH had been handed over two maps for the complete battalion before taking off from Delhi on 27
October.
the enemy in Shalateng itself. By evening, the enemy had started congregating in
front of the locality and stand-off firing had started and the same continued
throughout the night.
​ ll other units and subunits were holding localities to maintain the
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tactical balance.

Indian Artillery and Armoured Cars rolling down Srinagar-Baramulla-Uri Road

A Pathan captured alive by Indian Troops at Baramulla (source: AP)

 GONE WITH THE WIND: 07 NOVEMBER 1947
​ he instructions from Delhi were crisp and unambiguous- the Valley
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had to be held at all costs! The Government of India also wanted invaders out of
the Valley at the earliest. Post a meeting of the Defence Committee, verbal
instructions were issued to the GOC, JAK Division to recapture Baramulla by 15
November. Authorities were willing to take 500 casualties if that became
inevitable.
​ he message to Brigadier LP Sen, therefore, was very clear. He started
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making a plan and keeping in mind the likely dates of arrival of all the troops and
other necessities, he set his eyes on 10 November when a decisive battle would
have to be fought around Srinagar before chasing the invaders back to Baramulla
and beyond. It was contemplated that the enemy would not be able to contact the
defences before 08 November. If that happened, the two new infantry battalions
that were likely to join them by 07 November, would be moved on the night of
08/09 November, duly guided by men from 1/2 Punjab and 1 Sikh, in an
encircling movement via Magam, with the aim to launch an attack at Pattan on 10
November. And as soon as the enemy was sandwiched between Pattan and
Srinagar, he would be subjected to attacks both from the front and rear. Thereafter,
troops from Srinagar would advance towards Pattan and chase the enemy to
Baramulla and beyond.
As part of the contingency planning, it was decided that in case the enemy
attacked before the reinforcements were ready to carry out an encircling
movement, one of the newly arrived battalions would be deployed in depth, in the
rifle range area, and the other battalion would be kept in reserve centrally.
However, not much was yet known about the enemy activities along the
Eastern axis. So as to probe and test the strength of the enemy along that axis, a
strong patrol consisting of two armoured cars and one rifle troop of 7 Cavalry was
sent to Bandipura to the North of Wular Lake on 07 November.
By the morning of 07 November, thousands of invaders had concentrated
in front of 1 Sikh locality at Shalateng and joined the ranks with their own. Unlike
previous occasions, however, no physical assault was yet launched and stand-off
firing that had started the previous night, continued for a while. It was though a
given that the attack would be launched anytime soon. An aerial reconnaissance
by a Harvard aircraft also confirmed invaders in thousands along with hundreds of
lorries and buses parked behind them, congregating around Shalateng.
 Battle of Shalateng

Colonel Harbaksh Singh, the Deputy Commander of 161 Infantry

Brigade, moved to Shalateng and positioned himself along with Lieutenant
Colonel Pritam Singh, CO, 1 (Para) Kumaon. He took charge of the situation just
when an attack was being built up by the enemy. Colonel Harbaksh Singh had the
benefit of knowledge of the terrain in and around Srinagar because of his long
indulgence with trekking in the area a few years back. Now visualising the overall
scenario that was in the offing, he ordered1 the 7 Cavalry patrol to turn West from
a point ahead of Ganderbal and head for Sumbal. Thereafter, the patrol was to get
behind the horde at Shalateng from the North/Northwest, somewhere near
Zainkut. That was a great intuitive decision taken by Colonel Harbaksh and the
decision was soon going to be proved vital, in the overall scheme of things.
He also instructed the company of 1 (Para) Kumaon that had been moved
to Shalateng and had been deployed behind 1 Sikh, to pull out and stealthily
deploy to the West of the main road with an aim to hit the right flank of the horde.
 Lieutenant Noel David was the patrol leader and he had received the
message when his patrol was in the vicinity of Ganderbal. He swung left and
drove through the river bed of Sind River before crossing a narrow, weak wooden
bridge over the river at Krahom2. Having crossed Jhelum at Sumbal, the patrol
turned left once again and started closing on to Shalateng by following the
alignment of Jhelum River and staying away from the road Srinagar-Pattan
Baramulla till the very end. By noon, both the patrol and the company of 1 (Para)
Kumaon were in respective areas, ready to be launched.
The enemy, however, took the initiative and under a heavy covering fire
of 3-inch mortars, waves of men started to walk over the raised banks of a spill
channel in order to rush towards the perimeter of the locality. A couple of LMGs,
sited intelligently in good defiladed positions, cut the first two waves easily. Faced
with such an effective machinegun fire, the invaders began to panic and run
backwards. At that juncture, Colonel Harbaksh Singh gave a go-ahead and both
the forces converged on to the enemy with a violent intent. Suddenly, the horde
found itself surrounded from three sides. It was later learnt that on seeing the
armoured cars coming from their rear, the invaders had initially broken into
jubilation, taking those cars as belonging to the Pakistan army3. It was only when
the firing commenced that they realised the real identity of the men in metal
monsters. By that time, it was too late and the invaders started running towards
the rear in utter panic. Many of them tried to hide behind huge maize heaps that
had been stacked by the locals after harvesting the crop a few days ago.
1- ​Who took the decision and who advised the commander can be a subject of debates at a later date, as
personal accounts of few officers tend to indicate. At the end of the day, it was a command decision and no
one but the Brigade Commander would have been held responsible if the plan were to go awry. The
Commander, therefore, also deserves the credit for goods, if any. However, it is likely that the Deputy
Commander’s claims that he was the one who actually conducted the battle around Shalateng may actually be
true.
2- ​The Cavalrymen were to later confide that the bridge at Krahom was very narrow and rickety.
Having removed the side rails of the bridge, cars had been driven across with parts of wheels outside the
bridge on both sides. As they would say, that was one hell of a crossing where an inch or more of error would
have meant losing a fully loaded armoured car.

Soon, the RIAF jets joined the battle and started hitting the enemy. A few
incendiary bombs were also dropped that set the dried maize stacks on fire,
engulfing those hiding inside such stacks. By now, 1 (Para) Kumaon had started
bayoneting the invaders who were yet to recover from the shock. The battle at
Shalateng was over in less than 20 minutes! More than 300 dead bodies littered
the trails behind the fleeing enemy. Many more had perished after jumping into
Jhelum in a desperation to save themselves. The total enemy losses were in the
excess of 600. The Indian forces had suffered only one fatal and two non-fatal
casualties.
 The liberation of Kashmir had begun. The enemy didn’t even try to
retrieve the lorries laden with ammunition, rations and supplies of all kinds. The
freshly ploughed fields had slowed the speed of the invaders and they had been
shot like ducks. At some subconscious level, 1 (Para) Kumaon was seeking
revenge for their loss at Badgam. 4 Kumaon, after all, shared its roots with the
senior-most battalion of the regiment! 1 (Para) Kumaon cleared Zainkut Ridge by
1700h while one company of 1 Sikh went chasing the enemy full steam. A few
civil buses available at the defended locality were used by 1 Sikh.
The enemy wound up his HQ near Milestone 7 in a jiffy, leaving behind a
3-inch mortar, an MMG and a lorry full of medical supplies and a Pakistan army
ambulance. Pattan was taken by 1830h and the threat to Srinagar was over in all
practical terms. That was the point when the logistic issues caught up and many
apprehensions came true. No move could be undertaken beyond Pattan because of
non-availability of fuel, coupled with poor condition of the buses. The inevitable
had happened and a huge delay now stared at the Indian commanders and troops.
It had been a complete rout for the enemy. Indian forces had joined hands
and delivered a decisive defeat to the conglomerate of tribesmen, soldiers and
religious fanatics. Colonel Harbaksh Singh, using his military acumen, had turned
a sure-shot difficult situation into an easy-looking victory. It needs to be noted that
while the overall equation had improved because of arrival of troops, there was
still a huge disparity at the point of contact where three infantry companies
(roughly 270 men) faced thousands
3- ​The thought that the armoured cars had belonged to Pakistan Army was not without a reason.
Lieutenant Colonel Tommy Masud, CO 11 FF Cavalry had been advocating the induction of Pakistan’s
armour into Kashmir quite vocally. Having used his tanks to assault Bhimbar (Mirpur area) on 28 October,
he had volunteered to take his cars into Kashmir, all by himself, thereby ‘sparing’ Pakistan GHQ the need to
issue a formal order to him to do so.

of invaders. Diverting the armoured cars and bringing them in from a direction
that simply confused the enemy, was a tactical master stroke. Choosing to launch
the only local reserves, 1 (Para) Kumaon, even before the commencement of the
actual battle, also paid off. Those were the calculated risks and were well-taken as
events would prove.
At that point, Colonel Harbaksh Singh asked Major General Kalwant
Singh for permission to proceed to Baramulla with the aim of chasing the enemy
who had lost his bearings by then. However, the permission was not granted.
Brigadier LP Sen was ordered to now follow the enemy and conduct the
operations of his brigade. Brigadier LP Sen then joined the advancing troops
while Colonel Harbaksh Singh fell back to the airfield, as ordered.
 2 Dogra4 Battalion from Adampur landed up at Srinagar and was
earmarked as Divisional reserves.
4- ​2 Dogra was raised as 38 Dogra Regiment of Bengal Infantry in 1890. Rechristened as 38 Dogra in
1903 and 1/17 Dogra in 1922, it finally got its present name in 1947 when it converted from a Territorial
Army battalion into a regular battalion. Called ‘Saviours of Ladakh’ the battalion’s moment of glory came
during the conflict in Ladakh region. Present designation: 2 DOGRA. It is the senior-most battalion of the
regiment.

Proud & Tall: The Memorial at Shalateng (Post renovation. The memorial also serves as the key memorial
for the HQ, Counter Insurgency Force ‘Kilo’ (Rashtriya Rifles) and is interchangeably referred to as Kilo
Force Memorial too)
 1 SIKH troops holding a dominating ground

Lieutenant General Kipper Cariappa (wearing a peak cap) and Major General Timmy Thimayya
(without cap)with troops of 1 SIKH and other units
‘Aam Rukh’ (General Line of Direction) under surveillance by soldiers of 1 SIKH

Sardar Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister, with 1 SIKH men

(All four preceding picturess courtesy 4 MECH (1SIKH))
 BARAMULLA: 08 NOVEMBER 1947
​ he forced halt at Pattan exceeded 12 hours and the Indian forces
T
actually lost out on a crucial opportunity to chase the invaders all the way across
IB during those lost hours. The move could only commence after the first light as
Brigadier LP Sen reached Pattan with the Tac HQ of 161 Brigade. Pattan was to
be the new location of the HQ for now as troops pushed on with vigour.
​ aramulla was re-captured without any significant resistance and 1 Sikh
B
as well as 1 (Para) Kumaon entered the town at 1600h, with 2 Dogra less a
company following closely. Brigadier LP Sen moved forward and brought his Tac
HQ to Baramulla a couple of hours later, leaving behind 1/2 Punjab to take care of
Pattan. The dead body of an NC worker, Maqbool Sherwani who had been shot
and nailed on a cross by the invaders before arrival of the forces, was recovered
and buried.
​ ajor General Kalwant Singh, at that moment, de-linked defence of the
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airfield and the city from the operations to flush out the invaders. Accordingly, an
adhoc HQ, named ‘Sri’ Force1 was raised at the Airfield under the command of
Colonel Harbaksh Singh. One company of 2 Dogra, 4 Kumaon and 6 Raj Rif were
placed under the command of the new HQ. Some developments were happening
in the Jammu region and Major General Kalwant was instructed to spare a
battalion and send that to Jammu post-haste.
​ aramulla had been recaptured much before the stipulated date and such
B
a victory invited well-deserved congratulatory messages from all senior
commanders involved with the operations in the Valley.
​ efore the day came to an end, inputs regarding the presence of many
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invaders in Shopian, about 30 Km West of Anantnag, were received through the
NC sources. The inputs also indicated their plans to disrupt the track Jammu-
Srinagar and cut off the force in the Valley.
There were two major vulnerabilities on the unmetalled road- firstly the
Banihal Tunnel2 and secondly the bridge over Chenab River at Ramban3.
1- ​The main tasks of Sri or Srinagar Force were to clear the area around the city of the enemy, law and
order in the city and protection of LOC between Srinagar and Baramulla. The Force did fulfil its task in
conjunction with Body Guard Cavalry (for long range patrolling) and civil authorities.

By destroying either of the two, the enemy could cut off the Valley for weeks at a
stretch. A company of 3 (Para) Rajput was then moved from Jammu to Ramban
and a squadron of JAK Body Guard Cavalry was sent to Shopian from Srinagar.
 Situation as on 08 November (Last Light)
(Legend: X- Brigade; XX- Division)
2- ​The present twin tunnel tubes set, called the Jawahar Tunnel passing through the Pir Panjal Range at
Banihal came much later in 1956. The old tunnel, being referred to here was the one that existed during 1947.
A total distance of 10 km gets added if one takes the road via the old tunnel instead of the Jawahar Tunnel.
3- ​The bridge, despite the beating it had taken when armoured cars had crossed and when some cracks
had been observed in the metallic parts, had since been inspected and declared as fit to take on 3-ton trucks.
Many supplies, mainly fuel, was now being sent by road.

URI: 09- 13 NOVEMBER 1947

​ aramulla was moped up in detail on 09 November. Troops were also
B
deployed on a high ground immediately to the West of the town. The road running
ahead to Uri was secured till Baramulla. 2 Dogra was now made responsible to
hold the town as a firm base. While mopping had been happening, the RIAF jets-
Tempests- flew four sorties over the area on either side of the Pir Panjal Range.
Using 250-pound bombs and rockets, they targeted the enemy on the run. A boat-
bridge near Muzaffarabad was rocketed and destroyed and many lorries hit during
the day.
​ he advance to Uri began on 10 November at 0700h, by two remaining
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battalions, 1 Sikh and 1 (Para) Kumaon. However, about 17 km ahead, a bridge
over Nangdhari Nar Nala was found to be destroyed and held by approximately a
platoon size strength of the enemy1. Soon, a way was found around the bridge as
troops kept the head of the enemy down with effective and superior firepower.
The opposition was overcome quickly and the advance resumed before getting
stalled at another destroyed bridge- that one over Hapatkhal Nala (also referred to
as Buniyar Nala), short of Rampur. The enemy at the site was well-entrenched and
had been holding two shoulders in strength. It was 1530h on 10 November.
​ he terrain around the bridge and the fact that the enemy had not only
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entrenched himself but also had the support of 3-inch mortars and automatic
weapons, meant a delay in clearance of the opposition. Not much of progress
could be made throughout 11 November. It was now known that about 4,000
invaders had also been holding strong defences in and around Uri while 50-odd of
them were at the site of the demolished bridge at Rampur. Brigadier Sen was now
in a bit of a spot since the battalion at Pattan, 1/2 Punjab, had been withdrawn by
Major General Kalwant Singh and with 2 Dogra holding Baramulla, he was left
with no reserve troops. In any case, the terrain around the bridge didn’t allow for
the concentration of a larger body of troops. The unfortunate delay at Pattan due
to the lack of transport was now coming back to haunt the commander.
Finally, in the wee hours of 12 November, the Indian troops attacked and
cleared the opposition, taking the enemy by surprise. For the time being, vehicles
had to be shed there as the troops moved ahead. Uri was captured
1- ​With invaders having taken a solid beating and having decided to run away with the loot, the platoon
at the bridge was, most probably, made up of Pakistan army regulars.

and cleared of invaders on 13 November. On the same day, a diversion at Rampur

bridge also got completed and supplies reached the troops at Uri. The Kashmir
Valley, per se, stood liberated!
 News Columns: The Advertiser’ dated 11 November 1947

(A British journalist, Sydney Smith, working for The Daily Express, London, was holidaying in Srinagar
when the invasion happened on 22 October. With the help of the owner of the houseboat where he had been
staying, he managed to reach Baramulla and returned to file a report on 23 or 24 October. On 27 October, he
followed Lieutenant Colonel Rai’s column all the way to Baramulla. There, he was taken a prisoner by the
invaders soon after the death of the officer the very next day. He, however, escaped getting shot though he had
been injured. He was then sent to the St Joseph’s Mission Hospital that had been ransacked earlier in the day
but a part of it and few of its residents had been saved just at the nick of the moment when a convent-educated
Pathan Officer of Pakistan Army, Major Hayat Khan, had walked in and saved the members who had been
lined up to be shot! The journalist remained in ‘custody; at the Mission for next ten days. Once Smith was
released through backdoor channels linking London with Islamabad, he filed many reports of the horror that
had befallen Baramulla. The above paper columns appeared in The Advertiser on 11 November and many
newspapers across the globe took up the news with due enthusiasm.
All his stories were believed to have been picked up by a well-known writer, HE Bates for his fiction, The
Scarlet Sword!
Picture source: https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/43742335)
An Artillery Observation Post group (left); Holding the Fort: 1 SIKH on the Outskirts of Baramulla
(right)
Fanatics from Pakistan (left); An LMG, set on ‘Aam Rukh’ (general line of direction) being manned by
1 SIKH soldiers (right)

The Bridge at Domel (left); Many battlefield engagements resulted in hand to hand fights (right)

DECISION DILEMMA: ARMY HQ

The PM of J&K State, Mehr Chand Mahajan, had been making repeated
appeals to the authorities at Delhi to help the State forces and refugees in the
areas South of Pir Panjal, notably Poonch and Mirpur sectors. His last appeal of
12 November, addressed to the Defence Minister of the country, highlighted the
race against time for the ill-fated populace and forces in the Jammu region. With
the recapture of Uri on 13 November, the possibility of diverting resources
towards Poonch did finally present itself to the planners.
Post capture of Uri on 13 November, the following decisions were taken
during the meeting of Defence Committee of the Cabinet at Army HQ, Delhi on
14 November 1947: -
-The complete stretch of Jhelum Valley Road to be denied to the enemy.
 -Post securing of the Jhelum Valley Road, Indian forces to start
withdrawing and to be replaced by State forces and police.
-Jammu-Banihal-Srinagar road to be kept open throughout the winters, if
possible.
-Jammu to have a force adequate enough to give aid to civil power, to
supress disorderly elements and to protect minority communities.
-Small mobile columns to be despatched to relieve and evacuate
beleaguered garrisons and evacuate non-Muslims astride Jammu-Poonch-
Uri road if such a need is felt.
-No effort other than aid to civil power, within the constraints of above-
mentioned tasks to be undertaken since operations in Poonch during
winters were ruled out due to lack of means and resources.
It was discussed and agreed upon during the meeting that the enemy was
now likely to employ a different tactics in J&K. Having faltered by operating like
a regular army in Kashmir and having been dislodged by the Indian forces, the
enemy was likely to play on his core strength that lay in guerrilla warfare. Unlike
before, such manoeuvres were likely to come into play on either side of the Pir
Panjal Range where the terrain favoured such tactics. It was also decided to
evacuate Poonch since the forces had been stretched and the enemy, with the
local support of Poonchi ex-servicemen and deserters, was likely to rush the
garrison sooner than later.
The Defence Committee of the Cabinet had its reasons to arrive at the
decisions taken on 14 November. Fortunately, the decision to evacuate Poonch
was reversed over the next 48 hours. The story of Poonch, beyond some
references, is not being covered in this work.
On 16 November, General Officer Commanding (GOC) of JAK Division,
Major General Kalwant Singh, issued orders for the speedy relief of Naushera,
Jhangar, Kotli, Mirpur and Poonch. The plan envisaged a two-pronged approach
on to Poonch, both from Jammu and Uri. The outline plan was as under: -
- A force consisting of 50 Para Brigade and attached troops, under
Brigadier Paranjape, was to move at 0600h on 16 November with the
utmost speed on axis Akhnoor-Beri Pattan-Naushera -Jhangar and thence to
Kotli and Mirpur. Naushera was to be secured on 16 November, a firm base
established at Jhangar on 17 November, Kotli relieved on 18 November
and Mirpur relieved latest by 20 November.
- A force consisting of two battalions of 161 Infantry Brigade1 and attached
troops, under Brigadier LP Sen, DSO, was to start from Uri on 18
 November towards Poonch, arriving at Poonch on the same day. A
detachment of 161 Infantry Brigade and attached troops were to advance
South from Poonch and affect junction at a place called Puri with 50 Para
Brigade troops. After reinforcing Poonch garrison with one battalion, the
rest of the force was to withdraw to Uri.
-268 Infantry Brigade2 (under re-organisation with two battalions i.e., 1
Patiala3 and 1 Madras4) was to take over protection of the lines of
communication from 0600h on 17 November as under: -
1- ​1/2 Punjab, having been withdrawn from 161 Brigade, was sent to Jammu to be a part of 50 Para
Brigade.
2- ​Raised as 268th Indian Armoured Brigade in July 1942 at Sialkot, the formation was reorganised as
an Infantry Brigade in October 1942 itself. On 01 May 1947, it was re-designated as 268 Infantry Brigade
Group. The formation exists as an infantry brigade today.
3- ​1 Patiala, later 15 PUNJAB, completed 300 years of service on 13 April 2005. The oldest infantry
battalion in the Indian Army, 15 PUNJAB also has the proud distinction of being the second highest
decorated battalion of the Army, with 22 Battle Honours, one Theatre Honour (Punjab) and numerous
gallantry awards.
4- ​1 Madras, like other battalions of Madras Regiment, traces its roots to 1750s when Major Stringer
Lawrence raised companies and regiments from existing Madras Levies. 1 Madras (former 73rd Carnatic
Infantry) became the 1st Battalion of the Mechanised Infantry Regiment later.
-Jammu-Kathua.
​-Jammu-Banihal.
​-Jammu- Beri Pattan

For a coordinated air effort, the airfield at Jammu was to be extended

from the existing 885 metres to 1275 metres. The plan was to move 7 RIAF
Squadron Detachment of Tempests from Amritsar and Flight No 1 RIAF
Squadron of Harvards from Srinagar to Jammu. The extension of the airfield was
a technical requirement to enable such moves.
 Plan of the GOC, JAK Division

The plan, as proposed by the GOC came under adverse criticism from
multiple quarters. The officiating C-in-C, General Bucher5, pointed out the fact
that the plan far exceeded the decision of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet.
He also expressed his reservations about the uncoordinated move of two columns
while the enemy held heights astride both the axes. Even Brigadier Paranjape,
Commander of 50 Para Brigade, disagreed with his GOC. That part, being
Naushera-centric, is not being covered in this work. There were certain delays too,
as apprehended by commanders at different levels.
5- ​The minds of the British Government and the British officers, now under Indian Government, had
been working in synch for the obvious reasons. As already mentioned, even Lord Mountbatten who, as many
British commentators called an outcaste because of his leanings towards India, was the one to plant the
seeds of referendum in the minds of Kashmiris. In fact, he, during the conflict and without taking into
confidence the Indian Government whose Governor General he was, went to Pakistan to negotiate with
Jinnah, repeating the plebiscite offer. Jinnah, however, had his own ideas and nothing moved forward on that
front. Beyond the British, the decision of the Indian authorities to turn the spearhead of Indian forces
towards Poonch rather than chasing the enemy out of Muzaffarabad- or at least till Domel bridge- lacked
military logic. Many observers inside J&K claim that the decision to move towards Poonch had been taken
to extricate Brigadier Krishna Singh who happened to be a close relative of the Maharaja and was the
Brigade Commander at Poonch! At the stage of decision making, such claims appear to be true. What
happened later and how such decisions did help in saving Poonch, is something that couldn’t have been
visualised as yet.
General Sir RMM Lockhart KCB, CIE, MC (C-in-C of Indian Army from 15 August 1947 till 01 October
1948) & Lieutenant General Sir Dudley Russell KBE, CB, DSO, MC (GOC-in-C, Delhi & East Punjab
Command (1947-48) and Chief Advisor to Indian Army (1948-1950)

THE BALL GETS ROLLING

​ he plan envisaged by the GOC, JAK Division, was put into action and
T
50 Para Brigade group commenced the move on 16 November 1947, with the aim
of clearing the axis and holding Naushera-Jhangar area before marrying up with
161 Brigade column near Poonch. However, because of reasons varying from too
ambitious a planning to enemy interference and roadblocks and a demolished
bridge at Beri Pattan (South of Naushera) to assessed lack of initiative to reverse
flow of refugees, the progress of operations could not match the plan.
I​ n the meanwhile, the column under Brigadier LP Sen, Commander 161
Infantry Brigade received the go-ahead at 1000h on 20 November 1947. By then
the situation in Uri had been more or less stabilised though the territory West of
Uri was yet to be recovered. Leaving 1 Sikh and a troop of 32 Field Battery
behind for defence of firm base at Uri, the following force started from Uri for
Poonch on the same day: -
-​ Tac HQ 161 Infantry Brigade.
- 1 (Para) Kumaon.
 -​ 2 Dogra less two companies.
​-Two troops of 7 Light Cavalry.
​-17 Mountain Battery.
​-One platoon of 1 Mahar (MMG).

​ he plan envisaged the move as a motorised column of 200 vehicles

T
(including 60 civil buses and many lorries) via Haji Pir and reach Poonch where 1
(Para) Kumaon was to stay back to hold the garrison while the rest of the force
was to return after linking up with 50 Para Brigade at a pre-determined point
South of Poonch. 1 (Para) Kumaon was to lead the advance scheduled to
commence at 1130h on 20 November 1947. Two platoons of 1 (Para) Kumaon
were at the tail as the rear guard. The road connecting Uri with Poonch via Haji
Pir was narrow, winding and had a number of bridges on it. As per the account by
Brigadier LP Sen, he was not allowed to carry out any reconnaissance of the route
and was instead advised to rely on a report of the State Road Department.
Contrary to the department’s claims about the road being fairly motorable, it was
found out to be in a very poor state.
As the leading elements of the leading battalion moved out, they
discovered a demolished bridge just about three km outside Uri. The discovery led
to a delay and it was only around 1400h that 1 (Para) Kumaon could clear its tail
from Uri with the rest of the force following it up. Even though the leading
battalion could clear itself of the demolished bridge through a detour, the long
convoy incurred huge time delay while negotiating the detour. As a result, leading
battalion, Tac HQ of the Brigade and bulk of the force got separated from the rest
of the convoy. No opposition was encountered and the going had been uneventful.
The first column, under Brigadier LP Sen, crossed Haji Pir Pass and took a halt at
Aliabad Sarai, North of Basan hamlet, about 30 km short of Poonch. The second
column that had been lagging behind, had made little progress due to the delay in
crossing the diversion. There were about 28 vehicles in the column but a very
small component (two platoons) of infantry to protect it. As per the original order
of march, armoured cars were in the rear, bringing up the rear. This column halted
at a point, Milestone 7, roughly half way between Uri and Haji Pir Pass.
​ n 21 November, the leading force resumed advance at 0700h and
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crossed Halan Janubi without any issues. However, a big fiasco awaited them a
little ahead at a place called Kahuta1. There was a wooden bridge over Betar Nala
near the latter’s confluence with one of its tributaries descending from Northwest.
A detachment of JAK State forces had been deployed to protect the bridge at that
point. There had evidently been either lack of communications or confusion
during the passage of message since the detachment had no information about the
arrival of the relief column. When they spotted the headlights of the convoy
driving down to their location, they were in a dilemma for a while. They had no
explosives and had no way of blowing up the bridge in an instant. Had they
waited for the vehicles to get close enough for them to be identified positively,
there was a danger of the enemy taking over the bridge if the column turned out to
be a hostile column. To play safe, especially, when they had no prior intimation2,
they set the bridge on fire well before the convoy could reach the bridge. The
detachment then fell back to Poonch.
1- ​Not to be confused with another place with the same name. Kahuta town is in Pakistan’s Punjab,
across Jhelum River, Southwest of Pallandri. This Kahuta was actually called Kahuta Farwad and was just a
little settlement (now in PoJK).
2- ​With different versions being cited by different personnel intimately involved with the ongoing
operation, no conclusive deduction about the coordination aspect can be made at this stage. However, many
accounts do mention about the complete isolation of JAK State troops, including lack of communication with
HQ of JAK Division at Srinagar, prior to the arrival of 1 (Para) Kumaon. If that be so, the lack of
coordination can then be attributed to such a sad affair. It is believed that the garrison didn’t even have a
single

​ s the column came to a halt, the reality dawned on Brigadier LP Sen.

A
With no other option available, the troops dismounted and started creating a ford
over the nala. The construction work was time consuming and progressed
painfully slowly. Four jeeps were also lowered into the nala with the instructions
to find a place to come out of the nala downstream.
The second column, having spent the night, too resumed the advance in
the morning. However, not known to the troops, the enemy had spent the previous
night in creating a roadblock just a few hundred metres ahead of the milestone
where the night halt had been taken by the column. The enemy had also occupied
dominating grounds around the roadblock in a way that the whole convoy would
come under effective fire once it was halted at the roadblock. A reserve party had
also been deployed in the nala below the road to exploit the gains likely to be
made.
​ s the leading vehicle took the very first turn after resuming the
A
advance, it encountered the roadblock. Before soon, all vehicles had halted within
a metre or two of one another. Suddenly, very heavy fire opened up from the
surrounding heights. With fire coming from all the directions, whatever infantry
was available, was also pinned down and, thus, could not assault the feature
overlooking the road. The only hope lay in the armoured cars but the cars were in
the rear and the road width didn’t permit overtaking. With road bends in front,
gunners inside the cars were not able to support any action in the front. Soon, the
armoured cars too came under heavy attack and the last car had a puncture due to
a bullet hit. Demonstrating a very high degree of skill, the driver was able to turn
around the car and rush towards Uri, carrying information about the attack and a
few seriously wounded soldiers.
​ y now, the convoy and the personnel had been badly hit with many
B
already dead or seriously wounded. The remnants kept on fighting and were able
to keep the enemy at bay throughout the day. As the night fell, the armoured cars
in the rear retreated after picking up a few casualties while all other vehicles
remained stuck. Once the resistance almost died, the invaders descended on the
convoy and after looting whatever could be looted and after shooting the
survivors, they set the vehicles ablaze.
To add to the problem of the troops, almost at the same time, another
functional radio set. As Brigadier LP Sen described later, Poonch Brigade didn’t figure on the distribution
list of HQ JAK Division either. Thus, the operational instructions addressed to HQ 50 Para Brigade and HQ
161 Infantry Brigade, had no endorsement for Poonch Brigade!

wooden bridge between Uri and ambush site was destroyed by burning. At the end
of the day, 1 (Para) Kumaon had lost 16 men while 14 had been badly wounded.
As many as 24 vehicles had either been destroyed or had been rendered unfit for
movement. It was one serious setback to the army.
The news of ambush reached Brigadier LP Sen only well after the action
at ambush site had got over. In fact, the information came to him via a reverse
channel wherein JAK Division HQ, having been informed about the ambush after
the arrival of the survivors at Uri, had, in turn, informed the Tac HQ of 161
Infantry Brigade. That was around 2200h on 21 November. HQ JAK Division had
simultaneously issued directions to Srinagar garrison to rush reinforcements to the
ambush site. By that time, the work on the ford at Kahuta was still going on and
the main column had not moved forward towards Poonch.
Brigadier Sen directed the CO of 1 Kumaon, Lieutenant Colonel Pritam
Singh, MC3 to march down to Poonch with his battalion less a company, without
putting in any further efforts on the ford. The Commander then turned back and
dashed towards the ambush site with the rest of the column. By the time the
vehicles could be reversed and were ready to move back, it was approaching
midnight on 21/22 November 1947.
The going was painfully slow due to the rough road with numerous
switchbacks. Realising the futility of pushing on in dark, the column was halted
soon after crossing Haji Pir Pass. The Pass, as a matter of oversight, had been left
un-held after the previous crossing but fortunately, no untoward incident happened
on the way back because of the oversight. It resumed its advance in the morning
and finally Brigadier Sen and his group reached the ambush site at 1000h on 22
November. At about same time, 4 Kumaon4 less two companies, having left
Srinagar at 0330h, reached the ambush site. A little while later, Lieutenant Colonel
Pritam and his warriors reached the outskirts of Poonch town. We now leave the
Poonch part at this
3- ​Brigadier Pritam Singh, MC, was and is still remembered as Sher Baccha (Son like a lion or Lion’s
son) by the locals because of his outstanding leadership during the year-long siege of Poonch.
4- ​After the action, 4 Kumaon was deployed at Uri with an additional company, called ‘E’ Company
that was actually a company of Dogra troops who had been repatriated to India after their original unit,
4/13 Frontier Force had joined the Pakistan army. In addition, the survivors of 1 (Para) Kumaon’s rear
guard were also placed under the command of CO, 4 Kumaon and the so-formed platoon stayed at Uri
before moving to the parent unit at Poonch on 09 January 1948. The battalion also had a Boys’ platoon
(please see ahead).
stage.
The Pioneer platoon of 2 Dogra commenced the work around the burnt
bridge between the ambush site and Uri but the going was very slow. Some
engineer elements of the brigade, present at Uri, were also called upon and they
joined the effort.

Attempted Link-Up with Poonch from Uri

 ​ hile two columns had been converging on to the ambush site and
W
while work on creating a diversion at the site of the burnt down bridge between
the ambush site and Uri was going on, the enemy decided to stay away. But for
long range sniping, no other attempt was made by the enemy to disrupt the relief
operations. The diversion could finally be made ready after three days and
recovery then started in the afternoon on 25 November. The mixed columns
finally arrived back at Uri at 0230h on 26 November 1947.
​Out of a total of 24 vehicles that had been ambushed, only 13 could be
recovered as repairable while three more were made roadworthy through
cannibalization of parts at the site itself. The balance eight vehicles were then
pushed down into the nala and written off as losses. Most of the vehicles had
either been captured or had been requisitioned from the State.
​ he enemy, having learnt his lessons after getting beaten while
T
attempting a regular army-like tactic during the initial days, had apparently
reverted to his core strength. The ambush on Uri-Poonch road was one example of
his revised tactics. It was to be learnt later that the enemy actions, i.e., ambush and
destruction of bridge, had been launched by an enemy HQ based at a 10,000 feet
high peak of Pir Panjal at an uninhabited place called Lalanka. The selection of
the site for the base as also the fact that it was being maintained through mules
operating from Pallandri, about 65 kms away, confirmed the assessment that the
enemy had finally chosen to fight like a guerrilla.
I​ n the meanwhile, because of the fall of Mirpur and domination of enemy
around Kotli and Jhangar, as also because of ambush on Uri-Poonch road, the plan
of advance of 50 Para Brigade from Kotli to Poonch was cancelled.
 ​

Haji Pir Pass- 1947 (The flags and stonewall depict the shrine of the Pir)

ANOTHER STORY THAT MUST BE TOLD

​ he move of 161 Brigade column towards Poonch meant Uri garrison
T
being looked after by 1 Sikh and an artillery fire unit. Even the enemy, now taking
a much-needed break after the non-stop beating since the action at Shalateng, also
knew that the Uri garrison stood weakened for the time being.
While organising the defence of Uri, one platoon strength picquet had
been sited on a dominating feature in the North, across Jhelum River. Called Point
4060 or Nalwa Picquet (so named by the battalion, 1 Sikh in honour of legendary
General Hari Singh Nalwa of Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s army), the feature was vital
for the defence of Uri since it overlooked the troops and the town at Uri from
North. There had been a bridge to access the feature earlier but the same had been
destroyed by the invaders. The Sikhs had, as an interim measure, joined a couple
of planks and balanced the same over rocks to create a small bridge since winters
had reduced the flow of Jhelum to a great extent. The shortage of troops had
forced the CO to keep only 20 men under Subedar Gurcharan Singh at the picquet
when Brigadier LP Sen, having withdrawn all other infantry elements, had moved
towards Poonch and a few other picquets around the town had to be manned
solely by 1 Sikh. The men belonged to Number 12 Platoon of ‘D’ Company.
​ n the fateful night 0f 22/23 November, while issues at the ambush site
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on Uri-Poonch road were being sorted out, a massive attack came on to that
isolated picquet. About 900 odd invaders attacked the picquet. Unlike the earlier
actions of the invaders, that attack on the picquet (as also the ambush on Uri-
Poonch road) indicated a good application of mind by the enemy. He had chosen
an isolated picquet, the capture of which would jeopardise the situation of the
Indian troops at Uri. In addition, with the link based on a highly shaky, single
plank contraption over Jhelum, no reinforcements were expected in the night. It
had been a wise choice made by the enemy but little did he know the resolve of
the brave Sikhs holding the picquet and the garrison at Uri on that wintery night.
I​ t was around 2300h when the first assault came in full force. Mortars
and MMGs sited very close to the picquet let loose such a heavy volume of fire
that the whole of the Uri bowl was shaken up for a while. However, the attack was
repulsed by alert defenders. The section Commander of the forward section that
bore the brunt, Naik Chand Singh, was wounded in his arm while fighting against
heavy odds, leading his men fearlessly.
 Nalwa Picquet Action
​ ​An hour later, another assault was launched and this time, in
addition to pushing in bigger waves of men, the enemy had put in a
multidirectional attack from three directions. The Sikhs fought on bravely, not
allowing the enemy to gain any foothold within the perimeter though at one point,
the invaders came in as close to as 27 metres of the defences. During that assault,
an already injured Naik Chand Singh rushed ahead and destroyed the 3-inch
mortar that had been brought up during the ongoing assault. He was fatally
wounded during this heroic act.
​The platoon commander, Subedar Gurcharan Singh, a veteran of WW II,
displayed an unyielding leadership and kept his men motivated all that while.
Rushing from one section post to another, he defied the threat of incoming bullets
and mortar bombs throughout the action.
​ ield artillery guns had arrived a few hours back and had not registered
F
the defensive fire tasks yet. However, when the SOS call for support came in,
gunners rose to occasion. It was a moon-lit night but the moon had been in a
waning phase and luminosity was not very bright. Making use of whatever
ambient light was available, the gunners laid the guns and started firing with open
sights. Waves after waves of the enemy fell to bullets of 1 Sikh and artillery
shrapnel.
​ he CO, Lieutenant Colonel Sampuran Bachan Singh, was now in a
T
difficult situation. There was no reserve available and the personnel posted on the
picquets around the bowl could not be taken out. At that juncture, esprit-de-corps
came into play. The Quartermaster of the battalion, Captain Joginder Singh and
the men of his administrative platoon, came forward and volunteered to go in. The
Quartermaster of the battalion, Captain Joginder Singh and men of his
administrative platoon, came forward and volunteered to go in. It may be noted
that the administrative platoon had tradesmen like chefs, housekeepers and such
personnel and it was only a sense of camaraderie that had inspired those men to
walk into a perilous situation without a second thought. The body of 15-odd
volunteers then rushed down into the river, crossed the contrivance called bridge
without any aids and lights and then rushed up the slope shouting the blood
curdling war cry, “(Jo) Bole so Nihal, Sat Sri Akal’, meaning ‘one will be blessed
eternally who says that God is the ultimate’!
​ he enemy, already frustrated with failed attempts to rush the picquet,
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lost his nerve when the sounds of the war cry reached the other side. The hostiles,
planning to take on a handful of men who would never get any support from
anywhere, were taken by surprise and perceived the resonances as if springing
from a large force that had rushed up, as if, from nowhere! And then the sight of
fearless Sikhs running up a near vertical slope of the feature dimly lit in the
ambient light, took the wind out of the enemy who chose to flee, leaving behind
many dead as also the much-prized possession of a 3-inch mortar1. Naik Chand
Singh, the Section Commander of the forward Section was awarded the MVC
posthumously for the act of gallantry and resolute leadership under fire. Subedar
Gurcharan Singh2 and Havildar Bagh Singh were awarded VrCs for their courage
and bravery3.
1- ​As per an account by Lieutenant General K.K. Nanda, enemy also left two MMGs and five LMGs
behind (Book, War with No Gains).
2- ​There was another JCO by the same name and in the same battalion! The other JCO too was
awarded a VrC and that too in this very conflict. However, that JCO was an MC awardee of the WW II and he
earned his VrC during fighting at Baramulla. He later served as an ADC to the President of India. The JCO
at Nalwa had been posted to 1 Sikh after his parent unit had moved to Pakistan.
3- ​Many accounts, as available on the internet as also in various books, mention that the platoon minus
at Nalwa was reinforced by a company of 4 KUMAON. That, of course,

HIGHER DIRECTIONS: NOVEMBER 1947

Winters had already set in and the snowing season was due to begin
anytime. Winters in Kashmir were expected to bring action to a halt purely due to
logistical issues arising out of snowed out lines of communication (LOC). The
enemy had been routed out of Uri. The Indian army had snatched the initiative
from the enemy and had staged a massive military upset.
In Jammu region, while important garrisons in Naushera and Jhangar had
been secured and evacuation had been carried out from Kotli, Poonch was still
under siege.
At the macro level of policy and planning in the country, Kashmir’s
security was the priority number one as far as newly appointed PM was
concerned. General Sir Rob Lockhart, KCB, CIE, MC, the C-in-C of Indian
Army, however, wanted detailed analysis of the military situation before
proceeding further. The unanimous decision of the Defence Committee of the
Cabinet to prioritise security of Kashmir was to become the corner stone for all
the decisions that were to be taken in the days to come.
Based on the military appreciation carried out by the Joint planning Staff
on the orders of the C-in-C, certain issues were flagged on 26 November 1947. It
was visualised that the enemy might be able to deploy about 15,000 personnel for
infiltration, interdiction of supply lines, attack on isolated outposts as well as
garrisons along the borders in J&K during the months to come. It was also
appreciated that nothing major - in terms of a large numerical strength attacking
own garrisons- might happen before the snow melted in 1948 and the enemy was
likely to remain focussed on inciting the populace on communal lines, disrupting
LOC and small-scale attacks on isolated outposts. Expected enemy action in East
Punjab, Rajputana (now Rajasthan) and Kathiawar (now Gujarat) as well as in the
Northeast region, volatile situation in Hyderabad and likelihood of disturbance to
communal harmony in the hinterland were also flagged and measures suggested.
The details of the latter part are being left out for the sake of brevity and focus on
the area of interest in J&K.
never happened. The official history of the war (as released by MoD) doesn’t mention about any other
reinforcements. The author was fortunate enough to interact with a veteran historian of Sikh Regiment,
Brigadier Indrajeet Gakhal, 1 SIKH. It was confirmed that the incident as narrated here holds true!

