Cai et al.

/ CULTURE IN CONTEXT 591

Culture in the Context of

Intercultural Negotiation
Individualism-Collectivism and Paths
to Integrative Agreements

DEBORAH A. CAI
University of Maryland
STEVEN R. WILSON
Purdue University
LAURA E. DRAKE
University of Maryland

This study explores culture’s effect on behaviors and outcomes in intercultural negotiation and
examines how those effects are moderated by role. Eighty U.S. and international students took
part in a previously developed negotiation task (Pruitt, 1981) and completed Hui and Triandis’s
(1986) individualism-collectivism (INDCOL) scale. Negotiation interactions were coded for
information sharing, offers, and distributive tactics. Findings show that a negotiation dyad’s
collectivism is positively associated with higher joint profit. The effects of culture on both com-
munication behaviors and joint outcomes, however, differ by role of the negotiator. In particular,
seller collectivism has larger and more consistent effects on communication behavior and joint
profit than buyer collectivism. Results support a “culture in context” perspective of negotiation
that takes into account negotiator qualities, contextual and structural features of the negotia-
tion, and mediating processes in addition to cultural values.

C
onflicts often contain potential for mutually beneficial outcomes
that go unrealized (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Pruitt & Rubin,
1986); thus, scholars have identified communicative and cogni-
tive factors that impede joint gain (Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Pruitt, 1981;
Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), such as distributive tactics (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975;

Deborah A. Cai (Ph.D., Michigan State University, 1994) is an assistant professor in the Depart-
ment of Communication at the University of Maryland, 2110 Skinner Building, College Park,
MD 20742, phone: (301) 405-6524, fax: (301) 314-9471, e-mail: [email protected]; Steven
R. Wilson (Ph.D., Purdue University, 1989) is an associate professor in the Department of Com-
munication, Purdue University, 1366 LAEB 2114, West Lafayette, IN 47907-1366, phone:
(765) 494-7547, e-mail: [email protected]; Laura E. Drake (Ph.D., Michigan State Uni-
versity, 1995) is an assistant professor at the Department of Communication, University of
Maryland, 2120 Skinner Building, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, phone:
(301) 405-6530, e-mail: [email protected]. The research reported in this study was ap-
proved by the University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects at Michigan
State University. We wish to thank Edward L. Fink and two anonymous reviewers for their
helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article. Please direct correspondence to first author.
Human Communication Research, Vol. 26 No. 4, October 2000 591–617
© 2000 International Communication Association
592 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

Putnam & Jones, 1982; Tutzauer & Roloff, 1988) or fixed-sum percep-
tions (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). With few exceptions (Brett & Okumura,
1998; see Graham, 1993), this research has not been replicated among
international participants. Consequently, we understand little about
culture’s influence on integrative bargaining (Cai & Drake, 1998; Weiss,
1996). To complicate matters, scholars historically have assumed that
culture directly affects negotiation behavior (Graham, 1985; Pye, 1982),
but recent research suggests that buyer-seller roles and norms of nego-
tiation can moderate effects of culture (Cai, 1998; Drake, 1995) and that
intercultural contexts bring about significantly different negotiation pro-
cesses than intracultural contexts (Adler & Graham, 1989). Thus, our chal-
lenge is to isolate the effects of culture from those of structure or context
when assessing integrative outcomes.
To this end, our paper pursues two goals. First, we examine how cul-
ture (here, individualism-collectivism) affects behavior in intercultural
negotiation. Although a few studies look at reaching integrative outcomes
among international partners (Adler & Graham, 1989; Brett & Okumura,
1998), none analyzes behaviors for reaching such outcomes. We look at
how cultural values affect communication behavior. Second, we examine
how the effects of culture on negotiation are moderated by role. After
defining individualism-collectivism, we offer a rationale for the relation-
ship between collectivism and high joint gain. Next, we examine culture’s
effect on communication processes. Finally, we suggest a basis for expect-
ing qualifying effects of structural and contextual features on outcomes.

Culture and Cultural Values

Culture is defined as socially transmitted beliefs, behavior patterns,

values, and norms of a collection of individuals identifiable by their rules,
concepts, and assumptions (Salacuse, 1991). Janosik (1987) describes the
various research traditions for understanding culture’s influence on ne-
gotiation. The most frequently employed tradition is a culture as shared
values approach, which suggests that unique negotiating styles are the
result of underlying cultural values such as individualism-collectivism
that drive communication behavior (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Trompenaars,
1993). A second tradition, labeled culture in context, is discussed later.

Defining Individualism-Collectivism

The individualism-collectivism continuum is adopted frequently to re-

flect a culture’s value preferences and emphasis on certain goals over oth-
ers (Schwartz, 1990). Individualist cultures emphasize autonomy and in-
dependence, self-determination, and protection of self-interests. Collec-
 Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT 593

tivist cultures emphasize interconnection, conformity to group norms,

relational harmony, and protection of in-group interests (Hofstede, 1980;
Hui & Triandis, 1986; Schwartz, 1990). Collectivist cultures draw clearer
distinctions between in-group and out-group, and place greater empha-
sis on status and role authority, than do individualist cultures (Gudykunst,
1987; Hui & Triandis, 1986). Nations often are characterized as having a
predominant value orientation; for example, the United States is viewed
typically as individualistic, whereas China’s culture is viewed as collec-
tivistic (Adler, Brahm, & Graham, 1992). A culture as shared values ap-
proach suggests these contrasting orientations should produce differing
approaches to negotiation.

Cultural Values and Negotiation Outcomes

Graham and his colleagues have made notable contributions to the

shared values approach (see Graham, 1993; Weiss, 1996; Wilson, Cai,
Campbell, Donohue, & Drake, 1995). Employing Pruitt’s (1981) integra-
tive bargaining simulation, these studies compare U.S. business students’
negotiating with the negotiating of students from Brazil and Japan (Gra-
ham, 1983), Canada and Mexico (Adler, Graham, & Gehrke, 1987), Brit-
ain, France, and Germany (Campbell, Graham, Jolibert, & Meissner, 1988),
China, Japan, and Korea (Graham, Kim, Lin, & Robinson, 1988), and Rus-
sia (Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992). The authors find cultural differ-
ences in perceived use of integrative versus competitive tactics, partner
satisfaction, and reciprocation of tactics.
We extend this body of research in four ways. First, the studies by Gra-
ham and his colleagues measure individual profit but not joint profit.
Integrative negotiation, however, involves concern for maximizing both
one’s own and the other party’s outcomes (Fisher et al., 1991; Pruitt, 1981).
According to Pruitt and Lewis (1975), joint profit is the best measure of
integrative outcomes because it reflects whether parties can “increase the
size of the pie” in a way that benefits both. Only by measuring joint profit
can we learn about the link between culture and integrative potential.
Second, the research by Graham and his colleagues tends to rely on glo-
bal and perceptual measures of the bargaining process, such as asking
negotiators to rate their use of bargaining strategies (Graham et al., 1992)
or their perceptions of using distributive behaviors and the importance
of information (Graham et al., 1992; Graham et al., 1988; Graham, Mintu,
& Rodgers, 1994).1 Studies of perceived conflict styles, however, demon-
strate that participants’ views of their own behavior often are not shared
by others. For example, both participants in organizational conflicts tend
to perceive their own behavior as collaborative but the other party’s be-
havior as competitive (Thomas & Pondy, 1977). By coding communica-
594 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

