Did the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 Provide the Framework for a Durable Peace? (2002).

In D. Showalter (Ed.), History in Dispute (Vol. 8, pp. 277-286). St. James Press. https://
link-gale-com.libproxy2.nus.edu.sg/apps/doc/CX2876800045/GVRL?
u=nuslib&sid=bookmark-GVRL&xid=946eb046

TREATY OF VERSAILLES
Did the Treaty of Versailles in 1919
provide the framework for a
durable peace?

Viewpoint: Yes. The Versailles settlement was purposely designed to estab­

lish lasting international stability. It was no harsher than comparable treaties
and was entirely appropriate for the political environment of 1919.

Viewpoint: No. The Treaty of Versailles was disastrous because it embit­

tered Germany and fostered political radicalism in that country.

The Great War left the international relations of the world in a dysfunctional
state. The much-maligned Treaty of Versailles (1919) and its counterparts
were, however, less responsible for that condition than their reputation would
have it. The Versailles settlement was worked out quickly. Armies needed to be
demobilized. Food had to be shipped to countries previously blockaded. Revo­
lutionary movements demanded containment. The negotiating processes were
highly bureaucratized by earlier standards. They were also highly publicized.
The discussions made corresponding demands on the diplomatic and political
skills of all the participants. It is scarcely surprising that the results of the confer­
ence did not meet long-range needs, either in Europe or elsewhere in a world
increasingly resentful of Euro/Western hegemony.

At the same time, however, the Versailles settlement was flexible, incorpo­
rating the possibility of future modification. None of the participants regarded it
as anything but a work in progress. By the mid 1920s the Rhineland occupation
had come to an end. Germany was a member of the League of Nations. Even
the issue of reparations was in the process of being negotiated.

The Versailles settlement was undermined not by its intrinsic weaknesses

but by the general lack of restraint that emerged in Europe after 1914 and per­
sisted as an independent consequence of the war. Low- and mid-level armed
conflict persisted into the mid 1920s: Russia and Poland, Turkey and Greece,
and France and Spain in Morocco-that last conflict, in passing, far more costly
than any nineteenth-century imperialist war. The Little Entente, the French net­
work of eastern European alliances, and the Balkan ambitions of Italy encour­
aged unstable successor states to threaten each other with armies they could
not afford. Postwar European economic relationships developed in zero-sum
contexts well before the Great Depression. Great-power policy became the
conduct of war by other means. The new Soviet Union regarded itself in a state
of war with its capitalist counterparts. Germany and Russia were entirely
excluded from the peace negotiations. The allies blockaded Germany for a
year after the armistice. Even the League of Nations developed into a forum for
expressing antagonisms. President Woodrow Wilson's principle of "open cove­
nants openly arrived at" too often became "overt hostilities publicly expressed."
International agreements are only as good as the will to implement them. After
1918 that will increasingly eroded in Europe and the world.

