AFTER THE CASE OF PEOPLE V.

OANIS
MISTAKE OF FACT & INTENT DISTINGUISHED FROM MOTIVE
FERNANDEZ V. PEOPLE (2019) JEEPNEY
FACTS:
The facts are posited by Fernandez and Garino are summarized in the decision of the CA:
-In the prosecution's narration of events, on January 21, 2011 at around 1:00 a.m., Garino and an
unknown companion were seated inside a jeepney which was parked in front of Fernandez's house, when
Garino saw someone go out of the gate.
-When they heard a gunshot, they immediately alighted from the jeepney, and it was then that Garino saw
that the person who fired the shot was Fernandez, though he did not know the latter's name at the time.
-As the two ran away, Fernandez fired his gun a second time, hitting Garino on his right gluteal area, or
"buttocks" in layman's terms. Garino was then brought to the Ospital ng Makati and resultantly underwent
immediate surgery. He was confined for some two weeks and spent almost P200,000.00 for his stay in the
hospital.
-Garino presented his doctor, Dr. Teresita Sanchez (Dr. Sanchez), as a witness, who testified that Garino
was near death when he was taken to the hospital, and had to undergo a second operation because his
large vessel, external iliac vein and intestines were injured.
-When questioned if he knew who his assailant was, Garino testified that he previously saw him at the
salon where he and a certain Me-Ann Barcenas (Barcenas) worked. He found out his assailant's name
only when Barcenas visited him at the hospital a few days after his surgery.
-Of note, however, neither Barcenas nor Garino's companion during the night of the shooting was
presented as witness for the prosecution, as only Garino, his brother Albert, who had the incident
blottered at the police station, and Dr. Sanchez were presented to testify.
For its version of the facts, the defense presented Fernandez himself, as well as his son Jayvee, to testify
as witnesses.
-Fernandez, a retired police officer, vehemently denied the prosecution's version of the events and
claimed that he was sleeping with his wife at the time of the incident and was unaware of any unusual
incident outside his house at the time.
-According to Fernandez, he was not investigated by the police or by any barangay official on the alleged
shooting, and only learned of the charge for Frustrated Murder upon receipt of a subpoena from the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
-While Fernandez admitted owning the jeepney parked outside his house, he denied any knowledge of
Garino and said that he first laid eyes on the latter only during the trial proper. He could likewise not think
of any reason why Garino would file a case against him.
RTC: The RTC rendered a Decision convicting Fernandez of the crime of frustrated murder.
CA: The CA denied Fernandez' appeal and affirmed with modification the contested conviction.
Arguments before the SC: In his Petition, Fernandez argues that the evidence presented by the
prosecution was insufficient to establish that he was the perpetrator of the crime charged in the
Information. First, Fernandez questions the veracity of his identification as the one who shot Garino,
considering: a) Garino did not know Fernandez prior to the incident; b) Garino only learned of Fernandez
when he was merely pointed to by Barcenas, who was not the companion of Garino at the time of the
incident; c) Barcenas was not presented to the witness stand to confirm the identity of Fernandez as the
person who shot Garino; and d) Garino could not have seen his perpetrator as he was allegedly running
when shot on his right gluteal area.
The defense added that, as the incident took place during the wee hours of the morning, the condition of
visibility at the time of the alleged shooting would not be favorable to ascertaining the perpetrator's
identity, much less determining that Fernandez indeed was the culprit. Fernandez further contends that
Garino merely assumed that the perpetrator was Fernandez because the jeepney, where Garino stayed in
with his unknown companion, was parked in front of Fernandez's house.
Finally, Fernandez argues that even hypothetically admitting that he was the person seen by Garino, the
evidence offered by the latter was insufficient if not altogether absent to show the commission of
Frustrated Murder. He states that the prosecution failed to prove that there was intent to kill on his part,
especially since Garino did not even testify that he actually saw Fernandez point a gun towards him and
fire the same. He alleges that the prosecution was unable to show intent, nor the presence of treachery in
the commission of the offense — vital elements of the crime he is being accused of.
ISSUE:
WON Fernandez is guilty of the crime of frustrated murder
RULING:
NO. The Court acquits Fernandez on the ground of reasonable doubt. The lower courts committed grave
abuse of discretion in hastily convicting Fernandez on the basis of questionable evidence.
Doctrine:
1.Lack of motive as defense: While motive is generally immaterial when it comes to considering intent in
a criminal case, it can help facilitate the intrusion into the accused's mind especially when there is an issue
to the identity of the latter.
YAPYUCU V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
In the evening of April 5, 1988, a shooting incident occurred in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, taking the life of Leodevince Licup and injuring Noel Villanueva. The accused were Salvador
Yapyuco, Jr., Generoso Cunanan, Jr., Ernesto Puno (all members of the Integrated National Police), Jose
Pamintuan, Mario Reyes (barangay captains), and others affiliated with the Civil Home Defense Force or
civilian volunteer officers. They were charged with murder, multiple attempted murder, and frustrated
murder.
The accused initially entered not guilty pleas, with some applying for and granted bail. During the pre-
trial conference, the remaining accused waived their right to pre-trial inquest. The joint trial commenced
after evidence presented at the bail hearings was integrated into the trial proper.
The prosecution’s narrative, collaborated by testimony and physical evidence, outlined the victims
leaving a barrio fiesta and driving slowly along the dark road when they were suddenly fired upon
without warning. The ensuing confusion included exchanges between the barangay captain and the
injured, and the urgent relocation of the wounded to the hospital. The forensic chemist testified to
gunpowder residue on the firearms of the accused and bullet holes predominantly on the passenger side of
the victims’ vehicle. The medicolegal expert detailed the injuries of the deceased and the surviving victim,
supporting the prosecution’s claim of intentional shooting.
The defense primarily relied on Yapyuco’s testimony, suggesting a legitimate police operation that
responded to reported NPA presence. Yapyuco claimed that shots were fired at the vehicle only after it
aggressively tried to evade a checkpoint and subsequent warning shots.
The Sandiganbayan found the accused guilty on different charges, rejecting claims of lawful duty, citing
the calculated positioning of the accused and the intensity of gunfire, indicative of an intent to kill without
justification.
ISSUE:
Whether the principle of Mistake of Fact is applicable in the instant case.
RULING:
No, the principle of Mistake of fact is not applicable. In the context of criminal law, a mistake of
fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the
subject of the prosecution.Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime
where it negates the intent component of the crime.It may be a defense even if the offense
charged requires proof of only general intent.The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the
defendant,and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person.A proper
invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable;(b) that it be a
matter of fact;and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crimeor the existence of the
mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.In the present
case, he relied merely on the statement of his co-accused therefore it cannot be invoked.
Conclusion:
Yapyuco who merely relied on the statement of his co-accused cannot invoked mistake of fact since it
needs to be a personal belief and not the belief of others.