tion tactics as they occur in the negotiation, we can examine the actual
relationship between culture, communication behavior, and integrative
outcomes.
Third, the work by Graham et al. assumes cultural values based on the
participants’ country of origin. Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, and
Lucca (1988), however, argue that within-country variance may also be
significant. Therefore, results based on assumptions about national cul-
ture do not demonstrate how specific cultural values are related to be-
haviors and outcomes. Because we want to draw conclusions about the
effects of cultural values on communication behaviors and integrative
outcomes, we assess individualism-collectivism at the individual level.
Fourth, these prior studies draw generalizations for international ne-
gotiation based on country-by-country comparisons. Brett and Okumura
(1998) demonstrate, however, that intra- and intercultural dyads operate
differently in their ability to realize integrative potential by providing
evidence that interdependence between negotiators results in lower joint
outcomes for intercultural dyads than intracultural ones. Recognizing the
complexity of negotiator relationships, we examine the effects of both
parties’ collectivism on the use of bargaining tactics and the realization of
integrative outcomes during intercultural negotiation.
As these four points make clear, research to date has not explored rela-
tionships between cultural values (measured at the individual level) and
integrative outcomes. This study contributes to existing research in inter-
cultural negotiation by exploring these relationships.
Although it has been argued that individualist negotiators may stimu-
late each other to achieve higher joint gain (Brett & Okumura, 1998), we
provide four reasons to suspect that collectivism affects integrative negoti-
ating to achieve higher joint outcomes. First, collectivist negotiators may
have more concern for the opponent’s outcome because collectivist cultures
measure success in terms of maximizing group interests.2 Second, collectiv-
ist negotiators may engage less often in fixed-sum assumptions—the belief
that negotiators’ interests are necessarily related in zero-sum fashion (Th-
ompson & Hastie, 1990)—because collectivism is characterized by a greater
concern for the welfare of the group as a whole. Third, collectivist negotia-
tors may consider issues simultaneously rather than sequentially, because
collectivist cultures emphasize holistic over field independent thinking
(Gudykunst, 1987). Packaging issues allows negotiators to find integrative
solutions while incurring minimal concessions (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975;
Tutzauer & Roloff, 1988; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990).
Finally, collectivistic negotiators may avoid distributive tactics, because col-
lectivist cultures value relational harmony (Kim & Wilson, 1994) and es-
chew forceful conflict styles (Kumagai & Straus, 1983; Lee & Rogan, 1991).
Based on the culture as shared value view, we predict that:
 Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT 595

H1: A negotiation dyad’s profit will increase as the dyad’s total collectivism
increases.

The preceding rationale presumes culture affects negotiation processes

associated with integrative outcomes. Tutzauer and Roloff (1988) suggest
three such processes: information sharing, heuristic trial and error (i.e.,
making simultaneous offers), and avoiding distributive tactics. Because
collectivism is associated with the value of group goals over individual
ones, we expect that negotiator collectivism may lead to asking more ques-
tions about the other’s needs, preferences, and interests. Further, because
collectivism is associated with holistic problem solving, we expect nego-
tiator collectivism to result in greater frequency of packaging multiple
issues. And because collectivism values maintaining group harmony, we
expect negotiator collectivism to reduce the use of distributive tactics.
Thus, we expect that:

H2: During intercultural negotiation, negotiator collectivism will be (a) posi-

tively associated with the frequency of asking for information about the
other’s needs and interests, (b) positively associated with the frequency of
offers that package multiple issues, and (c) negatively associated with the
frequency of using distributive tactics.

To our knowledge, this study is the first to measure individualism-

collectivism at the individual level in order to explore relationships be-
tween culture, communication processes, and a dyad’s integrative po-
tential. Aside from testing implications of the culture as shared values
view, our study assesses whether predictions made so far are stated too
generally. This line of reasoning is suggested by Janosik’s (1987) culture
in context view.

Culture in Context

In contrast to the culture as shared values view, the culture in context

view assumes a multicausal, contingency-based perspective in which not
only culture but negotiator qualities, structural and contextual features,
and mediating processes affect bargaining. Negotiator qualities that can
affect the negotiation include personality and bargaining experience.
Structural features affecting negotiation include role, number and link-
age of issues, time limits, and cultural composition of the bargaining
dyad (intra- versus intercultural). Finally, mediating processes affecting
negotiation include reciprocity of bargaining tactics (Adler & Graham,
1989; Cai & Donohue, 1997). As a result of such contextual features, the
596 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

effects of individualism-collectivism on outcomes may be moderated by

other variables. This study goes beyond the culture as shared values view
by focusing on two possible moderators: the role of buyer and seller, and
the collectivism of the bargaining partner.

Buyer-Seller Roles

Roles are “sets of rights, obligations, and normative expectations at-

tached to social positions, and impose limitations on task-characteristic
responsiveness . . .” (Neale, Huber, & Northcraft, 1987, p. 230). In busi-
ness negotiations, the roles of buyer and seller carry with them estab-
lished expectations for behavior. If buyers stress different expectations
and goals than sellers (Wilson & Putnam, 1990), then these roles may be
important modifiers of individualism-collectivism’s effect on joint prof-
its. For example, Neale and her colleagues consistently have found that
U.S. buyers earn higher profits than sellers during negotiation simula-
tions (Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985; Huber & Neale, 1986; Neale
et al., 1987; Neale & Northcraft, 1986). Graham reports similar advan-
tage for buyers across culture, with the qualification that buyer-seller
differences are more pronounced in highly collectivistic cultures such as
Japan (Graham, 1983), Korea (Graham et al., 1988), and Mexico (Adler et
al., 1987).
The effects of bargaining role on negotiation outcomes may reflect
differences in power. Emerson (1962) suggests that Individual A is de-
pendent on Individual B to the extent that (a) Individual B can influence
the goals of Individual A, and (b) Individual A has few alternatives avail-
able for achieving those goals. Applying this to negotiation, sellers may
perceive a dependency on each and every buyer to earn a profit, because
there may be only a limited number of buyers with whom they can close
a deal. Buyers may not perceive the same dependency on sellers, be-
cause alternative suppliers often are available. Thus, buyers frequently
may have more power than sellers. Even a collectivistic buyer is likely to
consider alternatives to find the best deal; if one seller cannot provide a
good deal, the buyer will seek another. As a result, despite levels of col-
lectivism, the buyer’s role may encourage individualistic behavior to gain
the largest share of a fixed set of resources. In contrast, the seller, being
in a less powerful role, may benefit more when facilitating joint problem
solving in a manner that increases resources available to both parties.
Thus, collectivistic behavior may be more advantageous to the seller. In
this way, social roles may moderate the effects of cultural values on com-
munication behavior (Hui & Triandis, 1986; Schwartz, 1990). In light of
this reasoning, we ask:
 Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT 597

RQ1: Are the effects of individualism-collectivism dependent upon negotia-

tor role? More specifically, (a) are seller collectivism and buyer collectiv-
ism both associated with a dyad’s joint profit, and (b) are the effects of
seller collectivism on seller’s negotiation tactics different than the effects
of buyer collectivism on buyer’s negotiation tactics?

