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A History of International Thought

International thought is the product of major political changes over the last few
centuries, especially the development of the modern state and the industrialisation
of the world economy. While the question of how to deal with strangers from
other communities has been a constant throughout human history, it is only in
recent centuries that the question of ‘foreign relations’ (and especially imperialism
and war) have become a matter of urgency for all sectors of society throughout
the world. This book provides the first comprehensive overview of the evolution
of Western international thought, and charts how this evolved into the
predominantly Anglophone field of International Relations. Along the way
several myths of the origins of International Relations are explored and exposed:
the myth of the peace of Westphalia, the myths of Versailles and the nature of the
League of Nations, the realist–idealist ‘Great Debate’ myth, and the myth of
appeasement. Major approaches to the study of international affairs are discussed
within their context and on their own terms, rather than being shoe-horned into
anachronistic ‘paradigms’. Written in a clear and accessible style, Ashworth’s
analysis reveals how historical myths have been used as gatekeeping devices, and
how a critical re-evaluation of the history of international thought can affect how
we see international affairs today.

Lucian M. Ashworth is Professor and Head of the Department of Political

Science at the Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada.
This page intentionally left blank
A History of International
Thought
From the origins of the modern state
to academic international relations

Lucian M. Ashworth
First published 2014
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2014 Lucian Ashworth
The right of Lucian Ashworth to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and
Patent Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,
now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and
recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Ashworth, Lucian M., 1964–
A history of international thought : from the origins of the modern state
to academic international relations / Lucian Ashworth.
pages cm.
Summary: “A History of International Thought in International
Relations”-- Provided by publisher.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. International relations--History. I. Title.
JZ1242.A8 2013
327--dc23
2013031221

ISBN: 978-1-408-28292-2 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-0-415-73538-4 (hbk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

by Saxon Graphics Ltd, Derby
Contents

Preface vii

1 Introduction 1

PART I
International relations before the study of International
Relations 17

2 The origins of the modern state and the creation of

international relations … by mistake 19

3 Reaction and reform: patriarchal order and the

Enlightenment response 38

4 A new global political economy? 71

PART II
The emergence of the discipline of International Relations
and the great crisis of humanity 93

5 The geopolitics of empire and the international anarchy,

1880–1918 95

6 The new world: international government and peaceful

change, 1919–1935 134

7 Collapse and war: continuity and change in IR theory,

1936–1945 181
vi Contents
PART III
Conclusion: international relations in living memory and
lessons for the future 249

8 A new IR for a new world?: The growth of an academic

field since 1945 251

Bibliography 279
Index 299
Preface

Studying the past is like investigating the aftermath of an explosion. The pieces
that can be put together to make a coherent story are spread in a seemingly
random pattern. While some materials have evaporated entirely, or at best been
left scorched and incomplete, others are present in their entirety, but are ripped
up and spread around the site. You usually arrive on the scene after others have
already tried to make sense of the scene, leaving behind attempts to reconstruct
what had been present. These are the stories constructed by those who have
already tried to reconstruct, in whole or in part, what had happened. Some have
done their job well, while others have made leaps of logic that you now realise are
wrong. Others still have made ill-informed assumptions about what had been
there, and have failed to properly investigate the material. Even while piecing
together what you find, you realise that the task in front of you keeps revealing
an increasingly complex picture. You piece together what you can, draw your
conclusions, but also realise that you don’t quite have all the information you
need (and probably never will), and that perhaps someone someday will find
something in the debris that you missed.
This book is an attempt to reconstruct a narrative out of the pieces that make
up the story of the history of international thought. It is a story that has benefited
from the hard work of people that have already sifted through parts of the rubble,
but it is also a story that has not received the attention it deserves from scholars
of International Relations (IR). It is also a story that I have wanted to write for a
long time ever since I realised that the tales we were told about the origins of IR
and international thought did not fit the evidence. My first revelation came
during my PhD thesis in the early 1990s, when I realised that the story of the
realist–idealist first ‘great debate’ was inaccurate. This led in 1995 to a chapter
in my PhD thesis that argued that the realist–idealist debate had never taken
place (later presented at the Canadian Political Science Association conference in
Montreal in 1995, and published in my book in 1999). I was not the only one on
this trail, however. Peter Wilson had discovered the same anomaly, and his
excellent 1998 criticism of the idea of a realist–idealist debate is justly regarded
as a classic in the historiography of international thought. Peter had been in the
year ahead of me during my undergraduate years at Keele University. It was
another Keele graduate in the same year as me, David Long, who worked with
viii Preface
me during my postdoctoral year at Carleton on a reassessment of David Mitrany.
Looking at Mitrany had been a suggestion of my PhD supervisor at Dalhousie,
Robert Boardman (Bob had been Mitrany’s research assistant). Yet, the seed that
led to the writing of this book was probably planted much earlier than this. In my
final year as an undergraduate at Keele in the 1984–5 academic year I had signed
up for Hidemi Suganami’s ‘Causes of War’ course. We had had to choose three
electives, and this course had been my third choice. Despite this, it was to become
my favourite course during my entire undergraduate degree (and there was some
stiff competition here from Mark Hoffman’s excellent Strategic Studies, from the
lectures in my second year International Cooperation course delivered by John
Vincent, and my first- and second-year tutorials with Alan James and Lorna
Lloyd). Hidemi not only introduced me to the work of J.A. Hobson (the first time
I realised that secondary sources often got their analysis badly wrong), but also
to historiography.
This work has been in the back of my mind since at least the late 1990s, but
until now I did not feel that I had enough knowledge to write it. There have been
two reasons that have pushed me to break cover and write a history of international
thought. First, is the lack of an accessible text on the history of international
thought (although Torbjørn Knutsen’s quite different 1992 A History of
International Relations Theory is an exception here); and second is the general
lack of knowledge on the history of international thought within International
Relations (IR) circles. Obviously the two are related. This is not to say that there
have not been plenty of people writing on disciplinary history, many of whom I
have acknowledged below, but rather that this scholarship has not managed to
make it into the textbooks that train our next generation of scholars, and
consequently the vast mass of the profession remains ignorant of the history of
their field. The struggle to get people to unlearn the tired old myths that still get
trotted out as cognitive shortcuts (to use Kim Hutchings’ phrase) goes on. As I
write IR textbooks are still being printed that talk about the ‘Treaty’ of Westphalia,
the Westphalian system, the failure of the League, the realist–idealist ‘Great
Debate’, and how appeasement proved a group of people called realists right. If
these myths were just harmless distractions – stories we told students to keep
them amused – there would be no harm. If only it were that simple. Unfortunately
historical myths are rarely anodyne. They serve a purpose, whether intended or
not. Historical myths are used as arguments in theoretical discourse. The myth of
League failure, for example, is often invoked as an argument against international
organisations. Thus, a deeper historical study can have a critical role in discussions
of theory. Equally, without a deeper understanding of its intellectual history IR
is likely to cling to another myth: the myth of spurious persistence that assumes
that ideas have a life of their own outside of the context of writers using them.
This can also give our field a little humility. Our ideas and theories do not exist
in some unhistorical realm waiting to be discovered, they are the products of, as
well as participants in, human history. We need to understand international
thought and the field of IR as embedded in a wider historical experience. This
also means we need to expose the silences in the myths as well. A glaring example
 Preface ix
is the way that the industrial revolution is often forgotten in introductory IR
textbooks, despite the central role it played in the development of international
thought.
The community of scholars interested in the history of international though in
general, and the disciplinary history of IR in particular, has grown significantly
in the last two decades, and many members of this community have helped me
through the intervening years with my understanding of specific parts of this
story. At the risk of causing offence through forgetting an intellectual debt, I
would like specifically to thank Duncan Bell, Ian Bruff, Randall Germain, Ian
Hall, John Hobson, Gaynor Johnson, Torbjørn Knutsen, Tony Lang, Halvard
Leira, Lorna Lloyd, David Long, Sean Molloy, Craig Murphy, Nick Rengger,
Brian Schmidt, Tim Shaw, Stuart Shields, Hidemi Suganami, Casper Sylvest,
Andrew Williams, Peter Wilson and Owen Worth. I would also like to assure
Ben Rosamond, Laura Shepherd and Chris Agius that, whatever font this book
eventually appears in, it was originally keyed in Times New Roman.
This page intentionally left blank
1 Introduction