It was further appreciated that in view of the inhospitable terrain and

inclement weather as also limitation of air maintenance due to restrictions on
flying in bad weather, reliance was required to be laid on self-contained boots on
ground. It was felt that a minimum force of four infantry brigade groups- two in
the Valley and two in Jammu region- each with four infantry battalions,
supporting arms and sound logistical backup, was required to keep the situation
under control. However, while troops could possibly be mustered, stocking the
supplies to support such a force level during the winter months was something
beyond the capabilities of logistical echelons available at that time. A balance was
then struck by reducing one brigade group and leaving three – one in Uri-
Srinagar and two in Jammu region (Jammu and Naushera-Jhangar). It was further
decided to keep supporting arms and ancillary troops at the disposal of local
brigade commanders. Both the regions were to be allotted air effort as on
requirement basis. All State forces were placed under the GOC of JAK Division
and all other local militia raised by the likes of NC were placed under
government control but they were not to participate in operations along with
army units.
On 28 November, the above issues were deliberated upon during the
meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. Indian PM was of the view
that Domel, where two routes from Pakistan converged before entering J&K,
must be taken and a garrison established there to prevent enemy from sneaking in
using the bridges there. However, both the C-in-C and the Governor General,
Lord Mountbatten advocated a conservative approach citing overstretching of
supply lines and danger of isolation of Domel in the event of an enemy action
succeeding in doing so. The C-in-C then decided to consult two subordinate
Generals in the chain of command, i.e. Lieutenant General Russell, the GOC-in-C
of Delhi & East Punjab Command and Major General Kalwant Singh, GOC of
the JAK Division and requested the Committee to grant him some time for the
consultation. The Committee agreed to wait while approving the
recommendations made by the Joint Planning Staff. It also directed the C-in-C to
explore the possibility of blowing up the bridges at Domel if not occupying it to
start with.
The following points, as submitted by Lieutenant General Russell, were
put forth by General Lockhart to argue the former’s case in front of the Defence
Committee of Cabinet on 03 December 1947: -
-Holding of Domel after capture meant a requirement of one additional
battalion and the same was not recommended from logistics point of view
as well as threat to the axis.
-If Poonch remained occupied by own troops, the enemy might stay in the
Uri area. However, if Poonch was abandoned, enemy would realise the fact
that the Indian Army had enough troops to attack enemy in Uri, thereby,
inducing the enemy to vacate Uri area.
-Many units were still getting over recent splits because of the partition;
many were not fully equipped and for many, such a terrain was a challenge
in itself. Experience and training left a lot to be desired.
-The road from Uri to Domel passed through steep defiles and enemy
snipers held dominating positions.
Further, he insisted that Poonch had to be evacuated before any plans to
capture Domel were formalised. His outline plan was as under: -
-Evacuate Poonch.
-Concentrate an infantry brigade group in Naushera.
- Enemy to be evicted from the area to the South of Jammu and axis
Pathankot-Jammu-Naushera to be secured.
-Aggressive patrolling and commando actions all along the frontier in
Kashmir and Jammu.
-Move troops from Jammu, after securing the areas, as mentioned above,
and striking enemy in Uri and chasing the invaders out till Domel.
-Work on upgradation of axes that had been taking severe beating due to
increased traffic on such dirt tracks.
Fortunately, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet found the thought
process of the GOC-in-C a bit too cautious1. With the news of mass rapes,
1- ​There are many conspiracy theories doing rounds in the literature of that era and decades following
it about British officers at the highest levels trying to sabotage the Indian offensive against Pakistan in J&K.
When read in conjunction with the fact that the British did create the situation for the fall of Gilgit and
connived with Pakistani establishment to annex J&K, such speculations do appear to hold water. However,
another view may attribute such an approach to a conservative thinking on the part of such officers and such
an approach may, in turn, be related to their leadership qualities. There is no doubt, however, that the
situation would have been absolutely different and in India’s favour had such interventions by British
officials not happened.

genocide and plunder in Rajouri-Mirpur-Bhimbar area being brought from J&K

to Delhi by none else but the Deputy PM, Sardar Patel, the Committee was faced
with a decision dilemma. Pandit Nehru, however, was firm on not vacating
Poonch even if own troops there were to meet the worst fate in line of duty.
Based on the directions issued by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet,
the Joint Planning Staff prepared a staff paper outlining the plan to reinforce JAK
Division with four battalions and a Signal Section under a Brigade HQ with the
aim of conducting offensive operations in Jammu-Akhnoor-Bhimbar-Naushera-
Jhangar.
The following2 infantry battalions were then ordered to move to Jammu
immediately: -
-1/9 Gorkha Rifles3.
-3 Royal Garhwal Rifles4; and
-4 Rajput5.
HQ 80 Infantry Brigade with integral Signal Section was deployed near
Gurgaon and was picked up for the task.
The exhaustive staff paper also highlighted the problems expected to be
faced while executing the directions. The main issue related to the sustenance
capability of the existing axes in Jammu region. Both Pathankot-Jammu and
Jammu-Jhangar axes were dirt tracks with limited load bearing capacities.
2- ​The Brigade HQ commenced its move to Jammu on 13 December under a new commander,
Brigadier Vidyadhar Jayal, DSO who had taken over the assignment on 12 December 1947. However, as per
the version of HQ 80 Infantry Brigade, as on 23 December 1947, the formation comprised of 1/2 Punjab, 1/9
GR (Gorkha Rifles), 4 Rajput and 2 JAK Infantry (State Forces). Further, as per records held with HQ 80
Infantry Brigade, 1 Patiala came under command on 13 December 1947 while 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles
moved to Srinagar.
3- ​Ist Battalion 9 GR belongs to the family of 9 GR that traces its origin to 1817.
4- ​Raised as 3/39 Garhwal Rifles in 1916, 3 Garhwal Rifles holds the unparalleled distinction of
winning one MVC, 18 VrCs, two Ashoka Chakra Class III (Shaurya Charka equivalent) and 19 Mentioned-
in-Despatches and the battle honour of ‘TITHWAL’ during operations in Kupwara and Kishanganga Valley
in 1948. ‘Royal’ was dropped in 1950. The present name of the battalion is 3 GARHWAL RIFLES or 3
GARH.
5- ​4 Rajput (now 4 RAJPUT) traces its origin as Ist Battalion, 30th Bengal Native Infantry (1798).
Named as 8/7 Rajput Infantry in 1922 before being re-designated as 4 Rajput. It was one of the three Rajput
battalions (1 and 3 being other two) to fight in during the conflict.
The staff calculations threw up a requirement of around 990 vehicles to
complete the dumping of stocks. The ongoing upgradation work on Jammu-
Pathankot stretch had been very slow due to the shortage of civil labour. The
track ahead of Jammu was, in any case, in bad shape. One field company, four
pioneer companies, two GT (General Transport) platoons, one tipper company
and eight dozers were required to improve, upgrade and then maintain the stretch
between Pathankot and Naushera. Instructions were issued for those elements to
move to Jammu.
 A bird’s eye view of Uri Bowl from Pir Panjal (base image: Google)

EARLY WINTERS 1947-48

By the last week of November 1947, skirmishes and stand-off attacks had
become a daily routine. Decisions about the future actions were being finalised at
Delhi while the troops faced off with enemy as the winters set in.
 The Uri Sector had the enemy concentration in large numbers, ostensibly
to deny any advance towards West (Domel) or South (Poonch). As per various
reports, enemy did number anything between 4000 to 6000 men. By that time, the
presence of regulars was no secret and enough evidence could be found at the
points of contact. Pakistan’s South Waziristan Scouts and Frontier Scouts had
been positively identified in Uri. The men of the group could be seen wearing
serge battle fatigues. The tactics being employed, in any case, left no doubts in
the minds of the Indian forces that some seasoned soldiers had been directing and
leading the operations against them, on ground. Pakistan, however, remained in a
denial mode.
The garrison at Uri, towards end of November, had the following units
and forces, post some reshuffling during the recent days: -
-HQ 161 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier LP Sen.
-One squadron of 7 Cavalry.
-1 Sikh under Lieutenant Colonel Sampuran Bachan Singh.
-4 Kumaon1 under Lieutenant Colonel Man Mohan Khanna.
-One company of 1/1 Punjab (Indian elements).
-One Company 1 (Para) Kumaon.
-One Company less a platoon of 1 Mahar (MMG)
-One troop 32 Field Battery of 11 Field Regiment.
-One platoon 32 Assault Field Company.
-3 Light Field Ambulance.
-4 Field Surgical Team.
1- ​4 Kumaon had been facing shortage of manpower and after the battle of Badgam, the manpower
state had suffered badly. When the regimental training centre of the Kumaon Regiment was ordered to make
up the strength of 4 Kumaon, the Centre Commandant decided to send in all the men who were, in some way,
associated with 4 Kumaon. When the shortage could still not be met, he decided to take boys, already
earmarked for 4 Kumaon, from Boys’ Company and made up the strength. Boys companies, in almost all
centres were maintained during those days. Sons of veterans and serving personnel of the regiment were
taken in, educated and trained to be soldiers during the days to come in such companies. When the boys
reached Srinagar, the CO decided not

Within the garrison, the duties were rotated just before the end of the
month and 1 Sikh was withdrawn from the perimeter and kept as the formation
reserve while 4 Kumaon was placed along the perimeter. 2 Dogra had been doing
road protection between Baramulla and Uri.
At that point, the enemy had been holding Sank Ridge, starting from the
South of Uri, all the way to Pir Panjal where the ridge joined the main feature
West of Haji Pir. As per the inputs, a major chunk of the enemy force in the area
was located to the South of Uri. The enemy was apparently so deployed as to
deny any linkage between Uri and Poonch. About 1,000 odd enemy personnel
were reportedly concentrated along the belt Gohalan- Muhri Doba- Thajal along
the main Sank ridge. 4 Kumaon, now in the perimeter, had three posts echeloned
behind one another along Sankh Ridge. The posts had been named as Jitter,
Jitterbug and Diamond, with the post called Diamond being the Southernmost
and literally in the show window. Jitter and Jitterbug were manned by the ‘D’
Company while Diamond was manned by the ‘B’ Company of 4 Kumaon.
A number of attacks and incidences of stand-off firing on the forward
picquets, on the both sides of Jhelum continued throughout the period. On 01
December, a massive attack came on to Diamond Post. The enemy, more
determined than before, kept on pressing waves after waves for three long hours
and that too on either side of the sunset. The defenders, however, held on and
fought bravely. Finally, the enemy gave up and fled the area, leaving behind 25
dead while dragging an equal number of injured along.

to absorb them into rifle companies and created a platoon, Boys’ Platoon, and placed it under a competent
platoon commander, Jemadar Har Singh. He had also instructed that Boys’ Platoon would not be placed in
the line of fire because of their tender age and lack of proper training. However, the total strength of the
battalion, made up as per the War Establishment, did include a platoon of boys in the head count. All the
rifle companies, therefore, had a shortage of almost one section per company on ground because of such an
arrangement. However, with ‘E’ Company, as mentioned before, the battalion was now comfortable with its
manpower state.

DOMEL OR NOT
​ he big question as to whether an advance must be undertaken from
T
Uri to Domel or otherwise was once again analysed by Lieutenant General
Russell in consultation with Major General Kalwant Singh. The appreciation took
into consideration the following issues: -
-Administrative restraints wherein any major increment in forces in J&K
was difficult to maintain.
-The directions and decisions of 14 November had visualised operations
till Uri. The operations thereafter were subject to action in Poonch. As
long as Poonch remained under siege, the enemy was content sitting
opposite Uri; if Poonch was evacuated, the enemy would know that
Indian forces had enough troops to spare for Uri.
 -Troops had been on internal security duties for long and had been
inducted without any training in the mountain warfare. Units were still
recovering from the turbulence of partition that had taken subunits and
equipment out of many units.
-The road ahead of Uri was narrow and ran through a gorge. Delay line
battles and sniping could easily be conducted by the enemy holding the
high grounds. As per a realistic estimate, at least one brigade group was
required to progress beyond Uri and then to keep the LOC secured.
Based on the above factors, Lieutenant General Russell was of the view
that a pre-requisite to any advance ahead of Uri was the successful evacuation of
Poonch garrison. The following courses1 were, thus, visualised: -
-To attempt to destroy the enemy at Uri and follow up the success by a
dash for Domel before he had any time to recover.
-To push forward strong mobile patrols to maintain pressure and strike to
the extent of the forces available, in case patrolling and reconnaissance in
force disclosed that the enemy was thinning out at Uri.
1- ​Source: Operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-48; Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

- To bluff the enemy into believing that our intention was to continue the
advance down the Jhelum valley by a display of force beyond India’s
actual resources. The extent to which such a deception could be
successful would depend largely upon the loyalty of the local inhabitants,
but the fact that nearly all reports are exaggerated might be exploited.
-To launch a full-scale operation towards Domel in the spring as soon as
land communications were improved.
​ s far as the enemy was concerned, he would try his best to make sure
A
that a clean withdrawal from Poonch was not undertaken.
​The above appreciation led to the plan as summarised below2:-
-A successful withdrawal from Poonch and complete control over the
areas between Srinagar and Uri as also Jammu and Naushera, before
launching any offensive from Uri.
-Once above was done, move reinforcements from Jammu to the Valley.
-If the enemy, post evacuation of Poonch, kept on holding areas opposite
Uri in strength, he must be struck hard to force him to withdraw across
the IB.
 -If the enemy reduced his forces after the evacuation of Poonch, he would
be thrown beyond Domel and the bridge at Domel be demolished.
​ s can be seen, the above appreciation and plan were loaded with too
A
much of caution and restraint. While the directions of 14 November had been
correctly cited, the situation had changed vastly over the time period that had
followed and sticking to the previous line of thought might not have been the best
option to exercise.
Sardar Patel and Sardar Baldev Singh visited Jammu on 02 December and
returned with the horrifying tales of atrocities being unleashed on non-Muslims in
Jammu region. On 03 December, Pandit Nehru, during the Defence Committee of
the Cabinet, put his foot down and refused to give a go-ahead for the evacuation
of Poonch.

2- ​ibid.
​ n 05 December 1947, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet considered
O
both the papers during the meeting. Despite the Joint Planning Staff’s
recommendation being strongly supported by the Governor General, Pandit
Nehru refused to clear evacuation of Poonch. He, instead, wanted bold actions in
and around Poonch to break the will of invaders.
On 06 December 1947, PM chaired a meeting at Jammu. Maharaja Hari
Singh, Lieutenant General Russell, Major General Kalwant Singh and Bakshi
Ghulam Mohd (Minister for Law and Order in J&K) were present during the
meeting. Despite Lieutenant General Russell trying his best to argue his case that
had some military reasoning, the PM refused to budge. Finally, the GOC-in-C,
seeing the forceful conviction in the PM’s mind, gave his assurance about the
commitment of forces to make the operation a success.
 Uri Sector

FORMULATION OF PLAN FOR J&K

The formulation of the plan for J&K at Army HQ had started soon after the
conclusion of the proceedings of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet on 05
December 1947. After the high-level meeting at Jammu on 06 December,
Lieutenant General Russell finalised his operational instructions and issued the
same to the GOC of JAK Division on 10 December 1947. The operational
instructions analysed three sectors, and thrusts therein, as under: -
- Uri Sector (Northern Sector) – With the plan to cross Pir Panjal via Haji
Pir Pass now shelved for the time being, 161 Infantry Brigade was to
concentrate on its operations in the general area of Uri where the enemy
still held many heights and important positions. However, since the enemy
sat expecting the Indian Army to try and open Uri-Poonch axis, a deception
plan to keep up with his belief was required so as to spring a surprise at the
right moment.
-Naushera-Kotli-Poonch (Central Sector)- The enemy interference between
Beri Pattan and Naushera was not significant and there was a need to keep
 the status unchanged to avoid the need to have too many soldiers on road
protection tasks. However, while trying to make contact with Poonch,
surprise was difficult to be maintained beyond Jhangar. There was, thus, a
need to create a deception for a short while by showing movement towards
Pallandri. In order to establish contact with Poonch and then to ensure
supplies along the Jhangar-Poonch axis, additional troops were required
and while such a supply route was being opened, air supply would have to
be resorted to. An estimation of air effort had to be worked out based on the
estimated time required to open the axis.
-Akhnoor-Munnawar-Bhimbar (Southern Sector) – Bhimbar was a
roadhead and was expected to be held strongly. Further, the approach road
to Bhimbar ran hugging the border with Pakistan and in addition to
interference expected from across the border, the restriction on crossing the
border was a huge impediment. A mule track connected Naushera with
Bhimbar and offered an opportunity to surprise the enemy if used along
with another approach parallel to the border. A success in the sector meant
added protection to the thrust in the central sector.
Tasks to the GOC, JAK Division, based on the aforementioned
appreciation/analysis, were given out as under: -
-To push West as far as possible in Jhelum Valley and inflict maximum
embarrassment on investors of Poonch from the direction of Uri.
-To relieve Poonch town by deploying adequate force along the central
thrust.
-To advance to Bhimbar.
Engineering resources were at a premium given the herculean tasks that
had to be performed. Tasking of Engineer resources in Jammu region was done as
under: -
-14 Field Company in support of the forward brigade.
-22 Field Company to improve axis Akhnoor-Beri Pattan and operate ferry
at Beri Pattan.
-69 Field Company as reserve at Jammu.
Maintenance of troops was a major issue too and its importance was
underscored time and again while issuing administrative instructions, as under: -
-The ceiling limit for troops in the Valley was fixed at 4,000. However,
option to increase the strength was kept available to the GOC JAK Division
 if and only if those many troops could be maintained by JAK Division
without asking for additional resources.
-Protection of supply lines ahead of Kathua was the responsibility of JAK
Division.
-Adequate dumping was required to be done at Jammu, Akhnoor and
Naushera to support operations in the central sector.
-Supplies for Poonch were to be flown ex Jammu and HQ Delhi-East
Punjab Command was responsible for ferrying supplies, by air, from Delhi
to Jammu.

TOUGH TIMES: DECEMBER 1947

​ he action around Uri didn’t pause even for a single day while decisions
T
were being taken at Delhi. After a failed attempt by the enemy to capture
Diamond Post on 01 December, the enemy reverted back to his routine of
launching jitter parties, small but crisp attacks, long range sniping and stand-0ff
fire assaults. On an average, two such incidents were being reported every day and
on both sides of Jhelum.
​ n 06 December, the enemy, having kept his main focus on the area
O
South of Uri during recent days, suddenly launched another assault on Nalwa
Picquet, across Jhelum River. The defenders, yet again, threw the invaders back.
As a follow up, a fighting patrol was sent to the village of Mukdam Saiyidan to
sanitise the area on 08 December. The enemy chose to stay out of sight and the
patrol returned to the picquet at Nalwa without any engagement with the enemy.
​ hile a show of offensive was being done to the North of Jhelum, it
W
was decided to step out and hit the enemy on Sankh Ridge. On 09 December, a
platoon of 4 Kumaon, sent out to carry out the reconnaissance of Bhatgiran
village, came under heavy fire while it was still short of the village.
 Posts in the South of Uri
I​ t was estimated that at least two platoons of enemy had opened up on the
patrol. With snow all around, the patrol did manage to slowly withdraw back into
the perimeter where own picquets made the enemy give up chase of the platoon in
retreat.
 Ambush between Mahura & Rampur
‘B’ Company of 1 Sikh then went again to the same area on 10 December
and came back after engaging the enemy and estimating the strength to be in
excess of three companies. On 10 December itself, ‘D’ company and a platoon of
‘B’ company manning Diamond Post, approached the village of Muhri Doba
where the enemy was known to have a base inside the village. The attack went off
smoothly and enemy started to flee to South and the Southwest. With the attack
fetching the desired results, ‘C’ Company was also launched with the platoon of 1
(Para) Kumaon under command. At the end of the action, 80 invaders had been
killed and 50-odd had been wounded. Indians had suffered five fatal casualties.
The enemy, however, came back strongly and launched an attack with two
companies on Jitter Post at 2030 on 10 December itself. The attack was repulsed.
On 11 December, the enemy struck at the main road between Uri and
Rampur and the movement on the road ceased suddenly. ‘D’ Company of 4
Kumaon and the platoon of 1 (Para) Kumaon were pulled out after denuding the
defences a bit and were launched against the enemy. Soon, the troops were pinned
down as it was now clear that at least one battalion of the enemy was in the area to
the Southeast of Uri, i.e., between Bhatgiran and the main road. A fighter jet of the
RIAF on routine mission was directed and the pilot bombed the enemy while own
troops watched from a close distance. With aerial assaults underway, both the
companies started to withdraw but the enemy appeared to be in no mood to give
up. As the companies started getting closer to own perimeter, the enemy
undertook a smart outflanking move to intercept the troops withdrawing back into
the perimeter around Uri. Jemadar Dhan Singh of 1 (Para) Kumaon stood up to
the occasion as he led his platoon bravely while fighting a tough rear-guard action.
He managed to bring his platoon in but was badly wounded during the action.
As the luck would have it, the Boys’ platoon of 4 Kumaon was deployed
in the very same area where the enemy ambush party was headed. As instructed
by the CO, the boys had been deployed at a safer portion of the perimeter after the
boys had tenderly protested against the soft treatment being given to them a few
days before, making the CO relent a bit. The platoon commander, caught between
orders and a real situation, ordered the boys not to open fire. He was probably
hoping for the enemy to go ahead to some other location. But as the enemy
headed straight into the boys who, despite their inexperience and young age, had
been bravely holding their nerves and the fire, were ordered to open fire by the
platoon commander. The youngsters aiming straight as taught by their instructors,
hit the bull with many enemy personnel getting incapacitated in the very first
volley of fire. Still confused as to how and what had hit him, the enemy chose to
flee, leaving the dead and injured behind. The platoon commander, Jemadar Har
Singh was awarded VrC for his leadership and courage under fire. Jemadar Dhan
Singh too was awarded a VrC but he didn’t live to receive it personally; he died
four days after getting wounded.
​ wo days later, another operation was planned and launched. The exact
T
details of the operation are not really recorded in the official history of the war1.
By what has been recorded, invaders holding the hills and spurs jutting out of
Sankh Ridge to the South, had been indulging in sniping as well as interfering
with the movement of convoys on the roads Uri-Poonch
1- ​The reason for such a gap in the information is the fact that a few very different versions of the
operation have been recorded/claimed by as many participants in their notes and memoirs.
 Unforgiving Terrain: Action at Bhatgiran

and Uri-Baramulla. A patrol under Major Ajaib Singh of 1 Sikh (‘B’ Company)
had a patrol clash with enemy on 10 December and it was decided to re-visit the
area to clear it of the enemy.
To start with, an operation was launched by 1 Sikh under their CO to clear
the area to the South/Southeast of Uri. Accordingly, 1 Sikh, less one company,
moved out at 0700h on 12 December. It had snowed and the ridges were all
covered with snow. No major contact or interference by the enemy was made
during the sweeping of the slopes by the battalion. The enemy personnel probably
deployed on the look-out duties or as observation posts, were seen abandoning
their positions and retreating further South.
After reaching the ridge, the battalion started moving back down via
Bhatgiran ridge2, aiming to reach the village by the same name and then turn
North along Haj Pir-Uri Road. However, the moment the leading company started
moving downwards, followed by the rest of the battalion, it was suddenly caught
in a large killing area, a deep re-entrant, being dominated by enemy on the three
sides. ‘B’ Company, got pinned down and could only be extricated through the
gallant action of the leading platoon of ‘D’ Company under Jemadar Nand Singh,
VC. A veteran and Victoria Cross awardee of the WWII, Jemadar Nand Singh led
his men from the front and launched a fearless assault on the enemy. It finally
boiled down to hand to hind fighting and both sides took heavy casualties. As the
brave platoon charged with bayonets fixed on their rifles, a burst of an LMG hit
the brave JCO from very close quarters. He was awarded MVC posthumously.
Most of the men of the platoon perished during the assault but the
courageous action allowed ‘B’ Company to pull out of the re-entrant. Another
JCO to fall while fighting was Subedar Bishan Bahadur Singh, a MC awardee of
WWII. He, too belonged to ‘D’ Company and he, seeing Jemadar Nand Singh’s
platoon perishing during the contact battle, had charged and run into the hail of
bullets, with utter disregard to his own safety and well-being. He died fighting
while covering the withdrawal of the battalion and was awarded MVC,
posthumously.
The CO, Colonel Sampuran Bachan Singh and ‘B’ Company Commander,
Major Ajaib Singh too got wounded and the battalion was ordered to withdraw.
The enemy, however, started following the mauled troops and it soon became a
running fight.
Incidentally, the picquet through which the battalion was now
withdrawing, was once again held by Boys’ Platoon of 4 Kumaon. The boys had
another moment of glory within a short span when they engaged enemy and
forced him to withdraw, thus, facilitating exit of 1 Sikh from the contact battle.
Incidentally, the picquet through which the battalion was now
withdrawing, was once again held by Boys’ Platoon of 4 Kumaon. The boys had
another moment of glory within a short span when they engaged the enemy and
forced him to withdraw, thus, facilitating the exit of 1 Sikh from the contact
battle. At the end of the day, 1 Sikh had lost one officer, two JCOs and 57 OR
(Other Ranks) while two officers, including the CO, four JCOs and 55 OR had
been wounded. The enemy battalion of Frontier Scouts, suffered an estimated 300
killed and 500 wounded.
2- ​As per Brigadier Sen, the orders for the battalion had been to move out through the area held by
picquets of 4 Kumaon and then re-trace their steps through the same route. The orders, apparently, had been
violated because the battalion, instead of getting back through the same route, chose an alternate and easier
route that had not been secured.
Over the next few days, Jitter Post was attacked on 13, 14 and 15
December, but unsuccessfully. On 19 December, Jitter and Jitterbug were attacked
simultaneously but once again, the invaders were repulsed.
 1 Sikh, having lost many men during the engagement at Bhatgiran, was
pulled out of action and was relieved by 6 Raj Rif. 1 Sikh moved to Srinagar for
rest and refit on 22 December, leaving one company at Baramulla for a few more
days. Srinagar Force was then dissolved and Colonel Harbaksh Singh took over
the command of 1 Sikh while still remaining the Station Commander of Srinagar
Station. 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles under Lieutenant Colonel LS Negi reached
Srinagar on 18 December. Banihal Pass got snowed out and closed for the winters
on 20 December.
On 24 December, Jhangar in Naushera Sector, fell to the enemy. HQ of
JAK Division also moved to Jammu for impending operations in the Jammu
region .

Jemadar Nand Singh, VC, MVC (P)

 Nand Singh Bridge at Uri was named after the brave JCO. It got damaged during the massive
earthquake in 2005 (seen in the picture (above) is the diversion created, the new bridge under construction
and Nand Memorial on a small hill to the left (the pillar is seen); another view of the memorial and the new
bridge (below))
 TAKING STOCK OF THE SITUATION

​By the end of December 1947, the situation in J&K State, under JAK
Division, was as under: -
-HQ JAK Division had four brigades- one in Valley (161 Infantry
Brigade) and three in Jammu region (80 Infantry Brigade at Akhnoor, 50
Para Brigade at Naushera and 268 Infantry Brigade at Jammu)- in
addition to an adhoc brigade at Poonch.
-The enemy forces were estimated to be about 13,000 in Uri Sector, 6,000
at Muzaffarabad and about 17,000 in Jammu region.
-The enemy, therefore, had a clear numerical superiority in Uri and
Naushera sectors. In addition, a faster build up by enemy was possible
because of the shorter and well-maintained axes via Manshera and Mirpur
respectively.
-Uri was being defended strongly but Poonch was highly vulnerable with
movement hindering snow acting as a saving grace for the time being.
As per the appreciation of Major General Kalwant Singh, the GOC of JAK
Division, the following steps were required to be taken immediately to salvage
the situation: -
- Uri Sector and Poonch garrison to be reinforced by a battalion each.
-Air evacuation of ladies and children from Poonch.
-Hold Naushera and Beri Pattan at all costs.
-A brigade group to be organised for the recapture of Jhangar.
-Build up on Chhamb to threaten and capture Bhimbar.
- Hold Akhnoor bridge over Chenab River at all costs.
-Hold Jammu at all costs.
-Capture Mirpur.
-After capture of Mirpur, relieve Poonch.
The C-in-C of Indian forces, General Rob Lockhart, while considering the
appreciation and recommendations made by Major General Kalwant Singh, was
of the view that the enemy was likely to prevent the capture of Mirpur and relief
of Poonch and was likely to attempt and drive back own forces from Uri, Poonch
and Naushera. As per General Lockhart, the enemy would harass individual
posts, raid line of communications and create panic in the villages to achieve the
aim. The enemy was likely to carry out such actions all along the front from
Jammu to Uri.
As against Major General Kalwant Singh’s recommendations, General
Lockhart, therefore, was of the view that it would be unwise to concentrate on
one area (Jammu region in this case) and leave out the other area (Valley),
especially so, when the enemy would be aiming to capture Srinagar. He felt that
the forces in the Uri sector were not strong enough to undertake an advance
towards Domel and at the same time, to defend Uri and to protect LOC. The
finalised and approved course of action included the following: -
-The task in Uri sector would be to consolidate the defences, prevent
infiltration and take limited offensive actions only when such an
opportunity came forth.
-Poonch to be held at all costs.
-Early steps to recapture Jhangar so as to open Naushera-Jhangar-Kotli -
Poonch axis to assist Poonch garrison.
-A threat to be developed along Chhamb-Bhimbar.
-Security of Jammu to be ensured.
-Air effort to be dedicated including transport aircraft for six supply sorties
per day.

The situation on ground, as also, the recommended plan of action

demanded reinforcement of forces in JAK Division. The issue was deliberated
upon during the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 27 December 1947. The related
problems of maintenance of such an increment were also discussed since passes
were getting closed and lines of maintenance already stood overstretched. Only
two dedicated Dakotas1, available for the maintenance ex Jammu, were already
under stress.
A summary of decisions/recommendations taken/made during the meeting,
and during the days that immediately followed the meeting, is given below: -
- One infantry brigade with three infantry battalions, a squadron of
armoured cars and a field company of engineers to reinforce JAK Division.
Out of three battalions, 2 (Para) Madras2 or 3/9 Gorkha Rifles3 (3/9 GR) to
reinforce Poonch and Ist Battalion the Indian Grenadiers4 to reinforce Uri
from within the resources of Delhi-East
1- ​Dakotas had been modified to carry out aerial attacks.
 Punjab Command. The third battalion to be identified by the Army HQ
from some other Command.
-Recommendations to buy 15 Dakotas on immediate basis.
-JAK Division, post reinforcements, was recommended to be renamed as
JAK Force.
-HQ East Punjab Area to raise six Front Constabulary battalions in addition
to 10,000 strong irregular force; latter to be made available to HQ JAK
Force, if required.
-A 10,0005 strong force of irregulars, primarily ex-servicemen, to be raised
within J&K.
-Patiala Royalty to raise one more infantry battalion.
-Establishment of an Intelligence Bureau (IB) to augment intelligence set
up in J&K and for managing a prisoners’ cage.
-A Line of Communication Sub Area HQ6 at Pathankot with an aim to
convert Pathankot into an advance base.
-Deputy Force Commander for JAK Force.
2- ​2 (Para) Madras was part of 77 Para Brigade. Raised in 1776 as 75th Carnatic Infantry, the
battalion underwent a number of changes in its nomenclature right till after independence when it was
finally named as 2 MADRAS. During the conflict of 1947-48, 77 Para Brigade had 2(Para) Madras, 3(Para)
Rajput and 4 (Para) Rajputana Rifles. However, since the disbandment of 2nd Airborne Division in 1945,
these battalions had been carrying out parachute duties while still wearing the uniforms of own parent
regiments except the headgear (maroons). Word, ‘Para’, was added to their titles for the ease of distinction.
3- ​3rd Battalion 9 GR belongs to the family of 9 GR that traces its origin to 1817. This battalion was
air flown into Poonch in January 1948.
4- ​The first-born grenadier regiment of the armies in the Commonwealth belongs to the Indian Army.
The idea of 'Grenadiers' evolved from the practice of picking the boldest and sturdiest men for the most
hazardous tasks in battle. The Grenadiers have the longest unbroken record of existence in the Indian Army.
The very first mention of a grenadier company dates back to 1684 as part of English troops who had taken
possession of the island of Bombay in that year. Subsequently, the first Grenadier Regiment in the world,
namely "The Grenadier Battalion, First Regiment of Infantry” was raised at Bombay in 1779. After many
changes and re-designations, two Battalions, Ist Indian Grenadiers and 2nd Indian Grenadiers were
converted into motorised ‘Tank Escorts’ battalions during the WWII. 1st Battalion, The Grenadiers became
2nd Battalion Brigade of the Guards in 1950.
5- ​Raising of irregular units was witnessed all across the state. Shortage of troops
-An Administrative Commandant at Srinagar.
-Long term plan to raise an Area HQ in Jammu and other Sub Area HQ at
other locations, as and when felt necessary.
-Institution of gallantry awards to recognise acts of bravery.
 Some of the aforementioned decisions
and recommendations were implemented straightway and others went into long
procedural pipelines. Indian forces were now gearing up for a long slog over a
tough and unfriendly terrain and inclement weather conditions- not actually
found elsewhere across the entire landmass of the country.
 Indian Engineers at work on Jammu-Srinagar Road (left); Two Tempest Aircraft over Kashmir Skies
(right)
was one reason while fighting spirit of local volunteers was another but an equally important reason. Such
units were called Leh Scouts in Leh, Nubra Guards in Shyok Valley, Border Defence Scouts in Jammu, Bal
Sena and Banmanush in Chhamb-Naushera, Poonch Scouts in Poonch and National Home Guards in the
Kashmir valley. Most of these irregulars were eventually absorbed into the newly constituted JAK Militia
battalions in 1948 under the Ministry of Home Affairs. All such units served along LC for next 18 years.
Because of their performance in 1965 and 1971 wars, the units were later absorbed into Indian Army as JAK
Light Infantry units in 1972.
6- ​A LOC Sub Area was later raised under Brigadier Jai Singh at Pathankot. Present name: HQ 21 Sub
Area.

WINTERS OF 1947-48

​With the advent of Chilla-i-Kalan1, heavy snowing had picked up by

the end of December and had brought all actions around Uri to a grinding halt.
However, by mid-January, snow hit the valley floor at Uri, sending everything
into a sombre wintry sleep for a while.
​ ieutenant General Kodandera "Kipper" Madappa Cariappa, OBE, the
L
GOC-in-C, Eastern Command took over the command of HQ Delhi and East
Punjab Command and changed the name of the formation to HQ Western
Command.
​ aving received the tasking as issued by the Army HQ, Brigadier LP
H
Sen carried out a detailed appreciation of the situation in January 1948. His
appreciation justified, and rightfully so, the importance of holding Uri strongly.
Uri had a strategic importance since routes from Muzaffarabad/Domel, Poonch
and Srinagar/Baramulla converged at Uri. The terrain configuration was such that
any large-scale movement towards Srinagar, either from Poonch or from Domel,
had to be progressed through Uri. With the Pir Panjal peaks safely burried under
the deep snow, chances of any misadventure by the enemy either through
Gulmarg route or Pir-kiGali route (both across Pir Panjal), were almost nil.
However, there was a massive presence of enemy both to the South (astride Uri-
Haji Pir-Poonch) axis and to the West (Chakothi-Domel). Even though Haji Pir
was now under very heavy snow, the enemy action originating from South of Uri
was very much likely while anything from Poonch area, per se, was almost ruled
out.
To the North of Uri, Jhelum flew fast but had been shrunk in width due to
winters. The river could be crossed at will and yet the possibility of any threat
developing from the North and coming on to Uri or the lines of
1- ​ he December 21st marks the beginning of the 40-day winter period known as ‘Chilla-i-Kalan’. This
T
period is considered as the coldest period of winter not only in Kashmir but also South of Pir Panjal and
extends to the areas as far and wide as Middle East. It is followed by 20 days long Chila-iKhurd and 10 days
long Chilla-i- Bacha. The origin of these terms lies in Persian tradition wherein the night of 21/22 December
is celebrated as Shab-e Yalda- “Night of Birth” or Shab-e Chelleh – “Night of Forty”. This Persian winter
solstice celebration has been popular since the ancient times. The Iranian Azerbaijanis call it Chilla-e-
Gejasi, meaning the beginning of the first 40 days of winter. In literal sense, Kalan means big, Khurd means
small and Bacha means miniscule.
communication was again very low. Kazinag Dhar, Chhota Kazinag Dhar, Kafir
Khan Range and Samsabari Range (all originating from Kala Pahar) were under
heavy snow and the enemy would not achieve anything by merely walking along
the Northern bank of the river where concealment was difficult. The prime threat,
therefore, remained from South and West.

Appreciated Enemy Approaches

​ hamsabari Range, though under snow, could be crossed by a sizeable

S
force, on foot with logistics on mules, if such an attempt were made by the enemy
to use Tithwal -Tangdhar- Kupwara/Handwara axes. Having crossed Nastachhun
Pass (NC Pass), the enemy could hit the valley floor where snow would not be a
major issue. Further, once down in Khamil River basin, the enemy had an option
to progress the operations via Kupwara-Bandipura-Srinagar or Handwara-
Sopore-Baramulla/Magam-Srinagar. However, denying that option to the enemy
by a force based at Uri was difficult and impractical2. The one major route to
Srinagar via Gilgit too had
2- ​His appreciation was to be proved accurate when the enemy threat did develop in Handwara area a
month later and then in the month of April 1948, the enemy tried to hit Mahura powerhouse in strength.
been snowed out and was not an immediate issue.
The known enemy strength around Uri was about 1,500 in the area
Bhatgiran, about 6,000 between Garhi and Domel, 3,000 at Muzaffarabad and
about 500 in Handwara area.
​ oming back to the tasking per se, as the Brigade Commander,
C
Brigadier Sen was supposed to defend Uri strongly, deny enemy infiltration and
interference with the LOC (road Uri-Baramulla-Srinagar) and carry out limited
offensive actions as per the opportunities available. In his own scheme of things,
protection of the power house at Mahura3 was also an important task since it
supplied power to Srinagar and other parts of the Valley.
​ o defend Uri, Brigadier Sen worked out a requirement of two and a
T
half battalions- one and a half battalion to man the defensive layout around the
bowl and one battalion to be kept in reserve at Uri to meet any unforeseen
contingency and/or to exploit a fleeting opportunity as and when it made itself
available.
​ he LOC, all of 48 km between Uri and Baramulla had to be protected
T
to prevent isolation of Uri. A number of bridges on the road had been destroyed
by the withdrawing enemy and now the diversions had been created and a few
had been repaired. Any one bridge getting demolished meant the isolation of Uri
with a possible tightening of noose around the bowl. The LOC, therefore, needed
close protection of Mahura, Rampur, Buniyar, Nowshera and Baramulla.
​Brigadier LP Sen had five battalions at that moment. Taking out 2.5
battalions for Uri, he would be left with 2.5 more. Three more attached
companies and supporting elements in the form of a squadron of 7 Cavalry and
artillery troops were also in addition to the five battalions but only infantry and
armoured cars could be taken into consideration for tasking. With one battalion
and a company protecting LOC between Uri and Baramulla, there would still be
one battalion and three companies left for protection of Baramulla. His broad
plan, therefore, hinged on the following deployment: -
​-2.5 Battalions at Uri.
-One battalion to look after the road Uri-Baramulla with its HQ and
3- ​The powerhouse had been saved, just in the nick of time by 1 (Para) Kumaon as they went chasing
the invaders at Baramulla and beyond.

one company at Rampur, two companies at Mahura and one company at

Buniyar.
 -One battalion less a company at Baramulla with one company at
Nowshera.
The above deployment gave a balanced posture to the brigade, as also,
allowed respective battalion commanders to have a stability in command. A
further change, however, was forced on the Commander when confirmed inputs
of Pakistani regulars and many tribesmen heading towards Mahura were received
on 18 January. A company of 2 Dogra had been deployed at Mahura but the
inputs indicated a very large strength of enemy building up through snowed-out
footpaths, across the river.