Partner Collectivism

The culture in context view suggests that a negotiator’s collectivism

could influence joint profit not only by affecting the negotiator’s own
behavior, but also by influencing the behavior of the other party. Nego-
tiators often reciprocate integrative and distributive tactics (Adler et al.,
1987; Graham et al., 1988, 1992; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Putnam & Jones,
1982; Weingart et al., 1990), so highly collectivistic negotiators may facili-
tate joint profit in part because their own integrative behavior encour-
ages the other party to behave integratively as well. Thus, we ask the
following:

RQ2: During intercultural negotiation, (a) is seller collectivism associated with

the buyer’s communication tactics, and (b) is buyer collectivism associated
with the seller’s communication tactics?

Further, if negotiators employ distributive tactics, then even highly col-

lectivistic partners may reciprocate (Kelley, 1966), resulting in the reduc-
tion of integrative behaviors to achieve higher joint gain. Therefore, it
may be only when both negotiators are collectivistic that higher joint gain
is achieved. Therefore, we ask the following:

RQ3: During intercultural negotiation, do seller collectivism and buyer collec-

tivism interact linearly in their effect on joint profit?

METHOD

Eighty U.S. and international students (45 females, 33 males, 2 unre-

ported; M age = 25.70, Mdn= 24, SD = 6.67 years) at a large Midwestern
university participated in this study.3 Aside from the U.S. (36), countries
of origin were Taiwan (12), India (5), China (3), Japan, Pakistan, Senegal,
Singapore, and Ukraine (2 each), Bermuda, Cameroon, Hong Kong, Ko-
rea, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, Philippines, Sudan, Thailand, Vietnam,
and Zambia (1 each), and 2 unreported.4 Twenty-two participants re-
ported previous job-related negotiating experience.5 Three participants
did not fully complete the measure of individualism-collectivism.
598 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

Participants were recruited via three methods. We asked members of

international student organizations on campus to participate; we re-
quested volunteers from classes that typically enroll international stu-
dents; and we advertised a $100 raffle for international students in the cam-
pus newspaper and on campus-wide flyers. Each participant in the study
received a raffle ticket for a random drawing at the close of the experiment.

Procedures

Three persons from different countries were scheduled for each time
slot to increase the likelihood of having two persons available to partici-
pate. When all three persons arrived, one was randomly selected to com-
plete only a questionnaire for use in another project with the provision
that the two “negotiators” always were from different countries of origin.
The two negotiators were separated so they could ask questions about
the instructions without giving away information to the opponent. Par-
ticipants completed a consent form briefly describing the task, then they
were given instructions randomly identifying their role as either buyer or
seller. Both participants received instructions manipulating cognitive fram-
ing.6 Next, participants completed a brief pretest to ensure they under-
stood the instructions. Participants then were moved to the negotiation
room and given 30 minutes to complete the negotiation task. All negotia-
tions were conducted in English. Sessions were videotaped from behind
a one-way mirror, and a tape recorder was placed on the negotiation table
to ensure sound quality. After completing the negotiation task, bargain-
ers completed a final contract spelling out the settlement points for each
issue. Dyads not finished negotiating were stopped at the 30-minute mark.
Participants again were separated and asked to complete two ques-
tionnaires assessing (a) satisfaction with their own performance and out-
comes and (b) individualism-collectivism (INDCOL) and demographic
information, including four questions assessing English ability (how long
they had been in the U.S., when they first learned English, how long they
had been conversing in English, and how competent they felt conversing
in English). Finally, participants were debriefed about the purpose of the
study but asked not to share this information with others.

Negotiation Task

The negotiation task was a variable-sum simulation (see Pruitt, 1981)

involving a retailer (buyer) and wholesaler (seller) negotiating the price
for three appliances (see Table 1). The retailer was described as a large
regional chain-store that currently did not carry the brand name manu-
factured by the nationwide wholesaler. There were nine possible settle-
 Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT 599

TABLE 1
Negotiators’ Payoff Schedules for Bargaining Simulationa

Big screen TVs Personal copiers Laptop computers

Buyer Seller Buyer Seller Buyer Seller
A $000 $2,000 $000 $1,200 $000 $800
B $100 $1,750 $150 $1,050 $250 $700
C $200 $1,500 $300 $900 $500 $600
D $300 $1,250 $450 $750 $750 $500
E $400 $1,000 $600 $600 $1,000 $400
F $500 $750 $750 $450 $1,250 $300
G $600 $500 $900 $300 $1,500 $200
H $700 $250 $1,050 $150 $1,750 $100
I $800 $000 $1,200 $000 $2,000 $000
a
Adapted from Pruitt (1981).

ment options for each appliance (marked “A” through “I”), each with
assigned profits for both parties. Participants read and were told explic-
itly, “You can approach the task in any fashion you choose. The only re-
strictions on your behavior are that you may not show your own profit
sheet to your counterpart and you may not ask to see your counterpart’s
profit sheet.”
Each negotiator could earn a maximum of $4,000 or a minimum of $0.
According to Table 1, an obvious compromise agreement would be E-E-E,
yielding for each negotiator an individual profit of $2,000 and a joint profit
of $4,000. A more integrative solution is possible if negotiators logroll,
because TVs are the most profitable appliance for the seller, whereas laptop
computers are most profitable for the buyer. A-E-I yields an individual
profit of $2,600 for each negotiator, for a joint profit of $5,200. To encour-
age integrative bargaining and remain consistent with prior research,
negotiators were instructed to achieve at least $2,200 profit across the three
appliances (Bazerman et al., 1985; Huber & Neale, 1986; Pruitt & Lewis,
1975). To induce concern about the other, participants were told that their
own company would incur long-term benefits from working with the
other company if an acceptable agreement was reached.
We chose Pruitt’s (1981) simulation to facilitate comparison of our find-
ings with the large body of prior research on integrative bargaining con-
ducted both with U.S. and international participants (see Graham, 1993;
Neale & Bazerman, 1991). In support of the task’s external validity, Neale
and Northcraft (1986) compared expert (real estate agents) and amateur
(undergraduates) negotiators using a similar version of this simulation.
Pairs of experts reached more profitable joint agreements than pairs of
amateurs, as would be expected if the task taps an important aspect of
skill at integrative bargaining.
600 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

TABLE 2
Modified Individualism-Collectivism (INDCOL) Scalea

1. It is enjoyable to meet and talk with my neighbors regularly.

b
2. I would not let my neighbors borrow things from me or my family (R) .
3. Neighbors should greet each other when they come across each other.
4. I am not interested in knowing what my neighbors are really like (R).
5. Married people should have time alone every day undisturbed by their spouses (R).
6. If a person is interested in a job about which the spouse is not very enthusiastic, the
person should apply for it anyway (R).
7. It is better for a husband and wife to have their own bank accounts than to have a
joint account (R).
8. It is desirable that a husband and wife have their own set of friends instead of having
only a common set of friends (R).
9. When I am among colleagues/classmates, I think I should do my own thinking
without minding about them (R).
10. A person ought to help a colleague at work who has financial problems.
11. In most cases to cooperate with a coworker whose ability is lower than one’s own is
not desirable as doing the thing alone (R).
a
For all items, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. Higher score = greater collectivism.
b
(R) represents reverse scored items.

