Pemberton EnforcingGenderConstitution 2013
Pemberton EnforcingGenderConstitution 2013
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to Signs
A lthough Michel Foucault is famous for his work on both sex and
criminal punishment, he never considered these issues in relation to
each other. Foucault pays no attention to the sex, gender, or sexuality
of prisoners or to whether the institution of the prison or the norms
instilled through disciplinary power might be gendered. The use of male
pronouns throughout the English translation of Discipline and Punish
ðFoucault 1995Þ suggests that disciplinary subjects and those responsible
for conducting surveillance are presumptively male.1 Foucault’s later work
on sex and sexuality in The History of Sexuality ð1990Þ and Herculine Bar-
bin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century French
Hermaphrodite ðFoucault 1980Þ does not consider the role of prisons and
the criminal justice system in establishing sex and sexuality.2 Moreover,
Foucault’s neglect both of gender ðincluding masculinityÞ and of women
is noticeable throughout his work, provoking criticism from feminists and
accusations that he overlooks “the gendered character of many disciplinary
Thank you to Mary Hawkesworth, the editorial staff at Signs, and two anonymous re-
viewers for Signs for their invaluable guidance and feedback. My thanks go to Barbara Arneil,
Bruce Baum, John Bretting, Ryan Combs, Rita Dhamoon, Heath Fogg Davis, Kiki Jamieson,
Laura Janara, Margaret McLaren, Christy Munro, Penny Weiss, and Angelia Wilson for con-
versations and comments about this work. Thanks also to audiences at the American and West-
ern Political Science Association Meetings and participants at the 2008 Critical Resistance
Conference.
1
The question of gendered language is more complex in the original French, but it is
beyond the scope of this article to analyze the gendered implications of the French language
or of Surveiller et Punir ðFoucault 1975Þ in particular. However, the terms homme and
hommes ð“man” and “men”Þ appear far more frequently in that text than femme and femmes
ð“woman” or “wife,” “women” or “wives”Þ, suggesting that Foucault’s subjects of analysis are
presumptively male. A search of Surveiller et Punir using Google Books reveals that the word
homme occurs on forty-one pages in the book and hommes on sixty-one pages, whereas femme
occurs on six pages, and femmes on only five.
2
Herculine Barbin was an intersex person in nineteenth-century France whose sex was
legally reclassified from female to male. Foucault found Herculine’s diary in the archives of the
French Department of Public Hygiene and had it republished with his commentary as Her-
culine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century French Her-
maphrodite ðBarbin 1980Þ.
[Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 2013, vol. 39, no. 1]
© 2013 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/2013/3901-0007$10.00
3
There are three distinct prison systems within the United Kingdom: those of England
and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Although I will be referring to laws or institutions
that apply throughout the United Kingdom, such as the 2004 Gender Recognition Act, my
analysis of prison populations and policies is confined to England and Wales. To avoid continu-
ally repeating the phrase “England and Wales” ðwhich, inconveniently, lacks a commonly accepted
abbreviationÞ, I will at times use the term “English” when referring to England and Wales.
4
Although my argument is partially empirical, the central purpose of this article is to un-
cover and theorize gendered techniques of power. I am not developing a causal explanation of
existing policies or an exhaustive comparison of transgender law and imprisonment in England
and Wales and in the United States. In providing a broad comparative analysis of the gender
recognition policies in two very different societies, I have inevitably been unable to fully ex-
plore the particulars of either case, and I hope that the insights provided by the comparison
outweigh the reduction in detail about each jurisdiction. Regrettably, there are many impor-
tant issues that I cannot address here, including an examination of how gender, race, and class
relate to patterns in criminalization, policing, and sentencing. A comparison of the varying
prison regimes in the thousands of men’s and women’s facilities in England and Wales and in
the United States is also beyond the scope of this analysis.
