National Identities

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Orthodoxy and political myths in Balkan national

identities

Lucian N. Leustean

To cite this article: Lucian N. Leustean (2008) Orthodoxy and political myths in Balkan national
identities, National Identities, 10:4, 421-432, DOI: 10.1080/14608940802519045

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National Identities
Vol. 10, No. 4, December 2008, 421
432

Orthodoxy and political myths in Balkan national identities

Lucian N. Leustean*

Aston University, Birmingham, UK

This article analyses the relationship between Balkan national identities and the region’s
dominant religion: Eastern Orthodox Christianity. After examining the concept of
‘symphonia’ between Orthodoxy and politics that developed during the Byzantine
Empire, this article argues that the political myths that have emerged from Orthodoxy
are the most potent in the Balkan mythical imaginary. Political myths have a direct
impact on contemporary politics developing a threefold structure: the sacralisation of
politics; the perception of the nation as a divine manifestation; and, the construction of
a divine realm on earth.
Keywords: Eastern Orthodox Christianity; symphonia; mythical imaginary; Balkans;
Bulgaria; Macedonia; Greece; Romania; Serbia

Introduction
The political evolution of modern nation-states in the Balkans has been intrinsically linked
to the powerful force of the mythical imaginary. Myths that combine religion and politics
have been milestones in the creation of national identity as political leaders have employed
religion in forging an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983; Judah, 2000; Mertus, 1999;
Perica, 2002). Predominantly Orthodox states in the Balkans created similar myths because
the region shares the same religious doctrinal elements despite differing political
evolutions. Comprehending the religious and political background could address why
some myths have emerged in a particular territorial and temporal location; how have myths
been influenced by religion and politics, and which myths remain the most powerful within
the nation.
The literature on the nation-building process addresses a broad taxonomy of myths
(Smith, 1986, p. 192; Mojzes, 1994, p. 18; Schöpflin, 1997; Kostø, 2005); however, it lacks
an investigation of the impact on mythical construction of the dominant religion in the
Balkans: Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Myths are powerful elements that connect the
past with the present. Their influence extends from the mere hic et nunc to a supernatural
reality offering legitimacy and power to religious and political actors. From the vast array
of myths, political myths are the most dynamic. According to Henry Tudor (1972, p. 138),
they tell ‘the story of a political society that existed or was created in the past and which
must now be restored or preserved’; and, from this perspective, they lie at the intersection
of the religious and political realms.
Eastern Orthodox Christianity has developed an intrinsic relationship with political
myths, emphasising the mystical dimension of everyday life, which is seen as a permanent
battle between good and evil, spirit and flesh. According to Orthodoxy, the constant return

*Email: [email protected]

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# 2008 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/14608940802519045
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422 L.N. Leustean

to Christ
the founder of religion and the political model of imitation for the faithful
is
at the core of the evolution of the nation. Religious leaders have claimed that the Church is
the founder of the nation and indissolubly connected with its political evolution. Analysis
of both the theological concept of the nation and the political potency of Orthodoxy
provides the framework of the evolution of political myths. According to the Church’s
view, in order to find the right way to rule the people, religious and political leaders should
imitate the kingdom of God by transforming their societies into a pre-figuration of Christ’s
communion (Ware, 1997).
The sacralisation of time and the resurrection of memorial historical periods in the
present are the main characteristics of the Balkan mythical imaginary transcending
religion and politics. Orthodox churches argue that only their form of Christianity elevates
their societies to a spiritual dimension and that history provided the best example of
collaboration between religious and political realms, reaching its apogee during the
Byzantine Empire. Reference to the spiritual and political glory of Byzantium is the
starting point for analysing political myths in the Balkans. In the evolution of their nation-
states, political and religious leaders have made reference to this period as the example for
their communities to follow. In this way, they affirmed that the nation-building process was
supported by divine intervention and that history gave them the authority to lead the
masses.
After examining the theoretical framework of Orthodoxy and politics in the Byzantine
world, this article investigates political myths in the predominantly Orthodox countries in
the Balkans
namely Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Greece
highlighting
their significance for contemporary politics. This article does not propose to analyse all
myths in the Balkans or to provide a categorisation of myths, but to examine only those
connected with Orthodoxy and politics. I exclude from this analysis those Orthodox
churches that are not autocephalous or those countries in which Orthodoxy is not the
dominant religion
namely Albania, Cyprus, Montenegro and Turkey.

