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 Douglas J. Kresse

Education

:
|
 Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2022 with funding trom
Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/ison_ 9781259868436
 Apvocacy
nc DEBATE.

Fifth Edition

Douglas J. Kresse
Fullerton College

Graw
Hill
Education
 Education

Copyright © 2016 by McGraw-Hill Education LLC. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Except as
permitted under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in
any form or by any means, or stored in a data base retrieval system, without prior written permission of the publisher.

D2 US 4 TEI 23722 21.20

ISBN-13: 978-1-259-86843-6
ISBN-10: 1-259-86843-5

Solutions Program Manager: Joyce Berendes

Project Manager: Tina Bower
CONTENTS

Overview: Reasons for arguing. What is argument?

Toulmin model
Warrants; Aristotle (Ethos, pathos, logos)
Backing and Argument fields
Qualifier & Rebuttal
Evidence standards
Brockriede: Model, Configural Argument, Enthymeme
Rhetorical process—Advocacy
Communication Model (Model)
Anxiety
Canon-Invention
Organization
Style & delivery
Nonverbal communication
Language & meaning
Memory & ELM
Perelman
Narrative & Tipping Point
Metaphor
Social Judgment Theory, Fear Appeals
Inoculation; Compliance-Gaining Strategies
Self-Persuasion; Social Learning; Reasoned Action
Burke |
Listening-Memory
Public Speaking Review
Debate & Format
Ethics
Stasis—Fact-Value Policy Propositions
Resolution
Affirmative
Negative
Refutation
Guidelines: Presumption; Burden of proof; Burden of Rebuttals
Voting
Cross-examination; Flowing; Presentation
Definitions
Bibliography
Templates

Communication model illustration by Hirofumi Matsuoka.

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ADVOCACY AND DEBATE: PERSPECTIVES ON ARGUMENT

Kenneth Burke (1950) tells us that people communicate in order to coordinate meanings and
action. Our youngest daughter's first words ("I wanna straw") came on an occasion when mere
pointing to an object (we were supposed to make sense of those gestures) was inadequate to
create common meaning and to gain our compliance.

Burke writes that communication (rhetoric) is the "symbolic means of inducing cooperation by
beings that by nature respond to symbols" (1950, p. 43). Humans use language and gestures
to communicate because we seek to gain common understanding, coordinate meaning and
action, and organize society (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Reasoning is an inherent part of the
communication process. This text approaches communication—in particular, advocacy and
debate—from an argumentative perspective.

First, our production of rhetoric (discourse) is an argumentative act. We communicate for a

reason. We organize our ideas in a certain way that reflects some reason. We select words
and deliver them in a certain style for a reason. Reasoning is inherent in communication from
the perspective of an advocate.

Second, the process of understanding and knowing involves reasoning. Sense-making is a

process of organizing information and drawing inferences from that information: the process of
listening and making sense of what we hear is inherently argumentative (Fisher, 1985, p. 517).

Finally, Our responses to communication manifest our reasoning. What we hear affects our
understanding. It helps us develop an or/entation towards something. Kenneth Burke (1965)
explains that humans act toward these orientations. We respond because of reasons. Human
interaction is inherently argumentative.

This book considers many fundamental concepts of argument, advocacy and debate. It begins
by covering some of the reasons why we argue and debate. It then considers some basic
issues fundamental to understanding argument. the functions of argument, argument models,
ethics of arguing, and standards for good reasoning. The book concludes with the process of
creating speeches and debates--from generating ideas to delivery and evaluation of
arguments.

REASONS FOR ARGUING

The ability to debate ideas openly—and safely—is a hallmark of a democracy where human
rights are honored. Debate and advocacy also offer peaceful means of altering a policy or
judgment. There is no guarantee that every decision made by discussion and debate will be
wise or effective. But there are numerous examples where inadequate debate leads to policy
failures. Additionally, the failure to allow civil debate in societies had been ascribed as a cause
for destructive political culture and violence (Makiya, 1993; Conquest, 2001).

Public discourse has other advantages. Forcing decision-makers to be accountable to the

scrutiny of open debate is a necessary check on powers that leaders have. The proverb that

3
"power corrupts" was accepted by our Founding Fathers, who devised a system of government
where decision makers in executive positions, legislatures, and courts would need to debate
issues. To the degree that we fail to have adequate deliberation in our courts, legislatures, or
executive branches, we can expect to have abuses of power and poor quality decisions. Open
advocacy and debate that extends to every able citizen also ensures that we all assume a
necessary level of responsibility for our society.

WHAT IS ARGUMENT?
Argumentation scholar Wayne Brockriede observed that if there was only one way of looking at
things, we wouldn't need to argue or debate—we wouldn't need to give reasons for our view on
things (1985). But there usually are differing ways of looking at things, and when that
happens, it invites us to communicate in order to explain or resolve or manage those
differences.

Answering "what is argument?" needs to take into consideration that there are different
perspectives on looking at argument. We can look at argument in three ways: as individual
reasons ("logical product"), as the process of influencing others ("rhetorical process,") and as
discussion and debate ("Dialectical method").

This text first examines models of argument "products": individual "good reasons." We will
examine argument models (Toulmin, Brockriede), evidence standards, and the underlying
authority for arguments. The book next examines argument as rhetoric. The development of
persuasive message—from conceiving and organizing a speech to its delivery—is surveyed.
Means of adapting messages to audiences—persuasive strategies—are included here. Finally,
the book examines debate: ethics, developing cases, and responding to arguments.

LOGICAL PRODUCT: THE TOULMIN MODEL OF ARGUMENT

One way of looking at argument is to view it as a "logical product": a reason that people use in
communication. Argument as product can be seen as any justified belief we hold.

Arguments are comprised of claims we make, evidence to support them, and a justified
"inferential leap" between evidence and claim.

Perhaps the clearest example of an "argument product" is Stephen Toulmin's model (1958),
advanced in his book, The Uses of Argument. Before Toulmin, scholars had used sy/logisms
as a primary means of diagramming arguments. Perhaps the most familiar syllogism is:

All men are mortal.

Socrates /§ a man.
Therefore, Socrates /s mortal.

Walter Fisher has observed that the weakness in this model is the lack of any meaningful leap
of inference between the premises and the conclusion; once you accept the first two
statements, you're locked into the conclusion. Brockriede wrote that "[because] in a syllogism
4
the conclusion is entailed by the premises, no inferential leap is required: nothing is said in the
conclusion not already said in the premises" (Ehninger & Brockriede, 1978, p. 23).

When we argue, the conclusion isn't predestined as it is in a formal syllogism. Fisher writes
"the syllogism is a verbal maneuver in terms of which have no necessary connection with real
things" (1989, p. 33). Toulmin offered his model as a more realistic explanation of the things
we use when we reason: arguments.