Deployment of 161 Infantry Brigade: Winters 1948

The brigade reserve battalion, 4 Kumaon was ordered to move to Mahura

and thwart the attempts by the enemy. It was a chilly night and a strong blizzard
was on when the battalion moved out from Uri at 0430h on 19 January. While the
battalion did manage to cover ten km to Mahura, on foot, in four hours, the
follow up transport did so in six hours. The going was extremely difficult, both
due to accumulated snow and the blizzard.
The blizzard abated after a day and on 21 January, ‘C’ Company under
Captain Dildar Singh crossed Jhelum after improvising, using a large tea-chest in
lieu of a missing basket of an old, out-of-order suspended cradle ropeway (please
see picture ahead) that had existed a long time ago. They crossed one man at a
time and could send across only two platoons less a section that day. The party
that had crossed, then went ahead and deployed on a dominating ground that was
later named after the Company Commander. The next day, the balance of the
company built up and took up defences on Dildar Ridge, thereby, eliminating
immediate threat to Mahura.
On 23 January, ‘A’ Company, having crossed under the Company
Commander, Major Bolina, started with aggressive patrolling. On 27 January, the
company attacked and dislodged enemy from his stronghold at Dhanni Saiyidan
before taking up defences on the same picquet. A two feet wide suspension bridge
was then constructed by Sappers at Mahura. Despite the wild swings that the rope
bridge would make during windy conditions, it was to serve as a lifeline for the
troops deployed to the North of Jhelum.
As mentioned earlier, winters had brought activities to a virtual halt and
both sides remained content with patrolling and securing of respective areas
without any major offensive task being undertaken by either of the two
A lot was happening across Pir Panjal during that period after arrival of 1
(Para) Kumaon at Poonch and new operations being planned in Naushera Sector.
However, those details are being left out of this work. Similarly, with the threat
developing towards Leh, a small force of 75 Dogra volunteers from 2 Dogra and
JAK State Forces left Srinagar on 16 February and reached Leh on 08 March.
The force was led by Captain Prithi Chand of 2 Dogra with Captain Khushal
Chand as the second-in-command. That part is also not being covered in this
book4.

4- ​‘Z’ or Zebra Force had been raised under Brigadier Lakhinder Singh to conduct all the operations
in Handwara-Skardu-Ladakh belt, just prior to despatch of that force.

ACTION RETURNS: SPRING OF 1948

​ he middle of March saw life in general limping back to normalcy in
T
the Valley. Sometime around that period, the enemy too started building up his
strength in the Valley with the obvious aim to reach Srinagar once again. By the
end of March, the areas in the immediate vicinity of Uri and Mahura had as many
as eight new battalions of enemy forces. With the snow cover now depleted even
on the higher reaches, the enemy had started pushing in force towards North of
Jhelum as well. Very soon, Uri-Mahura area had been flanked by the enemy
successfully, while maintaining a reasonable distance from the Indian troops. It
was also confirmed that regular units had moved into the sector.
I​ n addition to the existing enemy locations in Bhatgiran, Muhri Doba,
Thajal, Garhi, Chakoti, Muzaffarabad and Bachi Forest, the reported fresh enemy
reinforcements in the area were as under: -
-One Battalion in the area Gohalan-Salamabad Forest-Dardkot, to the
Southwest of Uri.
-One battalion astride Jhelum, in the area Kalgai (South bank) and Sulatn
Dhakki and Shahdara (North Bank).
-One battalion in area Zambur Pattan- Jabri-Dabkan, across Jhelum, to the
Northwest of Uri.
-One battalion in area Nala Zambur Pattan-Dhanni Saiyidan, across
Jhelum, to the North/Northeast of Uri.
-One battalion in area Maiyan-Bijhama, across Jhelum, to Northeast of
Uri.
-One battalion in area Kopra-Bagna-Islamabad-Limbar, across Jhelum and
to the North of Mahura-Rampur area.
-Two battalions, referred to as Jinnah’s Fauj, dispersed on South and North
of Jhelum.
With such a massive increment and with increased number of regulars
now facing Indian troops, there was a genuine reason for Brigadier LP Sen to be
worried. The formation was once again re-organised with the threat building up
against Uri and the LOC. The fresh deployment of the units was now as under: -
-Two battalions, 6 Raj Rif and 2 Dogra at Uri.
-4 Kumaon at Mahura.
-3 Royal Garhwal Rifles at Baramulla.
Deployment of Enemy Battalions around Uri (Two battalions
of Jinnah Fauj not being shown)

The above deployment kept on changing with the changes in the threat
perception. The intelligence, however, was a big handicap for the Indian troops
since neither the local population was of any help nor was there any trans-territory
movement of civilians taking place.
Throughout the month, raids and counter-raids kept befalling the Uri
sector. On 04 March, a strongly held feature, Point 7760, across Jhelum and to the
Northwest of Mahura was attacked by a company strong fighting patrol of 4
Kumaon. The enemy, taken by complete surprise, was taken on by Kumaonis in a
bayonet charge. 35 of them were killed before they could gather their wits and
run. Artillery fire was then called for and another 57 of them were killed in the
shelling.
 Mahura & Around

Then, on 16 March, a bigger force under the Tac HQ of 4 Kumaon with

‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies approached Chullan, across Jhelum. However, an alert
enemy opened up, forcing the patrol to pull back. Enemy then tried to follow up
the leading company now in retreat but the following company had deployed and
had been waiting for the enemy in an ambush. Sensing trouble, the enemy gave up
on chase. The very next day, enemy from North of Dhanni Saiyidan came down
South and tried to rush 4 Kumaon picquets, Dildar and Spring North of Mahura.
Before the assault could be launched, MMGs opened up and artillery joined the
battle, forcing the enemy to withdraw and retreat into the hills across the river.
 On 18 March, at about 2000h, two companies of enemy from Bijhama and
one company from Point 7760 came as one big force with an aim to attack Dildar
picquet at Mahura. But it met with the same fate as the previous one had, with the
artillery, mortars and MMGs breaking the assault.On 19 March, a ‘B’ Company
patrol from 4 Kumaon was pinned down by the enemy occupying slopes of Point
7760 but timely artillery fire support helped the patrol to extricate. On 22 March,
a 4 Kumaon patrol trying to probe Islamabad Nala to the North of Rampur, was
encircled by enemy closing in from Lachhipur and Kopra areas. Once again,
artillery came to the rescue and the patrol extricate itself without any losses.

A
new brigade, 163 Infantry Brigade was also raised in the Valley, by upgrading HQ
Z Force. Brigadier JC Katoch, the erstwhile commander of 161 Infantry Brigade,
took over the command of 163 Infantry Brigade as Brigadier Lakhwinder Singh
moved out on promotion on 22 March.
Lieutenant General (later Field Marshal) KM ‘Kipper’ Cariappa, OBE, GOC-in-C, Western
Command, became the first Indian C-in-C of Indian Army in 1949

ACROSS THE RIVER: APRIL 1948

 ​ he trend of skirmishes, raids and sniping continued even during the
T
month of April 1948. On 07 April, enemy attacked a picquet, Anandparbat, being
manned by 4 Kumaon at Mahura. The attack was repulsed with no casualty. With
an increased threat to Mahura and intelligence inputs indicating further increase in
threat factor, 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles was moved from Baramulla to Nag Nari
across Jhelum on 08/09 April. The aim was to fix the enemy in the North of the
river, by threatening his open flank to the East.
​ he recent spurt in activities had led Brigadier Sen to believe that
T
something big was in the offing. Having deployed to the North of Indian Picquets
on the other side of the river, enemy had been patrolling aggressively while more
and more un-held areas were being taken by the enemy further to the North.
Inputs about enemy personnel crossing Jhelum to the West of Uri and then
marching East back towards area opposite Mahura were also being received.
Brigadier Sen cautioned CO 4 Kumaon and between two of them, all
contingencies were discussed and thrashed in detail. 4 Kumaon was now getting
ready to face a coordinated and deliberate enemy action. Brigadier Sen, in
anticipation of the enemy’s action and in line with own plans to thwart such
actions, gave warning orders to 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles to get ready for a limited
attack on orders.
The reported enemy disposition, again dynamic in nature, at that point of
time was as under: -
-Two weak battalions were pitched against 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles
opposite Nag Nari, in Point 7706 area.
-There were total of three battalions spread in the area between Zambur
Pattan and Kopra.
-Main concentrations of unknown numbers at Lacchipura, Maiyan, Point
7760, Goashar, Chullan, Bari Baikh, Bagna and Islamabad.
On 10 April, the enemy once again came down South and tried to rush
another picquet of 4 Kumaon, called Chittor to the North of the river. After
beating the attack, the enemy was chased towards point 7760 and engaged with
artillery.
​ uring the period, while the intent of the enemy had been known, the
D
likely timelines of enemy’s actions were not clearly known and a huge gap in the
information existed. Fortunately for Brigadier Sen, on 10 April, an enemy
commander, named Khalil, was heard communicating on radio to his masters in
Pakistan and that too in clear. His claim, “Tomorrow night, I shall change the
map”, filled up the gap in the information and stage was set to pre-empt the
enemy’s plans. The green signal was given to Garhwalis.

Clearance of Area North of Jhelum (‘F’ inside

the arrow depicts Feint attacks/deception)

​ n 11 April, 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles, now at Nag Nari, launched an

O
attack on a feature, Point 7706, to the West of own location. Three companies -
‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’- under the CO, Lieutenant Colonel LS Negi, approached the
feature at around 1100h. At that moment, the leading platoon made contact with
the enemy and brushed aside a few enemy-held positions before getting pinned
down short of the top. Another platoon was sent in to join the battle and after
closing in and fighting with bayonets and khukhris (curved blade machetes of
Nepali origin), troops took the feature. The enemy lost 26 of his men while 34 had
been wounded. Nine Bulas (Garhwali soldiers are affectionately called so)
sustained injuries. The RIAF flew over the area on 12 April and bombarded
enemy locations. A patrol sent to probe Bambyar on 12 April, came under fire and
pulled back after breaking contact with the enemy who had been deployed inside
the village.
 ​ o sandwich the enemy in disarray, 4 Kumaon was tasked to capture
T
Kopra feature on 14 April. Three companies were to launch a multi-directional
attack after forming up across Jhelum. 25Pounders from Uri and 3.7-inch
howitzers from Mahura were to support the attack planned to commence at 2100h.
Two 3-inch mortars, initially deployed on either flank and on the home bank, were
to move ahead and cross Jhelum at the first light. Air support had also been
coordinated. Two mixed platoons were tasked to stage a simulated attack on Dara
and Point 77601 simultaneously about four hours before the actual attack at Kopra.
The simulation was to continue an hour after the H-hour of the actual attack.
A well-coordinated attack went through without any hiccups and the
objective of Kopra was captured by 0730h on 15 April. Permanent picquets were
established on the feature, as planned. The operation had been so clean that not
even a single soldier had been injured during the attack while the enemy had
suffered 13 fatal and nine non-fatal casualties.
The enemy, now sandwiched between Kumaonies from West and
Garhwalis in the East, was now in a state of panic. The complete stretch of
territory between Kopra and Nag Nari, i.e., Bagna, Islamabad, Limbar and
Bambyar, was abandoned by the enemy even before any mopping of the area
could be undertaken by the Indian forces.
​With Mahura situation still not very comfortable, redeployment of
battalions was ordered by Brigadier Sen. Accordingly, 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles
moved out from Nag Nari, leaving one company behind, and joined 4 Kumaon at
Mahura on 17 April. 1 Madras took over duties of road protection between
Buniyar and Mahura.

1- ​CO, 4 Kumaon had created another company, ‘F’ Company that was named ‘Refugee Company’ by
pulling out 20 men from each company that were deployed to hold picquets on ground. Such manpower would
be rotated regularly. The men of the company would generally train if not being employed as reserves in the
action. Men of Refugee Company were employed to carry out ruse towards Point 7760 during the operation.
​ ith snow melting and allowing the enemy practically unhindered
W
movements, Uri too had also been feeling the heat. Two battalions. i.e., 6 Raj Rif
and 2 Dogra, were deployed in Uri. The assaults on picquets like Subash (a
company less a platoon of 6 Raj Rif), Chauhan (one platoon of 6 Raj Rif), Tagore
(a company less a platoon of 2 Dogra), Nalwa (a company of 6 Raj Rif) were
invariably violent and supported by mortar and MMG fire.
On 18 April, sudden increased presence in Kalgai was picked up by
troops in contact. At about 1815h that day, Subash picquet came under heavy
attack from the direction of Danna. A platoon of mortars and at least two MMGs
were supporting the assault. Initially, the fire assaults proved to be ineffective but
at 1835h, a company strength of enemy emerged from the forested area and
started advancing towards the picquet. The defenders held the fire, allowing the
enemy an unimpeded approach. As the enemy closed within 50m, the post opened
up with all the weapons at its disposal. Artillery too joined in and the enemy who
had been charging with war cries, was found crying and moaning before long. The
neighbouring Ashoka picquet also opened 3-inch mortar fire and enemy found it
difficult to extricate. After the enemy managed to break the contact, Subash
picquet was reinforced by a platoon.
The enemy came again at 2100h and attacked both Subash and Ashoka but was
beaten back once again despite the fact that pre-H Hour bombardment had been
particularly heavy and effective. It proved to be a long, tough night as the enemy
disengaged but re-appeared in front of the most important picquet of Nalwa at
2300h. For over next two hours, the picquet was heavily bombarded before long
range automatic weapons opened up. The enemy, somehow, chose to stay away
and all the firing ceased by 0400h. The enemy suffered scores of fatal and many
more non-fatal casualties that night. The exact figures were never known but at
Nalwa, where the enemy didn’t even launch a physical assault, 14 men were seen
lying dead at a distance while 20 odd bodies were counted while being carried by
the enemy on retreat.
Subash picquet, because of its resilience while bearing the brunt of the
attacks that night, had displayed remarkable soldiering. The picquet commander,
Jemadar Sanwal Ram of 6 Raj Rif was awarded Vr C for his undaunted and
courageous leadership.
​ fter the re-deployment of troops, 161 Brigade now started executing
A
the next string of operations. On 19/20 April, an operation was launched to flush
out the enemy from Points 7760 and 9062, further West of the territory already
cleared. 4 Kumaon was tasked to attack Point 7760 while Point 9062 was given to
3 Royal Garhwal Rifles as latter’s target. Both the attacks were to go in during the
night and were staggered over two night because of the limited artillery available
to support the attacks.
 Picquets under Attack
​ n the intervening night of 19/20 April, 4 Kumaon left the firm base on
O
the Northern bank of the river and commenced the move towards the objective.
However, it had to fight its way through Dara and Goashar where a very stiff
opposition was faced even before the main objective could be contacted.
However, troops slogged on and finally at 0725 on 20 April, Point 7760 was
captured and secured. Six men had been wounded during the attack while enemy
suffered 42 fatal and 24 non-fatal casualties.
3 Garhwal then started the operation well past midnight, around 0200h on
21 April. It had been raining continuously since the previous evening and the
going was pretty difficult. The terrain ahead, was a very steep incline and the wet
rocky surfaces offered little or no grip. By 1100h on 21 April, the objective had
been taken. Multiple patrols were then dispatched to Zambur Pattan on 22 April
and the area was found to have been abandoned by the enemy. The threat to
Mahura stood eliminated now.
 ​ n the home bank and along the main road, 1 Madras under Lieutenant
O
Colonel Menon, had been deployed with the battalion HQ and ‘B’ Company at
Buniyar, ‘A’ Company at Baramulla, ‘C’ Company at Uri (alongside 6 Raj Rif),
‘D’ Company at Bandipore and Administrative Company and administrative base
at Baramulla.

Flush-out Operations Across the River

I​ nputs regarding some enemy personnel arriving in the area Kaurali
were trickling in. It was reported that the enemy had been concentrating in
Darakujan Forest to the South, having arrived from Poonch and Bagh and was
intending to attack the main road and even 1 Madras location at Buniyar. The CO
decided to lead a patrol to probe the area and left the HQ at 0730h on 26 April.
After two hours, at about 0930h, sounds of heavy automatic and other small arms
fire were heard by the troops at the base. The direction of the sounds was towards
South where the patrol had gone a couple of hours ago. The sound indicated an
intense but crisp and short fire engagement high up in the mountains.
With no radio contact getting established with the patrol led by the CO, a
platoon was dispatched to make contact with the first patrol. But that platoon
could neither find the first patrol nor could it establish any contact with the latter.
Two more patrols were then despatched in the afternoon and while they were still
searching the area.
One survivor from the CO-led patrol arrived at Buniyar camp at around
1400h. As per him, the first patrol had been surprised by the enemy who had
sprung an ambush and had been able to inflict heavy casualties on own troops.
The survivor, as per him, had survived because he had slipped into a nala where
he had stayed hidden for almost three hours before moving back.
At 1600h that day, the body of the CO alone was found and, was brought
back. With a new threat developing from the South and directed towards Buniyar,
the HQ and one company of 1 Madras at Buniyar were reinforced by a company
of 4 Kumaon the next day. On 28 April, Bandipore and Uri companies of 1
Madras were moved back to Buniyar. Once the concentration was complete, 1
Madras commenced operation on 29 April with an aim to clear the Kaurali area of
the enemy. The move commenced at 0530h. The first bound of a ridge
overlooking Bachi village was secured by 1800h without any opposition. Firm
base for the further operation now established, the battalion HQ and ‘B’ Company
moved up to Pran Kutrian while ‘D’ Company stayed back in a state of readiness,
at Buniyar.
Next day, ‘B’ Company moved South and occupied Salasan village and
once again faced no opposition. A patrol was then sent to the spot where the first
patrol had been ambushed. Two more bodies – those of Lieutenant Philip and
Naik Narayanan- were found there. No other bodies were found thereafter.
 Capture of Kaurali

‘D’ Company had fetched up and had married up with the battalion HQ at
Pran Kutrian on 30 April. It moved out at 0530h on 01 May to clear Maidanan. It
was then that the first contact with the enemy was made when heavy fire was
brought down on the company by the enemy. The fire was returned and after a
brief engagement, ‘D’ Company captured the village. Bodies of three dead
enemies were recovered from the village. On 02 May, ‘C’ Company joined the
operation and all three companies advanced to Kaurali but the enemy had fled
before the arrival of the battalion. Picquets were then established at Kaurali and
the area was secured. The immediate threat to the main road from South too, now
stood eliminated.
Across Jhelum, Nalwa picquet was the most important picquet that was
vital for the safety of Uri bowl per se. The enemy had targeted it a number of
times but was never able to rush it. On 29 April, 6 Raj Rif was ordered by
Brigadier LP Sen to capture a feature that overlooked Nalwa. By 2000h, Tac HQ
and four companies moved into Nalwa and got ready for the attack. With ‘A’
Company in the lead, the objective was captured by 0715 on 30 April. However,
the feature had to be cleared in detail and ‘D’ Company launched an assault on the
far edge of the longish feature, Point 8370, in the broad daylight, having been
delayed earlier. The enemy opened up but the opposition was overcome with a
scout, Dhonkal Singh going beyond the call of the duty to blast an LMG post even
after getting repeatedly hit even before reaching the bunker. He lobbed two hand
grenades with his left arm since his right arm had already been incapacitated. He
was awarded MVC posthumously.

​‘B’ Company then

passed through ‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies and started mopping up the area. A large
number of enemy personnel were seen gathering for a counter-attack. However,
artillery fire was called for and the assault was broken even before it could be
launched. With mortars in close support and MMGs firing long range, enemy was
routed from the area. Uri, too, was now safe from any enemy interference.
A Field Hospital at Uri (above); 1940s -Two contraptions used to cross Jhelum in one picture –
Suspended cradle ropeway of the left and rope foot bridge on the right (left)

THE SHUFFLE

​On 03 May 1948, JAK Force was reorganised into ‘Ja’1 or Jammu
Division (later 26 Infantry Division2) and ‘Sri’ or Srinagar Division (later 19
Infantry Division) under HQ Western Command. Major General KS Thimayya,
DSO took over the command of Srinagar Division that consisted of all staff
officers of erstwhile HQ JAK Force. Major General Atma Singh took over as the
GOC, Jammu Division with a whole new team of staff officers at the HQ. Major
General Kalwant Singh, having successfully commanded the formation during
some highly testing times, moved on to be the Chief of General Staff of Indian
Army. HQ Western Command now controlled both the HQ directly.
HQ of Srinagar Division was established at Baramulla. The directive from
HQ Western Command to Major General Thimayya specified the tasks of the
newly created Sri Division as under:_
-Task in General: To capture Domel and prevent enemy invasion from
Pakistan in the division’s area of responsibility.
-Task in Particular: As under:-
-​ To ensure complete security of Srinagar city.
-To continue to hold important posts and outposts in Uri, Baramulla,
Handwara, Skardu, Leh and Kargil.
 -To secure LsOC and administrative echelons in the divisional area.
The GOC, with the directive in mind, analysed the situation and reached
the conclusion that if all the troops beyond Kargil were withdrawn and if Gurais
(or Gurez, in Kishanganga Valley) was captured and a two-brigade level thrust
was launched along Uri-Chakothi-Domel and Handwara- Tithwal- Muzaffarabad
axes, the above stated tasks could be completed.
1- ​ Initially, first three alphabets were picked up for Sri(nagar) and Jam(mu). However, the staff at
Command HQ found ‘Jam’ a bit indecorous and recommended ‘Ja’ instead.
2- ​Renaming of Divisions happened on 12 December 1948. The inter-Division boundary ran along Pir
Panjal between Banihal Pass and Haji Pir Pass via Pir Panjal Pass and Sun Set Peak. However, despite
Poonch being on the other side of the boundary, it remained under Srinagar Division till August 1948.
The plan of the GOC, thus, aimed to employ 161 Infantry Brigade to
capture Chinari-Garhi-Domel and 163 Infantry Brigade3 to capture Tithwal and
Muzaffarabad with 77 Para Brigade4 in reserve at Uri. Poonch Brigade was to
launch a battalion towards Bagh to tie down enemy reserves in the South of Pir
Panjal.
The GOC chaired the conference of all the commanders on 13 May 1948.
He shared his plan and indicated his plan to relieve 161 Brigade at Uri with 77
Para Brigade before the operation. He also directed that a time gap of two or three
days would be required between the two thrusts so that 163 Brigade action could
suck in reserves from Muzaffarabad before 161 Infantry Brigade started the
operations.
All the COs and commanders were then taken for aerial reconnaissance of
the complete area. A Dakota flew all the officers along Srinagar-Uri-Domel road
before turning North to fly over Tangdhar-Tithwal-Handwara area on the way to
Srinagar. The reconnaissance gave a good idea of the terrain through which
operations would be conducted shortly.
A bit of reshuffle, too, happened at this stage. Firstly, 163 Infantry
Brigade that had initially been made responsible for the operations between
Handwara- Bandipur- Ladakh, was now ordered to focus at Handwara-Tithwal-
Muzaffarabad sector. HQ Sri Division took over the responsibilities for Bandipur
and Ladakh and reduced the load on 163 Brigade.
With two brigades in the Valley, i.e., 161 and 163 Brigades, the infantry
units were distributed with 2 Dogra, 4 Kumaon and 6 Raj Rif coming under HQ
161 Infantry Brigade while 1 Madras, 1Sikh and 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles going to
HQ 163 Infantry Brigade. As can be seen, no major force increment had happened
except for two new HQ coming into the being. Artillery, armoured and engineer
resources were also split while medical facilities were kept centralised under the
Division HQ. The GOC then ordered the brigade commanders to evolve their
respective operational plans and be ready to launch by 18 May (163 Brigade) and
20 May (161 Brigade).
3- ​ Before the upgradation of Z Force as HQ 163 Infantry Brigade, it had only one battalion, 1 Sikh,
under command. Brigadier Katoch, however, soon fell sick and the command of the new brigade passed on to
Colonel Harbaksh Singh who took over the command as a Brigadier in mid-May 1948.
4- ​Please see footnotes to Chapter, ’28 October 1947’/Delhi. The Brigade had arrived in the Valley on
05 May 48.

TALL ASK: MAY 1948

By the beginning of the month, Uri, Mahura and Buniyar had been
rendered safe because of the successful operations undertaken by the brigade.
Brigadier LP Sen had been mulling over the options to recapture Domel and while
he had already written an appreciation as early as in January 1948, he had been
revisiting and improving upon the same by taking cognisance of the developments
that had been happening since January. With the directions from the GOC now
clear, it was the time to go back to the plan yet again.
Before arriving at the final course of action, options about approach were
analysed. Amongst the top considerations were the reach of artillery, ability of the
armoured cars to support the attack, ease of maintenance and casualty evacuation.
The following approaches were considered: -
- ​Approach – 1: Along the main road, Uri-Domel. The 72 km long
stretch had 22 bridges and while all such bridges had been prepared for
demolition by the enemy, many of the bridges were being covered by fire,
too. The enemy could demolish bridges one by one and had the advantage
of falling back to successive pre-prepared delay lines based on such
bridges, thereby, delaying the advance. As regards own advance, the
troops would enjoy close and heavy fire support all along the route. Other
factors like ease of maintenance and casualty evacuation were
comparatively easier to organise and thus a big plus point. Another issue
that favoured taking the approach was the trend that had been observed
right from Srinagar, all the way to Uri. The enemy had shown the
tendency to get up and flee whenever he saw a major strength build up
against him. The approach along the main road did afford faster and
heavier concentration of troops. The Northern flank of the advance would
be secured but interference from the mountainous terrain from the South
was an important issue, since such a terrain allowed the enemy to operate
with stealth; guerrilla tactics being his forte.
- ​Approach – 2: The second approach led all the way along the
Northern bank and had two crossing points, in form of the footbridges at
Uri and Chinari. But the bridge at Chinari that was under enemy’s control,
was prone to demolition in the face of an assault, since, complete surprise
by a large-sized force was difficult
 Approaches to Domel

to conceal. Logistics, as well, as casualty evacuation were difficult to

organise and fire support would be available from the field guns based at
 Uri.
- Approach -3: A broader hook, keeping away from the Northern bank of
Jhelum and traversing Chhota Kazinag Dhar and parts of Kafir Khan
Range was another option. While that approach did afford a fair amount of
surprise to the Indian forces, there were too many issues with logistics and
rearward movement of casualties. The move would be based on foot and
supported by mules and would be through steep, mountainous terrain. The
artillery support would be available from Uri initially but the guns would
be required to roll forward to overcome deficiency in the range as the
operations progressed. The possibility of enemy blowing up the bridge at
Chinari was as applicable to this approach as it was to the Approach-2.
- Approach-4: One of the main issues with Approach-1 was the fact that it
was sandwiched between a river on the North and huge mountains on to
the South. Approach-4 was via those high Pir Panjal ridges to the South.
While the terrain offered a fair amount of friction along that approach,
even artillery support was restricted due to range and crest clearance
issues. When guns fired with the highest charge, the resultant dispersion
and the lay of the ground characterised by folds, spurs and re-entrants,
together rendered the fire more or less ineffective or at least, pretty
inaccurate. Further, the terrain didn’t favour much manoeuvre nor did it
allow a speedy concentration of the forces at the point of decision.
Maintenance and casualty evacuation were as difficult as was the case
with Approach -3. However, as an option, the advance could also be
undertaken without really hitting the ridgeline since the slopes did allow
cross-country move after detailed reconnaissance.
-Approach-5: The approach was the longest and involved moving back to
Baramulla- Sopore before turning towards Handwara. From Handwara,
either directly or via Kupwara, after crossing NC Pass, the approach
involved descending into Tithwal and then taking the track to Domel from
North, along Kishanganga River. This approach was discarded for being
too long and through an unknown territory.
Having analysed all of the above routes/ approaches, Brigadier Sen
concluded that a combination of approaches would have to be adopted. He chose
the Approach-1 (along the main road) in combination with either Approach-3
(along Chhota Kazinag Dhar/ Kafir Khan Range) or Approach-4 (along Pir Panjal
Range). With Jhelum posing a major obstacle, the combination of the Approach 1
and Approach 4 appeared to have merit over the other combinations despite an
increased degree of difficulty involved. Such an option allowed for a better
command and control as also, the comparative ease of switching forces as per the
tactical situation.

Approach- 5 via Handwara-Tithwal

As a result of the analysis carried out, Brigadier Sen made plans to launch
the operation to capture Domel in three phases as under: -
-Phase 1- Capture of Chinari by a dual approach, i.e., two battalions
advancing along the main road (Approach-1) and three battalions along
Pir Panjal (Approach-4).
-Phase 2- Capture of Garhi.
-Phase 3- Capture of Domel.
However, by the time the month of May 1948 set in, the situation on the
ground had undergone a few changes and the plan had to be reviewed. The main
change was the location and the strength of the enemy on ground. It was assessed
that six battalions of the enemy were still active in the area of interest. One
battalion, as before, had been operating in the area Bhatgiran and to the East of it.
Another battalion was to the West, i.e., in the area Muhri Doba- Gohalan-Kalgai
and Dardkot. Chakothi, itself, had one battalion. The fourth battalion, less one
company was at Chinari with its company at Kathai. The fifth battalion was in the
area Shahdara-Sulatn Dhakki, across the river and so was the sixth battalion in
and around Maidan. The enemy forces were largely composed of Poonchis,
Pathans and an increased number of regular battalions of Pakistan Army.
The modified plan now consisted of a main thrust along the main road
and a supplementary one via the hills to the North of Jhelum (Approach-3)
initially and then via the hills to the South of Jhelum (Approach-4) later. The
resources available to 161 Infantry Brigade Group were as under: -
-HQ 161 Infantry Brigade with integral signal section and light aid
detachment.
-6 Raj Rif.
-7 Sikh1.
-2 Dogra.
-4 Kumaon.
- Sawai Man Guards2
-3 JAK Militia Battalion3.
-B Squadron 7 Cavalry.
-11 Field Regiment less one battery.
-Patiala Mountain Battery.
-32 Assault Company.
-Other detachments of RIASC4, Light Field Ambulance, Workshop
company and carriers.
-No 8 Squadron RIAF was on call for the close fire support.

1- ​11 Sikh Regiment, owing its roots to 1846, had six infantry battalions since 1922. During the WW II,
seven more battalions were raised and it was then that 7 SIKH was raised. The Battalion earned the Battle
Honour of OP HILL during 1965 Indo-Pak war.
2- ​Raised in 1932 by Sawai Man Singh II (Major General HH Maharaja Sawai Shri
​ he plan, thus, included a main thrust along Uri-Domel Road and
T
another thrust from Mahura to Pandu by 161 Infantry Brigade. 77 Para Brigade
was ordered to take over the defence of Uri.Units were now shuffled a bit and HQ
161 Infantry Brigade Group was ordered to proceed with the detailed planning
and execution.
Planning
 ​ rigadier LP Sen made a deliberate plan for the Phase 1 of the overall
B
operation for the recapture of Domel. The Phase 1 per se, i.e., recapture of Chinari
was to be undertaken in five phases, as under: -
-Phase 1- 4 Kumaon was allotted one company of 2 (Para) Madras (from
Goashar) and one company of Sawai Man Guards. 4 Kumaon was to
undertake advance from Mahura to capture Pandu that lay across Jhelum
River, roughly to the North of Chakothi. On the South of the main road, 2
Dogra was to advance to Point 7300. Both the battalions had the support
of one battery each of 11 Field Regiment. 6 Raj Rif and Patiala Battery
were to be in reserve at Uri. D Day was to be night 19/20 May. 77 Para
Brigade was to stage a demonstration in the direction of Bhatgiran while
Poonch Brigade was to show offensive movement towards Bagh as part of
the deception plan.
- Phase 2- A mobile column of B Squadron of 7 Cavalry, one company of
7 Sikh (in carriers and armoured fighting vehicles) was to advance from
Uri and move to Milestone 62 with the aim of locating and destroying the
enemy in Shahdara-Dardkot nalas. Adequate mortar and engineers support
along with air support had been tied up. 6 Raj Rif was to be in reserve at
Tagore Picquet at Uri itself.
-Phase 3- 4 Kumaon to capture Point 10657/Chhota Kazinag.
Simultaneously, 6 Raj Rif was to advance from the Milestone 62 and
secure Point 8432. With 7 Sikh as reserve, both the battalions had
Sir Man Singh II GCSI GCI), on his return after one year-long military training in England, the present
designation of the battalion is 17 GRENADIERS. Major General Sawai Man Singh II was the last ruler of
Jaipur and the father of Brigadier Bhawani Singh, MVC of 10 Para (SF).
3- ​Most of these irregulars were eventually absorbed into newly constituted JAK Militia battalions in
1948 under the Ministry of Home Affairs and were later absorbed into Indian Army as JAK Light Infantry
units in 1972.
4- ​Royal Army Service Corps; now ASC.
been allotted one field battery each and a battery of Patiala Artillery was in
support.
Phases 4 & 5- Orders were to be issued later.

Execution: Pandu Thrust

​ Kumaon had some tough terrain to cover during the move. The hills
4
were steep and the peaks had snow on them. The essence of the operation lay in
complete surprise and 4 Kumaon, having moved out with seven days of packed
rations on the morning of 18 May, didn’t light a single fire for the next two days.
The crossing of the river and deployment in the concentration area was all done
stealthily and in small groups. Wherever the enemy had visual domination,
movements were made only during the hours of darkness. Artillery started
registering the targets the same evening, once all the troops had reached the
desired concentration area, North of Point 9062 where a company of Sawai Man
Guards had been deployed.
The next day was spent in doing reconnaissance and gaining enemy as
well as, terrain intelligence. It was now clear that the objective stretched for more
than six km and was being held by 4 Azad Poonch Battalion, supported by a full
Pathan battalion.
There were six prominent pimples on the long ridge that was curved and
folded inwards. With the East end of the long ridge emanating from Chhota
Kazinag (Point 10657), the ridge ran West before turning South towards Jhelum.
The last pimple or peak overlooking the river and Chakothi was Point 6873. To
the North of that pimple lay Pandu top (Point 9178) and then four more
pimples/peaks to the East. It was also learnt and then confirmed during the recce
that the central pimples were unoccupied while the enemy had prepared defences
on all other pimples over the past three months.
Lieutenant Colonel MM Khanna, the CO, then decided to infiltrate from
behind the enemy and launch a surprise attack on an unsuspecting enemy. The
battalion, having crossed over to Tregan, to the Northwest of Chhota Kazinag
feature (held by the enemy) and having got behind the enemy, waited for the last
light before sending a platoon of the leading ‘B’ Company to probe forward and
fix ropes since the passage over the the knife-edge rocky feature was very narrow.
Once that was done, at 2100h on
 Pandu and around (overlay on Google Earth image)

19 May, ‘B’ Company launched a silent attack and occupied the second and third
pimples (counting from the East/ Chhota Kazinag side) without losing
the element of surprise but, the terrain had taken its toll on time and the
peaks were secured at about 0430h on 20 May. The first light was now around the
corner in another hour or so.
​ s the ‘D’ Company passed through, closely followed by ‘C’ Company, it
A
was met with a very stiff opposition. Once ‘D’ Company got pinned down and the
advance got stalled, ‘C’ Company was sent in from a flank and the next peak was
taken. During the attack, communications with the gun end of the field battery got
disrupted due to the damage to the radio set but the troops fought hard to capture
the objective, making use of 2-inch mortars and automatics. The enemy suffered;
30 killed and 50 wounded, while, 4 Kumaon lost two men and took seven as
wounded.
​At 0200h on 21 May, ‘C’ Company, followed by ‘B’ company, launched the
attack to capture Chhota Kazinag and Chinal Dori ridge. The fight continued
throughout the night and the whole of the next day. Finally, by 0530h on 22 May,
the enemy pulled out after leaving ten men dead and carrying about 20 wounded
along.
 ​ fter having established the Tac HQ of the battalion at Chinal Dori, the
A
CO ordered ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies to turn around on 24 May and get poised for
operations towards Pandu feature. Point 9178 (Pandu Top) was captured without
any major opposition on 25 May. Followed by Point 6873 by 0700h on 25 May
1948. The Tac HQ of 4 Kumaon moved to Pandu and the battalion re-organised
itself around the ridge. From across Jhelum, the road Uri-Chakothi was now under
Indian domination.

Operations of North & South of Jhelum till 25 May

Execution: Main Thrust

​The progress along the main road connecting Uri with Chakothi had not
been able to be made as planned. The enemy offered stiff opposition from the
word, ‘go’. On 18 May, the enemy burnt a wooden bridge on the road around
Milestone 66 and established a well-defended roadblock near Mile Stone 64. The
enemy active on the higher reaches of Pir Panjal also kept on interfering with the
operations, thus, tying 77 Para Brigade from the South.
​ Dogra was ordered to capture Point 7300 that overlooked Uri-Domel
2
road from the South. However, since Salamabad feature had also been held in
strength, the task of 2 Dogra involved clearing Salamabad feature first before
capturing Point 7300. On 19 May, at around 2130h, ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies
started advancing towards Salamabad with ‘D’ Company in reserve. However,
there was some confusion during the navigation and the battalion lost its way.
​ hile trying to find its objectives, the battalion lost the element of
W
surprise and in a desperate bid to accomplish the task, ‘A’ Company tried to
assault Point 7300 even before ‘C’ Company could gain a foothold on Salamabad
feature. Soon, ‘A’ Company was encircled and had to charge thrice with bayonets
to break the cordon so as to fall back on ‘B’ Company that had been following ‘A’
and was next to ‘C’ Company. ‘A’ Company lost 10 men while 20 men got
wounded; the enemy losses were 25 killed and 40 wounded.
In the meanwhile, ‘C’ Company was facing heavy interference from many
ridges around Salamabad feature. It also fell back to ‘B’ Company location. With
all three companies boxed in, the enemy launched a multi-directional attack on the
three companies. The enemy attacked in three waves but was repulsed every time.
The enemy suffered heavy losses but the exact figures were never known while 2
Dogra lost two more men and 12 men were wounded.
Three companies of 6 Raj Rif were then sent to reinforce and rescue 2
Dogra and protect the left flank of the forward battalion. With reinforcements
rushing forward, the enemy retreated into high mountains. The second phase of
the operation, therefore, could eventually begin on 21 May when 7 Cavalry and
mobile column started rolling on the road. Two road blocks and two blown up
bridges slowed down the advance and the night of 21 May was spent between
Milestones 65 and 64. Another bridge had to be repaired and that took up the
whole of the next day as sappers worked around the clock. The next night halt was
taken at the Milestone 61.
When the advance resumed on 23 May, the leading troop came across
another demolished bridge at the Milestone 58. As the cars came to a halt, the
enemy opened up with 3-inch mortars and MMGs, forcing the cars to retreat
beyond the bend. The troop later moved back and joined up with rest of the group
at the Milestone 60.
The next day, two troops moved up again but drew a similar response
with the enemy bombarding the cars with more than 120 bombs in a short span of
time. The cars were once again not able to move ahead because of the demolished
bridge and the enemy bombardment. Before the cars could pull out, a bridging
column on 12 3-ton lorries fetched up and halted behind the two troops. The
enemy resumed mortar firing that killed one and wounded two soldiers as also
destroyed one vehicle. The sappers then withdrew, followed by both the troops.
 The third troop led the advance next day but met a similar fate. The
advance from Uri to Domel, therefore, got stalled for now.
While a very slow progress leading to stalling of the advance, had been
happening along the main road, some progress was being made along the hills to
the South of the road. 7 Sikh started from their concentration area at Milestone 62
during the night 20/21 May for the Milestone 60 at Urusa. On 21 May, during the
day, 7 Sikh captured Point 6430 and secured the feature. Thereafter, the advance
was resumed on 22 May and 7 Sikh approached the lower slopes of Point 7315
without meeting any enemy. However, once close to the road, the leading
company drew small arms fire from the feature as well as long range automatic
fire from Chakothi. The Sikhs took up defences in the area and finally captured
Point 7315 after a fierce fight on 25 May.
The delay caused due to the blown-up bridges and enemy resistance along
the road, gave enough time to the enemy to reinforce his positions along the road
and build up a strong force to counter Indian advances towards Domel. By the
third week of May, the enemy had more than a brigade of regulars5 in the area.
Hordes of tribesmen and Poonchis were in addition. As per the intelligence
gathered, the following regular units of Pakistan army had been identified: -
5- ​While the role and involvement of Pakistan regulars was never in doubt, it was presumed by the
decision makers at Delhi and the Valley that regular units and formations would not be fielded by Pakistan
inside J&K. However, when a few regulars were taken prisoners and fragments of bombs and shells did prove
the connection, the reality dawned on the Indian chain of command. Slowly, enough evidence was gathered
and a strong case made up against Pakistan by India, with the intent of exposing Pakistani lies at UN and
such like platforms. However, Pakistan decided to hit the confession box just in time (more details ahead)

-1 FF Rifles- in Bundi Forest area.

