2nd Batch Case Digest

JD 2-A

November 19, 2024

 RULE 7
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land Registration
Authority, Petitioner, vs. KENRICK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006
Facts: The dispute originated from Kenrick's construction of a concrete
perimeter fence over parcels of land adjacent to the Civil Aviation Training Center of
the Air Transportation Office (ATO), which resulted in the alleged dispossession of
30,228 square meters of prime land owned by the Air Transportation Office.
Kenrick Development Corporation asserted its claim of ownership based on
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605, and 135606, which they
claimed were derived from a supposed TCT No. 17508 belonging to Alfonso
Concepcion. The authenticity of this title was brought into question when the Air
Transportation Office, through Atty. Jose Loriega of the Land Registration Authority,
reported that there were no records of TCT No. 17508 in the Registrar of Deeds of
Pasay City. Furthermore, the land in question was determined to be located within the
Villamor Air Base, raising issues of jurisdiction and ownership.
In response to these findings, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
complaint for the revocation, annulment, and cancellation of Kenrick’s certificates of
title in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Kenrick files his answer to the
complaint and further issues arose as to the validity of the response. During the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee hearing, Atty. Onofre Garlitos, who represented Kenrick,
disclosed that he had not personally signed the answer as someone else did so without
his authorization. In light of this revelation, the Republic filed a motion to declare
Kenrick in default, asserting that the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading,
thus lacking any legal effect. The trial court granted this motion, declaring Kenrick in
default and allowing the Republic to proceed with ex parte presentation of evidence,
leading Kenrick to seek relief from the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring Kenrick in default due
to its alleged failure to file a valid answer to the complaint, predicated on the
authenticity of the signature on that answer.
 Ruling: No. The Court ruled in favor of the Republic, finding that it is the
Court of Appeals that erred in reinstating Kenrick's answer. The Supreme Court held
that an adoptive admission occurs when a party does not deny the correctness of a
statement made by another, which in this case, the statements made by Atty. Garlitos
about the validity of the answer were deemed conclusive against Kenrick as they
adopted those statements.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court clarified that the signature on the pleading is
critical, and the Rules of Court mandate that pleadings must be signed by the party or
their counsel. A lawyer's signature carries with it several assurances regarding the
document’s legitimacy, and such authority cannot be unilaterally delegated to non-
lawyers. Additionally, the Court emphasized the importance of adhering to procedural
rules, rejecting respondent Kenrick's assertion that a merely technical deficiency
could permit a relaxation of rules. The Court held that procedural rules serve to
promote orderly and fair justice, thus confirming the trial court's actions in declaring
respondent Kenrick in default due to the invalidity of its unsigned answer. Like all
rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive
of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure. In this case, respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it should
be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty.
Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to
account for his possible misconduc in signing a document that he did not authorize.

NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

LORETA TORRES, et. al., petitioners, vs. SPECIALIZED PACKAGING

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and/or ALFREDO GAO (President) and
PETER CHUA (General Manager); EUSEBIO CAMACHO GENERAL
SERVICES and/or EUSEBIO CAMACHO (President/General Manager); MPL
SERVICES and/or MIGUELITO LAURIANO (President/General
Manager), respondents.
G.R. No. 149634 July 6, 2004
 Facts: The petitioners, who are former employees of Specialized Packaging
Development Corporation (SPDC), filed a series of complaints against their employer
and labor recruiters Eusebio Camacho General Services (ECGS) and MPL Services
for illegal dismissal and non-payment of various financial entitlements, including
overtime, 13th month pay, and night differential. Their complaints were later
consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter Salimathar Nambi. In his initial decision,
Labor Arbiter Nambi ruled in favor of the petitioners, noting that SPDC and MPL
Services failed to submit their position papers by the deadline. As a result, the orders
included reinstatement and payment of monetary claims. SPDC appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which subsequently reversed the
ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.
During the second round, the NLRC again reversed Labor Arbiter Nambi’s
decision, prompting the petitioners to appeal to the Court of Appeals However, the
Court of Apeals dismissed the petition due to issues with the verification and
certification against forum shopping, which were only signed by two of the twenty-
five petitioners. The Court of Appeals maintained that all petitioners should have
verified and certified the petition to prevent potential forum shopping.
Issues: Whether or not the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the petition due to
defective verification and certification against forum shopping was appropriate.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court found merit in the petitioners' arguments.
Highlighting that both verification and certification against forum shopping are
essential but functionally distinct, the Court clarified that verification is intended to
ensure good faith and the truthfulness of assertions, which can be satisfied through
adequate representation by knowledgeable individuals, even if not all parties sign.
Ratio Decidendi: For the certification against forum shopping, the Court
recognized the possibility of substantial compliance depending on the circumstances.
While generally requiring all parties’ signatures, the Court acknowledged that
exceptions arise where petitioners may provide a reasonable explanation for missing
signatures. In this case, the Court considered the claims of practical difficulties due to
the drawn-out nature of the proceedings and the logistical challenges in gathering
signatures. The Court held that the need for procedural compliance should not
overshadow the larger goal of delivering substantial justice. The confirmation of the
merits as expressed in both the labor arbiter's rulings lent further credence to allowing
the case to continue rather than terminating it on procedural grounds.
Consequently, the Court overturned the Court of Appeals' dismissal, emphasizing the
need to grant the Court of Appeals the opportunity to review the substantive issues
regarding the merits of the case.
The ruling reinforces the principle of substantial compliance with procedural
requirements, allowing for flexibility where justifiable circumstances exist.
Verification under the Rules of Court can be satisfied through the affidavit of at least
one knowledgeable party, not necessarily requiring all parties’ signatures. While
generally all interested parties must cooperate in signing certifications, the Court may
allow exceptions based on compelling reasons that outline difficulties faced by
petitioners. The ruling underscores the commitment to allowing cases to be heard on
their merits, prioritizing fair process over rigid adherence to procedural technicalities.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

NORBERTO ALTRES, Et. Al., petitioners, vs. CAMILO G. EMPLEO,

FRANKLIN MAATA, LIVEY VILLAREN, RAIDES CAGA, FRANCO
BADELLES, ERNESTO BALAT, GRACE SAQUILABON, MARINA
JUMALON and GEORGE DACUP, respondents.
G.R. No. 180986 December 10, 2008

Facts: In July 2003, Iligan City Mayor Franklin M. Quijano announced

several vacant career positions in the city government and sent notification to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) regarding these vacancies. Following the
announcement, numerous applicants, including the petitioners, applied for various
positions. On May 27, June 1, and June 24, 2004, Mayor Quijano issued appointments
to the petitioners. However, subsequent to the issuance of these appointments, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod (City Council) passed Resolution No. 04-242, which
requested the CSC to suspend action on all appointments pending the enactment of a
new budget. This was followed by Resolution No. 04-266, which prohibited the
transmission of all appointments signed by the Mayor until a proper review could be
conducted. This effectively delayed the approval of the appointments. As mandated
by the CSC's memorandum circular, the city accountant, Camilo G. Empleo, did not
issue the necessary certification confirming the availability of funds for the salaries
and wages of the petitioners. Consequently, the CSC’s Field Office for Lanao del
Norte and Iligan City disapproved the appointments, stating that the lack of the
required certification was the reason for the disapproval.
The petitioners subsequently filed a petition for mandamus against Empleo,
seeking to compel him to issue the certification of availability of funds and for others
to sign their position description forms. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
denied the petition. The trial court's ruling was predicated on the fact that the
certification in question fell under the jurisdiction of the city treasurer, not the city
accountant.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners verification and certification of non-
forum shopping is technically flawed, thus did not comply with procedural rules.
Ruling: No. The Court established that the petitioners had sufficiently
complied with the requirements for verification and the certification against forum
shopping despite not all petitioners signing, thus supporting the assertion of justifiable
circumstances for their failure to obtain full compliance. The emphasis lay on the
principles of substantial compliance to ensure that a technical lapse did not unjustly
hinder the pursuit of justice.
Ratio Decidendi: In the present case, the signing of the verification by only
11 out of the 59 petitioners already sufficiently assures the Court that the allegations
in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter
of speculation; that the pleading is filed in good faith; and that the signatories are
unquestionably real parties-in-interest who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge
and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition. With respect to
petitioners’ certification against forum shopping, the failure of the other petitioners to
sign as they could no longer be contacted or are no longer interested in pursuing the
case need not merit the outright dismissal of the petition without defeating the
administration of justice. The non-signing petitioners are, however, dropped as parties
to the case.
With respect to petitioners’ non-presentation of any identification before the
notary public at the time they swore to their verification and certification attached to
the petition, suffice it to state that this was cured by petitioners’ compliance with the
Court’s Resolution of January 22, 2008 wherein they submitted a notarized
verification and certification bearing the details of their community tax certificates.
This, too, is substantial compliance. The Court need not belabor its discretion to
authorize subsequent compliance with the Rules. The decision reaffirmed that in
certain instances, the requirements for certifications, including forum shopping, may
be met through substantial compliance rather than strict adherence.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

RULE 8

CEFERINA DE UNGRIA [DECEASED], substituted by her HEIRS,

represented by LOLITA UNGRIA SAN JUAN-JAVIER, and RHODORA R.
PELOMIDA as their Attorney-in-fact, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
GENERAL SANTOS CITY, BRANCH 35, ROSARIO DIDELES VDA. DE
CASTOR, NEPTHALIE CASTOR ITUCAS, FEROLYN CASTOR FACURIB,
RACHEL DE CASTOR, LEA CASTOR DOLLOLOSA, and ROSALIE
CASTOR BENEDICTO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 165777 July 25, 2011

Facts: Respondents Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor, Nepthalie Castor Itucas,
Ferolyn Castor Facurib, Rachel De Castor, Lea Castor Dollolosa, and Rosalie Castor
Benedicto, collectively the heirs of Fernando Castor, filed a complaint in the Regional
Trial Court of General Santos City against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria and several
others for ownership, possession, damages, and other alternative actions regarding Lot
No. 1615. The petitioners alleged that Fernando Castor had unlawfully transferred
rights and interests in the property, which was conjugal property, to Eugenio de
Ungria, petitioner Ceferina's father, through a Deed of Transfer dated October 3,
1960. The heirs claimed that the transfer was executed fraudulently and sought the
annulment of the said deed and related documents.
Petitioner Ceferina filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on various grounds,
including that the complaint was barred by extraordinary acquisitive prescription and
laches, and that the Regional Trial Court lacked jurisdiction due to the plaintiffs'
failure to pay the full filing fees. The RTC denied the motion on November 19, 1999,
affirming that the action could proceed based on the allegation that the land was
conjugal property, thus entitling the widow and heirs a lawful claim. Petitioner
Ceferina lodged a petition with the Court of Appeals, which upheld the Regional Trial
Court’s decision, concluding that the matter involved questions of property rights
appropriately handled through a full trial rather than dismissal at this stage.
 Issue: Whether or not the affirmative defenses of extraordinary acquisitive
prescription and laches were applicable.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the Court of
Appeals' ruling. The Court ruled that no title to registered land can be acquired
through prescription against the rights of registered owners. The defenses of laches
were not predicated upon solid evidence that warranted dismissing the action outright,
emphasizing that these issues must be resolved through trial.
Ratio Decidendi: It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to
registered land in derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the
registered owner but also against his hereditary successors. In this case, the parcel of
land subject of this case is a titled property, that is titled in the name of the late
Fernando Castor, married to Rosario Dideles.
This Court noted that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the defenses of
acquisitive prescription and laches were unavailing. It found that the subject property
is covered by a Torrens title, thus, it is axiomatic that adverse, notorious and
continuous possession under a claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is
ineffective against a Torrens title; that unless there are intervening rights of third
persons which may be affected or prejudiced by a decision directing the return of the
lot to petitioner, the equitable defense of laches will not apply as against the registered
owner.
Anent petitioner's defense of laches, the same is evidentiary in nature and
cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings. Without solid evidentiary
basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to dismiss respondents' complaint. The case
reiterates that registered land cannot be subject to acquisition through adverse
possession, reaffirming protection under the Torrens System of land registration.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

RAFAEL C. UY (CABANGBANG STORE), petitioner, vs. ESTATE OF VIPA

FERNANDEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 200612 April 05, 2017
Facts: Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay was the registered owner of a parcel of
land located in Jaro, Iloilo City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-26576.
In 1990, she entered into a lease agreement with petitioner Rafael C. Uy, wherein he
committed to pay monthly rents starting at P3,000.00 with an annual increase of 10%.
Vipa passed away on March 5, 1994, leaving behind her husband Levi Lahaylahay
and two children, Grace Joy and Jill Frances without a will. Following Vipa's death,
Levi relocated to Aklan, while Grace Joy became the de facto administrator of Vipa's
estate.
In June 1998, petitioner Rafael ceased rent payments. Consequently, on June
12, 2003, Grace Joy, representing Vipa's estate, filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against Rafael in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Iloilo City. By that
time, Rafael had accumulated unpaid rents amounting to P271,150.00. Rafael
countered that he had deposited P10,000.00 in court due to uncertainty over who the
rightful heirs were, given claims by Patria Fernandez-Cuenca (Vipa’s sister) that she
was entitled to the rents. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Iloilo City ruled in
favor of Grace Joy, ordering Rafael to vacate the property and pay the overdue rent,
among other financial obligations. Rafael then appealed to the Regional Trial Court,
which reversed the Municipal Trial Court in Cities decision, dismissing the complaint
on the grounds that Grace Joy lacked the authority to file the case and failed to
exhaust barangay conciliation procedures.
Issue: Whether or not Grace Joy, one of the children of the deceased Vipa
have the authority or capacity to represent the estate of her mother Vipa in the
unlawful detainer complaint.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court partially granted petitioner Rafael’s petition.
Petitioner Rafael failed to plead in the answer he filed with the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities that Grace Joy has no authority to represent the Estate of Vipa. Neither did
he raise therein the lack of barangay conciliation between the parties herein prior to
the filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer. Accordingly, the foregoing defenses
are already deemed waived.
Ratio Decidendi: This Court ruled that Grace Joy had authority to represent
Vipa’s estate, given her appointment as administrator. As the appointed administrator,
Grace Joy has the authority or capacity to initiate action in favor of the estate of Vipa.
This case underscores the conviction in affirming that an administrator of a decedent's
estate can initiate legal actions concerning estate property on behalf of the estate. The
court determined that petitioner Rafael’s defenses regarding her alleged lack of
authority and the need for barangay conciliation were deemed waived, as they were
not presented in the original answer to the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. Under
Rule 8 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, failure to raise the affirmative defenses at the
earliest opportunity shall constitute a waiver thereof.
The court addressed the ownership issue, stating that petitioner Rafael could
not assert ownership until he acquired Levi's undivided share in the property from
Levi, which occurred post-complaint. Thus, his prior position as a mere lessee
remained valid until the transfer, after which he obtained co-ownership rights.
The Court affirmed that Rafael should pay his overdue rentals while also
recognizing his rights as a co-owner since he obtained a share from Levi. The Court
noted that the claim regarding the necessity of liquidation of the conjugal partnership
properties was not violated since the co-ownership was established through the sale.
The Court declared that Rafael was liable for the unpaid rentals amounting to
P271,150.00 with specific interest terms and additional costs, including attorney's
fees.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

JOSE Z. MORENO, petitioner, vs. RENE M. KAHN, CONSUELO MORENO

KAHN-HAIRE, RENE LUIS PIERRE KAHN, PHILIPPE KAHN, MA.
CLAUDINE KAHN MCMAHON, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MUNTINLUPA CITY, respondents.

G.R. No. 217744, July 30, 2018

Facts: Petitioner Jose Z. Moreno claimed that since May 1998, he and his
family had been occupying two parcels of land (covered by TCT Nos. 181516 and
181517) co-owned by his full-blooded sister, respondent Consuelo Moreno Kahn-
Haire, and her children (Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine), who are also
respondents in this case. In April or May 2003, the respondents initiated discussions
to sell the lands to petitioner Jose for US$200,000, of which US$120,000 was to go to
Consuelo, and US$20,000 each to her children. Petitioner Jose accepted the offer,
however, the agreement was initially verbal and had not been formalized in writing.
Over several years, Jose made partial payments to the respondents, settling the
shares for the children, leaving a balance of US$120,000 owed to respondent
Consuelo. In July 2010, respondent Consuelo decided to cancel the agreement and
treated previous payments as rent instead. Petitioner Jose opposed this decision and
insisted on proceeding with the sale. On July 26, 2011, without petitioner Jose's
consent, the respondents sold their shares to Rene, who then consolidated the
ownership, leading to the issuance of new Tranfer Certificate of Titles in Rene's
name. After learning of the sale, petitioner Jose sent demand letters asserting his
rights to the property, which led him to file a complaint for specific performance and
other related prayers in Civil Case No. 12-004.
The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City dismissed Jose's complaint for
failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code. This provision mandates that
earnest efforts to compromise must precede litigation among family members.
Petitioner Jose contended that the Regional Trial Court’s dismissal was erroneous
since it cannot dismiss a case motu proprio based on the non-compliance of a
condition precedent, and also argued that Article 151 did not apply to him regarding
his nephews and niece. Petitioner Jose's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Subsequently, petitioner Jose appealed to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial
court’s ruling asserting that the dismissal was warranted due to petitioner Jose's
failure to make earnest efforts to reach a compromise.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the Regional
Trial Court’s motu proprio dismissal of Jose's complaint.
Ruling:Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the lower
courts' decisions. Jose Z. Moreno's complaint was incorrectly dismissed by lower
courts for not adhering to Family Code provisions concerning immediate family
members. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissals, clarifying that the alleged non-
compliance is a procedural matter rather than a jurisdictional one.
Ratio Decidendi: This Court clarified several points regarding Article 151 of
the Family Code. The Court asserted that the trial court erred in its motu proprio
dismissal. Non-compliance with the earnest effort requirement under Article 151 is
not a jurisdictional defect but merely a condition precedent that should be invoked by
an opposing party through a motion to dismiss or an answer. In this case, the
respondents had failed to raise this objection timely, which rendered the appeal
invalid. In addition, the Court determined that Article 151 only applies when the suit
is exclusively between family members as defined in Article 150. Since the nephews
and niece were considered "strangers" to petitioner Jose concerning the issue at hand,
the lawsuit did not fall under the ambit of Article 151. The Court emphasized that
when a stranger is a party to a suit, the requirement for earnest efforts towards
compromise is waived, prior to litigation among family members. The non-
compliance with the earnest effort requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code
is not a jurisdictional defect which would authorize the courts to dismiss suits filed
before them motu proprio. Rather, it merely partakes of a condition precedent such
that the non-compliance therewith constitutes a ground for dismissal of a suit should
the same be invoked by the opposing party at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion
to dismiss, or in the answer. Otherwise, such ground is deemed waived.
Ultimately, the Court ruled that the Regional Trial Court acted erroneously in
dismissing the case based on claims of a lack of effort towards compromise and ruled
for a reinstatement of Jose's complaint for further proceedings in the Regional Trial
Court.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

RULE 9
SPOUSES HUMBERTO DELOS SANTOS and CARMENCITA DELOS
SANTOS, petitioners, vs. HON. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO, Presiding Judge of
RTC, Branch 16, Davao City and METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST
COMPANY, respondents.
G.R. No. 153696 September 11, 2006
Facts: Respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company filed a complaint
against petitioner spouses Humberto and Carmencita Delos Santos in the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City for a sum of money. After being served a summons, the
petitioners did not file their answer within the prescribed 15-day period, leading to
respondent Metrobank filing a motion to declare them in default. The trial court
granted respondent Metrobank’s motion declaring the petitioners in default and
scheduled the ex-parte presentation of respondent Metrobank's evidence.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed an opposition to the motion for default and a
motion to admit their answer, claiming they were unaware of the requirement to file
an answer due to their lack of legal expertise and the unavailability of their attorney.
Their opposition was dismissed and denied their motion to admit the answer.
Petitioners continued to assert their defense, even filing a motion to lift the default
order, attaching an affidavit of merits indicating they had a meritorious defense.
However, this motion was also denied. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals, which dismissed their petition, citing that the petitioners’
claims of ignorance of the rules and their attorney's unavailability did not constitute
excusable negligence.
 Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
declaring the petitioners in default?

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for review and reversed
the trial court’s decision that deemed Spouses Humberto and Carmencita Delos
Santos in default for not filing a timely answer against Metropolitan Bank,
highlighting grave abuse of discretion and the necessity of due process in such
proceedings. This ruling permits the couple's answer to be admitted. The Court
asserted that the trial court's failure to hold a hearing on the motion for default before
issuing its order deprived the petitioners of due process.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court highlighted that the procedural requirements
under Section 3 of Rule 9 necessitate both a motion for default and a hearing before a
declaration can be made. It noted that the petitioners did indeed express their intention
to file an answer and raised material defenses prior to being declared in default.
Furthermore, the Court recognized the potential for excusable negligence due to the
uniqueness of the situation involving an unavailable attorney. It stated that the trial
court should favorably consider defenses such as litis pendentia, which had been
asserted by the petitioners, as it raised a substantial concern that warranted judicial
review. The Orders declaring the petitioners in default and subsequently denying their
motion to lift the default were thus reversed and set aside, allowing their answer to be
considered in the ongoing litigation.
The Supreme Court reiterated that the new rule on Civil Procedure pertaining
to the declaration of default applies. Such that although objections and defenses that
are not pleaded in an answer or motion to dismiss are deemed a waiver, the court may
still dismiss the complaint if any of the following are present in a pleading or
evidence on record: (a) that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b)
litis pendentia; (c)res judicata; or (d) statute of limitations. The Court found that there
is meritorious defense on the part of the Petitioners as their case was indicative of a
litis pendentia. Moreover, the Supreme Court commented that the trial court should
have observed the rule on extension of the time to plead. It discussed that a court at its
discretion may allow answer or any other pleading even after the time fixed by the
rules if there has been an excusable negligence on the part of the adverse parties or
simply if it is shown that the adverse parties are deprived of their substantial rights
without their intention to delay the proceedings, the court may apply the rules
liberally when substantial justice calls for it.