Orthodoxy and symphonia

The relationship between church and state in Orthodoxy is characterised by the concept of
‘symphonia’ (sym8vnı́a) or the ‘system of co-reciprocity’ (aýsthma synallhlı́aw, lat.
consonantia), a doctrine that developed in Byzantium. As John Meyendorff (1974, p. 283)
states: ‘[T]he great dream of Byzantine civilisation was a universal Christian society,
administrated by the emperor and spiritually guided by the church.’ According to this
vision, the Empire was considered the kingdom that would last forever, whose political and
religious domination would be without competitor on earth, as it was the reflection of
Christ’s kingdom. Both the church and the state should collaborate towards ‘achieving a
sublime destiny’ of the people under their jurisdiction (Papathomas, 1998, p. 705) and there
is no conflict between the means employed by church or state in promoting the welfare of
their subjects. While there is a separation between the completely laic character of the state
and the religious status of the church, symphonia promotes equality and an intimate
relationship between these institutions
however, with different priorities and methods of
operating. The state is interested in its survival within a system of states and the projection
of its power in international politics. The church operates with religious methods leading
the community towards the best way of achieving spiritual progress and salvation.
According to symphonia, both church and state use their own laws in order to promote
their own purposes and there is no confusion between them. The state does not rule itself
according to church law nor vice versa. There is no interdependency nor is there
 National Identities 423

a complete separation. In fact, the major problem of the concept of symphonia is that the
demarcation line between church and state remains unclear. For this reason, religious
leaders could achieve strong political roles in society and political leaders could influence
the church’s position. From this perspective, the ruler and the priest are the major political
and, at the same time, religious, figures on earth.
Both the church hierarchy and the emperor had special status in the Byzantine Empire.
The emperor was considered the thirteenth apostle or equal with the apostles (isapostolos)
who fought for the right or ‘Orthodox’ faith, while the patriarch was in charge of ensuring
that the community was following the spiritual path towards salvation (Hussey, 2004). The
church-state relationship is influenced by the mutual cooperation between the emperor and
the patriarch on their respective paths to achieving their individual and their subjects’
salvation. According to Orthodoxy, the emperor had a special place in the material and
spiritual worlds as the chosen leader, ‘similar to God, who is over all, for he does not have
anyone higher than himself anywhere on earth’ (Pelikan, 1974, p. 168). As Steven
Runciman (1933, p. 133) states:
The Church was a democratic institution. It was possible for any Orthodox Christian, however
humble his origin, to attain to the Patriarchal throne; merit was in theory the sole criterion.
And in practice, except when an Emperor deliberately appointed a nonentity
an action that
was always unpopular
the Patriarchs were of a very high level of ability.
The patriarch’s main attributions were related to the spiritual progress of his faithful,
while the emperor regulated the life of the clergy, appointing the highest hierarchical
positions and mediating conflicts between its clergy (Vasilev, 1980, p. 148). The history of
Byzantium also offers examples of patriarchs who acted against imperial policy. Thus,
patriarchs Photius, Germanus and Arsenius were deposed for defying the emperor who
attempted to interfere too much in ecclesiastical policy, while John Chrysostom lost his
patriarchal throne for censuring the morals of the Court (Runciman, 1933, p. 113). From
the fifth century, religious heresy was considered a state crime. Byzantium supported only
one religion, Orthodoxy, and condemned its opponents, especially when they were
politically dangerous for the stability of the empire, such as in the case of the Bogomils
sect, which had its own concept of Christianity and preached disobedience to the state
order (Runciman, 1933, p. 114).
The concept of ‘symphonia’ acquired a stronger dimension during the reign of the
Emperor Justinian, who, in the systematisation of civil law, set out some aspects of the
relationship between church and empire. Referring to the importance of Christianity,
Justinian stated in his Edict to the People of Constantinople Concerning the Faith in 554:
We believe that the first and greatest blessing for all mankind is the confession of the Christian
faith, true and beyond reproach, to the end that it may be universally established and that all
the most holy priests of the whole globe may be joined together in unity and with one voice
may confess and preach the Orthodox Christian faith, and that every plea devised by heretics
may be rendered null and avoid. (Ure, 1979, p. 122)
Furthermore, the classical text that indicates the boundaries of the priesthood and
imperial offices is Justinian’s Sixth Novel in which he writes:
There are two major gifts which God has given unto men of His supernal clemency, the
priesthood and the imperial authority
hierosyne and basileia; sacerdotium and imperium. Of
these, the former is concerned with things divine; the latter presides over the human affairs and
takes care of them. Proceeding from the same source, both adorn human life. Nothing is
greater concern for the emperors as the dignity of the priesthood, so that priests may in their
turn pray to God for them. (Vassiliadis, 2003, p. 99)
424 L.N. Leustean