-4 FF Rifles in Kathai area, across Jhelum, to the North of Chinari.
-4/16 Punjab in general area Chinari and South.
-15 Punjab in area of Point 9210.
-Unidentified troops around Point 10027 to the North of Jhelum.
It was now evident to Major General Thimayya, GOC of the Srinagar
Division, that 161 Infantry Brigade would not be sufficient to displace such a
huge force of the enemy regulars. He, therefore, ordered HQ 77 Para Brigade to
move to Pandu, advance to the West from the features held by 4 Kumaon and then
start interfering with the enemy at Chakothi and further to the West till Chinari,
from the Northern bank of the river. Such a move, however, was marred by many
issues besides the fact that the security of the LOC was being depleted. The most
important issue related to administrative difficulties and lack of adequate routes
(there were only two and for the most parts, both the routes could only allow foot-
based movements; even mules couldn’t reach everywhere). The logistics and
maintenance were certainly going to be a big challenge and yet the GOC decided
to take the risk of launching the thrust from North of the river despite
administrative lacunae rather than forcing the way through main road where no
headway was in the sight.
77 Para Brigade was allotted 2 Dogra, 4 Kumaon, one mountain battery
and each and every mule available with 161 Brigade. That done, the brigade
finally concentrated at Pandu on 29 May.
Major General Thimayya, having seen the resistance being offered along
the main road as also the presence of a regular military formation in Chakothi
area, decided to launch another thrust via Tithwal to hit enemy at Domel, thus
cutting him off from withdrawing or from getting reinforced in the face of Indian
advance. By that time, 163 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Harbaksh Singh had
already captured Tithwal (that part not being covered in this book) and a thrust
towards Muzaffarabad-Domel was expected to fetch handsome dividends. The
Brigade Commander was ordered to plan ‘Operation Suriya’ wherein 163 Brigade
was to launch two thrusts- diversionary one along the jeepable track running along
River Kishanganga and the main one via Naoseri-Khiddar- Point 10131 to
Muzaffarabad (the cross-country one). 2/4 GR6 and one troop of 8 Anti-tank
Regiment were allotted to HQ 163 Infantry Brigade for the operations.
At Uri, in the meanwhile, the tasking of 77 Para Brigade was as under: --
4 Kumaon to capture Point 6875 and Kathai.
-2 Dogra to capture Point 11385 and Point 10027.
Sawai Man Guards moved up and relieved 4 Kumaon on 29/30 May, thus,
allowing 4 Kumaon to focus on the task at hand. 4 Kumaon, having spent a
reasonable time in the area, was well-versed with the enemy dispositions as well
as the terrain. There were multiple patrol clashes on 27 May, followed by a failed
attempt by a company of tribesmen to rush the Northern part of Pandu ridge on 29
May.
4 Kumaon finally launched the main operation at 0200h on 31 May. ‘B’
Company led the advance with troops wearing canvas shoes to avoid making
noises. The approach to Point 6875 was over just two feet wide footpath on a
ridge with steep falls on either side. To complicate the problems, artillery was out
of range. In any case, the enemy had been well-dug in with as much as six feet
thick overhead protection over automatic weapons.
 When less than 50m short of the first bunker, the enemy detected the
movement, heavy fire was brought down on the leading platoon at about 0600h.
There were casualties and as the platoon got pinned down, another platoon tried to
attack along the other flank but that, too, got pinned down. The following platoon
was stuck because of the lack of space on the ridge and couldn’t move through the
two front platoons.
The Company Commander, in order to avoid an almost inevitable
slaughter if the attack was pressed, pulled back and organised a fire base of all
machineguns and three 2-inch mortars. Battalion’s 3-inch mortars, in the
meanwhile, kept on engaging rear bunkers of the enemy to ensure the safety of
own troops in contact. That caused some damages as also prevented the
reinforcements from joining the enemy’s company at the objective. Once a degree
of screening had been achieved, the assault group of the company
6- ​The Second Battalion of the 4th Gorkha Rifles (2/4 GR), Maili Paltan, was raised in Bakloh, in 1886.
Known as the 2nd Battalion 4th Prince of Wales’s own Gurkha Regiment, Officers and men of the battalion, in
line with regimental tradition of 4 GR, wear a plain Black lanyard attached to a whistle over the jersey. The
intention of this arrangement is to facilitate the use of the whistle with the left hand, while leaving the right
hand free to use the sword. The uniform and insignia are spartan; the regiment prides itself on its simplicity
and disregard for pomp and ceremony.

Broad Plan: 77 Para Brigade

assaulted frontally at 0900h and took the objective. Kumaonies lost two soldiers
and had seven wounded while the enemy ran away leaving behind 30 killed and
with more than 40 wounded who were taken along. A large quantity of war-like
stores was recovered and the list included seven rifles, two Bren guns, one Sten
gun, two MMGs and one 2-inch mortar. Naik Nar Singh was awarded MVC
posthumously.
‘B’ Company, post re-organisation and replenishment, moved on and
captured Kathai without any notable opposition by 2100h on 02 June. A tough
fighting spirit, astute leadership and presence of mind by the command elements
had ensured completion of task by 4 Kumaon. With Uri-Domel road just across
the river, troops started interfering with the enemy. However, while the river
offered protection in front, the rear of Northern flank was still open and
vulnerable. The impending task of 2 Dogra catered to the same.
2 Dogra, on the other hand, had a tough time, more because of the terrain
than anything else. Starting from Chinal Dori on 31 May, the battalion reached
and secured Point 10490 on 01 June. On 02 June, at 0530h, ‘B’ and ‘C’
Companies moved ahead along with the Tac HQ, to capture Point 11385. Rest of
the battalion followed closely, leaving ‘C’ Company to hold the firm base at Point
10490.
By 1800h on 02 June, Point 11385 and two more features in the vicinity
had been secured. At 0100h, the battalion advanced to take the final objective of
Point 10027 across Tharri Di Gali. When the leading platoon was about 550m
short of Point 10027, it came under heavy fire, including that of three well-sited
MMGs. The track was very narrow with drops on either side and the gradient was
such that the troops had to move on all fours to find a grip over the ridge. The
Artillery was out of range and air support could not be provisioned because of the
bad weather. The enemy, by now aware of the happenings to the South where 4
Kumaon had captured crucial territory, had already started reinforcing Point
10027 and was now outnumbering the attackers. After a long slog and finding it
impossible to gain any further, the battalion was ordered to withdraw to Pandu on
the night 6/7 June. The weather had definitely played its role and the delay, thus
incurred, had allowed the enemy to reinforce the localities all across the front to
the North of Jhelum.
77 Para Brigade had, thus, scored a mixed bag. A lot now depended on the
progress of 163 Infantry Brigade. Alarmed by the Indian intent and because of the
ease of building up along the well-laid, well maintained and shorter axes, the
enemy had already reinforced his positions to the West of Tithwal in addition to
the ones astride Jhelum. With the odds now tilted heavily in favour of the enemy,
the resources available to Brigadier Harbaksh Singh were inadequate for the kind
of numerical superiority being aimed for. With three battalions deployed to protect
Tithwal, the Commander was of the view that at least one more battalion was
required to undertake the offensive, leaving two battalions to protect Tithwal.
However, more pressing was the need to build up logistics. Tithwal was down to
half a day’s worth of supplies, due to the slow build-up based on mules and
porters. Since it was desirable to have seven days’ worth of supplies before
launching the operation, the time estimated to build up that kind of stock was in
the excess of seven days. Air maintenance had been off for many days since the
weather was not holding up. It was already 05 June and the enemy had moved a
brigade7 into the area opposite Tithwal by then. The Brigade Commander updated
the GOC about the situation on ground and his inability to undertake any
operations within next ten days or so. Major
7-Alarmed by the rapid progress of the Indian thrust in the Tithwal sector, the enemy quickly moved
additional troops in the form of 9 Frontier Division under Major General Nazir Ahmed. The enemy now had a
brigade each at Chakothi, Domel and opposite Tithwal. Out of three, two were now facing Indian troops while
the third one was located centrally to be employed along either or both the axes as per the development of
threat/offensive plans.

General Thimayya saw merit in his point and advised him to stay firm in Tithwal
and consolidate further.
It was now apparent to the GOC that in the given terrain that demanded
an ideal numerical ratio of 9:1 or 6:1 in the favour of the attacker, the existing 1:1
ratio would not be enough. Looking back, it can be seen that the timely movement
of the Pakistan army formations into the area, as also, the delay in own operations
due to a long spell of inclement weather, had been the real cause of a dismal
tactical picture from an attacker’s point of view. All three brigades, over past one
month of operations, had also suffered casualties and the fighting strength of the
division was down by 210 men (60 killed and 150 wounded) by 05 June.
On 05 June itself, Major General Thimayya ordered the re-organisation of
the forces in the Uri area, i.e., 77 Para Brigade and 161 Infantry Brigade. 4
Kumaon8, while deployed at Kathai, was reverted back to HQ 161 Infantry
Brigade. HQ 77 Para Brigade, 2 Dogra and Sawai Man Singh Guards were
ordered to revert back to Uri with 2 Dogra coming under command of HQ 161
Infantry Brigade by last light on 06 June 1948.
 8- ​4 Kumaon, despite their performance during the
hard-won victories at Pandu and Kathai, was never awarded any battle honour for either. The reasons are not
known but a detailed study of those two battles brings out the actual degree of difficulty, hardships faced and
tales of raw valour and courage as well as astute leadership by many officers and men of the battalion. And
the point got more prominence since the GOC, Major General Thimayya, belonged to 4 Kumaon! The first
GOC of the new Corps HQ that was raised a bit later (and would have been involved in such
recommendations), too was from Kumaon Regiment. This too speaks volumes about the impartial handling of
such matters by the senior commanders in the chain. One possible reason, however, could be the fact that the
battalion was awarded the battle honour of Srinagar (Badgam) in the same conflict and it might have been a
matter of policy not to award more than one such honour to any unit. Similarly, certain individuals, like
Major General RS ‘Sparrow’, having been awarded the MVC for gallantry in Naushera sector, were not
awarded any such medal for leadership and gallantry during the historic battle of Zoji La. Possibly, one
person-one award policy was followed in such cases too. These observations about single award, however,
are just a matter of conjecture.
A team of armourers preparing the arsenal for loading on to a Tempest aircraft (in the background)
 Major General Atma Singh,the first GOC, Jammu Division,
died in an accident in September 1949 & Major General (later General) KS ‘Timmy’ Thimayya, DSO,
the first GOC, Srinagar Division, rose to become 6th Chief of Indian Army in 1957
Major General KS Thimayya, DSO, GOC, Sri Division welcoming Pandit Nehru as Sheikh Abdullah
looks on- Srinagar (1948)

THE SLOG: JUNE 1948

​ he month of June had not begun with too many successes and in fact
T
had seen plans to advance and capture Domel via main Uri-Domel road or from
Tithwal getting shelved. The GOC, however, was now looking into another- the
last- option to exercise. The option involved attacking along the Approach-4, i.e.,
via Pir Panjal top and or making use of the slopes that rolled down to the Jhelum
Valley from various peaks on the massive range.
After losing Kathai to 4 Kumaon, Pakistan regulars and their accomplices
had started showing a great amount of aggression in the sector. 4 Kumaon was
still deployed at Pandu. Two companies of 2 Dogra had reinforced Pandu area on
08 June and had strengthened the defensive layout. The enemy, uncomfortable
with Kathai wedged into his defences, started attacking Kathai regularly with
artillery supporting such attacks, but was not successful.
​ s far as enemy presence in the area was concerned, approximately two
A
battalions had reportedly been holding the area to the South of the main road. 7
Sikh holding Point 7315, South of Urusa, was being subjected to shelling and
bombardment on daily basis.
​ ith their supplies also being interfered with regularly, the battalion
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was having a tough time and was under stress. Similar was the state of 6 Raj Rif
that was deployed between Uri and Urusa. Brigadier LP Sen, in any case, was
already planning an operation to clear the enemy from the vicinity of the road and
from the features that dominated the road from the South. The fact that the Pir
Panjal ridge, per se, as well as the countryside towards Southern slopes of the
range that descended into the Poonch Valley, were under enemy control, was in
itself quite discomforting for the GOC.
​ ajor General Thimayya, thus, decided to go in for a bold sweep
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towards the South. 2/3 GR1 and Sawai Man Guards of 77 Para Brigade were now
allotted to HQ 161 Infantry Brigade. 2 (Para) Madras relieved 2/3 GR. HQ 77
Para Brigade, along with 2 (Para) Madras, was given the responsibility of
protecting Southern flank of defences in Uri bowl.
1- ​2nd Battalion of the 3rd Goorkhas (as was 3 GR known at that time and later as 3rd The Queen's
Own Gurkha (1907) and the 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles (1908) and finally 3 GR (1950)),
raised in 1891, is part of 3 GR family that traces its origin back to 1815. The battalion took part in the two
World Wars and was never disbanded or suspended even during the re-organisation of the British Indian
army after two wars.

​ 61 Infantry Brigade was tasked to carry out an outflanking manoeuvre

1
along Pir Panjal Range to the South, with an aim to get behind the enemy brigade
at Chakothi, thereby cutting off the enemy in that area. Once that was done, 77
Para Brigade was to move ahead along the main road to Chakothi for further
operations towards Domel.

Pir Kanthi and Ledi Gali

​ he outline plan of 161 Brigade, with the immediate mission to capture
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enemy strong positions at Ledi Gali and Pir Kanthi, was as under (the plan did
change a bit at a later stage): -
-Tac HQ of 161 Infantry Brigade, along with Sawai Man Guard to
advance to Ledi Gali.
-6 Raj Rif to advance from Urusa- Point 8432- Point 9356.
 -2/3 GR to advance from Urusa-Point 9108-Pir Kanthi.
On 07 June, at 0600h, 2/3 GR started from Uri, in mechanical transport,
debussed at a point East of Urusa and started the climb towards 10,924 ft high Pir
Kanthi feature. The battalion was self-contained for three days, resulting in heavy
loads on manpack basis. Short of Point 9108, the leading elements came under fire
and the battalion was subjected to heavy mortar firing from 3-inch mortars. The
battalion pulled back and took up a harbour for the night on the slopes of the long
ridge at 2030h.
Next morning, at 0900h, ‘D’ Company launched an attack in the face of
enemy opposition and captured Point 9108 by 1230h. The enemy responded by
launching three counter-attacks but all three attempts were repelled. The total
casualties of 2/3 GR were six over two days while enemy lost 15 men and seven
others sustained injuries. The final objective of Pir Kanthi was now right in front
but suddenly, the weather turned very bad and the enemy kept on putting up a stiff
resistance, thereby, delaying the operation to capture Pir Kanthi. 6 Raj Rif, left
their area astride the main road at 1000h for Point 8432, on 08 June. The first
objective was taken by 1900h by ‘B’ and ‘D’ Companies. The rest of the battalion,
including the logistical elements fetched up in toto by 11 June at Point 8432. Point
9356, overlooking the area, kept on harassing the battalion through consistent
MMG fire and occasional fire assaults by mortars. Two companies of the enemy
had been reported at Point 9356 and preparations for a deliberate attack were
made by 6 Raj Rif despite the interference.
On 11 June, Tac HQ 161 Infantry Brigade and Sawai Man Guards left Uri
at 0900h and reached Point 9768 by the last light. The complete elements built up
at Point 9768 by 12 June evening.
With all three battalions now poised for attack on their final objectives, a
three-pronged attack began on 13 June with 2/3 GR attacking Point 8570, 6 Raj
Rif attacking Point 9356 and Sawai Man Guards attacking Point 10658. All three
objectives were taken by three battalions, i.e., 6 Raj Rif by 1000h on 17 June, 2/3
GR by 1000h on 14 June (and went on to clear an enemy locality being held by
two companies and a mortar position at a height called Raje ka Bazaar by 1800h
on 18 June) and Sawai Man Guards by 2230h on 14 June. The enemy now, by and
large, had reeled back into his main positions at Ledi Gali and Pir Kanthi.
All three battalions were now set to take the two objectives. However, the
terrain didn’t permit multi-directional assaults and it was decided that 2/3 GR
would capture Pir Kanthi first. Other two battalions would then rush through Pir
Kanthi and assault Ledi Gali from an awkward direction from the enemy’s point
of view. However, the enemy was deployed in strength and the ground held by the
enemy held complete domination over the area through which the attack was to be
launched by 2/3 GR.

A bird’s eye view of the terrain and the plan as was executed by 161 Infantry Brigade (underlying
image: Google Earth)

The CO, 2/3 GR, having done a detailed ground reconnaissance over the
next couple of days, proposed a deception plan wherein two companies would
launch a feint on Pir Kanthi from the most expected and only assailable direction
while two companies would take a difficult approach and take the enemy by
surprise. Once the plan was approved, two companies were pulled out and
deployed in a different location, away from the vigil of the enemy.
The enemy, while detailed and with the last-minute planning going on,
kept on trying to dislodge the Indian troops from the heights that the enemy had
lost but without any success. The weather too turned violent and nothing really
could move for almost a week. Finally, on 28 June, the feint went in at 0130h. The
feint was preceded by another feint along the same approach a couple of days
back, and having remained ‘unsuccessful’, the troops had withdrawn, much to the
delight of the enemy.
As the feint went in and the enemy opened up, Gorkhas, taking an
unexpected route, climbed up a dip silently and were only discovered when they
were less than 90m away. It had been a bit too late for the enemy who was routed
by 0530h. 2/3 GR took 11 fatal and 51 non-fatal casualties while the enemy lost
84 men and took about 40 wounded ones along. In the daring operation, the
battalion had delivered a resounding defeat to the well-entrenched enemy who had
two companies of 3rd Battalion of Bagh Brigade, two platoons of Pakistan army
regulars and more than 100 tribesmen, defending an almost unassailable feature.
2/3 GR was awarded battle honour of Pir Kanthi- an award they richly deserved.
Sawai Man Guards passed through 2/3 GR and assaulted Ledi Gali and
captured it by last light on 28 June itself. Three battalions then expanded and re-
organised themselves around the newly captured objectives.

Attempt on Haji Pir Pass

As part of the summer offensive, 77 Para Brigade was tasked by Major
General KS Thimayya to dislodge the enemy from Haji Pir Pass in the first week
of June 1948. It was a daunting task since the ridges dominating the 22 kms long
stretch between Uri and Haji Pir Pass were being held by the enemy. It was
estimated that approximately two battalions’ worth of enemy personnel were
holding the ridges astride the road and the pass per se. The layout of the area
between Uri and Haji Pir too was such that the enemy had a distinct advantage.
There were two long ridges through which a road wound up to Poonch. Both the
ridges were with the enemy. The road, in any case, was motorable only till
Milestone 5 where a bridge stood demolished. All the logistics, therefore, had to
be manhandled beyond that point. Both shoulders and ridges on either side of the
pass, viz., Kiran Height and Ridge had enemy defences.
There was, thus, no option but to move along the road, clearing the
heights astride the axis. While the pass could not be assaulted from East or West
due to enemy presence, the sheer geography of the area towards Northwest was
too inimical to be of any use to the attackers. However, around Milestone 13, the
terrain did offer an option to leave the track and approach the pass in the shadow
of the ridge that obscured such a movement from the pass.
​ (Para) Madras of 77 Para Brigade was tasked to evict the enemy from
2
Haji Pir Pass. On 07 June 1948, the battalion commenced the advance along Uri-
Poonch road at 0700h, with its ‘D’ Company in the lead. By the last light, the
battalion had cleared the heights astride the road right till Milestone 8. No enemy
opposition, despite earlier inputs to the contrary, was met. The battalion took up a
harbour for the night close to Milestone 8 itself.
The Next day, on 08 June, the leading company resumed its advance at
1100h. Over next two hours, the battalion covered about 3.5 miles and reached a
blown-up bridge over Haidrabad Nala just ahead of Milestone 11. It was at this
point when the leading ‘D’ Company drew first fire. ‘D’ Company got pinned
down with many soldiers caught in open, on the road itself. ‘B’ Company, in the
meanwhile, moved up and fanned out alongside the leading company. The enemy
had been holding a dominating position and was estimated to be of about a
platoon strength. By the time the enemy could be evicted, it was already getting
dark. The battalion occupied a firm base around the demolished bridge itself.
On 09 June, reconnaissance and probing patrols were sent throughout the
day. As per the intelligence gained, enemy had pulled back from the forward
delaying position to the another one in the forest. The locality inside the forest had
bunkers and well-coordinated defences. Next day at 0600h, ‘D’ Company
launched an attack on the enemy locality and drove the enemy further up the slope
and occupied the bunkers abandoned by the enemy. The battalion then took up a
firm base in the forest. Over next two days, i.e., on 11 and 12 June, aggressive
patrolling was carried out to sanitise the forest. A few incidents of stray sniping as
well as heavy firing from top of the ridge were faced but no major contact battle
was fought during the period. In the meanwhile, ‘C’ Company also moved up and
got deployed alongside ‘D’ and ‘B’ Companies.
 Haji Pir Pass and Attempt by 2 (Para) MADRAS

​ rmed with terrain and The enemy intelligence, on 13 June, ‘D’ and ‘C’
A
Companies launched attacks on Haji Pir Pass ridge from the firm base provided by
the ‘B’ Company. Surrounding heights around the firm base were also secured by
‘B’ Company. The attacks commenced at 1530h. However, as the leading
elements reached Milestone 13, heavy automatic fire was brought down on them
by the The enemy holding dominating positions on the ridge astride the pass. The
troops tried to outflank the enemy defences to turn his defences but the terrain
advantage was tilted heavily in The enemy’s favour. After an intense fight and
efforts by the assaulting troops extending over the next four hours, troops were
ordered to withdraw to the firm base after the last light.
Faced with heavy odds in assaulting, it was decided to beef up the
firepower. One section of Patiala Mountain Battery moved up close to Milestone
10 and two more infantry mortars joined in, making it a total of four mortars with
the battalion. While artillery was building up and targets were being registered,
aggressive patrolling continued and attack plans were rehashed. Once the
preliminaries had been completed, the operation was finalised to be carried out in
two phases, starting just before the first light on 16 June.
​ he broad attack plan involved ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies attacking one
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part of the ridge, along the left and right approaches respectively. Once taken, a
firm base was to be provided to the following company to attack the remainder of
the ridge. On 15 June, both the leading assault companies inched forward and
occupied the far edge of the forest while the artillery was busy registering targets
on the ridge. ‘B’ Company and Tac HQ also moved up across Milestone 13.
​ n 16 June, the two leading companies left the firm base and
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commenced their move towards the first part of the ridge from two flanks. Heavy
artillery shelling and mortar fire took enemy by surprise but soon, both the
companies started receiving intense automatic fire. ‘C’ Company had been
moving up along the ridge that had no forest cover and, thus, bore the brunt of
numerous machineguns during the assault. Enemy firing from inside the bunkers
almost halted the company in its tracks. ‘D’ Company had the cover available till
a point about 225 metres short of the objective. But as they emerged from the
woods, they too faced stiff opposition in the form of heavy fire. Artillery and
mortars, however, came down heavily on the enemy even while own troops had
reached within the safety distances of the shells and bombs bursting on top. Many
bunkers received direct hits and suddenly some of the enemy personnel were seen
fleeing after abandoning the bunkers.
​ he enemy, however, either had reinforcements available behind the
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ridge or was able to bring in reinforcements just in time when the panic had
started to set in. In the meanwhile, both the companies were able to reach within
last 45 metres of their respective objectives. That was when they met two
formidable obstacles- first, an almost vertical climb to the ridge and secondly, the
arrival of enemy reinforcements. The attempts were finally given up and the
battalion withdrew to Uri on orders.
North of Jhelum
As mentioned before, two companies of 2 Dogra had reinforced 4
Kumaon in the Pandu area earlier that month. 2 Dogra company raided a hillock
held by the enemy on 18 June and evicted the enemy from there. The tally of
casualty read 3 vs 16 killed and 3 vs 30 wounded in favour of Dogra company.
Such a success brought cheer to all in the chain of command but on the
very next day, i.e., on 19 June, Lieutenant Colonel MM Khanna, CO, 4 Kumaon
was wounded in an ambush between Pandu and Point 10490. The party of 23
personnel had been moving along the track that was under Indian troops and was
presumed to be safe from enemy interference. The CO had been on his way to
congratulate the troops personally as also to deliver a captured MMG to the
company of 2 Dogra (under command) to further strengthen the latter’s position.
Not known to the CO, a signaller had, unintentionally (but violating the
instructions in doing so), passed the message about the CO’s visit in a clear, un-
coded wireless communication the previous evening. The same had been
intercepted by the enemy since both the forces were using similar radio sets. The
party halted to take a break in an open patch that was surrounded by tall maize
and pine trees, near Khatir Nar. Suddenly, two companies of the enemy sprung an
ambush on the party.
At that time, coolies and porters had just put their loads down for a
breather and the troops were settling down to have their lunch. It was around
1230h. Fortunately, a sentry had seen some movement and had opened fire as if
on intuition. Taken by surprise and not really in a state of readiness as also
because of lack of any cover, the situation became hopeless in a few minutes. 13
soldiers, including a JCO, Subedar Mohan Singh, were killed and three, including
the CO, got severely wounded. The CO had been shot through his chest. The
enemy then melted into the forest after picking up whatever they could lay their
hands on2.
Fortunately, a civilian porter by the name of Zuma Mohammad, one of the
porters, returned to the spot soon after the ambush. The CO, still in his senses,
gave him a message for the Battalion HQ and the civilian ran towards the HQ. A
relief platoon had already started from the HQ and the porter guided the platoon to
the spot. That was how the lives of the wounded could be saved3. Lieutenant
Colonel MM Khanna was evacuated to Delhi. Shelling, bombardment and
repeated skirmishes continued in Pandu area till the end of the month and beyond.
2- ​In his memoirs, the CO contradicts the above (official) account. He claims that weapons and
equipment, except one MMG, were not allowed to be carried by the enemy since if any such thing had
happened, there would have been loss of such stores and no such losses had actually happened. Lieutenant
Colonel MM Khanna, MVC retired as a Lieutenant General and had the proud distinction of being the first
alumni of the prestigious Indian Military Academy to be appointed as the Commandant of his alma mater in
1956. He was a Brigadier at that time.
3- ​As per the account in the book, Valour Triumphs: History of the Kumaon Regiment by KC Praval. The
account further goes on to say that all the dead bodies and weapons were recovered by the relief platoon.
Further, despite his refusal, Jumma Mohammad was given pension for life, a piece of land near Mahura (by
the State government) and VrC by the President of India.
Gazette Notification for award of VrC to the civilian porter, Zuma Mohd
Gazette Notification in respect of Jemedar Megh Singh, VrC, 6 RAJ RIF
 Gazette Notifications in respect of two personnel of 2/3 GR

SETBACKS: JULY 1948

​ he loss of Pir Kanthi and Ledi Gali in Uri Sector and the capture of
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area across Kishanganga River in Tithwal had apparently shaken up the enemy
hierarchy. Both the sectors were reinforced by more and more regular troops. An
increased aggression in the intent of the enemy was now clearly visible and the
resources being pumped in, both in terms of the equipment and the manpower, did
lend credibility to such an intent.
On 01 July, three localities in Pandu area, viz., Pandu, Point 6878 and
Kathai were subjected to heavy shelling and then attacked at 0515h. All three
localities fought back and after about four hours of intense fighting, attacks were
repulsed. Same evening, at around 1830h, the enemy started shelling yet again.
The shelling continued for five-odd hours when the enemy attacked Point 10490
at 2200h. The attack was repulsed yet again. On 02 July, the scenario was repeated
with slight variations in the timings and with a similar outcome. The enemy had
suffered heavily during these attacks on two days.
​ he reports, however, indicated building up of troops in the area and it
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was assessed that a full-fledged deliberate attack was being planned by the enemy.
One major gap in the information was due to the fact that most of the enemy’s
forces had been concentrated and kept at Chinari, just to the South of the river.
But increased reconnaissance activities and heavy shelling did indicate that the
enemy was preparing the ground for a major offensive. The shelling continued
through 04 July too.
At that juncture, Brigadier LP Sen developed some medical problem and
was evacuated back to Delhi where he was advised by the medical authorities to
stay back since he was not found fit to join back. Brigadier Henderson Brooks1
took over the command of 161 Infantry Brigade.
1- ​Brigadier Thomas Bryan ‘TB’ Henderson Brooks belonged to 5 Maratha Light Infantry and retired as
a Lieutenant General after commanding the Eastern Command. Paths of Brigadier LP Sen and Brigadier
Brooks (both Lieutenant Generals at that time) would cross again after the 1962 Indo-China war. Lieutenant
General LP Sen had commanded Eastern Command during 1962 war before handing over the command to
Lieutenant General PP Kumaramangalam (he commanded only for a few months) who, in turn, handed over
the command to Lieutenant General Brooks. Lieutenant General Brooks, along with Brigadier PS Bhagat, VC
(later Lieutenant General) authored the still classified ‘Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report’ about the 1962
debacle.

​ Kumaon, despite the setback received in the ambush, had been doing a
4
fantastic job. During the first three days of the month, 4 Kumaon had inflicted
more than 80 casualties on the enemy. However, on 05/06 July, 2 Bihar relieved 4
Kumaon. 2 Bihar2 was a raw battalion and was no match for 4 Kumaon’s
experience and knowledge of the ground in the area.
Across Kafir Khan Range in Tithwal, by 10 July, 163 Brigade had
withdrawn to the East of River Kishanganga in face of heavy assaults by a
numerically superior enemy. That portion doesn’t form part of this work, as
mentioned earlier. Uri sector too, brimming with Pakistan army regulars, was
likely to face stiff opposition both, during the advance and defensive operations.
​ ajor General Thimayya, therefore, carried out a fresh assessment of
M
the situation to evolve his plans. As the enemy strength looked formidable, he
correctly decided to lay focus on consolidation around Urusa along Uri-Domel
Road, around Pandu to the North of the river and along Kishanganga River in
Tithwal sector. The first endeavour now was to make sure that no enemy
infiltrates into the Valley per se. It was, thus, felt that an imaginary line, joining
home bank at Tithwal with Chakothi and Pir Kanthi on Pir Panjal, be defended
since Kafir Khan Range (standing between Uri Sector and Tithwal Sector) offered
many routes of infiltration to the enemy and unless and until, the complete
linearity of the line of defences was secured, the enemy could surprise the
defenders at any point.
Reshian Gali and Ricchmar Gali were two major passes on Kafir Khan
Range. The GOC was of the opinion that the best way to dominate the complete
linear belt would be by holding the long ridge running South from Kishanganga,
Point 7802 to Kafir Khan peak and the high grounds between Kafir Khan and the
Jhelum, implying Pandu and Chhota Kazinag. The main issue with such a plan,
simply, was the availability of troops. Tithwal Sector required at least three
battalions on the ridges and one battalion in depth. Reshian Gali, by itself,
required a battalion. The Southern slopes would consume two battalions. That
translated into seven battalions between Jhelum and Kishanganga.
Further to the South, three battalions were required to hold the slopes
rising from Urusa till Pir Kanthi. One battalion was required to give
2- ​As per many commentators, Brigadier LP Sen had made sure that 4 Kumaon was kept in the Pandu
area despite higher HQ and the GOC wanting 4 Kumaon to be relieved. But after his evacuation and with the
new commander coming in, the wishes of the GOC were implemented without any resistance.
 A Google Earth overlay depicting the line of forward troops

depth to the forward battalions and two battalions were required to block the
enemy from descending from Haji Pir Pass as well as for holding the passes
between Haji Pir Pass and Pir Panjal Pass3 to prevent any infiltration into
Gulmarg/Badgam/Shopian area. That translated into six battalions.
Threats of infiltration also existed via Gurais (Gurez) in the North, Zoji
La in the East and Suru4 Valley in Kargil. That would need two battalion between
Bandipore and Gurais, two between Kangan in Sindh Valley to Zoji La and one
battalion as reserve at Anantnag. A total of five battalions were, thus, required.
As against a requirement of 18 Battalions, only 15 were available. With
nothing more likely to come, the GOC reduced the total requirement by reducing
the reserve battalion at Anantnag, re-working the strength on either side of Kafir
Khan Range and reducing a battalion from Haji Pir Pass- Pir Panjal Pass area. The
resultant deployment was to be as under: -
3- ​Also referred more commonly as Pir ki Gali Pass, located on the Mughal Road joining Poonch area
with Shopian in Kashmir.
4- ​An invasion through Suru Valley could enable enemy to capture Kargil- Zanskar- Kishtwar/Anantnag
without any resistance.
Valleys in and Around Kashmir Valley (lines depict connectivity and not
the state of LsOC)

-Uri Sector: Six infantry battalions, one field regiment, one mountain
battery and an anti-tank troop under 161 Infantry Brigade.
-Tithwal Sector: 163 Infantry Brigade with four battalions and one field
regiment.
-Gurais- Zoji La Sector: 77 Para Brigade with four battalions and one
battery of mountain battery.
-Divisional Reserves: 7 Cavalry (Baramulla) and a battalion (Handwara-
Kupwara)

The order of battle of three brigades of Srinagar Division, as on 10 July

1948, read as under: -
Formation & Commander Area of Units
Responsibility
77 Para Brigade under Gurais- Zoji La -2 (Para) Madras
Brigadier HL Atal -1 Grenadiers
 -2/4 GR
-1 Patiala
161 Infantry Brigade under Uri-Chakothi -7 Sikh
Brigadier Henderson Brooks -2 Dogra
-4 Kumaon
-2 Bihar
-2/3 GR
-Sawai Man Guards
-1 JAK Militia
163 Infantry Brigade under Tithwal -1 Madras
Brigadier JC Katoch (he had -6 Raj Rif
taken over on 26 June) -1 Sikh
-3 Royal Garhwal Rifles
-7 JAK Infantry (-)
-2 JAK Militia

The main reason why adequate reinforcements could not be sent to J&K
was that events were moving fast towards a crisis in Hyderabad, and it was feared
that Police Action in Hyderabad would lead to communal disturbances in India
and also possibly lead to the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan.
Just two days before the loss of the forward positions in Tithwal, i.e., on 06 July
only, the Army HQ had issued instructions that no major operation would be
undertaken without referring back to them. Lieutenant General Cariappa had been
instructed to concentrate mainly on stabilising the existing positions. He had also
been informed that he should not expect any additional troops for some time to
come.
The Army Commander fully appreciated the anxieties of the Army HQ concerning
the overall situation in India, with particular reference to Hyderabad and the
possible emergency arising along the Punjab frontier. He, however, felt that “we
must, either be prepared to accept possible reversals on certain fronts in our J & K
operations for want of adequate troops to drive out the enemy and retain troops in
India to meet various contingencies in Hyderabad and our Western frontier, or we
must do everything we can to avoid a National Emergency in India and make
available more troops immediately to reinforce J & K forces to carry out offensive
operations.”
 Kafir Khan Range and North (Underlying image: Google Earth)
It was necessary to continue the offensive operations in order to prevent
the enemy from seizing the initiative and launching powerful counter-attacks to
recover lost ground. Lieutenant General Cariappa felt it absolutely essential, both
militarily and politically, that Kargil could be retaken with a little delay. That
required at least an additional brigade for Sri Division. The capture of Mirpur, or
at least the location of a Brigade Group on the high ground North of Mirpur, was
necessary in order to prevent the enemy build-up for operations against Poonch.
That operation required a Brigade Group too. It was also necessary to continue the
offensive operations for the capture of Domel.
​On 13 July, Lieutenant General Cariappa requested the Army HQ for
additional two Brigade Groups. The Army HQ replied that three infantry
battalions had already been made available to him for Kargil operations, but the
additional troops asked for were not available.
The situation in Tithwal sector was still delicate and remained so till 20
July when the enemy was finally thrown back, with 30 killed and 60 wounded in
his rank and file.
​ he enemy, having forced the withdrawal of Indian troops to the East of
T
Kishanganga River, was now looking for some substantial gains in Uri-Chakothi
area. The enemy, having reinforced the sector, was reportedly deployed as under: -
-One regular battalion, one MMG Company and 3000-odd tribesmen
were operating in the areas North of Jhelum and along the Southern slopes
of Kafir Khan Range.
 -Three regular battalions, one troop of armoured cars, one MMG
company, two artillery batteries and two anti-aircraft guns were deployed
to the South of Jhelum and along the slopes of Pir Panjal Range.
-One Azad Kashmir Battalion and 500 tribesmen were deployed on Pir
Panjal, West of Pir Kanthi. One regular battalion, one battalion of Bagh
Brigade and 2000-odd tribesmen were deployed to the East of Ledi Gali
and around Haji Pir Pass.
​ n the intervening night of 21/21 July, Pandu feature was subjected to
O
intense shelling by the enemy. More than 200 shells from 25-pounder field guns
straddled the localities on the feature. Under the covering fire, the enemy
launched a massive attack at 0330h. One complete battalion was able to infiltrate
between Kathai and Pandu. Two battalions encircled Pandu ridge from North and
South, thereby practically isolating Pandu from three directions. Attacks were then
launched from two directions, thereby isolating two companies, ‘C’ and ‘D’
Companies, of 2 Bihar.
​ nder a ferocious assault by a numerically superior enemy, both the
U
companies withdrew and did a fighting break-out from their localities of Point
6873 and North-western spur of the ridge. They managed to fall back to the
battalion HQ at Pandu by 2000h, within one hour of each other. Over the balance
of the night and throughout the next day, more than 400 field shells landed on
Pandu where two companies and the battalion HQ had been holding after pulling
out. The defenders held on and beat back the enemy’s attempts to capture Pandu
on three occasions during the time period.
​ wn artillery had been pounding the enemy sitting in the localities
O
earlier held by two companies of 2 Bihar. MMGs and 2-inch mortars kept on
engaging the enemy in the East of Kathai and elsewhere. More enemy
reinforcements, however, kept on joining in and by the evening, the enemy had
one full brigade of regulars and uncountable tribesmen on the North of Jhelum.
The enemy then brought up his medium and heavy artillery and
pulverised defences at Pandu. At last, the effort bore fruits and Pandu fell to the
enemy on 23 July when 2 Bihar pulled out at 2030h and reached Uri at 1430h on
24 July. Shortage of ammunition was cited as the reason for such a step5.
 Attack on Pandu

5- ​2 Bihar had withdrawn without any orders to do so. The loss was, thus, attributed to the
incompetence of the CO, Lieutenant Colonel Tur who was arrested on the orders of Brigadier Henderson and
then court-martialled. The GOC, in agreement with the Brigade Commander, upheld the sentence awarded to
the officer.