JOSE R. MARTINEZ, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 160895 October 30, 2006
Facts: Petitioner Jose R. Martinez filed a petition for land registration with the
Regional Trial Court of Surigao del Sur, seeking to register three parcels of land
known as Lot No. 464-A, Lot No. 464-B, and Lot No. 370. Petitioner Martinez
claimed to have purchased these lots in 1952 from his uncle, asserting continuous
possession of the properties since the 1870s through his ancestors. The Regional Trial
Couset a hearing date and published a Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette. The
Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed an
opposition to petitioner Martinez's petition. The Office of the Solicitor General
contended that petitioner Martinez's possession did not conform to legal requirements,
his documentation was insufficient, and the properties were public land not subject to
private appropriation.
The Regional Trial Court issued an order of general default against all parties,
including the Office of the Solicitor General, due to their non-appearance at the
hearing. The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioner Martinez's evidence and
ruled in his favor allowing his registration of the lands. The Office of the Solicitor
General filed a Notice of Appeal, after which the records were transferred to the Court
of Appeals. The Land Registration Authority advised the trial court that Lot No. 370
was improperly included because it lacked an approved survey plan. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding that Martinez had failed to
provide sufficient evidence for registration and ordering the dismissal of his
application. Martinez filed a petition to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Office of
the Solicitor General lacked the standing to appeal post-default.
Issue: Whether or not the order of general default barred the Office of the
Solicitor General from appealing the trial court’s favorable decision for Martinez.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court dismissed Martinez's petition. The Court
determined that the Office of the Solicitor General, despite being in general default,
could still appeal a trial court decision in a land registration dispute. Meanwhile, Jose
R. Martinez's petition was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence supporting his
ownership claim.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court noted that while the Office of the Solicitor
General was declared in default, it retained the right to appeal from the trial court’s
judgment. The Court reasoned that the order of general default was improperly
declared since the Office of the Solicitor General had already filed an opposition to
petitioner Martinez's petition before the hearing. The trial court should have
recognized this opposition and allowed for the presentation of evidence. The Court
endorsed the principle established in previous cases that a defaulted party still has the
right to appeal. It clarified that despite the restrictions imposed by the default, such as
being unable to present evidence in the trial court, the right to contest an adverse
judgment in an appeal remains intact.
Ultimately, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals' findings, agreeing that
Martinez's claim was supported by insufficient evidence. It outlined the burden
resting with Martinez to show ownership through concrete acts of dominion and valid
documentation, which he failed to meet. It is important to note that a party declared in
default retains the right to appeal an adverse ruling, even without filing a motion to set
aside the default order. An order of default cannot disregard previously filed
oppositions or answers that possess substantial grounds, particularly in cases
involving public interest.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioners, vs. ZUELLIG PHARMA

CORPORATION and the PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193494 March 7, 2014
Facts: Petitioner Lui Enterprises, Inc. (LEI) and respondent Zuellig Pharma
Corporation (ZPC) entered into a 10-year lease agreement over a property in Davao
City, which was owned by Eli L. Lui. In 2003, the Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBC) claimed ownership of the property and demanded direct
rental payments from respondent ZPC, submitting a new title. Upon receiving the
bank's letter, respondent ZPC informed petitioner LEI. Subsequently, due to
conflicting claims regarding rental payments, respondent ZPC filed for interpleader in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, maintaining that it had already consigned an
amount of P604,024.35 in rental payments. Petitioner LEI moved to dismiss
respondent ZPC's complaint, citing a lack of authority from respondent ZPC's
representative to file the interpleader case and asserting that a prior nullification case
regarding dation in payment with respondent PBC prohibited the interpleader action.
Respondent ZPC filed a written authority confirming its representative's power to
initiate the interpleader and argued that petitioner LEI's motion to dismiss was filed
late, four days beyond the reglementary period.
The trial court eventually declared petitioner LEI in default for not answering
the interpleader complaint in time. After being declared in default, petitioner LEI
attempted to set aside the order on grounds of excusable negligence attributed to its
previous counsel, although the motion came a year later. Respondents ZPC and PBC
opposed this motion, asserting that petitioner LEI had no case for negligence and the
pending nullification action did not obstruct the interpleader case.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying petitioner LEI's motion
to set aside the order of default.
Ruling: No. The Supreme court favored the Regional trial Court in its
decision to declare petitioner Lui Enterprises in default for the latter’s failure to file
the answer within the period set by the Rules of Court. It denied the petition for
review on certiorari filed by petitioner Lui Enterprises because it did not find grave
abuse on the part of the lower court declaring it in default. It affirmed the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals likewise sustaining the default of petitioner Lui
Enterprises. It also declared that there should be no awarding of attorney’s fees to
respondent Zuellig Pharma.
Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision
to dismiss petitioner LEI's appeal due to procedural noncompliance, specifically the
absence of a subject index and references required under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
It noted that such procedural rules are intended to facilitate the orderly administration
of justice and should not be disregarded lightly. On the issue of excusable negligence,
the Court found petitioner LEI's justification inadequate, ruling that negligence of its
counsel cannot excuse untimely filing. Moreover, regarding the interpleader case, the
Court ruled that the nullification action in Davao did not constitute litis pendentia as
respondent ZPC was not a party in that case, and the rights at stake were not identical.
Finally, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's denial of attorney's fees to
respondent ZPC was appropriate, ruling that there was insufficient evidence of bad
faith from petitioner LEI in the events leading to the interpleader case. Excusable
negligence must be proven adequately to overturn a default ruling, which emphasizes
the responsibility of litigants to monitor their cases actively.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

RULE 10
PHILIPPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ENRIQUE
MANALO & ROSALINDA JACINTO, ARNOLD J. MANALO, ARNEL J.
MANALO, AND ARMA J. MANALO, respondents.
G.R. No. 174433 February 24, 2014
Facts: Respondent Spouses Enrique Manalo and Rosalinda Jacinto applied
for an All-Purpose Credit Facility for P1,000,000.00 with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) intended for the construction of their house. Their loan was secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage on their property. Over the years, the credit facility was
renewed and increased several times, culminating in a renewal, increasing the facility
to P7,000,000.00. This led to a new mortgage agreement that included properties
registered in the names of their children. Petitioner PNB claimed that the last recorded
payment was in December 1997 and this prompted petitioner PNB to send demand
letters to the respondent spouses Manalo due to unpaid obligations. Despite demands,
the respondent spouses Manalo failed to settle their account, prompting petitioner
PNB to initiate foreclosure proceedings. Petitioner PNB won the foreclosure sale with
a bid of P15,127,000.00, leading to the issuance of a Certificate of Sale.
The respondent spouses Manalo filed an action to nullify the foreclosure
proceedings and claimed damages. They contended that they had borrowed from a
certain Benito Tan, believing that the loan would be used to restructure their existing
obligations with petitioner PNB instead of being declared in default and facing
foreclosure. They also alleged petitioner PNB's failure to comply with the notification
requirements of Act No. 3135. Petitioners PNB and its General Manager countered
that the loan from Benito Tan had been credited to the respondent spouses Manalo's
account, denied making any representations about restructuring, and asserted the
legitimacy of their foreclosure rights. They emphasized that the respondent spouses
Manalo had not challenged the validity of their loans or mortgage.
Issue: Whether or not the foreclosure proceedings were invalid due to
respondent PNB's unilateral imposition of interest rates which were iniquitous and
unconscionable and should be nullified.
 Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court determined that the unilateral interest rate
hikes by petitioner Philippine National Bank on respondent spouses Manalo's loans
were invalid due to the absence of mutual consent. The Court upheld the foreclosure
process but adjusted the interest rate to 12% per annum, emphasizing the importance
of mutuality in contracts and adequate notification of rate changes.
Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals in nullifying the interest rates imposed by PNB against the Spouses even
though the Spouses did not allege in their pleading said issue on interest rate. It
applied the Rule on Civil Procedure pertaining to allowable amendment on the
pleadings upon either express or implied consent of the other parties in a suit and by
virtue of fairplay and justice in deciding the case in favor of the Spouses. The lower
Courts rightly applied Rule 10 of the Rules on Civil Procedure when it did not need to
direct an amendment of the complaint by the Spouses because failure of a party to
amend his or her pleading to conform to evidence during a trial does not prevent a
court from adjudicating the case presented before it.
The Regional Trial Court initially ruled in favor of petitioner PNB, holding
that the respondent spouses Manalo were estopped from questioning the interest rates
imposed, as they had paid without protest. The RTC dismissed the concern regarding
the foreclosure's validity based on notice requirements under Act No. 3135, asserting
that the spouses had accepted the loan conditions. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
upheld the foreclosure's validity but ruled that petitioner PNB had unlawfully imposed
interest rates by not providing prior notice before increases. Citing Article 1308 of the
Civil Code, the Court of Appeals concluded that mutuality was lacking in the
contracts of adhesion resulting from petitioner PNB's unilateral decisions regarding
interest rates. The Court of Appeals ordered petitioner PNB to recompute the debt
owed by the respondent spouses Manalo, fixing the interest at 12% per annum from
the date of default.
The Supreme Court ruled that the validity of the interest rates was indeed
raised correctly at trial. It emphasized that even if petitioner PNB had not formally
disputed the issues during trial, the matters were impliedly raised and fairly addressed
in the appellate process. The unilateral determination of interest rates by petitioner
PNB was deemed a violation of the principle of mutuality of contracts. The ruling
established that a contract that allows one party to unilaterally impose changes is
fundamentally inequitable, and any obscurity in contract terms will be construed
against the party that prepared it, reinforcing the doctrine of contracts of adhesion in
consumer credit agreements.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

ALFREDO CHING, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, RTC- BR. 58, MAKATI, METRO MANILA, PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 110844 April 27, 2000

Facts: The case revolves around petitioner Alfredo Ching, who was charged
with four counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Presidential Decree No. 115, known as the Trust Receipts Law.
The specific allegations involve petitioner Ching misappropriating goods he received
under trust receipt agreements with respondent Allied Banking Corporation. The trust
receipts required him to sell these goods and remit the proceeds to the bank but he
allegedly failed to do so. Following the charges filed, petitioner Ching made a series
of motions before the Regional Trial Court, seeking dismissal of the charges or at
least a suspension of the criminal proceedings until the resolution of his pending civil
case against the bank, in which he sought a declaration of nullity of the trust receipt
agreements and damages. Petitioner Ching, along with Philippine Blooming Mills Co.
Inc., initiated Civil Case No. 92-60600 in the trial court of Manila, asserting that the
trust receipts were invalid and constituted merely a loan agreement. Despite his
requests, in subsequent motions, the trial court of Makati denied the suspension of the
criminal proceedings, leading petitioner Ching to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial, determining there was no
prejudicial question in the civil case that would warrant suspension of the criminal
proceedings.
Issues: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court is correct in admitting the
amended complaint filed by petitioner Ching.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court dismissed petitioner Ching's petition to halt
criminal estafa proceedings, with the court stating that his civil action to nullify trust
receipt documents did not present a prejudicial question. This ruling reinforced the
separation of criminal and civil matters, permitting the continuance of the criminal
case.
 The Regional Trial Court previously admitted the amended complaint of the
petitioner Ching as it relied on the rule that amended pleadings supersede previous
pleadings and any judicial admissions made in the previous pleadings will cease.
However, the appellate courts emphasized that even though amended pleadings are
allowed, it should still be filed properly without delay and should not result in a
change in the cause of action or defense or theory of the case or inconsistency with
what was alleged in the original complaint.
Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court explained that under the Rules of Court,
pleadings that are amended lose their status. As such, they are treated as if they
disappear from the record. Any judicial admissions made in the said pleadings cease.
Amended pleadings must be formally offered as evidence in order to take effect,
otherwise, any admissions in the amended pleadings will not be considered.
In the case, the original complaint was superseded by the amended complaint.
The judicial admissions made in the original complaint were abandoned. However,
the court did not recognize the amended complaint because of the Petitioner’s delay in
filing the amendment. The Court found that the Petitioner took 18 months from the
original complaint to filing the amended one.
Moreover, the amended complaint altered the theory of the case. The
allegations made in the amendment are inconsistent with the original complaint where
the Petitioner claimed the trust receipts were mere security or collateral and the the
principal loan was a pure loan. In the amended complaint, the Petitioner stated that the
trust receipts are additional documents. Clearly, there is inconsistency between the
original and the amended complaint that the Supreme Court finds justification not to
admit the amended complaint. Hence, the Regional Trial Court erred in admitting the
amended complaint.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

RAFAEL BAUTISTA and LIGAYA ROSEL, Petitioners, vs. MAYA-MAYA

COTTAGES, INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 148361 November 29, 2005

Facts: Respondent Maya-Maya Cottages, Inc. (MMCI) filed a complaint
seeking the cancellation of the title held by spouses Rafael and Ligaya Bautista over a
3,856-square meter lot in Batangas, alleging that the title was fraudulently obtained.
The petitioner Bautistas responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that MMCI,
as a private corporation, was not qualified to challenge the title because it could only
lease public alienable land, not own it. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.
However, MMCI filed a motion for reconsideration and requested permission to
amend its complaint, claiming that the technical description in the petitioner Bautistas'
title did not match the disputed land. In November 1996, the trial court reversed its
decision, allowed the amended complaint, and denied the motion to dismiss. The
Bautistas then sought relief from the Court of Appeals, arguing that the amended
complaint still failed to state a valid cause of action and that the trial court had abused
its discretion, which the CA dismissed; hence the petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in admitting MMCI's amended complaint.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in admitting respondent MMCI's amended complaint.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, a party has
the right to amend their pleading once before a responsive pleading is served, or
within ten days after a reply is served. This right to amend exists regardless of
whether the amendment introduces new claims or alters the legal theory. A motion to
dismiss is not considered a responsive pleading under this rule. Since the petitioner
Bautistas only filed a motion to dismiss and had not yet submitted a responsive
pleading to the original complaint, respondent MMCI was entitled to amend their
complaint, provided the dismissal order was not final, as in this case. The Court of
Appeals therefore correctly determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the amended complaint.
The Court also noted that the issue of MMCI's standing to sue was a matter of
defense that could only be properly determined during the trial. The Court's ruling
reinforced the principle that procedural rules regarding amendments to pleadings are
designed to promote justice and allow parties to fully present their cases. As a result,
the petition is denied, and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are affirmed in full,
with costs assessed against the petitioners.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

RULE 12
CESAR E. A. VIRATA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
 G.R. No. 114331 May 27, 1997
Facts: In the case presented, petitioner Cesar E. A. Virata was one of fifty-
three defendants implicated in a civil case filed by the Philippines against former
government officials, including Ferdinand Marcos, for the recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth amassed during Marcos' regime. The complaint outlined various illegal
acts purportedly contributed by the defendants, including accusations that petitioner
Virata collaborated in reducing electricity franchise taxes, facilitating the acquisition
of Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), and manipulating corporate obligations to
enrich certain individuals, particularly those linked to the Marcos and Romualdez
families.
As the legal process progressed, petitioner Virata filed a motion for a bill of
particulars, asserting that the specifics of the allegations against him were vague and
insufficient for him to prepare a meaningful defense. The respondent Sandiganbayan
court granted his motion in part, requiring the respondent Republic to clarify specific
allegations but denied parts of his request related to other charges, deeming them clear
enough. The respondent Republic then submitted various bills of particulars, but
petitioner Virata contended that these documents failed to clarify the allegations
against him further, introducing new allegations instead and remaining ambiguous.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in admitting
the bills of particulars filed by the Republic, given their alleged vagueness and failure
to comply with prior court orders.
2. Whether or not the Office of the Solicitor General and the Presidential Commission
on Good Government authorized to deputize counsel to file the bills of particulars for
the Republic.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court found merit in Virata’s petition, ruling that
the bills of particulars did not provide the required clarity and specificity. The Court
underscored the necessity for a complaint to contain ultimate facts constituting a
cause of action, highlighting that the failure to do so undermines due process rights.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. As to the question on the vagueness of allegations, the Court observed that the
allegations were inadequately specified and remained vague, rendering it difficult for
Virata to mount a defense. Key elements of the accusations were not clearly
established in the bills of particulars.
A complaint must clearly state the essential facts that support the plaintiff's
cause of action, including the plaintiff’s right, the defendant’s duty, and the breach of
that duty. While complaints can be vague, the defendant has the right to request a bill
of particulars to obtain more specific information under Rule 12 of the Rules of Court,
allowing for a proper defense and preparation for trial. In the case, both the November
3, 1993 bill of particulars and the October 22, 1992 Limited Bill of Particulars were
too vague and lacked the necessary specifics, making it difficult for petitioner Virata
to respond appropriately to the allegations. Further, instead of providing detailed
clarifications, the bills largely restated the claims from the expanded Second
Amended Complaint without offering the specifics needed for petitioner Virata to
properly address the charges. The Republic's failure to provide clear details meant
petitioner Virata could not determine exactly what actions or omissions were being
alleged against him. The allegations were vague and failed to explain how petitioner
Virata supposedly violated the law or public trust. As a result, the Court concluded
that the bills of particulars did not comply with the procedural rules or prior court
orders, leading to the dismissal of the charges against petitioner Virata in the
expanded Second Amended Complaint.

2. As to the legal representation and deputization, this Court dismissed claims that the
filing of the bills was improper due to the lack of authority to deputize other councils.
It acknowledged that the Office of the Solicitor General’s authority to deputize others
for preparing pleadings was upheld under the law.
The Court reasoned that the Office of the Solicitor General was justified in
seeking assistance from the PCGG due to the latter’s greater familiarity with the case
and possession of all relevant records. The Office of the Solicitor General did not
relinquish its responsibility but instead authorized the PCGG to file the bill of
particulars. This delegation was supported by the provisions in the Administrative
Code and the authority granted to the Office of the Solicitor General under
Presidential Decree No. 478, which allows the Solicitor General to deputize legal
officers or hire external counsel as needed.
However, it also stressed that despite the legality of the representation, the quality
of the submitted particulars was crucial; their inadequacy ultimately justified
dismissing the charges against petitioner Virata. The Court dismissed the expanded
Second Amended Complaint concerning petitioner Virata due to the respondent
Republic's failure to comply with the court's prior order for the required clarity in the
allegations. The Court cited Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, which allows
for dismissal when there is non-compliance with the required pleadings.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

RULE 13

HEIRS OF BENJAMIN MENDOZA, NAMELY: PACITA MENDOZA,

VICTOR MENDOZA, JOSE MENDOZA, CESAR MENDOZA, EFREN
MENDOZA, EDWARDO MENDOZA, EDNA MENDOZA AND BEVERLY
MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND J.A.
DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.

G.R. No. 170247 September 17, 2008

Facts: This case begun with a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by
respondent J.A. Development Corporation against petitioner Benjamin Mendoza in
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). The MTCC dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction, and this decision was upheld by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and remanded the case back
to the MTCC for further action.
The primary issue raised by the petitioners is improper service of notice. They
argued that their legal counsel, Atty. Sergio F. Angeles, who had represented them at
the MTCC and RTC levels, did not receive a copy of the petition for review filed by
the respondent in the Court of Appeals (CA). Instead, the petition was allegedly
served on Benjamin Mendoza directly, rather than through his attorney. Despite this,
the Court of Appeals maintained that the petitioners had indeed received the notices,
as evidenced by the registry receipt and return cards showing their receipt of the
petition and the subsequent decisions. The petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing procedural errors, but the Court of Appeals denied it, stating
that the service of notices had been properly conducted. The petitioners now contest
the CA’s decision on the grounds of improper service of notices, which they claim
hindered their ability to effectively participate in the appellate process.
 Issue: Whether or not due process was violated by improper service of court
documents, which denied the respondents the opportunity to participate in the
appellate proceedings.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts failed to
adhere to proper judicial procedure, particularly regarding service of notice to
counsel. Given that Benjamin Mendoza was consistently represented by legal counsel,
any service of legal documents to him personally was not valid. Consequently, the
Court ruled that the petitioners were deprived of meaningful participation in the
appellate process, violating their right to due process.
Ratio Decidendi: According to Section 2, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, if a party is represented by counsel, all notices or legal service must be
directed to the counsel, unless the court specifically orders service on the party. Any
service made directly to the party, instead of their counsel, is considered invalid and
without legal effect. Proper service of documents is critical in judicial proceedings.
Service to a party who is represented by counsel is generally considered a nullity
unless otherwise directed by the court.
In the case, the petitioners were denied due process because they were not
properly notified, for service was made directly to them instead of to their lawyer.
Consequently, despite the Court of Appeals' Entry of Judgment, the decision could
not be considered final. While the Court of Appeals did entertain the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration, the procedural mistake remained unresolved. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decisions of the Court of Appeals and
remanded the case. The Court allowed further proceedings to ensure that both parties
could fully present their arguments regarding the jurisdiction over the unlawful
detainer action.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

HYPTE R. AUJERO, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS

SATELLITE CORPORATION, Respondent.

G.R. No. 193484; January 18, 2012

Facts: Petitioner Hypte R. Aujero work as an an accountant in the respondent
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) Finance Department.
After 34 years of service, the petitioner applied for early retirement. His application
for retirement was approved, entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate
equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that
time, the petitioner Aujero was Philcomsat’s Senior Vice-President with a monthly
salary of P274,805.00. In 2001, the petitioner executed a Deed of Release and
Quitclaim in Philcomsat’s favor, following his receipt from the latter of a check in the
amount of P9,439,327.91.
Almost three (3) years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid
retirement benefits, claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is
P14,015,055.00 and the P9,439,327.91 he received from respondent Philcomsat as
supposed settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which is more than enough
reason to declare his quitclaim as null and void. According to the petitioner, he had no
choice but to accept a lesser amount as he was in dire need thereof and was all set to
return to his hometown and he signed the quitclaim despite the considerable
deficiency as no single centavo would be released to him if he did not execute a
release and waiver in Philcomsat’s favor.
The petitioner Aujero claims that his right to receive the full amount of his
retirement benefits, which is equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for
every year of service, is provided under the Retirement Plan that Philcomsat created
on January 1, 1977 for the benefit of its employees.
Issue: Whether or not the delay in filing Philcomsat’s appeal and posting of
the surety bond is justified.
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled in Philcomsat’s favor since procedural rules
may be relaxed in cases with substantial merit.
Ratio Decidendi: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is aimed at correcting jurisdictional errors and is only granted in cases where there is a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, such as a capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment. It does not address every mistake of law or fact, as these do not
necessarily amount to an excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion. The writ is
meant to correct significant errors, not minor missteps.
In this case, the Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that the NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion by accepting Philcomsat's belated appeal. While procedural
rules are generally mandatory, the Court has increasingly allowed flexibility in their
application to ensure cases are decided on their merits. Aujero’s claims were found to
lack sufficient merit to justify strict enforcement of procedural rules, especially since
Philcomsat's appeal was not entirely meritless.
 The Court emphasized that in cases with substantial merit, procedural rules
may be relaxed. Philcomsat's appeal was considered valid as the petitioner, a well-
educated and senior executive, voluntarily signed the quitclaim without presenting
any convincing evidence of coercion. The Court affirmed that the NLRC correctly
prioritized justice over technicalities, and there was no grave abuse of discretion to
warrant a writ of certiorari. Thus, the decision to allow the appeal was upheld.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

RULE 14

EDGAR T. CARREON, petitioner, vs. MARIO AGUILLON AND BETTY P.

LOPEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 240108; June 29, 2020

Facts: This case arose from a breach of contract complaint filed by respondent
Mario Aguillon against petitioner Edgar Carreon and his wife, Isabel, in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. After respondent Aguillon's motion, the RTC
declared petitioners Carreon and Isabel in default due to their failure to respond to the
summons and complaint properly served to them through their son. The RTC ruled in
favor of Aguillon, ordering the defendants to pay damages, interests, and attorney’s
fees.
Once the decision became final, a writ of execution was issued, leading to the
sheriff levying the defendants’ property, which was later sold to Betty P. Lopez at a
public auction. After the sale, Lopez initiated a petition to cancel the Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the names of petitioners Carreon and Isabel, and to have
a new TCT issued in her name. Even though the RTC's orders were rendered without
proper service to the defendants, it nonetheless granted the petition and issued a new
title to Lopez.
It was not until June 2017 that petitioner Carreon became aware of the
eviction from their family home when he received a writ of possession from the city
government. Subsequently, petitioner Carreon filed a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment before the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud due to improper service of summons.
 Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly acquired jurisdiction over the
defendants, given the alleged improper service of summons, with the CA ultimately
finding the service to be valid and upholding the RTC’s actions.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court determined that petitioner Carreon's claims
about defective service of summons had prima facie merit, noting that the return of
service lacked key details and did not show sufficient efforts to personally serve the
summons.
Ratio Decidendi: Petitioner Carreon argued that the summons had been
served on his son (whose name was not identified in the return) and that the process
server did not make reasonable efforts to serve the summons personally. Petitioner
Carreon also clarified that he did not have a son but only a daughter, who affirmed
this in an affidavit. The Court emphasized that improper service of summons
undermines the court’s jurisdiction and can serve as grounds for annulling a
judgment.
The Supreme Court determined that petitioner Carreon's claims about
defective service of summons had prima facie merit, noting that the return of service
lacked key details and did not show sufficient efforts to personally serve the
summons. As such, the Court ruled that the CA could not dismiss petitioner Carreon’s
annulment petition based solely on the presumption of regularity, especially when the
service appeared irregular.
The Court directed that Carreon’s annulment petition be given due course, and
ordered the CA to issue summons and hold a trial to properly assess the merits of the
case. The CA’s decision to dismiss Carreon’s motion and annulment petition was
reversed and set aside.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION

TITAN DRAGON PROPERTIES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MARLINA

VELOSO-GALENZOGA, respondent.