To discover from the history of thought that there are in fact no such timeless
concepts, but only the various different concepts which have gone with various
different societies, is to discover a general truth not merely about the past but
about ourselves as well.1

Man has no nature, just history.2

This chapter explores the nature of international thought and international

relations, stressing the problems we have in defining what the international
is. In providing an introduction to the study of international thought it will
explore a number of issues that are important to understanding the study
of the international:

1 The role of history and historical accounts as gatekeeping devices.

The stories we tell about the origins of things are not neutral, but are
highly politically charged narratives that can be used to promote
some ways of thinking, while marginalising others.
2 Texts from the past change their meanings over time, and as the
concerns of the readers of the text change. In order to understand a
particular text from the past it is important to try and read it on its
own terms, rather than just imposing our own concerns and prejudices
on it. This is not as easy as it sounds.
3 There are two under-analysed assumptions in IR that directly affect
the way that we interpret the history of international thought. These
are: (a) The way that certain historical myths continue to be repeated
in IR, despite the fact that they have been refuted in scholarly
publications. The worst of these is the myth of the realist–idealist
debate. Forcing all ideas into realist and idealist straitjackets stops us
from being able to see the richness and diversity of international
thought. (b) That what we know as international thought is, almost
entirely, a western interpretation of the world.
2 Introduction
This book divides international thought into three phases. The first,
explored in Part I, involves the creation of an inter-state system as a by-
product of the formation of the modern western state from the sixteenth
century onwards. The second, examined in Part II, follows the development
of a self-conscious analysis of the international during and after the
industrialisation of society. The third, the development of IR as a university
subject after 1945, is summarised in Chapter 8. This book concentrates on
the first two phases.