DATA, WARRANT, CLAIM: THE CORE OF TOULMIN’S MODEL

When we reason, we explain wAy we think the way we do. Toulmin's model reflects this.
There are three basic parts of Toulmin's model: a claim, evidence, and a warrant.

The claim is the idea you want people to accept or to give assent. Evidence is what you
provide to support that claim. The warrant authorizes the connection between claim and
evidence.

When you go to a job interview, you want the employer to accept one basic claim: you are the
person for the job. Imagine you walk into the employment office, tell them "I'm the person for
your job!" and then you leave. This isn't likely: you're a reasonable person, and so are they.
They want you to provide a reason why you're the person for the job. To illustrate, let's start
with just the claim and its support (evidence—also called "data" or "grounds") (Toulmin,
Rieke & Janik, 1984).

EVIDENCE/ DATA/ GROUNDS CLAIM

Work experience You should hire me for this job.

Interpersonal skills
Educational background

"Evidence" and "claim" are the "expressed" parts of most arguments. When you are analyzing
arguments—in writings or speeches—most of the time, all you'll see or hear are evidence and
claim. Warrants generally exist in the minds of speakers and audiences. They seldom are
explicit.

But look at another basic argument along the same lines:

EVIDENCE/ DATA/ GROUNDS CLAIM

| was born in Oregon. You should hire me for this job.

| like chocolate.

You still have an argument. But is it reasonable? There is movement from the evidence to
the claim—an "inferential leap." But is it reasonable? Is it warranted? Probably not. The
2)
third major part of Toulmin's model is the warrant: that which justifies or legitimizes the
inferential movement from data (evidence) to claim.

One can look at the inferential leap as moving from claim to data, or from data to claim. When
you make an assertion—a claim, then you are expected to provide a reason for the claim.
Providing evidence that fits with a claim is the basic part of an argument product. We can
also argue from data to claim. We do this all the time when we make sense of information
around us, and draw a conclusion from that evidence.

Medical doctors do this every day. At an office visit, I will tell the doctor the symptoms I'm
feeling. "I feel tired. My throat is sore. My nose is plugged up." I expect the doctor to
make an inferential leap—to organize that evidence, and make some inference from it.

DATA CLAIM

| feel tired. You are sick!

My head is all clogged up.
| have a sore throat.
"Cough!"

WARRANT

These are signs of the flu.

Here we see the third part of Toulmin's model: the warrant. It asks you "why" the evidence
leads to the claim, or why you make the claim based on the evidence.

What does Toulmin's model have to do with advocacy and debate? First, what we're doing in a
debate is advancing arguments—series of data-warrant-claims. Not every claim we hear is
legitimate. Toulmin's model provides a means of judging arguments. Second, the model
reminds us of key responsibilities in making good reasons. This helps us in researching and
crafting arguments.

WARRANTS

Warrants are simply our explanation of why it's reasonable to move from evidence to a
conclusion (c/a/m). We can all think of situations where people draw the wrong conclusion from
some evidence; warrants help us explain why we made good or bad inferences.

There are a number of ways of classifying or making sense of those things that justify
inferential leaps: warrants. These are provided to help in constructing and evaluating
arguments. It's important to realize that warrants function most importantly in the mind of

6
audiences as they connect data and claim. There is no reason we need to see any argument as
being justified by just one sort of warrant; Brockriede (1978) argues that multiple warrants
may function to link claim and evidence.

ARISTOTLE'S PROOFS as WARRANTS

One way to approach warrants is to use Aristotle’s proofs of ethos, pathos, and logos. Each or
all can be used to make the connection between evidence and claim. Warrants are rarely
overtly stated—instead, warrants represent the audience's perception of why the evidence and
claim "fit" together.

ETHOS: AUTHORITATIVE PROOFS

Ethos (or credibility) functions to justify the inferential leap because of the believability of the
arguer. If someone writes you a letter of recommendation, here is how we could diagram that
argument—where a doctor prescribes medication following a thorough examination:

DATA CLAIM

Results from You should take this

diagnostic medicine.

gable WARRANT-- ETHOS

The doctor is credible. |

trust my doctor.

Arguments are persuasive to the degree that they—and the persons arguing them—are
credible. We accept arguments often because we have confidence and trust in the advocates.

There are some common guidelines of evaluating the credibility of others’ statements
(Walton, 1997, p. 258). These include:

Is the expert an authority in the field?

Is the expert a reliable source?
Is the person's testimony consistent with that of other authorities?
Is the person's opinion based upon evidence?
What motives affected the person's testimony?
Has the person made statements in the past that undermine this opinion?
eS Was this witness in a good position to observe or judge events?
ee)
eee

These issues often become critical factors in public and academic debates. It is not uncommon
to see critical debates where authorities disagree with each other.
You're probably familiar with testimonials offered for unconventional medical treatments,
remedies, and the like. Social Psychologist Carol Tavris (2001, B11) notes that not all medical
testimonials (in print or TV) are credible: "no matter what kind of therapy is involved, clients
are motivated to tell you it worked well."

The issue of credibility goes beyond whether we are qualified in offering our opinions to
whether we are presenting arguments and evidence /Aonest/y. Two journalists—former New
Republic writer Stephen Glass and New York Times writer Jayson Blair were made famous by
their repeated acts of plagiarism (Kurtz, 2003 May 8; Shafer 2003; Barnes 2002). Emory
history Professor Michael Bellesiles wrote an award-winning book (Arming America) where he
argued that the Founding Fathers couldn't have meant the Second Amendment to mean
individuals had a right to bear arms. He argued that research indicated that few people actually
owned guns at the time of the writing of the Constitution. The problem with Bellesiles
argument was his research was fabricated (Skinner, 2002). (Eventually, his awards were
withdrawn, and he no longer works at Emory.)

Francis Fukuyama's book Trust makes clear, society must operate on high levels of trust of
others if it is to function efficiently. Everything we say and do is filtered through a lens of
"ethos." Trust /s an all-important organizing principle by which we all operate.

In summary, authoritative warrants function when we trust an authority's assertion that there is
a connection between evidence and claim. When a doctor says, "you've got a possible case of
skin cancer we need to take care of—this mole looks suspicious," it is enough for most of us to
trust the doctor and to act on that argument. We make the connection between an observable
piece of data (a mole on the skin) and its meaning ("this is a sign you may be at risk for
cancer") because we recognize the doctor as a trustworthy authority. In an academic debate,
a judge or audience may not understand all of the evidence you present—and sometimes may
not understand the link between evidence and your claims. But they may be willing to accept
your arguments because they view you as credible—as authoritative.

PATHOS: MOTIVATIONAL WARRANTS

Values function as underlying foundations that legitimize our judgments and actions. We
consider here the role that "pathos"—emotional or evaluative appeals—play in reasoning.

Some have viewed "pathos" as "mere emotion'"—not rational. But pathos can be understood to
signify one's values or motives. There is no separation from rationality here—although not all
values or motives are admirable. If somebody does say, "they're acting on emotion," there’s
nothing inherently wrong with that. It's impossible NOT to act in concert with our emotions or
values. There is no motivational vacuum in argument, and we would do well to address the
core concerns of others (Haidt, 2012).