G.R. No. 246088, April 28, 2021

FACTS: This case revolved around a dispute between petitioner Titan Dragon
Properties Corporation and respondent Marlina Veloso-Galenzoga. In the course of
legal proceedings, the petitioner Titan sought to serve summons to respondent
Veloso. However, instead of serving it directly to the respondent Veloso, the
summons was handed to the her daughter, who signed a receipt acknowledging its
delivery. Respondent Veloso challenged the validity of the service, arguing that it was
improper because the summons was not personally delivered to her and that her
daughter was not authorized to accept it on her behalf. Petitioner Titan, on the other
hand, contended that the service was valid under the rule for substituted service under
the Rules of Court since personal service was not possible at that time.
Issue: Whether or not the service of summons was invalid because the sheriff
did not make diligent attempts to find the correct address, as mandated by the rules.
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that the service of summons by publication was
invalid, thus the Regional Trial Court lacked jurisdiction over the case against the
petitioner. The Court emphasized that personal service is the preferred mode of
service, and the sheriff's lack of diligence in addressing the actual whereabouts of the
petitioner failed to comply with the necessary legal standards. As such, all subsequent
judgments made by the trial court were declared void.
Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner Titan failed to
properly serve the summons to respondent Marlina Veloso-Galenzoga, which was
crucial for establishing the court's jurisdiction over the respondent. Although
petitioner Titan Dragon attempted to serve the summons through substituted service
after being unable to do so personally, the Court found this method to be inadequate.
For substituted service to be valid, it must be made to someone of appropriate age and
discretion at the respondent's last known address, and that person must inform the
respondent about the summons. In this case, petitioner Titan did not present sufficient
evidence that the person, respondent Veloso's daughter, who received the summons
met these requirements. Furthermore, the petitioner TItan failed to provide enough
proof that the summons was properly served according to the prescribed procedures
under the Rules of Court. As a result, the Court concluded that the failure to properly
serve the summons deprived the court of jurisdiction over the respondent, rendering
the lower court's decision void for lack of jurisdiction and a violation of the
respondent's right to due process.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSSENTING OPINION
 ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS ALBANO,
LILY REYES, JANET BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND RANDY HAGOS,
petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO R. CO, JR., respondent.

G.R. No. 156759; June 5, 2013

Facts: Respondent Francisco R. Co, Jr., a retired police officer, filed a libel
suit against several individuals associated with the publication "Abante Tonite,"
claiming damages due to an allegedly defamatory article published on June 6, 2000.
The defendants included the publisher Allen A. Macasaet, managing director Nicolas
V. Quijano Jr., circulation manager Isaias Albano, and several editorial staff
members, all of whom were named as petitioners in the case. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) issued summons for each defendant to be served at their office at
Monica Publishing Corporation in Manila.
On September 18, 2000, Sheriff Raul Medina attempted to personally serve
the summons but found all petitioners absent from the office. After two unsuccessful
attempts at personal service that day, during which he was informed that the
defendants were always out gathering news, Sheriff Medina opted for substituted
service. He served the summons to the secretary of Macasaet and the wife of Quijano,
both of whom acknowledged receipt. The other defendants were served through an
editorial assistant.
The petitioners responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint,
claiming that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over them because the service of summons
was ineffective. They argued that the sheriff did not adequately comply with the
requirements for substituted service outlined in the Rules of Court, having not made
sufficient efforts for personal service first. Additionally, the petitioners contended that
Abante Tonite could not be a defendant as it was neither a natural nor a juridical
person.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The petitioners' subsequent motions
for reconsideration were also denied. Dissatisfied, they sought relief through a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus at the Court of Appeals (CA),
which ultimately affirmed the RTC's decision and dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the summons were properly served through substituted
service and the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that summons were properly served
and thus, jurisdiction over the petitioners were acquired. It was emphasized that strict
compliance with personal service is not required when substituted service is justified
by the circumstances, with the primary concern being fairness and due process.
Ratio Decidendi: In actions in personam, proper service is crucial for the
court to gain jurisdiction and for the defendant to have the opportunity to respond.
While personal service is preferred, if it is not feasible within a reasonable time,
substituted service may be used, but only under specific conditions set forth under
Rule 14 in the Rules of Court. Substituted service is an exceptional measure,
permitted only when reasonable attempts at personal service have failed.
In this case, the sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons twice, but
both attempts were unsuccessful due to the defendants' unavailability. After
determining that further personal service would be futile, substituted service was
employed, and the court found it valid under the circumstances. The petitioners had
already participated in the case by filing pleadings, indicating they had received
notice of the summons and waived any objections to the service. The Court
emphasized that strict compliance with personal service is not required when
substituted service is justified by the circumstances, with the primary concern being
fairness and due process.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

RULE 17

RAMON CHING AND POWING PROPERTIES, INC., petitioners, vs. JOSEPH

CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS,
respondents.

G.R. No. 175507; October 8, 2014

Facts: The case revolves around Antonio Ching, who had various businesses
and properties valued at over P380 million. His family situation was complex, as he
had children from two relationships: claimed to be the legitimate son of Lucina Santos
and allegedly illegitimate children, Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, with his
housemaid, Mercedes Igne. Petitoner Ramon Ching, claiming to be the sole child of
Antonio with Lucina, disputed the Chengs' claims. After Antonio's murder in 1996,
conflicts arose regarding the distribution of his estate. Tomas Ching reportedly
induced Mercedes Igne and her children to sign a waiver of their rights to the estate in
exchange for P22.5 million, which they claimed was never paid. A subsequent
affidavit by Ramon Ching classified him as the exclusive heir to Antonio's estate
sparked further disputes.
Following various legal maneuvers, including dismissals and the filing of
multiple related cases, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a second complaint for
annulment of the estate settlement, which was dismissed without prejudice by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6. Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties
argued that based on the "two-dismissal rule," the dismissal should count as with
prejudice, which prevents further claims on the same matter.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court's dismissal of the second case served as a
bar to filing a third case under the "two-dismissal rule."
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents, stating that
the two-dismissal rule does not apply since the first case was dismissed at the instance
of the defendant while the second case was dismissed at the request of the plaintiff.
Therefore, the dismissal of the second case cannot operate as a bar to the third case.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court found the second dismissal without prejudice
because it was based on procedural issues, not plaintiff misconduct or jurisdictional
defects. However, the third filing was still deemed improper, as it was made while a
motion for reconsideration was still pending, constituting forum shopping. The Court
denied the petition, focusing on the provisions of Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which addresses the dismissal of cases. Under this rule, a plaintiff can
voluntarily dismiss a case before the defendant responds, with the dismissal typically
being without prejudice unless it is the second dismissal of the same claim, in which
case it may be with prejudice. A plaintiff may also seek dismissal with court approval
or due to failure to prosecute, often resulting in a dismissal with prejudice.
The Court also emphasized that the dismissal of the second case was explicitly
ordered to be without prejudice, and since it had resulted from the plaintiffs' voluntary
motion before any responsive pleading was filed by the defendants, the requirements
for the two-dismissal rule were not met.
Regarding the issue of forum shopping, the Court noted that the ongoing motion for
reconsideration in the second case was still unresolved when the third case was filed,
which meant that the dismissal of the second case was not yet final. Therefore, the
respondents' filing of the third case constituted forum shopping, as it introduced a
similar cause of action during the pendency of another related case. However, the
Court ultimately prioritized substantial justice over strict procedural compliance,
allowing the third case to move forward.
The "two-dismissal rule" applies only in instances where the plaintiff
dismisses actions for the second time; if the first dismissal was at the defendants'
request, it does not count under this rule. Dismissals requested by plaintiffs are
typically considered without prejudice unless explicitly stated otherwise. The court
underscored the preference for resolving cases on the merits, avoiding dismissals on
procedural grounds whenever possible, thereby promoting the delivery of substantive
justice in legal proceedings.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

ALEX RAUL B. BLAY, petitioner vs. CYNTHIA B. BANA, respondent.

G.R. No. 232189 March 7, 2018

Facts: Petitioner Alex Raul Blay filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, citing psychological incapacity. Respondent Cynthia Bana responded with
an Answer and a Compulsory Counterclaim. Later, petitioner Blay decided to
withdraw the petition and filed a Motion to Withdraw. Respondent Bana opposed,
arguing that her counterclaim should still be adjudicated separately. Petitioner Blay
argued that the counterclaim should be dismissed because the respondent Bana missed
the deadline to file a required manifestation. On May 29, 2015, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) granted the Motion to Withdraw but allowed the counterclaim to
proceed independently, giving the petitioner 15 days to respond to it. Petitioner Blay
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in March 2016. He then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which was dismissed in
February 2017. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, ruling that the counterclaim
could proceed despite the withdrawal of the petition. The petitioner’s subsequent
motion for reconsideration was denied in June 2017, leading to the current petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error in upholding the
trial courts orders, which directed that the respondent's counterclaim be independently
adjudicated by the same trial court.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and
set aside the trials court’s Orders. It held that the Court of Appeals incorrectly
interpreted Section 2, Rule 17. The Court emphasized that although the rule states that
dismissal shall be limited to the complaint, it also imposes a condition that a party
wishing to pursue a counterclaim must manifest their intent within the specified
period. If this manifestation is not made, the counterclaim must be prosecuted in a
separate action.
Ratio Decidendi: The petition is meritorious because the Court of Appeals
misapplied Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court regarding the dismissal of the
complaint and the defendant's counterclaim. The rule specifies that if a counterclaim
has been filed before the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the dismissal only affects the
complaint, and the counterclaim may be pursued either in the same action or
separately. However, if the defendant wishes to have the counterclaim resolved in the
same case, they must file a manifestation within 15 days of receiving the motion to
dismiss. In this instance, the respondent did not file the required manifestation, but the
CA incorrectly upheld the RTC’s decision allowing the counterclaim to remain in the
same action. This oversight ignored the rule's requirement for the defendant to make
their choice within the 15-day period, meaning the counterclaim should have been
filed separately. The petition is therefore granted, the CA's decision is reversed, and
the RTC's dismissal is ordered without prejudice to the counterclaim being pursued in
a separate action.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

RULE 18

HELEN L. SAY, GILDA L. SAY, HENRY L. SAY, AND DANNY L. SAY,

petitioner, vs. GABRIEL DIZON, respondent.

G.R. No. 227457 June 22, 2020

Facts: This case originated from a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the
Deed of Absolute Sale filed by respondent Gabriel Dizon against Robert Dizon and
petitioners Helen, Gilda, Henry, and Danny Say, before the Regional Trial Court of
Koronadal City, South Cotabato, recorded as Civil Case No. 1973-24. The trial court
dismissed the complaint citing forum shopping, as respondent Dizon had previously
filed a similar complaint concerning the same matter. After the dismissal became
final, the petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Leave of Court to Set Defendants'
Counterclaim for Hearing. A Notice of Hearing was issued and the petitioners
interpreted this notice as a mere notification of the hearing rather than a formal order
to submit their Judicial Affidavits.They filed their Judicial Affidavits just one day
prior to the hearing. Respondent opposed the late submission, asserting that it
contravened the Judicial Affidavit Rule (JAR), which required such documents to be
filed five days before the scheduled hearing.
The trial court ultimately admitted the late Judicial Affidavits, arguing that
technicalities should yield to substantive justice. This decision was contested by the
respondent, leading to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). The
CA subsequently set aside the trial court’s orders, asserting that the it had gravely
abused its discretion in allowing the belated submission without satisfying the
conditions of the JAR.
Issue: Whether or not the CA made an error in concluding that the RTC
committed a grave abuse of discretion by admitting the petitioners' Judicial
Affidavits, which were submitted late.
Ruling: Yes. The Court decided that although the late submission of the
petitioners' Judicial Affidavits violated the Judicial Affidavit Rule, it was deemed an
honest mistake.
Ratio Decidendi: The petition was found to be valid as the court examined
whether the Regional Trial Court had committed grave abuse of discretion. The Court
of Appeals had previously identified such abuse when the trial court’s accepted the
petitioners' late Judicial Affidavits, which violated the Judicial Affidavit Rule (JAR).
The JAR requires that these affidavits be submitted at least five days prior to a
hearing. Although the petitioners submitted theirs just one day late due to a
misunderstanding of a Notice of Hearing, this was deemed an honest mistake.
The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the affidavits since the late submission did not significantly harm the
opposing party. The petitioners had also paid the fine for the delay, and their late
submission did not impact the case's merits. The court highlighted the importance of
resolving cases based on their substance rather than strictly adhering to procedural
rules. As a result, it reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the trial
court's orders and allowing the petitioners to proceed with their case.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION
 DENNIS T. UY TUAZON, WORLD WISER INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND
JERZON MANPOWER AND TRADING, INC., petitioners, vs. MYRA V.
FUENTES, respondent.

G.R. No. 241699 August 04, 2021

Facts: This case centers on the validity of lease contracts signed by petitoner
Dennis T. Uy Tuazon without the consent of his wife, respondent Myra V. Fuentes,
for properties they jointly owned. After mediation failed due to the parties' non-
participation, petitioners sought a referral to Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR), but
the Regional Trial Court denied this request, ruling that the matter could not be settled
through compromise because it involved an ongoing property liquidation. The trial
court ruled in favor of respondent Fuentes, declaring the lease contracts void due to
the lack of her consent and the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld this decision. The CA
also dismissed petitioners' due process claims, noting that they had actively
participated in the case despite failing to attend the mediation sessions. Petitioners
then appealed the CA’s decision to the Supreme Court through a petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the lack of Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) warrants
the dismissal of the petition.
Ruling: No. The lack of Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) does not warrant
dismissal of the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition filed by the
petitioners, affirming the CA's decision. The Court reasoned that the contracts of lease
were void due to Fuentes’ lack of written consent, as mandated by Article 124 of the
Family Code, which requires joint consent from both spouses for the disposition of
common property.
Ratio Decidendi: Regarding the procedural issue, the Court ruled that the
denial of a judicial dispute resolution request did not invalidate the proceedings.
Petitioners showed no likelihood of settlement due to their non-appearance at
mediation conferences, and thus the RTC had correctly exercised discretion in not
referring the case for further dispute resolution. The Court ruled that the trial court’s
decision not to refer the case to Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) after mediation
was not a procedural error. According to the 2020 Guidelines for Court-Annexed
Mediation and JDR, referral to JDR is only necessary if the judge believes a
settlement is still possible following a failed mediation. In this case, the trial court
found that settlement was unlikely due to petitioners' behavior during the mediation,
including their repeated absences. The Court also noted that petitioners only raised the
issue after the trial had concluded, suggesting an attempt to delay the proceedings.
Therefore, the trial court’s decision was upheld.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

RULE 19

RUBEN SAW, DIONISIO SAW, LINA S. CHUA, LUCILA S. RUSTE AND

EVELYN SAW, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
BERNARDO P. PARDO, Presiding Judge of Branch 43, (Regional Trial Court
of Manila), FREEMAN MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, FREEMAN
INCORPORATED, SAW CHIAO LIAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CALOOCAN CITY, and DEPUTY SHERIFF ROSALIO G.
SIGUA, respondents.

G.R. No. 90580 April 8, 1991

Facts: This case arises from a collection suit filed by respondent Equitable
Banking Corporation against respondent Freeman, Inc. and its President and General
Manager, Saw Chiao Lian. The bank sought a preliminary attachment due to unpaid
loan obligations. Petitioners, which include stockholders of Freeman, Inc. (Ruben
Saw, Dionisio Saw, Lina S. Chua, Lucila S. Ruste, and Evelyn Saw), filed a motion to
intervene in the case. They alleged several grounds for their intervention:
1. The loan agreements between Saw Chiao Lian and Equitable Banking
Corporation lacked approval from stockholders holding at least two-thirds of
the corporate capital.
2. Saw Chiao Lian purportedly had no authority to enter into said loan contracts
on behalf of the corporation.
3. There was alleged collusion between certain officials of Freeman, Inc. and the
banking corporation to facilitate the loans.
The trial court denied the petitioners' motion to intervene. Subsequently, the
petitioners appealed this denial to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the
appeal, Equitable Banking Corporation and Saw Chiao Lian reached a compromise
agreement, which was approved by the lower court. However, due to failure to
comply with this agreement, the bank obtained a writ of execution, leading to the sale
of two lots owned by Freeman, Inc. to Freeman Management and Development
Corporation.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners possess the legal interest necessary to
successfully intervene in the case, given that their rights as stockholders are claimed
to be inchoate.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' decision,
affirming the lower court's denial of the petitioners' motion to intervene.
Ratio Decidendi: Equitable Banking Corporation's collection suit against
Freeman, Inc. and its president was upheld by the Supreme Court, which denied the
stockholders' motion to intervene due to a lack of sufficient direct interest in the case.
This decision clarified the limitations on stockholders' rights to intervene in corporate
litigation, emphasizing the need for specific legal interests. The Court highlighted two
crucial components concerning intervention, the legal interest requirement and the
jurisdictional issues. As to the legal interest requirement, the Court reiterated that to
successfully intervene, a party must have a direct legal interest in the litigation that is
immediate and not merely contingent. The petitioners' interests were deemed too
indirect and expectant to satisfy this requirement under Section 2, Rule 12 of the
Rules of Court. Their alleged rights as stockholders to assert corporate claims were
classified as speculative. As to the jurisdictional issue, on the issue regarding the
petitioners’ appeal and the alleged divestiture of jurisdiction from the trial court, the
Court clarified that the appeal pertained only to the denial of their motion to
intervene. Since the petitioners had not been recognized as parties to the main case,
the writ of execution issued by the lower court was consistent with the judicial
proceedings and did not infringe upon the statutory requirements governing
intervention.
Thus, the Court concluded that with the issuance of the writ of execution and the
fulfillment of the collection suit, the circumstances under which intervention could be
entertained had ceased, and the petitioners were left without a valid claim to intervene
in the original action.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner., VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND

TEODORO ABISTADO, SUBSTITUTED BY MARGARITA, MARISSA,
MARIBEL, ARNOLD AND MARY ANN, ALL SURNAMED ABISTADO,
respondents.
 G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
Facts: Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for the original registration of
his title over a parcel of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, the Property
Registration Decree. The case was assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court
of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, and docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC)
No. 86. Since Teodoro Abistado died while the petition was pending, his heirs—
Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold, and Mary Ann Abistado—were substituted as
applicants under the representation of their aunt Josefa Abistado. The land registration
court denied the petition, stating "want of jurisdiction" because the notice of the initial
hearing was not published in a widely read newspaper as required by Section 23 of
PD 1529. Only the Official Gazette had published the notice. By determining that
publication in the Official Gazette was adequate to grant jurisdiction, the Court of
Appeals overturned this rejection and mandated that the title be registered in the
private respondents' names. The current case is before the Supreme Court because the
Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the Director of Lands, disagreed and filed a
petition to overturn the Court of Appeals' ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC
Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not
dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner Director of Lands
reversing and setting aside the assailed decision and dismissing without prejudice the
application of private respondent for land registration.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the publication of the notice of initial
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory under Section 23 of PD
1529. The Court emphasized that the term "shall" in the statute denotes an imperative
and mandatory requirement. The Court reasoned that land registration is a proceeding
in rem, which requires constructive seizure of the land against all persons, including
the state, who have rights or interests in the property. Such a proceeding is validated
through publication, and strict compliance with the publication requirement is
necessary to ensure that all interested parties are notified and have the opportunity to
contest the application.
The Court further noted that the detailed requirements of mailing, posting, and
publication in both the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation are
essential to the due process rationale behind the publication requirement. The failure
to comply with these requirements would render any decision legally infirm and
would prejudice the rights of interested parties who were not properly notified.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being
in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all
persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through publication. the all-encompassing in rem
nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the
whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as
possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication,
mailing and posting.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

SM AGRI AND GENERAL MACHINERIES, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division), EXECUTIVE LABOR
ARBITER, REGION V, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ALBAY, or any of
his deputies, and VIVENCIO ABO, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-74806 January 9, 1989
Facts: Respondent Vivencio Abo, began working for SM Industries on August 2,
1976, as the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of a branch office. After SM Industries
rebranded as SM Agricultural and General Machineries in 1981, Abo remained an
OIC there until his dismissal on May 31, 1982. Abo complained about his alleged
wrongful termination and requested reparations from the Ministry of Labor and
Employment. Citing Abo's deliberate noncompliance in not reporting sales, collection
reports, and monthly allowances since January 1981, the petitioner defended the
termination.
On March 29, 1984, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in Abo's favor,
directing his reinstatement with back pay, unpaid income, emergency benefits, 13th
month pay, service incentive leave, moral and exemplary penalties, and legal fees. On
April 23, 1984, the petitioner filed an appeal by registered mail after receiving the
verdict on April 10, 1984. On November 29, 1985, the NLRC rejected the appeal due
to its late filing, and on April 7, 1986, it rejected the petitioner's request for
reconsideration. Hence, the case at bar.
Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioner’s appeal on the ground of tardiness or late filing.
 Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting the
petition and annulling the NLRC's resolutions. The Court found that the NLRC had
erred in dismissing the appeal based on a technicality of late filing, emphasizing the
principle that if the last day for filing an appeal coincides with a legal holiday, such
appeal can be filed on the next succeeding business day.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court highlighted Section 31, Article VIII of the
Revised Administrative Code, which states that if the last day for an act falls on a
holiday, the act may be performed on the next business day. Thus, while affirming
that the ten-day rule under Article 223 encompasses calendar days, the Court
recognized a crucial exception for holidays. The ruling established that the NLRC’s
rigid adherence to the ten-day filing deadline, without consideration of legal holidays
affecting the filing date, represented an error that warranted corrective action. When
the last day for filing an appeal falls on a legal Holiday, the same can be filed on the
next business day following said Legal Holiday. the Revised Administrative Code,
specifically, Sec. 31, Art. VIII thereof, clearly provides that - Where the day, or the
last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may
be done on the next succeeding business day.
The court recognizes an exception to this general rule, i.e., where the 10th day
is a Sunday or a Legal Holiday, in which event, the appeal can be filed on the next
business day. Consequently, in such a case, the supposedly last day to appeal will not
be deemed the last day because it happens to be a Sunday or Legal Holiday. Instead,
the act can be done on the next business day following that Sunday or Legal Holiday.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner, vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN, Respondent.

G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013
Facts: Petitioner Josielene Lara Chan filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City. She requested custody of their children, the dissolution of
conjugal partnership to respondent Johnny Chan, and a declaration of the nullity of
their marriage. According to petitionerJosielene, respondent Johnny was labeled as
mentally deficient due to his constant drinking and drug usage, and he failed to
provide for his family. Respondent Johnny was confined for rehabilitation and
detoxification. Respondnet Johnny countered that petitioner Josielene failed in her
wifely duties and agreed to marriage counseling but was forcibly confined at the
hospital. When petitioner Josielene was briefly arrested for an unrelated offense, the
marriage took a further turn for the worst. Respondent Johnny's imprisonment for
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse" was noted on a Philhealth Claim Form 1
during pre-trial. Petitioner Josielene asked Medical City for Johnny's medical records
via subpoena duces tecum on August 22, 2006. Citing physician-patient privilege,
respondent Johnny objected. The motion and subsequent reconsideration were refused
by the trial court. On September 17, 2007, petitioner Josielene petitioned the Court of
Appeals in a special civil action of certiorari, but the same denied her request as well.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court
correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital
records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the
physician-patient communication.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Josielene cannot access her
husband's hospital records due to physician-patient privilege, emphasizing the
confidentiality of medical communications. This decision highlights the protection of
patient privacy even amid the complexities of marital nullity cases.
Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled against
Josielene, affirming the decisions made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The
Court reinforced the legal principle surrounding physician-patient privilege as
enshrined in Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which prohibits the
examination or admission in court of matters disclosed in confidence by a patient to
their physician without the patient's consent.
The Court noted that: The procedural objection to evidence must come at the time it is
offered, rendering Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum premature; The
hospital records, which contained sensitive medical information, could not be
disclosed until the trial commenced and proper evidence was formally offered; and
The Act of Johnny attaching the Philhealth form did not equate to a waiver of
privilege concerning his medical records since it was offered before trial and did not
serve as a basis for disclosing further confidential details.
A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a
civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or
treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending
such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable
him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient. The
physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician
who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be
examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the
latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the
physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body,
enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come
to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt
the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

SPOUSES RUBEN and MYRNA LEYNES, petitioners, vs.