5
A comparative analysis of which institutions in England and Wales, and in the United
States, use formal policies of sex segregation and which do not, where informal sex segre-
gation is prevalent, and the reasons and implications of these policies is unfortunately beyond
the scope of this article. This is a promising area for further research.
in the way that subjects internalize its norms and the process of surveil-
lance, thus transforming unruly prisoners into orderly and conformist sub-
jects. Although discipline originated in prisons during the early nineteenth
century, it spread into other institutions such as schools and eventually
to society as a whole, producing a “great carceral network” ð298Þ. However,
Foucault concludes by rejecting this account of the rehabilitative prison,
arguing that prisons do not normalize subjects but instead produce a cate-
gory of delinquents. The supposedly normalizing effects of the disciplin-
ary prison are revealed to be a ruse by which prisons mark prisoners out as
distinct, necessarily fail to correct them, and through this failure justify the
further extension and intensification of disciplinary power.
Foucault’s engagement with issues of sex and sexuality occurs in the first
volume of The History of Sexuality and his commentary to Herculine Bar-
bin. In The History of Sexuality, Foucault ð1990Þ argues that what we un-
derstand as sexuality and as sex are not natural but have instead been con-
structed through regimes of power and truth. This insight leads Foucault
to reject the idea that there are preexisting biological categories of male
and female. Instead, Foucault states that discourses of sexuality produced
the concept of sex, which is a “fictitious unity” of anatomy and sensations
ð154Þ. Since sexuality emerged during the nineteenth century as a priv-
ileged site for truth about the self, particularly in the Catholic practice of
confession, Foucault rejects the idea that power operates to repress sex-
uality. Instead, he argues that sexuality is produced through medical dis-
courses and the requirement that people should talk about it and that sex-
uality is part of broader strategies of power that he terms “bio-politics” ð139Þ.
Biopolitics involves knowledge of and government over the population as
an entity, through means such as control of infectious diseases, birthrates,
and death rates. Foucault therefore regards sexuality as uniquely important
because it is located at the intersection of biopolitical governance of the
whole population and the targeting of individuals by disciplinary power.
Given that Foucault encountered Herculine Barbin’s memoirs while re-
searching The History of Sexuality, it is not surprising that there is overlap
between these two texts. Herculine Barbin’s narrative begins with her/his
experience of being educated in a girls’ boarding school and later of teach-
ing in a similar school where s/he developed a romantic relationship with
Sara, the daughter of the school’s owner ðBarbin 1980Þ.7 When people grew
7
It is difficult to know what pronoun to use in reference to Herculine Barbin because we
do not know Herculine’s self-identified sex, gender, or pronoun preferences. One option is to
use a gender neutral pronoun such as “ze,” but such pronouns often carry a connotation of a
gender identity outside of the masculine-feminine binary and risk retroactively imposing an
of binary gender identities and that from a biological perspective the two
binary sex categories could be replaced by five categories that would take
account of intersex people. Similarly, Judith Butler ð1999Þ draws on the ex-
istence of intersex people to suggest that the idea of binary biological sexes
is a product of binary categories of gender. Butler and Fausto-Sterling there-
fore undermine the account of sex and gender developed by feminists such
as Simone de Beauvoir ð1957Þ, in which sex is a natural, immutable, and pre-
discursive foundation on which socially constructed gender identities de-
velop: “If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct
called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was al-
ways already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex
and gender turns out to be no distinction at all” ðButler 1999, 10–11Þ. Hav-
ing rejected the idea that categories of gender are based on biological sexes,
Butler develops an account of gender as performative, that is, as an iterative
practice that brings into existence what it purports to represent. Moreover,
Butler uses feminist psychoanalytic theory to retheorize the relationship be-
tween sex and sexuality in terms of “the compulsory order of sex/gender/
desire” ð9Þ, which she argues is founded on a taboo against homosexuality.
Like Foucault ð1990Þ, Butler traces binary sex categories to sexuality, but she
extends and deepens Foucault’s analysis by theorizing the role of gender in
relation to both sex and sexuality and by providing an account of individ-
ual agency and resistance. However, the obvious difficulty with Butler’s ac-
count of gender as performative and sex as indistinguishable from gender
is her failure to take account of the materiality of the body. While there
are multiple ways that one could performatively enact gender, including the
parody of gender through drag as Butler suggests, one is simultaneously
constrained and enabled by a body that has given features such as height
and facial shape. Although bodies are interpreted through multiple dis-
courses such as gender, race, and disability, and such interpretations de-
pend on the context, bodies are not infinitely or instantly malleable, and this
affects the identities that one can performatively enact.