In their send-up of English history, originally published in 1931, Sellar and

Yeatman declared that history is what you could remember. Theirs was the only
‘memorable’ history because it was made up of the partially remembered stories
of English history overheard in ‘golf-clubs, gun-rooms, green-rooms, etc’.3 What
Sellar and Yeatman were satirising was not history per se, but rather the way that
people construct definite narratives out of half-digested historical ‘facts’.
Throughout 1066 and All That the text is broken up by declarations that a certain
person or event is a good or bad thing. The whole story is tied to what is the
defining feature of whether something is memorable or not: whether it relates to
Britain being ‘top nation’. Thus, the American War of Independence results in
America having no more history, because America was now no longer
‘memorable’. While Sellar and Yeatman were satirising a specifically British
Whig history4 that when they wrote was already under attack from a new
generation of historians, what is uncomfortable about their approach is that we
are all guilty of these kinds of distortions and over-simplifications (a Whig
history is one that is written not to understand the past, but to give support to
current positions in the present). Historical narratives, tottering on a flimsy base
of knowledge, are frequently used to justify certain positions, policies or
preferences. Often the shrillness of our claims on an issue is directly proportional
to our lack of knowledge of the historical case at its base. Most recently, and since
history teaching in schools around the world have come under the control of
national curricula, these narratives have been used to justify the existence of
specific sovereign states. Yet, these narratives are not exclusive to state-based
nationalisms, and can be found among all human collectivities. Even academic
fields of study are not immune to this process.
International Relations (IR) has its own set of standard Whig histories. These
revolve around the idea of the first great debate and the dichotomy of realism and
idealism. The construction of a conflict between realist and idealist approaches
peppers many textbooks, and allows lecturers of introductory IR courses to
present a simple history of IR that sees it as a long struggle between idealist and
realist paradigms. This great debate is often located in the inter-war period, but
it is also sometimes placed in the post-1945 period. The fact that there is no
agreement on when this ‘Great Debate’ took place should send warning signals
through teachers of introductory courses. Like all good myths the realist–idealist
 Introduction 3
debate is based upon a kernel of historical evidence. Brian Schmidt has located a
realist–idealist debate among US foreign policy studies in the late 1940s, while
‘realist’ and ‘idealist’ were terms that were traded (often with different and
conflicting meanings) between the wars. There is even evidence of a debate
resembling the realist–idealist debate before the First World War.5 On balance,
though, the realist–idealist ‘Great Debate’ over-simplifies the past by ignoring
the rich diversity of pre-1950s IR, and imposing anachronistic conditions on to
the past. A similar process operates in International Political Economy (IPE),
where the myth of a complete separation between the study of politics and
economics prior to the 1970s has written out both liberal and socialist political
economy approaches to the international that were active prior to 1950.6
This book is an attempt to bring some historical rigour to these stories that we
tell about the international. I do not presume to be telling the whole and complete
story, though. Like Bertrand Russell, I believe that the more we know the less
certain we are about the truth. All histories are interpretations and present a
particular biased angle, which can be due to factors such as the cultural baggage
of the author or the evidence available. There is, however, a major difference
between narratives based on flimsy and misleading evidence, and histories
(however biased or misleading they still are) that endeavour to understand and
uncover as much of the past as humanly possible. Well informed histories,
however subject to their own biases, at least provide us with an attempt to recreate
the past, and offer a firm foundation for scholarly debate. The central goal of this
book is to provide as much understanding of the history and origins of
international thought as possible within the confines of a single work. In order to
do this I try as far as possible to understand these ideas within the context of their
own times. This is more of a struggle than it may at first appear because the past
at one level is irredeemably lost to us. Our evidence for the past is always
fragmentary and limited to certain forms of evidence that tend to survive better
than others. Thus, while we know much about late Republican Rome from the
archaeological record and the surviving writings of the period, we are limited by
the loss of other forms of evidence, such as the perspectives of the slaves or the
mindsets of the citizens themselves that were the context in which the surviving
evidence existed and made sense. Added to this there are our own views and
contexts. Our own views on slavery, so different from the Roman, mean that we
either tend to judge their society by our own standards (as the film Spartacus
did), or we unconsciously ignore the unpalatable aspects that interfere with our
interpretation of an idealised past (as the equally classic film Cleopatra did).
That said, there are also very good reasons for studying the past in general,
and the history of ideas in particular. First, whether we like it or not, political
arguments based on historical precedent or narratives are a central feature of our
society. Positions are justified by reference to historical narratives, and thus the
spread and acceptance of historical narratives form an effective gate keeping
device, where they are used not to understand the past, but to prevent ideas that
do not fit the story from being accepted. Second, the predominant tendency in IR
theory to read past theorists only in terms of present day concerns and categories
4 Introduction
limits our understanding of the richness of texts, as well as the tendency of these
texts to be interpreted differently by different generations. Related to this is our
failure to understand two aspects of a text: its relation to the possible intent of the
author, and the way that the attitudes of a particular audience in space and time
reinterpret a text. Texts, in short, are not static and unproblematic sources. Third,
the placing of a text within its historical context helps reveal the complexities of
human existence, and guards us against simplistic formulae for human action
that merely extrapolate the particular concerns and prejudices of groups in space
or time. In terms of the history of international thought, this imperative to study
ideas within a broader historical context has sharpened with the development of
international political theory (IPT). The development of a more philosophically
nuanced IR theory via IPT means that IR now needs to undergo the same
revolution in thought that political theory went through with the debates about
the nature of the history of ideas in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In short, we
must match our deepening philosophical understanding with an equally deep
understanding of how historical context affects the way that we read philosophical
insights. The next section confronts this issue.