FORMER TENTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, BANSALAN, DAVAO DEL SUR, MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 1, BANSALAN, DAVAO DEL SUR, and
SPOUSES GUALBERTO & RENE CABAHUG-SUPERALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 154462 January 19, 2011
Facts: A piece of the Superales' property is allegedly unlawfully occupied and
encroached upon by the Leynes. The Superales claim that a residential land is legally
theirs. The Barangay Captain was informed of the invasion by the Superales. They
made an effort to resolve the conflict amicably. The relocation survey carried out on
the land was rejected by the Leynes. A case for forcible entry was made by the
Superales. They demanded damages be paid and that the Leynes' construction be
taken down. The Superales were granted a favorable ruling by the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC). Due to their failure to submit their response within the allotted
time, the Leynes were placed in default. The Leynes filed an appeal with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) against the MCTC's ruling. The MCTC's ruling was upheld by the
RTC. The RTC rejected a motion for reconsideration that the Leynes had submitted.
The RTC granted the Superales' request for execution. The Leynes petitioned the
Court of Appeals for certiorari. The petition was denied because it lacked relevant
dates and was the incorrect remedy. A writ of execution was issued by the RTC. The
Leynes submitted a motion to halt the writ's enforcement along with a manifestation.
The motion was granted by the RTC, and the execution was put on hold. The Leynes'
request for reconsideration was turned down by the Court of Appeals. In order to file
the motion for execution, the RTC remanded the matter to the MCTC.
 Issue: Whether or not the MCTC and the RTC both committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied to admit spouses
Leynes answer and ruling that since the last day for filing an answer fell on a
saturday, the same should have been filed on the said day since there were court
personnel on duty.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulling and setting
aside the MCTC’s ex parte judgment and remanding the case to the MCTC for further
proceedings. Based on the rules, the spouses Leynes’ answer was filed within the
reglementary period, and they were not in default.
Ratio Decidendi: Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from
the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be
filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the
petitioner’s timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an
appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should
be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be
counted from the denial of the motion.
In computing said 10-day period, we resort to Rule 22, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, which provides that : in computing any period of time prescribed or allowed
by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act
or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and
the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls
on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time
shall not run until the next working day.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION
 HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO, petitioners, vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD.,
ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
Facts: Petitioners Harry L. Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo, and Jane Go were
charged with Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. According to the case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 396447, the accused allegedly planned to defraud
Highdone Company Ltd. in August 1996 by pretending to have goods at the Bataan
Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan. They damaged Highdone
Company Ltd. by executing a Deed of Mortgage for $464,266.90, characterizing it as
a first mortgage, even though they knew it was already encumbered by China Bank
Corporation. At arraignment, the petitioners entered a not guilty plea. Li Luen Ping, a
crucial witness for the prosecution, was unable to attend later trial dates because of
health concerns. Li Luen Ping's lung infection and incapacity to travel were the
reasons given in a motion to take his oral deposition. A medical certificate was
produced, and the motion was allowed by the MeTC in spite of resistance. Following
the denial of their move for reconsideration, the petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC declared that Section 17,
Rule 23 on depositions in civil proceedings could not be applied to criminal cases,
therefore nullifying the MeTC's orders. The Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the
RTC's ruling, permitting the taking of depositions in Cambodia and Laos. The current
petition resulted from the denial of the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in permitting the taking of
depositions in Cambodia and Laos, as it infringed the constitutional right of the
petitioners to a public trial and to confront the said witness face to face; and in
applying the rules on deposition-taking in civil cases to criminal cases.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, reversing
the CA's decision and reinstating the RTC’s ruling. The Court underscored the
importance of oral testimony in criminal proceedings, emphasizing that the
examination of witnesses should occur in the courtroom where the case is pending to
protect the accused’s rights.
Ratio Decidendi: The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court
allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer
oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular
official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign
state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to
the other party. But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more
particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeably be unavailable for trial,
the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the
judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. It is
true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil
procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it
says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases.
However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and
squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply
Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
The CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
for taking the deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness when it upheld the
trial court's order allowing the deposition of prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to take
place in a venue other than the court where the case is pending. This was certainly
grave abuse of discretion.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

(Second Division) and LUCIO TAN, ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS
(represented By IMELDA R. MARCOS, IMEE M. MANOTOC, IRENE M.
ARANETA and FERDINAND MARCOS, JR.), IMELDA R. MARCOS, et. al.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 112710 May 30, 2001

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, through the Philippine Commission

for Good Government, filed a complaint against multiple defendants, including Lucio
C. Tan and the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the Sandiganbayan. This complaint
alleged that Ferdinand E. Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos, illegally accumulated
wealth during their presidency in a fraudulent manner against the Filipino people. It
was claimed that Mr. Tan was complicit with the Marcoses, agreeing that the latter
would hold a majority interest in Shareholdings, Inc., a company that held substantial
shares in businesses owned by Tan, such as Fortune Tobacco Corporation and Asia
Brewery, Inc. The complaint asserted that Tan paid the Marcoses bribes in exchange
for government support of his business ventures and alleged multiple other illegal
transactions that caused financial loss to the Development Bank of the Philippines.
The petitioner subsequently amended the complaint to replace Ferdinand
Marcos with his estate following his death, and included additional defendants
believed to have facilitated the illegal activities. A "Motion for Leave To Take the
Deposition of Rolando C. Gapud," who was identified as a former financial adviser to
Marcos and a key witness, was filed requesting the court’s permission for a deposition
to be conducted in Hong Kong due to Mr. Gapud's fear for his safety and his asserted
unavailability to testify in person. The Sandiganbayan denied this motion, stating it
was premature because not all defendants had been summoned, and that no
extraordinary circumstances existed to warrant the deposition's immediate taking.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the petitioner’s motion for
the deposition of Rolando C. Gapud based on the ground of prematurity due to
incomplete service of summons to all defendants.
Ruling: No. The petition to take a deposition from key witness Rolando C.
Gapud outside the jurisdiction was denied by the Sandiganbayan, a decision later
upheld by the Supreme Court. The ruling stressed that preliminary matters must be
resolved before conducting depositions in civil cases, underscoring the need for issues
to be joined prior to discovery.
Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s decision,
dismissing the petition. It noted that the taking of depositions is indeed premised on
the existence of specific conditions surrounding jurisdiction and the readiness of the
parties to address the issues at hand. The court elaborated that while depositions can
be taken once jurisdiction is established over any defendant, the plaintiff must still
await the service of answers from all parties before proceeding with depositions,
except in very exceptional circumstances. The Court found that petitioner failed to
justify the urgency of taking Mr. Gapud's deposition prior to obtaining answers from
all defendants. It highlighted the lack of credible evidence demonstrating a real threat
to Mr. Gapud's safety or any medical condition necessitating immediate deposition.
 The Court held that the Sandiganbayan acted within its discretion by ruling
against the deposition at such a premature stage of the case, affirming that the right to
explore discovery must be balanced against the rights of all other parties involved.
There are instances, however, when a deposition is allowed to be taken before
service of answer once jurisdiction has been acquired over the person or thing. Leave
of court may be granted only in "exceptional" or "unusual" cases, and the decision is
entirely within the discretion of the court. It should be granted only under "special
circumstances" where conditions point to the necessity of presenting a strong case for
allowance of the motion. There must be some "necessity" or "good reason" for taking
the testimony immediately or that it would be prejudicial to the party seeking the
order to be compelled to await joinder of issue. If the witness is aged or infirm, or
about to leave the court's jurisdiction, or is only temporarily in the jurisdiction, leave
may be granted. A general examination by deposition before answer however is
premature and ordinarily not allowed, neither is mere avoidance of delay a sufficient
reason.
In the case at bar, petitioner alleges that the taking of Mr. Gapud's deposition
in lieu of his testimony is necessary because the allegations in the complaint are based
mainly on his disclosures regarding the business activities of President Marcos and
Lucio Tan; that although Mr. Gapud was granted immunity by President Aquino from
criminal, civil and administrative suits, he has been out of the country since 1987 and
has no intention of returning, fearing for his safety; that this fear arose from his
damaging disclosures on the illicit activities of the cronies and business associates of
former President Marcos which therefore renders him unable to testify at the trial.
The Court notes that petitioner waited all these years for a ruling on this case
instead of working for the rest of the defendants to be summoned and their answers be
filed. Petitioner can, as a matter of course, take Mr. Gapud's deposition after the
individual defendants have at least filed their answers.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.

OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL, respondent.
G.R. No. 193158 November 11, 2015

Facts: Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC) filed a complaint

against Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital (OLLH) for the administrative offense of filing
multiple claims, which is penalized under Section 145, Rule XXVIII of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7875. PHIC alleged that
OLLH filed two claims for the same amount of PhilHealth benefits involving the
same patient, diagnosis, and period of confinement. The case was assigned to Senior
Arbiter Atty. Darwin G. De Leon, and summons were duly served upon OLLH.
Respondent OLLH filed a Verified Answer and moved to defer the submission of its
position paper pending the response of the PHIC President and CEO to written
interrogatories and the inspection and copying of certain documents. PHIC opposed
OLLH's motion, and the PHIC Arbitration Department, through Arbiter De Leon,
denied the motion, stating that the administrative proceedings are summary in nature
and that allowing the interrogatories and document inspection would delay the case.
OLLH's Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Aggrieved, OLLH elevated the
issue to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari. The CA reversed the
PHIC Arbitration Department's decision, ruling that OLLH had shown good cause for
its resort to modes of discovery to prepare its defense.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation's
Arbitration Department committed grave abuse of discretion in denying OLLH's
resort to modes of discovery.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation's (PHIC) denial of Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital's (OLLH) request for
modes of discovery in an administrative case involving multiple claims, stating that
PHIC acted within its discretion. The ruling highlighted that the limited discovery is
appropriate due to the summary nature of administrative proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: Through written interrogatories, a party may elicit from the
adverse party or parties any facts or matter that are not privileged and are material and
relevant to the subject of the pending action. Like other modes of discovery
authorized by the Rules, the purpose of written interrogatories is to assist the parties
in clarifying the issues and in ascertaining the facts involved in a case. On the other
hand, the provision on production and inspection of documents is to enable not only
the parties but also the court (in this case, the PHIC Arbitration Department) to
discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with the case pending before
it. It must be shown, therefore, that the documents sought to be produced, inspected
and/or copied/photographed are material or contain evidence relevant to an issue
involved in the action.
 In the case, the questions contained in the written interrogatories filed and
received on July 28, 2009 sought to elicit facts that could already be seen from the
allegations as well as attachments of the Complaint and the Verified Answer.
Specifically, the entries in the three (3) Validation Report that OLLH sought to be
identified and/or explained by PHIC are either immaterial or irrelevant (to the issue of
whether OLLH is guilty of filing multiple claims and OLLH's defense that it
inadvertently attached a second copy of the subject PhilHealth Claim Form 2 to the
Transmittal Letter filed on June 19, 2007) or, even if material or relevant, are self-
explanatory and need no further elaboration from PHIC. Thus, the interrogatories
were frivolous and need not be answered. Aside from this, the PHIC Arbitration
Department correctly observed that the written interrogatories were mistakenly
addressed to the President and CEO of PHIC, who could not competently answer,
either based on his job description or first-hand experience, issues that arose from and
related to the filing and processing of claims.
As the PHIC Arbitration Department held, all the issues and queries raised by
OLLH in its written interrogatories and motion for production/inspection may be
addressed in a hearing to be held after submission of the position paper of the parties.
If the Arbiter deemed it necessary, based on the required pleadings already submitted
g may be conducted wherein witnesses who testify may be subjected to clarificatory
questions. In such hearing, the Arbiter has the power to issue subpoena ad
testificandum and duces tecum; he may issue subpoenas requiring attendance and
testimony of witnesses or the production of documents and other material/s necessary.
In effect, these serve the same purposes of the modes of discovery.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

RULE 30

ARTURO H. TROCIO, petitioner-appellant, vs. JORGE LABAYO,

Undersecretary of Finance; SIXTO B. TADEO, Assistant Provincial Treasurer
of Misamis Oriental; and ABELARDO SUBIDO, Commissioner of Civil
Service, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-35701 September 19, 1973
Facts: Petitioner Arturo Trocio filed in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against
respondents to set aside decision of respondent Abelardo Subido dismissing him from
the position of Municipal Treasurer of Camiguin. An answer to such petition wherein
it was stressed that petitioner had been granted six postponements of the hearing of
the case to afford him a chance to engage the services of counsel.
On September 10, 1964, a notice to the parties that the case had been set for
hearing on October 14 of that year, a copy thereof being served on petitioner's
counsel. Upon that case being called on that date, there was a motion on the part of
petitioner's counsel to set the case for pre-trial. Counsel for petitioner was adamant,
however, insisting that the notice of hearing as such was null and void. When the
Court inquired as to where the petitioner was, counsel answered that he was in Cebu
City, upon his own advice, on the assumption that a hearing on the merits could not be
held.
From the standpoint of the court, this step taken by petitioner smacked of a
dilatory tactic, as evidenced by its being raised only on that morning, notwithstanding
the fact that notice was sent as far back as September 10, 1964 and that at any rate,
petitioner not being present, a pre-trial could not anyway be held. Moreover, the
notification as worded did not preclude a pre-trial, which incidentally was not at all
necessary as the question posed was legal. Hence the order of dismissal, based on
what for the lower court, was a lack of interest to prosecute the case. The matter was
elevated to the CA on the ground that there was a denial of procedural due process.
As the question raised was purely legal, the case was elevated to this Court.
Issue: Whether or not a party is denied his constitutional right to procedural
due process if in the notice of the hearing the suit filed by him, it was not specified
that the purpose thereof was for a pre-trial.
Ruling: No. Merit attaches to the contention of petitioner that the notice as to
the hearing scheduled for October 14 should specify that it was for a pre-trial. A
hearing as known to the law is not confined to a trial but embraces the several stages
of litigation. It does not preclude pre-trial. A hearing "does not necessarily mean
presentation of evidence." It could cover the determination of whether an accused is
entitled to bail or the submission for the court's determination of a motion to dismiss,
or any motion for that matter. It does not admit of doubt then, considering furthermore
what did transpire, that such a purely technical objection on the part of petitioner
raised at the last moment should not be taken too seriously. Much less does it lay any
basis for an asserted denial of procedural due process.
Ratio Decidendi: As set forth in an opinion penned by Justice Castro,
speaking for the Court, in Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro: "One of
the objectives of pre-trial procedure is to take trial of cases out of the realm of surprise
and maneuvering." Pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues
necessary to the disposition of a cause are properly raised. Thus, to obviate the
element of surprise, parties are expected to disclose at a pre-trial conference all issues
of law and fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve
privilege or impeaching matter. The lower court therefore acted in accordance with
law and sound reason when it noted that the facts being undisputed and the legal issue
likewise being clear, pre-trial, under the circumstances, would not be a necessity even
on the assumption that the belated insistence of its observance by petitioner was
motivated in entire good faith.
The suspicion entertained by the lower court as to its being resorted to as a
dilatory tactic by petitioner was not without basis. He had more than a month, from
September 9 to October 14, 1966, to seek clarification of the nature of the scheduled
hearing. What was even more revealing as to his lack of good faith was his absence
on the day of hearing. What was the lower court to make of such tell-tale conduct?
Did it not indicate lack of interest to prosecute? There was nothing then, that did
smack of arbitrariness in its ruling as it did. There was no affront to the sense of
justice and of fair play which is essential for an assault on any actuation of
governmental agency predicated on a denial of due process succeed. Instead of this
futile insistence on a pre-trial, which would serve no useful purpose, petitioner could
have impressed on the court the legal support for his stand that the order of dismissal
by respondent Commissioner of Civil Service was devoid of legality. He did nothing
of the kind. Under the undeniable facts of record, the lower court certainly could have
decreed the dismissal without any legitimate fear that its order suffers from the
constitutional infirmity of failure to accord respect to the due process safeguard.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,

MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS AND ELIZABETH DIMAANO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 123997 January 20, 1999
Facts: The petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a special civil action for
certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition against the Sandiganbayan and Brig. Gen.
Pedro R. Balbanero. The Republic alleged that Balbanero acquired funds, real
properties, and other assets amounting to P10.5 million that were manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and emoluments. Balbanero filed an answer with
counterclaim, and the Republic filed a reply with a motion to dismiss the
counterclaim.
The Sandiganbayan required Balbanero to prove the legal source of the
remaining P1.3 million of his alleged unexplained wealth. The parties were required
to meet to resolve the matter before trial. Balbanero submitted a document titled "Real
Estate Mortgage Loan" to prove the legal source of the remaining P165,043.00. The
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) denied that Balbanero had
satisfactorily explained the legitimate source of his wealth. The Sandiganbayan
allowed the Republic to present oral and documentary evidence to support its
complaint for forfeiture. Balbanero moved to limit the remaining issue to the amount
of P165,043.00, but the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. Balbanero filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Supreme Court. Balbanero moved
to cancel the hearings on 18, 19, and 20 October 1995, but the Sandiganbayan denied
the cancellation. On 19 October 1995, the Republic appeared without its promised
witness and requested a reset of the hearing, but the Sandiganbayan denied the motion
and required the Republic to submit a written offer of evidence within fifteen days.
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying the Republic's oral motion for postponement of the 19 and 20 October
1995 hearings and requiring it to submit a written offer of evidence.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s
dismissal of the case. The investigation and forfeiture proceedings against Major
General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and insufficient evidence, highlighting the authority limitations of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government over military personnel. The ruling
emphasized constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure.
Ratio Decidendi: It is well-settled that motions for continuance or deferment
of hearings are granted only upon meritorious grounds and that the grant or denial
thereof is addressed to the sound discretion of the court the exercise of which will not
be disturbed except on a showing of a patent and grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner
failed to show such patent and grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondent in denying its oral motion for postponement. Records show that the 18, 19
and 20 October hearings were scheduled some five (5) months earlier, or on 10 May
1995, for several reasons among which was to give Associate Solicitor Tagapan of the
OSG, who appeared for the first time vice Solicitor Reodica, an opportunity to study
the case. In addition, on 13 October 1995 when public respondent Sandiganbayan
cancelled the 18 October hearing, it cautioned the parties that such cancellation was
without prejudice to the settings on 19 and 20 October 1995. However, on 19 October
1995, Solicitor Tagapan appeared only to manifest that he had just been relieved from
the case and that other solicitors were assigned to take over but unfortunately they
were not then available. The OSG explains that the re-assignment was effected in
response to public respondent's complaint about the assignment of many PCGG cases
to young and inexperienced solicitors. But a careful reading of the questioned Order
of 19 October 1995 shows that public respondent objected not so much on the
assignment of the case to young and inexperienced solicitors but that such re-
assignment was done on short notice and very close to the date of scheduled hearings.
The excuse given by the OSG completely failed to justify why the re-assignment had
to be done so near to the scheduled hearing of 19 October 1995 and, worse, to
solicitors who were not even present.
Furthermore, it has not been shown that some other urgent circumstance
prompted the re- assignment to justify the OSG's non-compliance with the requisites
of motions in general set out in Rule 15 of the Rules of Court Sec. 2 of which
provides that motions shall be in writing except motions for continuance made in the
presence of the adverse party, or those made in the course of a hearing or trial. A
motion for postponement should not be filed at the last hour and that judges are
cautioned against granting improvident postponements. Thus when the reason
adduced in support of a motion for postponement was not unavoidable or could have
been foreseen but was presented only on the day of the trial although there was no
apparent reason why it could not have been presented earlier, thus avoiding
inconvenience to the adverse party, it is proper for the court to deny postponement.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

MILWAUKEE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF

TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 173815 November 24, 2010
 Facts: In 1998, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) notified
Milwaukee Industries of its intent to examine their books of account and other
accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for 1997 and other unverified prior
years. Milwaukee complied with the directive and submitted its documents to CIR.
After this, CIR issued three undated assessment notices together with a
demand letter and explanation of the deficiency tax assessments. Milwaukee protested
the assessments on the CIR tax assessments. Due to CIRs inaction regarding its
protest, Milwaukee filed a petition for review before the CTA. The CTA then asked
Milwaukee to continue its presentation of rebuttal evidence. Not prepared, Milwaukee
moved for the postponement of the pre-marking and presentation of its rebuttal
evidence. Immediately, the CTA issued a verbal order denying Milwaukee’s motion
and likewise gave Milwaukee 10 days within which to submit its Formal Offer of
Rebuttal Evidence. Milwaukee moved for reconsideration but was denied. Aggrieved,
Milwaukee filed this petition before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Respondent Court of Tax Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to be allowed to present rebuttal
evidence and its subsequent motion for reconsideration.
2. Whether or not petitioner was denied due process by not being allowed to
present its rebuttal evidence in relation to its disallowed interest and bank
charges.
Ruling: No. The Court held that the Court of Tax Appeals did not commit
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to be allowed to present rebuttal
evidence and its subsequent motion for reconsideration and that the petitioner was not
denied due process by not being allowed to present its rebuttal evidence in relation to
its disallowed interest and bank charges.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court emphasized that as a rule, the grant or denial of a
motion for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which
should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere
convenience of the courts or of the parties, the ends of justice and fairness should be
served thereby and that this discretion must be exercised intelligently. In the present
case, the Court is of the view that the CTA gave enough opportunity for Milwaukee to
present its rebuttal evidence. The records would show that when Milwaukee requested
for resetting on September 5, 2005 and October 26, 2005, its motions were granted by
the CTA. As a matter of fact, by January 16, 2006, Milwaukee was already able to
partially present its rebuttal evidence. Thus, when the CTA called on Milwaukee to
continue its presentation of rebuttal evidence on February 27, 2006, it should have
been prepared to do so. It cannot be said that the CTA arbitrarily denied Milwaukee’s
supposed simple request of resetting because it had already given the latter several
months to prepare and gather its rebuttal evidence. Milwaukee tried to reason out that
if only the CIR gave an advance notice that it would be waiving its right to cross-
examine its witness, then it could have "rushed the collation and sorting of its rebuttal
documentary exhibits."
The Court held that, Milwaukee was given more than ample time to collate and gather
its evidence. It should have been prepared for the continuance of the trial. True, the
incident on said date was for the cross-examination of Milwaukee’s witness but it
could be short; it could be lengthy. Milwaukee should have prepared for any
eventuality. It is discretionary on the part of the court to allow a piece-meal
presentation of evidence. If it decides not to allow it, it cannot be considered an abuse
of discretion. Finally, the Court stated that Milwaukee’s right to due process was not
transgressed. The Court has consistently reminded litigants that due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard. The requirement of due process is satisfactorily met as
long as the parties are given the opportunity to present their side. In the case at bar,
Milwaukee was precisely given the right and the opportunity to present its side. It was
able to present its evidence-in-chief and had its opportunity to present rebuttal
evidence.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION
VICENTE YU, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EMILIO MAPAYO, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-29742 March 29, 1972
Facts: Plaintiff Vicente Yu (Yu) filed a case for recovery of sum against
defendant Emilio Mapayo (Mapayo) for the unpaid balance of the sale between them.
In his answer, Mapayo alleged that the balance was due to a hidden defect which, in
view of such defect, Yu allegedly waived. The city court decided in favor of Yu, but
on appeal, the court ordered plaintiff to submit his evidence, which Yu’s counsel
asked the court to let Mapayo prove his claim of the defect since it was his allegation,
which the court denied, causing the dismissal of the case. Motions for reconsideration
were also denied, hence this petition.
 Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff should provide the evidence for the
allegation of the defendant.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Vicente Yu's case
against Emilio Mapayo for an unpaid balance on a marine engine, emphasizing that
Mapayo's admissions obligated him to justify his defenses. The court ordered a ruling
in favor of Yu for the outstanding amount, affirming the rights of plaintiffs in
disputed claims.
Ratio Decidendi: Under section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,
“admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other
proceedings do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown
to have been made through palpable mistake.” Plaintiff’s counsel refused to comply
with the order of the trial court requiring plaintiff to present his evidence. Instead of
calling his witnesses, he moved the court to present them after the defendant had
presented their evidence. Such a stand is supported by Section 2 of the Revised Rule
of Court 129, which provides that admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or
in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and cannot be
contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake.
The appellate court ruled in favor of the plaintiff-appellant, overturning the
trial court's dismissal order. The court reasoned that since the defendant had admitted
the essential allegations in the complaint, it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to
provide further proof of these admitted facts. The court cited Section 2 of Rule 129 of
the Revised Rules of Court, emphasizing that judicial admissions fulfill the
evidentiary requirements for those facts.
The appellate court also criticized the trial judge's handling of the proceedings, noting
that the insistence on the plaintiff to present evidence, despite the admissions,
constituted a misunderstanding of the rules of evidence. The trial judge's behavior was
deemed inappropriate, as it disrupted the due process the plaintiff was entitled to
receive.
As a result, the court set aside the dismissal and remanded the case, directing the
lower court to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum claimed, plus
reasonable attorney's fees.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

RULE 31
STEEL CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EQUITABLE
PCI BANK, INC., (now known as BDO UNIBANK, INC.), Respondent.

