Power System Elements

Relays

PJM State & Member Training Dept.

PJM©2019 10/1/2019
Objectives

• Describe the purpose of protective relays, their characteristics and

components
• Identify the characteristics of the various protection schemes used for
transmission lines
• Given a simulated fault on a transmission line, identify the expected relay
actions
• Identify the characteristics of the various protection schemes used for
transformers and busses

2
Objectives

• Identify the characteristics of the various protection schemes used for

generators
• Describe the purpose and functionality of Remedial Action Schemes
associated with the BES
• Identify operator considerations and actions to be taken during relay testing
and following a relay operation

3
 Basic Concepts in Protection

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 Purpose of Protective Relaying

• Detect and isolate equipment failures

‒ Transmission equipment and generator fault protection
• Improve system stability
• Protect against overloads
• Protect against abnormal conditions
‒ Voltage, frequency, current, etc.
• Protect public

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 Purpose of Protective Relaying

• Intelligence in a Protective Scheme

‒ Monitor system “inputs”
‒ Operate when the monitored quantity exceeds a predefined limit
• Current exceeds preset value
• Oil level below required spec
• Temperature above required spec

‒ Will initiate a desirable system event that will aid in maintaining system reliability
(i.e. trip a circuit breaker, throttle back a unit, etc.)

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 Fault Causes

• Lightning
• Wind and ice
• Vandalism
• Contamination
• External forces
‒ Cars, tractors, balloons, airplanes, trees, critters, etc.

• Equipment failures
• System disturbances
‒ Overloads, system swings

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 Fault Types

• Single phase to ground (most common)

• Three phase (rare but most severe)
• Phase to phase
Ib
Vb Ib Vc
• Phase to phase to ground
VVb Vc
bb Vcc

Ia
Va Ic
Vaa Ic Ic

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 Overlapping Zones of Protection

Key Element to Remember:

Protective Schemes Are Designed to Have:

Overlapping Zones of Protection!

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 Primary Transf. Differential
B/U Transf. Differential
10
Overlapping Zones of Protection

Primary Bus Differential

B/U Bus Differential

B/U Line Protection

Primary Line Protection

6438
 Overlapping Zones of Protection

• Critical elements of the power system are protected by “Primary”

and “Backup” relay systems
‒ Primary Schemes
• Generally high speed schemes (operate speed = 1 cycle)
‒ Backup Schemes
• Can also be high speed but don’t have to be
‒ System conditions dictate if this scheme has to be as
fast as the primary scheme

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 Relay Scheme Design Characteristics
Sensitivity - Can scheme detect all “events” that it is supposed to?
Selectivity - Will it remove only the “faulted” piece of equipment?
Speed - Can the scheme clear the fault fast enough to maintain or insure
system integrity?
Reliability - Will the scheme be secure and dependable?
Security - No misoperations
Dependability - Operate when it should

Economy - Provide the desired level of protection for the least cost
Simplicity - Attempt to keep designs straightforward

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 Relay Scheme Components

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 Components

• Other devices which are used in conjunction with

Protective Relays are:
‒ Current Transformer (CTs)
‒ Potential Transformers (PTs)
‒ Other Sensing Devices (e.g., Temperature, Oil Level, Pressure, etc.)
‒ Logic Circuits (Analog or Microprocessor)
‒ Three Pole Interrupting Devices (CBs, Circuit Switchers,
Motor Operated Disc)

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 Instrument Transformers

• Change primary voltages and currents into secondary quantities having

proportional magnitudes and identical phase angle relationships
‒ Primary current is transformed by CTs
(Current Transformers)
‒ Primary voltage is transformed
by PTs (Potential Transformers)
and CCVTs (Coupling Capacitor
Voltage Transformers)

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 Current Transformers (CTs)

• Transform high magnitude primary amps to secondary amp quantities

within the current ratings of relays and meters
• CT ratios are typically expressed as Primary Amps/5
‒ For example, a generator CT ratio expressed as 25000/5 means that 5000 amps
flowing in the primary circuit results in 1 amp flowing in the secondary circuits
‒ CTs that fit around breaker, generator, or transformer bushings are called
bushing CTs
• Most common type of CTs

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 Slipover CTs

Slipover CTs

Illustrations of Externally Applied Current Transformers

Above Left Slipover CTs installed on a 69kV circuit breaker
Above Right Slipover CTs installed on a 500kV circuit breaker
Below Similar to the bushing CTs pictured above, the window CTs below have a single turn primary
winding comprised of the primary current conductor passing through the center of the CT

Primary Conductors

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 Potential Transformer (PTs)

• PTs transform primary voltages to 115 VAC or 69 VAC secondary voltages

used in relay and metering circuits
• Large generators
‒ Usually have two sets of PTs,
• Metering PTs and the Regulator PTs

• PTs aren’t usually used at transmission voltage levels

• Most higher voltage applications use a derivative of the PT, the
Capacitance Potential Device

6438 18
 Capacitance Potential Devices

• CCPD (Coupling Capacitor Potential Device) or

CCVT (Coupling Capacitor Voltage Transformer)
‒ Use voltage division to reduce primary voltages
‒ Primary voltage divides across porcelain capacitance stacks
‒ The higher the voltage the more units in the stack
‒ Transformer in CCVT base does final transformation
‒ Due to voltage division, a failure in one stack can act as a row
of dominoes resulting in more failures

6438 19
 Diagram Of CCVT Construction
• Primary voltage divides across capacitance
stacks C1, C2, C3 and C4
• Voltage across C4 equals approximately 20 kV
C1

C2

C3

C4

6438 20
 Illustration of 230kV CCVT Illustration of 500kV CCVT
Notice that the 230kV CCVT
has 2 capacitor stacks,
while the 500kV CCVT needs
3 stacks to divide the higher
primary voltage

Capacitor
Stacks

Transformer
Enclosure

Grounding
Switch

6438 21
 Components
Components That Could Impact System Protection
Current Potential
Battery Bank Control Wiring Operating Coils
Transformers Transformers
Communication
Relays Critters Humans
Circuits

6437 22
 Effects

• CTs or PTs
‒ Main source of inputs to protection schemes
‒ Failure would render scheme inoperable if no redundant source
• Battery Bank
‒ Substation equipment uses DC to operate
‒ Loss of the DC would prevent devices from operating
• Control Wiring
‒ Damaged control wiring could prevent operation of isolating devices or relays
• Protection and control circuits are individually fused

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 Effects
• Operating Coils
‒ Part of breaker mechanism and would prevent operation if failed
• Communication Circuits
‒ Could result in an over-trip or no trip at all
• Relays
‒ Could result in miss-operation or no operation of the scheme and
the devices it is to operate
• Critters
‒ Mice can chew through control wires that could affect the operation
of a protection scheme

6437 24
 Effects

• Humans
‒ Vandalism
• Copper theft could render schemes inoperable
‒ Incorrect settings
• Scheme not operating when it should, or operating when it shouldn’t
‒ Scheme not completely isolated during testing
• Equipment tripping for non-fault condition
‒ Isolation links left open after testing
• Equipment not tripping for a fault condition

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Relay Devices

26
 General Functions:

• Protective
‒ Remove a system disturbance from the power system
• Regulating
‒ Insures system is operated within proper guidelines
• Auxiliary
‒ Other less critical functions (i.e., alarms, reclosing, etc.)