Two companies of 2 Dogra, holding Point 10490, were now suddenly cut
off with their rear now open to enemy interference. The companies then withdrew
to Chinal Dori. The balance of 2 Dogra deployed at Nandi, too, withdrew to
Mahura by 2000h on 23 July. Two companies of 7 Sikh at Chhota Kazinag were
now under stress with everyone else literally pulling out. 1 Royal Garhwal Rifles6,
the latest arrival at Uri, was rushed to reinforce 7 Sikh and to Chinal Dori, with an
aim to stop only further ingress towards the East.
 After the push-back in Tithwal, loss of Pandu with 24 fatal and 32 non-
fatal casualties was a big setback. 11 soldiers had also gone missing during the
action. Some equipment, including one MMG, five Bren guns and 12 Sten guns
were also lost. Looking back, it was more due to the enemy’s ability to gather and
push forces as well as superior firepower means (heavy and medium artillery)
over a much shorter and well-maintained route than anything else that was the
reason number one for such a situation. As the GOC, Major General Thimayya
had no ways and means to fight such a superior firepower and human resources
when there had been no additional reinforcements (Hyderabad action7 was about
to be undertaken anytime) nor any matching firepower resources. The enemy
seemed to have an endless supply of men who would come in waves after waves
as the Indian troops fought on. The fact that such reverses had not happened
earlier was only due to personal bravery and resilience on part of commanders and
the troops on ground. Any lesser leadership or a weaker will would have invited
such a situation much before end July8.
6- ​ Garhwal Rifles Regiment was originally raised in 1887 as the 39th (Garhwal) Regiment of the
Bengal Army of East India Company. In 1921, after it became a part of the British Army in 1857, the title of
‘Royal’ was conferred upon the regiment in recognition of their gallantry in action. The title was later
dropped in 1950. 1 Garhwal was awarded the battle honour of ‘GADRA ROAD’ in 1965 Indo-Pakistan war.
Later, the battalion converted and is now known as 6th Battalion The Mechanised Infantry or 6 MECH INF
(1 GARHWAL).
7- ​The Hyderabad action finally happened with effect from 13 September 1948 under Major General
(later General and Chief of Army Staff) JN Chaudhuri.
8- ​Even though Pakistan Army had planned and executed Operation Gulmarg, as per their own
admission to the UN, they got involved as regular units and formations in the Month of May 1948. Indian
troops had encountered such units at various places in early January 1948 though. Regulars in disguise,
however, were present from the day One.
 A map of Pakistan Army depicting attack on Pandu (Captain Raja Muhammad Sarwar Bhatti of 2/10
PUNJAB of Pakistan Army was awarded their highest gallantry award, Nishan-e-Haider, posthumously, for
his gallantry during the attack on Pandu)

Gazette Notification in respect of Lance Naik Gopal Singh, VrC, 4 KUMAON

WAR GAMING AT HQ SRI DIVISION

 The GOC of Sri Division, Major General Thimayya was in an unenviable
position by the end of July. Three major issues stared at him and needed to be
addressed. The issues were as under: -
-The decision as to whether to hold on to the existing forward positions or
to pull back to strong defensive positions on either side of Kafir Khan
Range.
-To convince the Army HQ and the HQ Western Command to rush
reinforcements from East Punjab Area (i.e., by weakening the defences of
the Punjab), at a time when the Hyderabad problem was at its zenith.
-To motivate and raise the morale of the Indian troops after recent
setbacks.
​ ajor General Thimayya had to decide whether it would be necessary
M
to defend the existing forward positions or to move back to the strongly defended
area of Uri! With the build-up of enemy forces in Chakothi area, the initiative had
already passed on to the enemy. At that point and with the kind of armament and
number of troops he had, the enemy had the following alternatives to choose
from: -
-To launch an attack in the North of the Jhelum with the aim of cutting the
line of communication between Rampur and Uri before attacking Uri from
the rear. He could possibly develop this alternative into a two-pronged
attack - one coming from the East and the other from the West. However,
there were some major confines to such an offensive. It was a tough
terrain to navigate and operate in. With a perilous line of communication,
it would not be possible for the enemy to maintain a large number of
troops. And then, there was a physical obstacle, a fast-flowing River
Jhelum, that he would have to cross to make his attack truly meaningful.
The greatest danger was that his force would be isolated if there was a
long interruption in the link-up between these troops and others coming
along the main road from Chakothi side. In view of those grave
complications, the enemy was not likely to adopt that course.
-The next alternative was to infiltrate a force along Kafir Khan range to
Handwara area with a view to unsettling the communications of 163
Infantry Brigade. However, such an offensive could be undertaken only on
a small scale due to a long and difficult line of communication.
- The third alternative involved attacking Uri from the South, i.e., from
Haji Pir Pass side. That option would have certain advantages It would
isolate the forward Indian positions in Urusa-Pir Kanthi area and would
 have the potential of achieving surprise and hitting the weak points. The
problem would be that due to long and difficult line of communication the
size of the attacking force would be limited.
- The option/alternative number 4 involved launching an attack along the
main road, combined with a subsidiary attack either from North of the
Jhelum or from South of the river, with the object of cutting the line of
communication between Rampur and Uri. However, the subsidiary attack
was more likely to come from South of the road than from North of the
Jhelum. There were obvious advantages in undertaking such offensive
operations- firstly, with a good line of communication, the enemy could
employ a large force, supported by artillery and armour; and secondly,
there was a fairly good chance of getting into the Valley after a
breakthrough at Urusa, which would have tremendous political and
propaganda value. However, there was a serious disadvantage - any attack
along the main road would meet with strong resistance.
The GOC’s reading of the situation led the GOC to conclude that the last
two courses offered maximum advantages to the enemy, and, therefore, he was
most likely to adopt a combination of those two courses. In view of such
possibilities, Major General Thimayya took into careful consideration the
advantages and disadvantages of the two alternative courses open to him, viz., to
withdraw the defence line to Uri and hold the enemy there to the last man and the
last round; or to hold the enemy from existing positions.
The first course would have several advantages- firstly, it would mean
compact defence and more troops concentrated in a smaller area; secondly, the
LOC would be shorter and easier and less exposed to enemy interference from the
North of the river, i.e., from the lower heights of Pandu; thirdly, lesser troops
would be required for holding the defences, thus allowing creation of reserves at
various levels of command.
However, the disadvantages were far too many. Firstly, it could be bad for
the morale (already flagged as the issue number 3). An Indian withdrawal would
have tremendous propaganda value for the enemy. With his morale raised by the
retreat of the Indian troops from the forward positions, the enemy would try and
repeat his tactics and cut the LOC at Buniyar and attack Uri. Moreover, the
subsequent operations along the road Uri-Domel would be more difficult, as again
the ground would have to be recaptured up to the existing forward positions near
Urusa and Pir Kanthi.
The GOC, therefore, decided on a combination of both these courses, i.e.,
to hold the existing defence line with a secondary defence line at Uri. His plan
was to put two brigades forward to hold the enemy in the existing position in Uri-
Urusa area with a view to going on the offensive subsequently.
​ n 11 July, HQ 77 Para Brigade had already been given a new task, i.e.,
O
to take over the operational responsibilities in Gurais (or Gurez) and Zoji La
areas. But with the loss of Pandu on 23 July, the necessity of strengthening the Uri
sector was felt at all levels of command. On 31 July, the Army Commander,
Lieutenant General KM Cariappa informed Major General Thimayya that the
latter could utilise the three additional units1, for some time, in his Division to
stabilise his position which had been in a state of imbalance on the Tithwal-
Chakothi front. Lieutenant General Cariappa also asked Major General Thimayya
to write an appreciation as to how soon he would be able to complete the
stabilization and release those units as well as the battalion, 2 Bihar, that had been
sent specifically to reinforce the Sonamarg sector.
​ n 5 August, Major-General Thimayya wrote an appreciation of the
O
situation regarding the security of Chakothi-Uri and Tithwal areas. He estimated
that a total of 17 battalions would be required to stabilize the stressed front. The
recommended deployment was as under: -
​-Chakothi-Uri area.
​-Chinal Dori-Chhota Kazinag –02 battalions.
1- ​Three units, 5 Maratha Light Infantry, 3 Jat and 1 Royal Garhwal Rifles, along with Gwalior
Mountain Battery, had earlier been sent to the Valley but had been earmarked for operations in the area
Burzil Pass and later for operations in the area Dras and Kargil.

​-Urusa-Pt 9108-02 battalions.

​-Pir Kanthi-Ledi Gali-02 battalions.
​-Uri defences-01 battalion.
-South of Uri to keep contact with enemy at Haji Pir-01 battalion.
​-Mahura-Buniyar area-01 battalion.
​-Reserve for the above area- 01 battalion.
​-TOTAL: 10 battalions.
​-Tithwal area.
​- Tithwal defences— 01 battalion.
​-Mir Kalsi-Pir Saheba— 01 battalion.
​-Richhmar Gali-— 01 battalion.
-Raniwala Dana Ridge— 01 battalion.
 -Sen Ridge-Pt 10874— 01 battalion.
-TOTAL: 05 battalions.
​-Handwara-Tithwal Axis.
-Line of Communication (including defence of Tutmar Gali) — 01
battalion.
-Divisional reserve based at Sopore— 01 battalion.
-TOTAL: 02 battalions.
​-GRAND TOTAL —17 battalions.
I​ n addition to the 17 battalions required for the security of Chakothi-Uri
and Tithwal areas, 04 battalions were also required for other sectors, i.e., Zoji La,
and Gurais-Kanzalwan-Rajdiangan Pass. But whereas the total requirement was of
21 battalions, only 18 battalions were available (17 Indian Army battalions and
one J & K State Forces battalion). Therefore, 03 additional infantry battalions
were needed. The date of the complete stabilization of the battle fronts would be
dependent on the date of availability of those battalions.
Typical of him, Major General Thimayya frankly informed the Army
Commander that it would be difficult to lay down any fixed date by which he
would be able to thin out in Chakothi-Uri and Tithwal sectors, and thereby, release
adequate troops (i e 03 battalions) for the operations in Kargil Sector. Kargil
operations had to be postponed. Further, Major General Thimayya was permitted
to utilise the three infantry battalions earmarked for the Kargil operations for
stabilising the Tithwal and Uri-Chakothi front.
Besides providing reinforcements, Lieutenant General Cariappa issued the
following detailed instructions to Major General Thimayya for raising the morale
of the troops and avoiding major disasters2:-
“​ You will take every possible step to ensure that the positions you now
hold in the Kashmir Valley are completely stabilized. In doing this, you must
ensure that every rank under your command is fully aware of his responsibility to
hold on to ground now in occupation until such time as you authorize withdrawal
from such ground. Not an inch of ground will be given to enemy nor will the
enemy be allowed to go a yard past your forward positions into our territory.
“​ Every position will be prepared strongly with properly sited section,
platoon etc, posts mutually supporting, well dug-in and bunkered and holding
adequate reserves of ammunition, supplies and water. You will make certain that
each of such positions have sufficient inter-communication arranged. All round
defence will always be provided for.
 “​ You will impress on all commanders that when forced to withdraw, for
tactical reasons, they will carry out such withdrawal in the normally accepted
manner and not in an uncoordinated and unplanned way as happened recently,
leaving behind quantities of equipment etc. Every commander, no matter how
small his command may be, will always have a position in rear, properly
reconnoitred and known to all ranks in his command to which he, when forced to
withdraw, will withdraw. The normal procedure of withdrawal, i.e. the sending
back first of impediments such as heavy and unwanted equipment, slow-moving
personnel, then a party to go back to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the party,
and then the withdrawal of the main party leaving behind a small party to come
last.
“​ Whilst you are to stabilize your present positions, I want you to make
quite clear to all your sub commanders that they will always maintain
2- ​Contents of this chapter, this point forward, have been reproduced from the official history of the war.

intact front with the enemy to ensure that they are not surprised at any time. This
is best done by maintaining vigorous patrolling all round. I want you to carry out
certain long-range patrolling under your orders into enemy country on a ‘hit and
run’ basis. Whenever possible, you will, without having to have a set piece
offensive operation, endeavour to gain as much ground as possible forward of
your present positions. You will at all times make quite certain that your line of
communication is, in no way, endangered by your going forward.
“​ I would like to see more deception carried out to harass and confuse
the enemy of your intention.”
I​ n more ways than one, therefore, offensive operations were halted in
July 1948. With the focus on stabilization and actions carried out as per the
directives of the Army Commander, the front was slowly stabilized. No ground
was yielded anywhere despite heavy shelling and numerous attacks, both big and
small, by the enemy in both the sectors.
A 25-Pounder being cleaned during a lull in the firing

OceanofPDF.com
 DECISIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS
Not known to many fighting on ground inside the Kashmir Valley,
the decision by Lieutenant General Cariappa to halt offensive operations
was neither to his liking nor was it taken by him through his free will. The
sequence of events in the subsequent paragraphs would clear the picture in
that regard.
Far away from Kashmir Valley, some major developments were
happening at the capitals of two nations. United Nations Commission for
India and Pakistan (UNCIP)1 sent a team to the two nations in July 1948 to
find a solution to the ongoing conflict. Pakistan, having denied any role in
the conflict and having attributing the cause of the issue to the emotional
bonding between co-religionists on either side of the border forcing tribal
fighters to move into Kashmir, for so long, finally accepted her role in the
conflict. On 07 July 1948, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zafarullah
Khan admitted to the involvement of Pakistani army and government since
May 1948. In fact, with increasing evidences being gathered against
Pakistan on daily basis, he had been left with no choice.
Discovering this, UNCIP shifted its efforts to affect a cease-fire
followed by a truce agreement providing for demilitarization. It was
prophesised that such a step would permit a free and impartial plebiscite to
be held throughout Kashmir. The results of the Commission's efforts were
agreements which were embodied in the Commission's resolution of 13
August 1948 (and later of 05 January 1949) and were accepted by both
parties. These were to be implemented in two ways, as under: -
-First, by the cessation of hostilities2.
-Second, the military commanders for India and Pakistan agreed
upon a cease-fire line to be supervised by the U.N. Military
Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)3.
1- ​On 01 January 1948, India had taken the dispute to the United Nations under the leadership
of Pandit Nehru. The PM had gone to the UN to get the resolution for a disputed state as per
International law. But the question is, “Was J&K considered as dispute state?” The simple answer is
“No”. With Maharaja Hari Singh accepting J&K as part of India and signing the instrument of
accession on26 October 1947, J&K had already become an integral part of India that had been
invaded by Pakistan.
2- ​To be affected on 01 January 1949.
The UNCIP made an ardent appeal to both the nations to
refrain from any offensive action that may prejudice negotiations for a
peaceful settlement. India immediately ordered a change in the posture
while Pakistan didn’t pay any heed to the appeal and continued with
offensive activities as before.
By now, the skirmishes had started between two opposing armies in
Punjab and Rajasthan too. Central and Southern India was also on a boil
due to Razakar and Hyderabad stand-off. Under pressure from both the UN
and internal issues, the Army HQ, on 06 July, issued a directive to
Lieutenant General KM Cariappa, GOC-in-C Western Command that no
further operations be undertaken without prior approval from the highest
HQ. The directive further advised the Army Commander to focus on
consolidating the existing positions.
Even though now committed to the defensive policy, the staff at
HQ Western Command, started working on the following possible
operations just to cater for any unforeseen eventuality: -
-Operation Duck for capture of Kargil so as to link up with Leh.
-Operation Easy to link up with Poonch from Rajouri.
-Operation Camel to capture Haji Pir Pass.
-Operation Snook to capture Bhimbar.
-Operation Steel to capture Kotli.
-Operation Crab for capture of Muzaffarabad.
-Operation Blood to capture Mirpur.

Out of the seven listed operations, first three could have been
undertaken with prior approval of the political leadership since those
operations dealt with the relief of besieged garrisons as part of defensive
operations. However, the balance four, even though aiming to retrieve own
territory and ensuring the security of hinterland, were not allowed because
of the stated defensive policy of the government of India. Apparently, the
directive had not taken into the consideration that the enemy had been on
offensive all across the front and could only be stopped through an
offensive approach. In addition to ongoing aggressions in Poonch, Tithwal
and Haji Pir, the enemy was also showing aggressive intent in Ladakh.
Contesting the directive of 06 July, the GOC-in-C further
elaborated that any success in Kargil would enable the enemy to send flying
columns into Bhaderwah-Kishtwar-Doda belt and isolate Kashmir from
Jammu. The
3- ​Under the Karachi Agreement, which was later signed on 22 July 1949.
ongoing activities right from Haji Pir to Jhangar to Naushera to Beri Pattan
and Chhamb were also indicative of enemy’s intent to capture the area
South of Pir Panjal by launching multiple attacks. He, therefore, asked the
Army HQ to allow him to launch offensives to recapture Mirpur, Domel
and such launch pads so as to wrest initiative from the enemy. However, his
pleas were not agreed to in toto. While he was allowed to launch offensive
in the Kargil area, any offensive action in Mirpur and around was not
agreed to. Further, it was stated that Poonch must hold on till relieved and
no further offensive should be launched to ease the pressure on the town.
The defensive mindset on top didn’t even allow the IAF to fly with
independence. The political considerations further banned any air action
against the border towns of the State, now under Pakistan’s illegal
occupation. Even enemy reinforcements and supply columns crossing over
bridges at Kohala and elsewhere were not allowed to be attacked.
While India adopted such an ill-advised and ill-thought defensive
policy at such a crucial stage, Pakistan started exploiting the opportunities
so presented by such a decision. Build-up against Leh and Poonch suddenly
became alarming. Instead of upsetting the enemy by snatching the initiative,
debates were held between holding on to Poonch or evacuating it.
 The decisions taken at
the highest level during the month remain debatable even today. The pros
and cons of such a decision were to haunt the nation in particular and the
region in general, for decades that have followed.

A convoy descending from Banihal Pass on the BC Road

THE STRESS: AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1948

​Monsoons had arrived in full force and the operations in Jammu
region, to the South of Pir Panjal, had virtually come to a halt. However,
with very few rain-bearing clouds able to cross the massive Pir Panjal
Range, rains had not been so violent in the Valley and far lesser in the areas
further to the North of the Great Himalayan Range.
Having seen and realised the results of possessing superior
firepower and abundant manpower, the Pakistan Army appeared to be in no
mood to let go of the pressure that it had built prior to the gains in Tithwal
and Pandu area. Both Uri and Tithwal Sectors continued to be shelled,
bombarded and attempts made to rush Indian posts and picquets. While the
enemy had bigger calibre artillery, own aircraft were now being constrained
because of political decisions as well as because of the presence of many
anti-aircraft guns in and around Domel. For once, in a stalemate like
situation with the Indian authorities adhering to the commitments made to
the UNO and Pakistan throwing all such thoughts to wind, the Indian troops
were at the receiving end.
On 12 August, the Indian picquets deployed to the South of
Tithwal, were shelled intensely with 200 shells of various calibres landing
within an hour. The shelling had not been in isolation. A number of well-
sited MMGs kept harassing Indian troops in the same area throughout the
day and the next. The fire assaults continued, this time by heavy mortars, on
14 August too. Many more posts around Tithwal were also engaged on that
day. That appeared to be Pakistan’s way of celebrating their Independence
Day.
Over the next one month, on an average, the enemy artillery fired
about 100 shells and bombs on Indian positions without any break. On 07
September, a 25-pounder gun was brought forward to fire in a direct role,
targeting the Tac HQ of 163 Brigade as well as the line of communication
running towards the NC Pass. That one gun fired, on an average, about 50
rounds per day between 07 and 12 September.
A fighter jet of RIAF then came in on 12 September and attacked
the gun position and was hit by MMG fire while attempting to blow up the
gun position. The jet caught fire and crashed but 1 Madras men braved
intense MMG fire volleys in order to retrieve the body of the pilot
successfully.
Throughout the month of September, relentless firing continued all
along the frontlines between Tithwal and Reshian Gali. Brigadier JC Katoch
then conducted a number of operations to return the favour and consolidate
own position in Tithwal area. The details of those manoeuvres are not being
covered in this work.
The situation in Uri sector, as far as the enemy actions were
concerned, was similar but the tempo of shelling during September was
extraordinarily high. On 01 September, a medium gun was brought up and
deployed at Chakothi by the enemy gunners. It opened up at 1405h and
over the next two and a half hours, that gun and many 25pounders, together,
fired more than 200 shells into the Indian held areas, with special focus on
the Uri Bowl. The Brigade HQ had been housed inside the Rest House and
a part of the building was damaged. Most of the window glasses were
shattered. The brigade signal exchange, however, was not so fortunate and
it received a direct hit that killed the signal NCO and put out
communication for a while. Once the fury died down, losses were counted
as six soldiers and four mules killed while 21 soldiers and four mules
wounded, in addition to material damage to other assets like vehicles and
generators.
When a similar attempt was made by the enemy on 04 September,
an RIAF jet was called in. Enemy gun positions in Chakothi were rocketed
while depth targets like Domel were also strafed in detail. The pilot of the
aircraft, Wing Commander Moolgavkar, was awarded MVC for such a
gallant act in the face of heavy hostile antiaircraft artillery fire.
On 06 September, at 0230h, a battalion less a company of the
enemy attacked Sawai Man Guards at Ledi Gali, making use of heavy
artillery and mortar fire. By the time the attack was finally repulsed and the
enemy made to flee at 0530h, a total of 180 shells and bombs had landed
inside the defended locality. Two days later, the enemy targeted and shelled
4 Kumaon position at Urusa with 25-pounder guns. During the counter
bombardment, a battery of Indian 25- pounders knocked one 25-pounder of
the enemy out of action by delivering a direct hit on its vital parts. With
that, artillery shelling started to ebb post 08 September.
While 161 Infantry Brigade stayed focussed on patrolling and
ambushes, action had started on the other side of the Pir Panjal; Operation
Emptee, a prelude to the link up with Poonch from Rajouri side, had begun.
Incidentally, JAK Corps1 was also formally raised around this time
and Lieutenant General SM Srinagesh2 took over as its first GOC on 16
September 1948. The HQ was located at Udhampur where the HQ of Indian
Army’s Northern Command is located now.
1- ​JAK Corps was renamed as V Corps on 12 December 1948. It was to later become 15 Corps
and is now responsible for operations in Kashmir Valley. It moved to Srinagar after raising of HQ
Northern Command in 1972.

2- ​Later General and the third Chief of

Army Staff of India, General SM Srinagesh belonged to Kumaon Regiment.

Lieutenant General (later General) SM Srinagesh, the first GOC of

JAK Corps, rose to become the Chief of Indian Army in 1955
Gazette Notification in respect of Major Sampuran Singh, VrC, 7 SIKH

OceanofPDF.com
 COOLING DOWN: OCTOBER 1948
As the new month began, so did the new phase of heavy shelling in
Uri area. On 03 October, using the gun positions at Pandu and Chakothi, the
enemy simultaneously shelled the forward positions of 2 Dogra, 4 Kumaon,
2/3 GR and Sawai Man Guards with 3.7-inch howitzers. The RIAF was
called in and the jets strafed, rocketed and bombed Pandu area and killed
many and damaged at least one gun. One of the aircraft, however,
developed engine trouble and caught fire before crashing. Fortunately, the
pilot1 bailed out and came back to safety of own troops.
4 Kumaon positions were then specifically targeted by 3.7-inch
howitzers on every day between 04 and 07 October. Brigadier Henderson
planned an operation to clear enemy from Sank ridge and Sank top (Point
9591) on the night 06/07 October. 7 Sikh and one platoon of 2/3 GR were
tasked for the mission. Starting during the intervening night from Subash
picquet to the South of Uri, the platoon of 2/3 GR secured an interim bound
called Twin Contours. 7 Sikh too secured their bound by 0310h on 07
October. On 08 October, a fighting patrol of four platoons of 7 Sikh
advanced to attack Pt 9591.
The enemy elements manning the forward posts withdrew without
offering a fight and were chased by the leading platoon. Many of them were
killed and wounded during the running engagement. Recce patrols were
then sent around from the firm base. At least three companies of the enemy,
supported by 3-inch mortars, were identified at the formidable Point 9591.
The recce patrols then fell back, under the cover of artillery fire, at 1330h
on 08 October and the attack was called off.
 1- ​The pilot of the aircraft was Flying Officer GD
Cabral. During his operational tour of 1947-48, this officer was shot down twice. On the first
occasion he successfully force-landed in the riverbed at Poonch. He came back to the Squadron and
carried on undaunted. He was again shot down over Uri and by his cool courage and resource
walked out of “NO MAN’S LAND” after being heavily shelled. He was awarded Vir Chakra for his
overall performance in operations.

Flying Officer GD Cabral, VrC

Similar probing actions by patrols of 2 Dogra against the enemy at

Point 9813 were carried out on 11 October too. The enemy had two
companies on the feature, and, the enemy out of sheer panic, fired about
3000 rounds of small arms ammunition and 80 shells on the small patrol. A
platoon of the enemy then stepped out with bayonets fixed on their
weapons, looking for Indian patrol. The platoon was ambushed and sent
back with uncounted losses.
Two days later, on 13 October, confirmed reports of about 3,000
men-regulars and tribesmen- concentrating to the North of Mahura with the
latter being the obvious target, were received by HQ 161 Infantry Brigade.
Without waiting for the attack to develop, Indian artillery straddled the area
and the enemy fell back, having lost the will to attack against heavy fire
assaults. On 14 October, another attempt was made on a position held by 7
Sikh but 300 odd attackers were pushed back after a brief but intense fight.
The formation, i.e., 161 Brigade group underwent another
reorganisation on 20 October. Now, six infantry battalions, i.e., 1 Royal
Garhwal Rifles, 2 Dogra, 2/3 Gorkha Rifles, 4 Kumaon, 7 Sikh and Sawai
Man Guards remained under HQ 161 Infantry Brigade Group. The HQ of
the Brigade too moved to Mahura from Uri. Remaining battalions, i.e., 2
(Para) Madras, 2 Bihar, 5/11 GR, I JAK Militia and 3 JAK Militia, were
placed under command 165 Infantry Brigade2 with HQ at Uri.
On the same day, the area received its first snowfall of the season
with Chhota Kazinag, Chinal Dori and Pir Kanthi receiving almost a foot of
snow. With that, ended the offensive operations in the Valley.

2- ​165 Infantry Brigade had earlier been inducted after 77 Para Brigade in anticipation of
action in the Valley.

IN THE WINGS
​ he operations in Srinagar-Baramulla-Uri belt stand covered in
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the book. On the side-lines of the main action, a few developments were
happening away from the limelight. JAK Forces had been made
responsible for the rear area security, to include Reasi area in Jammu
region. 3 JAK Infantry fought a long-drawn campaign in that area to evict
enemy who had been expanding to the North (Pir Panjal and Shopian) and
East (Banihal and Ramban) with the intent to disrupt build-up of forces and
logistics, through better part of 1948. That part if not being covered here.
​ eports of the enemy’s presence in the upper reaches of Shopian,
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between Pir Panjal Pass (or Pir ki Gali Pass) and Pir Budhil Pass as also to
the South of Pir Panjal Range, in the areas of Budhil, Reasi and so on,
began to surface in December 1947 when Hindu and Sikh refugees from
Budhal (or Budhil) and surrounding villages started to descend into
Shopian (or Shupiyan), to save their lives and honour.
​ s mentioned to the fore, JAK Body Guards troops had been sent
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to Shopian on 08 November to thwart the enemy’s attempts to disrupt the
move of military convoys into the Valley. However, having found no
enemy there, the troops had fallen back to Srinagar. On 15 December,
based on the fresh inputs, one company of 1 JAK Infantry including the
rear parties of 7 and 8 JAK Infantry under Captain Prithi Singh (many of
them had been with Brigadier Rajinder Singh during the eventful days of
22 to 26 October) reached Shopian. The Company HQ and one platoon got
deployed at Shopian while one platoon each was deployed at Hirpur (on
old Mughal Road) and Hanjpur (on Budhil track). By then, the top ridge of
Pir Panjal Range had got snowed out and no enemy presence was detected
in the area.
​ JAK Infantry commenced operations in Reasi area in mid-
3
March 1948. By that time, the snow levels had decreased a bit and
suddenly, the enemy was reported to be holding both the passes, viz., Pir
Panjal Pass and Pir Budhil Pass, on Pir Panjal range. One squadron of
Body Guards Cavalry was moved from Jammu to Shopian in March itself.
With the arrival of the squadron, the company moved up further South and
up the slopes of Pir Panjal. The company occupied a base at Dubjan,
leaving Shopian in the care of the squadron. Regular patrolling started but
the inputs regarding the enemy descending into Shopian could not be
verified since no contact was established right till the middle of May 1948.
 Shopian Area

​ n 12 May, a routine patrol, on its way from Dubjan to Aliabad,

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was ambushed by the hostiles at a point short of Aliabad. Six soldiers were
killed and one was taken prisoner. The prisoner, however, had luck on his
side. After torturing him, his hands and feet were tied and he was thrown
into the freezing cold water of a nala near Aliabad. He had, however,
survived the ordeal and reached back the company base on 16 May.
​ he ambush sent alarm bells ringing all the way to the Army HQ
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(Dogra). The presence of the enemy in the area had been confirmed but
exact deployment and strength was not yet known. The civilians, however,
confirmed enemy’s presence at Pir Panjal Pass and the numbers cited by
them varied from a platoon to a battalion. By the end of June, the snowline
had moved up and beyond Aliabad village. An MMG section of 4 JAK
Infantry had arrived from Srinagar to reinforce the company of 1 JAK.
​ n the intervening night of 01/02 July, a strong patrol along with
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the MMG section was led up the slope by Captain Prithi Singh. Having
reached the outskirts of the village without getting detected, the company
occupied the surrounding heights and sat in wait. As the day light broke, all
hell broke loose on the village with MMGs having a field day. The enemy
was wiped out in toto. Over the next few days, patrols were pushed up and
finally, Pir Panjal Pass was occupied without any resistance on 06 July.
Pir-ki-Gali stood secured now and Dogras foiled a number of attempts by
the enemy to dislodge them from the pass. The enemy, too, appeared
content with sniping and long-range firing.
​ ith the pass in own hands, the problem of maintenance cropped
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up. Shopian was too far and involved a steep climb to the pass. Further,
enemy presence was being reported along the ridge as well as on either
side of the ridge. The route of maintenance, therefore, remained prone to
enemy interference. On 15 July, a column of more than 50 mules, carrying
supplies for the company at the pass, was attacked by the enemy near
Aliabad. Captain Khajoor Singh and a section of MMG and men from the
squadron were escorting the column and they didn’t allow the enemy to get
near the column. At the same time, the company at the pass was attacked
and was soon under stress. Luckily, the column under Captain Khazoor
Singh reached in time and reinforced the locality.
​ aving followed the pattern of the enemy who would climb on to
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the shoulders of the pass during the day and return in the evening after a
day-long sniping regime, it was decided to lay an ambush to trap the
enemy. Captain Khazoor Singh led an ambush party early next morning
and walked straight into fifteen odd hostiles who were in the process of
consuming pre-dawn meal because of Ramzan fasting ritual. One of them
was killed while the others ran away.
​ etween 19 July and 24 July, the enemy occupied a dominating
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feature and kept on sniping without a break. One soldier was killed and a
few others were injured. The dominating position offered unhindered
observation and fire into the Dogra post. On 24 July, two platoons launched
an attack and evicted the enemy from the high ground and occupied it with
a post to prevent repetition of the same tactics by the enemy.
​ he supplies at the Pass were going to cater only till 31 July.
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With the compulsion to hold the pass now, another mule column was
pushed forward by the HQ of Kashmir Brigade of JAK forces under Major
Nischant Singh of 5 JAK Infantry on 26 July. Two companies of the
battalion escorted the mule column. Once near Aliabad, a large strength of
the enemy holding a dominating ground, brought down heavy fire on the
column. Due to the terrain configuration, the column couldn’t dislodge the
enemy and the column fell back to Dubjan.
​ he post, though running low on supplies, held on. By 01
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August, the enemy had cut the telephone line between Dubjan and the pass
and the post at the pass had run out of batteries. Their communication was
now cut. The enemy, in the meanwhile, brought up Haideri Battalion of
Azad Kashmir to the area and on 08 August, Haideris launched an attack
on the post. Dogras, low on ammunition, held their fire till a point when
the enemy reached within 100m of the post. And then they opened up with
all that they had at their disposal. The enemy scattered and ran away. There
were Pakistani officers and men in the battalion and they rallied the
invaders to launch two more attacks but they couldn’t gain a foothold. 47
dead bodies were seen scattered around the post while many more had run
away after suffering the injuries.
​ y the evening, the ammunition state had become too low and
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with no communications with the HQ, Captain Prithi Singh decided to
abandon the post. The move was carried out tactically and with stealth. The
enemy had no clue of the move but the going was hampered by those
injured during the fight earlier in the day. All those men were carried on the
make-shift stretchers. When they couldn’t go beyond one km after four
hours, the wounded men were made to sit on the mules as the troops
supported them along the way. Even then the pace didn’t pick up and the
column was daylighted around Aliabad itself.
​ he day was spent attempting to achieve a clean break but it
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turned out to be a day of rear-guard action. MMGs played their part and
finally, the company reached Dubjan after the last light. Nine men had been
lost and many had been injured. Four men, including Captain Khazoor
Singh, were Mentioned-in-Despatches.
​ he Army HQ (Dogra), at that stage, handed over the
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responsibility to HQ Sri Division and 3/9 Jat1 and 5 JAK Infantry were sent
to Shopian to tackle the enemy. By the end of the month, the pass had been
retaken and the area remained incident free till the ceasefire.
1- ​In 1823, Ist Battalion of 33 Native Bengal Army was raised by East India Company. After
undergoing a number of changes, the battalion was designated as 10th Jat in 1903. After the World
War I, the battalion became 3rd Battalion of 9 Jat or 3/9 Jat, in 1922, during the reforms carried out
by British Indian Army. The present designation of the battalion is 3 JAT, known for Battle of Dograi
in 1965 Indo-Pak War.

THE WAR HEROES

Wars are seldom won because of the gallantry of one single person
or by only a handful of soldiers. There are numerous battles and grassroot
level operations in a war. Every such battle and operation has certain
moments that define the final outcome of any battlefield engagement. It is
during such operations that individual acts of gallantry stand out. And yet
for every single recorded act of gallantry, there would generally be as
many- if not more- acts of gallantry by unsung heroes who may remain
obscure for ever. This chapter goes as an acknowledgement to all the
heroes whether they were rewarded or otherwise.
​ nother issue that gets debated at times is about the number of
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officers getting awarded vis-à-vis number of soldiers who are subordinate
to such officers. Firstly, no other army in the world has as high an ‘officers:
other ranks’ casualty ratio as that in the Indian Army. In any case, as a
glance at any list of awards would prove, subordinate soldiers outnumber
their officers in pure numerical terms. Mathematics and statistics, in any
case, are beyond soldiers!
​ he operations during 1947-48 saw many battles and numerous
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other battlefield contacts during the long war. India lost 1103 (76 officers,
31 JCOs and 996 Other Ranks) during the war in J&K. Overall, a total of
five PVCs, 47 MVCs and 284 VrCs were awarded to all ranks. While it
would be impossible to record each and every act of gallantry and
leadership in this humble book, brief stories of a few of such war heroes
are being shared with no prejudice against anyone.

Major Somnath Sharma, PVC (P), 4 KUMAON

​ ajor Somnath Sharma was born on 31 January 1923 at Dadh in
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the Kangra district of Himachal Pradesh, into a family that had many
soldiers1, including his own father. He was lovingly called Som!
 ​ rom the very childhood, he had only dream and that was to join
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the forces. After finishing his schooling from Sherwood College in Nainital,
he joined the Prince of Wales Royal Military College in Dehradun before
joining the Royal Military College at Sandhurst. On February 22, 1942, he
was commissioned into the 8/19 Hyderabad Regiment of the British Indian
Army (later 4th Battalion, Kumaon Regiment of the Indian Army).

​ uring his initial career, he had the fortune of serving under an

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illustrious soldier, Colonel K S Thimayya (the only Indian to command an
Infantry brigade in battle during the World War II and later Chief of the
Indian Army) during the Arakan Operations in Burma. For meritorious
action in the face of the enemy, Somnath Sharma was awarded ‘Mention-in-
Despatches’.
​ e was the Delta Company Commander of 4 KUMAON when
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the Pakistani invasion of Jammu and Kashmir began on 22 October 1947.
At that time, Major Sharma’s right hand was in a plaster cast due to a
fracture he had suffered while playing hockey. Though he was advised rest
due to his injury, he insisted on being with his company in the battlefield
and was given permission for the same, Major Sharma’s company was
airlifted to Srinagar on October 31, 1947.
​ hat followed thereafter has already been recorded in the earlier
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parts of this book. In his sacrifice, he set an example that continues to
motivate generations of soldiers who have followed since then. His saga
will continue to do so for the times to come. When seen in the context of
1947-48 conflict, his gallantry proved to be an important cog in the wheel
of the events that led to saving of Kashmir for India. The award of the PVC2
was an apt recognition by a grateful nation.

The Citation (The CO had recommended Military Cross3 that could not have been given to a dead
soldier)
1- ​His father, Major General Amar Nath Sharma retired after serving as the first Director
General of India’s Armed Medical Services. His younger brother, General VN Sharma, rose to
become Chief of Indian Army. The other brother, Lieutenant General Surinder Nath Sharma, retired
as the Engineer-in-Chief of the Indian Army.
2- ​As the luck would have it, India’s highest war time gallantry medal was designed by Mrs
Savitri Khanolkar. Major Somnath was her daughter’s brother-in-law.
3- ​In 1947, India was yet to come up with own series of gallantry awards. Military Cross would
have been equivalent of Vr C. The CO had made the recommendation since right till late 1970s, many
Common Wealth countries, besides, of course, the United Kingdom, had been awarding British series
of awards to their soldiers. However, at that point of time, MC could only be given to living soldiers
(many of us would remember the story of Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw getting his MC in the
battlefield itself). MC (P) started only in 1979. Indian series of wards came into force with effect from
26 January 1950. All such awards for 1947-48 operations were given retrospectively in 1950 and
even later).

Brigadier Rajendra Singh Jamwal, MVC (P), JAK Forces

​ owhere in the world we find such an example where in the
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Chief of a nation state’s army has gone into war with just about one
hundred soldiers, to face a few thousand enemy! But then that is what that
makes few worthy men and women stand apart from the rest.
​ orn on 14th June 1899 in Bagoona village (now re-named as
B
Rajinderpura) of Samba district of UT of J&K, Brigadier Rajendra Singh
chose his soldier father’s profession of arms over the softer options of the
day. After graduation from the Prince of Wales College in 1921, he was
commissioned in the J&K State Force in June 1921. He became Brigadier
in May 1942, commanded Jammu Brigade as well as Kashmir Brigade
before taking over as the Chief of Staff J&K State Force from Major
General HL Scott in September 1947.

Identity Card of Brigadier Rajendra Singh

 ​ oon after taking over, he went about changing the tactics of the
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force under command. Till then, the troops had been deployed in penny-
pockets all along then frontier. Such a deployment meant lack of defence
potential of such isolated posts. With threat looming large, he ordered re-
deployment of the forces with an aim of presenting a formidable resistance
to the enemy at the places vital to both sides. Unfortunately, before his
orders could be followed in toto, the enemy struck (remember, it was during
the first week of October 1947 itself when the enemy started pushing back
such posts in Jammu region).
​ he subsequent actions between Baramulla and Uri during those
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fateful days have already been recorded in this book. His planning, his own
courage and his leadership were few of the factors that made sure that the
enemy could not reach Baramulla till as late as 27 October, despite the
enemy having hit Domel on 22 October.
Any observer would realise that after one day’s delay because of
the resistance put up by a few men of 4 JAK under their CO, Lieutenant
Colonel Narain Singh Sambyal at Domel, it was only because of Brigadier
Rajendra Singh’s force that a huge delay could be imposed on the enemy.
Sacrifices by Lieutenant Colonel DR Rai and Major Somnath Sharma then
killed any chance that the enemy ever had.
 The Citation
I​ t is for this reason that Brigadier Rajendra Singh is hailed as the
‘Saviour of Kashmir’1 by military historians and readers alike. For his act of
gallant leadership, he was awarded the second highest gallantry award of
the nation, MVC. He became the first recipient of the coveted medal. He
was declared Missing in Action (declared Dead).
1- ​A metallic bust of Brigadier Rajendra Singh, MVC (P) was unveiled by Lieutenant General
AK Bhatt, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM, GOC 15 (Chinar) Corps on 25 October 2018. Mrs Uravshi Rani
Pathania, the eldest daughter of the ‘Saviour of Kashmir’ in a simple ceremony organized at the
Badami Bagh Cantonment in Srinagar, presented the bust to HQ 15 Corps. The event was attended
by two daughters and other close relatives of Brigadier Rajendra Singh and a host of Army Officers.
A two minutes’ silence was observed by the gathering in honour of the brave soldier. Later, the
relatives visited the Rajendra Villa, the present day Signal Regiment Officers' Mess in the BB
Cantonment, and stayed in the erstwhile Flagstaff House to relive the old times. The family also
visited Boniyar and paid homage at the Memorial where Brigadier Rajendra Singh had breathed his
last.
The Nation remains grateful to the Family (The GOC, 15 Corps with the
daughter or Brigadier Rajendra Singh Jamwal, MVC)

Lieutenant Colonel Dewan Ranjith Rai, MVC (P), 1 SIKH

I​ C-12 Lieutenant Colonel Dewan Ranjith Rai was born on 06
February 1913 in Gujranwala (now in Pakistan) and was educated at the
Bishop Cotton School, Shimla. He belonged to the first course of IMA,
Dehradun and passed out in 1935 and was later commissioned into Sikh
Regiment. He was among the first Indian officers to be posted to Command
and Staff College, Quetta as an instructor.
​ he Army Commander, during a recent visit to 1 Sikh (the unit
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being commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rai), had been so impressed that
he picked up the unit for the task in Kashmir when the urgent call came in.
Despite a very short notice as well as the fact that his unit had been
scattered over many square miles of territory at that moment, he led his men
into war in a way that was to define certain traditions for the army of a new
democracy.

He could have, as ordered, chosen to stay back at the airfield and

wait for the complete build-up of Indian forces before taking on the enemy
who, by then, would have come calling to the airfield itself. Such a choice
would have endangered the security of the airfield as also that of the Valley
itself, as explained earlier. His sense of initiative led him to seek and
destroy the enemy, rather than waiting for him to come to him, was proved
to be instrumental in saving Kashmir. His action, when studied along with
those of the others in the league, go on to prove that all those actions by
those brave men eventually did save the Valley for India.
 Accoutrements of Lieutenant Colonel DR Rai, MVC (P) (picture courtesy 4
MECH (1 SIKH))

Citation for MVC

His act has been recorded in the book and it was the realisation of
the significance of his sacrifice that the Indian lawmakers gave a standing
ovation to the gallant soldier. He was honoured with MVC posthumously
and became the first Indian soldier to have been bestowed with the honour.
The family, of the war hero had to struggle to retrieve their belongings from
their ancestral home that had been taken over by a local Muslim in
Pakistan. The Indian Army did its best to restore some of the assets back to
the family.
1- ​Brigadier Rajendra Singh was the first recipient but from JAK Forces.
2- ​General PN Thapar was Lieutenant Colonel Rai’s uncle. The next five generations of
Lieutenant Colonel Rai’s family have served in the Army. A lot of problems were faced by the family
when an attempt was made to retrieve their belongings from their home in Pakistan. First by the
Pakistani occupants of the house resisted when a few important items were taken out and then
Pakistan army personnel stood blocking the way at Attari-Wagah border. A prompt and bold action
by Indian soldiers posted at the crossing point finally saw the vehicle through.

Lieutenant Colonel Man Mohan Khanna, MVC, 4 KUMAON

​Lieutenant Colonel MM Khanna was born at Multan (now in
Pakistan) on 01 May 1915. He was commissioned into the Kumaon
Regiment on 16 July 1936. He holds the distinction of being the first
alumnus of Indian Military Academy (IMA) to be appointed as the
Commandant of IMA in 1956. He rose to the rank of Lieutenant General
before his retirement in 1968.

​ e commanded 4 KUMAON, the first PVC Battalion during the

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thick of action in the Valley. Right from November 1947 when the
induction of the battalion got completed, till his evacuation after sustaining
injuries in action in June 1948, he led his battalion from the front. 4
KUMAON earned a name and a reputation of its own because of the daring
actions enacted by the battalion, starting from the Battle of Budgam to the
defence of Mahura, to the capture of Pandu, Kopra and so on.
​ or an exemplary leadership, undaunted courage and able
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command of his battalion during the war, he was awarded the coveted MVC
by the Government of India.