What this book is … and what it is not

Over the last few years there has been a growing body of literature in IR called
international political theory (IPT). IPT has been defined as ‘that aspect of the
discourse of International Relations which addresses explicitly issues concerning
norms, interpretation, and the ontological foundations of the discipline’.7 In other
words, it is an understanding of the underlying theoretical foundations of IR and
international thought. Applying analysis taken from political theory, IPT has
added to our understanding of the history of IR through a deeper analysis of the
international thought of past theorists and philosophers within a broader context
of the analysis of questions of justice, war, power and sovereignty. While IPT
often analyses past thinkers, the primary focus is not to understand those thinkers
in terms of their context and place within the history of ideas (although it is not
precluded from doing so), but rather to understand those authors in terms of the
broader perennial questions that they are involved with asking. Thus, an analysis
of A.T. Mahan would be less about the contexts and debates in which his ideas
evolved, and more to do with how he can help us answer questions about
sovereignty, colonialism and war.
To a certain extent this development of IPT has brought IR into line with the
development of political theory. This alignment, however, opens up a question
about the relationship between theory and historical context. From the late 1960s
onwards political theorists have faced and debated the question of the role of
historical context in the interpretation of political theory and past theorists. The
first salvoes in this debate were fired by Quentin Skinner in 1969 and have since
been organised into what became known as the Cambridge School of political
theory.8 While I do not want to go into the details of this debate here, I do want to
stress the point that the Cambridge School helped open up political theory to the
 Introduction 5
history of ideas, and especially to criticisms of the construction of ‘traditions’ in
political thought that owed more to an ahistorical ‘spurious persistence’9 based
upon flawed understandings of the context of political thinking. This is not to say
that the Cambridge School is not without its critics, indeed Skinner’s original
1969 article was the subject of a robust response in 1974 by Parekh and Berki.
Even then, Parekh and Berki did not cast doubt on Skinner’s argument on the
importance of historical context, rather they took issue with how Skinner had
employed and (in their view) overstated it. For Parekh and Berki there were
different degrees of importance for context depending on the nature of the thinker
and the form of his or her work. There were attempts by past thinkers to address
what are seen as perennial problems of human existence, and so sometimes we
can read them in the same way as we would read a more recent writer.10 Yet, in
the final analysis Parekh and Berki replace Skinner’s more bullish support for the
understanding of the intentions and context of a thinker with an acceptance of the
inability to escape the present, and an acceptance that historical and contextual
understanding is always shifting and is never stable. The bottom line that emerges
from this exchange is the complexities of the relationship between a text, its
writer and their historical context. Any attempt to understand political theory
requires us to understand how it interacts with both its historical context and with
the audience in the present.
The success of IPT in IR has, therefore, brought with it an imperative to
engage with the historical context and linkages of international thought. Greater
awareness of the role of political theory in international thought requires us to
consider the importance of methods of thought associated with the history of
ideas too. This is where the history of international thought comes in. Its
importance lies placing international theory within its historical context, and
thereby acting as a support for the study of IPT. This is not the end of the matter,
though. The history of international thought also acts as a critique (and even a
criticism) of current narratives and practices that use historical narratives as a
means of bolstering or demolishing certain current theoretical arguments in IR.
For example, it is not uncommon – both in IR and in popular debates on foreign
policy – to hear the claim that some idea will not work, and the reason for this can
be demonstrated ‘by the failure of the League of Nations’ and of the ideas
associated with it. This feeds into a common sense narrative that many are
familiar with. But did the League, qua the League, fail? Were the ideas of those
who supported the League sunk with the League, and who exactly supported the
League, and in what way? The current tendency is to use the League story as a
criticism of all approaches that talk about institutional change in IR, and as a
support for ideas of power politics based on a particular reading of human nature;
and it can be a devastating put-down. The question is, though, is it good history?
While an actual analysis of the League is beyond the scope of this study, we will
in Chapters 6 and 7 explore many of the thinkers who wrote on the League and
League issues. The picture that emerges is instead a very complex one, with
many supporters of the League idea coming from what is now regarded as a
realist position, while many of those written off now as idealists were critical of
6 Introduction
some or all aspects of the League. A proper evaluation of how ideas, over time,
interact with the world of policy requires a more complex understanding of what
those ideas were, and how they evolved as part of a wider historical process. In
short, in order to do good theory we also need to do good history.
Thus, this book is not a work of international history, nor is it an account of IR
theories, it is also not necessarily a work of IPT, although to a certain degree it
contributes to all three. It inhabits the space between these three recognised and
well-developed fields. What it will do is confront two little-analysed assumptions
that have silently dominated much IR theory. These are:

1 The ‘text-hindered’ nature of IR’s approach to history, or rather how we only

interpret past international thought through the categories of ‘realist’ and
‘idealist’ that we find in our first year IR textbooks.
2 The view that IR theory is primarily an objective and universally relevant
attempt to understand global politics, rather than (in John M. Hobson’s view)
a parochial celebration and defence of western ideals.11