Douglas Walton observes that emotion plays a major role in legitimate argument.
First, effective argument assumes some degree of empathy—our ability to put ourselves in an
"opponent's position in an argument" (1992, p. 255). It is an essential aspect of arguing
ethically that we see an issue beyond our own perspective—to also consider perspectives of

8
others (Brockriede, 1972). Arguments also assume core values or emotions: fear, pity, or
other values. It is only when values (biases) lead to our overlooking facts, or to "succumb to ...
vested interests" that pathos becomes problematic" (Walton, 1992, p. 264).

Here, we “connect the dots” by seeing a connection between facts we observe (“children are
starving”), a core value (“concern for others”) and action (“You should contribute to our
charity”):

DATA/ EVIDENCE CLAIM

Children are starving. You should contribute to our charity.

WARRANT

You are concerned for others.

You value life.
(Values justify claim)

As the above illustration suggests, values or "pathos" explain the inferential move from data to
claim. If someone asks people to adopt a policy—to act in a certain way—there are always
values we use to justify those policies. We are moved to action by values (Haidt, 2012).

Appeals to emotions are important in moving people to action. The University of Oregon's Paul
Slovic has studied what motivates people to action on humanitarian disasters such as the
tragedy in Darfur. He argues that merely using statistics fails to stir the emotions that move us
to act: "We know that genocide in Darfur is real, but we do not ‘feel’ that reality" (2007). Slovic
suggests instead that we use concrete examples—narratives—that help people visualize the
problem and "feel" compassion.

LOGOS: SUBSTANTIVE JUSTIFICATION

Our brain organizes information by organized patterns (Hawkins, 2004). Logos refers to
patterns of data organization by which we make sense of reality. Ehninger and Brockriede
called these "substantive warrants" (1978). There are four common types of warrants
considered here: generalizations, analogies, signs, and cause-and-effect.

ARGUMENT BY GENERALIZATION

If you've ever made a batch of cookies for someone, you probably sampled a couple of the
cookies to make sure things turned out right. Based on a small sampling, you can be secure
that the rest of the batch is edible. We daily make these sorts of generalizations where we
base a judgment on a large group of things based upon small (but representative) samples.
In dating, we make generalizations about others. How many dates do you have to go on until
you know what the other person is really like? During the job interview process, employers try
to collect enough examples of information to make a credible decision. All these are
generalizations: making an inference about a larger whole from representative samples.

Surveys that sample segments of the population (it's too costly to survey everyone) help us
understand how the entire nation feels on issues. One needs to ask: are these examples
representative? Are they adequate in sample size? Are there counter-examples?

DATA CLAIM
We should hire Biff.
Resume.
Interview.
Letters of recommendation.
Internship.

WARRANT

Generalization
(These represent the norm)

While some may agree with this generalization, it has some limits. People are hired for jobs
based on some information—but not exhaustive knowledge. We only know a fragment about a
person before hiring. The question is: is the information representative of that person? Or is
this information not typical—was the person putting on “a good show” that wasn’t
representative?

We are familiar with stereotypes of different groups. Stereotypes are a form of generalization.
Often, these generalizations may have been based on too small a sample. The fallacy, “hasty
generalization,” is any flawed generalization argument.

ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY
Policy makers must decide on actions to take, and the information is never fully complete. If
we enact a policy—adopt health care reform, give foreign aid to some country, or revise our
education system, we’re never fully sure how things will turn out. One way to make sense of
things—and manage uncertainty—is to refer to similar experiences: analogies.

An argument by analogy—where the warrant linking data and claim relies on an analogy—seeks
to make a comparison between two things. Since argument involves an inferential leap from
the known to the uncertain, the comparison involves one thing that is known, and the other
that will be clarified.
10
Analogies are very powerful. They give the listener a sense that they understand the issue
clearly, and are therefore more likely to act on that understanding. That's why when arguing
by analogy, one needs to make sure the things compared are alike in essential ways.

As this text is being revised, there has been a long and disastrous civil war in Syria. Hundreds
of thousands have died. Millions have been displaced, and Europe has seen a flood of refugees
unmatched since World War 2. How should the United States Act? One proposal has been to
implement a no-fly zone that would protect Syrian civilians from air attacks by the Syrian
military (Mueller, 2015). Proponents of the move—for United States and other air forces to
create a “no-fly zone” blocking Syrian attacks—is an effective strategy: a similar intervention
was effective at blocking Saddam Hussein from attacking the Kurds in Northern Iraq from 1991-
2003. It protected the Kurds, and stopped an exodus of refugees. Opponents argue that
conditions are different, and that a no-fly zone now would be excessively risky—and ineffective.

The key issue to ask is whether this link—this comparison—is justified? For analogies to be
acceptable, the comparison needs to be understandable and fair. If you use an analogy that
the audience isn't familiar with, it won't have the persuasive effect you desire. Analogies need
to be between things that are comparable—alike in essential qualities—to be fair. Otherwise,
you may be accused of "comparing apples and oranges."

DATA/ EVIDENCE CLAIM

The “no-fly zone” We should establish a “no fly zone”
worked in Iraq from
1991-2003

WARRANT

Analogy:
[comparable]

ARGUMENT BY SIGN
Argument by sign suggests another pattern make a connection between things: that something
is an indicator of something else. You've heard of the saying, “where there’s smoke, there’s
fire.” That is an example of argument by sign.

Health professionals regularly use argument by sign, looking for symptoms of illness or injury.
Mechanics working on automobiles look for indications of mechanical failure or wear. The
question one asks in sign reasoning is: are these adequate indicators? Are there alternative
interpretations of this sign?

1
Other documents randomly have
different content
young Cæsar Valentinian, between East and West, a new, if
unsubstantial, cordiality appeared. Italy at least was restored to
prosperity, while in Aetius she possessed a general as great as the
great Stilicho. But if Italy was safe the provinces were in peril and
she herself saw Africa betrayed by Boniface and ravaged by and lost
to the Vandals under Genseric. Nor was the domestic state of her
household and court such as to inspire her with confidence in the
future. If her son Valentinian was a foolish and sensual boy, her
daughter Honoria was discovered in a low intrigue with a
chamberlain of the palace, and when in exile at Constantinople sent,
perhaps longing for the romantic fate of her mother, her ring to the
new and youthful King of the Huns, soon to be famous as Attila,
inviting him to carry her off as Adolphus, the Goth, had carried off
Placidia.
Such was the condition of things in the royal household of the
West. In Constantinople things were not more promising.
Theodosius, the young Emperor, called the Calligrapher, was a
dilettante of the fine arts, not a statesman. Those who surrounded
him were mediocrities intent rather on theological controversies than
on the safety of the State, or sunk in a cynical corruption in which
everything noble was lost. No one East or West seemed able to
grasp or to realise that there was any danger. Had the Imperial
Governments failed altogether to understand the fundamental cause
of the Gothic advance, the Vandal attack, indeed of all their
embarrassments? Had they failed to remember what was there
beyond the Rhine and the Danube? Had they forgotten the Huns?