PEOPLE V. GERVERO
FACTS:
At around 6:30 p.m. of 25 November 1991, at Barangay Milan, Lemery, Iloilo, Roda was at the house of
Barangay Civilian Volunteer Organization(CVO) Commander Hernando. After eating and while Roda
was waiting for transportation bound for her residence at Ajuy, Hernando, CVO members Jose and Benito
came out of Hernando's house. Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) officers Bañes,
Castigador, and their two companions, who were carrying firearms, approached Hernando and asked him
for money. When Hernando gave them P20.00, Bañes remarked, "Is that the only amount you can give
when you just received money from your wife?" Castigador took the money and said, "You just watch
out." When the CAFGU officers left, Roda informed Hernando of Castigador's remark, which Hernando
dismissed. Thereafter, Hernando, Jose, and Benito went back to Hernando's house and prepared to go to
the wake of CVO member Saturnino's wife.
At around eight o'clock in the evening, while Delia was inside their house at Barangay Milan, Lemery,
Iloilo, her husband Jose, together with Hernando and Benito, passed by. Delia peeped through the
window, called Jose's attention, and told him not to stay long at the wake. With the area being illuminated
by a light bulb, Delia saw the three walk along the national road and cross towards the rice field. A few
minutes later, Isaac, Jose's younger brother and also a CVO member, passed by Delia's house together
with Roda. Isaac shouted to call the attention of Hernando, who was then already in the middle of the rice
field. Roda, Delia, and Isaac could hear the three CVOs laughing while they were traversing the rice field.
Suddenly, Delia, Roda, and Isaac heard a burst of gunfire from where Hernando, Jose, and Benito were
walking. Jose, who was then wearing a pair of white pants, fell first. Delia heard someone shout, "This is
Hernando, a CVO!" and someone replied, "Birahi na!" ("Shoot now!"). Delia, from her window, also saw
Hernando attempting to turn back but was also gunned down. She also witnessed the group of armed men
approach the three CVOs whom they fired upon at close range.
When they heard the gunfire, Isaac dropped to the ground and ran back to his house; Roda took cover
among the rice paddies, looked at the direction of the gunshots, and saw persons with long firearms.
When Roda reached Hernando's house, she saw Hernando's son Ronnie and told him that his father was
shot but warned him not to go out as he might also be harmed. Delia and Isaac heard men pass by their
houses thereafter. Isaac recognized some of the gunmen to be his friends and positively identified the
accused as the armed men he saw.
Later that same night, Pilar Basulgan, wife of Brgy. Capt. Balinas, summoned Isaac. Together with Delia
and Ronnie, Isaac went to the house of Brgy. Capt. Balinas. There they saw the accused who had already
told Brgy. Capt. Balinas that they made a mistake in shooting Hernando, Jose, and Benito because they
thought that the three were members of the New People's Army (NPA). Isaac asserted that
misapprehension was impossible because the CAFGU officers personally knew the victims and the voices
of the three CVO members were recognizable. Brgy. Capt. Balinas asked if the victims were able to shoot
back, but the accused answered in the negative. Thereafter, Isaac, Delia and Ronnie proceeded to the
crime scene and saw Hernando, Jose, and Benito lifeless on the ground.
The RTC found the accused guilty of murder. The CA affirmed the conviction of the accused but modified
the amount of damages awarded. Hence, Gervero (deceased), Castigador, Solomon, and Eduardo
(accused-appellants) appealed to the SC.