We will deal with both of these in turn, showing how they have shaped the
arguments and assumptions of this book.
In a 1997 book on Roman villas John Thomas Smith refers to the phrase ‘text-
hindered archaeology’, which is in common use in archaeological circles.12 This
phrase referred to the tendency to interpret archaeological evidence through the
lens of historical texts (especially contemporary or near contemporary texts).
Such a reading distorted the interpretation of the archaeological record since it
assumed that texts could be taken at face value, rather than read as partial,
partisan or just plain inaccurate artefacts. Thus, for example, interpretations of
third and fourth century AD Gothic society using the available archaeological
evidence has been held back by too close an attachment to the Gothic history of
Jordanes, written two centuries later, by a partisan Eastern Roman, and in a
different political climate.13 The analysis of the history of international thought
has suffered from its own form of text-hindered fantasy, although it is not
historical texts that are the main source of the problem, but rather the
interpretation offered by textbooks, and their taking of certain interpretations as
the definitive account. With very few exceptions IR textbooks have assumed
that the history of IR is marked by a clash between two dominant paradigms:
realism and a less well defined second one called idealism, utopianism or
liberalism. Much of this interpretation seems to be borrowed (and distorted)
from Carr’s 1939 Twenty Years’ Crisis (Carr is to IR, perhaps, what Jordanes is
to Gothic history), or from 1950s debates over US foreign policy. Over the last
decade IR textbooks have kept this ‘realist’–‘idealist’ split, but have added other
‘paradigms’ as these approaches have gained some form of acceptance as distinct
schools of thought, although with little attempt to say why they can be called
paradigms.14 This often takes the form of grids, in which the paradigms are
defined in terms of their assumptions about the study of the international. The
most common pairs in this comparison are selfish human nature (realism) vs
 Introduction 7
altruistic or good human nature (idealism); state-centrism (realism) vs states and
others (idealism); anarchic international system (realism) vs communal
international system (idealism); and national interest (realism) vs internationalism
(idealism).15 The problem here is that so many attempts to properly explore the
writings of past international thinkers are shoe-horned into this realist–idealist
schema, and this hinders a proper historically nuanced reading of past
international thought. Certainly, the lumping of a group of disparate writers into
the category ‘idealist’ has rendered current IR oblivious to the differences
between advocates of collective security and the stricter pacifists, or to the
raging debate in 1930s IR over the role of capitalism as a cause of war. In this
sense, much of IR’s perceptions of its own history have been text-hindered –
whether that text be more recent textbook over-simplifications, or a too ready
acceptance of the objectivity of E.H. Carr. One goal of this book is to release the
study of international thought from the realist–idealist straitjacket. Much as
archaeologists struggle to allow their finds to structure the story that they tell,
so we must try to allow our ‘finds’ (in this case texts and archival material
understood within their historical context) to structure the story we tell. This is,
at one level, an impossible task because it is never possible (even for the best
historian) to wholly escape our own temporal and spatial context. However, the
more we are able to limit the intrusions of these fantasies of the present then the
more we are able to fully appreciate the meaning of past thought, and its place
within the multiple ironies and contradictions that is the historical record.
History, according to the historian Lynn White, ‘is a bag of tricks which the dead
have played upon historians’, and it is the illusion that the written record is ‘a
reasonably accurate facsimile of past human activity’ that is the most remarkable
of these tricks.16 We historians of IR must be aware of these tricks.
Thus, while this book is, to a large extent, a study of texts, I hope to avoid
some of the complaints made by archaeologists by stressing two things. First, the
importance of context in the development of international thought; and second,
seeing texts and ideas not as competing truths and scientific interpretations, but
as the equivalent of archaeological artefacts in their own right. Rather than seek
to, for example, analyse and critique Norman Angell’s Great Illusion as a work
of social scientific interpretation alone, the goal is to understand what Angell was
saying and how his text relates to contemporaries. This leads me to the second of
the under-analysed assumptions in IR: that ‘international theory does not so
much explain international politics in an objective, positivist and universalist
manner but seeks, rather, to parochially celebrate and defend or promote the
West’.17 This issue is already the subject of John M. Hobson’s 2012 book on
Eurocentrism and IR. Here, rather than repeating Hobson’s eloquent argument, I
would like to take his conclusion in a different direction. Hobson’s intent is to
point out this Eurocentrism in order to challenge it, and I certainly support this
goal. My role here is a different one: to understand the development, richness,
complexities, silences, contradictions and form of this fundamentally Eurocentric
(and, certainly since the 1890s, Anglocentric) project we call international
thought as a thing in itself. As a result, this study is also an unabashedly
8 Introduction
Eurocentric one, in the sense that it is studying a product of European (or western)
civilisation. This is not to say that the non-western world has nothing to offer. On
the contrary there is no doubt in my mind that it does. Rather, just as a study of
the Roman Empire will make no reference to the equally important civilisation
of China, so a study of the Eurocentric and latterly Anglocentric, tradition of
international thought will limit itself geographically and culturally. Thus, what I
am studying in this book is not the slow unfolding of a globally-minded scientific
project, but rather the development of a collection of western views and
interpretations that have tried to make sense of the international, and the west’s
place in a wider global politics, within a fundamentally Eurocentric world-view.
This is a world-view that, like all world-views, may have much to offer humanity
as a whole, but is also by its very nature myopic and limited in how much it can
be transferred into a truly global vision. In this sense western international
thought is little different from its parent body of western political thought.
Thus, at the end of the day this book is a sort of dig into the archaeological
record of international thought. The intent is to give some kind of temporal and
cultural context to the ideas that have been used to explore the international
within western political thinking. Here, though, we do run into an initial problem
of nomenclature. What is it that we mean by ‘international’? It is to this question
that the next section turns.

What is ‘the international’?