FOOTNOTES:
[2] See my “Ravenna” (Dent, 1913), pp. 1-10.
 II
THE HUNS AND ATTILA

The people called the Huns, “scarcely mentioned in other records,”

are fully described by that Ammianus Marcellinus[3] whom I have
already quoted. He lived at the end of the fourth century, was a
Roman historian born of Greek parents at Antioch, and after fighting
in Gaul, in Germany and the East, settled in Rome and devoted
himself to history. He describes the Huns as “living beyond the Sea
of Azov on the borders of the Frozen Ocean.” And adds that they
were a people “savage beyond all parallel.” He then gives us the
following careful description of them:—
“In their earliest infancy deep incisions are made in the cheeks of
their boys[4] so that when the time comes for the beard to grow the
sprouting hairs may be kept back by the furrowed scars, and
therefore they grow to old age as beardless as eunuchs. At the same
time all have strong and well-built limbs and strong necks; they are
indeed of great size, but so short-legged that you might fancy them
to be two-legged beasts, or the figures which are hewn out in a rude
manner with an axe on the posts at the end of bridges.[5]
“They do, however, just bear the likeness of men (horribly ugly
though they be), but they are so little advanced in civilisation that
they make no use of fire, nor of seasoned food, but live on roots
which they find in the fields, or on the half raw flesh of any animal
which they merely warm a little by placing it between their own thighs
and the backs of their horses.
“They do not live under roofed houses but look upon them as
tombs and will only enter them of necessity. Nor is there to be found
among them so much as a cabin thatched with reed; but they
wander about over the mountains and through the woods training
themselves to bear from their infancy the extremes of frost and
hunger and thirst.
“They wear linen clothes or else the skins of field mice sewn
together, and this both at home and abroad. When once such a tunic
is put on, it is never changed till from long decay it falls to pieces.
Their heads are covered with round caps and their hairy legs with
goat skins and their shoes which are ignorant of any last are so
clumsy as to hinder them in walking.
“For this cause they are not well suited for infantry; but, on the
other hand, they are almost one with their horses, which are poorly
shaped but hardy; often they sit them like women. In truth they can
remain on horseback night and day; on horseback they buy and sell,
they eat and drink, and bowed on the narrow neck of their steeds
they even sleep and dream. On horseback too they discuss and
deliberate. They are not, however, under the authority of a king, but
are content with the loose government of their chiefs.
“When attacked they sometimes engage in regular battle formed in
a solid body and uttering all kinds of terrific yells. More often,
however, they fight irregularly, suddenly dispersing, then reuniting
and after inflicting huge loss upon their enemy will scatter over the
plains hither and thither, avoiding a fortified place or an
entrenchment. It must be confessed that they are very formidable
warriors....
“None of them ploughs or even touches a plough-handle; for they
have no settled abode, but are alike homeless and lawless,
continually wandering with their waggons which indeed are their
homes. They seem to be ever in flight.... Nor if he is asked can any
one tell you where he was born; for he was conceived in one place,
born in another far away, and bred in another still more remote.
“They are treacherous and inconstant and like brute beasts are
utterly ignorant of the distinction between right and wrong. They only
express themselves with difficulty and ambiguously, have no respect
for any religion or superstition, are immoderately covetous of gold,
and are so fickle and cantankerous that many times in a day they will
quarrel with their comrades without cause and be reconciled without
satisfaction.”[6]
Such were the people who according to Ammianus were “the
original cause of all the destruction and manifold calamities” which
descended upon the Roman Empire, in the fifth century of our era.
Fifty-six years before they began directly to menace civilisation
and the Roman Empire, they had, as we have seen, in 376 a.d.,
driven the Goths before them to the first of those famous assaults
upon the frontiers of the Roman world. They themselves, utter
barbarians as they were, attempted then no direct attack upon our
civilisation, though in 396 they crossed the Caucasus, raided
Armenia and as Claudius notes, “laid waste the pleasant fields of
Syria.” In 409, however, Alaric being then intent on Italy, they
crossed the Danube and pushed on into Bulgaria, Uldis, their chief,
boasting in true Barbarian fashion, “All that the sun shines upon I
can conquer if I will.” It was the first claim of the Barbarian, vocal and
explicit, to “a place in the sun”—someone else’s place. Uldis’ boast,
however, had been but the prelude to his flight and fall. Amid the
welter of Barbarians less barbarous than he, Visigoths, Vandals,
Suevi, Alani, the Hun in fact was unable to do much more than drive
them on. When they had passed into the Empire, into Gaul and
Spain and Africa, he, worse than them all, was free at last to
threaten Christendom and its capitals, Constantinople and Rome.
It was not till the two brothers Attila and Bleda ascended the
Hunnish throne, if throne it can be called, in the year 423, that the
Huns really became immediately and directly dangerous to
civilisation.
That civilisation already half bankrupt and in transition had, as we
have seen, been bewildered and wounded by the actual incursion of
Barbarian armies south of the Danube and the Rhine, nay within the
heart of the Empire, within reach of Constantinople, within the very
walls of Rome. It was now to be assaulted by a savage horde, wholly
heathen, intent on murder and rape, loot and destruction.
The contrast between the two attacks, the attack of Alaric and that
of Attila, is very striking. To admire Alaric, even to defend him, is
obviously not impossible, since so many historians have been found
ready to do both. No voice unless it be Kaiser Wilhelm’s has ever
been raised in behalf of Attila. Here was the Empire, Christendom;
he fell upon it like a wild beast. At least the Goths were Christian—
though Arian—the Huns were pagan heathen. At least Alaric had
revered the Roman name and sought to assume it; Attila despised
and hated it and would have destroyed it utterly. But if there is this
moral contrast between the Gothic and the Hunnish attacks upon the
Empire, militarily they are alike in this above all that both were
directed first upon the East and were only turned upon the West after
a sort of failure. Happily for us the attacks of Attila, while infinitely
more damaging, were not nearly so dangerous as those of Alaric.
The Empire was assaulted by an assassin; it was delivered.
The Roman system with regard to the Barbarians had long been
established when Theodosius II ascended the Eastern throne. It
consisted not only in employing Barbarians as auxiliaries—thus Uldis
and his Huns had fought under Stilicho against Radagaisus at the
battle of Fiesole; but in setting the different Barbarian tribes and
races one against another. The Huns especially had been favoured
by the Empire in this way, Stilicho knew them well and Aetius who
was at last to defeat them upon the Catalaunian plains owed them
perhaps his life in the crisis that followed the death of his rival
Boniface in 433. But that policy, always dangerous, and the more so
if it were inevitable, was already bankrupt. The dispersal through the
provinces of the Goths, the Vandals, the Alani, Suevi and other tribes
left the Empire face to face upon its northern frontier with the real
force which had driven them on. In 432 we find Roua, King of the
Huns, in receipt of an annual subsidy, scarcely to be distinguished
from a tribute, of 350 pounds’ weight of gold. He it was who perhaps
first broke the old Roman policy. When the Empire, according to its
custom, made alliances with certain Barbarian tribes his neighbours,
he claimed them as his subjects and immediately swore that he
would denounce all his treaties with the Empire unless the Emperor