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 Solid State Microprocessor
Electromechanical

6441 28
 Universal Numbering System for Protective Relays
IEEE # Device Relay Function IEEE # Device Relay Function
Requires a combination of high current and low
Operates on low or high pressure of a liquid or
voltage to operate. The various zones of the distance
21 Distance Relay 63 Pressure Relay gas (oil or SF6) or on a rate-of change of pressure
scheme (Z1, Z2, etc.) assist with determining the
(sudden pressure)
location of the fault
Checks voltage magnitude, phase angle, and
Synchronizing Directional Operates if current is above a
25 frequency to verify synchronism across a CB before 67
Relay Overcurrent set value and flowing in the designated direction
allowing a close
Undervoltage Operates when voltage falls below a
27 78 Out-of-Step Detects loss of synchronism.
Relay set value
Initiates an automatic closing of
Operates when the temperature (usually a winding)
49 Thermal Relay 79 Reclosing Relay a circuit breaker following a
rises above a set level
trip condition

Instantaneous Operates with no time delay when current rises above Operates if frequency goes above or below a
50 81 Frequency Relay
Overcurrent a set level set limit

An auxiliary relay that can perform many

Operates on a time-delayed basis
Time functions (including tripping of breakers)
51 depending on the amount of current 86 Lockout Relay
Overcurrent and prevents closing of circuit breakers until it is
above a set level
reset either by hand or electrically
Senses a difference in currents entering and
Differential
52 Circuit Breaker Circuit Breaker 87 leaving power
Relay
system equipment
Auxiliary relay which is activated by a protective
Overvoltage
59 Operate when voltage exceeds a set limit 94 Tripping Relay relay and which initiates tripping of
Relay
appropriate breakers

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 Typical Performance Parameters:

Overcurrent
‒ Required input: Current from CTs
‒ Instantaneous: No intentional time delay
‒ Time delayed: Inverse time/current curve
‒ Can protect for both Phase and Ground faults
• The physical connection determines what current (phase or ground) the relay
will respond to

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 Inverse Curve Characteristic

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 Typical Performance Parameters:

Over/Under Voltage:
‒ Required input: Voltage from PTs
‒ Instantaneous or time delayed
‒ Generally used for automatic sectionalizing
control (i.e. auto transfer schemes, etc.)

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 Typical Performance Parameters:

Under-frequency Load Shed Relays

• Used to match load with available generation

• PJM Member companies must shed 25 - 30% of their peak load

‒ Done in either 5 or 10% steps
‒ Relays are set to shed load at predefined levels of frequency decay
• Load shedding is the most expedient way to stabilize the power system and to halt
further decay of the system frequency during a shortage of generation capacity

• UF load shedding is coordinated with UF relays at generating stations

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 Typical Performance Parameters:
Directional Capability
‒ Required Inputs: Current and Voltage
‒ How is it achieved?
• Directional relays require polarizing quantities
 Voltages and/or currents
 These are converted into proportional magnetic forces acting on an induction cup that spins
either clockwise or counter-clockwise towards a trip or non-trip position
• As a rule of thumb:
 Voltage restrains the induction cup from spinning in the trip direction
 Current tends to spin the cup such that its electrical contact operates and trips
• The rule of thumb makes sense: a power system fault decreases voltage and increases
current…less voltage means less restraint and more current means greater torque
toward the trip direction
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 Typical Performance Parameters
Directional Distance Relaying
‒ Requires Current and Voltage inputs
‒ Operates on the V/I = Z (impedance) principle
‒ Constant reach regardless of system
‒ Less susceptible to misoperating on load current (when compared to simple phase
overcurrent relays)
‒ Can provide three Zones of Protection:
• Zone 1 - Instantaneous Operation:
‒ Set for approximately 90% of line
• Beyond that relay would not be able to distinguish between internal or external fault
• Zone 2 - Fixed Time Delay Operation
‒ Set to see entire line + margin
• Zone 3 - Fixed Time Delay Operation (Generally not used for forward faults anymore)
‒ Set greater than Zone 2
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 Directional Distance Relay

B • Line A-B represents the total transmission

Relay Reach
Impedance
line impedance. Line A-C represents this
ZRELAY
relay’s desired reach, its length dictating
C
Fault
the diameter of the mho circle
Impedance
Line + Load
Z FAULT
Impedance • Line load impedance normally plots well
Z LOAD
outside the boundary of the mho circle
characteristic
• A fault “short circuits” the line to some
A degree, bypassing the impedance of the
connected load and effectively reducing
Z LOAD to some new value, Z FAULT, that lies
inside the mho circle and causes the relay
to operate
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 Directional Distance Protection

Zone 3 Element (Time Delayed)

Zone 3 Element (Reverse Looking)

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 Transient Load Limits

• Load carrying capability is another

concern with distance relays Relay Reach
Impedance
ZRELAY
• Transient limit represents the maximum
NORMAL
secure load carrying capability of the HEAVY
Line + Load
Line + Load
Impedance
protective relays during actual Impedance
Z LOAD
Z LOAD

operating conditions
‒ Operators must be aware of any lines
that are restricted not due
to their thermal capability, but by the
relays themselves

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 Typical Performance Parameters:

Differential
• Required input: Current from CTs
• Relay generally operates very fast (1 cycle)
• Normal protection for Generators, Transformers and Bus sections
• CTs supplying the relay should be matched so that currents into the
“zone of protection” are equal to those currents that leave
• The difference/mismatch in current is observed in the relays operate coil

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 Differential Relay
Current Flow
Protected
Equipment
CT #1 CT #2

Current Flow induced in CT #1 Current Flow induced in CT #2

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 Differential Relay
Current Flow Current Flow
Protected
Equipment
CT #1 CT #2

Current Flow induced in CT #1 Current Flow induced in CT #2

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 Typical Performance Parameters:

Other Types (not all inclusive):

• Frequency - Typically uses voltage

• Reclosing - Single or Multi-shot

• Thermal - Transformer Protection

• Auxiliary - Master Trip, 52X, etc.

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 Lockout Relays
• Part of generator, transformer, bus and other switchyard equipment
protection schemes
‒ Relay itself doesn’t protect anything;
• Has multiple contacts that operate multiple devices
• If they failed to trip for a fault, the switchyard GCB would stay closed and the
equipment would remain energized
• Electrical coil that trips the lockout relay is monitored
 Amber light above handle

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 Lockout Relays
• The amber lamp is normally lit to indicate three important things about the
Lockout Relay:
1) There is DC control power available to the lockout relay
2) The lockout relay operating coil is electrically intact
3) The lockout relay is reset and ready to trip

• Lockout Relay target

‒ Orange semaphore directly above the relay handle

• When the lockout operates

‒ Amber light goes out and colored target appears
‒ Lockout relay handle will be at an angle instead of being perpendicular to the floor

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 Illustrations of a Lockout Relay

RESET TRIPPED

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Line Protection

46
 Transmission Line Protection

• A typical power system utilizes three types of lines to deliver power

to the end user. They are:
1) Transmission Lines
2) Sub-transmission Lines
3) Distribution Lines

• We will be focusing on the Transmission lines which are defined as

lines operating at 100kv and above

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 Transmission Line Protection
• Because these lines carry large amounts of energy and are extremely
important to the operation of a power system, it is necessary to use the
most advanced relaying methods to insure their integrity

• The goal is to achieve selective, fast, and simultaneous fault clearing at all
terminals with instantaneous relays that cover 100% of the transmission line
and are immune to faults on adjacent lines or on remote substation buses

• Meeting this goal requires relays to accurately distinguish whether a fault is

on the protected line, or external to it. The only way to accomplish this and
to simultaneously trip all line terminals is to establish communication
among the terminals

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 Transmission Line Protection

• By comparing each terminal’s “view” of the power line, the protective

schemes can instantaneously determine if the fault is internal or external,
and then act accordingly
• Relaying that relies on communication between line terminals is known as
pilot relaying

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 Transmission Line Protection

• For reliability, transmission lines utilize Primary and Backup protective

schemes

• The criticality of each line is evaluated to determine if backup protection

should be equivalent to primary protection. The factors which influence
the decision are:
‒ System Stability Concerns
‒ Relay Coordination Concerns

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 Transmission Line Protection

System Stability:

• If stability studies indicate that delayed clearing of faults on a transmission

line cause a generator to go unstable, it indicates that both the primary
and backup protective schemes must clear all faults instantaneously

• These studies are done as part of the initial engineering process

6456 51
 Transmission Line Protection

Relay Coordination:

• If protection studies determine that coordination of backup relay schemes

can not be achieved, dual pilot protection schemes must be employed on
the line to be protected

• Typically happens on Long Line/Short Line situations

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 Relay Coordination – Normal Line Configuration

6456 53
 Relay Coordination – Long Line / Short Line

6456 54
 Transmission Line Protection

• Several types of “pilot” protection schemes exist.