Justinian’s model was followed by his successors and became the tenet of the relationship
between Orthodoxy and government. His Novels were further developed in the ninth
century in a document titled Epanagoge, most probably written by Patriarch Photius. Even
if this document was only a draft and was not officially adopted by the state, it was widely
circulated in Orthodox territories and influenced the development of further legislation
outside Byzantium, through the Middle Ages, to the creation of nation-states. Epanagoge
states that: ‘The temporal power and the priesthood relate to each other as body and soul;
they are necessary for state order just as body and soul are necessary in a living man. It is
in their linkage and harmony that the well-being of a state lies’ (Vassiliadis, 2003, p. 99).
In Orthodoxy, the body of the church is understood differently from that in Western
Europe, where it is perceived as merely an ecclesiastical organisation within the state.
According to Orthodoxy, the church includes ‘the whole body of the faithful, the ‘‘holy
catholic church’’ of the Creed, or at least the faithful of his own persuasion’ (Runciman,
1971, p. 14), and for this reason, the emperor was obliged to interfere in church life as he
was responsible for the salvation of his own subjects before God. This norm is valid even
nowadays and explains how political leaders may act in Orthodox countries: the political
ruler may see his personal salvation according to the mission instituted by God, that of
ruling a people on their paths to divinity.
Even if the Byzantine Empire disappeared from Europe’s map with the fall of
Constantinople on 26 May 1453, its religious and political legacy for Orthodox regions has
remained. As Henri Grégoire (1948, p. 127) states: ‘The Byzantine Church is the most
important of Byzantine survivals. The Empire has disappeared, but the Church remains.’
Through its religious ceremonies and jurisdictional organisation, the Church has continued
to remind the faithful of the Byzantium model regarding the relationship between church
and state. Myths and religious and political symbols of liturgical ceremonials brought
together the Orthodox people even if they were now subjects of other regimes. The
commonwealth survived through the transformation of Orthodox churches into national
churches, which shared the same religious faith (Meyendorff, 1996). While in the Western
part of Europe, the Roman Catholic Church and Reformed churches developed a different
religious and political trajectory, Orthodoxy remained ‘eager to enter the state of grace, the
right relationship to God, here and now’ (Runciman, 1933, p. 129). This aspect
characterised the relationship between Orthodoxy and various political forms of
government until modern times as, according to Church doctrine, any government is
transitory while the kingdom of God is eternal.
The historical evolution of most Balkan states shows that politicians used Orthodoxy
because of its nationalist message in order to induce cohesion and gain support for their
political programmes (Kitromilides, 1989; Leustean, 2007a). Looking back in history,
Orthodoxy influenced the nation-building process as its hierarchy saw the possibility of
reviving the Byzantine dream of a Christian state. Thus, the relationship between church
and state presented in Justinian’s Novels and Photius’s Epanagoge has remained present in
Orthodoxy’s attitude towards politics until today.

The mythical composition of the Balkans

The church and the state are only temporary organs through which Christ, as the supreme
ruler, communicates with his faithful and leads the nation towards salvation. The political
creation of state structures is perceived by Orthodoxy as a sinful act in the history of
humanity. According to Orthodoxy, in his creation of the material world God did not
institute any political organisation. People founded political institutions for their own
 National Identities 425