To capture the relationship between the material body and a subject that
is constituted by power but nonetheless exercises agency, the term “soma-
technics” has been developed to describe how bodies are constantly shaped
and modified by technologies ðSullivan 2009, 133Þ. The concept of soma-
technics indicates that the features and appearance of our bodies are not
immutable but are consciously modified by the subject in various ways.
Examples of somatechnics include piercings, tattoos, cosmetic surgery, and
practices such as exercise and diet and, therefore, range from expensive
medical treatments to everyday activities. The performative nature of gender
means that both normatively gendered and gender-variant people use so-
8
See Rosenblum ð2000, 568Þ, Edney ð2004, 331Þ, Tarzwell ð2006, 192Þ, and Brown and
McDuffie ð2009, 287Þ.
9
Gender Recognition Act, 2004, applications for gender recognition certificate, sec. 1,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/7/section/1.
10
Gender Recognition Act, 2004, applications for gender recognition certificate, sec. 2,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/7/section/2.
this issue open to the judgment of the gender recognition panel. It is there-
fore unclear whether gender-confirming surgery is necessary to obtain a cer-
tificate, whether hormone treatment would be regarded as sufficient, or
whether a certificate could be granted without any bodily interventions be-
ing provided as treatment for gender dysphoria.
The result of receiving a gender recognition certificate is explained in an
oddly worded section of the legislation, which states: “Where a full gender
recognition certificate is issued to a person, the person’s gender becomes
for all purposes the acquired gender ðso that, if the acquired gender is the
male gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a man and, if it is the female
gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a womanÞ.”11 Unlike the rest of
the act, this provision refers not only to someone’s gender but to someone’s
sex, although it then refers to sex as “that of a man” or “of a woman,” which
seems to conflate sex and gender. The implications of this passage regard-
ing the relationship between sex and gender are open to interpretation and
have been the cause of some controversy among commentators ðSharpe
2007; Jeffreys 2008Þ. However, the phrase “for all purposes” indicates
that receipt of a gender recognition certificate means that someone’s self-
identified gender would be recognized by all institutions within the United
Kingdom, including the criminal justice system.12 Those who receive a cer-
tificate will be granted government identification stating their newly rec-
ognized gender, including a reissued birth certificate. Further, applicants
for gender recognition certificates are protected from having their previous
gender disclosed under “prohibition on disclosure of information” provi-
sions. These provisions stipulate that the details of an applicant’s medical
treatment and gender history must not be shared with members of the pub-
lic, such as employers, and can only be revealed to other government offi-
cials for specified reasons such as “preventing or investigating crime.”13
Given that transgender people have differing preferences about their
bodies, and that treatments such as surgery and hormone therapy are not
always medically appropriate, the lack of specified bodily interventions
makes the 2004 act more inclusive than the policies in many other ju-
risdictions and has led to calls for similar legislation in the United States
ðAllen 2008Þ. Nonetheless, many gender-variant people would not be
able to obtain formal recognition of their self-identified gender under the
11
Gender Recognition Act, 2004, consequences of issue of gender recognition certificate
etc., sec. 9, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/7/section/9.
12
The 2004 act includes a few stated exceptions, such as competitive sports, where some-
one’s acquired gender may not be recognized after receipt of a gender recognition certificate.
13
Gender Recognition Act, 2004, supplementary, sec. 22, http://www.legislation.gov
.uk/ukpga/2004/7/section/22.
provisions of the act, and presumably these people would not have their
self-identified gender recognized by prisons. Those ineligible for a gender
recognition certificate include everyone under age eighteen, people who
self-identify outside of a man-woman gender binary, and those who do
not understand their gender identity as fixed or stable for the remainder
of their lives. The use of medical criteria in the application process for a
gender recognition certificate also means that transgender people who re-
fuse medicalization or a diagnosis of gender dysphoria would be unable
to gain legal recognition of their self-identified gender. Moreover, the un-
certainty about what forms of medical documentation and treatment will
be deemed necessary and sufficient by the gender recognition panels means
that some transgender people might be refused a certificate if they were un-
willing or unable to undergo those treatments ðe.g., genital surgeryÞ. This
concern about the required treatments is made more acute by the parlia-
mentary debates on the act, in which the government demonstrates a belief
that surgery would usually be involved, and by the gender recognition panel
guidance document stating that those who have not undergone surgery
need to explain this decision to the panel when applying ðSharpe 2007, 39Þ.