The ones we will review are:
‒ Directional Carrier Blocking
‒ Direct Under-reaching Transferred Trip
‒ Permissive (Over & Under-reaching)
‒ Phase Comparison
‒ AC Pilot Wire
‒ Optical Fiber Differential

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 Pilot Schemes
• 3 major components
‒ Protective relays set to look:
• Beyond, or over-reach, the remote terminal of the protected line
• Short of, or under-reach the remote terminal of the protected line
‒ A communications channel between the local and remote terminals:
• Telephone line operating at audio tone frequencies (usually between
1000 and 3000 HZ)
• Fiber optic link
• Powerline carrier
• Microwave
‒ Transmitting and receiving equipment at all terminals capable of either:
• Shifting between a continuous pilot signal (GUARD) and a permissive
signal (TRIP)
• Sending/receiving a blocking signal

6456 56
 Logic Gates Overview

AND Gate NOT Gate

Needs 2 inputs to get an output A B Output Output is the inverse of the input

A 0 0 0 A Output
B Output
0 1 0
1 0 0 A Output
1 1 1 0 1
OR Gate
Needs 1 input to get an output A B Output 1 0

A 0 0 0
B Output
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1

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 Directional Comparison Blocking Scheme
DCB

6446 58
 Directional Comparison Blocking

• Relays set to see beyond remote terminals

• Under non-fault conditions, no signal is sent between the terminals of the line

• Testing of communication path is done by Carrier Checkback Scheme

6446 59
 Directional Comparison Blocking
• To Initiate Trip:
‒ Over-reaching Relay must operate
‒ Absence of Blocking Signal from remote end
• In digital logic:

Over-reaching Relay

Blocking Signal AND Trip

AND: Needs two high inputs in

Invert
order to provide an output

6446 60
 Wave Trap and CCVT
Illustration of 500kV Wave Trap & CCVT
• The carrier signal couples to the transmission line
through the CCVT Wave
Trap
• The signal enters and exits the base of the CCVT,
then connects to a nearby impedance-matching
tuning box and then to the transmitter/receiver
equipment located inside the substation control
house
• The carrier signal traffic is bi-directional: the local
terminal both transmits a signal to the remote
terminal and receives a signal from it, all through
CCVT
the same path shown in the illustration
• The wave trap blocks the carrier signal from exiting
the transmission line through any path other than
through the CCVT

6446 61
 Directional Comparison Blocking

• Advantages of a Blocking Carrier Scheme

‒ Provides high-speed fault clearing all the way to the end of the line
‒ The carrier signal from the remote terminal serves to limit the reach of the local
carrier trip relay to the length of the protected line by preventing overtripping
‒ Communication between line terminals is across the power line conductors
rather than through separate telephone or fiber optic channels
‒ Since absence of a carrier signal constitutes permission to trip, scheme is
relatively immune to disruption by faults on the protected line
• A broken or faulted power line actually promotes correct operation by blocking transmission
of any spurious carrier signals that might prevent tripping

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 Directional Comparison Blocking
• Disadvantages of a Blocking Carrier Scheme
‒ Proper carrier channel tuning is essential to maintain signal levels
• Improperly tuned carrier channels make the scheme overtrip
‒ Switching coordination is necessary to block carrier schemes out of service at all
terminals as simultaneously as possible to prevent overtripping
‒ Blocking only one terminal of a carrier scheme has the same effect as
deteriorated signal strength by preventing transmission of a carrier signal
‒ No form of a “guard” signal is continuously present to monitor the carrier
channel’s integrity and ensure its viability during an actual fault
• An external checkback scheme that automatically exchanges carrier signals between
line terminals at periodic intervals is the only non-fault of ensuring that the carrier
communications channel is operational

6446 63
 Directional Comparison Blocking – Internal Fault
Carrier Start Carrier Trip
B O

O B
Carrier Trip Carrier Start

O O

6445 64
 Directional Comparison Blocking – External Fault
Carrier Block Carrier Trip
B O

O B
Carrier Trip Carrier Block

O RX

TX B

6445 65
 Directional Comparison Blocking

6445 66
 DCB Bismarck Sim

6445 67
 Direct Under-reaching Transfer Trip Scheme
DUTT

6447 68
 Direct Under-Reaching Transfer Trip

• Relays set to under reach the remote terminal

• Under non-fault conditions, a continuous GUARD signal is sent by the local
transmitter and monitored by the remote receiver
‒ Tests communication path
‒ Loss of GUARD will generate alarm

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 Direct Under-reaching Transfer Trip
• To Initiate Trip:
‒ Under-reaching Relay must operate
OR
‒ Receive a TRIP signal from the remote end
• In Digital Logic:

Under-reaching Relay

Trip Signal from Remote End OR Trip

OR: Needs one high input in

order to provide an output

6447 70
 Direct Under-reaching Transfer Trip

• Advantages of DUTT relaying

‒ Provides high-speed fault detection for the entire length of the line
‒ Communication between line terminals is continuously monitored by the
GUARD signal or some other form of pilot
‒ Immune from disruption by faults on the protected line since it uses a
separate communications channel rather than the power line itself

6447 71
 Direct Under-reaching Transfer Trip

• Disadvantages of DUTT relaying

‒ The communications channel is subject to external interruption
‒ Possibility of undesired tripping by:
• Accidental operation
• Mis-operation of signaling equipment, or
• Interference on the communications channel

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 Direct Under-reaching Transfer Trip
Under-reaching Relay
U

U
Under-reaching Relay

RX RX

U TX TX U

6448 73
 Direct Under-reaching Transfer Trip
Under-reaching Relay
U

U
Under-reaching Relay

RX

U TX

6448 74
 Direct Under-Reaching Transfer Trip

6448 75
 DUTT Bismarck Sim

6448 76
Permissive Under-Reaching Transfer Trip
(PUTT)

77
 Permissive Under-Reaching Transfer Trip
• Direct tripping relays set to under reach remote end
• Fault detector relays set to overreach remote end
• Under non-fault conditions, continuous GUARD signal is sent to remote end
‒ Tests communication path
‒ Loss of GUARD will generate an alarm

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 Permissive Under-Reaching Transfer Trip
• To Initiate Trip:
‒ Under-reaching Relay must operate
OR
‒ Over-reaching relay must operate AND receive a TRIP signal from the remote end
• In digital logic:

Over-Reaching Relay

Trip Signal from Remote AND

End

Under-Reaching Relay
OR Trip

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 Permissive Under-Reaching Transfer Trip

• Advantages of PUTT relaying

‒ Provides high-speed fault detection for the entire length of the line
‒ Communication between line terminals is continuously monitored by the
GUARD signal or some other form of pilot
‒ Immune from disruption by faults on the protected line since it uses a
separate communications channel rather than the power line itself
‒ More secure than DUTT, since TRIP signal is supervised by overreaching relay

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 Permissive Under-Reaching Transfer Trip

• Disadvantages of PUTT relaying

‒ The communications channel is subject to external interruption
‒ Special precautions are necessary to ensure PUTT will operate for faults on
radially energized lines
• Since PUTT requires TRIP permission from the Local terminal, “b” switch keying and
maintenance or PUTT TEST switches must be implemented and manually operated

‒ Failure of PUTT transmitters to shift from GUARD to TRIP or failure of PUTT

receivers to recognize that shift can completely disable a PUTT relay scheme

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 Permissive Under-Reaching Transfer Trip
Over-reaching Relay
O
Under-reaching Relay
U
U
Under-reaching Relay
O
Over-reaching Relay

U TX TX U

O RX RX O

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 Permissive Under-Reaching Transfer Trip
Over-reaching Relay
O
Under-reaching Relay
U
U
Under-reaching Relay
O
Over-reaching Relay

U TX

O RX O

6455 83
 Permissive Under-Reaching Transfer Trip

6455 84
 PUTT Bismarck Sim

6455 85
Permissive Over-Reaching Transfer Trip
(POTT)

86
 Permissive Over-Reaching Transfer Trip
• The nature of a POTT relay scheme requires two things to
happen before tripping is allowed:
‒ The protective relays must sense a fault, and
‒ The protective relays must receive a valid TRIP signal from the
remote terminal