material, rather than spiritual, progress. For this reason, in the Church’s view, political
leaders have to collaborate with the church in order to ensure their salvation and that of
the nation (Moscow Patriarchate, 2000). The national mythology of Orthodox countries in
the Balkans has at its core the promotion of a paradisiacal world towards which the
faithful aspires in a comparable manner to that in the Byzantium world. From this
perspective, Romanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks and, recently, Macedonians perceive
themselves as continuators of a great past in which the church played the main role in
providing the salvation of the dead, the living and unborn members of the nation. By
continually returning to historical elements that had sacred resonance, religious and
political leaders found the examples to follow and upon which to model their societies. The
presence of Church hierarchs together with political leaders at the most important political
events induce the idea that both spiritual and lay authorities work together in Orthodox
societies for the welfare of the people. However, while the mythologies of these countries
remind their nations of previous glory, political myths presuppose an actualisation of the
previous order in current political affairs. An examination of the national mythologies of
Orthodox countries in the Balkans reveals common elements across the region derived
from the employment of political myths.

The sacralisation of politics

The first structural element of political myths within the Orthodox world is the perception
of the political realm as sacred. Political leaders, seen by the Church as chosen by God,
have profane and divine attributes. This sacralisation of politics produces comparable
reverberations across Balkan national mythologies.
In Romania, after the creation of the state in 1859, political and religious leaders
promoted those national heroes that had both religious and political significance and
appealed to the body of the nation. Figures from the Middle Ages, such as Mircea the Old
(1349
1418), Stephen the Great (1457
1504) and Michael the Brave (1558
1601), were
considered predecessors and protectors of the new Romanian state and of the national soul
(Boia, 2001). The Orthodox Church acquired the position of the ‘mother’ of the people, as
the one who had supported the creation and survival of the Romanian nation throughout
centuries. Following the principle of symphonia, members of the Church hierarchy were
offered political positions in Parliament, while the state dominated the Church
transforming it into a state institution which served its political interests. Despite short
periods of unstable relations, this pattern of close contact between the top hierarchy of the
Church and politicians has remained dominant until contemporary times.
Recently, in embracing democracy after the fall of communism, Romanians claimed
that they suffered in the past not because of the decisions of their political leaders, but
because the leadership suppressed religion and destroyed churches and monasteries. The
Orthodox Church extensively used this myth in supporting the creation of a new state
based on stronger religious values. Romania did not have a complete rupture with its
communist past and the political authorities ensured that their positions remained largely
untouched (Corduneanu, 2003). All official polls indicate that for over 80% of the
population the Church is the most trusted institution alongside the army, while democratic
bodies such as Parliament or the President acquire less then 40% of votes.
Political myths acquired a stronger nationalist shape when the Romanian Orthodox
Church canonised heroic figures from national history. Despite historical controversies
over his personal life, Stephen the Great was canonised in 1992, while the nationalist
position of the Church was constantly defended by the political authorities. Thus, in 2004,
426 L.N. Leustean