broke off these alliances. Moreover, he demanded that all those of
his subjects then within the Empire should be restored to him; for
many had entered the Roman service to escape his harsh rule.
These demands could not be ignored or refused. In 433 Theodosius
was on the point of sending an embassy to treat with Roua, when he
heard that he was dead and that his two nephews, still young men,
Attila and Bleda, had succeeded him. It was they who received the
Imperial ambassadors.
The conference met on the right bank of the Danube within the
Empire, that is near the Roman town of Margus or Margum, a city of
Moesia, where the Danube and the Morava meet. The place was
known as the Margum planum on account of the character of the
country, and was famous as the spot where Diocletian had defeated
Carinus.[7]
The Byzantine historian Priscus has left us an account of this
strange meeting. The Huns it seems came on horseback and as they
refused to dismount the Roman ambassadors also remained on their
horses. It was thus they heard the arrogant demands of the Hunnish
kings: the denunciation by Theodosius of his alliance with the
Barbarians of the Danube, the expulsion of all the Huns serving in
the Imperial armies or settled within the Empire, an undertaking not
to assist any Barbarian people at war with the Huns, and the
payment by the Empire as tribute, tributi nomine, of seven hundred
pounds’ weight of gold instead of the three hundred and fifty given
hitherto. To all these demands the ambassadors were forced to
agree as Attila insisted either upon their acceptance or upon war,
and Theodosius preferred any humiliation to war. The famous
conference of Margus was thus a complete victory for the Huns, a
victory Attila never forgot.
That Theodosius was ready to accept any terms which Attila might
insist upon is proved by the fact that he immediately delivered up to
him his two guests, young princes of the Huns, and made no protest
when Attila crucified them before the eyes of his ambassadors.
This act seems to symbolise at the outset the character of Attila
and his reign. He was then, we may suppose, between thirty and
forty years old, and although the younger always the master of his
brother Bleda, whom he was soon to murder. Of the place of his birth
we know nothing,[8] but he grew up on the Danube and there learned
the use of arms, perhaps in the company of the young Aetius, who
had been a Roman hostage of Roua and who was one day to
conquer Attila. If we look for a portrait of him we shall unhappily not
find it in any contemporary writer; but Jornandes, probably repeating
a lost passage of some earlier writer, perhaps Priscus himself, tells
us that he was short, with a mighty chest, a large head, eyes little
and deep-set, a scant beard, flat nose and dark complexion. He
thrust his head forward as he went and darted his glances all about,
going proudly withal, like one destined to terrify the nations and
shake the earth. Hasty and quarrelsome, his words, like his acts,
were sudden and brutal, but though in war he only destroyed, and
left the dead unburied in their thousands for a warning; to those who
submitted to him he was merciful, or at least he spared them. He
dressed simply and cleanly, ate as simply as he dressed, his food
being served on wooden dishes; indeed his personal temperance
contrasted with the barbaric extravagance he had about him.
Nevertheless he was a Barbarian with the instincts of a savage.
Constantly drunk he devoured women with a ferocious passion,
every day having its victim, and his bastards formed indeed a
people. He knew no religion but surrounded himself with sorcerers,
for he was intensely superstitious.[9] As a general he was seldom in
the field, he commanded rather than led and ever preferred
diplomacy to battle.[10] His greatest weapon was prevarication. He
would debate a matter for years and the continual embassies of
Theodosius amused without exhausting him and his patience. He
played with his victims as a cat does with a mouse and would always
rather buy a victory than win it. He found his threat more potent than
his deed, and in fact played with the Empire which had so much to
lose, very much as Bismarck played with Europe. Like Bismarck too
his business was the creation of an Empire. His idea, an idea that
perhaps even Roua had not failed to understand, was the creation of
an Empire of the North, a Hunnish Empire, in counterpoise against
the Roman Empire of the South, to the south that is of the Rhine and
the Danube. For this cause he wished to unite the various Barbarian
tribes and nations under his sceptre, as Bismarck wished to unite the
tribes of the Germans under the Prussian sword. He was to be the
Emperor of the North as the Roman Emperors were Emperors of the
South. Had he lived in our day he would have understood that
famous telegram of the Kaiser to the Tsar of Russia—“the Admiral of
the Atlantic....”
It was the business of Theodosius to prevent the realisation of this
scheme, nor did he hesitate to break the treaty of Margus to achieve
this. His emissaries attempted to attach to the Empire the Acatziri, a
Hunnish tribe that had replaced the Alani on the Don. Their chief,
however, fearing for his independence, or stupidly handled, sent
word to Attila of the Roman plot. The Hun came down at the head of
a great army, and though he spared the Acatziri, for their chief was
both wily and a flatterer, he brought all the Barbarians of that part
within his suzerainty and, returning, soon found himself master of an
Empire which stretched from the North Sea to the Caucasus, and
from the Baltic to the Danube and the Rhine, an Empire certainly in
extent comparable with that of Rome.
It was in achieving this truly mighty purpose that Attila exhibits two
of his chief characteristics, his superstition and his cruelty.
It seems that the ancient Scythians on the plain to the east of the
Carpathians had for idol and perhaps for God a naked sword, its hilt
buried in the earth, its blade pointed skyward. To this relic the
Romans had given the name of the sword of Mars. In the course of
ages the thing had been utterly forgotten, till a Hunnish peasant
seeing his mule go lame, and finding it wounded in the foot, on
seeking for the cause, guided by the blood, found this sword amid
the undergrowth and brought it to Attila who recovered it joyfully as a
gift from heaven and a sign of his destined sovereignty over all the
peoples of the earth. So at least Jornandes relates.[11]
The other episode exhibits his cruelty. In founding his empire Attila
had certainly made many enemies and aroused the jealousy of those
of his own house. At any rate he could not remember without
impatience that he shared his royalty with Bleda. To one of his
subtlety such impatience was never without a remedy. Bleda was
accused of treason, perhaps of plotting with Theodosius, and Attila
slew his brother or had him assassinated; and alone turned to enjoy
his Barbary and to face Rome.
 FOOTNOTES:
[3] In the thirty-first book of his History of Rome: see Appendix
I.
[4] The Prussian student is even to-day famous for the scars on
his face inflicted in the duels at the Universities.
[5] Cf. the physique of the ordinary Prussian at its most
characteristic in Von Hindenberg, who really seems to have been
hewn out of wood.
[6] It was a modern and famous German who not long since
declared that the Prussians were such quarrelsome and
disagreeable brutes that it was only their propensity to drink beer
and that continually that mollified them sufficiently to be regarded
as human beings.
[7] It is curious to remember that this first encounter of Attila
with the Imperial power took place in what is now Servia only fifty
miles further down the Danube than Belgrade.
[8] It has been suggested that his name Attila is that of the
Volga in the fifth century and that therefore he was born upon its
banks; but as well might one say that Roua was born there
because one of the ancient names of that river was Rha.
[9] For all this see Appendix: Jornandes, R. Get., 35 and
especially for his dress and food, Priscus, infra.
[10] Cf. Jorn., R. Get., 36: “Homo subtilis antequam arma
gereret , arte pugnabat....”
[11] See Appendix, Jornandes, R. Get., 35.
 III
ATTILA AND THE EASTERN EMPIRE