277
 In the end they failed because they simply
tried to do too much. No group of men could
have accomplished the goals that these men set
Viewpoint:
before themselves. The three most important
Yes. The Versailles settlement was
nations were represented by men who largely
purposely designed to establish avoided their own staffs and tried to make all
lasting international stability. It was decisions themselves. French premier Georges
no harsher than comparable treaties Clemenceau, British prime minister David
and was entirely appropriate for the Lloyd George, and U.S. president Woodrow
political environment of 1919. Wilson met behind closed doors more than
Few people today would argue that the two hundred times (sometimes with Italian
Treaty of Versailles, signed in 1919, was a good prime minister Vittorio Orlando, sometimes
or lasting peace. Saying that the treaty failed to without him) and fought among themselves to
establish lasting peace in Europe, however, is push their own ideas. The stress caused Wilson
different from saying that the treaty was to fall seriously ill and Clemenceau risked his
designed to be so harsh that it would inevitably life by working on, even after surviving an
fail. Whatever faults were contained within the assassination attempt that left a bullet lodged
final treaty (and there were many), the framers near his lungs.
of Versailles entered into the peace negotiations National rivalries and the egos of forceful
intent on creating what British diplomat personalities produced a treaty that was unfavor­
Harold Nicolson called "eternal peace." "We able to Germany, but it was largely in line with
were," he said, "bent on doing great, perma­ comparable recent agreements. The precedent on
nent, and noble things." the minds of most Frenchmen was the Treaty of
That they failed is beyond question, but Frankfurt (1871) that had ended the Franco­
they did not fail because the treaty they wrote Prussian War. Under the terms of that treaty, Prus­
was unduly harsh. Although it was significantly sia forced France to cede the disputed and
larger in scope than most European peace trea­ resource-rich territories of Alsace and Lorraine
ties, one must bear in mind that the war it fol­ and to pay a punitive indemnity of 5 billion
lowed was also significantly larger in scope than francs (about $1 billion). This indemnity
any conflict in history. Moreover, none of the amounted to more than twice the total German
provisions of the treaty were particularly novel. costs for the war. A German army of occupation
Virtually all of them, including indemnities and remained in France until the French government
intentional humiliations, had been common fea­ paid the debt in 1873 by increasing taxes and
tures of European peace agreements for decades. promoting "liberation loans." To underscore
The Germans used many of them against France French humiliation, the Prussians forced the
following the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). French to accept a victors' march through Paris.
Europeans were quite familiar with the Latin Intending to rub even more salt in French
phrase Vae Victis (Woe to the conquered). While wounds, the Prussians declared the founding of
one can argue that the conferees could or should the Second Reich at Versailles, the palace built
have been magnanimous in victory, one cannot by Louis XIV as a symbol of French power.
argue that they were breaking significant new Europeans fully understood that winners
ground by not doing so. write the terms and losers sign them. The
The men who gathered in Paris had before peace agreements of World War I that pre­
them a truly historic opportunity. They had ceded Versailles were no exceptions. In
obtained from Germany an armistice that left the December 1916 the Germans defeated Roma­
Germans with virtually no means of defending nia and as a consequence seized the majority of
themselves against whatever treaty the Allies Romanian grain and oil fields. German forces
might wish to write. Not since 1815 had the occupied the Romanian capital, Bucharest,
powers of Europe held such power to redesign and German diplomats approved the transfer
the Continent. At that conference the British of the southern Romanian region of Dobruja
delegation had involved fourteen diplomats. The to Bulgaria, one of the Central Powers, and
British delegation of 1919, by contrast, occupied therefore an ally of Germany.
five entire Parisian hotels. At the height of the The treaty Germany signed with Bolshevik
conference, more than one thousand diplomats Russia was arguably the harshest in modern
from more than thirty nations were in atten­ European history. On 3 March 1918 Russia for­
dance. The conferees had before them the power mally withdrew from the war after signing the
to redraw the map of Europe and settle the many Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In that treaty, Germany
disputes that representatives of virtually every forced Russia to give up all claims to Poland,
nation and aspiring nation in the world brought Belarus, the Baltic States (where the Germans
before them. confidently expected to place German princes

278 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 8: WORLD WAR I, FIRST SERIES

 WAR GUILT AND REPARATION
The following articles are part of the Treaty of Versailles ARTICLE 233.
(1919):

ARTICLE 231. The amount of the above damage for

which compensation is to be made by Ger­
The Allied and Associated Governments many shall be determined by an tn1er-AUied
affirm and Germany accepts the responsibHity Commission, to be called the Reparation
of Germany and her allieS for causing all the Commission and constituted in� fc>rrn and
loss and damage to which the Allied and Asso-­ wlth the powers set forth hereunder and in
ciated Governments and their nationals have Annexes II to VII inclusive hereto.
been subjected as a consequence of the war
This Commission shalt corl$1der the
imposed upon them by the aggression of Ger­
claims and give to the German Government a
many and her allieS.
just opportunity to be heard.
ARTICLE 232.
The findings of the Commission as to the
The Allied and Associated Governments amount of damage defined as above shall be
recognise that the resources of Germany are concluded and notified to the German Gov­
not adequate, after taking into account perma­ ernment on or before May 1, 1921, as repre­
nent diminutions of such resources which will senting the extent of that Government's
result from other provisions of the present obligations.
Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such
loss and damage. The Commission shall concurrently.draw
up a schedule of payments prescribing the
The Allied and Associated Governments, time and manner for securing and discharg­
however, require, and Germany undertakes, ing the entire obligation within a period of
that she will make compensation for all damage thirty years from May 1, 1921...•
done to the cMlian population of the Allied and
Associated Powers and to their property during ARTICLE 235.
the period of the belligerency of each as an In order to enable the Altied and Associ­
Allied or Associated Power against Germany ated Powers to proceed at once to the resto­
by such aggression by land, by sea and from ration of their industrial and economic life,
the air, and in general all damage as defined in pending the full determination of their claims,
Annex I hereto. Germany shall pay in such installments and
in such manner (whether in gold, commodi­
In accordance with Germany's pledges,
ties, ships, securities or otherwise) as the
already given, as to complete restoration for
Belgium, Germany undertakes, in addition to Reparation Commission may fli, during
the compensation for damage elsewhere in this 1919, 1920 and the first four months of 1921,
Part provided for, as a consequence of the vio­ the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 gOkS marks.
Out of this sum the expenses of the armies of
lation of the Treaty of 1839, to make reimburse­
occupation subsequent to the Armistice of
ment of all sums which Belgium has borrowed
November 11, 1918, shall first be met, and
from the Allied and Associated Governments
such supplies of food and raw material$ as
up to November 11, 1918, together with interest
may be judged by the Governments of the
at the rate of five per cent (5%) per annum on
such sums. This amount shall be determined Principal Allied and Associated Powers to be
essential to enable Germany to meet her
by the Reparation Commission, and the Ger•
obligations for reparation may also, with the
man Government undertakes thereupon forth­
with to make a special issue of bearer bonds to approval of the said Governments, b e paid
for out of the above sum. The balance shall
an equivalent amount payable in marks gold,
on May 1, 1926, or, at the option of the German be reckoned towards liquidation of the
amounts due for reparation. Germany shall
Government, on the 1st of May in any year up
further deposit bonds as prescribed in para­
to 1926. Subject to the foregoing, the form of
such bonds shall be determined by the Repara­ graph 12 (c) Of Annex II hereto.
tion Commission. Such bonds shall b e handed Source: "The Versallles Treaty," Internet website,
http://hlstory.acusd.edu/genltextlversaiHestreatyl
over to the Reparation Commission, which has ver231.html
authority to take and acknowledge receipt
thereof on behalf of Belgium.