ISSUE:
I. Whether the trial court erred in not appreciating the defense of mistake of fact. (NO)
II. II. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the aggravating circumstance of treachery
qualified the killing to murder. (NO)
RULING:
Mistake of fact finds no application in this case
As early as in the case of People v. Oanis and Galanta, the Court has ruled that mistake of fact applies
only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness.
In Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, the Court has laid down the requisites for such defense to prosper, to wit:
(a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the
culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes
with respect to an element of the offense.
In this case, not all the requisites are complied with. First, there was no reason for the accused not to
recognize the victims because they were traversing an open area which was illuminated not only by
moonlight, but also by a light bulb. In addition, the witnesses testified that the victims were conversing
and laughing loudly. It must be borne in mind that it was not the first time that the accused had seen the
victims. Second, when Jose fell down, Hernando identified himself. However, instead of verifying the
identities of the victims, the accused continued to fire at them. Third, when the victims fell down, the
accused approached their bodies. At that point, they could no longer claim that they didn't recognize the
victims; and still not contented, they sprayed them with bullets such that Jose suffered 14 gunshot
wounds, Hernando 16 gunshot wounds, and Benito 20 gunshot wounds. Fourth, contrary to their
testimonies during trial to the effect that the victims were the first to fire their weapons, Brgy. Capt.
Balinas testified that when he asked the accused whether the victims had fired at them, the accused
answered him in the negative. Fifth, the accused would like the Court to believe that the victims knew the
safe word "Amoy" which must be uttered in response to "Simoy" in order to easily determine whether
they were members of the NPA. However, the victims could not have known the safe words as accused
Gervero himself stated in his testimony that only he and his coaccused were present when their
commanding officer briefed them about the safe words to be used in their operation. All these
circumstances negate accused-appellants' claim of mistake of fact and point instead to a concerted action
to eliminate the victims.
Accused-appellants are guilty of murder qualified by treachery
Generally, the elements of murder are: 1) That a person was killed; 2) That the accused killed him; 3) That
the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248; and 4) That the
killing is not parricide or infanticide.
That Hernando, Jose, and Benito died and that the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide have already
been established by the trial and appellate courts. What remains to be resolved is the appreciation of
treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
In order for the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following requisites must be
shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety of the
malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted by the offender. "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning
and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape."
The witnesses were all consistent in declaring that accused-appellants suddenly fired at the three
unsuspecting victims who never had a chance to mount a defense. The victims, who were on their way to
attend a wake and happily conversing with one another, were caught off guard when all of a sudden, they
were met with multiple gunshots. In such a rapid motion, accused-appellants shot the victims, affording
the latter no opportunity to defend themselves or fight back. Without any doubt, the manner of execution
was deliberately adopted by the accused who were all armed with heavily powered firearms. They
positioned themselves in what they termed as "ambush position," at a distance where their victims could
not easily see them, thereby ensuring that they hit and terminate their targets.