Perhaps the first place to start is to untangle what we mean by ‘the international’.
Like most successful intellectual fields IR benefits from an unspoken vagueness
about its subject matter. I call this a benefit because it has given the field a
flexibility that has allowed it to meander and change with the times and with
intellectual fashions. This is not unique to IR, but rather seems to be the norm.
The ideal field of intellectual endeavour seems to combine both a core definition
of what it is about with the ability to take in (or even move to) new forms of
study as opportunities arrive. To use a planetary analogy here, it seems that to
retain a stable orbit any intellectual field needs to combine conservative
centripetal forces intent on reigning in the field to within set parameters with
centrifugal forces working to move the field away in any and all directions.
Alongside this tension there is another that runs to the heart of the definition of
the field. Is IR primarily a recent, predominantly American, university-based
field reflecting the concerns of later twentieth century global politics, or is it
the latest manifestation of much older ideas about human relations? My simple
answer to this is a very unhelpful yes to both. While seemingly contradictory,
both are true, and our emphasis on one or the other largely depends on our
definition of IR, and following on from this the question of what date we see as
the founding of IR. The ‘when’ of IR is, in this sense, not an idle question, but
one that cuts to the heart of how IR is defined. If we interpret IR, with Stanley
Hoffman, as an American social science of the Cold War, then the field is
founded in the 1940s or 1950s, and can be defined as the (US) university-based
 Introduction 9
sub-field of political science that first coalesced around a predominantly
American-school realism intent on answering the questions of world order in a
bipolar world, but has now branched out to include other approaches (see
Chapter 8). If we look to the end of the First World War (a position more popular
in Britain, and especially in Aberystwyth where the first Chair in international
politics was founded in 1919), then IR is defined more broadly as a field that
includes policy-makers and journalists, and the question of the causes of war is
focused on as a major founding question (see Chapters 6 and 7). If the foundation
is sought in the late nineteenth century then the focus shifts to questions of
industrialisation and colonialism, and their effects on the broader states system.
Here the attention of IR shifts to a political economy approach over a much
longer period of time, where war and the system of states becomes the product
of wider modern and modernising forces of material development, class
conflict and imperialist ideologies (see Chapters 4 and 5). For others the early
modern era of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries become the key period
where territorial state competition becomes the norm, and a supposed clear
division between domestic and inter-state politics opens up. Here sovereignty
and analyses of the society of states tend to dominate (see Chapters 2 and 3).
Finally, there are those who see the fundamentals of IR rooted in forces that
transcend time, and as a result IR becomes a field that has always been there,
its principles rising to the surface throughout history when perspicacious
thinkers in times of crisis cut through the façades of ideological justifications
to reveal the permanence of interests and power. Here mention is made of the
power-political elements to be found in the works of Thucydides, Kautilya,
Machiavelli and David Hume.
Where we trace the origins of IR from is a reflection of what we see IR as
being primarily about. The idea of IR as timeless often underscores a belief that
the basic premises of IR are rooted in laws of history that have their origins in the
nature of humans or of human societies. While more historically nuanced
approaches are critical of this view of the origins of the field, and often interpret
it as the product of a naive and ill-informed view of the richness and variety of
human historical experience, there is a grain of value here for any analysis of the
history of international thought. While the devil of IR may lurk in the detail of
time-specific conditions, what ties all of IR together – while simultaneously
distancing it from much domestic politics – is the issue of the relations between
human societies and groups that do not necessarily recognise a higher authority
acting as a clear and unequivocal mediator for relations between them. This is a
wider question that has at least affected human relations since we first settled
down and claimed ownership of territory for farming or grazing, and even if the
way that those relations are manifest are managed and organised through time-
specific ideas, structures and forms of production. Even the nomads of the
Eurasian steppes needed ways in which to regulate grazing rights with strangers
outside of their own social group. These relations are qualitatively different to
those that occur within the group, and the ultimate sanction of war is never too
far away, even if more often than not they are solved peacefully.
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XXII
 THE GENERAL THEORY

Fragments of Particular Merit on This Phase of the Subject

BY VARIOUS CONTRIBUTORS

When Dorothy was carried by the cyclone from her home in Kansas to the
land of Oz, together with her uncle’s house and her little dog Toto, she
neglected to lower the trap door over the hole in the floor which formerly
led to the cyclone cellar and Toto stepped through. Dorothy rushed to the
opening expecting to see him dashed onto the rocks below but found him
floating just below the floor. She drew him back into the room and closed
the trap.

The author of the chronicle of Dorothy’s adventures explains that the same
force which held up the house held up Toto but this explanation is not
necessary. Dorothy was now floating through space and house and dog
were subject to the same forces of gravitation which gave them identical
motions. Dorothy must have pushed the dog down onto the floor and in
doing so must herself have floated to the ceiling whence she might have
pushed herself back to the floor. In fact gravitation was apparently
suspended and Dorothy was in a position to have tried certain experiments
which Einstein has never tried because he was never in Dorothy’s unique
position.]188

* * *

The Principle of Equivalence, of which Einstein’s suspended cage

experiment is the usual illustration, and upon which the generalized theory
of relativity is built, is thus stated by Prof. Eddington: “A gravitational field
of force is precisely equivalent to an artificial field of force, so that in any
small region it is impossible, by any conceivable experiment, to distinguish
between them. In other words, force is purely relative.”

This may be otherwise stated by going back to our idea of a four-

dimensional world, the points of which represent the positions and times of
events. If we mark in such a space-time the successive positions of an
object we get a line, or curve, which represents the whole history of the
object, inasmuch as it shows us the position of the object at every time. The
reader may imagine that all events happen in one plane, so that only two
perpendicular dimensions are needed to fix positions in space, with a third
perpendicular dimension for time. He may then conceive, if he may not
picture, an analogous process for four-dimensional space-time. These lines,
“tracks of objects through space-time,” were called by Minkowski “world-
lines.” We may now say that all the events we observe are the intersections
of world-lines. The temperature at noon was 70°. This means that if I plot
the world-line of the top of the mercury column and the world-line of a
certain mark on the glass they intersect in a certain point of space-time. All
that we know are intersections of these world-lines. Suppose now we have a
large number of them drawn in our four-dimensional world, satisfying all
known intersections, and let us suppose the whole embedded in a jelly. We
may distort this jelly in any way, changing our coordinates as we please, but
we shall neither destroy nor create intersections of world-lines. It may be
proved that a change from one system of reference, to which observations
are referred, to any other system, moving in any way with respect to the
first system, may be pictured as a distortion of the four-dimensional jelly.
The laws of nature, therefore, being laws that describe intersections, must
be expressible in a form independent of the reference system chosen.