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 8: WORLD WAR I, FIRST SERIES 279

 on thrones), Finland, Bessarabia, Ukraine, and domestic politics than they were in paying it off.
the Caucases. In all, Russia lost territory three In short, the postwar financial crisis in Germany
times larger than Germany itself (a grand total owes as much to the actions of Weimar Germany
of 750,000 square kilometers), including as it does to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.
one-third of its prewar population, one-third of
Neither was the War Guilt Clause excep-
its arable land, and 90 percent of its coal fields.
tional. Although most Europeans understood
Germany seized all Russian naval bases in the
that blaming Germany exclusively for the out-
Baltic except one and disarmed the Russian
break of the war was patently ridiculous, the
Black Sea Fleet.
guilt clause was typical of the kinds of humilia-
German plans for the West were scarcely less tions normally visited upon the vanquished.
harsh. Before the war, Germany had developed Indeed, the clause substituted an official stigma
the so-called September Program to guide the for an Allied victory parade through Berlin,
victors' peace that they planned to dictate to something the Germans opposed even more
France and Britain. If victorious, Germany envi- strongly than they opposed the guilt clause.
sioned a peace with four primary features: first, a Some scholars have argued that the absence of a
heavy war indemnity on France would prevent victory march was one of the greatest mistakes of
that country from rearming. This time, the Ger- the Allies. The war in the West had been fought
mans planned to take French overseas colonies as in France and Belgium; Germany was still intact.
well. Second, the Germans would create and Without a victors' march, the German army
dominate an economic union including wartime (which itself paraded through Berlin as President
enemies such as France, Belgium, and Italy but Friedrich Ebert hailed it as "unvanquished from
also including neutrals such as Holland, Norway, the field") could reject the guilt clause and make
Sweden, and Denmark. A German-dominated the fallacious claim that it had not been defeated
Poland and ally Austria-Hungary were also to be on the battlefield. A triumphal march such as the
included. Third, Germany would enlarge its Cen- German one down the Champs Elysees in 1871
tral African empire at the expense of Belgium, would have laid bare that fiction and made it
Britain, and France. Fourth, Germany would much more difficult for future German leaders
annex neutral Holland into the German Reich. to claim that they had been stabbed in the back.
As the war progressed, the costs of the war led
The idealism of President Wilson and his
German leaders to expect to receive even more
Fourteen Points made the eventual treaty look
spoils should they emerge victorious. Total war
exceedingly severe. It is important to keep in
would now call for total peace.
mind, however, that for all its harshness, the
Brest-Litovsk and the September Program treaty was not nearly as harsh as some in Europe
set the tone for future peace treaties. As German had wanted. As noted, there was no march
armies began to retreat in 1918, they destroyed through Germany and no Allied occupation of
fields, wells, mines, bridges, canals, and anything Germany similar to their occupation of north-
else that the Allied armies might use to speed up eastern France from 1871 to 1873. The Allies did
their drive east. Now someone would have to pay not, as the French military had publicly and
to rebuild those devastated areas and, in true loudly demanded, create bridgeheads across the
European fashion, the winners presented a bill to Rhine River. Nor did the Allies attempt to sepa-
the losers. Calls such as "Le Boche Payera" in rate the Rhineland from Germany as many
France and "squeeze the Germans like a lemon French industrialists had demanded. Even the
until the pips squeak" in Britain, however, were vast majority of Germans understood that the
more rhetoric than reality. The conferees agreed Rhineland would be demilitarized and that
not to set a total amount, establishing instead a France would take back Alsace and Lorraine
commission to determine the totals. In theory, (though some Germans unrealistically believed
this commission might have set increasingly they could demand a plebiscite), but the Allies
unrealistic debts. In reality, Allied postwar pro- made no further territorial demands in the West.
grams such as the Dawes Program were dedi- They also did not encourage a nascent separatist
cated to reducing and refinancing overall movement in Bavaria, nor did the conferees take
German debt, not enlarging it. seriously the arguments of those on the French
Right who thought that Germany should be
Much recent scholarship has emphasized
returned to its 1870 borders.
the role of Germany in exacerbating the debt cri-
sis. Germany did not raise taxes or support loans Prime Minister Lloyd George was especially
to pay the reparations, as France did from 1871 concerned to limit the reach of the treaty for fear
to 1873. Niall Ferguson, in an essay in Manfred of creating future areas of dispute such as
F. Boemke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Alsace-Lorraine. Largely thanks to his efforts,
Glaser's The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment the final treaty did not give Danzig to Poland
After 75 Tears (1998) argues that German leaders outright nor did it demilitarize East Prussia.
were more interested in using the debt to play Both of these features had been contained in the