Malum prohibitum as exception to the requirement of mens rea

AFTER THE CASE OF GARCIA V. CA

VALENZONA V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Sometime in 2003, the real estate company entered into two contracts to sell with Ricardo Porteo,
covering two subdivision lots. However, upon verification with the Registry of Deeds, Porteo found that
the said contracts were not registered, certifying that the real estate company had filed no contract to sell.
Worse, Porteo discovered that the subject lots had been sold to different buyers, and thus, he demanded a
refund of the payments he had made. The real estate company denied his request. This prompted Porteo to
file a criminal complaint against Valenzona for violation of Section 17 of P.D. 957, which mandates all
contracts to sell and other similar instruments relating to the sale of subdivision lots and condominium
units, whether or not the purchase price is paid in full, shall be registered by the seller in the Register of
Deeds where the property is situated. In his defense, Valenzona claimed that as president of the real estate
company, it is not among his functions to register documents since they have a different department
handling the same.

In contrast to crimes mala in se, which presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal
intent, crimes mala prohibita do not require such knowledge or criminal intent; rather, what is crucial is
volition or the intent to commit the act. While volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act
being done (as opposed to knowledge of the nature of the act), criminal intent is the state of mind that
goes beyond voluntariness, and it is this intent that is punished by crimes mala in se. Succinctly put, for
crimes mala in se, there must be proof of criminal intent, while for crimes mala prohibita, it is sufficient
that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.

ISSUE:
W/N VALENZONA is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of section 17 of P.D 957
RULING:
As applied here, even if a violation of P.D. 957 is malum prohibitum, the Supreme Court clarified that it
must still be established that the accused had the volition or intent to commit the prohibited act, which is
the non-registration of the subject contracts. In this case, the subject contracts were eventually rescinded,
and Valenzona and Porteo entered into a compromise agreement where they agreed to settle the civil
aspect of the case, which also led to Porteo’s execution of an affidavit of desistance. Hence, these should
have led the lower courts to be more prudent in deciding the instant case against Valenzona, especially
since what is involved here is the deprivation of his right to liberty.

LONEY V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end which caused
the tailings to gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

The DOJ separately charged petitioners with violation of Water Code of the Philippines
(PD 1067), National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), Philippine Mining Act of 1995
(RA 7942), and Article 365 of the RPC for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property. Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the
Informations were "duplicitous" as the DOJ charged more than one offense for a single act.

ISSUE:
WON the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only
the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand.

RULING:
NO, the charges should not be quashed. There is no duplicity of charges.
Under Sec. 13, Rule 110, duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or
information charges more than one offense. Under Sec. 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the
Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing
his defense. In People v. Doriquez, we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not
"the same" — x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other.