Independent Variables

Bargaining role. Participants were randomly assigned the role of buyer

or seller.

Individualism-collectivism. A modified version of Hui and Triandis’s

(1986) individualism-collectivism (INDCOL) scale was employed. The
INDCOL is a 66-item multidimensional Likert scale designed to assess an
individual’s level of collectivism by measuring attitudes and behaviors
toward six relational domains (e.g., coworkers, neighbors, extended fam-
ily). Scale modification occurred in three steps. First, we deleted items
that lacked clarity or face validity (22 items were removed). Next, we
assessed the remaining 44 items for internal consistency and parallelism
of the relational domains using confirmatory factor analysis (Hunter, 1980).
Three subscales, based on relational domain, passed this test with errors
not exceeding those expected by chance: neighbor, spouse, and coworker.
Finally, these three subscales were tested for second-order unidimension-
ality so they could be summed into a single collectivism score for each
negotiator.7
The modified INDCOL demonstrated second-order unidimensional-
ity with a “three-domain” reliability of alpha = .75 (for the 11-item scale,
alpha = .76). Higher scores on the resulting 11-item index (possible range
= 7–77) indicated greater collectivism (see Table 2). To substantiate the
 Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT 601

validity of our 11-item solution, total scores from this solution were cor-
related with the total scores of the revised 33-item version of INDCOL
suggested by Hui and Yee (1994). We found the 33-item version to have
an alpha reliability of .72 and the correlation between this scale and our
11-item solution is .86 (p < .0001), which supports the comparability of
our index with their revised solution.

Dependent Variable

Joint profit was obtained based on the final contracts signed at the end
of the simulation. Of the 40 dyads, 34 (85%) reached agreement within 30
minutes. Because joint profit is a measure of integrativeness, and we
wanted to retain deadlocked dyads, it did not seem appropriate to assign
joint profits of $0 to dyads that did not reach agreement. Following pre-
vious studies (e.g., Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Tutzauer, 1990), we treated the
six deadlocked dyads as if they had reached the least integrative solution
of a straight compromise agreement E-E-E, resulting in an individual profit
of $2,000 for each negotiator (see Table 1).

Communication Variables

Information sharing. The videotapes were coded for information shar-

ing tactics by three independent coders. Four 1-hour sessions were de-
voted to training coders to recognize information sharing, based on cat-
egories developed by Pruitt and Lewis (1975; Pruitt, 1981) and Thomp-
son and Hastie (1990). Information sharing was coded separately for buy-
ers and sellers.
Information sharing includes both asking for and giving information.
To address the hypotheses and research questions, we identified three
types of “asking for information.” We also identified three “giving infor-
mation” categories because it seemed reasonable to look at this aspect of
information sharing as well. Asking included (a) numerical requests—
details about the opponent’s profits in dollar amounts (e.g., “What do
you make for TVs at price D?”); (b) priority requests—details regarding
the opponent’s comparative importance of issues (e.g., “Would you rather
get a good price on TVs or on computers?”); and (c) directional requests—
queries about the opponent’s desire to move the price of any item up or
down (e.g., “You want a higher price for televisions?”). Similarly, giving
information included numerical, priority, or directional disclosures (e.g.,
“I make $1,200 for E,” “I make my greatest profits on the personal copiers
[in comparison to the other two products],” and “I need a lower price for
the copiers”).
602 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

To establish unitizing reliability, the coders independently counted the

number of asking and giving units present within each of 7 (out of 40)
negotiations. Guetzkow’s U, an index of disagreement in unitizing, ranged
from .01 to .10 for the three pairs and averaged .06. Folger, Hewes, and
Poole (1984) describe scores below .10 on this index of disagreement as
“quite low,” indicating acceptable unitizing reliability. Category
reliabilities were estimated using Cohen’s kappa to compare coders’ la-
beling of the units into one of the asking and giving categories. Cohen’s
kappa ranged from .86 to .93, with an average of .89 for the three pairs of
coders. Discrepancies in categorization were resolved through discussion
and consensus. The three coders then divided the remaining videotapes
for coding information asking and giving. Because of extremely low fre-
quency of asking and giving priority information (total number of occur-
rences in 40 dyads, asking priority: seller = 0, buyer = 2; giving priority:
seller = 4; buyer = 1), these categories were dropped from further analy-
ses. Frequencies of asking numerical information and asking directional
information were standardized and then summed separately for buyer
and seller as an index of “asking for information.”

Heuristic trial and error. In four 1-hour sessions, three new coders were
trained to recognize single- and multiple-item offers. Single-item offers
were defined as suggestions regarding the contract price for one appli-
ance only (e.g., “How about price B for TVs?”). Multiple-item offers were
defined as suggestions to combine the contract price for two or more ap-
pliances in a package offer (e.g., “Price C is okay for copy machines if I
can have price F for computers.”). Multiple offers often occurred as a
simple listing of prices (e.g., “How about D, E, and G?”). Single- and
multiple-item offers were coded separately for buyers and sellers.
The unit of analysis was the uninterrupted talking turn, all talk occur-
ring by one negotiator between the end of the opponent’s previous talk
and the beginning of the opponent’s next turn. Only turns in which offers
occurred were coded; all other turns received a “null” code. Unitizing
reliability was determined based on the match in coder performance across
8 (of 40) videotaped negotiations (187 offers). Using this method,
Guetzkow’s U reached .04 (agreement rate 96%). To establish categoriz-
ing reliability, units consensually recognized by coders were compiled
and listed. Coders then watched the same videotapes again, labeling each
unit as a single- or multiple-item offer. Agreement among coders produced
a global kappa of .96. Categorical kappas (103 single units, 50 multiple) were
.94 for single-item offers and .88 for multiple-item offers. For testing Hy-
pothesis 2, we report the use of multiple offers, but a sum of standardized
scores for single-item and multiple-item offers for each role was calculated
as an index of “heuristic trial and error” to address the research questions.
 Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT 603