Wing Commander Hrushikesh Moolgavkar, MVC, RIAF

​ ing Commander Hrushikesh Moolgavkar was born on 14
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August 1920 and was commissioned into the Royal Indian Air Force on 30
November 1940. Having taken part in the Burma campaign and having
flown more than 280 hours in operations, he earned an indelible name for
himself.

​ e had a close shave when providence saved the young pilot

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early in January 1945. While operating from Hove, near Cox Bazar,
Moolgavkar took off in a Spitfire. Just after the take-off, the engine of the
Spitfire cut out. While attempting to force-land the Spitfire on the sea
beach, the aircraft nosed over and lay upside down in the shallow water,
with Moolgavkar hanging upside down from his seat still in his straps. As
the tide rose, Moolgavkar faced the prospect of drowning slowly as the
water rose above his head level. A One in a million chance saw two British
Commando Officers notice the wrecked Spitfire. They pulled out
Moolgavkar from the aircraft, saving his life. Moolgavkar suffered from
several crushed vertebrae, and had to spend six months with his back in
plaster.
​ ing Commander Moolgavkar took over as the Commanding
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Officer of No.1 Operations Wing at Srinagar from Wing Commander M M
Engineer in late September 1948 when the Kashmir operations were
underway. Wing Commander H Moolgavkar did outstanding service on the
ground and in the air. He personally led and directed the bombing attacks
on the well-defended Skardu, Uri, Zojila Pass and Saadabad sectors. The
Uri sector, in particular, presented severe restrictions upon all operational
flying in that area. Wing Commander Moolgavkar evolved a plan of
attacking Uri guns and carried out this attack in a Tempest aircraft,
exposing himself not only to the fire of anti-aircraft guns but also coming
dangerously near the "compressibility zone' due to the heavy load of bombs
at a high altitude.
​ ing Commander Moolgavkar gave effective support to the
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Army during operations in Kashmir, displaying a high sense of duty,
coordination and planning. This officer by his offensive spirit and
leadership inspired his squadron commanders and pilots with great
confidence. He was awarded MVC for his gallantry. The brave officer rose
to become Air Chief of the IAF in 1976. He was awarded PVSM just prior
to his becoming Chief of Air Force.

Wing Commander Sidney Basil Noronha, MVC, RIAF

​ orn on 06 January 1919, Wing Commander SM Noronha was
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inducted into the RIAF in Nov 1941. He was the Squadron Leader of No 7
Squadron that took part in operations in the State. Since RIAF pilots flew
over the vast areas and carried out many operations during the conflict, they
were awarded the gallantry medals for their overall performance.
 ​ he citation of the officer reads, “By completing more than 37
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operational sorties over enemy strongholds in close support of the Indian
Army. Wing Commander S.B. Noronha has shown outstanding gallantry. He
carried out the squadron's offensive role with maximum success in the face
of adverse conditions.
He has been an outstanding leader both in air and on ground. His
brilliant leadership, fearless determination and unswerving devotion to duty
have set an inspiring example to all under his command.”
The gallant soldier died, while in service, in 1957.
Subedar Bishan ‘Bahadur’ Singh, MVC (P), MC, Sardar Bahadur OBI,
1 SIKH
​ orn on 14 January 1917 in village Purain, Ludhiana (Punjab), he
B
was enrolled into Sikh Regiment on his birthday in 1933, at a tender age of
16 years. He fought during the WWII in Burma where he was awarded
Military Cross and the title of Sardar Bahadur OBI.
 On 12 December, when the battalion, led by ‘B’ Company walked
into an ambush at Bhatgiran, he was the second-in-command of the next
subunit, i.e., ‘D’ company, to which belonged Jemadar Nand Singh, VC,
MVC (P) (please see ahead). After a fierce hand-to-hand fight, and during
the withdrawal, ‘D’ Company was given the task of holding the last layback
position. A fierce hand-to-hand fight again took place. Subedar Bishan
Singh with what was left of his small company organised a counter-attack.
Although wounded in the right arm, he personally led his company,
bayoneted two of the enemy with his own hands. Another wave of enemy
attacked and Subedar Bishan Singh was wounded for a second time, but
with utter contempt for his life, the brave JCO led his men on, cheering and
encouraging. He killed two more enemy personnel with his bayonet. This so
demoralised the enemy that they fled in all directions. Subedar Bishan
Singh then started chasing the fleeing enemy, shouting cries of "Sat Sri
Akal". It was then that this brave VCO paid the highest price for his
outstanding gallantry. He was killed by a bullet in the chest.
​ or his act of cool courage, inspiring leadership and dogged
F
determination against heavy odds, he was awarded the coveted MVC
posthumously.

Jemadar Nand Singh, VC, MVC (P), 1 SIKH

 J​ emadar Nand Singh was born on 24 September 1914 at
Bahadurpur village in Bhatinda District of Punjab He was enrolled into 1
Sikh battalion of the Sikh Regiment on 24th March 1933. During the world
war II Jemadar Nand Singh, then an Acting Naik, participated in operations
against the Japanese in Burma. In March 1944, in Burma, Naik Nand Singh
and his platoon were ordered to capture a Japanese position called India
Hill, which had a very steep knife-edged ridge. As Naik Nand Singh and his
men approached, they were met with heavy machine gun and rifle fire
which killed or injured most of them. Despite his injury, Naik Nand Singh
moved forward alone and captured the first trench and killed the two
Japanese occupants with his bayonet.
Following this he moved onto the second and third trenches, again
sustaining injuries from the continuous heavy fire and grenades of the
Japanese. And he kept on silencing them with his bayonet, single-handedly.
He was wounded six times but showed incredible bravery, determination,
and even total disregard for his own life or safety. His gallantry not only
helped his platoon clear the objective but also made sure that casualties to
his subunit were not caused by a well-entrenched enemy. He was honoured
with Britain’s highest honour the Victoria Cross1.
As had been narrated already, it had been only because of his
selfless bravery and inspiring leadership that his platoon, rallying around
him, put itself in the line of fire to save ‘B’ Company of the battalion on 12
December 1947 near Bhatgiran in Uri. Had it not been his decision to throw
himself and his platoon into danger so as to save the lives of his comrades,
the forward company would have perished altogether. Interestingly, even
during that action, he was first to bloody his bayonet when the platoon
fought hand-to-hand with a well-trenched, numerically superior enemy
from a near hopeless situation.
J​ emadar Nand Singh was awarded the nation’s second highest
gallantry award, MVC for his conspicuous bravery, unfaltering leadership
and supreme sacrifice. He is the only Indian soldier to have been awarded
with the two of the highest gallantry awards, a VC and an MVC.
 ​His legacy continues to inspire the soldiers and civilians alike2.
1- ​A living VC or a living PVC recipient is a rare phenomenon. Recipients of such awards are
generally protected and looked after by the armies all over the world. It is because of a commonly
held belief that one doesn’t’ generally get a second chance to come out alive from a similar situation
again. Armies the world over, including the Indian Army, look at such assets who have the potential
to inspire future generations of soldiers. Many commentators, and not too wrongly, have questioned
the merit of exposing Jemadar Nand Singh to such a danger. As they suggest, he could have been left
in the rear or better, sent to the regimental centre. Soldiers, especially such distinguished braves,
however, have a different way of looking at the things. To go with boots on and that too while doing
what you can do the best, is a matter of honour for many; the debate may continue!
2- ​In addition to the bridge at Uri (as mentioned to the fore), the following (and many more)
symbols carry the legacy of the brave son of the country: -
-The town ‘Bareta’ near his village has a local bus stand named after him and is known as
“Shaheed Nand Singh Bus Stand”.
-A statue of “Shaheed Nand Singh” in Bathinda (locally known as Fauji Chowk) stands as
a memorial.
-The Housing project of “Nand Lok” in Chandigarh has been named in his honour.

Naik Chand Singh, MVC (P), 1 Sikh

 ​ aik Chand Singh was born in village Jaid Rampuraphul in
N
Punjab in 1922. He was recruited into 1 Sikh Regiment on 21 March 1939.
He grew up in his battalion as a young, confident leader of men and became
a Naik just before the battalion’s move to Uri.
His moment of ultimate glory happened at Nalwa Picquet on 22
November 1947 when a 600 strong enemy force attacked the isolated post
on a hill across the Jhelum river at 2215 hrs. The situation and connectivity
of the picquet has already been explained in this book.
​ aik Chand Singh was the commander of the section that bore the
N
maximum brunt of the assault on the crucial picquet. The enemy carried out
the assault with heavy automatic and 2-inch mortar fire. Naik Chand Singh
held back his fire and ordered his men to follow him and open fire only
when he opened fire himself. They let the first enemy wave reach within 25
yards of their position, and then opened up with all they had-LMG, rifles
and hand grenades. The enemy was completely surprised and withdrew
some 20 yards and took up position behind boulders and bushes. The
firefight and the bombardment then continued for a while.
At that juncture, Naik Chand Singh realized that his hand grenades
could not reach the enemy position because of the inter-se distance
involved. And he also knew that the enemy had been gaining time to send in
the next wave. Therefore, he came out of his trench thrice in spite of heavy
enemy fire, and standing in the open hurled grenade after grenade at the
enemy. During this daredevil action Naik Chand Singh got wounded in the
forearm.
 Irritated by Naik Chand Singh’s heroics, at about 2230h, the enemy
brought forward a 3-inch mortar and started bombarding the platoon. Naik
Chand Singh, in spite of his wounded arm, volunteered to lead a raid party
of two more men with the mission to destroy that mortar. The group,
making good use of cover, crawled up to within a few yards of the mortar
position before lobbing a couple of grenades and charging the mortar
position with bayonets. Naik Chand Singh killed one of the crew with his
bayonet while the remainder fled. The mortar was put out of action and later
captured. He then withdrew safely with his two comrades.
The enemy had almost 30 times more men and was unwilling to
accept such a humiliation at the hand of 20-odd Sikhs. By now, the enemy
was in position behind a cover on the left flank. Protected from the fire of
the small arms, the enemy was in the process of making another attempt
when Naik Chand Singh came out of his trench and started throwing
grenades beyond the rocks that gave cover to the enemy. During that action,
Naik Chand Singh got a burst of enemy LMG fire and dropped dead. By
now, the enemy, having borne the brunt of two grenades that had injured
many sitting in a huddle, lost the will to launch another physical charge on
the picquet. And soon, the reinforcements, as described to the fore, arrived.
​ or his act of conspicuous gallantry, unyielding fighting spirit and
F
supreme sacrifice, the NCO was awarded with MVC posthumously.

Naik Nar Singh, MVC (P), 4 KUMAON

 ​ aik Nar Singh was born on 14 March 1926 in Gangoli Kotuli
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village, Bhainsuri (Almora), Uttarakhand.
​ n 31 May 1948, his battalion was tasked to move West from
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Pandu feature and capture Point 6875 as well as Kathai ridge to the North
of River Jhelum in Uri sector. Naik Nar Singh, in command of a section of
4 KUMAON, was wounded during the initial attack on a Point 6875 (called
Master feature) but refused to be evacuated. The feature was a narrow, steep
hill covered with dense pine forests. The approach to the feature was along
a very narrow and bridle path. The enemy was holding this feature with two
companies, a section of MMGs and a detachment of 3-inch mortars.
The attack commenced at 0530hours. All advantages lay in the
enemy hands as he was holding the high ground. Twice the feature was
attacked but owing to the lack of space for manoeuvring and intense enemy
fire, the company had to stay put at the same place where they had been
pinned down.
During the second assault, Naik Nar Singh was hit by an enemy
bullet in the right shoulder. He was ordered by the company commander to
pull back for further evacuation to the rear. But as the third wave of the
attack started, Naik Nar Singh quietly slipped out unnoticed and went on to
lead his section which was the leading section of the assault wave. Shouting
in his faint but courageous voice he inspired his men by telling them in his
Kumaoni language, "Kumaoni ke bachhao; jaan chali jae lekin dushman ke
aj tukre kar dalo. Picche nahin hatna", meaning ‘The sons of Kumaon,
don’t worry about life. Cut the enemy into pieces but we shall not retreat”.
 With his bayonet fixed, firing his Sten gun from the hip, he dashed
into an enemy LMG bunker and bayoneted two of the enemy LMG gunners
and captured the gun. By that time, he had lost much blood. The attack went
through successfully. The feature was with 4 KUMAON by 1130 hrs. But
nobody could hear a single word from Naik Nar Singh. He was found lying
dead in the enemy bunker on top of his two victims-one of his hands still
clutching the LMG that he had so gallantly captured.
​ or his supreme example of selfless sacrifice, devotion to duty,
F
determination to exterminate the enemy and guts, he was awarded the
coveted MVC, posthumously.

Rifleman Dhonkal Singh, MVC (P), 6 RAJ RIF

Rifleman Dhonkal Singh was born in Sekhala Junavas village in
Jodhpur district of Rajasthan, on 01 Dec 1923. He joined the Army in the
year of 1944 at the age of 21 years and was recruited into 6 Rajputana
Rifles.
A small account of his gallant action on 30 April 1948, during the
capture of a feature to the North of Nalwa Picquet, has been made in the
book. The details of the action now follow.
 It was on that day when Rifleman Dhonkal Singh moved out as the
leading scout of the leading section of the leading platoon that had been
assigned the task of assaulting the objective, Point 8370. The path to reach
the objective was along a narrow ridge covered with trees and undergrowth.
The enemy, having detected the movement of the platoon, was waiting for
them to come within the firing range. As it came within 30 yards of the
enemy bunkers, the enemy opened fire with LMG. Rifleman Dhonkal
Singh, being in the lead, bore the brunt of the fire and was wounded in the
left shoulder. Though surprised by such a sudden attack, he immediately
went to the ground and into crawling position to avoid enemy fire and
assess the situation.
He soon realized that the well-sited LMG had to be silenced before
moving forward towards the objective without incurring any more
casualties. He slowly crawled forward to the flank of the enemy and after
reaching within a few yards of the LMG post, destroyed it with a grenade,
killing three enemy soldiers. The enemy reacted violently before running
back. During the close battle, Rifleman Dhonkal Singh got hit by a grenade
in his chest and face. And yet, he went forward and hurled a second grenade
at the fleeing enemy, killing two more, including one commander. The
moments after his section reached the objective, Rifleman Dhonkal Singh,
severely wounded and drenched in blood, succumbed to his injuries. For
such a selfless devotion, determination, physical courage in the face of fire
and his sacrifice, he was awarded the nation’s second highest gallantry
award, MVC.

Sepoy Dewan Singh, MVC (P), 4 KUMAON

​Taking our minds back to the Battle of Badgam fought by ‘D’
Company of 4 KUMAON under Major Somnath Sharma, MVC (P), the
battlefield action has a mention of Sepoy Dewan Singh of the same subunit.
He, with his platoon surrounded and about to be overrun by an
overwhelming strength of the enemy, had just stood up and firing from his
hip, had killed many in a typical daredevilry way, thus enabling his fellow
men to pull back.

Born on 04 March 1923 in Purdam village in Pithoragarh

(Uttarakhand), he was recruited into 4 KUMAON on his birthday in the
year 1943. He was 20 then. He met his moment of glory when he was just
27 years old. The citation for the award of the MVC, read as under:-
​“On 3 November 1947, at Srinagar in Kashmir during an action against the tribesmen
at Badgam, Sepoy Dewan Singh was No. 1 Bren gunner of a platoon. The tribesmen were advancing
overwhelming numbers and the odds were such that the platoon commander was ordered to
withdraw. The enemy by now had reached very near. On seeing this, Sepoy Dewan Singh picked up
his Bren gun and commenced firing from his hip with great accuracy and speed. He was responsible
for inflicting at least 15 casualties on the enemy, thereby allowing the other personnel of his platoon
to withdraw. While firing at the enemy he was severely wounded In the shoulder but Sepoy Dewan
Singh would not leave his Bren gun till he himself was killed This Sepoy incomplete disregard of his
own life and through his example of determined and heroic offensive action, undoubtedly saved not
only his section but the whole of remaining platoon from being completely over-run
His courage, gallantry and devotion to duty are examples to other soldiers.”

The Chain of Command – Timmy, Srinagesh and Kipper

 THE UNFINSIHED TASK
After the siege of Poonch was broken in November 1948 and while
operations were being undertaken in Kashmir and Ladakh, many important
areas of the erstwhile State of J&K were still under enemy control.
Bhimbar, Mirpur, Kotli, Bagh, Chakothi, Domel, Muzaffarabad, part of
Kishanganga Valley, Gilgit and Skardu were still under enemy occupation
and unless such areas were liberated, the task of Indian Army could not be
considered as complete.
It, however, needs to be noted that exertions for restraint and pacific
settlement were being put into practice both by the Indian political
leadership and the Indian Armed forces. Utmost restraint was ensured so as
not to invade Pakistani territory. The bitter truth, however, is that if the
Indian troops could have unsettled and interdicted or captured the bases
that lay just across the border, the entire support system of the invaders and
the regulars of the Pakistani Army would have been destroyed, thereby,
resulting in their eviction from the Indian territory without suffering too
many casualties. The least that could have been aimed for, especially
during the early days of the conflict, was recapture and demolition of the
bridges at Kohala and Domel and domination of area around Mirpur. Sadly,
none of these three important tasks were ever given priority during the days
when all that was easily doable. With more and more Pakistan regular
troops joining the battle in an unforgiving terrain, the tasks kept of getting
out of reach for Indian forces.
Lieutenant General KM Cariappa did debate the issue with the Army
HQ. Possible routes, required force levels, likely gains and possible losses
were all discussed in detail. Plans for recapture during November 1948 had
actually been evolved by HQ JAK Corps. In addition to stated defensive
policy, issues like troop requirement, air effort required, weakening of the
front in Punjab, related logistical problems and inclement weather,
altogether, finally tilted the balance against any such plan. Another
possibility of a strong retaliation by Pakistan in the event of the capture of
Mirpur and Kotli and Pakistan’s insecurities about its vital installations like
Mangla Headworks getting threatened, leading to an all-out war, was also
an important factor in decision making.
 Lieutenant General KM Cariappa, the GOC-in-C of the Western
Command, went to the extent of appealing to the conscience of the tribal
invaders and their leader, many of whom he had known through his service
in Waziristan during the pre-partition days. In one such message, he wrote
"By remaining here, sacrificing your valuable lives and taking others for a
cause which is not your direct or indirect concern, you are incriminating
yourselves in the eyes of God ... You Gallant men of Waziristan and the
Frontier, I advise you to stop fighting .... I am perfectly willing to meet
your spokesman to arrange for hostilities to cease. If you agree to do this
please send a party of not more than six unarmed representatives carrying
two large white flags. I shall meet them."
In a way, July 1948 proved to be a turning point when India, having
agreed to proposed cease-fire, started accepting the representatives of the
UNO. They were welcomed both in Delhi and Srinagar. Pakistan, however,
remained non-committal. In its unjustified enthusiasm to implement the
UN enforced cease fire, Indian leadership, somehow, lost sight of even its
stated strategic aim that was to liberate the entire Jammu and Kashmir from
the aggressors. In doing so, India agreed to freeze all operations and
accepted a truncated Jammu & Kashmir.
On 06 July 1948, the Army HQ issued a directive to the Army
Commander on the future conduct of operations in J&K. The directive
simply ordered him "to cease all ground offensive operations against the
enemy". While remaining debatable, that order was probably the most
unfortunate decision of the war. That decision, taken during the hot
summers of 1948, had serious tactical and long-term strategic ramifications
for India in Jammu & Kashmir. While the Indian troops followed the order
in letter and spirit, Pakistan took full advantage of the situation and
launched offensives to capture vital areas in Uri, Tithwal and Kargil
sectors. Many in the Indian Army were left disappointed and disenchanted
by that precocious and strategically opinionated action during those days
and many officers of the future generations of the Indian Army continue to
remain so even today.
While many would say that Indian government developed cold feet
at that point but when an impartial view is taken, it appears that even the
Army had issues to deal with. Conspiracy theorists do blame the British top
brass that controlled the Indian armed forces at that time. Whatever it may
be attributed to, the decision to halt operations finally resulted in India’s
loss and illegal occupation of such territories by Pakistan. Fortunately,
without breaching the international borders, many areas were reclaimed
and recaptured between July 1948 and ceasefire. However, the situation
would have been much better had India paid Pakistan in the same coin.
No words can really describe the fact that with the ceasefire lurking
around the corner, the piquets from Pir Kanthi and Ledi Gali areas were
vacated on 28 December 1948 (three days before the ceasefire) due to a
heavy snowfall! The Pakistanis had not vacated their posts on the Pir
Panjal Heights in the Neja Galli area and 3 AK Battalion immediately
reoccupied those posts by 30 December. When the troops were rushed up
on 01 January once again, they were halted in their tracks by heavy fire
assaults from formidable localities now in the hands of the enemy.
The ceasefire agreement that came into effect with effect from the
midnight 01/02 January 1949, defined ceasefire line (CFL; later LC) as per
the agreement signed on 27 July 1949 (Please see Appendix ahead).
Many observers, both military and civilians, are of the view that
India should not have accepted the above cited ceasefire line agreement
since the occupied territories were within the reach of Indian forces at that
time. The Political decision is still seen as a tool that robbed the Indian
forces of a chance to not only recapture the lost areas but also improve
defensive posture as per the terrain configuration. At the same time, many
military observers in Pakistan are of the view that had the Operation Venus
(in Jammu Region) been given a go-ahead, India would have lost all of
J&K State’s territory North of Akhnoor. There are arguments and counter-
arguments, and the views on both sides have reasons to back up their
respective lines of arguments. A lot has been said and written about the
matter and this work doesn’t intend getting into any debate.
At a very basic level, one conclusion stands out as the end result.
1947/48 conflict ended with the Indians in complete control of strategic
valleys/areas of Poonch, Kashmir Valley and Ladakh even though Pakistan
was able to keep 2/5th of the state under his occupation.
However, the communications to all three areas run precariously
close to the international border/LC. Even with Manali-Leh axis now open,
communication lifeline in western Ladakh remains very close to the LC.
Therefore, to an extent, and in pure strategical terms, the Indian position
despite the strategic triumphs is not secure even today. Unfortunately, India
has not made use of various opportunities to address this issue during the
decades that have followed those eventful days of partition some 73 years
ago.

CFL (later LC) and IB

 Pakistan has not changed his overall strategy of proxy war supported
by the state machinery despite setbacks on battlefields as well as loss of
face on diplomatic front. The troubled relations between the two states
have never been normalised nor any quick solution is in sight. Given this
harsh reality, maybe we can conclude that too much of caution post mid
1948 has had its fallouts that continue to haunt the relationship between the
two countries even today.

OceanofPDF.com
 THE EQUILIBRIUM
(This chapter looks at the conflict as a whole)

​ he conflict fought over fifteen months was the first one for both
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the nations with new identities. The overall military culture, standard of
training and general approach towards warfare was similar. The size of the
forces and quantum of equipment held by the two forces were, certainly,
beyond comparison and yet teething problems were similar on both sides.
Inclusion of tribal hordes did, to a large extent, bring in a new style and
concept of fighting the war. Tribal intruders, on their part, gave up their
traditional way of guerrilla fighting for massed concentrations and lost the
plot very early during the conflict. A prompt action by Indian decision
makers did take the initiative away from them. However, as the conflict
progressed and as disgruntled tribal hot-heads started losing their will to
fight because of series of reverses, Pakistan Army took the complete charge
overtly and then the fighting attained a different level altogether. Even
though the conflict was fought all across the erstwhile J&K Princely State’s
frontiers and this work has focussed only on the Kashmir Valley per se,
there were certain common deductions that may interest any student of
warfare.
​ irstly, the casualty figures. Despite such a long campaign that was
F
fought in some of the roughest terrains obtainable in the subcontinent and
with very basic equipment and machinery, the Indian casualties were not
very high. It may be noted that the Indian forces had to assault well-
defended localities and mountain ridges or had to fight off invaders from
the confines of isolated garrisons and yet casualties- 1135 fatal and 3152
non-fatal - cannot be termed as disproportionate. These figures include
casualties suffered by the RIAF but exclude 1990 brave-hearts who were
wounded or killed or taken prisoners from the State forces. Casualties on
the other side were heavy but since no one seemed to keep record of the
tribal men killed during the conflict and for long, Pakistan had been
denying the involvement of his forces, any figures would simply be a
matter of convenience and guess work. One such assessment puts Pakistani
casualties at 6000 killed and 14000 wounded2. The attempt by tribal leaders
to adopt a new way of fighting had cost them dearly.
1- ​Official figures of Ministry of Defence, India.

​ ext was the role of powers who had no love lost for either of
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the countries. The conflict had started even while two nations were yet to
find their feet. It was a wrong time to start a conflict but vulnerability of
J&K on 15 August and the indecision/pro-India stance on the part of the
Maharaja were apparently reasons enough for Pakistan to undertake the
misadventure. Nevertheless, it needs to be understood that both the nations
depended on the former colonial power for fiscal, material and diplomatic
support. Even the highest decision making and executive institutions were
still directed by the British civil servants, and the commanders of the
armed forces on either side, were all British officers. The British office
bearers, both military and civil, looked after their own transitory interests
over any of the two main stakeholders. As a result, despite overt
impressions one may get, neither the Indian nor the Pakistani native
decision makers could influence the outcome of the war to the extent they
wanted to.
For many reasons, the British considered Pakistan more important
for their own long-term strategic interests. At the same time, as the
chronology of events illustrated, the British also wanted to avoid a war
between former colonies right after their independence. Therefore, the
war's intensity had to be limited. The tribal raids and small border clashes
between the forces could be written off as the budding paroxysms of
independence, but they could not be allowed to spread to other regions.
The British officers and civil servants therefore had to manoeuvre between
neutrality and favouring one side or the other. They were so successful in
this, that outside Jammu and Kashmir there were hardly any holdups in the
partition process. While the conflict raged on, migration of communities as
well as officials and even many units and subunits continued for a major
part of the conflict period. As can be expected, both sides continue to
blame the British for being biased against them.
Both the armies had inadequate weaponry when it came to air,
artillery and armoured pieces. India did make good use of her artillery and
air even though the scales of allotment were minimal mainly because of the
shortage of equipment and/or ammunition. Such allotments were too frugal
when compared to the battlefield engagements during the recently
concluded World War II. However, Pakistan didn’t make any efforts to
train the invaders and even regular troops to fight in the engagements
characterised by big calibre weapons beyond infantry mortars. In fact,
2- ​As per V Longer in his book, Red Coats to Olive Greens: A History of Indian Army, 1600-
1974.

Pakistan never expected such a swift reaction from the Indian side and
relied on sheer numbers to snatch territory that, itself, was predominantly
suited for infantry operations. He finally changed the tactics and brought in
guns but that was much later during the conflict.
The Indian Airforce, RIAF, dominated the skies from the moment
Indian forces were mobilised. Pakistan had been content with doing aerial
reconnaissance while the RIAF immediately took on an offensive stance
and never allowed the PAF to launch any effective strike inside India.
Having denied his role, Pakistan, as it was, not in a position to employ PAF
for many months initially.

PoJK…Yes, It is PoJK & Not PoK

The employment of tribal hordes proved to be valuable for

Pakistan. They were sent in for launching offensive operations when the
combat readiness of the regular forces was still very low. The expendables,
as they were, they did well playing the roles of the so called "freedom
fighters spontaneously organized by the local population" and so claimed
"volunteers helping their Muslim brothers suffering under Hindu
oppression." And more importantly, they did manage to make involvement
of Pakistan deniable to an audience that was willing to be deceived.
​ s mentioned to the fore, Indians and Pakistani forces had a lot in
A
common when it came to approaching a conflict on the battlefield.
However, since Pakistan chose to send in tribal invaders under a loose
control of regulars and then chose to deny his involvement for many
months, the principles of war couldn’t be employed properly by them. On
the other hand, Indians were able to use such concepts from the word go
and that was what made the difference. For example, the basic principle of
selection and maintenance of aim was lost sight of during looting and arson
at Muzaffarabad, Uri and Baramulla by the tribal entities. In the process,
they lost out on an opportunity to capture Srinagar and possibly the
Maharaja too. Indian forces, on the other hand, correctly set their first
objective of selecting Srinagar airfield and denied it before gaining and
then maintaining momentum right till Uri. After that, the decisions taken,
i.e., not to press for Muzaffarabad and choosing to act in the Jammu region,
remain debatable as regards this particular principle of war. While many
argue against not utilising the momentum gained till Uri for pressing
ahead, the fact that the Indians had to tackle more than 500 km of front in
an unknown terrain, does justify what the Indian decision makers chose to
do under those circumstances. Even within the Jammu region, the decision
to press only till Kotli (Mirpur, in any case would have needed additional
forces) and the question as to why didn’t Indian troops press for the bridge
at Kohala, remain debatable. Had the Valley force reached Domel bridge
and had the Jammu force reached Kohala bridge , complete J&K would
have got liberated since the enemy’s capability of sending in troops and
material into J&K would have got severely hindered.
The Principle of offensive action was employed reasonably well by
both the sides. Pakistani forces had invaded and were involved in offensive
actions from the day one. Indians, in order to evict the intruders, had no
choice but to be on the offensive from the very beginning. However,
offensive actions when surrounded, e.g. in Poonch, was what really stood
out for Indian forces. It was that spirit that kept the stressed-out garrison
going on for over a year. More importantly for Kashmir, the action of CO,
1 SIKH to move ahead to Baramulla rather than waiting in and around
Srinagar, did save the day for the Valley.
The next was the principle of maintenance of morale and
combative spirit. While Pakistan did reasonably well in keeping such a
large number of tribal fighters in the battlefield despite the latter’s
reputation of possessing a free will and roaming spirit, Indians deserve the
credit for ensuring that the troops never went down on morale. As the
readers would have noted, units were repeatedly employed on almost daily
basis over a prolonged period of a year and a half. It goes to the credit of
the officers and the junior leaders on ground who led
3- ​Both the bridges were supposed to be blown on 27 October itself but the RIAF didn’t have
right wherewithal for the job. Pandit Nehru tried to motivate Sheikh to send some volunteers to
destroy the bridge but that too didn’t materialise. The only option left was assault by ground forces.

led from the front during those trying times. 1 SIKH, e.g, had a majority of
troops whose own families had been left behind in Pakistan and the
soldiers kept on fighting without having any clue about the well-being of
their own kin. As we look back today, the much-applauded tradition of the
officers of Indian Army leading from the front appears to have grown its
roots during this very conflict.
The next principle of war, surprise, was handled by the two sides
differently. By sending in tribal hordes, Pakistan was able to achieve
surprise at a strategic level though he could never utilise it fully due to the
nature of human resource employed initially. Indians, on the other hand,
due to their combative spirit and offensive action, were able to achieve
surprises at the operational and tactical levels. There were many such
instances where the Indians left the Pakistanis dumbfounded through such
acts as countering the enemy at Baramulla itself, bringing tanks to Zoji La
or sending in armoured cars behind invaders at Shalateng or bringing a
squadron of armour concealed from Akhnoor for operations in Jhangar or
using torches to enable air landings in Poonch and intelligent use of
diversionary tactics during all the major operations. As a result, the Indians,
despite having been surprised at a strategic level, were able to gain at that
very level by achieving surprises at the tactical and operational levels.
Concentration of forces by three parties to the conflict played up
differently for all three. Pakistan was able to concentrate huge quantum of
forces initially but couldn’t ensure such concentrations as the tribal fighters
started to lose patience during the succeeding days. State forces failed to
concentrate as they tried to fight at a number of places based on the
activities of the intruders. As a result, they suffered many casualties and
were surrounded and then vanquished at many places. The Indian Army
ensured the concentration of forces initially but the wide frontage and
shortage of troops forced the dispersal of forces into three different
geographical segments.
Flexibility was another principle that widely separated two forces.
Pakistan, having relied on irregulars, both militia and tribal, was not able to
achieve or exercise flexibility in the battlefield. Indians, on the other hand,
because of better discipline and cohesion, were able to exploit this
particular principle of war to their advantage. Indians
were able to switch between the defensive and the offensive actions with
ease and illustrated the ability at a number of places during the conflict.
Shifting of 7 CAV from Jammu-Naushera belt to Zoji La in
complete secrecy was one example of the security of information. A similar
move of an armoured column from Akhnoor to Jhangar was another
example. Indians were able to ensure the security of information
throughout the conflict. By failing to secure mountain passes like Haji Pir
Pass, Indians did falter in achieving the security of men and material at
certain places though. Pakistan, on the other hand, remained lax in the
matter of security, especially during the initial months but things did
improve, once more and more regulars came in.
The issues of administration and logistics was one aspect where
Indian forces suffered from a very serious handicap. The lines of
communication on either side of the Pir Panjal Range were short and
wellmaintained for the intruders. And it was exactly the opposite for Indian
planners. However, what stood out was the ability of the Indian echelons to
take up the challenge. Innovative use of aerial platforms, speedy
construction of bridges and diversions and a wellthought of stocking plan
saw the day through for the Indians. It can be said with some amount of
certainty that had such a big challenge not been staring the Indian planners
in the eye, push to Domel would have been undertaken during the first half
of November 1947. The Kishanganga Valley, likewise, had no road
connectivity and forces were fighting in two areas- Upper and Lower
Kishanganga Valleys.
Finally, the impact and relevance of what happened in 1947-48
need a bit of looking back. A Hungarian military scholar, Peter Almos Kiss,
sums up this facet when he describes the phenomenon as (quoted),
“Interstate wars, fought by the regular forces of nation states have become
rare events since the end of World War II. Armed conflict between non-
state belligerents and the state’s security forces, generally fought within the
borders of one state (insurgency, civil war) has become the dominant form
of warfare – the age of asymmetric warfare has arrived. The first conflict
between India and Pakistan is one of the milestones, and Pakistan is one of
the pioneers of this process. Unlike subsequent asymmetric conflicts, non-
state belligerents played the decisive role only during the first few months
of this war (between August 1947 and about January 1948), then
conventional forces and conventional tactics begun to dominate operations,
and the irregular forces gradually came under central control. Even so, the
events have shown that by employing the principles and tactics of
asymmetric warfare, a modern state can promote its interests against
another, much more powerful state, and has a good chance of achieving
results far out of proportion to the resources it invests. Pakistan evaluated
the experiences of the Kashmir experiment as positive, and in its
subsequent wars has given an increasing role to non-state actors. It
deployed them with significant success in Afghanistan against the Soviet
occupation forces, and against India. Its regular forces were defeated in
every war against India, but by employing non-state belligerents it
nevertheless managed to introduce a strategic and political uncertainty
factor into the relationship between the two countries that significantly
reduced the difference in strength between them. What Pakistan has been
unable to achieve through its armed forces, it has achieved by more or less
open support to non-state belligerents: it has provided arms, training and a
safe haven to religious and ethnic minorities rebelling against India’s
central government.” (unquote)4
4- ​From his article, ‘THE FIRST INDO-PAKISTANI WAR, 1947-48’ of March 2013.

"The Indian Government's decision to impose serious operational limitation on him (Cariappa)
in July 1948, when the Pakistan Army was in full cry, was loudly protested by him (Cariappa).
The government's unfortunate strategic Paranoia prompted by political reasons saw the end of
a clear direction on the military operations in J&K. The dimensions that the J&K problem has
assumed now is a direct outcome of that strategic blunder ... The responsibility for leaving two
fifths of J&K under Pakistani occupation had serious long-term ramifications.”
Brigadier CB Khanduri

ANECDOTES OF A DIVERSE KIND

(Narrations, as cited, have intentionally been kept more or less unchanged)

Romance and Bridge at Ramban

A direct track link between Jammu and Kashmir during the 1840s was virtually non-existent.
Jammu had a well-defined path till Udhampur but beyond Udhampur, travellers had to fend for
themselves, making use of the twisted paths connecting villages along the general direction. The
main route remained the one following the alignment of Mughal Route through RajouriPoonch. After
the 1846 Treaty and the purchase of the State, Maharaja Gulab Singh decided to develop Udhampur-
Ramban-Banihal route to travel to Kashmir. It took many years, in fact many decades, and all of the
period of reign of Maharaja Gulab Singh and Maharaja Ranbir Singh, for a cart track to come up and
yet gaps at many places remained. Finally, around 1907, the cart track was completely marked and
re-aligned and the finishing work started in earnest. The royals started using it but the commoners
were not allowed for the next 15-odd years.
That track came to be known as Banihal Cart Road or BC Road (Jammu city still has a road
by this name- the stretch from where the BC Road used to start). At Ramban, a narrow wooden
bridge was built over the furious Chenab for foot movement of men and material. It was a serious
hurdle to movement of motor vehicles and didn’t really serve any meaningful purpose for personal
travel of the royals.
To address the issue, a suspension bridge was then constructed at Ramban. The bridge was
marvelled at by the locals because of the design and the kind and amount of metal used for the
construction. So much so that the suspension bridge became part of the folklore. A popular Dogri
song “Dhaarein Dhuraan peyaan, Kandiyaa peya Barsaala (the fog has settled over hills while rains
are lashing the Kandis (kandi meaning area adjoining the river))" has the following lines about the
bridge: -
" Ramban pul baneyaa baneya baaj garaaria,
Teri meri Preet lagi aey Lagi aey baaj rawaariya"

(literally meaning: “A bridge at Ramban has been constructed and without any pulley. You and me
have fallen in love without any middleman/facilitator!”) The readers would remember the ropeway at
Uri. All such contraptions had pulleys while the new bridge at Ramban had no such pulley!)
​However, the bridge had design issues related to load-bearing and vibrations. Thus, the
motor-bound travellers had to get down and cross the bridge on foot. Vehicles would then slowly
crawl across, take the passengers on board and then move on towards Jammu or Srinagar, as the case
might have been. Light vehicles, however, could cross with passengers seated inside. There were,
though, not many light vehicles around. Maharaja Pratap Singh, during whose reign the bridge had
been completed, was the first person to cross the bridge while being seated inside his car. That was
on 02 May 1921, coinciding with the annual Darbar move from Jammu to Srinagar that year. The
whole of BC Road was also thrown open to the public on that date.
​ n RCC bridge was built next to the old bridge, a bit upstream, during 1960s. However,
A
many defence officers and soldiers would remember crossing the old bridge, on foot even till 2004,
since the Transit Camp where the convoys would halt for meal/stay, is located next to the old bridge.
The old bridge was declared unsafe in 2004.

(Source: blog by the author, available at https://oldbridgeoverchenabatramban.

blogspot.com/2020/04/romanceand-bridge-at-ramban-direct.html)

Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan1, Pakistan Army

​ he accession of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, which was in the balance, had reached
T
a critical phase. The Quaid-i-Azam, with his acute sense of perception, decided to move to Lahore
from Karachi on 27 October 1947. In Lahore, beside his proximity to the scene, he would be in a
position to confer with Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister, who was also the Defence Minister.
The latter was hors de combat, having had all his teeth removed.
​ hortly after reaching Lahore, the Quaid-i-Azam had a meeting with the Governor, Sir
S
Francis Mudie. Later, the two drove to the residence of the PM. I was in attendance as the Army
ADC. I, therefore, speak with the first-hand knowledge of what follows.
​At the PM’s residence, we were ushered into Liaquat Ali Khan’s bedroom. Iskander
Mirza, of the former Indian Political Service, was already there; he had by then taken over as
Secretary, Ministry of Defence. He hurriedly took me aside and asked me how many light tanks were
there in Rawalpindi. I could not furnish him with this information, not because it was a top secret but
because I did not have a clue. I advised him to get in touch with the GHQ.
​The Quaid-i-Azam opened the discussion by enumerating the courses that the Ruler of
Jammu and Kashmir could adopt2. As I recall, three options were considered: to choose to remain
independent; to opt to join Pakistan; and, lastly, to merge with India. Liaquat Ali Khan opined that so
far, the ruler had vacillated, and that this indicated that he hoped to attain independent status for his
State. The Governor disagreed with him and stated that the pressure that was being exerted on the
Ruler by Delhi would force him to merge with India. The Quaid-i-Azam concurred with the
Governor. The latter also told the meeting that the tribesmen who had swarmed into the State were
proving a liability and could not be relied upon to achieve substantive results. The Governor- General
was of the same opinion and said that as the time was running out, the meeting had to devise a plan to
thwart Indian intentions, immediately. He elaborated that in order to anticipate events in Kashmir, the
only option open to us was to send a composite force from the regular army to seize the Srinagar
airfield. A sizeable reserve should also be located nearby for unforeseen contingencies. With this, the
discussion ended. Surprisingly, no one invited Iskander Mirza to air his views. In fact, I do not think
anyone even noticed him standing there in the background. Whether he later intimated the gist of the
discussion to Gracey, I am in no position to say.
​ n our return to the Governor’s House where we were staying, the Quaid-i-Azam asked
O
the Governor to convey instructions to Gracey, at the GHQ, to implement the plan just formulated.
The Governor Mudie then proceeded to pass on to Gracey the orders he had been given. During the
conversation, it appeared to me that an argument seemed to have developed between the two, as I
could sense Mudie getting hot under the collar. Finally, when he could not contain himself, he blurted
out, “These are the Governor-General’s orders, and you are an employee of the Pakistan
Government. You, therefore, have no alternative but to obey.” Mudie then put the phone down and to
no one in particular, remarked angrily, “I do not know which army he thinks he is serving!”3 The
Governor then went to see the Quaid-i-Azam, but I do not know what they discussed as I was not
present.
​The next morning, that is 28 October, Field Marshal Auchinleck, the Supreme
Commander, arrived in Lahore and, accompanied by General Gracey, conferred with the Quaid-i-
Azam, because as it transpired, Gracey had communicated the intentions of the Pakistan Government
to his opposite number4 in the Indian Capital. And there ended the flicker of hope that Pakistan may
have nourished of acquiring Kashmir which would remain the nemesis of both the countries.
1- ​From his book, Memoirs of Lt Gen Gul Hassan Khan. He was the ADC to the Governor
General, Jinnah.
2- ​The Instrument of Accession was signed on 26 October and the Indian Army had already
landed in Srinagar on 27 October. Either there is a lapse in the memory of the author or the Pakistan
establishment had actually been in dark. Latter, however, is not likely since the Indian Government
had informed the Pakistan Government about the move of troops to Srinagar on 27th itself.
3- ​General Gracey had been officiating as the C-in-C, Pakistan Army in the absence of General
Frank Messervy who was the permanent incumbent. It is wellestablished now that General Messervy
was the man behind Operation Gulmarg. However, with his intent to retire in early 1948, he had been
requested by Jinnah to go to England and find a suitable replacement for himself. It was because of
that reason that General Gracey had been officiating.
4- ​General Gracey was disliked by Jinnah as well as Messervy. As mentioned in the book
earlier, the custom was for all six chiefs of the three services of both the countries to report to the
Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Auchinleck on daily basis. It is, thus, apparent that General
Gracey had informed the Supreme Commander about the intent of Jinnah on the day he had been
ordered to send in troops to the Valley. He may or may not have informed his Indian counterpart
though.