From these postulates, Einstein was able to show such a formulation

possible. His law may be stated very simply:—All bodies move through
space-time in the straightest possible tracks.

The fact that an easy non-mathematical explanation can not be given, of

how this law is reached, or of just why the straightest track of Mercury
through space-time will give us an ellipse in space after we have split
space-time up into space and time, is no valid objection to the theory.
Newton’s law that bodies attract with a force proportional to their masses
and inversely proportional to the square of the distance is simple, but no
one has ever given an easy non-mathematical proof of how that law
requires the path of Mercury to be an ellipse, with the sun at a focus, instead
of some other curve.]182

* * *

One of the grave difficulties we have in gaining a satisfactory

comprehension of Einstein’s conceptions, is that they do not readily relate
themselves to our modes of geometrical thought. Within limits we may
choose our own geometry, but it may be at the cost of unwieldy
complication. If we think with Newton in terms of Euclidean geometry and
consider the earth as revolving around the sun, the motions of our solar
system can be stated in comparatively simple terms. If, on the other hand,
we should persist in stating them, as Ptolemy would have done, from the
earth as a relatively stationary center, our formulas will become
complicated beyond ready comprehension. For this reason it is much
simpler in applying the theory of relativity, and in considering and
describing what actually happens in the physical universe, to use
geometrical conceptions to which the actual conditions can be easily
related. We find such an instrument in non-Euclidean geometry, wherein
space will appear as though it were projected from a slightly concave
mirror. It is in this sense that some speak of space as curved. The analogy is
so suggestive it tempts one to linger over it. Unless there were material
objects within the range of the mirror, its conformation would be
immaterial; the thought of the space which the mirror, as it were,
circumscribes, is dependent upon the presence of such material objects. The
lines of light and of all other movement will not be quite “straight” from the
view-point of Euclidean geometry. A line drawn in a universe of such a
nature must inevitably return upon itself. Nothing therefore, can ever pass
out of this unlimitedly great but yet finite cosmos. But even now, since our
imaginary mirror is only very slightly concave, it follows that for limited
regions like the earth or even the solar system, our conception of geometry
may well be rectilinear and Euclidean. Newton’s law of gravitation will be
quite accurate with only a theoretical modification drawn from the theory of
relativity.]82

* * *

The way in which a curvature of space might appear to us as a force is

made plainer by an example. Suppose that in a certain room a marble
dropped anywhere on the floor always rolled to the center of the room;
suppose the same thing happened to a baseball, a billiard ball, and a tennis
ball. These results could be explained in two ways; we might assume that a
mysterious force of attraction existed at the center of the floor, which
affected all kinds of balls alike; or we might assume that the floor was
curved. We naturally prefer the latter explanation. But when we find that in
the neighborhood of a large material body all other bodies move toward it
in exactly the same manner, regardless of their nature or their condition, we
are accustomed to postulate a mysterious attractive force (gravitation);
Einstein, on the contrary, adopts the other alternative, that the space around
the body is curved.]223

* * *

In the ordinary “analytical geometry,” the position and motion of all the
points considered is referred to a rigid “body” or “frame of reference.” This
usually consists of an imaginary room of suitable size. The position of any
point is then given by three numbers, i.e., its distances from one side wall
and from the back wall and its height above the floor. These three numbers
can only give one point, every other point having at least one number
different. In four-dimensional geometry a fourth wall may be vaguely
imagined as perpendicular to all three walls, and a fourth number added,
giving the distance of the “point” from this wall also. Since “rigid” bodies
do not exist in gravitational fields the “frame of reference” must be “non-
rigid.” The frame of reference in the Gaussian system need not be rigid, it
can be of any shape and moving in any manner, in fact a kind of jelly. A
“point” or “event” in the four dimensioned world is still given by four
numbers but these numbers do not represent distances from anywhere; all
that is necessary is that no two events shall have exactly the same four
numbers to represent them, and that two events which are very close
together shall be represented by numbers which differ only slightly from
one another. This system assumes so little that it will be seen to be very
wide in its scope; although to the ordinary mind, what is gained in scope
seems more than that lost in concreteness. This does not concern the
mathematician, however, and by using this system he gains his object,
proving that the general laws of nature remain the same when expressed in
any Gaussian coordinate system whatever.]220

* * *

Einstein enunciates a general principle that it is possible to find a

transformation of coordinate axes which is exactly equivalent to any force,
and in particular one which is equivalent to the force of gravitation. That is
by concentrating our attention on the transformation which is a purely
mathematical operation we can afford to neglect the force completely. To
get a better idea of this principle of equivalence as it is called, let us
consider a relatively simple example (which actually has nothing to do with
gravitation, but which will serve to make our notions clearer.) A person on
the earth unconsciously refers all his experiences, i.e., the motions of the
objects around him to a set of axes fixed in the earth on which he stands.
However, we know that the earth is rotating about its axis, and his axes of
reference are also rotating with respect to the space about him. From the
point of view of general relativity it is exactly because we do refer motions
on the surface of the earth to axes rotating with the earth that we experience
the so-called centrifugal force of the earth’s rotation, with which everyone
is familiar. If we could find it convenient to transform from moving axes to
fixed axes, the force would vanish, since it is exactly equivalent to the
transformation from one set of axes to the other. However, we find it
unnatural to refer daily experiences to axes that are not placed where we
happen to be, and so we prefer to take the force and rotating axes instead of
no force and fixed axes.]272
 * * *