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 Permissive Over-Reaching Transfer Trip
• A GUARD tone or other pilot signal is continuously sent between
terminals for two purposes:
‒ To monitor integrity of the communications channel
‒ To enhance security of the POTT scheme:
• The GUARD signal must be present and recognized by the local receiver prior to
receipt of a TRIP signal from the remote transmitter in order to permit a local trip
output;
• In an audio tone POTT scheme the local receiver will not produce a trip output unless
the shift from GUARD to TRIP is accomplished within several hundred
milliseconds…this is GUARD-BEFORE-TRIP logic

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 Permissive Over-Reaching Transfer Trip

• To Initiate Trip:
‒ Over-reaching Relay must operate
AND
‒ Receive a trip signal from the remote end
• In digital logic:

Over-Reaching Relay
AND Trip
Trip Signal from
Remote End

6452 89
 Permissive Over-Reaching Transfer Trip

• Advantages of POTT Relaying

‒ Overreaching characteristic provides high-speed fault detection all the way
to the end of the line
‒ Communication between line terminals is continuously monitored by the
GUARD signal or some other form of pilot
‒ Immune from disruption by faults on the protected line since it uses a
separate communications channel rather than the power line itself

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 Permissive Over-Reaching Transfer Trip

• Disadvantages of POTT Relaying

‒ The communications channel is subject to external interruption
‒ Special precautions are necessary to ensure POTT will operate for faults on
radially energized lines
• Since POTT requires TRIP permission from the remote terminal, “b” switch
keying and maintenance or POTT TEST switches must be implemented and
manually operated
‒ Failure of POTT transmitters to shift from GUARD to TRIP or failure of POTT
receivers to recognize that shift can completely disable a POTT relay scheme

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 Permissive Over-Reaching Transfer Trip
Over-reaching Relay
O

O
Over-reaching Relay

O TX TX O

RX RX

6453 92
 Permissive Over-Reaching Transfer Trip
Over-reaching Relay
O

O
Over-reaching Relay

O TX

RX

6453 93
 Permissive Over-Reaching Transfer Trip

6453 94
 POTT Bismarck Sim

6453 95
Phase Comparison Blocking Scheme

96
 Phase Comparison Blocking

• Scheme was typically used on 500 kV system

• Relays at each line terminal compare the direction of the neutral

current flow they see

• This intelligence is exchanged with the remote terminal by pulsing the

blocking carrier signal in a square wave pattern that corresponds to
the positive and negative cycles of the 60 HZ line current sine wave

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 Phase Comparison Blocking

• For a Ground Fault External to the Line:

‒ Fault current flows INTO the line at the LOCAL TERMINAL and OUT OF
the line at the REMOTE TERMINAL
• The relay currents seen at each terminal are thus 180o apart

‒ The BLOCKING CARRIER signal pulse trains received at each terminal are
in-phase with the TRIP signal pulse trains generated at each terminal…
each time the TRIP signal goes to full value, the CARRIER signal does
likewise and BLOCKs tripping of either terminal

6450 98
 Phase Comparison Blocking
Local Terminal Fault Current Remote Terminal

Trip Signal at Local Terminal

Blocking Signal sent by Remote Terminal

External Fault

6450 99
 Phase Comparison Blocking

• For a Ground Fault Internal to the Line:

‒ Both the LOCAL TERMINAL and the REMOTE TERMINAL see fault current
flowing INTO the line…the relay currents seen at each terminal are thus
in-phase
‒ The BLOCKING CARRIER signal pulse trains received at each terminal now
are out-of-phase with the TRIP signal pulse trains generated at each
terminal… each time the TRIP signal goes to full value, the CARRIER signal
is at a low value and is unable to block, thus both terminals TRIP

6450 100
 Phase Comparison Blocking
Local Terminal Remote Terminal

Trip Signal at Local Terminal

Blocking Signal sent by Remote Terminal

Internal Fault
6450 101
AC Pilot Wire

102
 AC Pilot Wire

• Form of differential line protection where phase currents are

compared to determine if a fault is internal or external to the
protected line segment (similar to phase comparison)

• Requires a pair of wires between terminals to operate

‒ Economical for short lines

• Operation is similar to a bus or transformer differential scheme

• Loss of two wire pair will defeat tripping scheme

‒ No automatic testing of P.W. exists

6451 103
 Pilot Wire Scheme

6451 104
Line Differential Scheme

105
 Line Differential Relaying
• Relays operate on a current differential basis
• Requires the use of optical fiber to transit digital information
• The digital information contains the current magnitudes and other
diagnostic parameters and is transmitted continuously between
connected stations
• Failure of the fiber communication path will automatically block the
scheme and initiate an alarm

6449 106
 Line Differential Relaying
FIBER FIBER
LOCAL REMOTE
OPTIC OPTIC
RELAY RELAY
TX/RX TX/RX

LOCAL REMOTE
TERMINAL TERMINAL

Illustration of a Line Differential Relay Scheme

Each line differential relay directly measures line current at its own terminal
and, via the fiber optic communications link, instantaneously receives from its
counterpart a measurement of the line current at the remote terminal.
The sum of the local and remote line currents seen by each relay is normally
zero; a non-zero result indicates a line fault and causes both relays to trip.

6449 107
 Backup Transmission Line Protection

• Can be exactly like primary protection

‒ Depends upon stability or coordination concerns

• If stability and coordination are not a concern, non-pilot relaying

can be applied as a backup scheme

6570 108
 Backup Transmission Line Protection
• In non-pilot applications, line protection
generally consists of the following:
‒ Stepped Distance for Phase Protection
‒ Directional Time and Instantaneous Overcurrent
for Ground Protection
• With microprocessor based relays, additional
functions are available for use.
The more common functions include:
‒ Ground Stepped Distance elements
‒ Negative Sequence Overcurrent elements

6570 109
 Other Functions Performed:

• When either a primary or backup relay responds, the relay

scheme will initiate:
1) Tripping of the line terminal CB(s)
2) Stop sending carrier blocking, send trip signal, etc.
Depends upon relay scheme
3) Initiate Breaker failure relay scheme/DTT
4) Automatic reclosing (if applicable)

6570 110
 Breaker Failure Relaying
• Breaker Failure protection clears a fault even if the circuit breaker that’s called
upon to trip fails to operate or fails to interrupt the fault
• Every function that sends a TRIP signal to a transmission line circuit breaker also
initiates its breaker failure scheme
‒ Except manual and SCADA TRIP commands
• If a breaker has not interrupted fault current within 7 to 10 cycles
‒ Breaker failure scheme operates to trip all adjacent circuit breakers, and
‒ Remote line terminals via DTT (if necessary)
• After a breaker failure operation, all tripped breakers generally stay locked open
until the master trip relay is hand reset
‒ Some locations have automatic restoration schemes that allow adjacent
breakers to reclose once the failed circuit breaker has been isolated by its MODs

6434 111
 Breaker Failure Relaying

6434 112
 Breaker Failure Relaying
DTT

6434 113
 Close In Fault Protection

• In service for a short period of time after a transmission line has

been re-energized (i.e. one terminal closed)

• Simple instantaneous overcurrent relays are utilized to trip the

line if a fault (i.e. grounds) exist on the line
‒ The relays are removed from service after a short time delay

6444 114
 Reclosing Practices

• Just as it is advantageous to clear a fault as fast as possible to minimize

the shock to the electrical system, it is also advantageous to return the
transmission path to service as soon as possible

• Since most faults on transmission lines are transient in nature

(i.e. disappear when circuit is de-energized), automatic reclosing provides
the means for returning the power system to a more stable state

6440 115
 Reclosing Practices

• On the 230 kV system, multi-shot reclosing may be employed.

However, this can differ among PJM member companies

• On the 500 kV system, it is a standard policy to utilize single shot

reclosing for lines
‒ Reclosure times may vary across the PJM footprint, but could take place
up to 5 seconds after the line trips

6440 116
 Reclosing Practices

• Where is automatic reclosing not desirable?