2 8 0 H I S T O R Y IN D I S P U T E , VOLUME 8: WORLD WAR I, FIRST SERIES

initial report of the Commission on Polish had eluded Imperial Germany. The rise of Adolf
Affairs. It is thus misleading to view the treaty as Hitler and the genesis of World War II were in
a product of the unchecked demands of the many ways a direct result of the harsh peace forced
Great Powers. upon Germany in 1919.
In fact, by the end of the conference there The first and perhaps most important flaw in
were many thoughtful people in Europe who the Versailles settlement—and the one most over-
believed that the treaty had been too soft. French looked by historians—is that the request by Ger-
Marshal Ferdinand Foch made his famous state- many for an armistice stemmed from its leaders'
ment, "This is not peace. It is an armistice for impression that the peace would be fair, equitable,
twenty years," in frustration at what he perceived and democratic. Concretely, they expected a peace
as the softness of the treaty, particularly the fail- settlement that would follow the guidelines of Pres-
ure to create Allied military bridgeheads across ident Woodrow Wilson's famous "Fourteen
the Rhine. Versailles was no peace with honor, Points." Presented to Congress on 8 January 1918,
but neither was it the Carthaginian peace that Wilson's terms called for a postwar world domi-
many Germans later claimed it was. In its princi- nated by open diplomatic relations, multilateral dis-
pal features, Versailles was perfectly in line with armament, free trade, freedom of the seas, and the
recent European tradition. It is more accurate to settlement of disputes by international representa-
say that Germany perceived the treaty as unduly tive organizations. They also involved several provi-
harsh, even though it was no worse than what sions for the revision of European borders along
the Germans had planned for their enemies. ethnic lines, including but not limited to the evacu-
That perception, much more than realities, ation of the wartime conquests of Germany, the
brought war to Europe again almost twenty return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, national
years to the day after Foch's chilling prophecy. self-determination for the peoples of the Habsburg
- M I C H A E L S. NEIBERG, U.S. AIR and Ottoman Empires, and the resurrection of a
FORCE ACADEMY Polish state with access to the sea. In subsequent
public addresses Wilson restated his points and
added that their provisions could be modified on a
case-by-case basis. When Germany, finally con-
vinced of its inability to win the war, approached
the Allies for an armistice in October 1918, Wilson
replied with a series of diplomatic notes declaring
Viewpoint: that he would only negotiate with a democratic
No. The Treaty of Versailles was German government free from its "military masters
disastrous because it and the monarchical autocrats."
embittered Germany and fostered
political radicalism in that country. No responsible German officials believed that
a peace treaty drafted on this basis would turn into
A recent revisionist argument has suggested the Carthaginian peace that the Allies presented to
that the provisions of the Paris Peace Settlement— their country the following year. In the last weeks
specifically the terms of the Treaty of Versailles of the war, Germany accepted all of Wilson's terms
(1919) signed with Germany—created a rational in principle. None of them were judged too severe,
framework for postwar Europe and promised at least from the perspective of Berlin. The return
long-term international stability. The traditional of Alsace-Lorraine, a largely French region that had
historical analysis, however, is much more correct a long history of being passed back and forth
in its assessment of the post-World War I peace set- between Germany and France, and had not been
tlement as a disaster for European stability. The well integrated into the German Empire anyway,
Treaty of Versailles violated the spirit of a promised was not a serious loss. Re-creating a Polish state
democratic peace; placed the entire burden of with sea access was also a minimal threat, since the
responsibility for the war on the shoulders of Ger- Empire contained far fewer Poles than either Rus-
many; required it to pay symbolically offensive, yet sia or Austria and had already proclaimed a new
ultimately insignificant, reparations to the Allies; Polish state in November 1916. Wilson's call for
and deprived it of its great power status in an unre- Polish "access to the sea" did not strictly involve
alistic and unsustainable fashion. The cumulative massive territorial transfers from Germany, as
effect of these factors created widespread senti- access could easily be granted either by giving up
ments of anger and betrayal among the German only the Baltic port of Danzig or allowing Polish
people, undermined the stability of the postwar commerce to cross German territory free of cus-
moderate republican government of Germany, toms duties. Both measures had historical prece-
legitimized extreme political movements in the eyes dents. Abandoning the strong military presence of
of the centrist and traditional right-wing main- the Empire in the East was acceptable because a
stream, and catalyzed a foreign policy centered on broad segment of German political opinion
recovering losses and pursuing the hegemony that opposed direct territorial annexation, while the