In the United States there is no comprehensive gender recognition stat-
ute, so policies regarding the sex/gender identity of transgender people dif-
fer between federal and state jurisdictions and between agencies within a
given jurisdiction. The most inclusive policies categorize people according
to their self-identified gender and would therefore place a self-identified
woman in a women’s facility regardless of her legal status or medical his-
tory. Although policies based on gender self-identification are unusual, they
are used by a handful of institutions within the United States, including
the homeless shelters in New York City and San Francisco ðSpade 2008, 737Þ.
More commonly, institutions will recognize a sex/gender identity that dif-
fers from the one given at birth if the individual has received a medical di-
agnosis and treatment related to sex/gender. In most states the Department
of Motor Vehicles will reclassify someone’s gender if provided with medi-
cal documentation ðAllen 2008, 171; Spade 2008, 771–72Þ. The most re-
strictive policies toward transgender people stipulate that the sex/gender
assigned at birth can never be formally changed, which is the practice in
Tennessee ðSpade 2008, 735Þ. While Dean Spade argues that most prison
authorities in the United States employ gender recognition policies based
on birth sex ð735Þ, most scholars state that prisons usually classify and place
inmates according to their genitalia.14 In theory, a genitalia-based place-
14
See Rosenblum ð2000, 568Þ, Edney ð2004, 331Þ, Mann ð2006, 105Þ, Tarzwell ð2006,
192Þ, and Brown and McDuffie ð2009, 287Þ.
ment policy means that transgender people who have undergone genital
surgeries would be placed in appropriate institutions.
The theoretical implications of a sex/gender recognition policy based on
genitalia are different from those of a policy based on an unchangeable birth
sex/gender, but the two policies overlap because the sex/gender identity
assigned to a child at birth is almost always based on genitalia. Given that
a large majority of transgender people within the United States have not
undergone genital surgery ðGrant et al. 2011, 72Þ, the practical implications
of a genital placement policy are the same as those of a birth-sex/gender
policy for most transgender prisoners, that is, placement in a facility that is
inconsistent with their self-identified gender. A genitalia-based placement
policy is also likely to cause difficulties even among transgender people who
have undertaken genital surgeries because it assumes binary categories of
sex/gender that conflict with the experiences of many transgender people
and ignores the possibility that people may have nonnormative genitals. For
example, under a genitalia-based system of classification it would not be
clear whether a transgender woman who had undergone a penectomy ðsur-
gical removal of the penisÞ but not vaginoplasty ðsurgical construction of
a vaginaÞ should be placed in a men’s or a women’s facility. Placement pol-
icies based on genitalia are also liable to invite harassment and invasive
searches by prison staff seeking to categorize transgender people, which can
facilitate violence and sexual assault ðTarzwell 2006, 180Þ.
Despite the lack of official figures about transgender prisoners, activ-
ists are documenting the experiences of transgender people in the Amer-
ican criminal justice system and have identified a vicious circle of nonnor-
mative gender, poverty, and imprisonment ðGehi and Arkles 2007; Sylvia
Rivera Law Project 2007Þ. The combination of discrimination and the
placement of transgender prisoners in facilities that conflict with their self-
identified gender leads to high rates of verbal, physical, and sexual assaults
against transgender prisoners, sometimes from both prisoners and guards
ðRosenblum 2000, 525; Peek 2004, 1239–40; Mann 2006, 105Þ. These
problems are particularly acute within men’s prisons, where being per-
ceived as feminine places one at the bottom of the prison hierarchy and
makes one particularly vulnerable to rape.15 The high incidences of HIV
and hepatitis C among prison populations and the nonavailability of con-
doms in most prisons ðdue to the fact that sex is against the rulesÞ mean
that prison rapes involve a high risk of infection with life-threatening dis-
eases ðRosenblum 2000, 524Þ.
15
See Rosenblum ð2000, 523Þ, Edney ð2004, 331–32Þ, Peek ð2004, 1226Þ, and Mann
ð2006, 105Þ.