G.R. No. 190462 November 17, 2010

Facts: Petitioner Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) is a domestic

corporation incorporated and registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It is engaged in the manufacturing and distribution of cold-rolled and
galvanized steel sheets and coils. During its operations, SCP encountered and suffered
from financial difficulties and temporary illiquidity, aggravated by the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis. And shortage in working capital and reduced operating capacity
compounded its problem. As a result, SCP was unable to service its principal
payments for its liabilities.
Respondent Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., now known as Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc.
(BDO-EPCIB) filed a creditor-initiated petition to place the SCP under corporate
rehabilitation pursuant to the provisions of Section 1, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. SCP did not oppose the petition but instead
filed its own counter rehabilitation plan and submitted it for the consideration of the
Rehabilitation Court. RTC promulgated a Decision approving the Modified
Rehabilitation Plan. Therefrom, several creditors went to the CA via separate
Petitions for Review on Certiorari, to wit: (1) SCPs petition entitled Steel Corporation
of the Philippines v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.; (2) DEGs petition entitled DEG
Deutsche Investitions-und Entwicklungsgesselschaft mbH v. Steel Corporation of the
Philippines; (3) BDO-EPCIBs petition; and (4) Investments 2234 Philippines Fund I,
Inc.s (IPFIs) petition entitled Investments 2234 Philippines Fund I (SPV-AMC), Inc.
v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.
The petitions of SCP and IPFI were eventually consolidated under CA-G.R.
SP No. 101732. However, the CA denied BDO-EPCIBs motion to consolidate with
CA-G.R. SP No. 101732.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in refusing to consolidate the cases
pending before it.
Ruling: Yes. The Court agree with Steel Corporation of the Philippines
(SCP). By refusing to consolidate the cases, the CA, in effect, dispensed a form of
piecemeal judgment that has veritably resulted in the multiplicity of suits. Such action
is not regarded with favor, because consolidation should always be ordered whenever
it is possible.

Ratio Decidendi: Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Sec.

1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. Likewise, Rule 3, Sec. 3 of the 2002 Internal Rules
of the CA adopts the same rule. It is a time-honored principle that when two or more
cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they must be
consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to
settle expeditiously the issues involved. Consolidation is proper wherever the subject
matter involved and relief demanded in the different suits make it expedient for the
court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the rights of the parties by
hearing the suits together. Consolidation aims to attain justice with the least expense
and vexation to the parties-litigants. The purpose of this rule is to avoid multiplicity of
suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets,
and simplify the work of the trial court. In short, consolidation aims to attain justice
with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants. It contributes to the swift
dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Further, it
results in the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by
the courts in two or more cases, which would otherwise require a single judgment.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the REGIONAL

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, REGION III, Petitioner, vs.
HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO, JR. and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
OLONGAPO CITY, Respondents.

GR No. 199501, March 6, 2013

Facts: This case involved an action for annulment of the miscellaneous sales
patent filed by Apog and San Juan; and for the cancellation and reversion of title filed
by the Republic, against Oribello, Jr. before the RTC of Olongapo City. On July 25,
1997, this Court issued an Order stating that on several occasions when these cases
were set for trial, neither of the Republic’s counsels appeared, constraining the Court
to postpone the hearing. The actuations of both lawyers result to delay in the early
termination of these cases which have been pending since 1992. Hence, the Republic
of the Philippines is hereby deemed to have abandoned the case for the government.
On 21 February 2005, the trial court dismissed the consolidated cases without
prejudice for non-substitution of the deceased plaintiff (Oribello) and his counsel. The
Republic moved for reconsideration, contending that the Order applied exclusively to
civil case for recovery of possession and did not affect civil case for reversion of
property. Petitioner prayed that it be allowed to present its evidence. The trial court
allowed the continuation of the presentation of petitioner’s evidence in its Order dated
29 June 2005.
The heirs of Oribello filed a Manifestation and Motion. They pointed out that
from the time the Republic received the Order in 1997, it did nothing to question the
same, making the Order final. In its Resolution of 12 July 2006, the trial court recalled
its Order and dismissed the case. The Republic appealed to the CA. The CA agreed
with respondents that petitioner has lost its right to participate in the proceedings of
the case when it failed to question the trial court’s order on 12 September 1997,
declaring it to have abandoned the case. As a consequence of petitioner’s inaction,
such order inevitably became final. The Republic contends that the 12 September
1997 Order of the trial court, deeming it to have abandoned the case, is interlocutory
in nature; thus, is not appealable. The Respondents argue otherwise, maintaining that
such Order is a dismissal of the complaint on the ground of failure to prosecute which
is, under the Rules, considered an adjudication on the merits, and hence appealable.
Issue: Whether or not the September 12, 1997 Order was interlocutory,
meaning it did not fully dispose of the case and therefore should not be subject to
appeal.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, determining that
the September 12, 1997 Order was indeed interlocutory rather than a final dismissal.
The Court stated that the trial court had only deemed the petitioner to have abandoned
its presentation of evidence, rather than dismissing the case itself. It emphasized that
there must be a thorough evaluation of whether there was a genuine intention to delay
the proceedings by the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court emphasized that an interlocutory order "does not
dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon" by the court.
Its effects are merely provisional in character and substantial proceedings have to be
further conducted by the court in order to finally resolve the issue or controversy. The
Court in its decision highlighted that, a final order is defined as “one which disposes
of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined
by the court.” Conversely, an interlocutory order “does not dispose of the case
completely but leaves something to be decided upon” by the court. Its effects are
merely provisional in character and substantial proceedings have to be further
conducted by the court in order to finally resolve the issue or controversy.
While petitioner failed to appear on the hearing of 12 September 1997, such
failure does not constitute a ground for the dismissal of the reversion complaint for
failure to prosecute. Petitioner’s non-appearance on that date should simply be
construed as a waiver of the right to present additional evidence. Termination of
presentation of a party’s evidence does not equate to dismissal of the complaint for
failure to prosecute. In fact, the trial court merely "deemed" petitioner to have
abandoned the case without stating expressly and unequivocally that the complaint for
reversion was dismissed.
As to the second issue, Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that
an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
Since the Court decided that the Order is interlocutory in nature, the same is not
subject to appeal as the order has not completely disposes of the case.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

RULE 32
Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY, respondent.
G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004
Facts: In 2003, Social Justice Society (SJS), a political party, filed a petition
for Declaratory Relief to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking the interpretation of
a few constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of Church and State
(Sec. 6, Art. II, 1987 Constitution), and wanted relief on the constitutionality of the
acts of the religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office during the
election period. Among the religious leaders were Mike Velarde, Cardinal Sin, Eddie
Villanueva, Eli Soriano and Eraño Manalo, who claimed that there was justiciable
controversy nor a cause of action in the case filed against them; thus, seeking the
dismissal of the petition. The RTC denied the motion for the dismissal and decided on
the case on the basis of deeming the endorsement of specific candidates in an election
to any public office as a clear violation of the separation clause in the Sec. 6, Art. II of
the 1987 Constitution. It then proceeded with a lengthy opinion of the issue raise.
Issue/s: Whether or not Social Justice Society’s (SJS) declaratory relief is
procedurally infirm and lacking substantively?
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Velarde, granting his
Petition for Review. It found the SJS’s Petition for Declaratory Relief procedurally
infirm and lacking substantively for several reasons such as failure to show justiciable
controversy; lack of legal standing; inadequate cause of action; and procedural
deficiencies of the Regional Trial Court.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court emphasized that SJS's claims were speculative
and did not present an actual controversy—there were no specific acts by Velarde that
threatened SJS’s rights. A justiciable controversy must be based on concrete facts, not
conjecture. The Court noted that SJS failed to demonstrate sufficient legal interest or
injury necessary to pursue the declaration. Simple assertions of being an interested
party as voters did not meet the required material interest in the issues raised. The SJS
Petition did not state ultimate facts or grievances against the respondents, rendering it
void of essential elements required to establish a cause of action. It functioned more
as a request for an advisory opinion rather than a legitimate legal claim. The Supreme
Court criticized the RTC for its failure to provide a dispositive portion in its ruling,
which is a critical element of any judicial decision. The absence of clear factual
findings and legal grounds made the RTC's ruling fundamentally flawed and void
according to existing legal standards.
The decision established significant principles regarding the necessity of
clearly demonstrated standing and justiciable controversies in declaratory relief
actions, as well as the importance of adhering to procedural requirements in judicial
rulings.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, Petitioners, vs.

SPS. RODOLFO C. MAÑALAC, JR. and ROSITA P. MAÑALAC, Respondents.

G.R. No. 145441. April 26, 2005

 Facts: The case involves the Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and the
spouses Rodolfo and Rosita Mañalac. On October 8, 1976, the Mañalacs obtained a
loan of P1,300,000.00 from PSBank, secured by a real estate mortgage over eight
parcels of land. Due to their inability to pay, the loan was restructured on October 13,
1977, increasing the amount to P1,550,000.00. On March 5, 1979, the Mañalacs, with
PSBank's consent, sold three of the mortgaged properties to the spouses Igmidio and
Dolores Galicia, who assumed part of the mortgage. The Galicias then mortgaged
these properties to secure their own loan from PSBank. The Mañalacs defaulted again,
leading PSBank to foreclose on the remaining five properties. The foreclosure sale
occurred on May 3, 1982, with PSBank as the highest bidder. The Mañalacs failed to
redeem the properties, resulting in the consolidation of titles in PSBank's name. On
December 16, 1983, the Mañalacs attempted to repurchase some of the properties by
tendering a check for P1,200,000.00, but PSBank refused to release the properties.
The Mañalacs then filed an action for damages, and PSBank filed a petition for a writ
of possession. The cases were consolidated, and the trial court annulled the
foreclosure sale and dismissed PSBank's petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision with modifications, awarding moral damages to the Mañalacs. PSBank then
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the consolidation of civil
cases no. 53967 with LRC case no. 3951 when procedurally those two could scarcely
be consolidated.
Ruling: No. The Court rejected the contention that the Court of Appeals erred
in consolidating Civil Cases No. 53967 with LRC Case No. 3951. The Supreme
Court ultimately reversed the decision, reinstating the sale's validity and adjusting the
awarded damages.
Ratio Decidendi: While a petition for a writ of possession is an ex parte
proceeding, being made on a presumed right of ownership, when such presumed right
of ownership is contested and is made the basis of another action, then the
proceedings for writ of possession would also become groundless the entire case must
be litigated and if need be must be consolidated with a related case so as to thresh out
thoroughly all related issues. Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the trial court’s order consolidating Civil Case No. 53967 with LRC Case
No. R-3951, arguing that consolidation is proper only when it involves actions, which
means an ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or a prevention of a wrong. The Court held
that while a petition for a writ of possession is an ex parte proceeding, being made on
a presumed right of ownership, when such presumed right of ownership is contested
and is made the basis of another action, then the proceedings for writ of possession
would also become groundless. The entire case must be litigated and if need be must
be consolidated with a related case so as to thresh out thoroughly all related issues.
In the same case, the Court likewise rejected the contention that under the
Rules of Court only actions can be consolidated. The Court held that the technical
difference between an action and a proceeding, which involve the same parties and
subject matter, becomes insignificant and consolidation becomes a logical conclusion
in order to avoid confusion and unnecessary expenses with the multiplicity of suits. In
the instant case, the consolidation of Civil Case No. 53967 with LRC Case No. R-
3951 is more in consonance with the rationale behind the consolidation of cases
which is to promote a more expeditious and less expensive resolution of the
controversy than if they were heard independently by separate branches of the trial
court. Hence, the technical difference between Civil Case No. 53967 and LRC Case
No. R-3951 must be disregarded in order to promote the ends of justice.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

RULE 33
FREDERICK F. FELIPE, petitioners, vs. MGM MOTOR TRADING
CORPORATION, doing business under the name and style NISSAN
GALLERY-ORTIGAS, and AYALA GENERAL INSURANCE
CORPORATION, respondents.

GR No. 191849 September 23, 2015

Facts: Frederick Felipe filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages
against MGM Motors, Inc. and Ayala General Insurance Corporation (Ayala
Insurance) wherein he claimed that he purchased on installment basis a Nissan
Terrano Wagon through MGM Motors' authorized representative Jane Sarmiento. He
allegedly gave a P200k downpayment and P5000 reservation fee to Sarmiento. He
further issued seven (7) Allied Bank checks, each bearing the amount of P24,165.00
payable to MGM Motors. When he got the vehicle, he then insured it with Ayala
Insurance and paid a premium of P40,220.67.
 One day, the vehicle, while parked along Adriatico Street in Manila, was
reportedly lost. He tried to claim from Ayala Insurance but the latter refused to pay its
liability causing damages to Felipe. On the other hand, MGM Motors refused to
produce, despite repeated demands, the document of sale by installment covering the
vehicle. He allegedly paid additional P200k as partial payment for the vehicle. The
refusal of MGM Motors to produce the document and its renouncement of the
existence of the installment sale; and the subsequent unlawful insistence on a cash
transaction agreement, had caused damages to him.
MGM Motors’ denied receiving the down payment of P200k and P5k
reservation fee paid through Sarmiento. Consequently, MGM Motors filed a case for
violation of BP 22 against Felipe’s mother. In order to settle the civil aspect of the BP
22 case, Felipe paid P200k to MGM Motors. MGM Motors counterclaimed for
damages. While Ayala Insurance said Felipe had no valid cause of action against them
since he had no insurable interest because he is not the owner of the vehicle that he
had insured with it. Ayala Insurance also counterclaimed for damages. MGM Motors
and Ayala Insurance filed Motions to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence. The Regional
Trial Court dismissed the case. The evidence admitted by the trial court do not prove
the material allegations of Felipe's complaint, as well as the alleged liability of Ayala
Insurance. The motion for reconsideration by Felipe was also denied. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in granting the demurrer to evidence
filed by MGM Motors and Ayala Insurance.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision to
deny the petitioner’s claims. The Court ruled that the trial court correctly dismissed
the case due to insufficient evidence to support Felipe’s allegations. They noted that
while the receipt constituted payment, it did not itself suffice to establish an
installment sale.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court articulated that the burden of proof lies on the
party making the allegations. In this case, the evidence admitted (the testimony of
Felipe's father and the receipt) did not substantiate a claim for an installment sale as
there was no documentation or clear indication of any installment agreement from
MGM Motors. The trial court had also noted that the only sales invoice indicated a
cash transaction.
 As for Ayala Insurance, Felipe failed to demonstrate his insurable interest,
essential for making an insurance claim, as his ownership was not established at the
time of the vehicle's loss. The dismissal based on demurrer to evidence was thus
deemed appropriate.
A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence and is presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one
of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. - After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether the
plaintiff has been able to show that he is entitled to his claim, and it is incumbent
upon the trial court judge to make such a determination. The allegation that the
purchase of the vehicle was on an installment basis was not supported by any
evidence. The receipt of a partial payment does not suffice to prove that the purchase
was made on an installment basis. Felipe did not present any document to prove said
allegation while MGM Motors produced a sales invoice wherein it was stated that the
mode of payment is "COD" or cash on delivery. Felipe also failed to substantiate his
allegation against Ayala Insurance. He has the burden of proof to show that a loss
occurred and said loss was covered by his insurance policy. Considering that the trial
court only admitted two pieces of evidence in Felipe's favor and none of those tend to
prove loss of the subject car and coverage thereof under the insurance policy, Felipe is
not entitled to the reliefs he had prayed for.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JUAN C. TUVERA,

VICTOR P. TUVERA and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 148246 February 16, 2007
 Facts: This case arises from a civil complaint filed by the Republic of the
Philippines against Juan C. Tuvera, Victor P. Tuvera, and Twin Peaks Development
Corporation (Twin Peaks) to recover what the Republic alleged to be ill-gotten wealth
acquired through fraudulent and illegal means during the regime of former President
Ferdinand Marcos. Twin Peaks was established in March 1984 with Victor Tuvera,
son of Juan Tuvera, as a major shareholder. Juan Tuvera was serving as the
Presidential Executive Assistant to President Marcos during this period. In May 1984,
a Timber License Agreement (TLA No. 356) was granted to Twin Peaks by President
Marcos, allowing it to operate on 26,000 hectares of forest land. This license
permitted the company to conduct logging operations and export timber, specifically
mahogany from the narra species. The Philippine Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) was created after Marcos was ousted in 1986 to recover the ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcos regime. In June 1988, the PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration on all
assets of Twin Peaks, asserting that these assets were acquired through unlawful
means. Following this, the Republic filed a complaint seeking restitution of TLA No.
356, claiming gross abuse of authority and public trust on the part of the Tuveras. The
respondents, on the other hand, moved for the dismissal of the case through a
demurrer to evidence after the Republic presented its case. They contended that Twin
Peaks was awarded TLA No. 356 after complying with various legal requirements
and denied any allegations of wrongdoing. They argued that the PCGG lacked the
authority to institute the action, and they filed counterclaims for damages against the
Republic. The Sandiganbayan sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case, leading
to the Republic's appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issues: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the demurrer to
evidence and is the doctrine of res judicata applicable to bar the Republic’s claim.
Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the Sandiganbayan's decision to grant
the demurrer to evidence. The Court noted that the Sandiganbayan erroneously
applied the doctrine of res judicata in ruling against the Republic. It clarified that res
judicata applies only when there is an identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
action, which was lacking in this case.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court stressed that the issue at hand was whether the
Republic proved its cause of action, and it emphasized that the respondents had
waived their right to present evidence by opting for a demurrer. The Court found that
the absence of a competitive bidding process for the issuance of the TLA indicated
substantial insufficiencies in how Twin Peaks secured its timber rights, this indicating
possible abuse of power linked to Juan Tuvera’s influence as a presidential aide.
While the Court found inadequacies in the evidence presented by the Republic
concerning actual damages, it ruled that it could award temperate and exemplary
damages given the evidence of wrongful acts. The Supreme Court ordered the
respondents to pay one million pesos each as temperate and exemplary damages for
their wrongful conduct.
Further, the Court stated that an examination of the Sandiganbayan’s
Resolution shows that dismissal of the case on demurrer to evidence was principally
anchored on the Republic’s failure to show its right to relief because of the existence
of a prior judgment which consequently barred the relitigation of the same issue. In
other words, the Sandiganbayan did not dismiss the case on the insufficiency of the
Republic’s evidence nor on the strength of respondents’ evidence. In addition, the
Court decided that demurrer to evidence must not be granted. The general rule is that
upon the dismissal of the demurrer in the appellate court, the defendant loses the right
to present his evidence and the appellate court shall then proceed to render judgment
on the merits on the basis of plaintiff’s evidence. It thus becomes the Court’s duty to
rule on the merits of the complaint, duly taking into account the evidence presented
by the Republic, and without need to consider whatever evidence the Tuveras have,
they having waived their right to present evidence in their behalf.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

TEODORO K. KATIGBAK and BIENVENIDO E. MERELOS, petitioners, vs.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 140183 July 10, 2003
Facts: On July 18, 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) entered into a
contractual agreement for the land development of the Pahanocoy Sites and Services,
Phase I in Bacolod City with A.C. Cruz Construction, represented by Arceo Cruz. The
contract was officially confirmed by the NHA Board of Directors with work
commencing shortly after. However, on August 29, 1991, the NHA unilaterally
rescinded the contract and shifted the remaining construction works to Triad
Construction and Development Corporation, headed by Jose Cruz. Following the
rescission, Arceo Cruz filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. A
preliminary investigation led to the filing of an information with the Sandiganbayan
on May 3, 1995, accusing several officials, including petitioners Teodoro K. Katigbak
and Bienvenido E. Merelos, of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(RA 3019). They were specifically charged with conspiring to act with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality, resulting in the improper rescission of the initial contract
and the awarding of the construction work to another contractor without public
bidding, thereby causing undue injury both to Arceo Cruz and to the government.
During the trial, the prosecution presented various witnesses and numerous
documents to substantiate their claims, arguing that the petitioners acted in bad faith.
The case underwent periods of motion, including a demurrer to the evidence filed by
the petitioners on January 12, 1998, which the Sandiganbayan later denied in its
resolutions dated April 7, 1999, and August 9, 1999.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners' demurrer to evidence.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioners,
finding that the evidence presented by the prosecution did not sufficiently establish
their involvement in the alleged criminal activities related to the rescission of the
contract.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court decided that the respondent Sandiganbayan's
denial of the motion to dismiss the instant criminal case on demurrer to evidence
constituted grave abuse of discretion. The denial was a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The Court highlighted that a
demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action to the effect
that the evidence his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true
or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to
support a verdict of guilt. The Court stated that a careful scrutiny of the documentary
evidence adduced by the prosecution does not support the charge of violation of
Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019, as amended, in the instant information against
the petitioners. Significantly, the said pieces of documentary evidence were offered
only for the purpose of establishing the participation and liability of their co-accused,
Robert Balao. In this connection, the rule is explicit that courts should consider the
evidence only for the purpose for which it is offered. The prosecution relies heavily on
NHA Board Resolution No. 2453 to establish the alleged conspiracy between the
petitioners and their co-accused. This resolution purportedly approved the
cancellation on the ground of "mutual termination" and the award of the contract to
Jose Cruz. However, the Court is bothered by the unexplained failure of the
prosecution to include in its formal offer of exhibits such a very vital piece of
evidence in proving the existence of the alleged conspiracy.
The Court emphasize that any evidence a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must formally be offered by him. Such a formal offer is
necessary because it is the duty of the judge to rest his findings of fact and his
judgment strictly on the evidence offered by the parties at the trial; and no finding of
fact can be sustained if not supported by such evidence. Documents not regularly
received in evidence during the trial will not be considered in disposing of the issues
in an action. In view of the complete absence of evidence, both testimonial and
documentary, the petitioners satisfactorily demonstrated that the prosecution had
failed to prove the crime charged against them, respondent Sandiganbayan's denial of
their motion to dismiss the instant criminal case on demurrer to evidence constituted
grave abuse of discretion. The denial was a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION

(SOLIDBANK), petitioners, vs. DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC.,
NARCISO G. MORALES, AND SPOUSE, respondents.
G.R. No. 143338 July 29, 2005

Facts: The case stems from a complaint filed by The Consolidated Bank and
Trust Corporation (Solidbank) against Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., Narciso G.
Morales, and his spouse. The bank sought recovery of a sum of money claiming that it
extended a loan of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) to the respondents on April 23,
1982, evidenced by a promissory note they executed that day. The terms required the
respondents to pay the loan in twenty-five monthly installments of ₱40,000.00 each,
with an interest rate of 23% per annum, and the full amount to be settled by May 23,
1984.
After the respondents defaulted on their payments, Solidbank alleged that the total
outstanding amount had reached ₱1,332,474.55 by March 9, 1984, prompting it to
issue both oral and written demands for the outstanding payment. In response to the
bank's Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the Defendants in Default, respondents claimed
they were never served with the summons or the complaint. Del Monte Motor Works
filed an answer denying the allegations, claiming the promissory note was void for
lack of valid consideration, asserting they never received any funds. Morales admitted
certain parts of the complaint while qualifying his acknowledgment by stating he had
been living separately from his spouse and that their property relations followed a
system of complete separation of property, thereby contesting any obligations under
the conjugal partnership. As the case progressed, Solidbank presented its evidence
primarily through Liberato A. Lavarino, the bank's collection manager, who testified
about the loan and subsequent demands. However, during the trial, issues arose
regarding the original promissory note, which was missing. Solidbank attempted to
introduce a duplicate original as evidence, but the respondents filed motions to
exclude it, arguing that it lacked proper identification and constituted hearsay. The
trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, dismissing Solidbank’s complaint on
December 28, 1987, stating that the absence of the original promissory note and
proper identification of the duplicate undermined Solidbank's claims. This decision
was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeals on November 25, 1999, leading
Solidbank to file a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the application of the best evidence rule which led to
the exclusion of exhibit E was proper.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Solidbank, reversing the
decisions of the lower courts. The Court held that the best evidence rule as stated in
our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court explained that respondents failed to specifically
deny the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note as required under the
Rules of Court. By not providing specific, sworn denials to these facts, the
respondents effectively admitted their obligation. The Court clarified that while the
best evidence rule requires the original document to be presented, exceptions exist.
Since the original promissory note was in the respondents' possession, whose failure
to produce it warranted acceptance of the duplicate note as sufficient evidence. The
absence of the original meant Solidbank was not required to produce evidence to
prove the content of the promissory note. The claims of bias against the presiding
judge were dismissed by the Court, stating that there was no credible evidence of bias
or prejudgment based on extrajudicial sources.
 The decision established that a failure to properly contest the genuineness of a
document can result in an admission of the obligation, reaffirming the importance of
specific denials and supporting declarations under oath.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

RULE 34
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
SANNAEDLE CO., LTD., Respondent.