Distributive tactics. A third group of four coders was trained to recog-

nize put-downs, threats, demands, and refusals, according to Pruitt’s
(1981) guidelines. Put-downs were negative comparisons between the
opponent’s and the bargainer’s own company or demeaning comments
aimed at the opponent (e.g., “You’re being completely unreasonable!”).
Threats were implied or explicit commitments to impose harmful conse-
quences, such as a walk-out, if the listener failed to comply with the speaker’s
wishes (e.g., “There’s no use in trying to negotiate a contract with [your
company] if you won’t let us make some profit.”). Demands were direct
orders that the listener make accommodations for the speaker (e.g. “Just do
it! Tell your boss this was the best offer you could get.”). Refusals were ex-
plicit rejections of an opponent’s offer (e.g., “No way at price C.”). Distribu-
tive tactics were coded separately for buyers and sellers.
The unit of analysis was the uninterrupted talking turn. Only turns evi-
dencing distributive behaviors were coded. Other turns received a null code.
Unitizing reliability was determined based on coder performance across 6
(of 40) videotapes (168 distributive acts). Guetzkow’s U reached .02, or 98%
agreement. Category reliabilities were determined when units consensu-
ally recognized by coders were compiled, listed, and then assigned a code
during a second viewing of the same videotapes. Based on 126 talking turns,
Cohen’s kappa for the coding scheme as a whole reached .92. Judging from
the categorical kappas, some distributive moves were more difficult to rec-
ognize consistently (putdowns = .75; threats = .53), whereas others were
easier to identify consistently (demands = .85, refusals = .92).
Examination of the relationships among the four distributive tactics
suggests that the four tactics, although generally grouped together as
“distributive” in previous research, are not unidimensional. The mean
correlation (after r to z transformation) among put-downs, threats, and
demands is r = .42. In contrast, the mean correlation between refusals
and each of these three tactics is only r = .14. This suggests that refusals
are not as strongly associated with the other three tactics as the other
three are among themselves; therefore, refusals were not included in fur-
ther analyses of distributive tactics. Standardized scores for put-downs,
threats, and demands were summed to represent “distributive tactics”
for the remainder of the analyses.

Transforming Variables

Descriptive statistics for the nine communication variables coded in

this study appear in Table 3. All of the communication tactics, with the
exception of giving directional information, were significantly skewed
in a positive direction. Consequently, we transformed each communica-
tion variable (except giving directional information) using x.1 (see Winer,
 604

TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics for Communication Tactics a

Communication Buyers Sellers

tacticsb
M SD Skewc % buyers used >1d M SD Skewc % sellers used >1d

Single Offers 2.03 0.93 -.34 93% 2.19 0.80 -.02 97%

Multiple Offers 1.69 0.99 .17 87% 1.71 1.04 .22 87%

Threats 1.03 0.05 1.35 30% 1.02 0.03 1.88 22%

Putdowns 1.04 0.07 1.86 25% 1.02 0.04 2.45 20%

Demands 1.04 0.07 1.45 33% 1.04 0.05 .94 37%

Ask Numerical 1.04 0.06 1.66 32% 1.04 0.06 1.39 37%

Ask Directional 1.02 0.03 1.32 27% 1.02 0.05 2.42 20%

Give Numerical 0.45 0.56 .46 40% .51 0.58 .24 45%
HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

Give Directionale 0.76 0.51 -.84 70% 2.43 2.43 1.10 77%

a
At the level of individual tactics, significant differences between buyer and seller were found only for giving directional information, t (39) = 4.37,
p < .0001, using a two-tailed paired t-test. No other buyer-seller differences were significant. Comparisons were performed on transformed variables.
b
For both buyer and seller, n = 40. Descriptive statistics reported are based on transformed variables.
c
Standard error of skewness (after transformation) = .37.
d
Percentage of buyers or sellers who used the tactic at least once.
e
Sellers’ giving directional information was not transformed.
 Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT 605

1971). Because many variables had a modal value of zero, we followed

Winer’s recommendation of adding the constant of 1 to information ask-
ing and giving tactics (except seller’s giving directional information,
which did not require transformation) and distributive tactics before
transformation. In all cases, the transformation resulted in the skews being
reduced by one third to one half. The transformed variables were used
for the remaining analyses.

RESULTS

Dyad Collectivism and Joint Profit

Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 is based on a culture as shared values per-

spective, positing that a negotiation dyad’s profit will increase as the
dyad’s total collectivism increases. This prediction was evaluated by a
Pearson correlation conducted with “dyad” as the unit of analysis.8 Each
member of the dyad’s score on the INDCOL scale was summed to create
a dyad joint index (M = 96.73, SD = 11.60); this index was then correlated
with joint profit. Dyads on average reached agreements with $4,383 joint
profits, higher than the $4,000 resulting from a straight compromise (E-E-
E; see Tables 1). The dyads’ summed collectivism was associated signifi-
cantly with joint profit (r = .38, p < .01, one-tailed, n = 37; one-tailed tests
are used for correlations whenever directional relationships are tested). 9

Role, Negotiator Collectivism, and Joint Profit

Research Questions 1a and 3. Given that a dyad’s overall level of collec-

tivism is associated with joint profit, Research Question 1a asks whether
seller collectivism and buyer collectivism both are associated with a dyad’s
joint profit, and Research Question 3 asks whether seller collectivism and
buyer collectivism interact linearly in their effect on joint profit. Pearson
correlations demonstrate that only seller collectivism is significantly and
positively associated with a dyad’s total profit (r = .38, p < .01, one-tailed,
n = 38); buyer collectivism is not significantly related to total profit (r =
.12, ns, n = 39). We then regressed total profit simultaneously onto buyer
collectivism, seller collectivism, and a mean-corrected interaction term of
buyer and seller collectivism. The mean-corrected interaction term is the
product of the buyer’s and seller’s mean-corrected collectivism score,
obtained by subtracting each buyer’s [seller’s] collectivism score from
the mean of buyers’ [sellers’] collectivism. The regression was significant,
R2 = .23, F (3, 33) = 3.23, p < .04.10 Inspection of the unstandardized regres-
sion weights revealed that, once again, only seller collectivism was posi-
606 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

TABLE 4
Correlations Between Total Profit, Buyer Collectivism, Seller Collectivism, and
Communication Processesa

Tacticsb Role Total profit Seller collectivism Buyer collectivism

Ask Information
Ask numerical Buyer .10 .05 -.16
Seller .23* .19 .06
Ask directional Buyer .19 .32** -.03
Seller .23* .38** .12
Sum Buyer .19 .24* -.09
Seller .34** .41** .13
Give information
Give numerical Buyer .13 .10 .09
Seller .08 .14 .11
Give directional Buyer -.38** -.30** .02
Seller -.20 -.08 .16
Sum Buyer -.19 -.15 .08
Seller -.08 .04 .19
Offers
Single offers Buyer .02 -.07 .24*
Seller .08 -.05 .29**
Multiple offers Buyer -.01 .00 .06
Seller .12 .33** .00
Sum Buyer .00 -.05 .23*
Seller .12 .18 .18
Distributive Tactics
Threats Buyer -.45** -.10 -.07
Seller -.32** -.09 .23*
Put-downs Buyer -.30** -.16 -.05
Seller -.25* -.26** .17
Demands Buyer -.08 -.11 -.32**
Seller -.06 -.26** .23*
Sum Buyer -.38** -.17 -.20
Seller -.30** -.29** .30**

a
Correlations performed on transformed variables.
b
Buyer role, seller role, total profit, and buyer collectivism, n = 40. Seller collectivism, n = 38.
*p < .10 (one-tailed).
**p < .05 (one-tailed).