When Attila had achieved the hegemony of the North he turned his
attention upon the Empire; and it is curious for us at this moment to
note the coincidence that this first attack upon civilisation was
delivered at the very spot upon the Danube where the Germanic
powers in August, 1914, began their offensive. Attila directed his
armies upon the frontiers of modern Servia at the point where the
Save joins the Danube, where the city of Singidunum rose then and
where to-day Belgrade stands.
The pretext for this assault was almost as artificial and
manufactured as that which Austria put forward for her attack upon
Servia. Attila asserted that the Bishop of that same frontier town of
Margus, on the Morava, where he had made treaty with the Empire,
had crossed the Danube, and having secretly obtained access to the
sepulchre of the Hunnish kings had stolen away its treasures. The
Bishop, of course, eagerly denied this strange accusation, and it
seemed indeed so unlikely that he was guilty that Theodosius was
exceedingly reluctant to sacrifice him. The people of Moesia
clamoured for a decision; if the Bishop were guilty then he must be
delivered to Attila, but if not Theodosius must protect both him and
them. For Attila had waited for nothing; he had crossed the Danube
before making his accusation and had occupied Viminacium, one of
the greater towns upon the frontier.
Meanwhile the Bishop, seeing the hesitation of Theodosius and
expecting to be sacrificed, made his way to the camp of the Huns
and promised in return for his life to deliver Margus to them, and this
he did upon the following night. Then, dividing his forces into two
armies, Attila began his real attack upon the Empire.
 The first of these armies was directed upon Singidunum, the
modern Belgrade, which was taken and ruined, and when that was
achieved it proceeded up the Save to Sirmium, the ancient capital of
Pannonia, which soon fell into its hands. The second crossed the
Danube further eastward and besieged Ratiaria, a considerable
town, the head-quarters of a Roman Legion and the station of the
fleet of the Danube.

THE ATTACK OF ATTILA UPON THE EAST.