G.R. No. 181676 June 11, 2014

Facts: This case arose from a Complaint for Sum of Money filed by Sannaedle Co.,
Ltd. (respondent) against Asian Construction and Development Corporation
(petitioner). The complaint was premised on a Memorandum of Agreement that the
parties executed, wherein the respondent was engaged to supply and erect insulated
panel systems at various pavilions as part of the Philippine Centennial Exposition
Theme Park, specifically for the Phase I Project, for a total amount of $3,745,287.94.
The petitioner made several payments totaling $3,129,667.32, leaving an outstanding
balance of $615,620.33. The respondent claimed that it had made multiple written
demands for payment, which the petitioner ignored. In response, the petitioner filed
an Answer with a Counterclaim, alleging various defenses. The respondent challenged
the sufficiency of the petitioner’s Answer through a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, asserting that the allegations in the Answer constituted an admission of the
essential claims made in the Complaint. On October 6, 2000, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ruled in favor of the respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay the balance of
$615,620.33 with interest at 12% per annum. The petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied, prompting an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). On
April 25, 2006, the CA dismissed the appeal and upheld the RTC's decision, a ruling
reaffirmed upon the denial of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on February
6, 2008.
Issue: Whether or not whether the judgment on the pleadings entered by the
RTC and affirmed by the CA was proper, given that the petitioner had raised special
and affirmative defenses in its Answer.
 Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court found that the petition lacked merit. It
upheld the use of judgment on the pleadings as appropriate because the petitioner’s
Answer failed to tender a genuine issue. Under the applicable rules, particularly
Section 1, Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is warranted when the Answer does not deny essential allegations or does
not create a substantive issue regarding the claims made.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court emphasized that Judgment on the Pleadings is
proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. An answer fails to tender an issue if it
does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and
10, Rule 8 of the 1997 . Additionally, the Court stated that while petitioner allegedly
raised affirmative defenses, i.e., defect in the certification of nonforum shopping, no
legal capacity to sue and fortuitous event, the same cannot still bar respondent from
seeking the collection of the unpaid balance. Other than these affirmative defenses,
petitioner’s denial neither made a specific denial that a Memorandum of Agreement
was perfected nor did it contest the genuineness and due execution of said agreement .
The Court reiterated that the petitioner had admitted to the execution of the
Memorandum of Agreement and the existence of the balance due. It highlighted that
the defenses raised by the petitioner, which included defects in documentation and
claims of fortuitous events affecting payment obligations, did not address the core
obligation of payment established by the agreement itself.
NO CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINION

RULE 35

MANUEL YBIERNAS, VICENTE YBIERNAS, MARIA CORAZON

ANGELES, VIOLETA YBIERNAS, and VALENTIN YBIERNAS, Petitioners,
vs. ESTER TANCO-GABALDON, MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS, INC.,
and THE SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY,
BRANCH 163, Respondents.

G.R. No. 178925 June 1, 2011

Facts: The case involves a dispute over ownership of a parcel of land located in
Talisay, Negros Occidental, owned by Estrella Ybiernas who executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property in favor of her heirs, Dionisio Ybiernas and
petitioners Manuel Ybiernas, Vicente Ybiernas, and Maria Corazon Angeles. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 47, Bacolod City issued an Order directing the
registration and annotation of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the title. Respondents
Ester Tanco-Gabaldon and Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. filed a Complaint for sum
of money and damages against Estrella and three other individuals, alleging fraud in
the representation of ownership of a parcel of land in Quezon City. In this effect, the
Pasig City RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Estrella's
heirs filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim, asserting the transfer of ownership to
them. The Pasig City RTC resolved the Complaint for sum of money in favor of
respondents, ordering Estrella, et al., to pay P6,000,000.00, plus legal interest and
damages. Ybiernas, the petitioners filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title and
Damages, claiming that the levy was invalid because the property is not owned by any
of the defendants in the Pasig City RTC case. The RTC granted a motion for summary
judgment in favor of the petitioners, declaring the levy on attachment invalid and
cancelling the entry on TCT No. T-83976. Tanco, Gabaldon, the Respondents filed a
notice of appeal and a motion for new trial, claiming newly discovered evidence that
Cadastral Case No. 10 did not exist and the April 28, 1988 Deed of Sale was
simulated. The Court of Appeals granted the motion for new trial and remanded the
case to the trial court for further proceedings. Hence, the petitioners filed a petition for
review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court’s summary judgment

constituted a final judgment that could be appealed and was thus a proper context for
a motion for new trial.
Ruling: Yes. This Court agrees with the Court of Appeals when noted that
the Regional Trial Court’s summary judgment was a proper subject of an appeal
because it was a final adjudication on the merits of the case, having completely
disposed of all the issues except as to the amount of damages. The CA concluded that
respondents properly availed of a motion for new trial because such remedy could be
availed of at any time after the appeal from the lower court had been perfected and
before the CA loses jurisdiction over the case. According to the CA, respondents were
able to show that they obtained the new evidence only after the trial of the case and
after the summary judgment had been rendered.
Ratio Decidendi: The issue of whether the RTC judgment is a final judgment
is indeed crucial. If the judgment were not final, it would be an improper subject of an
appeal. Hence, no appeal would have been perfected before the CA, and the latter
would not have acquired jurisdiction over the entire case, including the motion for
new trial. But more importantly, only a final judgment or order, as opposed to an
interlocutory order, may be the subject of a motion for new trial.
A summary judgment is granted to settle expeditiously a case if, on
motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except
the amount of damages. The RTC judgment in this case fully determined the
rights and obligations of the parties relative to the case for quieting of title and
left no other issue unresolved, except the amount of damages. Hence, it is a final
judgment. In leaving out the determination of the amount of damages, the RTC
did not remove its summary judgment from the category of final judgments. In
fact, under Section 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may
not be rendered on the amount of damages, although such judgment may be
rendered on the issue of the right to damages.

FLORENTINO PINEDA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF ELISEO GUEVARA,

represented by ERNESTO E. GUEVARA and ISAGANI S. GUEVARA, namely:
ELISEO GUEVARA, JR., ZENAIDA G. SAPALICIO, DANTE G. GUEVARA,
DANILO C. GUEVARA, and ISAGANI S. GUEVARA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 143188 February 14, 2007

Facts: On September 7, 1995, the respondents Guevara heirs, initiated an action for
the nullification of various certificates of title concerning a parcel of land located in
Marikina, covering approximately 2,304 hectares. The Guevara heirs contended that
they were co-owners of this property, originally covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 386 issued on December 7, 1910, to the spouses Emiliano Guevara
and Matilde Crimen. They claimed their predecessor-in-interest purchased the
property on January 1, 1932, and had exercised ownership, including selling and
donating portions thereof, with the purchase sale indicated on the title's annotation.

The complaint named several defendants, including Florentino Pineda, who claimed
to be a buyer in good faith, asserting actual possession of the land since 1970 and
ownership through Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 257272. The Guevara
heirs alleged that the defendants illegally asserted ownership over portions of the
property, particularly under TCT No. 223361, derived from what they deemed a fake
title, OCT No. 629, which was issued after the original OCT No. 386.

In response, Pineda and the other defendants raised defenses including lack of cause
of action, laches, estoppel, and prescriptions. The Regional Trial Court of Marikina
dismissed the complaint based on laches.
On appeal, the Guevara heirs assert an infringement on their right to due process and
the inapplicability of laches as a ground for dismissal. The Court of Appeals reversed
the Regional Trial Court decision, ruling that laches was not a valid ground for
dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which enumerates specific
grounds for such a motion. Pineda's motion for reconsideration of this ruling was
denied, leading him to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court order of dismissal be treated as a
summary judgment.

Ruling: No. The Court rejected the notion that the Regional Trial Court's order could
be treated as a summary judgment.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Rule 35, the defending party or the claimant, as the case may
be, must invoke the rule on summary judgment by filing a motion. The adverse party
must be notified of the motion for summary judgment and furnished with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions before hearing is conducted. More importantly, a
summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

In the case at bar, the issues are far from settled. For instance, both petitioner and
respondents claim their ownership rights over the same property based on two
different original certificates of title. Respondents charge petitioner of illegal
occupation while the latter invokes good faith in the acquisition of the property.
Clearly, these are factual matters which can be best ventilated in a full-blown
proceeding before the trial court, especially when what are involved appear to be
sizeable parcels of land covered by two certificates of title.

Issues of prescription and laches should be thoroughly examined in the context of a

full trial to allow both parties ample opportunities to present evidence and establish
their claims. Laches requires evidentiary proof during a trial and cannot generally be
resolved through a motion to dismiss. Take note that the failure to raise procedural
objections at the appropriate stage limits the ability to assert such claims in
subsequent appeals.

PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK, Petitioner, vs. FELIPE CHUA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 178899 November 15, 2010

Facts: Tomas Tan, a stockholder and director of CST Enterprises, Inc., initiated a
derivative suit against various parties, including Philippine Business Bank and Felipe
Chua. The suit arose from alleged unauthorized loans taken by CST, purportedly
without the approval of its board of directors. Tan had entrusted original copies of the
titles to CST's properties to Felipe Chua, the President of CST, before going abroad
for medical treatment. Upon his return, he learned from Chua that CST's properties
were being used as collateral for loans taken out by John Dennis Chua, another
individual associated with CST, without proper authority.

A Secretary's Certificate, purportedly authorized by CST's board, allowed John

Dennis Chua to open a bank account and secure loans on behalf of CST. Using this
certificate, loans totaling approximately Ninety-One Million One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P91,100,000.00) were taken out from Philippine Business Bank, secured by
CST's properties. Felipe Chua was a co-maker on the promissory notes corresponding
to these loans.

Later, when the CST defaulted, Philippine Business Bank threatened foreclosure,
prompting Tan to file a complaint asserting that the loans and mortgage were
unenforceable due to lack of authority. Philippine Business Bank countered by stating
that the loans were valid given the Secretary's Certificate and demanded payment
from Chua through a cross-claim, asserting he was liable under the promissory notes
he had co-signed.

The Regional Trial Court granted partial summary judgment against Felipe Chua,
finding him liable for P75,000,000.00. The latter appealed but was disallowed by the
RTC, claiming it was no longer valid, a writ of execution was subsequently issued
against him.

Respondent Chua challenged the RTC’s decisions in the Court of Appeals (CA),
arguing that the RTC had exceeded its jurisdiction and that the partial summary
judgment was interlocutory, thus not final. The CA agreed that the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion, stating that the partial summary judgment was not a final
order and therefore should not have been executed.

Issues: Whether or not the partial summary judgment rendered by the RTC a final
judgment, thus exempt from appeal given that the main case was still pending.

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court denied Philippine Business Bank's petition. It held
that the RTC’s partial summary judgment did not constitute a final judgment; rather, it
was an interlocutory order.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court emphasized the distinction between final judgments and
interlocutory orders, noting that partial summary judgments do not dispose of the
entire case but only address specific claims or defenses. In one of the cases decided by
the Court, it clarified that a partial summary judgment is intended to simplify
proceedings and does not end the court’s adjudicative tasks. It further stated that
certiorari could not be used to correct what is generally a procedural error or
misjudgment concerning the propriety or validity of the judgment. Given these
findings, the Court affirmed that the RTC erred in issuing a writ of execution based on
the interlocutory partial summary judgment, reaffirming that a party could not be
subjected to execution until the entire case had been resolved. Clearly, this partial
summary judgment did not dispose of the case as the main issues raised in plaintiff
Tomas Tan’s complaint, that is, the validity of the secretary’s certificate which
authorized John Dennis Chua to take out loans, and execute promissory notes and
mortgages for and on behalf of CST, as well as the validity of the resultant promissory
notes and mortgage executed for and on behalf of CST, remained unresolved.

Moreover, certiorari was not the proper recourse for respondent Chua. The propriety
of the summary judgment may be corrected only on appeal or other direct review, not
a petition for certiorari, since it imputes error on the lower court’s judgment. It is
well-settled that certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in
the judge’s findings and conclusions of law and fact.

This Court affirms the CA’s ruling that the partial summary judgment is an
interlocutory order which could not become a final and executory judgment,
notwithstanding respondent Chua’s failure to file a certiorari petition to challenge the
judgment. Accordingly, the RTC grievously erred when it issued the writ of execution
against respondent Chua.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO

and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, Petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA,
JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.

CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS

SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Movants-Intervenors.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Movant-Intervenor.

G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008

Facts: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila and City Mayor Atienza enacted
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the area from industrial to commercial and directing
the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of
the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation. However, instead of enforcing the ordinance, the City of
Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that the scaling
down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. In the
MOU, the oil companies were required to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG
spheres and to commence work for the creation of safety buffer and green zones
surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will
enable the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting
from joint operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod
ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued
against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate
removal of the terminals of the oil companies.

Issue: Whether or not petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to compel
respondent in enforcing the ordinance.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition directing Mayor Atienza to
immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

Ratio Decidendi: Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, mandamus may be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain
legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty
of respondent to do the act required to be done.

Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty,
which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the
relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus proceeding
concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are
interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and
they need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are citizens of Manila and thus
have a direct interest in the ordinances.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as
city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.
"One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the
duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the
Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty
to do so. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No.
8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.

SALLY MIGUEL, et. al., Petitioners, v. JCT GROUP, INC., and VICENTE
CUEVAS, Respondents.

G. R. NO. 157752. March 16, 2005

Facts: The case centers on a group of petitioners who were employees of Glorious
Sun Garment Manufacturing Company, a garment exporter that ceased operations in
October 1994. Following the closure, two entities, namely, De Soleil Apparel
Manufacturing Corporation and American Inter-Fashion Corporation took over the
manufacturing plant and operations of Glorious Sun, absorbing its employees,
including the petitioners.

In 1989, JCT Group, Inc. entered into a Management and Operating Agreement
(MOA) with De Soleil to manage its operations related to exporting goods, which
lasted until May 1, 1990. After the expiration of this agreement, De Soleil also halted
operations by July 1990, resulting in the termination of the petitioners' employment.
The petitioners filed complaints before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) alleging illegal dismissal and seeking back wages against several parties,
including De Soleil, American Inter-Fashion Corporation, the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), Glorious Sun, JCT, and Vicente Cuevas
III.

JCT and Cuevas motioned to dismiss the case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
due to the absence of an employer-employee relationship. However, without resolving
the motion, the labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring them illegally
dismissed and ordering several parties to pay back wages and other benefits. The case
underwent various appeal processes, including a modification by the NLRC that
absolved Glorious Sun of liability. The matter was eventually elevated to the Supreme
Court but was dismissed for a lack of merit. The Court of Appeals subsequently
reversed the NLRC decisions without clear factual findings supporting the rulings
regarding JCT and Cuevas’ liability as employers.

Issues: Whether or not the Court of Appeals should not have remanded the case for
further proceedings, because the labor arbiter and the NLRC had committed no grave
abuse of discretion in their Decisions.

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court denied the petition finding the same no merit.The
Court do not agree with the contention of the petitioners. In sum, the CA did not
commit reversible error in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC
and the labor arbiter for their failure to state the facts upon which their conclusions
had been based.

Ratio Decidendi: According to the Court, grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. That is, power is arbitrarily or despotically exercised by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and caprice is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Labor arbiters are required to state the factual and legal bases of their decisions. They
thereby conform to the requirement of due process and fair play, because parties to
the controversy are informed of why and how such decisions were reached. When no
factual findings support the conclusions made in a labor decision, a remand of the
case for further proceedings may become necessary.

In the case, the labor arbiter and the NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion
because they failed to establish the factual basis for their conclusions regarding the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between the petitioners and
respondents. With such findings, the Court supported the appellate court's decision to
remand the case for further proceedings, allowing for the necessary factual
determination since the initial judgments lacked sufficient detail on the pertinent
relationships. As provided under the Rules of Court, where a judgment fails to make
findings of fact, the case may be remanded to the lower tribunal to enable it to
determine them. It is necessary to remand the present case for further proceedings,
because the labor arbiter and the NLRC failed to make the factual findings needed to
resolve the controversy.

DANIEL T. SO, Petitioner, VS. FOOD FEST LAND, INC. Respondent.

G.R. No. 183628, February 09, 2011

Facts: The case involves a dispute between petitioner Daniel T. So and respondent
Food Fest Land, Inc. regarding a lease contract. The lease agreement included a
provision that stipulated if the lessor (petitioner So) was compelled to seek judicial
relief against the lessee (respondent Food Fest), the latter would be liable to pay
liquidated damages equivalent to 25% of the amount due, with a minimum of
P500.00. Additionally, the lessee (respondent Food Fest) would be responsible for
attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the amount claimed, with a minimum of
P3,000.00, along with all expenses of litigation.

The Court of Appeals had previously ruled in favor of petitioner So, affirming his
entitlement to liquidated damages. However, it did not award attorney's fees, which
was contrary to the stipulation in the lease contract. In response, petitioner So filed a
motion for reconsideration and clarification regarding the appellate court's decision,
particularly focusing on the omission of attorney's fees.

Issues: Whether or not the dispositive portion of the decision prevail over the body of
the decision in case of conflict.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court found merit in petitioner So's motion for
reconsideration. It clarified that the appellate court's decision was inconsistent with
the lease contract's stipulations regarding attorney's fees. The Court emphasized that
the contractual stipulation should prevail, thereby holding respondent Food Fest, as
the lessee, liable to pay attorney's fees to petitioner So, the lessor.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court addressed the general rule regarding conflicts between
the dispositive portion and the body of a decision. The fallo or dispositive portion of a
court decision controls over the body of the decision. However, if there is a clear
mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision prevails. In this case, the
Court concluded that the body of the decision indicated that respondent Food Fest
should be responsible for the attorney's fees, leading to an amendment of the
dispositive portion of the decision.

The case underscores the principle that contractual stipulations regarding damages
and attorney's fees must be honored and enforced as agreed by the parties. The ruling
illustrates the principle that in cases of conflict between the dispositive portion and
the body of a decision, the latter may prevail if it is clear that a mistake has occurred
in the dispositive portion.The instants case demonstrates the Supreme Court's
authority to amend previous decisions to align them with the clear intent of the
contractual agreements between the parties.

DIAMOND BUILDERS CONGLOMERATION, ROGELIO S. ACIDRE,

TERESITA P. ACIDRE, GRACE C. OSIAS, VIOLETA S. FAIYAZ and EMMA
S. CUTILLAR, Petitioners, vs. COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Respondent.

G.R. No. 171820 December 13, 2007

Facts: Marceliano Borja filed a civil action against petitioner Rogelio S. Acidre for
breach of contract concerning the construction of a residential and commercial
building. Petitioner Rogelio, as the sole proprietor of the Diamond Builders
Conglomeration (DBC), faced allegations under this contract. To resolve the dispute,
Borja and petitioner Rogelio entered into a Compromise Agreement, which detailed
the obligations of both parties regarding the completion of the project and included
provisions for payments and penalties related to delays in construction.
Under the agreement, petitioner Rogelio admitted to having received P1,530,000.00
of the P2,100,000.00 total contract price but had an outstanding balance of
P570,000.00. The agreement specified timelines for payment and completion, with a
provision that failure to complete construction within the allotted time would lead to a
penalty involving a performance bond.

To comply with the Compromise Agreement, Rogelio secured a Surety Bond from
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers) to ensure that Borja would
be compensated in the event of a breach. The Indemnity Agreement, signed by
petitioner Rogelio and the other petitioners, made them jointly liable for any amounts
Country Bankers might pay under the bond.

Subsequently, Borja sought to execute the Surety Bond due to petitioner Rogelio's
alleged failure to meet his contractual obligations, prompting Country Bankers to
inform the petitioners of their intent to seek reimbursement should they proceed with
the payment of the bond. Despite a pending motion filed by the petitioners to oppose
the execution, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) approved the Motion for Execution,
leading to Country Bankers paying Borja.

Country Bankers then demanded reimbursement from the petitioners, but the
petitioners refused to pay. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, dismissing
Country Bankers' complaint for lack of merit. This dismissal was subsequently
reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled that Country Bankers was
entitled to reimbursement since its payment was a response to a valid court order
rather than a voluntary disbursement.

Issues: Whether or not the petitioners were obligated to reimburse County Bankers
for the payment made under the Surety Bond on the basis of a compromise agreement
entered into between them.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision, ruling that Country
Bankers was entitled to reimbursement in the amount of ₱370,000.00 it paid to Borja
under the surety bond.

Ratio Decidendi: A compromise judgment is a decision rendered by the court on the

basis of a compromise agreement entered into between the parties to the action. It has
the force of law and is conclusive between parties.