tively associated with joint profit (b = 13.72, p < .05, one-tailed). The rela-
tionship between buyer collectivism and joint profit, although positive,
was not statistically significant (b = 11.52, p = .13), and the interaction
term also was not significant (b = 1.26, p = .11). Thus, for RQ1a, the re-
gression analysis demonstrates joint profit is only associated with seller
collectivism regardless of the level of buyer collectivism, and for RQ3,
buyer and seller collectivism do not interact to affect joint profit. These
findings become easier to interpret when examining the effects of buyer
and seller collectivism separately on communication tactics.
 Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT 607

Role, Communication Tactics, and Joint Profit

Prior to examining whether culture affects the use of communication

tactics as predicted, we look at whether buyer and seller use of commu-
nication tactics affects total profits in ways presumed by previous re-
search in which role distinctions are not made. The first data column of
Table 4 provides correlations between each tactic and total profit sepa-
rately for buyers and sellers.
The correlations for asking information show that only the seller’s use
of asking information has a significant positive relationship to total profit
(r = .34, p < .05, one-tailed). As in prior research (e.g., Thompson, 1991;
Tutzauer & Roloff, 1988), joint profit is associated with sellers asking more
questions about the buyer’s needs and preferences. In contrast, the buyer’s
degree of asking for information is not associated with total profit. The
only information-giving tactic that is significant is the buyer’s degree of
giving directional information, and it is negatively associated with total
profit (r = -.38, p < .05, one-tailed). Buyers appeared to give directional
information (e.g., “I need lower prices on copiers”) as a way of demand-
ing better outcomes for themselves rather than to facilitate problem solv-
ing. In sum, as sellers ask for more information, total profits increase, but
as buyers give more directional information, total profits decrease.
The use of offers, both single and multiple, did not function as the
literature predicts. No significant relationships were found between the
issuing of offers and total profit for either buyer or seller. Distributive
tactics, however, functioned as expected for both roles. Increased use of
distributive tactics by either buyer or seller is significantly and negatively
associated with total profits (buyer: r = -.38, p < .05; seller: r = -.30, p < .05,
one-tailed). Specifically, as putdowns and threats increase, total profit de-
creases (see Table 4, Column 1).

Role, Negotiator Collectivism, and Communication Tactics

Hypothesis 2 and Research Question 1b. We know, then, that seller collectiv-
ism is significantly associated with joint profit, and that the degree of asking
information by the seller and the degree of buyer and seller distributive
tactics affect joint profit. Next, we examine how culture influences the use of
these tactics. Hypothesis 2 posits that during intercultural negotiation,
negotiator’s collectivism will be (a) positively associated with the frequency
of asking for information, (b) positively associated with offers that package
multiple issues, and (c) negatively associated with the frequency of using
distributive tactics. Further, RQ1(b) asks whether the effects of seller collec-
tivism on seller’s negotiation tactics are different than the effects of buyer
collectivism on buyer’s negotiation tactics.
608 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

The second and third data columns of Table 4 provide Pearson correla-
tions between buyer and seller collectivism and the use of communication
tactics. For H2a, seller collectivism has a significant positive relationship
with the degree of asking for information by the seller (r = .41, p < .05, one-
tailed). Buyer collectivism, however, is not associated with the buyers’
asking for information (r = -.09, ns). As for making offers that package
multiple issues (H2b), once again seller collectivism is significantly and
positively associated with multiple offers by sellers (r = .33, p < .05, one-
tailed), but buyer collectivism is not associated with multiple offers by
buyers (r = .06, ns). Similarly, for H2c, seller collectivism has a signifi-
cantly negative association with the seller’s frequency of using distribu-
tive tactics (r = -.29, p < .05, one-tailed), but buyer collectivism is not sig-
nificantly related to the buyer’s use of distributive tactics (r = -.20, ns).
In sum, Hypothesis 2 receives partial support in that seller collectiv-
ism has significant effects on the seller’s use of all three communication
behaviors that previous research has associated with integrative outcomes,
but buyer collectivism has no such effects. Further, the answer to RQ1,
which asks whether the effects of individualism-collectivism are depen-
dent on negotiator role, is affirmative. Seller collectivism affects the seller’s
use of all three communication behaviors, but buyer collectivism only
marginally affects the buyer’s use of distributive tactics.

Role, Negotiator Collectivism, and Partner Communication

Research Question 2. To look at whether the partner’s collectivism af-

fects a negotiator’s communication behavior, we posed Research Ques-
tion 2, which asks if (a) seller collectivism is associated with buyer’s com-
munication tactics, and (b) buyer collectivism is related to seller’s com-
munication tactics. Once again, the second and third data columns in
Table 4 provide Pearson correlations to address these questions.
For asking information, seller collectivism marginally affects buyers’
behavior (r = .24, p < .10, one-tailed), and buyer collectivism does not
affect sellers’ behavior (r = 13, ns). In particular, seller collectivism af-
fects asking directional information by buyers (r = .32, p < .05, one-tailed).
Seller collectivism results in a decrease of buyers giving directional in-
formation (r = -.30, p < .05, one-tailed), a tactic that tends to promote
distributive bargaining (see above). No other information-giving tactics
are significantly related to buyer or seller collectivism.
Seller collectivism has no affect on the number of offers that buyers
make, but buyer collectivism is positively associated with sellers mak-
ing single offers (r = .29, p < .05, one-tailed). Finally, although seller col-
lectivism does not significantly affect buyers’ use of distributive tactics
(r = -.17, ns), buyer collectivism is significantly associated with an in-
 Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT 609

Figure 1: Summary of the Effects of Seller Collectivism on Negotiation Tactics and

Joint Profit

crease in sellers using distributive tactics (r = .30, p < .05, one-tailed). In

other words, as buyer collectivism increases, sellers tend to respond with
more distributive behavior.
The answer to Research Question 2, then, is that seller collectivism
does affect buyers’ communication behaviors of asking for more infor-
mation and giving less directional information, and buyer collectivism
affects seller communication behaviors of making more single offers and
using more distributive tactics.