HISTORY IN D I S P U T E , VOLUME 8: WORLD WAR I, F I R S T SERIES 281

 Imperial government itself had established friendly erately postponed until the symbolic date of 18
national states that could potentially continue to January 1919, the anniversary of the proclamation
exist without a German military presence. Wilson's of the German Empire in 1871. Germany and its
last demand, for political reform, actually coincided allies were not allowed to attend. Rumors that the
with the long-standing goals of many German poli- meetings were only a preliminary series of
ticians. In late October 1918 even Kaiser William inter-Allied discussions for a large and inclusive
II became a convert to liberalization and consented peace conference were circulated to fool the Ger-
to the creation of constitutional monarchy. When mans into thinking that they would ultimately be
the popular mood nevertheless forced his abdica- heard and permitted to negotiate. These rumors,
tion, the unexpected advent of a democratic repub- however, never materialized into fact and were later
lic represented an even greater fulfillment of disavowed. The details of the peace treaty were
Wilson's conditions. decided in secret, first by a working group of the
American, British, French, Italian, and Japanese
As negotiations for an armistice entered their
heads of government and foreign ministers—the
last phase in the first week of November 1918, the
"Council of Ten"—and later by a de facto triumvi-
Germans had no reason to believe that the price
rate of Wilson, British prime minister David Lloyd
of peace would amount to anything more than
George, and French premier Georges Clemenceau.
the terms outlined by Wilson. The only inkling
that this arrangement would not in fact be the Wilson was hard put to maintain his original
case came from the extremely limited German sense of justice in the peace treaty. Lloyd George
understanding of Allied reservations to Wilson's and Clemenceau correctly took him for a foreign-
peace program. The joint Allied terms for the policy neophyte whom they could outmaneuver,
armistice presented on 5 November contained and they secretly agreed to support each other's
language that left the concept of "freedom of the goals in talks with him. They frequently invoked
seas" open for interpretation and alluded to diplomatic technicalities, employed rhetorical
indemnity payments for damage to civilian prop- tricks, and made dramatic appeals in order to
erty. Neither codicil appeared to contradict the impose many of their views on the American presi-
spirit—or most of the letter—of Wilson's program, dent. Wilson, of course, had already conceded on
but in truth Allied objections applied volumi- many issues in order to persuade them to accept
nously to each of the Fourteen Points, and the the armistice. Nevertheless, through compromise
American president could only preserve a unified and some clever negotiating of his own he managed
approach by secretly conceding on each of them to preserve some of his original ideas and soften
and not telling the Germans. Through no fault of some of the more extreme British and French
their own, German leaders were duped into demands. Lloyd George and Clemenceau, for
accepting a punitive peace that departed radically example, accepted the League of Nations as an
from both their own expectations and Wilson's institution to arbitrate international disputes.
original intentions. Their position was made Clemenceau was also persuaded to give up the terri-
worse by the extreme last-minute military provi- torial dismemberment of Germany for strategic
sions of the armistice, crafted by Marshal Ferdi- and economic reasons, and to accept a reduced fig-
nand Foch of France. Sensing the unwillingness ure for war reparations.
of Germany to continue the war and not wanting
Yet, overall, Wilson's provisions for a mod-
to leave it any military leverage in the peace nego-
erate peace were distorted and no room was left
tiations, Foch insisted on the complete with-
for bargaining. When the Treaty of Versailles—a
drawal of German forces not only from their
book-length document of 440 separate articles-
existing positions on the western front but from
was presented to a German diplomatic delega-
German territory west of the Rhine. Germany was
tion on 7 May 1919 (the fourth anniversary of
also supposed to surrender its fleet, much of its
the sinking of the passenger liner Lusitania)^
heavy artillery, and a large number of railway cars
the visibly disturbed German delegation under-
vital for mobilization and rapid troop move-
stood that none of it was negotiable and that, in
ments. In other words, Germany had to surrender
plain language, their country had been had. To
its material means of continuing the war even
list the most important of the unexpected
before the peace negotiations began. Although
terms, Germany had to accept full responsibility
they were not without suspicion, the new leaders
for the war (under the "War Guilt Clause," Arti-
of Germany knew they had little choice and, trust-
cle 231), even though that degree of responsibil-
ing that the negotiations would be fair neverthe-
ity was at the time, and has ever since, remained
less, agreed to Foch's terms.
highly questionable. All of the colonies of Ger-
From literally the first moment of the peace many were taken away, a substantial part of its
conference, it was clear that the peace settlement eastern provinces were ceded to Poland (despite
would be the Diktat-or dictation—that its critics the earlier ambiguity about the meaning of
later described. Revenge was a prominent theme "access to the sea" and the inclusion of territory
even in the scheduling of the talks. They were delib- that had nothing to do with sea communica-