Muzaffarabad: A First-Hand Account

While discussing about the brutalities of the Tribal attack, Khawaja Abdul Samad said:
‘Hindus and Muslims were taking refuge in separate areas. Most of the properties that belonged to
the Hindus had been burnt down. Many Hindus and Sikhs had been mercilessly slaughtered and most
of their bodies were still lying in their homes or on the streets. In the past two days, the tribesmen had
dragged numerous bodies and thrown them into the river………. Their attack had totally devastated
Muzaffarabad. The homes of Hindus and Muslims were looted, shops were plundered and all the
stock loaded onto trucks. Places of worship were not spared; they entered and took whatever they
considered to be of value. They tore down mandirs and desecrated masjids. In their lustful search for
gold, silver and rupees they even used digging equipment to search beneath the stone floors of shops.
Whatever they could find would be amassed in a collective place where tribal leaders would
supervise the whole process. From here, everything would be loaded onto trucks and sent on their
way to the North West Frontier Province. In Muzaffarabad and its surroundings, no Muslim home
was spared from this tribal bounty-hunt.’
Khawaja Abdul Samad, while discussing the loot and plunder carried out by the tribesmen
who apparently came to Jammu and Kashmir for the purpose of jihad and to ‘liberate’ the people of
Jammu and Kashmir, explained how they even looted materials hidden in a mosque: ‘As there was no
restriction on how much booty the tribal Pathans could take home, some of us locals consulted with
each other and made a plan. We decided that in order to protect Hindu assets from being seized by
the tribesmen, we would take upon ourselves (Muslims) to transport goods and valuables from Hindu
homes and store them in the masjid. Some Hindu youngsters, many of whom were our close friends;
who had yet somehow avoided the deathly onslaught were also utilised in this exercise. The ‘Bazaar
Wali’ masjid was a two-storey building. By the evening, so much stock had been stored there that
there was barely any room left for even a solitary ‘sandooq’ (large metal box for storing valuables) to
fit in. We locked up the masjid at night and left for our respective camps of refuge. When I returned
in the morning, I found that the masjid had been stripped bare clean. I was later to learn that the
tribesmen had come late the night before and taken everything.’

(Source: Article, This All Began in 1947: The Jihadist Operations of Pakistani State by Abdul
Nishapuri, published at https://lubpak.net/ archives/223350

Confessions of an Opportunist
 Ghulam Ahmed Rather doesn’t remember the exact date when a dozen tribal soldiers arrived
in his village, from Kurhama in Badgam, Kashmir. But he vividly remembers the details of that day.
“I was thrashing paddy along with my father when the tribal entered our village and asked for food.
A day before the tribal came, a naked mystic named Obid Moat, had visited the village. He went
around the village shouting, “Smoke, smoke, smoke! Burning.” The mystic was probably referring to
the fighting in other towns and the resultant destruction there. But he was perhaps having a
premonition about what was to befall our village. We paid no attention to him and didn’t realise
something awful is going to happen here. But Obid Moat knew it before us.
When the tribal entered the village, everything changed. Ours was a pure Muslim village.
They roamed throughout the village and asked for food and slept either in the courtyards of the
houses or in the mud cowsheds or besides the mud walls surrounding the houses. Many people from
my village and the adjoining villages voluntarily helped the tribal to make preparations for the attack
and provided food and assisted the tribal soldiers to carry around their weapons. Their weaponry was
mostly long rifles and duck-egg shaped bombs.
I also participated in the loot and plunder of a Sikh hamlet adjoining our village. The tribal
had been asking about the ‘baal waale kaafir (infidels with long hair) — Sikhs — and someone told
them about the Sikh village. The tribal were infuriated by what the Sikhs had done to Muslims in
‘Ambarsar’ (Amritsar) and wanted revenge.
Next day, the tribal attacked the village, housing around 40 Sikh families that time.
Fortunately, many local Kashmiri Muslims intervened and helped the Sikhs to flee. The tribal
accompanied by a hundred local Muslims, barged into the houses and took away whatever they could
carry. I too joined and managed to take a large tin box which was filled with seven apples, a yarn,
two wooden combs and a Granth Sahab, the holy book of Sikhs.
Many of my villagers looted whatever they could lay their hands on. They took away clothes,
jewellery, tore apart windows and took them away. They also looted wooden logs, cattle and sheep.”
Ahmed pauses to recollect details of the loot and plunder. “In two days, the village was left only with
empty houses and dogs. It looked as though no one had ever lived here,” he adds.
Does Ahmed feel any guilt about the plunder he became a party to 70 years ago? “Yes, I feel
guilty and regret what I did.” He blames the tribal fighters for “instigating” local Muslims to violence
and loot. But soon the villagers had to pay for their actions in a classic case of poetic justice, or so
believes Ahmed.
Two months later, his village, which had taken part in the loot was gutted in a fire. “Divine
justice,” explains Ahmed. “It was Allah’s way of punishing us. We couldn’t save even a needle.
Everything burnt.” Somehow the Granth Sahab, Ahmed had looted from the Sikh village, survived
the fire. But a difficult question stared Ahmed in the face: what to do with it?
He kept Granth Sahab as it was. For a long time, he preserved it at his home with respect
covered with a piece of cloth. Ahmed often consulted his Pir, the spiritual guide, about the book. “He
would tell me to keep it safe and treat it like I treat the Qur’an,” says Ahmed. “Pir Sahab said that
Granth Sahab is similar to Qur’an but written in Hindi.”
Ahmed says that he had Granth Sahab with him till 1981. “I then gave it to Sikh
acquaintance,” recalls Ahmed. During the tribal invasion, Ahmed served as a volunteer, carried rifles
and other weaponry on his back and would go from village to village with the tribal.
(Culled from http://kashmirnarrator.com/1947-indo-pak-war-kashmir-eyes-man-saw-close)

A First-hand account by a Veteran Soldier

October 24, 1947, is embedded deep in the memory of Subedar Major (Honorary Captain)
Barita Ram Sharma. On that day in 1947, he had filled 25 pounds of explosive material in a tin box
and planted it right under the Uri bridge before blasting it thus impeding the advance of tribal
marauders towards Srinagar city.
“His orders still echo in my head. On October 24, 1947, when I reached Uri from Srinagar,
General Sahib1 ordered me to blast the Uri bridge in order to halt the advance of the Kabailis towards
Srinagar city. By that time, General Sahib had done a fair assessment of the enemy’s strength and our
own defences”, Captain Barita Ram had said in one of his last interaction with the media at his house
in Bishnah, near Jammu.
He had then gone back by a couple days in his memory and narrated, “I was posted in
Srinagar as a weapons instructor. The first message was flashed on October 22, 1947, that enemy had
attacked Muzaffarabad and was fast approaching towards Srinagar city. In the absence of trained
army men who could stand opposite stoutly Afghan guerrillas, we were asked to report at Badami
Bagh cantonment. On reaching the headquarters, we received inputs that a large number of Muslim
soldiers of 4 JAK Rifles had betrayed their Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Narain Singh
Sambyal and also killed all Dogra men and officers of the battalion. Without losing much time,
Brigadier Rajendra Singh Jamwal collected 100-odd men and headed towards Uri after attending a
brief meeting with Maharaja Hari Singh. We reached Uri in the wee hours on October 23 and
proceeded to Garhi. By then, the enemy had reached Garhi after crossing Kohala and Domel.
plundering small villages enroute Srinagar.
After taking stock of the impact of the enemy attack Brigadier sahab realised that in order to
halt the invaders, it would be better to withdraw to Uri and hold a defensive position. To this day, his
decision to blast the Uri bridge is considered masterstroke as it gave enough time to the Maharaja to
arrange reinforcements from New Delhi and we could save Kashmir.”
At 98 years, Honorary Captain Barita Ram passed away in March 2013.
1- ​Referring to Brigadier Rajendra Singh, MVC.
(source: https://www.pgurus.com/october-27-1947-day-indian-armed-forces-saved-kashmir/)

The First One at Baramulla

“I can probably say I was the first man to see those people,” began Sheikh Mohammad
Maqbool. He had walked painfully to an armchair in his living room in North Kashmir’s Baramulla
town. At the end of his life, the 85-year-old National Conference leader, who had been the law
minister of Jammu and Kashmir, was almost blind. But Baramulla of 1947 seemed to hang before his
eyes: “They started streaming down the mountains as if they had sprung from the earth.”
​Maqbool was talking about the tribal invaders, mostly from the North West Frontier
Province, now part of Pakistan, who had stormed Baramulla in October 1947. On that first day, he
said, a “Chevrolet car” rolled up the town’s main road. “People, in their enthusiasm, went to welcome
them,” he said. “A man in a militia uniform came out and said ‘bhaago, nahi toh goli marunga.”
(Run or l will shoot). Maqbool, freshly graduated from St Joseph’s College, Baramulla, had lingered
in the crowd. In the dark green jacket that had been part of his college uniform, he must have stood
out, for the man in khaki then barked, not very accurately, “Oi, neeley jacket waaley.” (You in the
blue jacket).
​He had a message for Maqbool to deliver: the people of the town were to keep their
doors and windows open but not invite anyone inside; if they wanted to offer the invaders anything,
they must bring it outside.
“When I returned, people lifted me on their shoulders as if a hero had come,” Maqbool said.
He then relayed the message and told everyone to hang something green on their doors, “just as a
marker”. This last instruction was followed with alacrity.
“There was a man in the crowd, a zaildar, he was wearing a green turban. The loot of
Baramulla started from his turban,” declared Maqbool, with a wheeze of laughter. Back in Baramulla,
Muslim families were also moving to safety. Most of Maqbool’s family had migrated to a nearby
village but he was staying with his uncle in the town. The morning the invaders arrived, he had been
sent out to buy bread, the fluffy Kashmiri kind. “I purchased, for one rupee, 25 to 30 pieces, with the
intention that if we had to leave, we would have something,” he said.
The first ominous sign was the sight of two injured soldiers from the Maharaja’s forces
limping by a local shrine. Maqbool pressed the bread into their hands as they hurried away. Then
came the man in khaki, the herald of the invasion. The streets emptied as the invaders advanced, but
Maqbool was destined for more adventures. “I was just entering my house when someone called me,
an armed man,” said Maqbool. He wanted to know the way to the market. Maqbool, left with no
choice, decided to take him through deserted back alleys, where the man poked around curiously in
empty houses.
Finally, on the Hospital Road, they reached a chemist’s shop. It was closed but one of the
planks in the entrance had been prised open so they clambered in. To the raider in Maqbool’s story, it
could have been a curiosity shop. He first pocketed a bottle of phitkari, alum, but when Maqbool told
him it was used as an aftershave, he threw it out. Then he found a bottle of “Zulf-e-Bangali” and
asked what it was. “I said it was hair oil. He took off his turban, poured it on his hair and asked me to
rub it,” laughed Maqbool.
After he had assured the man that he had enough oil to last him till Srinagar, they set off
again into the deserted streets. Finally, they arrived at a crossroads where Maqbool managed to
escape. “He came out of the alley and went one way, I came out and ran the other way,” he said,
simply.
Not all encounters ended so well. When a man shot in the leg took shelter in their house,
Maqbool was sent to fetch a doctor. It was night. Most of the district administration had fled. The
only doctor left in town was on the other side of the river. But the bridges were guarded by sleeping
invaders. Finally, with a kangri between his teeth and a blanket as camouflage, Maqbool crossed one
of them. They returned by boat. The boatman, who knew him, said there was a body floating in the
water but they had been afraid to retrieve it.
“The doctor wanted it fished out,” Maqbool said. “He said the invaders might leave but
Baramulla’s people had to live. The water could not be contaminated.” They found a woman, 20 to
24 years old. From her ear hung a “dejhor”, a kind of long earring traditionally worn by Kashmiri
Pandit women.
(Source: Culled from https://scroll.in/article/854235/they-sprang-from-the-earth-its-been-70-years-
since-tribal-forces-poured-into-kashmir)

The Neighbours to Rescue: Baramulla

When the invaders came, Parvez recalls, Hindu girls took shelter in their house and borrowed
his sisters’ clothes in order to pass themselves off as Kashmiri Muslim women.
“It was Eid,” said Parvez, who was about 12 at the time. “We had to do qurbani (sacrifice) of
the goats. Just after we had slaughtered the goats and were cutting up the meat, we heard shots in the
hills. My brother had seen them crossing the Jhelum in boats. My father said, take the meat and
distribute it in the market.”
Parvez remembers a Hindu woman dropping her children out of her window in order to save
them from the marauders. “My father caught the first one. The second one was heavier so he was not
able to catch the child. The Pathans saw him wiping the second child’s blood. They thought, he had
saved Hindu children.”
They would have killed his father that day, Parvez says, if it had not been for his brother,
who had been a “pahlwan (wrestler)”. “He caught the invaders like this,” Parvez wrapped his arms
around himself in a tight embrace, “and said, ‘why will you kill him? He is my father, he is Muslim’.
The invaders said it was because he was saving Hindu children. My brother said, ‘no, our children
went into that house, it is them we are catching’. So, the invaders went away.”
(Source: Extracted from https://scroll.in/article/854235/they-sprang-from-the-earth-its-been-70-
years-since-tribal-forces-poured-into-kashmir)

Humanity Disgraced Yet Again

They rapidly advanced to Baramulla, a prosperous trading town on the road to Srinagar and
set about looting shops, ransacking homes, hunting for zar (gold) or anything that appeared shining.
To them the Sikhs and Hindus traders of Baramulla were kaafirs (infidels), hence marked men to be
killed or converted to Islam, their zanana (women) abducted, and their property looted. Two of my
relatives were killed by the Qabailis. Both had travelled to Baramulla that October to attend a
wedding. These deaths created great alarm and sadness in our extended family.
The Muslims of Baramulla fared just slightly better, initially. The enthusiasm with which
some who favoured Pakistan, had received the Qabailis as their agents of deliverance from the Dogra
Raj, soon turned to horrified disgust. They found themselves being roughly prodded by their co-
religionists to part with their women and anything of value. Lurid stories of the fate of Sikhs and
Hindus at Muzaffarabad and Uri, and the killings of the nuns at the missionary hospital in Baramulla,
quickly reached Srinagar and magnified the all-pervading sense of dread.
I remember my aunts storing bags of powdered chilli peppers and hundreds of large stones
by the dub. Their instructions were to jettison this amateurish fusillade should the Qabailis reach our
courtyard. We feared being coerced into accepting Islam, but the worst fear, more than getting killed,
was about the yezeth (honour) of women. They unfortunately, and most unfairly, had this additional
cross to bear. My cousin sisters were pulled from school and forced to stay indoors. One of my future
wife’s cousins had gone to check on his parents in Sirru Dangarpora Village. He was captured near
Palhalan Village, forcibly converted to Islam and renamed Ali Mohammed. His parents and family
had accepted conversion under pain of death.
The Salamati Fauj was a motley collection of National Conference workers and any able-
bodied young man who chose to volunteer. Most volunteered spontaneously to guard their mohallas
(localities) and properties, to burnish their manly credentials and also to gain some recognition.
Shopkeepers, including the Khatris of Amira Kadal, and Maharaj Ganj, college students, boatmen,
peasants, even tonga-wallas and local toughs, some with a shady past, volunteered. Guarding against
the Qabailis may have been the main motive, but joining the Salamati Fauj was also, for the
ambitious, a way to secure a spot in the Emergency Administration, settle old scores, or siphon-off
monies that had started flowing in from India. Pilfering the Maharaja’s treasury at Sher Garhi was
another remote lure.

(Source:https://www.andrewwhitehead.net/shanti-ambardar-kashmir-1947.html)

We Are Kaafirs
“I can tell you what happened with the Sikhs, rest I don’t know,” says Harbans Singh, who
lives with his wife in Baramulla’s civil lines. There are roses in the garden, lace curtains, a sunroom
and pictures of their two sons, one in the army and the other working in London. For years, this has
been home for the Singh family. Pre-1947, Harbans Singh had lived in Khadiniyar, then a primarily
Sikh village, near the main town. When Partition came, he was still a schoolboy.
Reports of the bloodshed unleashed by the Partition in Punjab and other parts of the
mainland would have been filtering in for months. Within the princely state, the Poonch uprising of
September had led to violence against Hindus and Sikhs, pushing them out of towns like Mirpur and
Muzaffarabad towards Jammu. In October, there would be large-scale massacres of Muslims in
Jammu, Udhampur and other districts, sending a tide of refugees towards the west.
“People say it was October 4 when we ran,” he said. “The previous evening, it was said in
the village that people from Muzaffarabad were running away, so we should also run. People in
Srinagar also said run.” So, the village took the collective decision to run. Singh’s father, who
worked with the forest department, was away on duty. His mother and five young children - three
boys and two girls - set out on foot with the rest of the village. “We took nothing,” he said.
Singh’s family went towards Kanispora, about five kilometres from Baramulla, where an
aunt and her two sons lived. “We hid in the orchards for a night,” he recalls. From Kanispora, they
walked to the village of Naji Bhat, now accompanied by their relatives. Then it was on to Dardpora,
then Biawa and so on. At every stop, the party swelled with more fleeing Sikhs. Until they reached
the village of Ichahama in the hills of Budgam district.
“It was quite a large Sikh village,” Singh continued. “There, 3,000 to 4,000 Sikhs landed up,
staying in the gurudwara and houses.” A few days later, word broke out that the invaders were going
to attack the village. “We had our desi rifles, some people from surrounding villages also gathered
there,” he said. The whole day, the village rang with gunfire. “Two hundred sardars died that day,
including women and children,” Singh claimed. When darkness fell, the fleeing Sikhs offered their
prayers and set out again towards the nearby town of Magam. It was there, according to Singh, that
they finally encountered the Jammu and Kashmir Army, the bedraggled forces of the Maharaja which
had retreated as the invaders poured in.
“We told them, we are kaafirs, be kind to us,” said Singh. “The police and army helped us
with cars. Some NC workers also helped. They took the injured and transported us. After seven to
eight days, we reached Srinagar.” Their father, who had gone home from work to find his house
deserted, later managed to join the rest of the family. In Srinagar, a refugee camp had been set up in
what is now known as the Exhibition Grounds, close to the state secretariat. That’s where the Singhs
stayed. Others took shelter in abandoned Hindu houses, said Singh. A bitter winter awaited the
refugees. Singh joined the Jammu and Kashmir Militia at the age of 18.

1- ​Source: https://scroll.in/article/854235/they-sprang-from-the-earth-its-been-70-years-since-
tribal-forces-poured-into-kashmir

Violence inside the Church

On October 27 1947, a Monday morning, a five-year-old boy named Tom Dykes Jr, lying
cloistered away in a remote Catholic mission in Kashmir, awoke to the sound of gunfire. “I got up
and went into the gardens of the [mission’s] hospital, and there were some nuns standing, talking
together, obviously very worried,” he recalled to me six years ago. “They beckoned me over to them.
And suddenly, the whole place erupted with shooting, shouting, screaming, yelling.” The nuns locked
Tom and themselves in a room next to the garden; the attackers began to batter down the door. “The
splinters started to fly across the room, and I could see the wild faces through the cracks in the door. I
noticed that at the back of the room there was another door, and I tried it. It wasn’t locked and I ran.”
He left the nuns huddling in a corner of the first room. “I remember seeing some of them later, and
they were staggering around the place with their habits torn.” Tom eventually found his family’s
Muslim servant, Feroze, with whom he fled the compound.
When the fury of the raid was spent, the pair went back to the mission to look for the others.
Tom found one of his younger brothers, Douglas, then aged two, sitting on top of a mound of bloody
corpses, sobbing. There was no sign of their parents. “At that point, a young girl came up to me, and
she said to me, well, your mother and father are dead.” They had been shot and fatally wounded
minutes into the attack. “Funnily enough, I don’t remember feeling too much. I just felt a bit numb.”
The attackers, Tom would later learn, had been tribesmen from the barren hills of Hazara and
Waziristan. And their ransacking of St Joseph’s mission, in the riverside town of Baramulla, nestled
in the foothills of the Himalayas, was part of a jihad to claim Kashmir – a Muslim-majority, Hindu-
ruled state – for the new nation of Pakistan.

Tom junior’s father, Lieutenant Colonel Tom Dykes1, is buried in the only Commonwealth
war grave in Kashmir. He wasn’t on active service at the time; rather, he was trying to take his family
to safety. His wife Biddy had come here to give birth. She has a humbler headstone three graves
away from her husband’s. They both died in their early 30s, in what is now a forgotten massacre at
the fag end of empire. The Dykes boys weren’t encouraged to talk about the incident as they were
growing up. Tom never shared his memories with his brothers.
“I stumbled on this story when, 20 years ago, I met the last remaining nun who had survived
the ordeal. Sister Emilia, an Italian, recounted how the tribesmen had climbed over the mission walls,
smashed through locked doors and manhandled some of the nuns. After they killed her friend - the
new Spanish sister, Teresalina - Emilia thought she too was about to die. Their father was a
Sandhurst-trained soldier from a family with a tradition of service in the British Indian army. He
married Biddy, a military nurse, at Agra, the city of the Taj Mahal, in 1940, and had risen to the rank
of lieutenant-colonel by the end of World War Two. When the British pulled out of India in August
1947, he agreed to stay on for a few months as an officer in the Indian army's Sikh Regiment to help
the transition.
A letter has emerged that he wrote after his arrival to a British officer in the Kashmiri capital,
Srinagar, just 30 miles away. In it he explains that he has come to collect his family only to be
"overtaken by the present events", in his astonishingly understated words. In clipped military fashion,
he writes: "I should be most grateful if you would send a vehicle here to Baramulla to collect us."
With an invasion underway, the evacuation was impractical. Two days later, he and his wife were
dead”.

The memorial inside the Church Compound at Baramulla

 1- ​“Dykes and I
were of the same seniority. We did our first year's attachment with the Royal Scots in Lahore, way
back in 1934-5. Tom went to the Sikh regiment. I went to the Frontier Force regiment. We'd lost
contact with each other. He'd become a lieutenant colonel. I'd become a full colonel. Tom and his
wife were holidaying in Baramulla when the tribesmen killed them,” remembered Colonel (later
Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw.

(Source: Andrew Whitehead in his column in Financial Times of 20 October 2007; https://
www.ft.com/content/ea0995c8-7b7c-11dc-8c53-0000779fd2ac. Picture source: https:// www.bbc.com
/news/ stories-41996612 )
The Last Letter
Gory Details
​The raid of the convent is narrated in even gorier details by Father Shanks, one of the
fortunate survivors and the anonymous 'witnesses' in the following report: -
"The tribesmen - great, wild, black beasts they were - came shooting their way down from
the hills on both sides of the town. They climbed over the hospital walls from all sides. The first
group burst into a ward firing at the patients. A 20-year-old Indian nurse, Philomena, tried to protect a
Muslim patient whose baby had just been born. She was shot dead first. The Patient was next. Mother
Superior Aldetude rushed into the ward, knelt over Philomena and was at once attacked and robbed.
The Assistant Mother, Teresalina, saw a tribesman point a rifle at Mother Aldetrude and jumped in
front of her. A bullet went through Teresalina's heart. At the moment Colonel Dykes, who had assured
us we would not be attacked, raced from his room a few yards along the terrace to get the Mother
Superior out of danger, shouting at the tribesmen as he ran. But the Mother Superior fell shot, and
Colonel Dykes collapsed beside her with a bullet in the stomach. Mrs Dykes ran from her husband's
room to help him. She too was shot dead.
While this went on, Mr Gee Boretto, an Anglo-Indian, was killed in the garden before nine
Christian Nuns. Then the nuns were lined up before a firing squad. As the tribesmen raised their rifles
a young Afridi Officer, who once studied in a Convent School at Peshawar, rushed in and stopped
them. At least there are living features of human quality in these incidents. He had been told his men
were raiding a Convent, and had run all the way from the town. That saved all our lives by a few
seconds.
We did not find Mrs Dykes until the following day. She had been thrown down a well."
(Source: Father Shank of the Convent doc # S/PV.762/Add.1/Annex 1/No. 27)
Kalu Saved Me
​ In 1946, I appeared in the B.Ed. examination as a student of Prince of Wales College,
Jammu. Earlier, I had served for a brief while in Cooperative Bank. Soon after I cleared the B.Ed
examination I was selected as a teacher and posted to Kargil. However, the order was modified at my
request. New posting was to Muzaffarabad. In July 1947, I joined the Govt. High School,
Muzaffarabad. Many Kashmiri Pandits were already serving as teachers in this school. Many
Kashmiri Pandits served in different departments of the State government in Muzaffarabad.
​I took up a room on rent on the 1st floor. In the same house Gulab Ram, a Kashmiri
Pandit who was 10-15 years older to me, lived on the ground Floor. I was 28 years and had married
recently. On the intervening night of 21st/22nd October I was woken up from sleep by the sound of
'tin tin'. Rumours were already rife in the town about an imminent Pakistani invasion. I went down to
tell Gulab Ram that 'firing is going on'. He was obese, his huge frame covered almost the whole cot.
Gulab had great sense of humour and loved to cut jokes with me. He tried to reassure me, "probably
shogas (wild crows) have entered the town to feed themselves on the fruit which is available here in
plenty. I have been telling you to get your wife here. Your hallucinations of 'bullet firing' would be
over".
I went back to sleep. Soon 'tin-tin' sound grew louder and two bullets hit my door. I opened
the door and picked up the hot casings of the cartridges. When I showed these to Gulab Ram he
turned pale with fear. It was 1:30 AM. The previous day Pt. Prem Nath Nehru and other Kashmiri
Pandits had met Colonel Narain Singh, the Commander of Dogra Garrison at Muzaffarabad and
conveyed to him that Pakistan had already purchased the loyalties of a section of his troops. They
impressed upon him the inadvisability of putting these troops at the front. The colonel had laughed
away their apprehensions, saying, "They have fought with me in Egypt. The will never betray me".
On 21 October itself, Prithvi Nath Mazari, a Kashmiri Pandit teacher posted at Danakcheli,
(20 kms from Muzaffarabad) had run away to Muzaffarabad after seeing tribal lashkar at Danakcheli.
Mazari immediately after his arrival went to see Colonel Narain Singh and Wazir Wazarat, Mehta
Duni Chand. He informed them that the Tribal lashkar was moving ahead towards Muzaffarabad.
The two officials put him off saying that he was spreading panic. We heard he was punished
by tying him to a tree. Mazari was later taken captive by the invaders. He did not return to India and
used to correspond with his relations in Habbakadal, Kashmir till 1960s. We learnt that he had
married a local there.
A section of troops was already in touch with the invaders. We had no concept of war and
took rumours about impending invasion lightly. While I was showing the cartridge casings to Pt.
Gulab Ram we heard loud cries of 'Gopal Ka Chowk Me Bago' (Run to Gopal Square). People
(Hindus) were running in the adjoining street to assemble at 'Gopal Ka Chowk'. It was a big
compound, surrounded by two-storeyed houses on all sides. We too reached the chowk and saw other
Kashmiri Pandits there.
In Muzaffarabad, the two communities lived in separate mohallas. Nearly 3 thousand Hindus
and Sikhs had assembled at the Chowk. Firing stopped in the morning. No sooner had it stopped one
row of houses lining the Chowk was set ablaze. People started fleeing the Chowk for safety. Now
everybody was unto himself, thinking about his survival alone. I too came out on the street to enter
the house of a purohit. The house was locked from outside. I scaled the compound wall to enter the
premises and hid myself under a heap of firewood.
An hour passed when shouting was heard from an adjoining street. It said, 'come out, you
have accepted Pakistan. You are our brothers now'. I came out of hiding and rested on the compound
wall. A big line of invaders, laced with .303 rifles and garlands of cartridges, was in front of me. A
raider asked me to join the crowd of non-Muslims, saying 'come down, you are our brother now'. He
helped me to come down from the wall and pushed me into the crowd. He tied a piece of green cloth
around my neck. The invaders were dragging the nonMuslims of the town in a procession, asking the
latter to raise loud cries of 'Pakistan Zindabad'. The invaders and the non-Muslims in the procession
numbered about ten thousand.
We were in the dark about the destination to which we were being dragged. Meanwhile, a
teacher colleague of mine, who was of the same age as I, saw me. He was Shabir, a new appointee
and my friend here. He was a local and seemed desperate to convey something important to me. In
view of the menacing watch of invaders, it looked difficult. I, however, managed to reach to him and
asked, Shabir, “Where are we being dragged?” Shabir confided, "Masterji, the intentions of these
people (the invaders) are not good. Somehow you try to come out of the crowd".
The entire non-Muslim Community of the town was in the procession. Kashi Nath Jalali, my
colleague, was sick and was standing beside me. He told me, "My knees have given up, I can't move
and want to leave". I replied, "The attackers are maintaining a strict vigil on us from all sides and
could kill us in case we defy the diktat". Around 125 invaders were escorting the crowd. Kashi Nath
Jalali had married recently. As he attempted to run away, the invaders felled him down in a field.
 Even after this incident, Shabir's advice was rankling in my mind. After moving another 400
yards I looked around and felt that nobody was watching me. I slipped out of the crowd and began
running away. I was fired upon but the bullet just hit my coat. I was saved. A big house with an
imposing gate stood before me. Its doors were open. I hid myself behind the door. The raider
following me entered the house but failed to locate me.
I was on the horns of a dilemma whether to leave the house or try my luck by entering the
house. Danger lurked on both the counts. The house belonged to a Muslim goldsmith. Thinking
discretion to be better part of valour I decided to enter the house on the presumption that ladies of the
house would take pity on me and save my life. There was nobody on the ground floor. At the first
floor I found the doors of a room wide open. Kashmiris belonging to the majority community were
sitting in it and enjoying roasted meat. They were eating clumsily, chopping the meat with a big knife
and then eating with both the hands. The room had wooden floor. To my surprise among the seven
Kashmiris was my friend and collegemate of SP College-Ghulam Din Wani of Khanpur, Baramulla.
After graduation he had gone to Aligarh for LLB while I went for B.Ed. Before the attack also I had
seen him in Muzaffarabad. He had received me warmly. After confirming my identity as 'Vishnath' he
had embraced me. We used to meet almost daily thereafter in Muzaffarabad. The other person whom
I knew among these seven Kashmiris was Gaffar Kala. He was in Police.
On seeing Ghulam Din Wani in the room I felt somewhat relieved. I told him, "The invaders
almost killed me". Wani started hurling abuses on me. I thought he did not recognise me. Then I tried
to introduce myself formally, telling him, "I am Vishnath Saproo". He countered, "you have sucked
our blood". I begged him to save me.
The seven Kashmiris were wearing army boots (supplied to police those days) with long
stockings. Ghulam Din started kicking me with his shoes. Then he dragged me to the veranda and
gave me a few blows on the head. I do not know anything after that. It was 2 PM. At 5 PM when I
regained consciousness, I found that seven Kashmiris had left. Ghulam Din had presumed me to be
dead after I lost consciousness. I was too scared to leave the house despite this incident. I feared the
invaders would spot me out and kill me. So, I decided to move to the next floor, the attic. There was a
heap of firewood on one side. A big door led me into a space, which opened into a room through a
small door. The room had a single window, which commanded a full view of Kishanganga bridge.
I moved towards the window with a twin purpose-to see what was happening outside and
secondly to jump down to death in case of any eventuality. I was too scared to face a bullet injury. I
could see the procession moving towards the Kishanganga bridge. Across this long bridge were
Ramkot and Brarkot. It was a major highway. The procession was made to cross the bridge. Invaders
now tried to play deception. They asked males among Sikhs to come out, telling them, "We have
nothing to do with Sikhs". The latter felt relieved but as they ran back towards the bridge, they found
the gate on the other side of the bridge closed. The invaders began firing on them, and killed them
mercilessly. Then they began pushing with their shoes, the dead bodies down the railing of the bridge
into Kishanganga river.
The bridge was clear again. Muzaffarabad town is perched on a hillock and the bridge is 300
ft. down. Pt. RC Kak had built this bridge during his premiership. The invaders then asked ladies to
segregate themselves from the main crowd. All the ladies in the age group of 11-45 years were
huddled into 30-35 buses, waiting on Kohala side and were taken to Wazirstan etc. Small children in
the lap of their mothers were thrown on to the road, where they fell victim to starvation or dogs. The
children of once rich people were now at the mercy of dogs. Some ladies, including Pandit ladies had
painted their faces with mud to escape the lustful eyes of the invaders.
After the attack began Shamboo Nath Thalchoor had given Strychnine (poison used for
killing dogs) to his daughter and two Sikh ladies-Prem Singh's mother Ranjit Kaur and daughter
Milap Kaur. These Sikh ladies then jumped into the Kishanganga. Pt. Shamboo Nath Dhar's mother
took poison when they were held captive in jail. Almost all Pandit ladies, 10-12 in number and many
Sikh ladies had managed to keep themselves away from being huddled into buses. Some of the ladies
who escaped jumped down to death in the Kishanganga flowing below. The 'captives' were then
ordered by the invaders to move into the prison, located close to the Kishanganga bridge on the other
side. Inmates of prison who numbered around 2500 includes males, old ladies and Kashmiri Pandits.
The big businessmen of the town-Pt Kanshi Ram, Dipti Ram and Hari Chand Naswari were
also among the captives. I was watching the entire scene from the attic window. The goldsmith's
house serving as my hideout had a wooden staircase. Suddenly I heard noise of 'thud thud'. Fearing
that the attackers were coming closer to me, I moved towards the window. Soon a person, who did
not look like a raider, entered my room through the small door. He was the servant of the house
owner Wali Mohammad. He was Kalu Khan.
I moved towards him and begged him to save my life. He was amazed to see me in the attic.
I began weeping bitterly. He asked me, 'Areh Baba Tusi Daso Tusi Kaun Ho' (O'man reveal your
identity, who are you?"). It turned out that Kalu had served in State Cavalry and had been discharged
from service. He was 35 years of age, illiterate and had been to Kashmir. He had been engaged as
casual servant by Pt. Srikanth of Ali Kadal on the occasion of the marriage ceremony of his two
daughters-Tulsi and Gouri. The Pandit family had treated him very well. I told Kalu, "I am a
Kashmiri Pandit. I am a teacher here'. He replied, 'Kashmiri Pandits are nice people. Do you know
Tulsi, Gouri? I feigned close acquaintance with the family. Gouri's mother-in-law had given Rs 5/-
and some old clothes to wear to Kalu. He went on to praise the Pandit community lavishly. With tears
rolling down his eyes, Kalu reassured me, "First I will die, only then you. You must not have taken
anything. I know Kashmiri Pandits do not take beef".
I mustered enough courage to ask Kalu “Who lived in the room on the first floor'. He said,
'The invaders, who go to Kashmir do not know the routes in Kashmir. The Kashmiri guides direct
them.” I asked, "Where from these people have come?" He replied, “They have come from Banu,
Kohat, Razmak, Wazirstan etc. The Kashmiris who live in the room have been enlisted as guides.”
The place which was my hideout turned out to be the main transit camp of the invaders.
Groups of invaders would come every day and take Kashmiris as guides with them. Kalu said, “The
owner of this house, Wali Mohammad was a Goldsmith. He knew about the invasion and sent his
whole family to Peshawar. He has entrusted this house to my care". Kalu went down to fetch three
chappatis along with little salt from langar (community kitchen) for me. At my request Kalu also
brought a chilm (smoking pipe) and little tobacco and a matchstick. He could not find cigarettes.
Kalu brought water in a wari (a small earthen pot). It was the first time since the attack that I took
water.
I begged Kalu not to forget me. He swore by the holy book that he would never betray me.
Kalu had to come to attic of and on to fetch wood for the langar. The following morning (23rd
October he got three chappatis again. For ten days, I watched how the invaders would get Sikhs from
villages around Muzaffarabad and then shoot them on the Kishanganga bridge. Their corpses would
then be, thrown into the river below.
 During the day I would not venture to come out lest somebody would see me. I would
answer the calls of nature in the room itself and then lift the excreta with hands, to throw it off from
the window when darkness would fall. It was living in Zindaya Narukh (hell). For ten days, Kalu
would get me a pot of water and three chappatis daily. All the time I would hear the noise produced
by the invaders’ movement-coming and going and eating at the Langar.
The looted cattle of non-Muslims had been brought here for slaughter. After 10 days, one
evening Kalu came to me and said, "Sir, now the Hindus are roaming around in the town. Killings
have come to a halt. Kashmir has been conquered. The Maharaja has fled away. His family has been
held captive and taken to Pakistan".
Until now I had thought my family was safe. Now my thoughts turned towards my family. I
asked Kalu, "What has been the fate of our Kashmiri Pandits?" He replied quite casually, "They all
are fleeing this place". I took his comments non-seriously. Meanwhile, Kalu said he knew where
Kashmiri Pandits were in hiding in Muzaffarabad and added that he would turn up the following
morning to take me there.
A total of 56 Kashmiri Pandits were in town that time. I had developed full faith in Kalu. He
was my saviour. The following morning Kalu turned up at my hideout. I had put on a Jawahar Jacket,
Pant, Coat and Cap. Kalu picked up my shoes in his hand to avoid any noise on the wooden floor. He
held me by wrist by the other hand and directed me down, whispering 'move, move'. On climbing
down the staircase, I saw tall, gigantic invaders, wearing boot on one foot and pulhour (grass shoe)
on the other. There were asleep and had even occupied the corridors. They looked like leeches.
The Langar was in the compound. We were soon at the place where the Kashmiri Pandits
were putting up. Kalu knocked at the main door. Pandits were too scared to open the door. When
Kalu knocked again somebody replied from inside, "Who are you?" I said, “I am Vishnath Sapur. O',
I am alive”. Sona Lal Warikoo opened the door and embraced me. He said, “We thought you were
killed in firing”. I told them that the victim was Kashi Nath Jalali. I was led into the house but on
seeing Kalu they got panicky and asked, “What strange creature you have brought with you'?
I informed them, “He is a protector like Lord Krishna to me. He is my brother. He has saved
me”. Kalu ordered them, “Don't make him labour much.” I again made request to Kalu not to forget
me. He would drop often to enquire about my welfare. Kashmiri Pandits would tease me, saying
“What hypnotic spell you have cast on him?” We were 56 Pandits at this house. They included males,
females and children. The house belonged to Pala Ram, a lawyer. He had been killed along with his
family.
(Note: The narrative above is by Pandit Bishambar Nath Sapru who was forced to convert
while at Muzaffarabad where he stayed stuck for more than three months. By sheer luck, he came
back, rather smuggled back, into Indian held territory when someone sent by an influential family at
Srinagar, to trace their son-in-law who had been a close friend of Pandit Sapru, acceded to his
requests to take him along. The duo then accompanied the ‘salt traders’ to Srinagar via Kishanganga
Valley. The full details are available at http://ikashmir.net/ pakraid1947/ muzaffarabad. html)