President Ion Iliescu brought the sword of Stephen the Great to Bucharest for a few days
from the Topkapi Museum in Istanbul in a gesture that showed the support of the political
class; and, in 2006 in a public national debate over who was the most important person in
Romanian history, the majority of people voted for Stephen the Great, especially because
of his combination of religion and politics.
The use of political myths has been clearly evident in political discourse during election
period when political leaders seek the support of the Church. On 29 October 2004, at the
beginning of electoral campaign, Prime Minister Adrian Nǎstase made public the decision
of his government to offer 95,000 hectares of forest to the Church from state patrimony.
Archbishop Pimen of Suceava, the beneficiary of this decree and who was previously one of
the staunchest critics of the regime, suddenly changed his attitude and stated that Nǎstase
became ‘one of the major patrons and guardians’ of the Church; his name would always be
remembered by the Church in its prayers similar to that of previous patrons from the
nation’s past’ (Ziua, 30 October 2004). Moreover, on 7 November 2004, after Nǎstase
attended a religious ceremony held by Bishop Calinic of Argeş, the bishop publicly claimed
to the congregation that Nǎstase’s ‘humble’ personality reminded him of previous leaders,
concluding his remarks that ‘you are similar to the great leaders in the history of our
country’ (Ziua, 8 November 2004). Through his comments, Bishop Calinic not only made
reference to a sacralised past, but also connected the glorious history of the country with
those candidates for whom the faithful should vote. This type of discourse is closely
connected with the Orthodox perception of the political leader as embodying the glorious
past. The basis for this perception lies within the concept of ‘symphonia’, which claims that
political actions are the will of God (Stan and Turcescu, 2007).
Comparable sacralisations of politics can be seen in neighbouring Serbia and Bulgaria.
In Serbia, the creation of the state has been perceived closely connected to that of the
Serbian Orthodox Church. Serbs converted to Christianity around 870 and reached
political and religious dominance of the Balkans during the Nemanja dynasty. Steven
Nemanja (1169
1196) achieved political cohesion by uniting the Serbian tribes, while his
third son, Sava, obtained religious independence from Byzantium by establishing the
Serbian Orthodox Church. Serbia had its golden age in the first half of the thirteen
century, becoming the most important political and military force in the Balkans.
The decline of Serbian political supremacy occurred with the battle at the ‘Field of
the Blackbirds’ (Kosovo Polje) in 1389, during which Prince Lazar was killed and led to the
creation of the myth of ‘Prince Lazar’s Supper’. According to this myth, before the battle
of Kosovo, Lazar occupied the position of Jesus at the Last Supper and took communion
with his soldiers, preferring to die and reach a heavenly world rather than survive in a
material one (Sells, 1996, p. 39). Through this gesture, Lazar united the spiritual and
material worlds, sacrificing himself for his faith and, in consuming the sacraments, he
appropriated the divine presence of Christ from the Eucharist. According to Orthodoxy’s
interpretation, the prince believed that only imitating Christ’s sacrifice would save his soul,
and his example should be followed by modern political leaders.
Bulgarians converted to Christianity under the rule of Tsar Boris in 864 and adopted
the Cyrillic alphabet by brother monks Cyril and Methodius. The ninth century is
considered the golden age of the country during which Prince Simeon took the title of
king, declaring the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as a Patriarchate. In the eleventh century,
Bulgaria fell under Byzantine rule and the Church lost its patriarchal title, but two
centuries later it regained its autonomy. However, independence was short as at the end of
the fourteenth century Bulgarians came under Ottoman rule. After the Second World War,
political myths were organised around the idea of the civilising mission of Bulgarians
 National Identities 427

among the Slavs, suggesting that common religion and similar languages should foster
closer relations between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Communist Bulgaria became the
cradle of antique Slavonic literacy and had a linguistic mission to other Slav countries
(Savova-Mahon Borden, 2001, p. 147). These myths acquired a martyrium form inducing
the idea of a long-suffering nation under Ottoman rule. From this perspective, Bulgarians
have more rights in the region because they survived the religious and political occupation
of the Muslim Porte. In the 1980s, some members of the clergy, with the support of the
state, advocated a campaign forcing Bulgarian Turks to adopt Christian names and
convert to Orthodoxy. The central presence of political myths in post-communist Bulgaria
has been asserted in the canonisation of Cyril and Methodius as national saints, despite
similar claims from Macedonia and Greece. They were titled in the Church calendar as
‘equal to apostles and teachers of the Slavs and Bulgarians’. The day of their
commemoration, 11 May, was declared the national day of the ‘Bulgarian Enlightenment
and Culture’.
The recent evolution of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was affected by a major
schism in May 1992 when part of the Church split from the communist-appointed
hierarchy. This separation was used by political leaders to ensure that the Church
supported government policy. The widening role of the Church in the national mythology
of Bulgaria was visible in the appearance on the political scene of the former tsar Simeon
Boris Sakskoburggotsky, who, as a child, was deposed in 1946 by the communists. Despite
only 15% of the population supporting the restitution of the monarchy, he took advantage
of the political capital offered by the Church. At the 2001 Easter celebrations, he publicly
recited the Orthodox Creed and subsequently attended religious ceremonies at the time of
the electoral campaign advocating his political ambitions. The National Movement for
Simeon II, then only two months old, subsequently won the election and formed the
government (Broun, 2002, pp. 389
90). Although religion was not the major factor in
winning the elections, the combination of religion and politics, and the employment of
political myths, fostered his political campaign. As the former tsar of Bulgaria he occupies
an important place on the national mythical level and, returning to his country, he was
perceived as a providential person who held authority both over religious and political
offices.