282 H I S T O R Y IN D I S P U T E , VOLUME 8: WORLD WAR I, FIRST SERIES

tions), and other border areas were to be ceded self-defense capability and was effectively David Lloyd George,
to Belgium, Denmark, and Lithuania on the removed from the ranks of the great powers. Vittorio Orlando, Georges
basis of national self-determination. For ethnic Clemenceau, and
The most onerous provision of all, however, Woodrow Wilson (I.-r.) at
Germans, however, national self-determination was the requirement of Germany to pay heavy repa­ the Paris Peace
was expressly denied first by a French-inspired rations to the Allies. Following from its acceptance Conference in 1919
clause that forbade any political or customs of war guilt, the reparations were to include com­ (Roger Viol/et)
union between Germany and Austria, and later pensation for war damage, as well as military pen­
by Allied recognition of the new Polish, Italian, sions and pensions for the families of dead Allied
and Czechoslovakian frontiers, all of which con­ soldiers. In 1921 their full amount was fixed at $33
tained large German minority populations. billion-an impossibly high sum for the era, yet
Germany was also restricted by astonish­ actually less than Clemenceau had initially wanted.
ingly severe limitations on its military power. Its The transfer of German territory, military equip­
army could field no more than one hundred ment, and colonial possessions was not to be cred­
thousand troops-or about 20 percent of its pre­ ited against the sum. One of Lloyd George's
war total. Its offensive capacity was for all practi­ assistants had characterized the British approach to
cal purposes abolished by prohibitions on tanks, reparations as squeezing a lemon "until the pips
planes, and an army general staff. The navy was squeak." Despite the outrageousness of these provi­
forbidden to maintain capital ships (of more sions-recognized even by members of the Allied
than ten thousand tons displacement) or subma­ delegations, including several American members
rines. The west bank of the Rhine and a fifty­ who resigned in protest-the German delegation
kilometer zone to the east of the river were could only submit. In another stinging jab of irony,
placed under Allied occupation for a maximum the signing ceremony was held in the Hall of Mir­
period of fifteen years and were to remain perma­ rors in the Palace of Versailles, a location chosen
nently demilitarized thereafter. The industrial because it had been the site of the proclamation of
Saar region was to be placed under French sover­ the German Empire in 1871.
eignty for fifteen years and was then subject to a As soon as word of the full dimensions of the
referendum to determine its future. From a stra­ Versailles Treaty became known to the German
tegic perspective, Germany was barely left with a public, it provoked a sense of bitterness and out-