In this case, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present. On the other hand,
the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of
necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to
prevent damage to property. This element is not required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is
different from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system,
much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental Compliance Certificate.
Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by
the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se. On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article
365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say
that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb
mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a
felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws
enacting them. Each of these laws require proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not,
although they stemmed from a single act, thus, there is no duplicity of charges and should not be quashed.
PRAETER INTENTIONEM
AFTER THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. ALBUQUERQUE
PEOPLE V. SALES
FACTS:
On September 19, 2002, Noemar Sales and Noel Sales, Jr., sons of Noel T. Sales (appellant), attended a
fluvial procession in Camarines Sur without parental permission and did not return home that night. The
following day, their mother Maria found them and brought them home, where a furious appellant
confronted them. The appellant whipped both sons with a stick and continued to beat them outside, tying
them to a coconut tree. Maria did not intervene due to fear for her life. Noemar eventually lost
consciousness and collapsed. Despite efforts to revive him, Noemar was dead. His body was never
examined by a doctor.
The appellant was charged with parricide and slight physical injuries. He pleaded not guilty. The
prosecution and defense presented their respective versions. The case was consolidated and brought to
trial.
The appellant admitted to beating his sons but denied fatally beating Noemar. He claimed Noemar had
health issues, including a weak heart and epilepsy. The defense presented Maria, who supported these
claims, though her testimony regarding the illnesses conflicted with the appellant’s. The death was
reported by the barangay captain, and the appellant voluntarily surrendered.
Procedural Posture:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the appellant guilty of parricide and slight physical injuries in a
Joint Decision on August 3, 2005, with certain mitigating circumstances considered. The appellant filed a
Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision on December 4, 2006. The
appellant escalated the appeal to the Supreme Court with two-fold issues.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of parricide and slight physical injuries

RULING:
The Supreme Court found the appellant guilty of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries. It
held that:
– The appellant’s intent was not to discipline but to vent his anger, as evidenced by the severity of the
beatings and the resulting injuries.
– Noemar’s death was directly caused by the physical injuries inflicted by the appellant, dismissing the
argument regarding Noemar’s supposed pre-existing health conditions.
– All elements of parricide were present, including the established filial relationship between appellant
and deceased.
– The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was upheld. However, the lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong was not applicable.
– Monetary awards were adjusted: exemplary damages were increased to P30,000.00, interest on all
awards at a legal rate of 6% from the finality of the decision until paid.
– The appellant’s conviction for slight physical injuries on Junior was supported by testimonies and
medical evidence.
Doctrine:
The decision reiterated the legal principles that parental discipline must always be reasonable and
intended for correction without exceeding the parameters of the parental duty. Failure to do so can result
in criminal responsibility. Moreover, it re-emphasized the doctrine that criminal liability is incurred for a
felony although the wrongful act done is different from that which the perpetrator intended, and all
elements of the crime of parricide as defined by Article 246 of the Philippine Revised Penal Code.
CONCURRENCE
RESULTING HARM
CAUSATION
AFTER THE CASE OF URBANO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
GARCIA V. PEOPLE (2009)
FACTS:
For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of
theRegional Trial Court (RTC) which found the petitioner Amado Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of homicide.
Amado Garcia was in a drinking Karaoke session with others at the house of Bogie Tacuboy when
Manuel Chy, whose house is adjacent to Tacuboy’s, appealed for the group to be quiet as the noise from
the videoke machine was blaring. It was not until Chy requested a second time that the group acceded.
Unknown to Chy, this left the petitioner irate and petitioner was heard to have said in the Ilocano
vernacular translated as “This Manny is so arrogant, I will lay a hand on him”.

On two other several occasions, Garcia and his friends talked about their drinking session and the
confrontation with Chy. Enraged at the memory, petitioner blurted out in the Ilocano vernacular translated
as “This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him live long” and, on another date, “This Manny is really
arrogant, I will finish him off today”. Later that afternoon, after drinking at a store they decided to drink
again at the store of Aurelia Esquiebl, Chy’s sister. The petitioner summoned Chy and immediately
punched him in the face. Chy cried out “Bakit moa ko sinuntok hindi ka naman inaano?” but the
petitioner kept on assaulting him. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and with it, struck the lower back
portion of Chy’s head.

When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he fled and went inside his house and phoned his wife
Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina about the mauling and complained of difficulty
in breathing. Upon reaching Chy's house, the policemen knocked five times but nobody answered.
Josefina arrived minutes later, unlocked the door and found Chy lying unconscious onthe kitchen floor,
salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy confirmed that Chy died of
myocardial infarction, a non-violent related cause of death
ISSUE:
Is Garcia the proximate cause of the death of Chy and should he be charged with homicide?
RULING:
YES. In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a bottle.
Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter petitioner's liability
for his death. Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine laid down in the case of United States v.
Brobst that:
“where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that
the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not
relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.”
“although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal malady, if, because of a
blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was hastened, beyond peradventure he is
responsible therefor who produced the cause for such acceleration as the result of a voluntary
and unlawfully inflicted injury.”