The nation as a divine manifestation

The second element of political myths in the Balkans is the perception of the nation as
having divine qualities. Of all countries in the region, the most active political myths that
bring the concept of ‘symphonia’ from the Byzantine world to contemporary politics have
taken place in Serbia. As Branimir Anzulovic (1999, p. 22) argues: ‘The difference
between Byzantium and Serbia . . . is that the Byzantine regarded the emperor and his
court as heavenly, whereas the Serbs conferred heavenly status on the nation as a whole.
The earthly Serbia is holy Serbia.’ Serbia acquired mythical dimensions as Orthodoxy
provided the means of salvation. Serbian political myths have developed an antemurale
form, claiming that the Serbians have not only been defenders of Christianity, but are
also a chosen people with a sacred mission (Velinkoja, 1998; Mylonas, 2003). The
existence of the Serbian nation in history was a direct act of creation by God who chose
them from other people in the same way that previously he had chosen the Jews as his
elected people.
According to Serbian Orthodoxy, the myth of ‘Prince Lazar’s Supper’ also had a
liturgical dimension. In the Church’s view, the liturgy is the most important moment in its
428 L.N. Leustean

ceremonials and, at a symbolic level, is the place where the material and heavenly worlds
meet and combine in a common celebration of God. The celebrating faithful and hierarchy
are surrounded in their liturgy by saints and angels. Political myths in Serbian identity took
this symbolism and adapted it at a national level. The Serbian nation acquired a sanctified
dimension. God was seen to be present in a continuous national liturgy among Serbs
indicating to the faithful how political leaders should rule their people.
The myth of Lazar was employed by Slobodan Milošević’s regime in supporting the
political rights of Serbians over the Albanian majority in Kosovo (Ramet, 1996). In 1989 at
the celebration of 600 years after the Kosovo battle, the Church and regime attracted
almost one million people to assert the rights of Serbians in dominantly-Albanian Kosovo.
The meeting was a display of religious and political symbolism in which Milošević’s
photographs were displayed together with religious banners and icons. Political myths
promoted not only a remembrance of a glorious past, but also an actualisation of the ways
in which Orthodoxy could be politically used by the authorities. In this way, Milošević
became the modern embodiment of past historical leaders, as a unique political actor who
could save the nation.
Comparable mythical perceptions remained visible not only during his regime, but also
during that of President Kostunica. On 3 December 2000, a few weeks before
parliamentary elections, Kostunica travelled to Mount Athos in Greece. Referring to
growing relations between Serbians and Greeks, he made remarks that recall church-state
relations in the Byzantine world, stating that ‘the two peoples will remain united until the
Doomsday’ (Athens News Agency, 4 December 2000). By visiting one of the most venerated
religious sites of Orthodoxy and referring to the Church’s theological doctrine, Kostunica
asserted the importance of religion for the evolution of their nations and, indirectly, for
elections in Serbia.
Tito’s regime had earlier generated another myth
that of a Croatian genocide against
the Serbs or the Jasenovac myth, after the place where around the Serbs were killed during
the Second World War (Byford, 2004; Perica 2005, p. 137). This myth was founded
immediately after the war, when two exiled Serbian bishops, Nikolaj Velimirović and Irinej
Djordjević, claimed that the Ustaše regime in Croatia killed large sections of the Serbian
population in concentration camps similar to those set up by the Nazis. The myth began to
be more vividly asserted in Serbian society from September 1984 when 20,000 Orthodox
faithful attended the consecration of a memorial dedicated to Jasenovac, at which, in his
sermon, Patriarch Germanus of Serbia drew a parallel between Jasenovac and Jerusalem
(Perica, 2005, pp. 152
3).
Close relations between the golden age of the Nemanjić dynasty, the Kosovo myth and
the Saint Sava cult, which dominate Serbian mythology, form the main political myths.
These myths were clearly evident in 1988 when, in seeking greater unity of the Serbian
nation, the Church exhumed Prince Lazar’s remains and toured them around the country
promoting the idea of a heavenly Serbia (Radić, 1998, p. 167). After the fall of
communism, the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church canonised nine new saints,
including eight victims of the Ustaše regime, and in 2003 the founder of the Jasenovac
myth, Bishop Velimirović, was also canonised (Perica, 2005, p. 156).
The Bulgarian nation has also been seen as having divine qualities. According to
national mythology, the Bulgarian nation appeared in history at the same time as the
institutionalisation of religion and language and directly connected with the religious
mission of Cyril and Methodius (Savova-Mahon Borden, 2001, p. 144). According to
official textbooks, the adoption of Orthodoxy led to the rise of the nation, for ‘Being
converted to Christianity, our nation was no longer barbarian’ (Hranova, 2005, p. 316).
 National Identities 429