Having thus, with this second army, secured the flank, Attila
marched his first army from Singidunum up the Morava to Naissus
(Nisch), precisely as the Austrians tried to do but yesterday. They
failed, but he succeeded and Naissus fell. Thence he passed on to
Sardica where he was met by his second army which had taken
Ratiaria. Sardica was pillaged and burnt.
Attila thus possessed himself in the year 441 of the gateways of
the Balkans, almost without a protest from Theodosius. Five years
later, in 446, he was ready to advance again. In that year and the
next he destroyed two Roman armies, took and pillaged some
seventy towns, and pushed south as far as Thermopylae, and
eastward even to Gallipoli; only the walls of Constantinople saved
the capital. Theodosius was forced to buy a disgraceful peace at the
price of an immediate payment of 6000 pounds’ weight of gold, an
annual tribute, no longer even disguised, of 2000 pounds, and an
undertaking that the Empire would never employ or give refuge to
any of those whom Attila claimed as his subjects.
It was easier to agree to such terms than to fulfil them. The
provinces were ruined, the whole fiscal system of the East in
confusion, and even what wealth remained was, as Priscus tells us,
“spent not in national purposes, but on absurd shows and gaudy
pageants, and all the pleasures and excesses of a licentious society
such as would not have been permitted in any properly governed
State, even in the midst of the greatest prosperity.” Attila, who
marked the decay and the embarrassment of the Imperial
Government, forewent nothing of his advantage. He became more
and more rapacious. When he did not obtain all he desired he sent
an embassy to Constantinople to intimidate the government, and this
became a regular means of blackmail with him, a means more
humiliating than war and not less successful.
The first of these embassies arrived in Constantinople immediately
after the terms of peace had been agreed upon. It made further
demands, and was treated with the most extravagant hospitality.
Three times within a single year other embassies arrived; they were
a means of blackmail and were assured of an ever-increasing
success.
The most famous and the most important of these embassies was
that which arrived in Constantinople in 449. The ambassadors then
employed by Attila are worthy of notice, for in them we see not only
the condition of things at that time, but also the naive cunning of the
Hun. The two chief legates whom Attila dispatched to Constantinople
upon this occasion were Edecon and Orestes. Edecon was a
Scythian or Hun by birth, a heathen of course, and a Barbarian, the
commander of the guard of Attila, and the father of Odoacer, later to
be so famous. Orestes, on the other hand, who was one of Attila’s
chief ministers, was a Roman provincial of Pannonia, born at
Petavium (probably Pettau on the Drave), who had made a fortunate
marriage as a young man when he allied himself with Romulus, a
considerable Roman personage of that province. He had, however,
deserted the Imperial service, certainly open to him, for that of the
Barbarians, and had made his fortune. Nor was his part in history to
be played out in the service of Attila, for his son Romulus was to be
the last of the Western Emperors, contemptuously known to history
as Romulus Augustulus.
Orestes was then an adventurer pure and simple, but in sending
him with the Barbarian Edecon, we see the system of Attila in his
blackmail of the Empire. The employment of a Roman provincial was
a check upon the Barbarian envoy. A bitter jealousy subsisted
between them, each spied on the other, and thus Attila was well
served. The fact that the Hun was able to command the services of
such as Orestes is a sufficient comment upon the condition of the
frontier provinces.
It was these two jealous envoys that, in the early months of 449,
appeared in Constantinople bringing, of course, new demands. Their
mission, indeed, was the most insolent that Attila had so far dared to
send. It demanded three main things; first, that all the country to the
south of the Danube as far as Naissus should be regarded as a part
of the Hunnish Empire; second, that in future Theodosius should
send to the Hunnish court only the most illustrious ambassadors, but
if this were done Attila for his part would consent to meet them on
the frontier at Sardica; third, that the refugees should be delivered
up. This last demand was a repetition of many that had gone before
it. As before Attila threatened if his requests were not granted he
would make war.
The ambassadors Edecon and Orestes came to Constantinople
where a “Roman” named Vigilas acted as their guide and interpreter,
an indiscreet and vulgar fellow of whom we shall hear more
presently. Received in audience by Theodosius in the famous palace
on the Bosphorus, the ambassadors with the interpreter later visited
the chief minister, the eunuch Chrysaphius. On their way they
passed through the noble halls of Constantine decorated with gold
and built of marble, the whole a vast palace, perhaps as great as the
Vatican. Edecon, the Hun, was stupefied by so much splendour, he
could not forbear to express his amazement; Vigilas was not slow to
mark this naive astonishment nor to describe it to Chrysaphius, who
presently proposed to put it to good use. Taking Edecon apart from
Orestes as he talked he suggested to him that he also might enjoy
such splendour if he would leave the Huns and enter the service of
the Emperor. After all it was not more than Orestes had done. But
Edecon answered that it would be despicable to leave one’s master
without his consent. Chrysaphius then asked what position he held
at the court of Attila, and if he was so much in the confidence of his
master as to have access freely to him. To which Edecon answered
that he approached him when he would, that he was indeed the chief
of his captains and kept watch over his person by night. And when
Chrysaphius heard this he was content and told Edecon that if he
were capable of discretion he would show him a way to grow rich
without trouble, but that he must speak with him more at leisure,
which he would do presently if he would come and sup with him that
evening alone without Orestes or any following. Already in the mind
of the eunuch a plan was forming by which he hoped to rid the
Empire once for all of the formidable Hun.
Edecon accepted the invitation. Awaiting him he found Vigilas with
Chrysaphius, and after supper heard apparently without
astonishment the following amazing proposal. After swearing him to
secrecy, Chrysaphius explained that he proposed to him the
assassination of Attila. “If you but succeed in this and gain our
frontiers,” said he, “there will be no limit to our gratitude, you shall be
loaded with honours and riches.”
The Hun was ready in appearance at least to agree, but he
insisted that he would need money for bribery, not much, but at least
fifty pounds’ weight of gold. This he explained he could not carry
back with him as Attila was wont upon the return of his ambassadors
to exact a most strict account of the presents they had received, and
so great a weight of gold could not escape the notice of his own
companion and servants. He suggested then that Vigilas should
accompany him home under the pretext of returning the fugitives and
that at the right moment he should find the money necessary for the
project. Needless to say, Chrysaphius readily agreed to all that
Edecon proposed. He does not seem either to have been ashamed
to make so Hunnish a proposal or to have suspected for a moment
that Edecon was deceiving him. He laid all before Theodosius, won
his consent and the approval of Martial his minister.
Together they decided to send an embassy to Attila, to which the
better to mask their intentions Vigilas should be attached as
interpreter. This embassy they proposed to make as imposing as
possible, and to this end they appointed as its chief a man of a high,
but not of consular rank, and of the best reputation. In this they
showed a certain ability, for as it seemed to them if their plot failed
they could escape suspicion by means of the reputation of their
ambassador. The man they chose was called Maximin, and he
fortunately chose as his secretary Priscus, the Sophist, to whose pen
we are indebted for an account of all these things. He asserts, and
probably with truth, that neither Maximin nor he himself was aware of
the plot of assassination. They conceived themselves to be engaged
in a serious mission and were the more impressed by its importance
in that its terms were far less subservient to the Hun than had been
the custom in recent times. Attila was told that henceforth he must
not evade the obligations of his treaties nor invade at all the Imperial
territories. And with regard to the fugitives he was informed that
beside those already surrendered seventeen were now sent but that
there were no more. So ran the letter. But Maximin was also to say
that the Hun must look for no ambassador of higher rank than
himself since it was not the Imperial custom towards the Barbarians;
on the contrary, Rome was used to send to the North any soldier or
messenger who happened to be available. And since he had now
destroyed Sardica his proposal to meet there any ambassador of
consular rank was merely insolent. If indeed the Hun wished to
remove the differences between Theodosius and himself he should
send Onegesius as ambassador. Onegesius was the chief minister
of Attila.
Such were the two missions, the one official, the other secret,
which set out together from Constantinople.
The great journey seems to have been almost wholly uneventful
as far as Sardica, 350 miles from Constantinople, which was
reached after a fortnight of travel. They found that town terribly
pillaged but not destroyed, and the Imperial embassy bought sheep
and oxen, and having prepared dinner invited Edecon and his
colleagues to share it with them, for they were still officially within the
Empire. But within those ruins, even among the ambassadors, peace
was impossible. Priscus records the ridiculous quarrel which
followed. The Huns began to magnify the power of Attila,—was not
his work around them? The Romans knowing the contents of the
letter they bore sang the praises of the Emperor. Suddenly Vigilas,
perhaps already drunk, asserted that it was not right to compare men
with the gods, nor Attila with Theodosius, since Attila was but a man.
Only the intervention of Maximin and Priscus prevented bloodshed,
nor was harmony restored till Orestes and Edecon had received