As I discuss in the introduction to this section, the fact that gender rec-
ognition policies usually involve medical documentation means that the
different health care systems in the United Kingdom and the United States
have different implications for transgender prisoners. The British National
Health Service provides universal health care to citizens ðand, in practice,
to many noncitizens who are residents in the United KingdomÞ that is free
at the point of use and thus does not exclude the poor or unemployed.
The treatment provided under the National Health Service includes men-
tal health services, hormone treatment, and gender-confirming surgeries
such as genital surgeries, and in principle all transgender adults in the United
Kingdom should have access to appropriate health care. In practice, there
are significant limitations in the provision of health care to transgender
people in the United Kingdom, including ignorant or prejudiced doctors,
the need for referral to a relatively small number of specialists, long wait-
ing times for some treatments ðespecially surgeriesÞ, and the more restricted
health care available to prisoners ðEquality and Human Rights Commis-
sion 2009Þ.
In contrast, virtually all health care in the United States is paid for by a
combination of private insurers, the state in the form of Medicare and Med-
icaid, and directly by users. A substantial number of people in the United
States have neither private health insurance nor government provision, and
around 50.7 million Americans, or 16.7 percent of the population, were un-
insured in 2009 ðUS Census Bureau 2010, 22Þ. Even those Americans with
health insurance are likely to have restricted access to gender-confirming
treatments, and particularly to expensive treatment such as genital surger-
ies, which in most states are not covered by Medicaid ðGehi and Arkles 2007Þ
and are often not covered by private insurers ðSpade 2008, 755Þ. Pooja S.
Gehi and Gabriel Arkles ð2007Þ argue that these Medicaid exclusions re-
produce racialized and class inequality and create a “legal Catch-22—being
required to show proof of medical care for legal recognition of their iden-
tities but being denied that care by Medicaid” ð8Þ. Transgender prisoners
often have even less access to gender-confirming health care because many
prison systems deny access to hormone treatment, and prisoners are al-
most always denied any form of surgery.16
Health insurance is both expensive and frequently tied to employment,
so unemployed or underemployed people in the United States are partic-
ularly likely to be uninsured. The high unemployment rates for transgen-
der people in America, which Jaime M. Grant and colleagues ð2011Þ esti-
16
See Rosenblum ð2000, 543–46Þ, Edney ð2004, 334–36Þ, Tarzwell ð2006,180–81Þ,
and Brown and McDuffie ð2009Þ.
transgender people ðGrant et al. 2011, 4–6Þ, and the continuation of ra-
cialized income and wealth disparities means that race and class dynamics
are often entwined. These multiple interlocking forms of discrimination
lead Grant and colleagues to conclude that in America, “transgender and
gender-nonconforming people face injustice at every turn” ð2Þ.
Given the evidence that binary sex categories are constructed, one can-
not approach contemporary prison systems with the assumption that the
segregation of male from female prisoners is a representation of biological
fact. If binary sexes are a construct produced by sexuality and by binary con-
ceptions of gender, then policies of sex segregation and the use of binary
sex/gender categories in prison statistics are an exercise of power that rein-
forces and naturalizes binary sex/gender categories. The invisibility of trans-
gender people within prison statistics is therefore both part of the exercise
of governmentality and an example of how “subjugated knowledges” ðFou-
cault 2003, 7Þ are erased by the prevailing regime of truth. The sex segre-
gation of prisoners also enables the application of gender-specific disciplinary
norms within prisons in order to produce normative masculine and feminine
identities, as I discuss in the following section. In short, and as Foucault’s
work repeatedly shows, there is no outside to power and no way of disen-
tangling it from truth.
homes and families than is the case for men, adding an extra dimension
to their punishment by impeding social ties and support ð68Þ. Similarly,
the shortage of women’s prisons sometimes means that the only women’s
prison in a region is high security, which leads to women being placed in
a higher security institution than is necessary and can make women’s pun-
ishment more severe than that of men who commit similar offenses. The
practice of strip searches and internal cavity searches by—often male—
guards is also experienced by prisoners as a form of violence, described by
Angela Y. Davis as “an everyday routine in women’s prisons that verges on
sexual assault” ð2003, 63Þ.