From this perspective, the relationship between Orthodoxy and the Bulgarian people
elevated the nation to a new position, similar to that of other modern nation-states in
Europe.
Romanians promote a comparable perception. They perceive themselves as ‘true’
defenders of Christianity being chosen by God to fight for the right religion. Romanian
Orthodoxy was seen as a means of uniting the people to the nation and the duty of
religious leaders was to ensure that various ethnicities would ultimately embrace the
prevailing religion of the state. Political myths acquired an extreme form in the interwar
period when right-wing political parties promoted the concept of superiority of Orthodox
nations; only by being Orthodox could individuals be good citizens of their country
(Leustean, 2007b).
Another nation with divine qualities that influences the very core of mythical identity is
Greece. The special relationship between Greek citizenship and Orthodoxy dates back to
the establishment of the Greek state in 1830 and has remained a contentious issue since. If
during the Ottoman Empire the Patriarch of Constantinople had jurisdiction over all
Orthodox faithful, soon after he came to power, King Othon of Greece ruptured relations
and proclaimed an autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church. The church was transformed
into a state institution and the government took control of religion. Greek political myths
were seen in the dispute between Hellenism and Byzantium, between those who supported
the idea that the nation dates back to Ancient Greece or the Byzantine Empire. In this
dispute, the Church looked back into history and comfortably appropriated themes from
pagan antique Greece as long as they fitted with state interests. The relation between Greek
citizenship and religion was also highlighted in the stipulations of the Treaty of Lausanne
in 1923. Following the defeat of Greece in the war against Turkey, the Greek-speaking
population from Asia Minor was transferred to the Greek mainland (Stavrou, 1988). Thus
the state had new citizens, and language and religion were the main factors that moulded
their national identity.
The relationship between Orthodoxy and citizenship has remained a major issue in
Greek national identity until today. In April 2000 the government removed reference to
religion on identity cards. Mass demonstrations were organised by the Church, which
claimed that this was a direct attack against the nation. The notion that a Greek is only
Greek if he or she is Orthodox represents a direct expression of political myths. As Costa
Carras (2004, p. 321) points out: ‘Orthodoxy remains a stronger element of identity for
Hellenes today than does religion for most other Europeans. . . . [M]odern Greece is seen as
successor to the subjugated Orthodox, with frequent use of the language of resurrection
applied to the nation.’

The construction of a divine realm on earth

The third structural element of political myths and the ultimate aim of the concept of
‘symphonia’ is the idea of constructing a divine realm of earth. This perception has been
particularly visible in Greece, whose mythical imaginary is closely connected with
territorial disputes. By assimilating religion as part of their national identity, Greeks
became not only continuators of the great Byzantine Empire, but also had a special
mission in the Balkans. After the fall of Constantinople, Greek Orthodoxy carried out the
myth of re-conquering the former capital. This vision forged the return not only to the
glory of previous times, but also recapturing the place where the emperor, the thirteenth
apostle, ruled the polis. In this way, Greek perception of political myths has both a concrete
430 L.N. Leustean