1) If protected line is an underground cable
2) If line has a tapped transformer that cannot be automatically
disconnected from the line
3) If line is just being returned to service and trips

• All situations are usually taken care of by the control scheme

during design stage

6440 117
 Reclosing Practices

Manual Reclosing
• This includes supervisory (SCADA) control in addition to control handle closures
• Used when switching equipment in or out of service. (SCADA is typically used
instead of control handle in order to confirm its availability
• Should fault occur as soon as a CB energizes a piece of equipment,
no automatic reclosing will take place

6440 118
 Reclosing Practices

Manual Reclosing
• Also used for “Try Back” (testing) of a line after a fault
• Company policy should be followed when fault testing is being considered
• The operator should consider the effects that testing may have on the
electrical system (shocking the system again)
• If possible, it is always better to request a patrol of line before trying to
restore it to service

6440 119
 Reclosing Practices

In general, reclosing of transmission line CBs is supervised by

Synchro-Check Relays
• Insures that the two systems being ties together are in synchronism with
each other (or close to it)
• If the systems are synchronized such that the angle between the two are
within defined limits, reclosing will occur
‒ If they are outside the predefined limits, the relay will block reclosing

6440 120
 Protective Relay Alarms via SCADA

• Depending upon design, receiving of an alarm could mean:

1) Low Signal Levels on Power Line Carrier Equipment

2) Loss of Guard on one or more Permissive or DTT schemes

6477 121
 Risks Involved
• Directional or Phase Comparison Schemes
‒ With low signal levels, there is a good chance that the protected
line could overtrip for a fault
• Permissive Transferred Trip Schemes
‒ With a continuous loss of guard, the scheme will shut itself down
• Little risk of overtripping exists
‒ With a sporadic loss of guard, noise is being introduced into
communication channel
• Fair chance of incorrect tripping exists
‒ Momentary loss of guard and return to normal
• Little risk of overtripping exists

6477 122
 Risks Involved

Direct Transfer Tripping Schemes

• A continuous loss of guard will shut down scheme
‒ Little risk of overtripping exists
• Sporadic loss of guard is indication of noisy communication channel
‒ There is a good chance that an overtrip will occur
• Momentary loss of guard and return to normal is of little concern
‒ Low risk of overtripping

6477 123
Transformer Protection

124
 Transformers:

• At the heart of the Transmission System

• They make the transport of large amounts of electrical energy

economically possible

• Because they are critical to the Bulk Power System, high speed
clearing for faults is desirable

6460 125
 Transformer Protection
• Typical Problems that can occur:
‒ Inside the Tank
1) Winding Faults to Ground
2) Winding Turn to Turn Shorts
3) Excessive Winding and/or Oil Temperature
4) Overloads (i.e. winding/oil temperature
‒ External to Tank
1) Bushing Lead Failure
2) Bushing Flashover
3) Lightning Arrester Failure
4) “Through Faults”

6460 126
 Transformer Protection
• Transformer Protection is typically provided by differential relaying
• Transformers provide unique problems for differential relaying that
must be accounted for:
1) Different voltage levels (i.e. different current magnitudes)
2) Automatic Tap Changers (LTC’s or TCUL’s) associated with transformers
cause further mismatch between high side and
low side currents
3) Energizing a transformer causes magnetizing inrush current
which appears as an internal fault to the differential relay
4) Because of Delta-Wye connections, the transformer introduces a
30 degree phase angle shift that must be accounted for

6460 127
 CT Connections for Tapped Transformer

6460 128
 CT Connections for Bus Connected Transformer

6460 129
 Transformer Protection

• Bottom Line:
‒ The differential relay is the ideal device for transformer protection
in that it takes advantage of the zone type of protection to provide
sensitive high speed clearing of transformer faults

• Since high voltage transformers are critical to the Bulk Power System,
generally primary and back-up differential relays are used for protection

• Beyond using two discrete differential relays, additional devices are used
to protect the transformer

6460 130
 Transformer Protection

Sudden Pressure Relays:

‒ If an arcing fault occurs inside the transformer tank, gases are generated
which can be detected by a pressure relay

‒ Operation of this relay will initiate tripping of the transformer

‒ This protection provides back up to the differential relays

6460 131
 Transformer Protection

Gas Analyzers (Combustible Gas Relay):

‒ Low magnitude faults produce gases as they breakdown the oil

and insulation in the transformer tank

‒ The gas analyzer relay constantly monitors the gas space above
the transformer oil, and will actuate an alarm if gas levels exceed
a predetermined level

‒ An alarm provides warning of a possible internal fault, which

could be catastrophic

6460 132
 Transformer Protection

Winding Temperature Relays:

‒ Winding Temperature (referred to as “Hot Spot” protection) inside the
transformer is simulated by using a CT to drive a heating element under oil
‒ As the transformer becomes loaded, the heating element produces more heat
‒ As the heat increases and predetermined temperature levels are reached,
a temperature sensing device will:
1) Start additional cooling groups (if possible)
2) Alarm if temperature continues to increase
3) Trip the transformer

6460 133
 Transformer Protection

Oil Temperature Relays:

‒ Oil temperature is monitored by a “Top Oil” device inside the tank
‒ Similar to the “Hot Spot” protection, when predetermined temperature levels
are reached, a temperature sensing device will:
1) Start additional cooling groups (if possible)
2) Alarm
3) Trip the transformer

6460 134
 Illustrations of Analog Gauge Style Winding Temperature
and Liquid Temperature Thermal Devices

6460 135
 Illustration of
Microprocessor Based
Thermal Device
Liquid Temperature
is the upper unit
Winding Temperature
is the lower unit

6460 136
 Transformer Protection

Transformer Neutral Overcurrent Relay:

‒ Relay is connected to a CT located on the neutral
connection of a WYE-Grounded transformer
‒ Used as Back-Up protection for “Through Faults”
‒ Must be coordinated with other system ground relays
‒ Operation of this relay will trip the transformer

6460 137
 Transformer Protection

Blind Spot Overcurrent Relay:

‒ On occasion, tapped transformers are energized from the low side
only (i.e. high side MOAB is open)
• This is typically done to maintain station service

‒ Line Relaying may not respond to a fault that could occur between
the Transformer Diff
• CTs and the MOAB

‒ A Blind Spot relay is used to detect this condition

• It is in service only when the high side MOAB is open
• Will trip the low side circuit breakers to isolate the fault

6460 138
 CT Connections for Tapped Transformer

Fault

6460 139
 Transformer Protection

• Other Protective Devices:

‒ Loss of Cooling Relay - If all fans and/or oil pumps are lost for any reason:
• The transformer will trip if temperature is above a predetermined level

‒ Low Oil Level - Lack of proper oil level compromises transformer cooling
• This device will alarm and eventually trip the transformer if oil level drops below a certain
threshold

6460 140
 Transformer Protection
• Operation of any of the above relay schemes will initiate other
protective functions
• The physical design of the electrical system will define what
additional actions are taken
• Some actions include:
1) Initiate Direct Transfer Trip to remote terminals
2) Initiate breaker failure relaying
3) Block reclosing of CBs that are tripped (until transformer is isolated)
4) Close the high speed ground switch
5) Initiate permissive trip/stop sending blocking signal, etc.

6460 141
 Transformer Protection

• Turn to Turn Shorts (Non-Fault Condition)

‒ Have not discussed this abnormal condition much
‒ In general, this condition is very difficult to detect - initially
‒ As more and more insulation deteriorates, this condition may cause
the gas analyzer relay to respond
‒ Otherwise, could go undetected until winding flashes over to ground
• At that point, normal transformer protection will respond
to clear the fault

6460 142
 Transformer Protection

• Because a Bulk Power Transformer is a high cost piece of equipment,

automatic testing of the transformer is generally not included in the
control scheme design

• If the differential relay responds, a master trip auxiliary relay will trip and
block closing of devices which could re-energize the transformer

• To reclose the locked out devices, this master trip relay must be
hand reset

6460 143
 Operator’s Role if Transformer Protection Operates

• Alert all that need to be informed of the operation

• Be aware of steps required to alleviate possible system
overloads, low voltage concerns, etc.