We seem to have a direct experience of force in our muscular sensations. By

pushing or pulling we can set bodies in motion. It is natural to assume, that
something similar occurs, when Nature set bodies in motion. But is this not
a relic of animism? The savage and the ancients peopled all the woods and
skies with Gods and demons, who carries on the activities of nature by their
own bodily efforts. Today we have dispossessed the demons, but the ghost
of a muscular pull still holds the planets in place.]141

* * *

The general theory is an extension of the special theory which enables the
law of gravitation to be deduced. Not in Newton’s form, it is true, but in a
better form, that is, one that accounts for two important facts otherwise not
explained. But it is a far more general theory that indicated above. It is a
complete study of the relations between laws expressed by means of any
four coordinates (of which three space and one time is a special case), and
the same laws expressed in the four coordinates of a system having any
motion whatever with respect to the first system. By restricting this general
study in accordance with certain postulates about the nature of the universe
we live in, we arrive at a number of conclusions which fit more closely with
observed facts that the conclusions drawn from Newton’s theory.]221
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Metadata

Title: Einstein’s Theories of Relativity and

Gravitation: A Selection of Material from the
Essays Submitted in the Competition for the
Eugene Higgins Prize of $5,000
Editor: James Malcolm Bird (1886–1964) Info
Contributor: A. d’Abro
Contributor: L. M. Alexander
Contributor: Prof. Joseph S. Ames
Contributor: Prof. E. N. da C. Andrade
Contributor: Lieut. W. Mark Angus
Contributor: Paul M. Batchelder
Contributor: E. T. Bell
Contributor: Lyndon Bolton
Contributor: Dr. George de Bothezat
Contributor: Charles A. Brunn
Contributor: Charles H. Burr
Contributor: Dorothy Burr
Contributor: Elwyn F. Burrill
Contributor: Professor A. E. Caswell
Contributor: Edward A. Clarke
Contributor: Harold T. Davis
Contributor: R. F. Deimel
Contributor: C. E. Dimick
Contributor: Saul Dushman
Contributor: Hugh Elliot
Contributor: Earl R. Evans
Contributor: E. P. Fairbairn, M.C., B.Sc.
Contributor: Francis Farquhar
Contributor: Montgomery Francis
Contributor: J. Elias Fries, Fellow A.I.E.E.
Contributor: H. Gartelmann
Contributor: James O. G. Gibbons
Contributor: Norman E. Gilbert
Contributor: Dean W. P. Graham
Contributor: D. B. Hall
Contributor: George Frederick Hemens, M.C., B.Sc.
Contributor: C. W. Kanolt
Contributor: Frank E. Law
Contributor: R. Bruce Lindsay
Contributor: Rev. George Thomas Manley
Contributor: George F. Marsteller
Contributor: John G. McHardy
Contributor: L. F. H. de Miffonis. B.A., C.E.
Contributor: Col. John Millis
Contributor: Dr. M. C. Mott-Smith
Contributor: Dr. Francis D. Murnaghan
Contributor: Edward A. Partridge
Contributor: Professor Andrew H. Patterson
Contributor: Professor William H. Pickering
Contributor: William Hemmenway Pratt
Contributor: Kenneth W. Reed
Contributor: James Rice
Contributor: Edward Adams Richardson
Contributor: Walter van B. Roberts
Contributor: C. E. Rose, M.E.
Contributor: T. Royds
Contributor: Prof. Henry Norris Russell
Contributor: Prof. Moritz Schlick
Contributor: Leopold Schorsch
Contributor: Prof. J. A. Schouten
Contributor: Frederick W. Shurlock
Contributor: W. de Sitter
Contributor: Prof. William Benjamin Smith
Contributor: Robert Stevenson
Contributor: Prof. W. F. G. Swann
Contributor: Prof. Arthur Gordon Webster
Contributor: L. L. Whyte
Contributor: Prof. R. W. Wood
Language: English
Original 1921
publication
date:

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vii is made is made is made 8
viii btween between 1
xiii Chiselhurst Chislehurst 2
28 attriuting attributing 1
38 axis axes 1
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59 assums assumes 1
61 II III 1
74 follows follow 1
74 parellel parallel 1
96 inadmissable inadmissible 1
110 apposite opposite 1
114 synonomous synonymous 1
123 indepedent independent 1
125 Descartean Cartesian 6
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144 incomphehensible incomprehensible 1
151 hypothenuse hypotenuse 1
153 dimension dimensions 1
156 Betelguese Betelgeuse 2
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170 [Not in source] . 1
181 Michelsen Michelson 1
182 Michelsen-Morley Michelson-Morley 1
185 that: [Deleted] 5
205 gometry geometry 1
206 and und 1
213 distroyed destroyed 1
219 wells walls 1
228 indisolubly indissolubly 1
231 signficance significance 1
240 amazinging amazing 3
244 dimsensions dimensions 1
249 Relativitatstheorie Relativitätstheorie 1 / 0
254 oberservers observers 2
260,
345 co-ordinates coordinates 1
262 or of 1
279 Poincairé Poincaré 1
291 Jean Jeans 1
298 methematicians mathematicians 1
305, Asso. Assoc. 1
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305 Astro. Astron. 1
312 axactly exactly 1
315 . , 1
319 acrross across 1
322 us use 1
327 BY [Deleted] 3
329 waste wasted 1
330 analagous analogous 1
335 rotatons rotations 1
340 imbedded embedded 1
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344 gravitaton gravitation 1
345 line live 1
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