Many analyses of women’s imprisonment observe that “women are dis-
ciplined in constricting gender-specific ways” ðHowe 1994, 131Þ and iden-
tify attempts to instill feminine norms among female prisoners. One exam-
ple is the tendency for women’s prisons to provide educational, vocational,
and health programs that focus on traditionally feminine skills or occupa-
tions such as beauty, needlework, flower arranging, cooking, and cleaning
ðBosworth 1999, 103–4; Rosenblum 2000, 534Þ. There are also different
rules for physical appearance and dress in men’s and women’s prisons,
which reinforce sex/gender stereotypes and create difficulties for transgen-
der prisoners who may be denied clothing consistent with their sex or gen-
der identification ðRosenblum 2000, 549Þ. Transgender prisoners may be
reported for disciplinary violations for wearing banned clothing or for hair-
styles that conflict with the gendered rules and norms of the institution
ðSylvia Rivera Law Project 2007, 31Þ. Further, there are higher rates of pun-
ishment for infractions in women’s prisons than in men’s prisons ðHowe
1994, 147Þ, which suggests that women are subject to a more restrictive
disciplinary regime. These disciplinary infractions may be the result of ten-
sions between competing ideals of femininity, and Mary Bosworth argues
that prison regimes encourage traditional “passive feminine behaviour”
ð1999, 105Þ that conflicts with contemporary values of autonomy and
agency and thus provokes resistance from prisoners.
It is equally important to consider how masculinity is constituted within
prisons, and here it is helpful to draw on Raewyn Connell’s ð1987Þ concept
of hegemonic masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity is constructed in op-
position to both femininity and subordinated masculinities and is pro-
duced by the state in institutions such as the military, police, and prisons.
Connell’s ð1987Þ analysis is based on Antonio Gramsci’s ð1971Þ concept of
hegemony as ideological dominance that is backed up by force, and she
argues that hegemonic masculinity is produced through dynamics of co-
ercion, hierarchy, and repression. Connell’s analysis is particularly helpful
and ethnic minority men in America, which are in large part due to the
war on drugs and racial profiling on the part of the police ðMauer 2006Þ,
mean that these gendered dynamics also intersect with race, ethnicity, and
class. Large numbers of poor, undereducated, black men spend years in
violent and repressive prisons and may become accustomed to using the
threat or actuality of violence as a survival tactic. Some ex-prisoners return
to society with the ethos of toxic masculinity and may perpetuate violent
forms of masculinity within their communities. The presence of threatening
ex-prisoners and gangs within many poor black communities in America can
cause this aggressive form of masculinity to spread, as sociologist Patricia
Hill Collins ð2004Þ observes: “Given this social context, it will be extremely
difficult to convince Black men that they should renounce aggression and
violence. In a predatory climate created by prison, street, and some elements
of Black youth culture, being perceived as ‘weak’ could get you killed” ð211Þ.
Official tolerance for and exercise of violence in many American prisons
thus creates an environment of toxic masculinity, and the racialized and eth-
nic disproportionality of prison populations means that some men are far
more likely than others to be subjected to this environment. While Foucault
ð1995Þ describes the prison as constituting delinquency instead of provid-
ing normalization, contemporary prisons contribute to the spread of violent
forms of masculinity instead of promoting nonviolence. The question of
how to encourage nonviolent and nonsexist forms of masculinity, includ-
ing what Athena D. Mutua ð2006Þ terms “progressive black masculinities”
ð5Þ, is not a simple one. However, given that prisons enforce binary con-
ceptions of sex and gender and contribute to toxic masculinity, imprison-
ment is unlikely to be a large part of the solution. Recent scholarship also
indicates that punitive criminal justice policies were introduced in America
partly as a deliberate strategy to impede greater racial equality ðWeaver 2007;
Murakawa 2008Þ and that imprisonment increases overall racialized in-
equality, thus reducing the life chances of many black men, women, and
children ðWestern 2002Þ. It seems likely that a combination of local anti-
violence efforts and the provision of better education, health care, drug
treatment, housing, employment opportunities, child care, and so on, in dis-
advantaged communities would be a more effective way to develop nonvio-
lent forms of masculinity than current policies of punitive policing and
incarceration.