historical mission
the conquering of the holy city
and an unseen symbolism
the return
to the spiritual order of Byzantium.
However, the re-emergence of the Byzantine world has been advocated not only by
Greek mythology, but also by Bulgarians and Romanians. In the nineteenth century, King
Ferdinand of Coburg adopted the title of ‘tsar’, recalling the glorious past of the Bulgarian
Empire. By adopting this title, he claimed to be a descendent of Byzantine emperors and in
the Balkan Wars (1912
1913) he supported the idea that if his side won he should be
crowned in the Church of Saint Sophia in Constantinople (Kolarz, 1946, p. 222).
In Romania, after 1989, political myths reinforcing the idea of a divine realm on earth
materialised with the Orthodox Church’s intention of building a ‘cathedral of national
salvation’ in Bucharest. At a time of economic difficulties and Romania joining the
secularised European Union, Romanians are searching for the salvation of their nation.
The Church claimed that Romanians could trace their roots from the activity of Apostle
Andrew, who allegedly preached on the territory of Dobrodja, in the southeast of the
country. Although there is no evident archaeological evidence to support this theory, the
Church brought the times of Jesus and his apostles into the present day implying that in
the process of the country’s democratisation, the Church and people had to ‘look back to
apostolic times’. In addition, the invitation of Pope John Paul II to Romania
the first trip
of a Catholic primate to a dominantly Orthodox country
supported the claims of the
Church that Romania was a unique spiritual place in the Orthodox commonwealth.
According to the Church’s view, Pope John Paul II and Patriarch Teoctist were
providential men who would take the Christian faith towards unification as in the first
centuries.
One of the newest Orthodox churches in the Balkans is the Macedonian Orthodox
Church, which ceded from Serbian jurisdiction in 1967. In a manner similar to that of the
other Orthodox churches, it affirmed its close connection to the Macedonian nation and its
political emergence. The Church constructed its identity on the religious history provided
by the intersection of political and religious developments in the region. Byzantine
Emperor Justinian I (527
565) was born in the Skopje region, where he built a city called
Justiniana Prima. In order to raise the religious profile of the city, he created an
archbishopric to which he appointed the Metropolitan of Skopje. Moreover, after Cyril
and Methodius translated the Bible into Cyrillic, their mission was continued by Saint
Clement and Saint Nahum, who are considered national saints. They founded a ‘university
for the Slavs’ and established the first Slavic monastery on the shore of Lake Ohrid. The
Ohrid Archdiocese existed until 1767 when it was abolished by the Ottoman Empire and
the Orthodox inhabitants were placed under Serbian jurisdiction.
The jurisdictional split from the Serbian Orthodox Church was directly supported by
political myths. Macedonian hierarchs argue that the Ohrid Archbishopric was ‘the mother
of the Serbian Orthodox Church’ and its new status would represent the restoration of
previous historical circumstances. The proclamation of autonomy on 17 July 1967
symbolically marked 200 years since the abolition of the Archbishopric of Ohrid and
the official document declaring ecclesiastical independence clearly made reference to the
glorious restoration of the former ecclesiastical organisation (Ilievski, 1973, pp. 92
4).
Furthermore, after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation, ethnic conflict between
Albanians and Macedonians led to religious clashes in the country. Under pressure from
the EU and NATO, the new constitution did not make reference to the role of the
Macedonian Orthodox Church in an attempt to alleviate the conflict. Orthodox hierarchs
saw this action as a direct attack against their church and accused President Boris
Trajkovski, who was a Methodist, of orchestrating a campaign against the dominant
 National Identities 431

religion. They created conspiracy theories and claimed that Macedonia had to resist not
only Albanian terrorists, but also religious sects supported by the president (Iveković,
2002, p. 533). A decrease in the influence of Orthodoxy in society was attributed to a
conspiracy at the top level, and the hierarchs made reference to previous collaborations
between church and state in the Middle Ages, thus emphasising the construction of
political myths.

Conclusion
Eastern Orthodox Christianity centres its doctrine on the unchanged search for the
kingdom of God and sees every political regime as the will of divinity on earth. Orthodoxy
is at the core of Balkan national mythologies and has a direct influence on the political
evolution of the state. The Church claims that its presence in society is fundamental for the
evolution of the nation. According to the Orthodoxy, the church is the cradle of the nation
and the place in which political and religious rulers should cooperate.
Due to their autocephalous structures and nationalist discourses, Orthodox churches
play a significant role in shaping the mythical imaginary, which is closely connected to the
Byzantine concept of ‘symphonia’. Political myths in the Balkans lie at the intersection of
religion and politics and are key to the development of the mythical imagination. Political
myths not only make reference to the former glory of the country, but also strengthen the
relationship between the body of the nation and religious and political authorities. After
the fall of communism, political myths have been most visible during election campaigns
when political leaders have used the Church discourse for gaining support from the
electorate or when the Church is threatened by religious competition. Thus, the main
elements of political myths are: the sacralisation of politics; the perception of the nation as
having divine qualities; and the promotion of the construction of a divine realm on earth.
This structure remains at the core of political myths, making them the most potent in
Balkan national identities.

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