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 8: WORLD WAR I, FIRST SERIES 283

 rage that lasted for many years. The treaty repre- investigate U.S. entry into World War I, reported
sented complete betrayal of what was expected to that the United States had been pushed into the
have been a just and honorable peace. German con- conflict by ruthless bankers and arms merchants
servatives viewed the left-wing politicians who had for their own profit. The British leadership devel-
ultimately signed the armistice and accepted the oped the widespread view that their erstwhile Ger-
treaty as the "November criminals" who had man opponents were honorable men of a proud
"stabbed Germany in the back." Many Germans tradition who should not have to feel perpetual
remembered that their armies were still standing guilt. In the 1930s a wide body of elite opinion in
on foreign soil in November 1918 and felt that the Britain believed that the Treaty of Versailles could
honor of their nation and its institutions had been be replaced by a framework of revisionist agree-
stained not only by foreigners but by their own ments favorable to Hitler's Germany.
leaders. Right-wing extremists, including Hitler,
The territorial provisions of the Versailles set-
made the ugly insinuation that Germany had been
tlement also proved ultimately unsustainable. Ger-
the victim of an international Jewish conspiracy
man colonies were gone forever, but the
and found many sympathetic listeners. Naturally
situation in Europe remained highly unstable.
these people were forgetting that the German
The drastic changes of borders and limitations on
High Command and Imperial government had rec-
self-determination rights remained contentious
ognized their inability to win the war and set the
debates in which even many Allied leaders came to
armistice in motion, but it was the new democratic
sympathize with the German side. As early as 1921
government—the Weimar Republic—that bore
the changes to the Polish and Danish frontiers of
political responsibility for the harsh peace. Over
Germany were minimized with Allied acquies-
time the legitimacy of the German democracy was
cence. Over the next two decades neither Britain
corroded by association. Had the new democratic
nor the United States were willing to commit
state been given the just peace that it had believed
themselves to defend the borders established by the
in, was promised, and expected, that would not
Versailles settlement, and even many French leaders
have been so.
considered them to be transient. In 1925, when the
The most significant long-term consequence centrist German foreign minister Gustav Strese-
of the peace, however, was that none of the provi- mann successfully negotiated the Locarno Pact, a
sions that created so much outrage in Germany had West European nonaggression pact that also guar-
any lasting practical significance. Even the War anteed the security of the frontiers, the British gov-
Guilt Clause, the fundamental article of the treaty ernment conceded that the eastern borders of
that formed the basis for its other harsh terms, Germany might be open to revision at a later date.
became unsustainable. It goes without saying that When Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in
German public opinion rejected it in principle. For March 1936, many British and French leaders won-
decades before the war, the Germans had believed dered aloud whether they should worry about the
that their country had long been denied its place in dictator invading "his own back yard." Two years
the sun by the machinations of foreign govern- later, the coerced union of Nazi Germany with Aus-
ments and that its justified place among the great tria—illegal under the Treaty of Versailles—was
powers had been constricted and destroyed by its unopposed. In September 1938 the British and
jealous neighbors. The dominant German opinion French governments agreed to Hitler's annexation
was that the growth of the Empire had been of German-populated border districts in Czecho-
unjustly blunted by the Entente powers and that it slovakia as a peace-preserving measure, even though
was thus provoked into lashing out. This thesis was none of the territory in question had ever belonged
not seriously challenged in German historiography to Germany. Nor did they take action when Hitler
until Fritz Fischer in the 1960s published his com- occupied much of the rest of Czechoslovakia in
prehensive study of Imperial German war aims. March 1939, or when he reincorporated the port
of Memel from Lithuania into the Reich the same
As war memories faded and the propagandis-
year. Only Hitler's invasion of Poland in Septem-
t s view of German aggression receded, many in the
ber 1939 prompted declarations of war from the
West came to share the German public's view of
arbiters of the Treaty of Versailles.
the war. "Revisionist" historians such as American
Charles Beard argued in the 1920s and 1930s that The military provisions of Versailles, which
Germany had been the victim of insecure hege- were intended to eliminate Germany as a threat to
monic neighbors that essentially forced it to fight European security, proved to have no teeth.
World War I, an argument that still circulates Although the limits on the size and offensive
today. Others made the popular, though invalid, capacity of the German army were initially
argument that the war was really no one's fault and respected, the Allies failed to establish any
had been the inevitable consequence of opposing long-term mechanism to ensure the permanent
alliance systems and imperial ambitions. A congres- compliance of the Germans. In addition to their
sional committee chaired by Senator Gerald Nye failure to form a lasting postwar alliance, there
(R-North Dakota), commissioned in 1934 to were no international inspection teams (apart