• In general, do not test (try-back) the transformer until it is

inspected by qualified individuals

6460 144
 Direct Transfer Trip (DTT) Relaying for
Transformer Protection

6459 145
 Clearing Sequence For A Fault On Auburn Transformer 20

1) A fault occurs inside Transformer 20 at Auburn

Yakima Auburn
230/69 kV SUB 230 kV PLANT and SWITCHYARD
Auburn 230 Yakima
kV CB East 230 kV GCB
230/13.8/4 kV
T20 MOD Transformer 20 To
13.8 kV and 4 kV Lowside
CBs
inside Plant

T20 HSGS

Yakima
Transformer West 230 kV GCB
69kV CB

6459 146
 Clearing Sequence For A Fault On Auburn Transformer 20
2) At Auburn, Transformer 20 protection operates to immediately trip the Yakima East and West 230kV circuit breakers and
the 13.8kV and 4kV Transformer 20 lowside circuit breakers. Simultaneously, a DTT TRIP signal is initiated to Yakima, the
T20 HSGS closes and the T20 MOD starts to open
3) At Yakima, the 230kV line and 69kV transformer lowside breakers open immediately upon receipt of the DTT TRIP
signal…all circuit breakers at Yakima are open before the HSGS at Auburn closes fully into the transmission line

Yakima Auburn
230/69 kV SUB 230 kV PLANT and SWITCHYARD
Auburn 230 Yakima
kV CB East 230 kV GCB
230/13.8/4 kV
T20 MOD Transformer 20 To
13.813.8
kV and
kV 4and
kV4Lowside
kV
CBs CBs
Lowside
inside Plant

T20 HSGS

Yakima
Transformer West 230 kV GCB
69kV CB

6459 147
 Clearing Sequence For A Fault On Auburn Transformer 20
4) At Auburn, the T20 MOD opens fully to physically isolate the fault and stops the DTT TRIP
signal to Yakima…all circuit breakers at Yakima reclose automatically. The transmission line
breakers at Auburn also reclose automatically after the failed transformer is isolated, but the T20
lowside breakers are designed to stay open

Yakima Auburn
230/69 kV SUB 230 kV PLANT and SWITCHYARD
Auburn 230 Yakima
kV CB East 230 kV GCB
230/13.8/4 kV
T20 MOD Transformer 20 To
13.813.8
kV and
kV 4and
kV4Lowside
kV
CBs CBs
Lowside
inside Plant

T20 HSGS

Yakima
Transformer West 230 kV GCB
69kV CB

6459 148
 Clearing Sequence For A Fault On Auburn Transformer 20
If the DTT TRIP signal had failed to reach Yakima, the line relays there would recognize the phase-to-ground
fault created by the T20 HSGS at Auburn and open the 230kV and 69kV circuit breakers
The Yakima circuit breakers at Auburn would be unaffected by a DTT failure because they are tripped locally
by Transformer 20 protection

Yakima Auburn
230/69 kV SUB 230 kV PLANT and SWITCHYARD
Auburn 230 Yakima
kV CB East 230 kV GCB
230/13.8/4 kV
T20 MOD Transformer 20 To
13.813.8
kV and
kV 4and
kV4Lowside
kV
CBs CBs
Lowside
inside Plant

T20 HSGS

Yakima
Transformer West 230 kV GCB
69kV CB

6459 149
Bus Protection

150
 Bus Protection

• On the Bulk Power System, the most common protection practice

to insure high speed clearing of faults on bus work is to use
Differential Relays
• Older, less critical stations may employ Time and Instantaneous
Overcurrent relays connected in a differential scheme
‒ These schemes can be less sensitive, slower or both

6435 151
 Bus Protection

• Generally, the CTs used for Bus Protection are located on the line or
equipment side of the circuit breaker
‒ Consequently, the CB is within the protection zone of the bus differential
and the line or piece of equipment (overlapping zones of protection)

6435 152
 Bus Protection

• If a bus differential relay operates, the relay will typically do the following:
1) Energize a Master Trip Auxiliary Relay
2) Trip all sources to that bus section (via the Master Trip)
3) Setup the Reset of the Master Trip Relay if bus testing is to occur
4) Block reclosing of all CBs except that of the automatic testing source
(if so equipped)
5) Initiate Breaker Failure
6) Initiate an Alarm

6435 153
 Bus Protection

• On the 500kv System, automatic bus testing does not occur

• In general, on voltage levels below 500kv, a single automatic test

of the bus might occur
‒ This can vary across the PJM territory

6435 154
 Bus Protection

• If the particular station is equipped with bus testing and a

successful test occurs, all remaining CBs that were tripped will
automatically reclose

• If the bus test was unsuccessful, all CBs, including the testing CB,
will be locked out

• Although automatic reclosing is blocked, the operator may have

the ability to close a CB via supervisory control (SCADA)

6435 155
 Operator’s Role is Bus Protection - De-Energize a Bus

• Know your company’s policy!

‒ Alert all that need to be informed of operation
‒ Be aware of steps required to alleviate possible system overloads,
low voltage concerns, etc. (sound familiar?)

• If the bus trips and locks out, no testing via SCADA should occur
until the station is inspected by authorized personnel

6435 156
 Bus Differential with Automatic Testing

6436 157
 Illustration of Automatic Bus Testing
in a Transmission Switchyard

6436 158
 Illustration of Automatic Bus Testing
in a Transmission Switchyard

Following a bus differential operation,

a preselected circuit breaker
automatically recloses to test the bus
6436 159
 Illustration of Automatic Bus Testing
in a Transmission Switchyard

If the bus test is unsuccessful,

all circuit breakers lock out
and must be closed manually or by SCADA
6436 160
 Illustration of Automatic Bus Testing
in a Transmission Switchyard

On the other hand, if the bus test is successful, all the

other circuit breaker automatically reclose after a time
delay to ensure the bus is stable
6436 161
 Bus Testing at Generating Stations
Following a bus differential operation at a generating station, special
consideration on the testing method is important to avoid severe mechanical
stresses on turbine-generator:
• Normally impedance between generator terminals and fault on power
line “cushions” the mechanical impact on the turbine-generator
• Bus fault is right at terminals of GSU transformer
‒ Want to limit exposure of generator to close-in faults
• Tripped bus at generating station should be tested with transmission line
energized from remote substation
• Impedance of transmission line limits current available to bus fault
‒ Minimizes stress on the local generators

6436 162
 Illustration of Automatic Bus Testing
at a Generating Station

G
G
G
1 2 3 4

Following a bus differential operation,

a preselected circuit breaker
must be closed to test the bus…
which one is preferred here and why?

6436 163
Generator Protection

164
 Station Arrangement

• A Generator is usually connected to the power system through a

wye-delta transformer (wye on the high voltage side, delta on the
generator side)

• Generator itself is connected wye with its neutral grounded through

a high impedance

• Purpose of this generator connection is to limit the high magnitude

currents which could flow for a ground fault

6443 165
 Station Arrangement – Unit in Service
DC Field
Prime Mover
AC

To Transmission
Grid
Unit CB
Generator Main Power
Transformer
(GSU)

To Transmission
Grid
Station Bus
Station Service
Bus

Station Service
Transformer

Emergency Start Up CB
Start Up
Diesel Generator
Transformer

6443 166
 Station Arrangement – Unit Out of Service
DC Field
Prime Mover
AC

To Transmission
Grid
Unit CB
Generator Main Power
Transformer
(GSU)

To Transmission
Grid
Station Bus
Station Service
Bus

Station Service
Transformer

Emergency Start Up CB
Start Up
Diesel Generator
Transformer

6443 167
 Station Arrangement – Station Blackout
DC Field
Prime Mover
AC

To Transmission
Grid
Unit CB
Generator Main Power
Transformer
(GSU)

To Transmission
Grid
Station Bus
Station Service
Bus

Station Service
Transformer

Emergency Start Up CB
Start Up
Diesel Generator
Transformer

6443 168
 Generator Unit Tripping

6443 169
 Generator Unit Tripping
• The frequency of failures in Rotating Machines is low, however
failures can and do occur
• Beyond actual failures, certain abnormal conditions can cause
generator failure if not corrected quickly
• Some of these harmful conditions are:
‒ Winding Faults
‒ Overheating
‒ Loss of Field
‒ Single Phasing
‒ Overloading
‒ Overspeed
‒ Motoring (turbine)
‒ Overexcitation