Summary

Based on the above analyses, we can draw significant links between

seller and buyer collectivism to joint profit through various communica-
tion behaviors. There are three paths by which seller collectivism leads
to higher joint profit (see Figure 1). Seller collectivism leads to (a) the
seller asking more information, which is positively associated with higher
joint profits, (b) the seller using fewer distributive tactics, which is nega-
tively associated with higher joint profits, and (c) the buyer giving less
directional information, which is negatively associated with higher joint
profits. For all three, seller collectivism leads to greater joint gain, which
accounts, in part, for the significant relationship between seller collec-
tivism and joint profit (r = .38, p < .01, one-tailed).
In contrast, buyer collectivism has mixed effects on joint profit through
communication behaviors (see Figure 2). First, buyer collectivism is mar-
ginally associated with a decrease in the buyer’s use of distributive tactics,
which is negatively associated with higher joint profits, so buyer collectiv-
ism leads to higher joint gains. But buyer collectivism affects the seller’s use
of distributive tactics in the opposite direction; buyer collectivism increases
seller distributive tactics, which leads to a decrease in joint profits. This rela-
tionship accounts, at least in part, for the low correlation between buyer
collectivism and joint profit (r = .12, ns). The effects of buyer collectivism are
contradictory, with one path increasing but the other decreasing joint profit.
610 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

Figure 2: Summary of the Effects of Buyer Collectivism on Negotiation Tactics and

Joint Profit

DISCUSSION

In this study of individualism-collectivism and integrative bargaining,

two views shape our discussion of culture and negotiation. The culture
as shared values view implies that collectivist negotiators should be more
adept than individualist bargainers at reaching mutually beneficial out-
comes. The culture in context view suggests that effects of a negotiator’s
cultural orientation are likely to be moderated by structural and contex-
tual factors (Janosik, 1987). Two such factors examined in this study were
the negotiator’s role, and the partner’s collectivism.
The following discussion summarizes our findings about the effects of
bargaining role and partner collectivism as moderators of cultural values
on communication behavior and joint profit. Directions for future research
and limitations of the study are also provided.

Summary of Findings

From a culture as shared values perspective, this study predicts that a

negotiation dyad’s profit will increase as the dyad’s collectivism increases
(H1). This hypothesis was supported, with the dyad’s summed collectiv-
ism correlating significantly with joint profit. Our study is the first to show
that, consistent with the culture as shared values perspective, the more
collectivistic the dyad is as a whole the higher joint profits the dyad is
likely to achieve. More importantly, our study provides support for a more
complicated culture in context perspective, in which buyer and seller role
interact with culture to affect communication tactics and joint profits.
In response to our hypotheses and research questions, our study iden-
tified five ways in which bargaining role moderates the effects of cultural
values on communication behavior and negotiation outcomes. First, the
effects of negotiator collectivism on joint profit vary by role. Only seller
collectivism was significantly associated with total profit, whereas buyer
collectivism was unrelated to joint profit (RQ1). Moreover, seller and buyer
collectivism did not interact in their effect on joint profit (RQ3). The impor-
tance of seller collectivism did not depend on levels of buyer collectivism.
 Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT 611

Second, the effects of negotiator collectivism on communication be-

haviors also vary by role. Seller collectivism is significantly associated
with the use of three tactics (i.e., asking for information, making offers
that package multiple issues, and avoiding distributive tactics) in the
directions hypothesized; buyer collectivism is associated only margin-
ally with one behavior: decreased use of distributive tactics. As a result
of these findings, H2 is supported for the seller but not the buyer. The
effects of seller collectivism on seller’s tactics is markedly different than
the effects of buyer collectivism on buyer’s tactics. Seller collectivism is a
useful predictor of the negotiator’s own communication behaviors, whereas
buyer collectivism has almost no predictive value in this regard (RQ1b).
Third, the effects of information exchange differ by role. Seller asking
for information is positively associated with joint profit, whereas buyer
giving directional information is negatively associated with joint profit.
Although previous research on information sharing suggests asking and
giving of information should lead to higher joint gain, these findings sug-
gest that more attention be given to the role of the bargainer because buy-
ers’ and sellers’ use of these tactics have different effects on profit.
Fourth, each parties’ collectivism affects their partners’ behavior, but
with opposite implications for reaching integrative outcomes. Our find-
ings showed that seller collectivism is associated with buyers asking for
more information and giving less directional information (RQ2a); buyer
collectivism is associated with sellers making more single offers and us-
ing more distributive tactics (RQ2b). Thus, negotiator collectivism affects
some behaviors of the bargaining partner, but seller collectivism tends to
promote integrative behavior by the buyer, whereas buyer collectivism
tends to promote distributive behavior by the seller.
Fifth, seller collectivism affects both buyer and seller behaviors, and
all of these behaviors are associated positively with joint profit (see Fig-
ure 1). In contrast, buyer collectivism affects several behaviors; some pro-
mote but others hinder achieving higher joint profit (see Figure 2).
Why does role moderate the effect of cultural values in so many re-
spects? As argued previously, sellers tend to be more dependent on buy-
ers than buyers on sellers; thus it seems plausible that sellers should have
a greater need to encourage an integrative process that will lead to higher
joint outcomes. Whereas the buyer may turn to alternative suppliers if
they are not satisfied with either the process or the agreement, it is in the
seller’s best interest to pursue satisfactory outcomes with every possible
buyer. Collectivism should make this effort more likely for the seller. It is
possible, however, that when the buyer behaves in a collectivistic man-
ner, the seller may no longer feel it necessary to yield or give in to the
buyer to facilitate an integrative process. Because the buyer is acting out
of role by being integrative, the seller may view this as an opportunity to
pursue personal gain and, as a result, use more distributive tactics.
612 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

Future Directions and Limitations

The communication behaviors associated with collectivism and the

mechanism by which an increase in buyer collectivism leads to more dis-
tributive tactics by sellers merit further research. Direct evidence is needed
to demonstrate that role effects reflect differences in perceived depen-
dency. Questions to be addressed in the future include: Which cognitive
frames and normative expectations surrounding the roles of buyer and
seller lead to differences in behavior, especially as these roles interact with
collectivism? Would results from our study reverse if a buyer perceived a
high dependency on the seller to achieve important goals or if the seller
perceived alternative options for obtaining a profit apart from the current
buyer? What normative expectations are associated with roles in other con-
texts (e.g., labor versus management), and do these roles also moderate the
effects of cultural values on negotiation outcomes? Future research should
examine expectations and assumptions related to bargaining roles, how they
vary across culture, and how they impact communication behaviors.
Future research also should examine relevant negotiation processes
that mediate the effects of role and collectivism on joint profit. This study
examined three sets of communication behaviors addressed in previous
research: information sharing, offers, and distributive tactics. Of these
three, only findings for distributive tactics were consistent with predic-
tions. The effects of asking and giving information varied by role, whereas
making offers had no effect on joint profit. These findings suggest further
research should explore additional communication processes, such as ar-
gument, to explain the effects of seller collectivism on joint profits. Al-
though some (Pruitt, 1981; Roloff, Tutzauer, & Dailey, 1989) define argu-
ment narrowly as a distributive tactic (i.e., giving reasons why the other
party should concede) that impedes joint gain, Putnam and her colleagues
(Putnam & Geist, 1985; Putnam & Wilson, 1989; Putnam, Wilson, Waltman,
& Turner, 1986) conceptualize argument more broadly as a process of giv-
ing reasons about how issues should be defined and proposals evalu-
ated—a process that can facilitate issue reframing and joint gain. Future
research should explore whether argument, conceptualized from this
broader perspective, mediates the effects of collectivism and role on joint
profit. Argument seems promising because participants who enact dif-
ferent roles tend to specialize in making particular types of arguments at
different points in a negotiation (see Putnam, Wilson, & Turner, 1990).
Limitations of this study should be acknowledged. First, external va-
lidity is restricted in that we observed students with limited bargaining
experience enacting a simulated negotiation. Although Neale and
Northcraft (1986) have shown that experienced and inexperienced nego-
tiators have similar decision biases when facing new situations, they have
also demonstrated that inexperienced negotiators are more likely than
 Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT 613