In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from the one
he intended; "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused). Thus, the circumstance that petitioner did not intend so
grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he
deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in
accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the
CA with modification to the penalties and damages.
PEOPLE V. VILLACORTA (2011)
FACTS:
On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-sari store to buy bread. Out of nowhere, Orlito Villacorta
appeared and thereafter stabbed the left part of the body of Cruz with a sharpened bamboo stick. After
that, Villacorta fled.

Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was brought to a nearby hospital where he was treated as out-
patient. He was discharged on the same day but on February 14, 2002, or 21 days after the stabbing
incident, he returned to the same hospital where he was treated for severe tetanus. The next day on
February 15, 2002, Cruz died. The medical report states that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to
stab wound.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted Villacorta for murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villacorta is guilty of murder.
RULING:
No. In this case, the proximate cause of the death is not the stabbing done by Villacorta upon Cruz. There
was an efficient intervening cause which appeared between the time of the stabbing and the time of the
death of Cruz.
In explaining this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that severe tetanus (the kind of
tetanus which causes immediate death) has an incubation period of 14 days or less. In this case, the
stabbing made by Villacorta could not have caused the tetanus infection as 22 days already lapsed from
the time of the stabbing until the date of death of Cruz. Something else caused the tetanus other than the
stabbing – in short, Cruz acquired the tetanus 14 days or less before February 15, 2003 and not on the
date of stabbing.
The court explained further:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim’s death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time [Cruz] was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical injuries based on the facts. Neither is he guilty of attempted
nor frustrated murder, his intent to kill was not proven by the prosecution.

CICL XXX V. PEOPLE

FACTS:
One early morning in October 2003, minor AAA, while he was about to reach home, was mauled by
CICL XXX in front of their house. AAA sustained severe injuries. This came after AAA testified before a
barangay proceeding against CICL XXX. Before AAA lost consciousness, he identified to his mother that
CICL XXX was his assailant. Thereafter, AAA received several medical treatments but in January 2004,
he slipped into a coma as a result of his injuries. In March 2004, CICL XXX was indicted for frustrated
murder.
In 2006, RA 9344 or the Juvenile Justice Act was passed. No amendment to the Information was made.
In 2008, while the case was still pending, AAA died. The Information was amended and CICL XXX’s
charge was upgraded to homicide.
In 2014, CICL XXX was convicted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CICL XXX shall be benefited by the passage of RA 9344. (juvenile justice act)
RULING:
Yes. Criminal laws which are beneficial to the accused are applied retroactively. Here, the concept of
discernment under RA 9344 must be applied as it benefits the CICL. Before RA 9344, discernment is only
considered for minor offenders over nine years old but below fifteen years of age.
Nevertheless, in this case, based on available evidence, CICL XXX has acted with discernment when he
committed the crime.

PEOPLE V. FLORA
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

PEOPLE V. BENEDICIO
FACTS:
On December 24, 2011, in Muntinlupa City, Philippines, Nestor Bendecio y Viejo, also known as “Tan,”
was charged with the complex crime of attempted murder with murder following an incident that resulted
in the death of a 7-year-old Jonabelle Marasigan and the attempted murder of Gerry Marasigan. The
accused allegedly fired a gun intended for Gerry Marasigan but missed, hitting Jonabelle and Gerry’s
sister, Princess Marasigan, instead.
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty, leading to a trial where Gerry Marasigan and Princess
Marasigan testified for the prosecution, asserting details of the shooting that implicated the accused. On
the contrary, Bendecio presented a defense of denial and alibi, claiming he was in Samar at the time of the
incident and failed to understand why he was implicated in the shooting.