presents of silk and jewels. Even these gifts were not made
altogether without an untoward incident. For Orestes in thanking
Maximin exclaimed that he, Maximin, was not like those insolent
courtiers of Constantinople “who gave presents and invitations to
Edecon, but none to me.” And when Maximin, ignorant of the
Chrysaphian plot, demanded explanations, Orestes angrily left him.
Already the plan of assassination was beginning to fester.
The ambassadors went on from ruined Sardica to desolate
Naissus (Nisch) utterly devoid of inhabitants, full only of horror and
ruins. They crossed a plain sown with human bones whitening in the
sun, and saw the only witness to the Hunnish massacre of the
inhabitants—a vast cemetery. “We found,” Priscus tells us, “a clean
place above the river where we camped and slept.”
Close to this ruined town was the Imperial army, commanded by
Agintheus, under whose eagles five of the seventeen refugees to be
surrendered had taken refuge. The Roman general, however, was
obliged to give them up. Their terror as they went on in the
ambassadorial train towards the Danube may well be imagined.
The great river at length came in sight; its approaches lined and
crowded with Huns, the passages served by the Barbarians in dug-
outs, boats formed out of the hollowed trunks of trees. With these
boats the whole Barbarian shore was littered as though in readiness
for the advance of an army. Indeed, as it appeared Attila was in
camp close by, and intent on hunting within the Roman confines to
the south of the river, a means certainly of reconnaissance as
habitually used by the Huns as commerce has been for the same
end by the Germans.
We do not know with what feelings Maximin and Priscus saw all
this and crossed the great river frontier at last and passed into
Barbary. To their great chagrin, for they had made the way easy for
the Hunnish ambassadors on the road through the Imperial
provinces, Edecon and Orestes now left them brusquely enough. For
several days they went on alone but for the guides Edecon had left
them, till one afternoon they were met by two horsemen who
informed them that they were close to the camp of Attila who awaited
them. And indeed upon the morrow they beheld from a hill-top the
Barbarian tents spread out innumerable at their feet, and among
them that of the King. They decided to camp there on the hill; but a
troop of Huns at once rode up and ordered them to establish
themselves in the plain. “What,” cried they, “will you dare to pitch
your tents on the heights when that of Attila is below?”
They were scarce established in their appointed place when to
their amazement Edecon and Orestes and others appeared and
asked their business, the object of their embassy. The astonished
ambassadors looked at one another in amaze. When the question
was repeated Maximin announced that he could not disclose his
mission to any other than Attila to whom he was accredited. Scotta,
the brother of Onegesius, then announced angrily that Attila had sent
them and they must have an answer. When Maximin again refused
the Huns galloped away.
The Romans, however, were not left long in doubt of the reception
they were to get. Scotta and his friends soon returned without
Edecon, and to the further amazement of Maximin repeated word for
word the contents of the Imperial letter to Attila. “Such,” said they, “is
your commission. If this be all depart at once.” Maximin protested in
vain. Nothing remained but to prepare for departure. Vigilas who
knew what Chrysaphius expected was particularly furious; better
have lied than to return without achieving anything, said he. What to
do? It was already night. They were in the midst of Barbary, between
them and the Danube lay leagues of wild unfriendly country.
Suddenly as their servants loaded the beasts for their miserable
journey other messengers arrived from the Hun. They might remain
in their camp till dawn. In that uneasy night, had Vigilas been less of
a fool, he must have guessed that Edecon had betrayed him.
It was not the barbarous Vigilas, however, who found a way out of
the difficulty, for at dawn the command to depart was repeated, but
that Priscus who has left us so vivid an account of this miserable
affair. He it was who, seeing the disgrace of his patron, sought out
Scotta, the brother of Onegesius, the chief minister of Attila, in the
Hunnish camp. With him went Vigilas as interpreter, and so cleverly
did the Sophist work upon the ambition of Scotta, pointing out to him
not only the advantages of peace between the Huns and the
Romans, but also the personal advantage Scotta would gain thereby
in honour and presents, and at last feigning to doubt Scotta’s ability
to achieve even so small a matter as the reception of the embassy
that he had his way. Scotta rode off to see Attila, Priscus returned to
his patron, and soon after Scotta returned to escort them to the royal
tent.
The reception must have been a strange spectacle. The tent of
Attila was quite surrounded by a multitude of guards; within, upon a
stool of wood, was seated the great Hun. Priscus, Vigilas and the
servants who attended them bearing the presents remained upon
the threshold. Maximin alone went forward and gave into Attila’s
hands the letter of Theodosius saying: “The Emperor wishes Attila
and all that are his health and length of days.” “May the Romans
receive all they desire for me,” replied the instructed Barbarian. And
turning angrily to Vigilas he said: “Shameless beast, why hast thou
dared to come hither knowing as thou dost the terms of peace I
made with thee and Anatolius. Did I not then tell thee that I would
receive no more ambassadors till all the refugees had been
surrendered!” Vigilas replied that they brought seventeen fugitives
with them and that now there remained no more within the Empire.
This only made Attila more furious: “I would crucify thee and give
thee as food for the vultures but for the laws regarding envoys,” cried
he. As for the refugees, he declared there were many still within the
Empire, and bade his people read out their names, and this done he
told Vigilas to depart with Eslas, one of his officers, to inform
Theodosius that he must forthwith return all the fugitives who had
entered the Empire from the time of Carpilio, son of Aetius, who had
been his hostage. “I will never suffer,” said he, “that my slaves shall
bear arms against me, useless though they be to aid those with
whom they have found refuge.... What city or what fortress have they
been able to defend when I have determined to take it?” When he
had said these words he grew calmer; informed Maximin that the
order of departure only concerned Vigilas, and prayed the
ambassador to remain and await the reply to the letter of the
Emperor. The audience closed with the presentation and acceptance
of the Roman presents.
Vigilas must surely have guessed now what his dismissal meant.
Perhaps, however, he was too conceited and too stupid to notice it.
At any rate he did not enlighten his companions but professed
himself stupefied by the change of Attila’s demeanour towards him.
The whole affair was eagerly discussed in the Roman camp. Priscus
suggested that Vigilas’ unfortunate indiscretion at Sardica had been
reported to Attila and had enraged him. Maximin did not know what
to think. While they were still debating Edecon appeared and took
Vigilas apart. The Hun may well have thought he needed
reassurance. He declared that he was still true to the plan of
Chrysaphius. Moreover, seeing what a fool Vigilas was, he told him
that his dismissal was a contrivance of his own to enable the
interpreter to return to Constantinople and fetch the money
promised, which could be introduced as necessary to the embassy
for the purchase of goods. Vigilas, however, can scarcely have
believed him, at any rate for long; a few hours later Attila sent word
that none of the Romans were to be allowed to buy anything but the
bare necessities of life from the Huns, neither horses, nor other
beasts, nor slaves, nor to redeem captives. Vigilas departed with the
order ringing in his ears, upon a mission he must have known to be
hopeless.
Two days later Attila broke camp and set out for his capital, the
Roman ambassadors following in his train under the direction of
guides appointed by the Hun. They had not gone far on their way
northward when they were directed to leave the train of Attila and to
follow another route, because, they were told, the King was about to
add one more to his innumerable wives, Escam, the daughter of a
chief in a neighbouring village.
Very curious is Priscus’ description of the way followed by the
patron and his embassy. They journeyed across the Hungarian plain,
across horrible marshes and lakes which had to be traversed
sometimes on rafts; they crossed three great rivers, the Drave, the
Temes, and the Theiss in dug-outs, boats such as they had seen on
the Danube hollowed out of the trunks of trees. They lived for the
most part on millet which their guides brought or took from the
wretched inhabitants, they drank mead and beer, and were utterly at
the mercy of the weather, which was extremely bad. On one
occasion, indeed, their camp was entirely destroyed by tempest, and
had it not been for the hospitality of the widow of Bleda they would
perhaps have perished.
For seven days they made their way into the heart of Hungary till
they came to a village where their way joined the greater route by
which Attila was coming. There they were forced to await the King,
since they must follow and not precede him. It was in this place that
they met another Roman embassy, that of the Emperor in the West,
Valentinian III, who was quarrelling with Attila about the holy vessels
of Sirmium. It seems that the Bishop of Sirmium in 441, seeing his
city invested, had gathered his chalices and patens and plate,
sacred vessels of his church, and had sent them secretly to a certain
Constantius, a Gaul, at that time Attila’s minister. In case the city fell
they were to be used as ransom, first of the Bishop, and in case of
his death of any other captives. Constantius was, however, untrue to
the trust placed in him by the Bishop, and sold or pawned the plate
to a silversmith in Rome. Attila hearing of it when Constantius was
beyond his reach claimed the booty as his own. It was upon this
miserable business that Valentinian had sent an embassy to Attila
from Ravenna.
It is certainly a shameful and an amazing spectacle we have here.
In that little village of Barbary the ambassadors of the Emperors,