experienced negotiators to approach negotiations with a distributive, win-

lose perspective. Second, many participants conducted the simulation in
a non-native language, given that English often was the only language
spoken by both participants. It is difficult to know the extent to which
acculturation and language constraints may have affected negotiator be-
haviors. Third, the sample size is insufficient for testing the summarizing
path models found in Figures 1 and 2. Future research can test such struc-
tural equation models if substantially larger sample sizes are included.
Fourth, the negotiation task involved three issues, so that logrolling po-
tential could be studied. Future research, however, will benefit by em-
ploying simulations that capture integrative processes other than logroll-
ing (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), especially as they occur in naturalistic negotia-
tions (e.g., see Putnam & Wilson, 1989).
Despite these limitations, our study provides insight into the contex-
tual effects of individualism-collectivism on integrative bargaining. This
study also demonstrates the utility of a culture in context approach to
negotiation research. Although the shared values approach is sufficient
for showing that a dyad’s collectivism affects joint profit, this perspective
would have missed the subtle and more interesting effects of buyer ver-
sus seller collectivism. Future research will benefit from viewing negotia-
tion processes and outcomes from the culture in context perspective be-
cause it provides insight into the complex interaction between culture,
norms of bargaining, and communication behavior.

NOTES

1. Three studies by Graham and his colleagues actually examine transcriptions or video-
tapes for communication behaviors (Graham & Andrews, 1987; Graham et al., 1992, 1994). No
coding scheme is used in the Graham and Andrews study; the other two studies compare
national cultures on frequencies of behaviors. Although both perceptual and behavioral mea-
sures are used in Graham et al. (1992), correlations between these measures are not reported.
2. This assumption continues to be problematic for prediction because a negotiator’s
concerns may center on whether the opponent is perceived as an in-group or out-group
member. Even within highly collectivist cultures, concern for others’ needs may be con-
fined only to those who are in-group members. Competition and distributiveness may be
directed toward out-group members (Triandis et al., 1988). Negotiators’ perceptions of in-
group versus out-group membership are rarely measured and probably vary widely de-
pending on contextual and structural features of the negotiation. For instance, when negoti-
ating in the U.S., non-U.S. negotiators may perceive an opponent who is not North American
as an in-group member. However, expatriates new to the U.S. and intending to seek citizen-
ship may perceive the same opponent as an in-group member and perceive all opponents not
from the U.S. as members of the out-group. In the present analysis, this problem was ad-
dressed partially by creating “future relationship” concerns within the induction. We assumed
that collectivism and its emphasis on relational harmony would foster in-group feelings to-
ward an opponent with whom the negotiator would have an ongoing business relationship.
Showing concern for the opponent’s goals is one means of fostering that relationship.
614 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

3. In comparison to prior research, 40 intercultural dyads is a substantial number for

analyzing communication behaviors during negotiation interactions. For example, in stud-
ies that analyze transcripts or videotapes for communication behaviors, Graham et al. (1994)
use 3 intracultural dyads from each of 10 countries for a total of 30 dyads; Graham and
Andrews (1987) use 3 intracultural dyads from the U.S., 3 intracultural dyads from Japan,
and 6 intercultural dyads for a total of 12 dyads; and Graham et al. (1992) use 3 intracultural
dyads from each of the Soviet Union and the U.S., for a total of 6 dyads.
4. The two participants who did not report their country of origin were paired with
participants from Taiwan and Bermuda. Participants were sought from a variety of nations
so that stronger conclusions could be drawn about the causal effects of collectivism. Fre-
quently, research compares participants from two or a few nations that are considered indi-
vidualist or collectivist (e.g., the U.S. vs. Japan). These nations, however, may vary along
numerous cultural dimensions other than collectivism, and collectivism may be related to
other cultural dimensions within a specific national culture. By drawing participants from a
wide variety of nations we hope to rule out possible spurious conclusions about other cul-
tural dimensions. In addition, although nations may vary in their overall level of collectiv-
ism (e.g., Japan > U.S.), there is also substantial interpersonal variation in collectivism within
any given nation (Triandis et al., 1988). By measuring individual participants’ collectiv-
ism, we also can examine within-nation variance, thus maximizing the ability to detect
cultural effects.
5. Previous negotiation experience was not associated significantly with collectivism
nor with any other experimental variable.
6. Originally we also manipulated psychological framing (positive versus negative) as a
third independent variable, using instructions adapted from Neale and Bazerman (1985) by
instructing participants in positively [negatively] framed dyads to make gains [avoid losses]
as desired by their supervisor. No significant results were found between framing and joint
profit or the communication variables, however, so framing was eliminated from further
analyses and discussion.
7. Second-order unidimensionality employs confirmatory factor analysis to test internal
consistency and parallelism of subscales. Subscales are treated as items and observed
intercorrelations are tested against those expected based on parallelism and internal consis-
tency. Parallelism is tested against the remaining subscales. If residuals (i.e., observed mi-
nus expected correlations) are less than those expected by chance, the subscales are said to
be internally consistent and parallel and items comprising those subscales may be summed
into a single index.
8. Each Pearson correlation used in this study was tested for assumptions of linearity,
homogeneity of variance, and normal distribution of the residuals. We regressed one mem-
ber of each pair of variables being correlated on the other and obtained plots of the ob-
served and expected distribution of residuals; all residuals appeared to be relatively nor-
mally distributed. We also examined the scatterplots and stem and leaf plots of standard-
ized residuals and observed no structured patterns of residuals. The skew and kurtosis of
the residuals for each pair of variables being correlated were small and not significant. As a
result, we concluded that all of the correlations met the necessary statistical assumptions.
9. All eight dyads in which collectivism of both the participant and his or her partner
was above the average level of collectivism included one U.S. participant. Thus, a rival
explanation that high outcomes or integrative behaviors resulted from international stu-
dents having a greater sense of in-group when paired with other collectivist international
students does not seem plausible.
10. The regression performed was tested for the assumptions of linearity, homogeneity
of variance, and normal distribution of the residuals. We plotted the observed and expected
distribution of residuals and observed the residuals were relatively normally distributed.
 Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT 615

We also examined the scatterplot and stem and leaf plot of standardized residuals and ob-
served no structured pattern of residuals. Both the skew and kurtosis of the residuals was
small and not significant. Thus, we concluded the regression met the necessary statistical
assumptions.

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