A Sudden Promotion & Meeting Mr Gandhi

In the evening of 31st October came further bad news. Brigadier J. C. Katoch, while
proceeding to visit 1 Sikh at Pattan in a jeep, was hit in the leg by a bullet. Fortunately, it had been
fired at long range and did very little damage. It was assumed that he would be able to carry on, but
at mid-day on 1 November, a signal was received that he was suffering from shock and was being
evacuated. Once again, the troops in the valley were being left without the appointed commander.
At 5 o’clock that evening, the military secretary, Brigadier Thapar, accompanied by
Brigadier Rudra, entered my office. Assuming that they have come in for a meeting, I gave them the
latest situation report and awaited the questions they may have wished to ask. After a long silence
that may have lasted a minute, Brigadier Rudra asked me to go see the Commander-in-Chief
immediately. When I enquired what it was all about, I was informed that the Chief would tell me. As
I walked down the corridor to the Chief’s room, I wondered what I had done. I could only guess that
it had something to do with the Press briefing I had given that morning, in which I had perhaps
divulged more than I should have.
General Lockhart received me almost immediately, and his opening remark was, “Well I
suppose you know why I have sent for you.” I informed him that I had no idea at all. “I have selected
you,” he replied “to go to Kashmir to command 161 Infantry Brigade. I want you to leave first thing
tomorrow. You will be given the temporary rank as Colonel and return to your present appointment.
Go and see General Russel right away, and he will tell you the latest regarding the troops he has
earmarked for Kashmir.”
I went from the Chief’s room to the DMO’s office and informed him of what I had been told,
and asked to whom I was to hand over Military Intelligence. He informed me that Colonel Chand
Narain Das would take my place and it took him only a few minutes to get things in order as my Staff
knew as much about everything as I did. I borrowed a couple of stars from one on my Staff Officers,
rearranged my badges of rank to conform to those worn by a Brigadier, and set off to meet General
Russell. General Russell was having tea in his drawing room when I reported to him. He
congratulated me on my promotion, and then glancing at my shoulder said that he was very glad to
see that I had put on the badges of the rank as it was essential, that on my arrival everyone should be
well aware of who the Commander was. He informed me that a new formation to be designated
Jammu & Kashmir Force, or JAK Division for short, was being raised and Major General Kulwant
Singh had been named as the Commander.
161 Infantry Brigade would eventually come under the command of JAK Division. Then he
told me what units would move into the Valley. When I asked him for advice as to how I should go
about my task, he thought for a few moments and replied: “You know much more about what is
happening than I do, and I am not allowed to enter the Valley. You will have to find your way about
when you get there. The only advice that I can give you is that if you get a chance of hitting them, hit
hard with all you have got and don’t let up.”
Vague though General Russell’s word may sound, it was in fact advice worth solid gold. A
practical commander and a veteran of many campaigns, he made no vain or rash statements. There
was no attempt to hedge the issue, a failing of many less brilliant soldiers, with the cliché ‘when you
get there, send me your appreciation of the situation of your plan’, thereby giving the impression that
he would vet them and advise one accordingly.
As I was leaving General Russell’s house, I received a message to the effect that Brigadier
Thapar would be waiting for me at the southern entrance to South Block of the Secretariat. When I
arrived, he informed me that Mahatma Gandhi wished to see me and be given an intelligence
briefing. We drove to his residence and I told him everything that was known to us. He listened most
intently and when I had finished and asked whether he had any questions, he replied “No, no
questions.”
 After a few seconds of silence, he continued, “Wars are a curse to humanity. They are so
utterly senseless. They bring nothing but suffering and destruction.” As a soldier, and one about to be
engaged in battle in a matter of hours, I was at a loss to know what to say, and eventually asked him:
“What do I do in Kashmir?” Mahatma Gandhi smiled and said: “You’re going in to protect innocent
people, and to save them from suffering and their property from destruction. To achieve that you
must naturally make full use of every means at your disposal.” It was the last time I was to see him
alive.
(Source: Lieutenant General LP Sen, DSO in Slender was the Thread)

Rubbing the Wrong Ones

Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, who had gone to the airfield to see Sardar
Patel off, apparently decided to visit the Brigade Headquarters on their way back to Srinagar. Having
them denied the opportunity of meeting them the evening before, because of the road being blocked
by the people heading for the airstrip, I had no idea what they looked like.
They arrived when I was busy on a wireless set, and Major Kak, the Liaison Officer, had led
them to the Brigade Operations Room and had proceeded to explain the situation to them, pointing
out the deployment of the Brigade. When I entered the room and was greeted with the sight of two
unknown civilians carefully studying the map, I was furious. I did not ask who they were, but ordered
them to leave the room immediately and never to set foot in it again.
I did not ask who they were, but ordered them to leave the room immediately. They left
hurriedly. It was only when their vehicle had disappeared into the distance that Major Kak told me
who they were!
(Source: Lieutenant General LP Sen, DSO in Slender was the Thread)

Pakistani Military author, Major Agha Humayun Amin

It may be noted that the overall in-charge of all the Indian Army operations in Kashmir was
Lieutenant General Russell in the capacity of General Officer Commanding in Chief, Delhi and
Punjab Command. This Russell performed his task most religiously and ably in marked contrast with
the two inefficient British crutches employed by Pakistan i.e. Messervy and Gracey. The British
government however had imposed a ban on Russell’s entry in Kashmir, and Russell who was a brave
man and a good soldier asked the Indians to either lift this ban or relieve him of his command. Once
the ban was not lifted the Indians replaced Russell by Lieutenant General Cariappa on 20th January
1948.
Mr Jinnah’s advisers, all his handpicked colleagues, including the Prime Minister, lacked
independent judgement and resolution to advise him successfully into committing the regular
Pakistan Army in Kashmir! Apart from Mr Jinnah no other Pakistani politician possessed the courage
to spur, prod or overrule the British C-in-C the way men like Nehru and Patel did in India. 99% of
the Muslim politicians who constituted the Cabinet including the Prime Minister had never
participated in any serious anti-British political movement before independence and had never been
to jail.
There was no full time Defence Minister and the Secretary Defence, the senior most
Pakistani Muslim who could have correctly advised Mr Jinnah, was an apology of a fighting soldier!
Sikandar Mirza had never fought any war or commanded even a company, and was more of an
authority on arranging cocktail parties, moonlight picnics or indulging in tribal area double cross and
factional intrigue than the art of war!
While Jhangar, Rajouri and Uri were lost, the Pakistani Government was not stirred to move
an inch. The Indian capture of Rajouri, 45 km North of Nowshera finally forced Gracey to conclude
that unless the Pakistan Army intervened in Kashmir, Pakistan’s security would be endangered and
additionally Pakistan could face a serious refugee problem and a major loss of morale as far as the
army’s rank and file were concerned. But even here Gracey played a double game, i.e. in ordering the
7th division commanded by a Britisher i.e. Major General Loftus Tottenham into Kashmir.
The first Pakistan Army formation to go into Kashmir was the 101 Brigade. This act of
singular decisiveness took place in May 1948. The 7th Division had three brigades i.e. 10 Brigade
(Abbottabad area), 101 Brigade (Kohat) and the 25 Brigade (Rawalpindi). 25 Brigade was inducted
in area Mirpur in May 1948, while 10 Brigade and 101 Brigade entered the war in Tithwal and Uri
Sectors. But the Indians had stabilised by then and thus, the Pakistan Army lost half of Kashmir
without ever having entered it!
The Indians were to claim later that they were capable of advancing till Muzaffarabad but
were restrained from doing so by their government! Such claims are a typical reflection of the
character of Indo-Pak people regardless of religion or race and should be treated with a pinch of salt
especially by foreigners. Similar claims were made by Pakistani authors about Poonch and Operation
Venus. The supposed facts that victory was so close and yet these noble commanders; as Indians and
Pakistani authors have claimed meekly obeyed their governments; merely prove how timid and
orders- oriented these military commanders were.
Sarrail, the French General, had disobeyed an order to abandon Verdun in WW One and
history vindicated his act of disobedience, so did Lyautuey when ordered to abandon French Algeria
in WW One and Francois a similar order to attack in a wrong direction at Tannenberg! The history of
warfare is full of examples where military commanders disobeyed orders and won battles, but if one
wants to study how victory (that is if there is a grain of truth in what Pakistani and Indian authors
assert) was not gained by obeying orders, it is Indian and Pakistan Armies that provide classic
examples of such cases.
The Pakistan Army’s appearance in Kashmir did not lead to any spectacular results. The fatal
state of indecision which had plagued Pakistani political leadership during the period October 1947-
May 1948 had ensured that Pakistan Army’s introduction could at best stabilise the frontier and little
else at best and still lose some more territory which had been captured by the Gilgit
Scouts/Militia/Tribesmen.
(Source: From his book, 1947-48 Kashmir War)

Arbab Hidayatullah, ex-Deputy Inspector-General of Police (Special Branch)

“The most active religio-political party in the Kashmir war in Pakistan was the Najia Party of
Maulvi Mohammad Amin. In order to enable him to send people to the warfront, Qayoom Khan had
issued special instructions to the police stations saying that those who carried a chit from Maulvi
Mohammad Amin should be allowed to carry weapons and should not be asked about permit or
license. In March 1948, it was reported that he, while preaching Jihad, issued chits to such members
of the party who volunteered to go to the Kashmir front on payment of two rupees four annas as
subscription. It was understood that the bearer of the chit could carry arms with a license.
Maulvi Mohammad Amin also visited Karachi in October 1948, and during this visit, the
Governor-General of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, sanctioned to him the purchase of 2000 rifles of
.303 calibre for the purpose of Jihad to be used in Kashmir. To arrange the funds for such purchase,
he, again, started subscriptions. However, according to the reports, the rifles were either sold to the
followers on cost or were issued to those who intended to go for Jihad in Kashmir from the ‘Baitul
Mal’ of the party.
The Frontier Government was apparently involved directly in arming and sending the
tribesmen. During the Governorship of Qurban Ali (1954-55), I was specially deputed by the
Governor to verify all the rifles, etc of the levies. The Governor had been told or had the suspicion
that, after the Kashmir War, the tribesmen, while returning the weapons, had replaced the original
parts of the rifles with the local made parts. This showed that the provincial government had issued
those weapons to the tribesmen going to the Front.
Major Khurshid, the commander of the Muslim League National Guards, played an
important role in organizing the tribesmen for the Kashmir War. According to Mohammad Ali Khan
of Hoti, one day he came to his house and handed him over a briefcase with 30,000 rupees in it and
told him to keep it at a safe place because that was the money for organizing tribesmen for the
Kashmir War. Subsequently, Mohammad Ali Khan Hoti, Major Khurshid, Pir Manki and other
leaders went into the tribal areas and other parts of the province and prepared people for Jihad and
thus people started going to Kashmir front.”
(Source: Hidayatullah Interview, 25 June 2001)

WSDC- Women Self Defence Corps by Krishna Misri

The WSDC was a seminal initiative. Kashmiri women had been brutalised on an
unprecedented scale. This was the tipping point. The government responded to the women’s concerns
with a sense of urgency and prioritized their empowerment. It was decided that women be trained in
selfdefence, should Srinagar fall into enemy hands. They were organised under WSDC. A challenge
was turned into an opportunity. Like many families, my family too got involved in the resistance
movement. My elder brother enrolled with the National Militia. My late sisters and I joined WSDC.
Two of us were still in high school.
The WSDC was a forum with wide ranging volunteer work from military training to social
work and cultural activity. Our day started at Gol Bagh, later named after Brigadier Usman – who
died in action – as Usman Zanana Park, with exercise, parade and weapons training. We were taught
target shooting with .303 rifles, Sten guns, Bren guns and pistols; and also throwing grenades, at
Chandmari, an open area on the outskirts of the city. When our instructor fired the first shot, most of
us were frightened. Soon a competitive spirit developed and as comfort levels increased, we learnt
the use of firearms. What every volunteer looked forward to with bated breath was firing from long
and short ranges. Taking the correct position and holding the butt of the gun tight and close to the
right shoulder, to lessen the impact of the rebound was the key. The real test of marksmanship was to
hit the bull’s eye. We participated in several firing competitions to hone our skills at the army
cantonment, at Badami Bagh. A perfect shot entitled a volunteer to three packets of salt; a rare
commodity in Srinagar in 1947.
 After a few weeks of training, the women contingents were seen on a march-past in the
streets of Srinagar. Alongside the army and militia contingents they participated in ceremonial
parades and presented a Guard of Honour to several dignitaries, both civilian and military. Presenting
Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India a Guard of Honour was the highlight of my
involvement with WSDC. Mukta Battalion was the name given to the first battalion of women
volunteers. Hailed as a radical development, WSDC became the theme of dominant public discourse
throughout the country. The streets of Srinagar resonated with patriotic slogans as the volunteers of
the National Militia and WSDC staged march-pasts on the streets of Srinagar.
Providing succour to dislocated individuals and families who thronged to the city to take
shelter from areas ravaged by the invaders was a challenge and called for immediate action.
Displaced from their home and hearth, traumatised and uncertain of their future, their dire physical
and psyche condition required urgent attention. Alongside women leaders, we visited the camps and
helped in the distribution of milk, foodstuffs, medicines, blankets and warm clothes. More than the
material needs, it was getting into their traumatised psyche that was a challenge. Meeting with
women refugees and listening to their harrowing experiences helped in bringing out their trauma.
Considering the severity of the winter months, many housewives and volunteers knitted sweaters,
caps and socks for them. Several volunteers went door to door and collected donations in cash and
kind. To boost the morale of ailing and injured soldiers, many volunteers visited the military hospital
and spent time with them. These activities gave a sense of reaching out to people in distress.
(Source: https://www.andrewwhitehead.net/krishna-misri-1947-a-year-of-change.html)

A Peep into What Was Denied by Pakistan for Long

A special Cell for control and conduct of military operations had been established in
Rawalpindi looked after by the then Director Military Operations Brigadier Sher Khan, MC. General
Gracey, the officiating C-in-C, kept in close touch with Brigadier Sher Khan who briefed him every
day at the GHQ. The General, after returning from the GHQ, used to change into civilian clothes, get
into his private car and himself drive to Sher Khan’s office monitoring the Kashmir operations. The
field operations were under Major General Tottenhan DSO, MC, GOC 7 Division. He, too, kept in
close touch with General Gracey.
Soon after the tribesmen invaded Kashmir, it became imperative to have some control over
them to defend Azad Kashmir effectively. To that end Pakistani officers’ volunteers were inducted
immediately to take care of those Lashkars. This number kept increasing, under General Tariq, nom
de plume of Col Akbar Khan, later Brigadier Akbar Khan. Brigadier Akbar had served under Gracey
in his Division and the General spoke highly of the Brigadier. He mentioned in the last battles of
Burma he had recommended Akbar for a VC for his bravery but unfortunately for the lack of enough
witnesses, he had got a good DSO. Gracey had suggested Brig Akbar to Liaquat Ali Khan for the
conduct of operations in Kashmir.
With the increasing tempo of Indian army operations in mid-1948, units of regular army
were inducted to defend our vital interests. In the summer of 1948, General Gracey presented his
Military Appreciation to the government, to prevent further advance of the Indian Army and counter
actions. The plan’s execution included, for the first time, limited offensive actions with heavy
concentrated artillery bombardment of the sensitive Indian army’s lines of communications across the
border.
(Source: Major General S Wajahat Husain, in his interview to the Defence Journal. He was the ADC
to the C-in-C of Pakistan Army (Source: http://www.defencejournal .com/ 2002/august/waj-ahat
.htm)

“Nehru had Patel; Jinnah had no Patel” – AH Amin

“This then was our tragedy. The old man leading us without having done any armed forces war
course, had the ‘Coup d Oeil’ in October 1947 to order that one brigade should advance along axis
Sialkot-Jammu and capture Jammu while another Brigade advance along axis Murree-Srinagar and
capture it’. Nehru had a Patel, while Jinnah had no Patel; and this included the entire cabinet, whether
Hindustani Punjabi Bengali Sindhi or Pathan, that consisted of decent amiable men who had been
good British subjects, and most unfortunate even no Thimayya or Bucher or Cariappa. We had
Akbars and Masuds but they were side-lined! They did not have that pleasant personality that could
please a politician and could get extensions, or the height or frame to be a Hollywood hero! They
were men of action known for decisiveness in the crossing of Chindwin…rather than tactical timidity
and poor war record while serving in a Chamar1 regiment in Burma! No wonder that Mr Jinnah
complained in 1930s about the Muslim leaders that he had, who in his words, had to ask the Deputy
Commissioner before doing anything!
(Source: In the above write up, AH Amin cites from Page-343- Report of November 7,1947-
Mountbatten’s ‘Top Secret’ Personal Reports as Viceroy of India -India Office Library and Page-154-
Looking Back- Mehr Chand Mahajan- Asia Publishing House London-1963)
1- Chamar Regiment is a legacy of the British Army. Specifically raised for natives belonging to
certain unprivileged classes, Chamar and Mahar regiments were raised during the war time. With
not many recruits available or volunteering for service and as part of the reduction, post war,
Chamar Regiment was disbanded. Mahar Regiment, however, survived when its recruitment base was
broadened from only Mahar community. General Ayub Khan of Pakistan had served in Chamar
Regiment and has apparently been referred to here.

The Posture that Worked

​Mehr Chand Mahajan mentions in his book, Looking Back, that despite the Maharaja
offering accession to India in lieu of military assistance, Pandit Nehru had been giving a cold
shoulder to both the PM and Deputy PM of the State. Finally, on 26 October, he claims to have met
Pandit Nehru, along with Sardar Patel, and having found a lack of response, had declared, “Give
army, take accession and give whatever powers you want to give to the popular party (Sheikh
Abdullah’s NC), but the army must fly to Srinagar this evening, otherwise I will go and negotiate
terms with Mr Jinnah as the city must be saved.”
​ andit Nehru was visibly upset at the Mahajan’s proposal of even contemplating the idea of
P
talking to Jinnah and told him to leave the room. As he was walking out of the room, Patel reportedly
said in his ear, “Of course, Mahajan, you are not going to Pakistan.”
​ t the same time, present in Nehru’s residence was Sheikh Abdullah, who had overheard the
A
entire exchange. Sensing a critical moment, he sent in a slip of paper to Pandit Nehru. Pandit Nehru
read it and said that what the Mahajan had been saying was also the view of Sheikh Abdullah!
The American Reportage
Margaret Bourke-White was a correspondent and photographer with the American magazine
LIFE. She authored many books, based on her coverage of Africa, England, France, China, Russia,
Italy and Germany during the Second World War. Bourke-White also covered the tribal invasion of
J&K in 194748. Her reportage on Kashmir— "Democracy in the Himalayas' and 'Struggle for
Kashmir' form a part of her book on India 'Halfway to Freedom' (New York, 1949). The 'Struggle for
Kashmir' deals specifically with the Invaders' invasion. Bourke-White was in Pakistan when the
invasion was beginning. The Pakistan government was reluctant to let her cross into Kashmir. They
feared that an upright journalist like Bourke- White would not hesitate to tell the world, the truth
about Pakistan's complicity in the invasion. Pakistanis trotted out excuses to put her off saying, 'there
was nothing to photograph', 'it was very dangerous for a woman,' 'Tribesmen abducted women'.
When she insisted on visiting those places which were the bases for invasion, the local
officials escorting her would drive her over 'picturesque but deserted roads to the border of Kashmir
and show her 'a breath-taking vista of the mountain scenery which had fine picture-postcard value but
little news value'.
On occasions, Bourke-White was able to slip out unescorted and meet tribal Pashtun
invaders. She narrates her conversation with one Invader leader, Badshah Gul of Mohmand tribe. Gul
had brought one thousand tribesmen, a convoy of trucks and ammunition for the invasion of
Kashmir. The trucks and buses would at times come back within a day or two "bursting with loot,
only to return to Kashmir with more tribesmen, to repeat their indiscriminate "liberating"—and
terrorising of Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim villagers alike".
About the buses and lorries, Bourke-White writes "taxi companies (in Rawalpindi) were
donating twenty or ten or a couple of trucks each, the number I suppose depending on the intensity
with which the owner believed the Muslims in Kashmir needed 'rescuing'. Bourke-White debunked
the myths that arms for the invasion came from tribesmen themselves, some of whom owned arms
factories. She writes, "I photographed one of the larger of these munition works, belonging to the
Afridi tribe. It was a rock-bound shack where five men worked. Since it took one man a month to
make a rifle, it is doubtful whether all the shacks on the North-West Frontier would account for more
than a fraction of the equipment with which the tribesmen poured into Kashmir during the fall of '47.
Certainly, these miniature ballistics establishment would hardly explain the mortars, other
heavy modern weapons, and the two aeroplanes with which the invaders were equipped". In an
eyewitness account about the delivery of arms, she writes, "In Pakistan towns close to the border,
arms were handed out before daylight to tribesmen directly from the front steps of the Muslim
League headquarters".
She makes revelations e.g. 'From Pakistan's Capital a train loaded with medical supplies and
volunteer personnel left every Wednesday morning for the Kashmir frontier, "some of the 'Azad
Kashmir' soldiers, taken as prisoners by the Indian army, were found to have pay books of the
Pakistan Army in their pockets'.
Bourke-White visited Baramulla soon after its liberation by Indian forces. She records, "The
once lovely town, straddling the Jhelum River at the gateway to the Valley, was as heaped with
rubble and blackened with fire as those battered Jewels of Italian towns through which many of us
moved during our war in Italy...the deserted convent on the hill was badly defaced and littered...We
made our way into the ravaged Chapel, wading through the mass of torn hymnbooks and broken
sacred statuary. The altar was deep in rubble".
(Source: 'Halfway to Freedom’ by Bourke-While)

War Booty!
The battle of Shalateng (05-07 Nov 1947) was a well-orchestrated battle that not only
secured Srinagar but sent the invaders scampering back towards Muzaffarabad. 1 Sikh, 1Para
(Kumaon) & Troop 7 Cavalry participated in the historic battle of Shalateng. The RIAF, Tempests
rained misery from the skies. Having hit the 1 Sikh wall, the invaders had nowhere to go except run
back, abandoning equipment and wounded comrades. It was at the end of this battle that 1 Sikh
commandeered a 1943 Bedford coach, the only war booty that they retained during and after their 14
months’ operational commitment in the Kashmir Valley.

The Bedford coach was used as an amenity transport for move of troops for sightseeing/
picnics/cinema, when in peace stations. Once the Battalion moved to a field, the Coach moved to the
Regimental centre as part of heavy baggage not required in the field . The Bedford Coach stayed with
the Battalion till 1961 when it was finally laid to rest at a marginal profit.
In Jan 1958 that the Paltan moved to Jaipur for its peace tenure. The CO, Colonel Deep
Singh, while inspecting the stores, as they arrived from the Regimental centre, directed the coach to
be refurbished for use by troops as amenity for sight-seeing around Jaipur. The task was undertaken
by MTO, Lt Tankha. During the Battalion’s stay at Jaipur, the coach was well-utilised by the
Battalion. However, it was soon realised that maintaining the coach was a costly proposition as
spares were becoming scarce. Just before the Battalion left for Misamari in March 1961,the Coach
was sold off and money added to the Regimental Fund.
Thus, the war booty of Shalateng was laid to rest at Jaipur!!
(Kind courtesy Brigadier Indrajeet Gakhal, 1 SIKH; reproduced with permission. Picture of the bus
is indicative and not of the original one being referred to)
A Bridge at the LC
​ bridge marks the LC between two parts of J&K State, on UriChakothi-Domel road.
A
There are a few interesting anecdotes related to the bridge. Christened as Kaman Setu, an existing
bridge on the above-mentioned road was so named in the memory of Lieutenant Colonel Kaman
Singh, MVC in 1956. The old bridge, before the renaming, had been washed away earlier in the 1951
floods and had been rebuilt by that time. Lieutenant Colonel Kaman Singh, MVC was awarded MVC
while in command of 3 Royal Garhwal Rifles during the conflict. The battalion, under his command,
earned a name for itself during the Battle of Trehgam Ridge in Kupwara and later in various
operations in and around Tithwal in Kishanganga Valley. Interestingly, having relinquished the
command and having served three tenures elsewhere, he came back to Uri to command 3 KUMAON
in 1956. He had been approved for the rank of Brigadier and was awaiting placement when a cardiac
arrest took him away on 15 July 1956. He was only 39 years of age at that moment.

Old Kaman Setu, the bridge left) and the renovated one (right)

The bridge and a post to the North of Jhelum were named in his honour in 1956 itself. The
post carries his name even today. However, when the friendship bus service between Srinagar and
Muzaffarabad began in 2005, the bridge was renamed as Aman Setu (the bridge of peace), dropping
the officer’s name in the process, due to a typical bureaucratic oversight. There were reactions from
the fraternity of veterans and serving personnel alike and the bridge was renamed as Kaman Aman
Setu, as part of the course correction.
In 2005 itself, soon after the opening of the bridge, a massive earthquake jolted the complete
sub-Himalayan belt and the hill holding the bridge on the Pakistan side gave way. A bunker of the
Pakistan army too, got damaged. On the request of Pakistan army, Indian Army sappers then walked
across and stabilised the bridge as also repaired the bunker for their counterparts! At the time of this
book going to the press, the bridge stands shut due to an escalation of tension between two the
nations after the ghastly car bombing of a CRPF bus at Pulwama on 14 February 2019.
(By the author)

The Road Across Haji Pir and the Lone School Teacher
​ he road connecting Poonch with Uri, across Haji Pir Pass, was made roadworthy,
T
though not macadamized, in 1940. As the road went into a state of disuse after 1947-48 conflict, the
state of the road started getting deteriorated with passing years. The Indian Army post at Silikot on
the Uri side and the Lone Hut post of Pakistan army then sat eyeball to eyeball, across the LC. On 28
August 1965, Indian Army recaptured the pass and the road became alive. Initially, only army
convoys were plying and then civilian traffic too, started. It was a nice throw back to an era gone
past. Beyond the Lone Hut post, was a reasonably big village called Khwaja Bandi in PoJK. Mrs
Indira Gandhi landed up there to inaugurate a school soon after the capture of the pass.

Haji Pir Pass as seen from Indian side

​The school, now under J&K Board of School Education, started functioning and three
teachers were posted by the Education Department, to run the school. While two of them took their
time, pulling strings to avoid going there, one teacher, Master Hasan Din, took up his post in all
seriousness, after reaching Khwaja Bandi on 08 September 1965. He was a Gujjar from Uri.
Unfortunately, he had to pack up (he had only two possessions beyond two pairs of dresses – a jute
mat and a blackboard) soon after the winter break of the school when the Tashkent Agreement was
signed and the two forces pulled back to the pre-war positions.
Incidentally, in 2005, when a massive earthquake hit the area, among five relief points opened
between the two parts of J&K, Haji Pir was one such point. A lot of effort was put in to de-,mine the
road stretch between Nand Singh bridge at Uri and Silikot, by the Indian Army. Pakistan, however,
already had a functional road till Khwaja Bandi. The track on Indian side had to be relaid. As on date,
the road till Silikot is functional while Pakistan has also extended the road right till the pass and
beyond, next to Lone Hut! The lone teacher, Master Hasan Din, however, passed away quietly
without any one really noticing the event. A part of the history, too, got buried alongside the mortal
man.
(By the Author)

Kashmir: The Fatal Attraction

EPILOGUE

​The job of the armed forces in a democracy is to fight as per the

political decisions, without really worrying about the political
developments that invariably follow such conflicts. Indian forces, too,
followed the principle without any hesitation. Senior commanders like
Lieutenant General Cariappa did try to put forth the military logic to the
decision makers at a number of occasions but the decisions once taken,
were carried out with elan. The culture continues even today and this is
how it ought to be!
No two battles are ever similar when it comes to planning and
actual execution. The fleeting moments that decide the outcome of any
battle, are dissimilar even if two battles are fought in the same place, on
two different occasions. It is, therefore, unfair to compare such
engagements. Needless to say, then, that comparing a larger matrix of
operations in two or more different geographical segments is no less than a
sin! Every theatre of operation has its own peculiarities even though it may
be the one same conflict being fought in such theatres. The forces in J&K
had to fight two enemies- invaders and inhospitable elements, and did a
superb job in tackling the both.
​ perations in Kashmir and Ladakh were fought in terrains that were
O
more challenging. The terrain in the Jammu region was less hostile, and
yet, it offered the enemy multiple options and immense local support.
However, what sets the operations in the Kashmir Valley apart is the
vulnerability of Srinagar city and the airfield, loss of any or both of which
would have changed the course of military history of the conflict
altogether. With desertions happening at Lohara Kot and Domel, the
situation had actually turned very critical for Srinagar, but for the four
actions fought by men under four extra-ordinary military leaders. Details of
all four operations, viz, 4 JAK Infantry at Domel, JAK Force between Uri
and Baramulla, 1 SIKH and allied troops between Srinagar and Baramulla
and then 4 KUMAON at Badgam, have been covered in detail. The Valley,
therefore, was saved because of a collective effort involving the forces of
the State as well as that of India. Everyone involved in the process,
therefore, deserves our appreciation and a heartfelt gratitude by every
Indian. Some common myths like
the Baramulla plunder being the chief reason for delay, on part of the
invaders, stand challenged with an intent to give credit where it is actually
due.
Not mentioned in many literary works, the departure of Indian
Army units from Kashmir, especially, from the border belt, was a moving
event in many cases. Tear-eyed locals had come out in large numbers to
offer their gratitude to the army that had not only saved their lives, but had
also helped them rehabilitate after the destruction. It was not without a
reason then, that most of the COs were requested by the local leaders to
stay on for a while!
The Kashmir Valley remains as vital to the defence of Indian
territory North of Pir Panjal today, as it was then, way back in 1947. A very
volatile Line of Control marks this Sector where there is never a dull
moment! With the passage of time and, with the induction of forces post
stabilisation of the situation, deployment on ground has undergone a big
change and so have the force levels within the area between Pir Panjal in
the South to Kazinag Dhar in the North.
As the readers would have realised, a sincere attempt has been
made to link the past with the present. Old names and titles, despite linking
them to the present terminology in the footnotes, have been retained for the
ease of continuity, in case, someone is interested in reading more than one
book on the subject.
A peculiar issue that comes to fore, while researching for the
material on Kashmir Valley operations, is the conflict in the narratives as
rendered by the officers who commanded formations or were involved as
Staff Officers during the war. Many a time, it boils down to inter-personal
relations between such able officers. To maintain the balance, I have tried
and follow the official history and then have included some of the
important variations in my own narrative that rests in your hands in form of
this book. The work, therefore, is no end in itself and there is much more
that needs to be dwelt into further. Only when such an effort is made, the
actual and unadulterated versions would come out. I leave that for the
future generations of soldier writers to explore.
I have many well-meaning friends from the fraternity to thank for
all the assistance and help. Being soldiers that they all are, they

would like to remain unnamed. My heartfelt thanks to each one of them! I

am sanguine that they would know!
Fortunately, while the book was being written and the research was on, I
happened to get an unlimited access to some of the old documents being
held in the Archives of J&K State Forces at Mubarakh Mandi Jammu. My
sincerest thanks to the Executive Director of the Mubarakh Mandi Jammu
Heritage Society for the same. I wish the project that aims to restore the old
palace complex to its glory, all the very best.
Writing is a time-consuming process and needs a bit of isolation from
worldly affairs. Having retired and having flown back to my roots, social
commitments are far too many. My gratitude to my family members who
have kept me out of many an engagement by filling in the space through
own presence.
Team Bookmart deserve a special mention for their ‘open arm’ policy
towards military authors. In this world where everyone is looking to make
money, especially by asking new authors to invest funds for publishing
their works, Bookmart stands out. My heartfelt thanks and best wishes for
their future endeavours.
Battles and military campaigns need to be re-visited from time to time to
create a meaningful link of the events of the past to realities of the present.
This book is just a small step in that direction. Thanks for giving your time
to the work.
I look forward to your valued opinion and comments. Feedback may please
be shared at [email protected].

​ ​Jai Hind!

Author

Appendix

AGREEMENT BETWEEN MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CEASE-FIRE LINE IN THE STATE OF

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Karachi, 27 July 1949

I- INTRODUCTION
A. ​The military representatives of India and Pakistan met together in Karachi from 18 July to 27
JULY 1949 under the auspices of the Truce Sub-committee of the United Nations Commission for

India and Pakistan.

B. ​The members of the Indian Delegation were:

1. ​ t.-Gen. S.M. Shrinagesh

L
2. ​ aj.-Gen. K.S. Thimayya
M
3. ​Brig. S.H.F.J. Manekshaw
As observers:
1. ​ r. H.M. Patel
M
2. ​ r. V. Sahay C.
M

C. ​The members of the Pakistan Delegation were:

1. ​ aj.-Gen. W.J. Cawthorn

M
2. ​ aj.-Gen. Nazir Ahmad
M
3. ​Brig. M. Sher Khan
As observers:
1. ​ r. M. Ayub
M
2. ​ r. A. A. Khan.
M

D. ​The members of the Truce Sub-committee of the United Nations Commission for India and
Pakistan were:

1. ​ hairman, Mr. Hernando Samper (Colombia)

C
2. ​ r. William L.S. Williams (United States)
M
3. ​Lt.-Gen. Maurice Delvoie (Military Adviser)
4. ​Mr. Miguel A. Marin (Legal Adviser).
II- AGREEMENT

A. Considering:
 1.
That the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, in its letter dated 2
July 1949, invited the Governments of India and Pakistan to send fully authorised military
representatives to meet jointly in Karachi under the auspices of the Commission's Truce Sub-
committee to establish a cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, mutually agreed
upon by the Governments of India and Pakistan;
2. That the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in its letter stated that "The
meetings will be for military purposes; political issues will not be considered", and that
"They will be conducted without prejudice to negotiations concerning the Truce
Agreement'
3. That in the same letter the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan further
stated that: "The cease-fire line is a complement of the suspension of hostilities, which
falls within the provisions of Part I of the Resolution of 13 August 1948, and can be
considered separately from the questions relating to Part II of the same Resolution";
4. That the Governments of India and Pakistan, in their letters dated 7 July 1949 to the
Chairman of the Commission, accepted the Commission's invitation to the military
conference in Karachi;
5. The Delegations of India and Pakistan, duly authorized, have reached the following
agreement:
I. Under the provisions of Part I of the Resolution of 13 August 1948, and as a
complement of the suspension of hostilities in the State of Jammu and Kashmir
on 1 January 1949, a cease-fire line is established.
II. The cease-fire line runs from MANAWAR in the south, north to KERAN and
from KE RAN east to the glacier area, as follows:

1. The line from MANAWAR to the south bank of the JHELUM River at URUSA
(inclusive to India) is the line now defined by the factual positions about which
there is agreement between both parties. Where there has hitherto not been
agreement, the line shall be as follows:

I. ​ ​In PATRANA area: KOEL (inclusive to Pakistan) north along the KHUWALA
KAS Nullah up to point 2276 (inclusive to India), thence to KlRNI (inclusive to India).
II. ​KHAMBHA, PIR SATWAN, point 3150 and Point 3606 are inclusive to India,
thence the line runs to the factual position at BAGLA GALA, thence to the factual position at
Point 3300.
III. ​In the area south of URI the positions of PIR KANTHI and LEDI GALI are
inclusive to Pakistan.

1. From the north bank of the JHELUM River the line runs from a point
opposite the village of URUSA (NL 972109), thence north following the
 BALLASETH DA NAR Nullah (inclusive to Pakistan), up to NL 973140,
thence northeast to CHOTA KAZINAG (Point 10657, inclusive to India),
thence to NM 010180, thence to NM 037210, thence to Point 11825 (NM
025354, inclusive to Pakistan), thence to TUTUMARI GALI (to be shared by
both sides, posts to be established 500 yds. on either side of the GALI),
thence to the northwest through the first "R" of BURST NAR to north of
GABDORI, thence straight west to just north of Point 9870, thence along the
black line north of BIJILDHAR to north of BATARASI, thence to just south
of SUDPURA, thence due north to the KATHAKAZINAG Nullah, thence
along the Nullah to its junction with the GRANGNAR Nullah, thence along
the latter Nullah to KAJNWALA PATHRA (inclusive to India), thence across
the DHANNA ridge (following the factual positions) to RICHMAR GALI1
(inclusive to India), thence north to THANDA KATHA Nullah, thence north
to the KISHANGANGA River. The line then follows the KISHANGANGA
River up to a point situated between JARGT and TARBAN, thence (all-
inclusive to Pakistan) to BANKORAN, thence northeast to KHORI, thence to
the hill feature 8930 (in Square 9053), thence straight north to Point 10164 (in
Square 9057), thence to Poirit 10323 (in Square 9161), thence northeast
straight to GUTHUR, thence to BHUTPATHRA, thence to NL 980707,
thence following the BUGINA Nullah to the junction with the
KISHANGANGA River at Point 4739. Thereafter the line follows the
KISHANGANGA to KERAN and onwards to Point 4996 (NL 975818).
2. From Point 4996 the line follows (all-inclusive to Pakistan) the JAMGAR Nullah
eastward to Point 12124, to KATWARE, to Point 6678, thence to the northeast to
SARIAN (Point 11279), to Point 11837, to Point 13090, to Point 12641, thence east
again to Point 11142, thence to DHAKKI, thence to Point 11415, thence to Point
10301, thence to Point 7507, thence to Point 10685, thence to Point 8388, thence
southeast to Point 11812. Thence the line runs (all-inclusive to India) to Point
13220, thence across the River to the east to Point 13449 (DURMAT), thence to
Point 14586 (ANZBARI), thence to Point 13554, thence to Milestone 45 on the
BURZIL Nullah, thence to the east to ZIANKAL (Point 12909), thence to the
southeast to Point 11114, thence to Point 12216, thence to Point 12867, thence to
the east to Point 11264, thence to KARO (Point 14985), thence to Point 14014,
thence to Point 12089, thence following the track to Point 12879. From there the
line runs to Point 13647 (KAROBAL GALI, to be shared by both sides). The
cease-fire line runs thence through RETAGAH CHHISH (Point 15316), thence
through Point 15889, thence through Point 17392, thence through Point 16458,
thence to MARIOLA (to be shared by both sides), thence through Point 17561,
thence through Point 17352, thence through Point 18400, thence through Point
16760, thence to (inclusive to India), DALUNANG
3. From DALUNANG eastwards the cease-fire line will follow the general line Point
15495, ISHMAN, MANUS, GANGAM, GUNDERMAN, Point 13620, JUNKAR
 (Point 17628), MARMAK, NATSARA, SHANGRUTH (Point 17531), CHORBAT
LA (Point 15700), CHALUNKA (on the SHYOK River), KHOR, thence north to
the glaciers. This portion of the cease-fire line shall be demarcated in detail on the
basis of the factual position as of 27 July 1949 by the local commanders, assisted
by United Nations Military Observers.
4. The cease-fire line described above shall be drawn on a one-inch map (where
available) and then be verified mutually on the ground by local commanders on
each side with the assistance of the United Nations Military Observers, so as to
eliminate any no-man's land. In the event that the local commanders are unable to
reach agreement, the matter shall be referred to the Commission's Military Adviser,
whose decision shall be final. After this verification, the Military Adviser will issue
to each High Command a map on which will be marked the definitive cease-fire
line.
5. No troops shall be stationed or operate in the area of the BURZIL Nullah from
south of MINIMARG to the cease-fire line. This area is bounded on the west by the
Ridge leading northeast from DUDGAI KAL to Point 13071, to Point 9447, to
Point 13466, to Point 13463, and on the east by the Ridge running from Point
12470, to Point 11608, to Point 13004, to Point 13976, to Point 13450. Pakistan
may, however, post troops on the western of the above ridges to cover the
approaches to KHAMBRI Bypass.
6. In any dispositions that may be adopted in consequence of the present agreement
troops will remain, at least 500 yards from the cease-fire line except where the
KTSHANGANGA River constitutes the line. Points which have been shown as
inclusive to one party may be occupied by that party, but the troops of the other
party shall remain at a distance of 500 yards.
7. Both sides shall be free to adjust their defensive positions behind the cease-fire line
as determined in paragraphs A to E inclusive above, subject to no wire or mines
being used when new bunkers and defences are constructed. There shall be no
increase of forces or strengthening of defences in areas where no major adjustments
are involved by the determination of the cease-fire line.
8. The action permitted by paragraph F above shall not be accompanied or
accomplished by the introduction of additional military potential by either side into
the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
9. Except as modified by Paragraphs II-A to II-G, inclusive, above, the military
agreements between the two High Commands relating to the cease-fire of 1 January
1949 shall continue to remain operative. I. The United Nations Commission for
India and Pakistan will station Observers where it deems necessary.
10. The Delegations shall refer this Agreement to their respective Governments for
ratification. The documents of ratification shall be deposited with the United
Nations Commission for India and Pakistan not later than 31 July 1949.
11. A period of 30 days from the date of ratification shall be allowed to each side to
vacate the areas at present occupied by them beyond the cease-fire line as now
 determined. Before the expiration of this 30-day period there shall be no forward
movement into areas to be taken over by either side pursuant to this agreement,
except by mutual agreement between local commanders.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned sign this document in three original copies.

DONE in Karachi on 27 July 1949

For the Government of India:

(Signed) S.M. SHRINAGESH

For the Government of Pakistan:

(Signed) W.J. CAWTHORN

For the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan:

(Signed) HERNANDO SAMPER

(Signed) MAURICE DELVOIE.

1- ​Richmar Gali is further to the West of Reshian Gali and on the same range (Kafir Khan
Range). It was captured by 1 Sikh as part of operations in Tithwal sector.

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 The Picture tells us something- strong personalities!
(From the left- Major General Kalwant Singh, Brigadiers LP Sen and Brigadier Harbaksh Singh)

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