The Court clarified that the payment made by Country Bankers under the Surety Bond
was not voluntary but rather an obligation arising from the explicit terms of the court-
approved compromise agreement. The Court emphasized that a compromise
judgment, once approved by a court, carries the same authority as any court judgment
and is immediately enforceable in accordance with Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court reiterated that the execution of a compromise judgment does not
require a party to await the resolution of subsequent motions regarding that judgment.
Therefore, respondent Country Bankers acted within its rights and obligations as a
surety under the circumstances, and the petitioners' claims of a need for intervention
had no standing because the law supports the automatic enforceability of such
judgments.
It is important to remember that once a compromise agreement is approved by a court,
it becomes a judgment that is executory and enforceable. Judgments based on
compromise are not appealable, and attempts to contest such judgments after their
approval may not prevent a party from incurring obligations arising from them.

SPOUSES JUANITO MAHUSAY and FRANCISCA MAHUSAY, Petitioners, vs.

B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 179675 June 8, 2011

Facts: The case involves the petitioner spouses Juanito and Francisca Mahusay who
purchased several lots in Aurora Subdivision, Malabon, Metro Manila from the
respondent B.E. San Diego, Inc. through two contracts: Contract to Sell No. 831 dated
May 14, 1973 for P33,000 and Contract to Sell No. 874 dated August 1, 1975 for
P197,040, which included an interest rate of 12% per annum, payable in monthly
installments. The petitioner spouses defaulted on their monthly payments beginning
October 1978, prompting the respondent B.E. San Diego, Inc. to initiate a case for
cancellation of the contracts, which was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.

Subsequently, the petitioner spouses entered into a Compromise Agreement with the
respondent B.E. San Diego, Inc. agreeing to pay the remaining balance under
previously established terms. However, they failed to adhere to this agreement,
leading the respondent B.E. San Diego, Inc to file a Complaint for Specific
Performance on April 18, 1990. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the
respondent B.E. San Diego, Inc., mandating the petitioner spouses to fulfill the terms
of the Compromise Agreement and awarded damages and attorney's fees.

The petitioner spouses appealed, contesting RTC jurisdiction and the validity of the
Compromise Agreement since only Francisca had signed. The Court of Appeals
upheld the RTC's jurisdiction but declared the Compromise Agreement void because
it lacked Juanito's consent as it involved conjugal property. The CA affirmed the
obligation of the petitioners to pay the unpaid amortizations but removed the actual
damages awarded.

After the CA decision became final, a dispute arose regarding the computation of the
unpaid amounts, leading the respondent to file a Motion for Clarification on May 6,
2004, to include penalties and interest. The CA issued a Resolution on October 11,
2004, clarifying that penalties and interest were to be included in the unpaid
amortizations. The petitioners filed a Motion to Delete and Withdraw this resolution,
contending that it was an unlawful amendment to the final judgment, which the CA
later denied.

Issues: Whether or not the motion for clarification of judgment filed by the
petitioners amend the original decision of the Court of Appeals.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled to deny the petitioner spouses’ plea and uphold the
CA's Resolution dated September 11, 2007. The Court concluded that the CA's
clarification did not alter the original judgment but merely specified the existing
obligations regarding unpaid amortizations, penalties, and interest.
Ratio Decidendi: The motion for clarification did not amend the original decision but
clarified ambiguities regarding the penalties and interest based on customary practices
in real estate dealings and established contractual provisions. The Court recognized
that the legality of the original contracts was not disputed, and upon failure of the
petitioners to fulfill their financial obligations, it was reasonable for the CA to clarify
its decision to include customary financial obligations such as interest and penalties.
The Court also emphasized that judgments may be clarified to address ambiguities or
omissions without constituting a violation of the immutability rule, noting that since
the petitioner spouses were in possession of the properties without proper payment, it
would lead to unjust enrichment.

The absence of substantial legal errors in the CA's resolutions affirmed the notion that
contracts should be honored and that fairness dictates that obligated parties fulfill their
agreement terms, including interest and penalties due to non-payment. Thus, the
specified legal interest rates of 12% per annum were validated from the time of
judicial demand until full payment.

The immutability of judgments rule, which states that a final judgment cannot be
modified or altered, except to correct clerical errors or mistakes. The allowance for
clarification of a judgment where ambiguities arise due to omissions, without
changing its substantive effects. The enforcement of liquidated obligations under
contracts, including the stipulation of penalties and interest, as consistent with
Philippine contract law.

CU UNJIENG E HIJOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE MABALACAT SUGAR CO.,

ET AL., defendants. THE MABALACAT SUGAR CO., appellant.

G.R. No. 45351 June 29, 1940

Facts: Plaintiff Cu Unjieng e Hijos, initiated a foreclosure suit against the defendant
Mabalacat Sugar Company. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, leading to
the issuance of a writ of execution. The mortgaged property, a sugar central, was
ordered to be sold at a public auction. During the auction, B. H. Berkenkotter filed a
third-party claim over certain machineries of the central. Despite this, the sheriff
proceeded with the auction after the plaintiff posted a bond, and the plaintiff emerged
as the highest bidder with a bid of P177,000. The sale was confirmed by the trial court
and subsequently affirmed on appeal.

At the time of the sale, the judgment debt, including interest, amounted to
P226,036.80. Berkenkotter then initiated separate proceedings to vindicate his claim
over the machineries. While his appeal was pending, the Mabalacat Sugar Company
petitioned the trial court on October 11, 1934, claiming entitlement to the proceeds of
the central during its receivership, totaling P36,793.99. The defendant argued that the
P177,000 bid excluded the machineries valued at P60,000, and if Berkenkotter lost his
appeal, the plaintiff should be charged an additional P50,000, covering the entire
judgment debt.

The plaintiff opposed, asserting that the P177,000 bid included the machineries, and
thus, they were entitled to a deficiency judgment, applying the net proceeds of the
central during receivership to the judgment debt. The trial court issued an order on
November 13, 1935, stating that the P36,793.99 should go to the defendant if the
plaintiff won the litigation over the machineries, as this would mean the plaintiff had
collected the full credit.

The plaintiff announced an intention to appeal but later filed a petition for a
deficiency judgment. The defendant opposed, claiming the issue had been adjudged in
the November 13, 1935 order. The trial court received a certified copy of the Supreme
Court decision in Berkenkotter's case on March 28, 1936, which Berkenkotter lost. On
May 29, 1936, the trial court overruled the defendant's opposition and granted the
plaintiff a deficiency judgment, applying the P36,793.99 to the judgment debt and
rendering a deficiency judgment of P35,737.99. The defendant appealed this order.

Issue: Whether or not the November 13, 1935 order was conditional and not final,
thus the second order was valid.

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order. It held that the November
13, 1935 order was conditional, dependent on the outcome of Berkenkotter's appeal,
and thus not a final disposition of the case.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court emphasized that such conditional orders are not final
until the condition is met, and therefore, the trial court retained jurisdiction to issue
the second order on May 29, 1936. The court cited Jaucian vs. Querol, which
established that judgments subject to a condition precedent are not final until the
condition is fulfilled. The court also noted that interlocutory or provisional orders can
be vacated or amended before a final judgment is rendered or becomes executory.

Regarding the inclusion of the machineries in the execution sale, the court found no
sufficient grounds to disturb the lower court's conclusion that the machineries were
included in the P177,000 bid.

It is important to take note that judgments subject to a condition precedent are not
final until the condition is fulfilled. Such judgments are not effective or capable of
execution until the condition is met. As to the jurisdiction over Interlocutory Orders,
trial courts retain jurisdiction to amend or vacate interlocutory or provisional orders
before a final judgment is rendered or becomes executory.

RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., ESSES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and

TRI-STAR FARMS, INC., Petitioners, v. FILIPINO BUSINESS
CONSULTANTS, INC., Respondent.

G.R. NO. 143312 : August 12, 2005

Facts: The legal dispute revolves around the possession of a 62-hectare land in
Calatagan, Batangas (Calatagan Property) involving the petitioners Ricardo S.
Silverio, Jr., Esses Development Corporation, Tri-Star Farms, Inc., and Filipino
Business Consultants, Inc. Petitioner Silverio, Jr. is the President of Esses and Tri-
Star, which were initially in possession of the Calatagan Property under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-55200.

In 1995, Esses and Tri-Star executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in
favor of FBCI, but they failed to redeem the property. This led FBCI to file a Petition
for Consolidation of Title in 1997, resulting in a judgment by default and the
cancellation of TCT No. T-55200, which was later replaced by TCT No. T-77656
issued in favor of FBCI.

Subsequently, FBCI obtained a writ of possession and entered the property. Silverio,
Jr., Esses, and Tri-Star, after learning of the judgment and writ of possession, sought
relief claiming that FBCI had forged the service of summons. The RTC Balayan later
nullified the default judgment and restored possession to Silverio, Jr., Esses, and Tri-
Star.

However, FBCI then claimed it acquired control over Esses and Tri-Star and filed
motions including an urgent request for the suspension of the writ of possession. The
RTC Balayan suspended the writ due to concerns of violence arising from the
ongoing contention over possession.

Issue: Whether or not the suspension of the writ of possession by RTC Balayan
constituted an interlocutory order.

Ruling: Yes. The Court found merit in the petition filed by the petitioners. It
established that the suspension of the writ of possession by RTC Balayan constituted
an interlocutory order, which cannot be appealed but instead can be contested via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The RTC Balayan acted inappropriately by
suspending the writ of possession based merely on an ex parte motion without due
hearing and notice, effectively hindering the parties' rights.

Ratio Decidendi: Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters that
do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. The proper
remedy to question an improvident interlocutory order is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, not Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 is the
proper mode of redress to question final judgments. An order staying the execution of
the writ of possession is an interlocutory order. Clearly, this order cannot be appealed.
A petition for certiorari was therefore the correct remedy. Moreover, Silverio, Jr.,
Esses and Tri-Star pointed out that the RTC Balayan acted on an ex-parte motion to
suspend the writ of possession, which is a litigious matter, without complying with
the rules on notice and hearing. Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star also assail the RTC
Balayan’s impending move to accept FBCI’s evidence on its subsequent ownership of
Esses and Tri-Star. In effect, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star accuse the RTC Balayan
of acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, which
is within the ambit of certiorari.

In consideration of the circumstance of the case, in the exercise of this Court’s

judicial discretion, it will treat the appeal as a petition under Rule 65. Technical rules
must be suspended whenever the purposes of justice warrant it, such as in this case
where substantial and important issues await resolution.

ONG CHIU KWAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, and the PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 113006. November 23, 2000

Facts: Assistant City Prosecutor Andres M. Bayona filed an information with the
Municipal Trial Court in Bacolod City, charging Ong Chiu Kwan with unjust
vexation for cutting the electric wires, water pipes, and telephone lines of a business
establishment called "Crazy Feet," owned by Mildred Ong. The incident took place on
April 24, 1990, when Kwan directed Welfredo Infante to relocate the aforementioned
lines, asserting that they were a disturbance. However, he did not present any permit
from the appropriate authorities to justify this action.

During the trial, the Municipal Trial Court found Kwan guilty of unjust vexation on
September 1, 1992, sentencing him to twenty days of imprisonment and ordering him
to pay moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The trial court ruled
that by cutting off these essential services during peak business hours, Kwan's actions
caused a significant disruption to Ong's operations.

Kwan appealed the Municipal Trial Court's decision to the Regional Trial Court,
which affirmed the lower court’s ruling without providing its rationale. He
subsequently filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which also
affirmed the conviction, finding Kwan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of unjust
vexation. Consequently, Kwan elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals commit an error by affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court adopting in toto the MTC’s decision, which lacked the
necessary statement of facts and law.

Ruling: Yes. The Court noted that in the decision of the Regional Trial Court which
the Court of Appeals affirmed peremptorily without noticing its nullity, the Regional
Trial Court merely quoted the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in full and added
two paragraphs.

Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court held that the evidence did support the
conviction of Kwan for unjust vexation, noting that he admitted to ordering the
cutting of the essential lines without appropriate authorization. However, it found the
affirmations by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals to be procedurally
flawed. The Constitution requires that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. Under the Rules of Procedure, the judgment must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall
contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the
accused and the law upon which the judgment is based. The Court criticized the
Regional Trial Court's minimal elaboration and warned of consequences for judges
who do not adhere to clear decision-writing standards.

Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it cannot

merely refer to the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court. The
court must make a full findings of fact and conclusions of law of its own.

Despite the procedural errors in affirming the lower court's decision, the Supreme
Court opted to review the evidence and concluded Kwan was indeed guilty of unjust
vexation. Nevertheless, it reversed the lower courts’ awards of moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees as there was insufficient evidence supporting
these injuries. Instead, Kwan was sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 with costs,
thereby setting aside all previous damage awards.

MICHAEL GAMALIEL PLATA, complainant, vs. JUDGE LIZABETH G.

TORRES, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1721 October 24, 2008

(Formerly A.M. No. IPI-03-1464-MTJ)

Facts: Complainant Michael Gamaliel Plata filed an administrative complaint against

respondent Judge Lizabeth G. Torres, who presided over the Metropolitan Trial Court
in Mandaluyong City. The complaint arose from the judge's failure to resolve a
Motion to Withdraw Information, which had been submitted by the Assistant City
Prosecutor over five years prior. The Motion was filed on July 29, 1999, at a time
when Plata was accused of attempted homicide. The Department of Justice had
reversed the prosecutor's resolution that initially found probable cause, thus directing
the prosecutor to seek the withdrawal of the information against Plata.

Upon the filing of the motion, the complainant expressed his grievances regarding the
excessive delay in its resolution. Despite his efforts to expedite the process, including
a manifestation filed in August 2001, the judge's court did not act on the motion until
after a significant elapsed time. The complainant alleged that this inaction violated his
constitutional right to a speedy trial and caused him undue stress and financial
burdens as he remained under the obligation of a bail bond.

Judge Torres failed to respond to several show-cause orders and directives from the
court that demanded her comment regarding the administrative complaint lodged
against her. Upon investigation, it was revealed that Judge Torres faced a substantial
caseload and cited it, along with personal issues, as reasoning for her delays.

Issues: Whether or not Judge Torres's failure to resolve the Motion to Withdraw
Information in a timely manner constituted a violation of the complainant’s right to a
speedy trial.

Ruling: Yes. The Court determined that Judge Torres’s failure to resolve the Motion
to Withdraw Information constituted gross inefficiency and a violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.

Ratio Decidendi: As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orferly and speedy
discharge of official business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory. The delay of over five years was deemed unacceptable, undermining
public confidence in the judiciary. The Court pointed out that judges are mandated to
act promptly on cases and should adhere to timelines prescribed by law and the 1987
Constitution, which aims to dispel judicial delays.

The Court recognized the validity of the judge’s concerns regarding her heavy
caseload but clarified that merely experiencing workload pressures does not exempt
judges from their responsibilities. It emphasized that judges could request extensions
when necessary but must not neglect their duties.
As a result, Judge Torres was fined for her failure to comply with the resolution
requiring her to comment on the administrative complaint and for the undue delay in
resolving the motion. Furthermore, the Court asserted that future violations of a
similar nature would result in more severe penalties.

Judges must ensure the speedy disposition of cases to uphold the constitutional right
to a fair trial. Continuous neglect of judicial duties and failure to comply with Court
directives is evidence of gross misconduct. The need for a judiciary that functions
efficiently is paramount to maintaining public trust in the legal system.

HACIENDA BINO/HORTENCIA STARKE, INC./HORTENCIA L.

STARKE, Petitioners, vs. CANDIDO CUENCA, et. al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 150478. April 15, 2005

Facts: Hortencia L. Starke is the owner and operator of Hacienda Bino, a 236-hectare
sugar plantation in Negros Occidental consisting of 220 workers performing various
agricultural tasks. The 76 individual respondents were part of the workforce of
Hacienda Bino. During the off-milling season, Starke issued an order stating that only
employees who did not sign in favor of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) would continue to be employed. The respondents perceived this as a
termination of their employment, and as a consequence, they filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, wage differentials, 13th month pay, holiday pay and premium pay
for holiday, service incentive leave pay, and moral and exemplary damages with the
National Labor Relations Commission. Labor Arbiter Drilon rendered a Decision,
finding that petitioner Starke’s notice was tantamount to a termination of the
respondents’ services, and holding that the petitioner company was guilty of illegal
dismissal. Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which
affirmed with modification the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It also denied the
motion for reconsideration of the respondents. Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to
the Court of Appeals which also affirmed with modification the decision of the
commission. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the same
Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals violated the doctrine of stare decisis laid
down by the Supreme Court and the applicable laws as to the status of the sugar
workers.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court finds that the petition is without merit. The Court of
Appeals correctly found that the facts involved in this case are different from the
Mercado case. This Court do not find the concept of stare decisis relevant in the case.
Ratio Decidendi: Under the doctrine of stare decisis, when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle
and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Where the
facts are essentially different, however, stare decisis does not apply, for a perfectly
sound principle as applied to one set of facts might be entirely inappropriate when a
factual variance is introduced.
The disparity in facts between the Mercado case and the instant case is best
exemplified by the fact that the former decision ruled on the status of employment of
farm laborers, while the herein case presents a different factual condition as the
enormity of the size of the sugar hacienda of petitioner, with an area of two hundred
thirty-six (236) hectares, simply do not allow for private respondents to render work
only for a definite period.
In this case, there is no evidence on record that the same particulars are present.
Application of stare decisis depends on the similarity of the circumstances and issues.
The petitioners did not present any evidence that the respondents were required to
perform certain phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time. Although the
petitioners assert that the respondents made their services available to the
neighboring haciendas, the records do not, however, support such assertion.
The primary standard for determining regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to
the usual trade or business of the employer. There is no doubt that the respondents
were performing work necessary and desirable in the usual trade or business of an
employer. Hence, they can properly be classified as regular employees.

AYALA CORPORATION, petitioner. v. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

G.R. No. 134284, December 1, 2000.

Facts: The case involves a dispute over a property subject to specific building
restrictions. Ayala Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Makati
City, covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title. Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy and
Sy Ka Kieng, and the sale was subject to Special Conditions and Deed Restrictions
regarding the construction timeline and building specifications of the intended
development. The restrictions were to expire in the year 2025. However, the original
vendees did not comply with the conditions. They were later able to sell the lot to
respondent Rosa-Diana Realty, with the latter executing an Undertaking to abide by
the same conditions. Subsequently, respondent Rosa-Diana submitted to the Makati
building official a different set of building plans that violated the deed restrictions.
Construction commenced based on the second set of plans, prompting Ayala to file an
action for specific performance or alternatively rescission with the Regional Trial
Court. While the trial court proceedings were ongoing, Ayala’s attempts to annotate a
notice of lis pendens on Rosa-Diana’s title were stymied by the Register of Deeds and
eventually by the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the action was in personam.
The trial court ruled in favor of Rosa-Diana, finding that Ayala was guilty of
abandonment or estoppel and failed to enforce the deed restrictions uniformly. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Ultimately, Ayala Corporation
filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether the doctrine of the law of the case or stare decisis barred Ayala
Corporation’s appeal.
2. Whether the trial court and Court of Appeals were correct in finding that Ayala
Corporation waived its right to enforce the deed restrictions.
3. The proper remedy for Rosa-Diana’s admitted violation of the deed restrictions.
Ruling: The Supreme Court finds merit in the petition and reversed the Court of
Appeals’ decision. The High Court held that neither the law of the case nor stare
decisis applied because the derivatively relevant issues were not conclusively decided
in the earlier cases. The pronouncements in the earlier case regarding estoppel were
considered obiter dicta.
Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court considered the issue fresh and found Rosa-
Diana’s bad faith in constructing the building beyond the contractual restrictions.
However, specific performance was no longer possible, and rescission was not
granted due to Ayala’s consent in the resale of the property and the subsequent
completion of the building. With respect to remedies, the SC ordered Rosa-Diana to
pay development charges based on the provisions of the consolidated and revised
deed restrictions as compensatory damages for the violation. Additionally, Rosa-
Diana was ordered to pay exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Contractual obligations have the force of law among the contracting parties and must
be complied with in good faith under Article 1159, New Civil Code of the
Philippines.
– A notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to prospective buyers or encumbrances
that a particular property is subject to a pending court litigation. However, its
propriety depends on the nature of the action.
– Obiter dictum refers to opinions expressed by a judge that do not form a part of the
court’s decision and are not binding precedent.
– Remedies for breach of contract may include specific performance, rescission, or
the payment of damages if specific performance or rescission is not possible or
relevant.
TARCISIO S. CALILUNG, Petitioner, vs. PARAMOUNT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, RP TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC., RENATO L.
PUNZALAN and JOSE MANALO, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 195641 July 11, 2016
Facts: The case arose from a series of agreements and financial transactions involving
the petitioner Tarcisio S. Calilung, and the respondents, which included Paramount
Insurance Corporation, RP Technical Services, Inc. , Renato L. Punzalan, and Jose
Manalo, Jr. In 1987, petitioner Calilung expressed his desire to purchase shares worth
P1,000,000 from RP Technical Services, Inc., but due to internal disagreements, he
was only allowed to buy P2,820 worth of shares. The remaining balance of P718,750
was to be invested in a Shell Station Project in Batangas.
As a consequence, signed a promissory note in favor of Calilung for the P718,750
with a stipulated interest rate of 14% per annum, guaranteed by Paramount Insurance
through surety bond. However, RP Technical Services, Inc. defaulted on the payment,
leading petitioner Calilung to file a complaint in the Regional Trial Court for non-
payment, which resulted in a ruling that held RP Technical Services, Inc. and
Paramount jointly and severally liable for the debt.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioner Calilung. The Court of Appeals
upheld the ruling, leading to a decision that became final and executory.
Subsequently, during execution proceedings, petitioner Calilung sought to collect
compounded interest on the judgment debt. The Regional Trial Court first denied this
request, clarifying that the original judgment specified simple interest without
compounding. However, after a motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court
reversed its stance and permitted compounded interest, only to revert back to the
original ruling in later orders.
Issue: Whether or not granting compounded interest would contradict the principle of
immutability of judgments, as it effectively altered the final decision without a basis
in the original judgment.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. It reaffirmed that
upon finality, the judgment dictates the terms of enforcement and the prevailing
party’s entitlements, including stipulated interest. The inherent principle of
immutability prevents altering finalized judgments, and thus the Court ruled that the
only interest collectible was the 14% simple interest as originally awarded by the
Regional Trial Court.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court clarified the nature of interest: monetary interest arises
from express agreement, and compensatory interest applies in specific contexts,
primarily regarding damages or delay. Since the judgment explicitly mandated simple
interest without compounding, any subsequent adjustment based on Article 2212
would violate the finality of the judgment.
The final ruling stated that each respondent was jointly and severally liable for the
payment to petitioner Calilung, reinforcing the creditor's rights to claim the total
amount from any of the debtors until the obligation was satisfied. The judgment
directed the respondents to pay to the petitioner the principal amount of P718,750.00,
plus interest of 14% per annum from October 7, 1987 until full payment; 5% of the
amount due as attorney's fees; and the costs of suit. Being already final and executory,
it is immutable, and can no longer be modified or otherwise disturbed. Its
immutability is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice, which demand that the judgment of the courts, at the risk of occasional
errors, must become final at some definite date set by law or rule.
It is important to take note that the immutability of judgments preserves the finality of
court decisions, thus, any adjustment post-judgment is generally impermissible unless
dictated by the initial ruling.

SISTER MA. ANGELINA M. FERNANDO, R.V.M., petitioner, vs. HON.