The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City found Bendecio guilty of the charged complex crime,
recognizing the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. Despite his appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction, with modification, sentencing Bendecio to reclusion perpetua for the complex
crime of attempted murder with murder.
ISSUE:
Whether the principle of aberratio ictus applies, making the appellant liable for the unintended killing of
Jonabelle Marasigan. (YES)
RULING:
The principle of aberratio ictus was upheld, attributing liability to Bendecio for Jonabelle’s death as a
direct consequence of his felonious act intended for Gerry Marasigan. Treachery was identified as a
qualifying circumstance due to the sudden and unforeseen attack, leading to the affirmation of the
complex crime of attempted murder with murder.

Doctrine:
This case reiterates the principle of aberratio ictus, where an unintended victim is injured or killed as a
direct consequence of an intended felonious act, holding the perpetrator criminally liable for all resultant
crimes. Furthermore, it highlights that treachery can qualify an attack as murder when the mode of
execution ensures the perpetrator’s safety from any defensive or retaliatory actions by the victim,
regardless of the actual target.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
AFTER THE CASE OF INTOD V. CA
PEOPLE V. SALADINO
FACTS:
Bartolo Saladino and Anastacio Alejo have appealed from convicting them of the murder of Luis
Bernabe. They were grabted separate trials but were both guilty.
In the night of June 23, 1948, Saladino and Alejo was resting in a house in Abucay, Paoay, Ilocos
Norte with policemen Melchor Quevedo, Wilfredo Osman, and George Plan. They were awakened by the
cry for help by Felix Pasion who reported that he had been robbed, one of the robbers being Luis
Bernabe. They brought Bernabe to the residence of Felix Pasion in Barrio Singao for questioning.
Bernabe denied the charge and was beaten. He was left hanging in the air while being repeatedly beaten
by Saladino.Alejo was called for his turn and reluctantly whipped Bernabe. Saladino continued the
maltreatment in the belief that Bernabe would soon confess. Plan intervened and said that it would be
better to bring Bernabe to their headquarters for questioning butSaladino ignored it. Osman noticed
that Bernabe seems to be dead but Saladino believed it to be a pretend on the part of Bernabe. After
realizing his predicament, two civilians were ordered to carry Bernabe down and told Alejo to shoot
Bernabe and say that the victim ran away. Three days after the internment of Bernabe, June 24, Saladino
swore before the fiscal an affidavit stating that the death of Bernabe was because the latter
attempted to escape. This was corroborated by the three policemen.However, after a days, Quevedowas
interviewed and gave a different story which accorded with the accounts of the witnesses during
trial.Quevedo, Osman and Plan agreed that that Bernabe was already dead even before Alejo was told to
shoot Bernabe. Saladino was firm in his version which was corroborated by Felix Pasion

ISSUE:
Whether or not Saladino and Alejo are liable to the death of Bernabe

RULING:
Yes. The defendant is guilty of having cruelly tortured and treacherously caused the death of Luis
Bernabe.The trial court believed in the story of Osman and Quevedo, the two eye-witnesses to be
the manner on how the true case happened. Saladino must be declared guilty of assassination. Anastacio
Alejodoes not appear to have conspired with him, and is not liable either as principal or as
accomplice ofthe murder.But he is guilty asaccessory after the fact for having performed acts tending to
conceal Saladino’s crime by making it appear that Bernabe had run away.Alejo was found guilty of
accessory after admitting that he whipped the Bernabe. Alejo is sentenced to imprisonment for not
less than three years of prison correctional nor more than six years and two months, of prisonmayor;
and in the case of insolvency of Saladino to indemnify the heliable to a penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony of murder, namely, prison
correctional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period (Art 53in connection of the
Revised Penal Code)

JACINTO V. PEOPLE
FACTS:

Petitioner, together with two other women, was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein
represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside the aforesaid
establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July
14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00, representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega
Foam Int’l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed petitioner’s conviction and her subsequent MR was denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.
RULING:
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was
apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the
crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons
or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently
impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought
was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v.
People that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, there is only one
operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another.
There can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for
Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been
impossible of accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash
as supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the
crime of qualified theft.
Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act of receiving the cash replacement
should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught
receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.