6443 170
 Generator Unit Tripping

• Not all of the problems mentioned necessarily

have to cause a unit trip
‒ If detected quickly, measures can be taken to mitigate the problem

• Consequently, some relay schemes will first produce

an alarm to alert operators of the problem
‒ If the problem worsens before corrective action can be taken, the
scheme will initiate a unit trip

6443 171
 Generator Unit Tripping

• If protective devices do cause a unit trip, the following actions

will occur:
1) Generator Synchronizing CB is tripped and locked out

2) Normal Station Service supply CB is tripped

3) Generator DC field CB is tripped

4) Prime Mover is tripped

6443 172
 Generator Unit Tripping

• When a unit trips, the function of the plant operator is to stabilize the
prime mover and auxiliary systems to insure a controlled shut down

• The generation dispatcher’s purpose is dependent upon their

company’s procedures
‒ This could involve negotiation for additional generation or
notifying that company’s energy marketing function

6443 173
 Overall Unit Protection

6443 174
 Areas to be Protected and Concerns

1) Generator - Winding Fault, Overloading, Overheating, Overspeed,

Underfrequency, Loss of Excitation, Motoring, Phase Unbalance,
Out of Step

2) Turbine - Overspeed, Underspeed, Vibration, Temperature

3) Auxiliaries - Cable Faults, Grounds on System

4) Station Service - Transformer Faults, Lead Faults, etc.

6443 175
 Ground
Relay Unit Differential
DC Field

AC

To Transmission
Grid
Unit CB
Main Power
Transformer
Generator Differential (GSU)

To Transmission
Station Bus Grid
Transformer Differential Protection Station Bus
Station Service
Bus

Station Service
Transformer

Start Up CB
Start Up
Station Service
Transformer
Bus Differential

Transformer Differential

6443 176
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Generator Differential
‒ Wraps only the Stator Windings of the Generator

‒ Sensitive to phase and some ground faults

‒ Operation of this relay will initiate a unit trip

6443 177
 Generator Differential

6443 178
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Overall Differential
‒ Wraps the Generator, Gen Step-up Transformer and Station Service
Transformer
‒ Sensitive to phase and some ground faults
‒ Backs up the Generator Diff, GSU Diff, Station Service Diff, etc.
‒ Less sensitive than the Generator Diff
‒ Operation of this relay will initiate a unit trip

6443 179
 Unit Differential Protection

Unit Differential
DC Field 87
AC

To Transmission
Grid
Generator Unit CB
Neutral to Main Power
Ground Transformer
(GSU)

To Transmission
Grid
Station Bus
Station Service
Bus

Station Service
Transformer

Start Up CB
Start Up
Transformer

6443 180
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Overcurrent Protection
‒ Provide Backup Protection for Gen. Diff Scheme
‒ Protects the generator from system faults that are not cleared within a
predetermined time interval
‒ Coordinated with System Overcurrent schemes
‒ Usually time delayed to minimize tripping for transient surges
or synchronizing
‒ Will initiate a unit trip

6443 181
 Other Generator Protection Relays
Generator

To Generator
CT
Step-up
Transformer
CT (GSU)

PT

51G 51 46 32 40 59 81

51 – Back-up Overcurrent 59 – Over-excitation

46 – Negative Sequence 81 – Under-frequency
32 – Reverse Power (Anit-motoring) 51G- Neutral Over-current
40 – Loss of Field

6443 182
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Negative Sequence Protection

‒ During unbalanced faults, “Negative Sequence” currents will flow
• Caused by open circuits in the system (Downed conductors, stuck breakers and pole-top
switches
• 120 cycle currents are induced in the solid forgings, non-magnetic rotor wedges and
retaining rings of the rotor caused by the “negative sequence” current in the stator
• The I2R loss quickly raises temperature of the rotor and would eventually cause serious
rotor damage

‒ Will initiate an alarm and trip unit

6443 183
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Anti-Motoring or Reverse Power Protection:

‒ Actually used to protect the Turbine instead of the generator
• When Generator takes in power, it is essentially a synchronous motor
(non-harmful to generator)
• This mode of operation, if sustained could lead to turbine blade failure
based ventilation being greatly reduced

‒ This is one standard method for taking unit off line

‒ May cause alarm, but will initiate a unit trip

6443 184
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Loss of Field Protection

‒ Generator Effects
• Synchronous generator becomes induction motor
• Induced eddy currents heat rotor surface
• High reactive current drawn by generator overloads stator (2 to 3
times the generator rating)

‒ System Effects
• Loss of reactive support
• Creates a reactive drain
• Can trigger system/area voltage collapse

6443 185
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Loss of Field Protection

• Loss of Field indicates that trouble exists in:
1) Main Exciter
2) Field Winding
3) Operating Error when machine is in Manual mode
• Relays monitor reverse var flow or low voltage
• Operation of this relay will alarm and initiate a unit trip

6443 186
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Overexcitation Protection
‒ Concern is for the Generator Field and main GSU transformer since overexcitation
can cause damaging overheating due to core saturation in a very short time
‒ Volts/Hertz, or Voltage or Current relaying is employed
• Typically “stair-step” operation
• One relay will alarm or automatically reduce field to allowable limits
• One relay will trip unit

6443 187
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Overexcitation Protection
‒ Generator issues:
• Voltage regulator problems
• Operating error during manual operation
• Control failure
• Loss of sensing signal

6443 188
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Overexcitation Protection
‒ System issues:
• Unit load rejection: full load, partial rejection
• Power system islanding during major disturbances
• Ferranti effect
• Reactor out of service
• Capacitors in service
• Faulty LTCs

6443 189
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Underfrequency Protection
‒ If System load exceeds the capability of the machine, the frequency will decay

‒ In PJM, machines are typically set for 57.5 hz with a 5.0 second time delay

‒ System load shedding schemes are used to dump load as required

• If not enough load is disconnected and frequency drops, relay will initiate a unit trip

‒ If unit tripping occurs, pull out your “Black Start Restoration” guide
because it will be needed!

6443 190
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Underfrequency Protection
• Turbine blades are designed and tuned to operate at rated frequencies
‒ Operating at frequencies different than rated can result in blade resonance and
fatigue damage
‒ Accumulated operation, for the life of the machine, not more than:
• 10 minutes for frequencies between 56 and 58.5 Hz
• 60 minutes for frequencies between 58.5 and 59.5 Hz

6443 191
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Generator Ground Fault Protection

‒ Method of Generator Grounding affects the protection provided by the
differential relays
• The higher the grounding impedance, the lower the ground fault current magnitude

‒ To detect these low magnitude faults, Neutral Overcurrent or an Overvoltage relay

scheme is employed

‒ Operation of this relay scheme will initiate a unit trip

6443 192
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Generator Ground Fault Protection

• Low Impedance
‒ Good ground source;
• The lower the R, the better the ground source
• The lower the R, the more damage to the generator
on internal ground fault

6443 193
 Protective Relay Schemes for the Generator

Generator Ground Fault Protection

• High Impedance
‒ Creates “unit connection”
‒ System ground source obtained from GSU

6443 194
Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)

195
 Disclaimer

• This presentation explains the types of RAS that can be found on

transmission and distribution systems

• Examples of RAS will be provided for schemes used in the PJM RTO
‒ Each individual scheme on the PJM system is not covered in this presentation

• Further information regarding specific RAS in PJM can be located in Section

5 of PJM Manual 3

6458 196
 Introduction

Line fault isolated

• Basic power system protection is designed to protect system

equipment by isolating faulted equipment
• Examples include: generators, lines, transformers and busses

6458 197
 Problem Statement

• The size and complexity of

the power grid makes the
bulk electric system
vulnerable to:
‒ Congestion
‒ Over/underfrequency
‒ Over/undervoltage
‒ Power system instability

www.gedigitalenergy.com (2013)

6458 198
 Problem Statement

• Unaddressed system
vulnerabilities could result
in:
‒ Multiple contingencies
‒ Equipment damage
‒ Power system collapse

6458 199
 Solution: Use Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)

• Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) is designed

to detect abnormal system conditions and initiate predetermined actions to
maintain the reliability of the Bulk Electric System (BES)
• Actions include:
‒ Changes in demand
‒ Changes in generation output
‒ Changes in system configuration
• Goals of an RAS:
‒ Maintain system stability
‒ Maintain acceptable system voltages
‒ Maintain all facilities within acceptable thermal limits

6458 200
 Criteria
• Dependability:
‒ Certainty that the scheme operates when required to avoid a collapse

• Security:
‒ Certainty that the scheme does not operate when not required

• Selectivity:
‒ Ability to select the correct and minimum amount of action

• Robustness:
‒ Ability of the scheme to provide dependability, security, and selectivity over the
full range of dynamic and steady state operating conditions

6458 201
 NERC Standards
• As the Reliability Coordinator, Transmission Operator and Balancing Authority,
PJM is responsible to monitor the status of all schemes in the RTO
PRC-001.1(ii) R6

IRO-002-4 R5

6458 202
 RAS Requirements

Communication Network

Relays

Scheme Logic
IF circuit breaker X trips THEN circuit breakers Y and Z
will____?