Conclusion
There are both clear similarities and important differences in the policies
toward transgender people in the English and the American prison sys-
tems. Both these prison systems use binary categories of sex/gender, use
sex segregation, provide limited gender-confirming health care to pris-
oners, fail to use self-identification as the basis of their gender recogni-
tion and placement policies, and involve the risk of harassment and vio-
lence toward transgender prisoners. However, while the 2004 Gender
Recognition Act in the United Kingdom means that the gender recog-
nition policies in prisons are ðin principleÞ no different from those in other
institutions, American prisons are more restrictive than institutions such
as the Department of Motor Vehicles. The American prison system en-
forces highly restrictive binary sex categories based on genitalia, thereby
miscategorizing and marginalizing most transgender people. In contrast,
the existence of comprehensive gender recognition legislation and univer-
sal health care in the United Kingdom means that the English prison system
reinforces binary gender categories that are more likely to be consistent with
prisoners’ self-identification. Nonetheless, limitations in both the 2004 act
and the provision of gender-confirming health care in the United Kingdom
mean that some transgender prisoners in England and Wales will be cate-
gorized and placed in facilities that conflict with their self-identification.
By using Foucault’s ð2007Þ account of the “triangle: sovereignty, disci-
pline, and governmental management” ð107–8Þ, one can see the multiple
and overlapping ways in which sex and gender are constructed within con-
temporary prison regimes. Statistics about prison populations are an exam-
ple of how governmentality serves to construct binary sex/gender identities
while erasing the existence of transgender and intersex people, and these
statistics also construct racialized identities. Given the high incarceration
rates of young black men, the construction and naturalization of sex, gen-
der, and racialized categories strengthen the historical association between
masculinity, blackness, and crime and are liable to further encourage racial
profiling by police. Furthermore, discipline within prisons is exercised both
formally and informally to enforce gendered dress codes and behavioral
norms. The final part of the triangle of power is sovereignty, or physical vio-
lence toward the body ðFoucault 1995Þ. The regular exercise and constant
threat of violence within many prisons means that sovereign power is in
continuous operation, providing a strong incentive for people to exhibit nor-
malized sex and gender identities and contributing to the spread of toxic
masculinity.
As should be clear from the contrast between the gender recognition
policies for transgender people in the United Kingdom and the United
States, sex/gender norms depend on historical and cultural context and on
change over time, including through government policy and legislation.
In recent years there has been a tough-on-crime approach employed in
both the United Kingdom and the United States, involving more inten-
sive policing for drugs and minor offenses, more punitive sentencing, ris-
ing prison populations, and more severe prison regimes ðGarland 2001Þ.
Unfortunately, the conceptualization of criminals in terms of danger is
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy because prisons that are overcrowded
with young men from deprived backgrounds are often violent institutions
that instill an aggressive, sexist, and homophobic form of masculinity.
Tough-on-crime policies have thereby contributed to the spread of toxic
masculinity within men’s prisons in America and within communities whose
young men are incarcerated at high rates. Given that 1.6 million people are
held in American prisons ðBureau of Justice Statistics 2010, 1Þ and that the
United States has the world’s highest incarceration rate ðWalmsley 2009Þ,
greater attention should be paid to how imprisonment shapes sex and gen-
der identities.
Postscript
Policies for transgender people in US prisons have been amended in the
National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape adopted
on May 16, 2012. Under the new standards, placement of transgender and
intersex prisoners should be based not on genitalia alone but on a case-by-
case judgment that takes into account the risks of sexual assault and is re-
assessed at least twice a year. In addition, the new policy prohibits guards
from searching transgender or intersex prisoners solely for the purpose of
determining their genital status, requires training for guards about LGBTI
people, and introduces better reporting procedures for sexual assault. These
rules are now in effect in federal prisons, and state and local facilities are
motivated to adopt the standards by the prospect of losing 5 percent of
their Department of Justice prison grant funding if the state governor does
not certify full compliance. It is too soon to assess the impact, but in prin-
ciple the new standards should increase the likelihood of transgender
women being placed in women’s prisons and reduce intrusive searches by
guards.
Department of Government and International Affairs
University of South Florida
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