CESAR D. SANTAMARIA, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region, Branch 145, Makati City, CHUA PING HIAN,
WILLIBALDO UY, LAUREANA P. BORRES and the REGISTER of DEEDS
FOR MAKATI CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 160730 December 10, 2004
Facts: The petitioner, Sister Ma. Angelina M. Fernando, R.V.M., filed a complaint
against several respondents including Chua Ping Hian, Willibaldo Uy, and Laureana
P. Borres. The complaint stemmed from a series of loans totaling P5.5 million
obtained by the petitioner Sister from respondent Chua, secured by a real estate
mortgage over a lot in Makati City, which was registered in her name. Before the
execution of the third loan, petitioner Sister was persuaded by respondent Borres,
acting as respondent Chua's agent, to sign a deed of absolute sale, purportedly as a
mere formality, conveying the property to respondent Chua for P3 million. Thereafter,
petitioner Sister was informed that her title had been canceled and a new one was
issued in respondent Chua's name.
After some time, respondent Chua offered to sell the property back to the petitioner
Sister for P10 million. However, the petitioner learned that respondent Chua had
instead sold the property to respondent Uy for P7 million, who received a new title for
the property. In her complaint, the petitioner Sister sought the annulment of the deeds
of absolute sale in favor of respondents Chua and Uy, the cancellation of their titles,
recovery of certain sums from respondent Borres, and damages.
Respondent Chua filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the argument that the
petitioner Sister’s claims were barred by prescription. Respondents Uy and Borres
contended that such claims had been waived.
The trial court initially dismissed the complaint on grounds of prescription,
ratification, and abandonment. Later, the trial court reinstated the complaint solely
against respondent Borres related to money demands, while the dismissal against
respondents Chua and Uy remained. Petitioner appealed but was dismissed by the trial
court. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which also
dismissed the petition and upheld the trial court’s ruling.
Issues: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's
decision to grant several judgments against the respondents was valid.
Ruling: Yes. This Court affirms the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition,and
affirming the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court
properly applied the rules regarding several judgments because the liability of
respondent Borres was distinct and separable from that of respondents Chua and Uy.
Ration Decidendi: The Court highlighted the criteria under Section 4, Rule 36 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure for rendering several judgments, which were
applicable in this case. A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is
clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against
each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or
against one of them will not necessarily affect the other.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly applied the foregoing provision because the
complaint was filed against several defendants with respect to whom, rendition of
several judgment is proper. The cause of action for collection of sum of money
against respondent Borres can thus proceed independently of the dismissal of the
action to hold her solidarily liable with respondents Chua and Uy for the alleged
fraudulent conveyance of the lot (first, second and fourth causes of action of the
complaint). As admitted by petitioner Sister in her motion for reconsideration of the
July 24, 2001 Order, the issue against Borres is one for misappropriation of the
amounts sought to be recovered. It is important to take note that when multiple
defendants are involved, the judgment may be rendered separately if the causes of
action against each defendant are distinct.
SPOUSES MATIAS B. AZNAR III and ELEONOR S. AZNAR, petitioners, vs.
HON. JUANITO A. BERNAD, In His Capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
XXI, RTC, Cebu, and the SPOUSES NICOLAS L. KINTANAR and
REDEMPTA C. KINTANAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 81190 May 9, 1988
Facts: Respondent spouses Nicolas and Redempta Kintanar filed a civil action in the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu against petitioner spouses Matias B. Aznar III and
Eleonor S. Aznar seeking the annulment of a Sheriff's Certificate of Sale, damages,
and attorney's fees, alongside a request for a preliminary injunction. The complaint
primarily contended that the Real Estate Mortgage, which was in question, was
fraudulent.
In response, the petitioners filed their answer on October 13, 1986, specifically
denying the allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint. The petitioners submitted a
Motion For Leave to Amend Answer Or To File Supplemental Pleading. This motion
indicated that the case had not yet been trial-calendared and asserted that no
responsive pleading had been filed regarding their answer. In the motion, they
emphasized the need to amend their answer to accurately reflect their defenses,
including the newly raised affirmative defense of prescription, which stated that the
plaintiffs’ claims had already lapsed due to the statute of limitations.
The petitioners claimed that the Real Estate Mortgage was executed on July 17, 1978,
and registered with the Cebu City Registry of Deeds on July 21, 1978. They noted
that the plaintiffs did not file their complaint until September 1986, which was beyond
the four-year limit established under Article 1391 of the Civil Code for annulment
actions.
The respondent judge denied the petitioners' motion to amend their answer on
November 4, 1986, citing a strict interpretation of Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which mandates the prompt raising of all defenses or objections in a
motion to dismiss or answer, or else they are assumed waived. The trial court
reiterated this stance in a subsequent denial of the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Dissatisfied with the trial court's ruling and the rejection of their amended answer, the
petitioners sought redress through a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ultimately certified the case to the Supreme Court for resolution
as it involved pure questions of law.
Issue: Whether or not the affirmative defense of prescription could be validly raised
for the first time in an amended answer, after the original answer had already been
filed, and whether or not the petitioners had the right to amend their answer
considering the procedural rules.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, stating that the trial
court's reliance on the rigid application of procedural rules was misplaced. The Court
clarified that an amended answer serves to replace the original answer, asserting that
the original answer ceases to exist with the admission of the amended answer.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court emphasized that the underlying purpose of procedural
rules is to promote justice and efficiency rather than create technical barriers that may
hinder a party's right to adequately defend itself. The Court pointed out that since the
petitioners acted to amend their answer within a week of filing the initial one and
before any responsive pleading from the respondents, there were no procedural
impediments to allowing the amendment.
It is a general rule that the affirmative defense of prescription when not seasonably
raised in either a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is deemed waived. However, this
case does not fall under the cited rule. It cannot be said that the petitioners failed to
allege the defense of prescription in their answer. Here, the amended answer is being
submitted to take the place of the original one. Once the amended answer is admitted,
the original answer passes into oblivion and ceases to exist with its former place
entirely taken over by the amended answer. The reliance of the trial court on the case
of Torreda vs. Boncaros is misplaced. The cited case involved a supplemental motion
to dismiss alleging the defense of prescription and not an amended answer. First, a
supplemental motion to dismiss, strictly speaking, is not a pleading. Further, as
differentiated from an amended pleading which takes the place of the original
pleading, a supplemental pleading does not extinguish the existence of the original.
As its very name denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary
pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that
which it supplements.
An amended pleading replaces the original pleading, allowing for new defenses to be
raised even if they were not included in the original answer, provided they are done so
in a timely manner. Procedural rules should be interpreted liberally to promote
substantial justice rather than to impose undue technicalities that could deprive parties
of their rights. The affirmative defense of prescription can be considered if it is
apparent from the face of the complaint, regardless of its inclusion in previous
pleadings.
 METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS & SEWERAGE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs.
HON. NICANOR S. SISON, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XXII, sitting at Pasig, Rizal; HEIRS OF DON MARIANO DE
SAN PEDRO, DOMINGO CECILIO & URBAN AGRO PRODUCTS, INC.,
represented by its Vice-President; EASTCOAST DEVELOPMENT
ENTERPRISES, INC., CONSTANCIO B. MAGLANA & FRANCISCO G.
ARTIGO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40309 August 31, 1983
Facts: The case revolves around a petition for the reconstitution of lost Transfer
Certificates of Title for Lot Nos. 946, 947, and 948 of the Tala Estate in Caloocan
City, filed by the heirs of Don Mariano de San Pedro, Domingo Cecilio, and Urban
Agro Products, Inc. in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The petitioners claimed
that their original titles to these lands were lost during World War II and sought to
have them reconstituted, asserting that no existing liens or encumbrances affected the
properties and that they possessed the lands in question.
The trial court initially set the hearing for the petition and mandated the publication of
the notice in the Manila Daily Bulletin, alongside posting copies in relevant public
buildings. On March 7, 1970, a representative from the Office of the Solicitor General
appeared without opposing the petition, leading to the court granting it on April 6,
1970. The titles were subsequently reconstituted in the name of Don Mariano de San
Pedro.
However, the Isabela Cultural Corporation, which was the registered owner of the
same lots and had existing titles dating back to the early 1930s, filed a motion to set
aside the April 6, 1970 order on grounds of jurisdictional defects due to improper
notice of hearing. They argued that the notice was not published in the Official
Gazette, as required by Republic Act No. 26. Following this, the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) also moved to intervene, claiming that
their own titles, also founded in the Torrens System, were superior and had not been
validly challenged through the reconstitution process.
Upon review of the motions, the trial court initially sided with the private respondents
who sought to affirm the validity of the reconstituted titles but later reversed its
decision, stating that the failure to publish the notice in the Official Gazette
constituted a lack of jurisdiction over the reconstitution petition.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court’s orders dated April 6, 1970, and September 4,
1974, null and void.
Ruling: Yes. The court ruled in favor of MWSS and Isabela Cultural Corporation,
declaring the orders of the trial court dated April 6, 1970, and September 4, 1974, null
and void. The Supreme Court reinforced that the provisions set forth in Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 26 regarding the publication of notices in the Official Gazette are
mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisites. The court emphasized that proper notice
served is essential to safeguard the interests of all possible claimants to the property in
question.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 13 of Rep. Act 26 specifies that publication of the notice of
hearing in proceedings for judicial reconstitution of lost certificates of title should be
made in the Official Gazette. It does not provide for any alternative medium or
manner of publication. In the case, the publication was done in the Manila Daily
Bulletin and not in the Official Gazette as required by the law. A proceeding for
judicial reconstitution of lost certificate of title partakes of the nature of a land
registration and cadastral proceeding, where publication of the notice of initial hearing
in the Official Gazette is required. The publication in the manner provided for by
Section 13 of Rep. Act 26 is compulsory and jurisdictional, unless said law is
amended, the same must be strictly complied with.
Again, the orders of April 6, 1970 and of September 4, 1974 are void orders, hence,
they are non-existent. A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a
valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any
tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the
consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for
any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled
to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All
proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In
other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as
it would be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in
the same position they were in before the trial.
The Court further articulated that ongoing titles under the Torrens System cannot be
disregarded, and any attempt to reconstitute titles must first involve valid resolutions
for the cancellation of existing titles held by rightful owners. The case underscored
the principle that the stability of Torrens titles is paramount and highlighted the
pitfalls of reconstitution petitions filed by third parties without notice to existing title
holders.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ex rel., THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, applicant, vs. JESUS SANZ, ET AL., objectors.
GABINO BARRETO PO EJAP, objector-appellee. THE MUNICIPALITY OF
TACLOBAN, objector-appellant.
G.R. No. L-21183 August 31, 1923
Facts: The case involves an appeal by the Municipality of Tacloban against a
decision made in cadastral survey No. 3, G. L. R. O. No. 153. The appeal came about
after the lower court delivered what is referred to as a "sin perjuicio" decision on
January 30, 1923. This type of decision is essentially a preliminary ruling that lacks a
comprehensive explanation or factual basis. The attorney for the Municipality of
Tacloban received notice of the decision on February 2, 1923, and subsequently filed
a motion for a new trial on February 6, 1923. The appellee, Gabino Barretto Po Ejap,
opposed the appeal by arguing that the motion for a new trial failed to meet the formal
requirements, thereby contending that it did not extend the time for submitting a bill
of exceptions.
The lower court denied the appellant's motion for a new trial on the grounds of non-
compliance with court rules. On June 2, 1923, the trial judge amplified the initial "sin
perjuicio" decision, providing the necessary factual basis for the ruling. The
appellant’s counsel filed for a bill of exceptions on June 20, 1923, claiming
compliance with the thirty-day requirement from the notice of the final decision.
Legal Issues: Whether or not the initial "sin perjuicio" decision of the lower court
constituted a final decision under the laws governing land registration cases.
Ruling: The court ultimately ruled in favor of the appellant, citing multiple
precedents indicating the importance of formal compliance with established rules
regarding appeals and finality of decisions. It determined:
1. The "sin perjuicio" decision, while not technically a final judgment due to its
lack of substantive reasoning, allowed the appellant to wait for the
comprehensive decision that followed on June 2, 1923.
2. The court acknowledged that the motion for a new trial did not adequately
adhere to procedural rules but accentuated the necessity for a definitive ruling
 from the lower court, which the appellant was entitled to wait for before filing
an appeal.
3. The court concluded that the bill of exceptions, filed on June 20, 1923, was
timely, as it fell within the thirty-day period mandated by law, exempting the
duration during which the court was deliberating the new trial motion.
The court noted the practice of issuing "sin perjuicio" decisions was undesirable and
should be avoided as it complicates the clarity regarding finality in judicial decisions.
The decision delineated that a "sin perjuicio" order is not equivalent to a final
judgment, thus allowing litigants to await definitive rulings before pursuing appeals.
It reaffirmed the established need for compliance with procedural norms to provide
clarity on the finality of decisions and the timing of appeals.

LUISA BRIONES-VASQUEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS

OF MARIA MENDOZA VDA. DE OCAMPO, respondents.

G.R. No. 144882 February 4, 2005

Facts: The case revolves around a property transaction between petitioner Luisa
Briones-Vasquez and Maria Mendoza Vda. de Ocampo, the latter acquiring a parcel
of land under a pacto de retro sale agreement. In this agreement, petitioner Briones
reserved the right to repurchase the property up until December 31, 1970. Maria
Mendoza passed away on May 27, 1979, after which her heirs, respondents Hipolita
Ocampo Paulite and Eusebio Mendoza Ocampo, filed a petition for consolidation of
ownership in 1990. They argued that petitioner Briones did not exercise her right to
redeem the property within the specified period.
The Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, issued a decision recognizing the
pacto de retro sale and allowing petitioner Briones a further 30 days to redeem the
property from the finality of the judgment, governed by Article 1616 of the New Civil
Code. The respondent heirs of Maria Mendoza then appealed this decision. The Court
of Appeals overturned the trial court’s ruling, declaring the agreement as an equitable
mortgage rather than a pacto de retro sale, and denying the right of repurchase. This
decision became final and executory on July 17, 1996. Upon request by petitioner
Briones and the respondent heirs, the trial court issued a writ of execution for
possession of the property. However, the execution could not proceed as the heirs
expressed disinterest in implementing the writ. Petitioner Briones filed for an alias
writ of execution, which also failed to be served due to the heirs' refusal to withdraw a
guaranteed deposit meant for the execution costs.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed an omnibus motion asking the trial court to discharge
the purported equitable mortgage and issue a writ of possession. However, the trial
court denied her motion, asserting that its hands were tied by the final judgment of the
Court of Appeals. To further clarify the situation, Briones motioned for a clarificatory
judgment, which was denied by the Court of Appeals stating there was nothing to
clarify since its earlier ruling was already definitive. The denial of the motion for
reconsideration followed. This led Briones to file a petition for certiorari against the
Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the decision sought through this motion was a nunc pro tunc
amendment of the final decision of the Court of Appeals, and thus should be allowed
as it was necessary for the proper execution of the Court’s ruling.

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, affirming the
decisions made by the Court of Appeals. The Court reasoned that once a judgment
becomes final and executory, it is immutable and unalterable except under exceptional
circumstances such as clerical corrections or the correction of void judgments.
Briones failed to demonstrate that her motion for clarificatory judgment fell under any
of these exceptions.
Ratio Decidendi: The analysis outlined that while Briones attempted to frame her
request as one seeking a nunc pro tunc entry to correct a record, the requirements for
such a characterization were not met for the reason that there was no judicial action
taken by the Court of Appeals that was omitted due to inadvertence. As a result, the
Court would not allow for the alteration of the final decision, which had already
categorized the transaction as an equitable mortgage.
As a general rule, final and executory judgments are immutable and unalterable
except under the three exceptions namely: a) clerical errors; b) nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party; and c) void judgments. In the case, petitioner
Briones claims the second exception, that her motion for clarificatory judgment is for
the purpose of obtaining a nunc pro tunc amendment of the final and executory
Decision of the Court of Appeals.
This Court defined and characterized judgment nunc pro tunc as a judgment intended
to record some act of the court done at a former time which was not then carried into
the record, and the power of a court to make such entries is restricted to placing upon
the record evidence of judicial action which has been actually taken. It may be used to
make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but
ought to have spoken. If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should
have rendered, or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no
power to remedy these errors or omissions by ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a
proper judgment. Hence a court in entering a judgment nunc pro tunc has no power to
construe what the judgment means, but only to enter of record such judgment as had
been formerly rendered, but which had not been entered of record as rendered. In all
cases the exercise of the power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc presupposes the
actual rendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a judgment will not furnish the
basis for such an entry.
Since the judgment sought through the motion for clarificatory judgment is not a nunc
pro tunc one, the general rule regarding final and executory decisions applies. In this
case, the Court of Appeals did not act arbitrarily nor with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the aforementioned Resolution
denying petitioner’s motion for clarificatory judgment and the Resolution denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
MANUEL YBIERNAS, VICENTE YBIERNAS, MARIA CORAZON
ANGELES, VIOLETA YBIERNAS, and VALENTIN YBIERNAS, Petitioners,
vs. ESTER TANCO-GABALDON, MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS, INC.,
and THE SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY,
BRANCH 163, Respondents.
G.R. No. 178925 June 1, 2011
FACTS: Estrella Mapa Vda. de Ybiernas was the owner of a parcel of land in
Talisay, Negros Occidental, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
83976. In 1988, Estrella executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, transferring ownership of
the property to her heirs, including petitioners Manuel Ybiernas, Vicente Ybiernas,
and Maria Corazon Angeles. This transfer was duly registered and annotated by the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, which issued an order directing that the deed be
annotated on the title.
In 1991, respondents Ester Tanco-Gabaldon and Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. filed
a complaint against Estrella and others in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
alleging fraud in the sale of a separate parcel of land in Quezon City. The court
subsequently issued a writ of preliminary attachment on Estrella’s property, which
was recorded as Entry No. 346816 on TCT No. T-83976. Upon learning of the levy,
petitioner Dionisio Ybiernas, as Estrella’s heir, filed an Affidavit of Third-Party
Claim asserting their ownership.
The Regional Trial Court ultimately ruled in favor of the respondents in the monetary
complaint, which was later appealed to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Dionisio
passed away and his heirs, the petitioners, filed an action for Quieting of Title and
Damages in Bacolod City, contesting the attachment as invalid since it was based on
an unowned property.
During the proceedings, the petitioners claimed the property had been validly
transferred to them, while respondents argued they had been wronged and that the
proceedings constituted forum-shopping. The Regional Trial Court initially ruled in
favor of the petitioners through a summary judgment but respondents later obtained a
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting a motion for new trial
based on newly discovered evidence.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision to grant a
new trial. It ruled that the Regional Trial Court’s judgment was indeed a final
judgment even though it did not determine the amount of damages, as it resolved the
issue of ownership and validity of the title. The decision clarified that a summary
judgment can be final if it addresses all important issues, except for damages.
Ratio Decidendi: On the matter of newly discovered evidence, the Court found that
respondents had met the criteria for a new trial. The evidence could not have been
discovered during the initial trial with reasonable diligence and was crucial to
challenge the validity of the earlier court order. New trial is a remedy that seeks to
temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice. The Rules allows
the courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when there exists
newly discovered evidence. The grant or denial of a new trial is, generally speaking,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court which cannot be interfered with unless a
clear abuse is shown.
This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered
after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that
it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered
evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with the exercise of
reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered.
In the case, the respondents relied in good faith on the veracity of the Regional Trial
Court’s Order which petitioners presented in court. It was only practical for them to
do so, if only to expedite the proceedings. Given this circumstance, this Court hold
that respondents exercised reasonable diligence in obtaining the evidence. The
certifications qualify as newly discovered evidence.
ELPIDIO S. UY, petitioner, vs. FIRST METRO INTEGRATED STEEL CORP.
and HON. ANTONIO I. DE CASTRO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
 Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 3,
Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. 167245 September 27, 2006
Facts: On July 5, 1999, by First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation (FMISC) filed a
complaint against Robert Juan Uy, Midland Integrated Construction Company
(MICC), and petitioner Elpidio Uy, for a sum of money and a prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment. The core of the dispute arose from FMISC's allegation that on
June 3, 5, and 6, 1998, it delivered deformed steel bars valued at P695,811.00 to
MICC and Robert. On June 9, 1998, Robert presented a Metrobank check issued by
petitioner as payment; however, this check was dishonored, and despite demands,
payment was not made.
In response to FMISC's complaint, both Robert and MICC denied the existence of any
contractual relationship with them, asserting that Robert merely referred petitioner
Elpidio to FMISC. Petitioner Elpidio Uy also claimed he had no business transaction
with FMISC and that the check was never intended as payment. Moreover, he
mentioned that he had stopped the payment of the check.
The case saw multiple postponements and rescheduling of hearings. Petitioner
maintained alternating counsel throughout the proceedings, leading to a significant
number of missed and postponed hearings. During the course, many requests for
continuance were made, often without justification.
After several hearing dates, the trial court ruled in favor of FMISC, ordering
petitioner Elpidio to pay the amount due along with interest and attorney's fees.
Following the ruling, petitioner Elpidio filed a motion for new trial due to alleged
gross negligence by his former counsel, which the trial court denied. Frustrated with
the trial court’s ruling and the failure of his counsel to present evidence, the petitioner
Elpidio sought a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial
court had erred in denying his motion for a new trial.
Issue: Whether or not there was a gross negligence by the petitioner’s counsel that
deprived him of due process and without a new trial he would suffer injustice due to
the incompetence displayed in the handling of his case.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The filing
by the petitioner of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals from the denial
of the motion for new trial by the trial court is proper. This Court finds that the trial
court correctly denied petitioner's motion for new trial.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 1, Rule 37 provides that a motion for new trial may be filed
within the period for taking an appeal based on the following grounds, namely: fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been
impaired in his rights. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.
In the case, this Court finds that the negligence of petitioner's counsel in failing to
attend the hearings for the reception of evidence inexcusable. Under the
circumstances, the petitioner's counsel's failure to attend the seven scheduled hearings
without justifiable reason tantamount to inexcusable neglect. As such, it cannot be a
ground for new trial. The Court noted that there were numerous opportunities for the
petitioner to present his case which he did not utilize effectively. The systematic
pattern of absence and requests for postponement by both the petitioner and his
attorneys led the Court to conclude that the negligence could not be classified as
gross, nor did it deprive the petitioner of due process. Moreover, the Court pointed out
that petitioner Elpidio's affidavit of merit was deficient as it lacked adequate facts that
would constitute a valid defense, merely citing conclusions without detailed factual
support.
In summary, the Court concluded that allowing a new trial on the basis of counsel's
mistakes would set a perilous precedent, allowing parties to endlessly relitigate
matters based on insufficient legal representation.
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO
VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO
CABACUNGAN, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF
BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR
and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch
43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondent.
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
Facts: Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito
Victoriano, Jacob Obania, and Domingo Cabacungan filed a complaint for annulment
of judgment, titles of land, and/or reconveyance against the Bureau of Forest
Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines, and the heirs of
Bernardo Del Mundo (Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador, and Carmen). The case was
initiated in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro.
During the proceedings, several motions were filed, including a motion by the
petitioners to declare the heirs of Del Mundo and the Bureau of Lands and Forest
Development in default, and motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the
Land Bank of the Philippines. The trial court granted petitioners’ motion to declare
the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default due to their
failure to answer, but denied it against the respondent heirs based on improper
service. The trial court denied the Land Bank and heirs' motions to dismiss, arguing
that the matters required trial to determine facts.
On February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed the petitioners' complaint, ruling that
the action had prescribed. The petitioners received the order on March 3, 1998, and
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on March 18, 1998. The motion for
reconsideration was denied on July 1, 1998, and upon receiving the denial on July 22,
1998, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, paying the appeal fees
on August 3, 1998.
The trial court, however, denied the notice of appeal, claiming it was filed eight days
late. This led the petitioners to seek remedy through a petition for certiorari and
mandamus at the Court of Appeals, insisting they had filed their notice well within the
reglementary period.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, stating that the 15-day appeal period
should commence from the February 12 order and not from the July order, leading to
the conclusion that the petitioners’ appeal was indeed late.
Issue: Whether or not the 15-day period for appeal should be counted from July 22,
1998—the date they received the order denying their motion for reconsideration.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and
holds that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of
15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their
motion for reconsideration).
Ratio Decidendi: This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of
the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the
above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which was
already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new
trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases.
The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes
significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is
given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or
rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to
have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to
deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day
appeal period should be counted – from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998)
or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days
from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from
receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of
the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt
of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the
notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.