6458 203
 PJM RAS Review Process

• PJM Manual 3: Section 1.7

‒ PJM receives proposal for RAS
• Must meet NERC RAS definition

‒ PJM and TO review scheme and system impacts

• PJM provides recommendation and identifies if scheme is needed
for reliability purposes including operational performance

‒ PJM posts scheme information and document scheme in M-03

‒ Owner obtains RRO approval and discusses at various
committee meetings

6458 204
 PJM RAS Identification

• PJM will always use the following format to identify RAS:

Facility/Equipment Identifier RAS Identifier

Black Oak 500/138kV #3 Transformer [RAS]

6458 205
 RAS Questions for Activation

• Does the scheme require manual activation (communication protocol)?

• What are the conditions that will activate the scheme?
• What conditions make the scheme nonfunctional?
• What procedures are in place should the RAS become unavailable?
• Is my contingency analysis modeled properly based on the relay
scheme logic?
• Is the bulk electric system in a reliable posture following the activation
of the RAS?

6458 206
 Types of RAS

6457 207
 Types of RAS

• Remedial Action Scheme is designed to perform several functions. These

include:
‒ Trip or transfer trip a facility
‒ Initiate generator load rejection schemes

6457 208
 Trip Scheme
• Will initiate breaker operation to mitigate overload
The contingency loss
of this line…….

When armed, breaker

will trip to mitigate the
overload

May cause flow on this line to

exceed predetermined value
based on temperature set……
6457 209
 Transfer Trip Scheme
• Will coordinate breaker operations to initiate remote tripping based on a
predetermined set of conditions
Breaker 6 is tripped
locally and DTT is sent to
breaker 5 to prevent
If breaker 4 trips stability issues
open……..

1 2 3

4 5
6

6457 210
 Generation Load Rejection

• Used to maintain system stability following loss of load events

‒ Full Load Rejection
• Most PJM generator runback schemes are Full Load Rejection

6457 211
 Generation Load Rejection

• Full Load Rejection

‒ Main generator breakers trip
‒ Loss of synchronization and full load
‒ Steam generators runback from full load to no-load

6457 212
 Generation Load Rejection

Line out for

maintenance

If breaker 1 trips
open……..

Unit breaker will open to

prevent unstable
operation

6457 213
 PJM RAS Actions
1. PJM will contact the TO to verify EMS results
and direct the RAS to be Enabled

2. PJM will modify the contingency definition to

simulate the N-1 condition in the EMS with
the RAS activated

3. PJM will log the activation/deactivation of

the RAS scheme that is a change from its
“Normal” status

4. PJM will control all actual facility loadings

below the Normal ratings and all contingency
loadings below the Emergency rating

6457 214
 PJM TO/GO RAS Actions

1. TO/GO will change the RAS status upon PJM’s

direction

2. TO/GO will not change the RAS status back to

“Normal” unless directed to do
so by PJM

3. TO/GO must report any condition that would

prevent the use of the RAS or cause the RAS
to become inoperable

6457 215
 Relay Testing
Considerations & Concerns

216
 Relay Testing

• Relay testing is important to insure Relays and Relay Schemes

are functioning as designed

• Because testing is usually done when primary equipment is

energized, there is a risk that unwanted operation of relay
schemes may occur

6442 217
 Why Can Tripping Occur?

• Close working conditions

• Wiring errors

• Improper “Blocking” or “Isolating” of equipment

• Inexperience (lack of training)

• Accidental (bump panel or relay)

6442 218
 Considerations and Concerns for S.O.’s:

• When a request is received from a person doing testing,

think about:
‒ What could it do to the system?
• Is the system being operated in a manner that the loss of the equipment
protected by the relay scheme will cause serious problems? (stability, voltage,
overloads etc.)

‒ Would the removal of relay scheme go beyond the setting criteria for
other relay schemes?

6442 219
 Protection Practice:

• Protection and Coordination are typically based upon the electrical system
being normal or altered by any single contingency
• A single contingency is the outage of a piece of equipment such as a line,
transformer or relay scheme
• If more than one piece of equipment is outaged at a station, protection or
coordination can be compromised
• The relay engineers should be contacted to insure protection and
coordination will still exist

6442 220
 General Considerations for Dispatchers
Following a Relay Operation

6442 221
 Know Your Company’s Policy Regarding
Dispatcher Response to a Relay Trip

• Who do you notify?

• Who to call to initiate repairs

• Who to call to perform line patrols, substation inspections, etc.

• Inter-company response and notifications

6442 222
 Data Collection and Fault Analysis

• Try to obtain as much data as possible for future detailed analysis

(i.e. relay targets, Digital fault recorder information, system conditions)

• Real time analysis comes with experience

• Often knowing what has tripped may lead to a determination of the faulted
piece of equipment or potential relay problem

(See examples)

6442 223
 Fault Analysis

Breakers 1 thru 7
trip open

Where is the
likely fault
location?

6442 224
 Fault Analysis

6442 225
 Appendix
Summary of Line Protection Schemes

6571 226
 Summary of Line Protection Schemes
Scheme Will initiate trip when…
Local over-reaching relay operates AND there is an absence of a
Directional Carrier Blocking
BLOCKING signal from the remote end
Local under-reaching relay operates OR TRIP signal is received from
Direct Under-reaching Transfer Trip
the remote end
Permissive Under-reaching Transfer Local under-reaching relay operates OR local over-reaching relay
Trip operates AND a TRIP signal is received from the remote end
Local over-reaching relay operates AND a TRIP signal is received from
Permissive Over-reaching Transfer Trip
the remote end
Both the LOCAL TERMINAL and the REMOTE TERMINAL see fault
Phase Comparison current flowing INTO the line and BLOCKING CARRIER signal is out-of-
phase with the TRIP signal
The current flow induced in the operating coil is less than the current
AC Pilot Wire
induced in the restraint coil
The sum of the local and remote line currents seen by each relay is a
Line Differential
non-zero result
6571 227
 Summary of Line Protection Schemes
Carrier Trip
Carrier Start
B T
Carrier Trip Carrier Start
T B

Directional Carrier Blocking

T T

B B

Under-reaching Relay
U
Under-reaching Relay
U

Direct Under-reaching Transfer Trip

U U
6571 228
 Summary of Line ProtectionOver-reaching
Schemes Relay
O
Under-reaching Relay
U
U
Under-reaching Relay
O
Over-reaching Relay
Permissive Under-Reaching Transfer Trip

U U

O O

Over-reaching Relay
O
Over-reaching Relay
O

Permissive Over-Reaching Transfer Trip

O O
6571 229
 Summary of Line Protection Schemes
Local Terminal Remote Terminal
Phase Comparison Blocking

6571 230
 Summary of Line Protection Schemes

AC Pilot Wire

6571 231
 Summary of Line Protection Schemes
FIBER FIBER
LOCAL REMOTE
OPTIC OPTIC
RELAY RELAY
TX/RX TX/RX

Line Differential

LOCAL REMOTE
TERMINAL TERMINAL

6571 232
 Questions?
PJM Client Management & Services
Telephone: (610) 666-8980
Toll Free Telephone: (866) 400-8980
Website: www.pjm.com

The Member Community is PJM’s self-service portal for members to search

for answers to their questions or to track and/or open cases with
Client Management & Services

233