284 HISTORY IN D I S P U T E , VOLUME 8: WORLD WAR I, FIRST SERIES

from a powerless disarmament commission) or could not collect compensation directly. The frus-
unilateral national efforts to make sure that Ger- trated French were unable to secure British and
many was keeping its armed forces in line with American support for their action and had to
the restrictions. Even the democratic and nonmil- withdraw in September 1924. A subsequent rene-
itaristic Weimar Republic systematically violated gotiation of reparations payments, conducted by
them. While it would have been hard to hide an the American financier Charles Dawes, indexed
army that exceeded the one-hundred-thousand- them to the economic prosperity of Germany.
man limit, the new government employed a large Another renegotiation in 1929, devised by the
number of combat veterans in so-called Freikorps American financier Owen Young, reduced the
(free corps), armed militias ostensibly needed to principal amount to just $9 billion and extended
maintain public order. The traditional General German payments out until the improbable year
Staff structure was only superficially abandoned; of 1988. The entire concept was soon made irrele-
many of its personnel were retained in a so-called vant by the world economic crisis, however, and
Truppenamt (troop office) that duplicated most in 1931 President Herbert Hoover declared a
of the functions of the banned General Staff. A moratorium on the repayment of the World War
secret agreement with the Soviet Union allowed I debts by the Allies if they would agree to a mor-
the Germans to train combat pilots and tank atorium on German reparations payments. When
crews on Soviet soil in exchange for training the Hitler came to power in 1933, he unilaterally
Red Army by German officers. Major naval con- repudiated reparations payments forever. The
struction was difficult to hide, but the Weimar Allied reparations commission calculated that it
government illegally contracted out submarine received less than 15 percent of the amount
construction to shipyards in the Netherlands and decreed in 1921. At the same time, however, the
Finland. If the guarantors of Versailles knew the German people suffered related economic priva-
full implications of these developments in the tion, the indignity of Franco-Belgian occupation
1920s, they never said anything. in the Ruhr, and the continuing burden of war
guilt. While they paid relatively little when all was
After Hitler came to power, German viola- said and done, they were even more embittered
tions of the military provisions of Versailles not by the Treaty of Versailles.
only continued but also grew bolder and became
The peace settlement that ended World War
more public. In March 1935 Hitler unilaterally
I was a disaster. It fundamentally ignored the
renounced the military provisions of Versailles
continued standing of Germany as a viable world
and reintroduced a peacetime draft. At almost the
power and violated the honest trust that demo-
same time his government publicly acknowledged
cratic-minded German politicians had placed in
the development of an air force with more than
Wilson's professed desire for an honest peace. At
three hundred planes. Again nothing was done.
the same time, it created far-ranging provisions
On the contrary, in June 1935 the British govern-
that could not have been sustained without a
ment accepted Hitler's offer to renegotiate the
long-term Allied commitment to police German
Versailles prohibition on the development of cap-
foreign, military, and economic policies. No
ital ships by Germany and signed an agreement
Allied power was willing to take up that commit-
that allowed Hitler to build a fleet up to 35 per-
ment, and eventually the victors of World War I
cent the size of the Royal Navy. The limitations
conceded on virtually every limitation and debil-
of the Treaty of Versailles on German armed
ity they had forced on Germany in 1919. While
forces were meaningless in the long run.
the terms of the Treaty of Versailles had little last-
The reparations issue, finally, proved to be ing effect, they nevertheless embittered a genera-
the biggest farce of all. The enormous $33 billion tion of Germans who became hostile to the West,
bill presented to Germany in 1921 was simply supported dangerous political radicalism, and
unpayable. Honest remittance would have crip- realized that their country still had the strength
pled even a healthy, prosperous economy. Ger- to refashion the international order.
many had just emerged from the costliest war in -PAUL DU QUENOY,
history up to that time and had also lost a signifi- GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
cant portion of its industrial base to territorial
changes and foreign occupation. The dislocation
caused by altered frontiers and the demobiliza-
tion of almost its entire army damaged its econ-
omy further. Clearly the German government References
was in no position to pay, and it defaulted within Manfred F. Boemke, Gerald D. Feldman, and
fifteen months. When France and Belgium occu- Elisabeth Glaser, eds., The Treaty of Ver-
pied the industrial Ruhr region in retaliation in sailles: A Reassessment After 75 Tears (Wash-
January 1923, the German government resorted ington, D.C.: German Historical Institute;
to hyperinflation to subsidize passive resistance Cambridge & New York: Cambridge Uni-
among workers in the region so that the French versity Press, 1998).

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286 H I S T O R Y IN D I S P U T E , VOLUME 8: WORLD WAR I, FIRST SERIES