Wang 24 [Ann Wang, "U.S.
Military Support for Taiwan in Five Charts", Council on Foreign Relations, 9-25-2024,
https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-five-charts] accessed on 10-20-2024// AF
U.S. military support comes primarily through the sale of weapons systems but Washington has in recent years begun to use other tools to
bolster Taipei’s defensive capabilities. Sales. Since
1950, the United States has sold Taiwan nearly $50 billion
in defense equipment and services, with a number of large sales during recent U.S. administrations. Only Israel, Japan, and Saudi
Arabia purchased more from the United States during that period. However, as of August 2024, Taiwan was reportedly waiting
on more than $20 billion worth of U.S. weapons deliveries, including dozens of F-16 fighter jets approved for
sale in 2019. (Arms trade experts say that on average it takes from two to five years between purchase and delivery for U.S. weapons.)
Shih 20 [Willy C. Shih is an American economist currently the Robert and Jane Cizik Professor of
Management Practice in Business Administration at Harvard Business School, "Global Supply Chains in a
Post-Pandemic World", Harvard Business Review, 10-xx-2020,
https://hbr.org/2020/09/global-supply-chains-in-a-post-pandemic-world] accessed on 10-30-2024// AF
When the Covid-19 pandemic subsides, the world is going to look markedly different. The supply shock that started in China in
February and the demand shock that followed as the global economy shut down exposed vulnerabilities in the
production strategies and supply chains of firms just about everywhere. Temporary trade restrictions and shortages of
pharmaceuticals, critical medical supplies, and other products highlighted their weaknesses. Those developments, combined with the U.S.-China
trade war, have triggered a rise in economic nationalism. As a consequence of all this, manufacturers worldwide are going
to be under greater political and competitive pressures to increase their domestic production, grow employment in their
home countries, reduce or even eliminate their dependence on sources that are perceived as risky, and rethink their use of lean manufacturing
strategies that involve minimizing the amount of inventory held in their global supply chains.
Crawford 24 [Krysten Crawford is a member of SIEPR’s communications team, writing about the
research and work of SIEPR affiliates as well as the institute’s programs and initiatives, "Can
global supply chains be fixed?", Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR),
9-12-2024, https://siepr.stanford.edu/news/can-global-supply-chains-be-fixed] accessed on
10-24-2024// AF
First the toilet paper and computer chips went missing, now it’s olive oil and airplane seats. Four years after the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic, shortages of products and services are becoming more frequent — a consequence not just
of the global health crisis, but also wars, trade sanctions, [and] software failures, and natural disasters. In response,
companies and policymakers around the world are having to rethink where critical materials come from and how they get delivered.It’s not easy
to do. As Matthew Jackson, a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) who studies complex
networks in various forms, says, we’re just beginning to build a clearer picture of what the world’s supply chains look like, including where there
are intersections that could lead to costly bottlenecks. Here, Jackson, who is the William D. Eberle Professor of Economics in the School of
Humanities and Sciences, discusses why supply chains are hard to fix, what’s being done to strengthen them, and how his recent
research helps businesses and policymakers move closer to solutions.We’ve seen, and continue to see, disruptions in the supply of products
and services on a scale that most people alive today have never experienced before — and we have not seen since the Second World War. Some
companies, like Starbucks, have long dealt with supply chain risks because coffee beans grow in some countries where there is a lot of volatility.
But others haven’t been prepared. The risks, for example, weren’t on the radar screens of Japanese car manufacturers when the 2011 tsunami
destroyed several plants that made automobile parts. It took Toyota, Honda, Nissan and others more than a year to fully recover.If supply
chain disruptions are our new reality, why is addressing them so difficult?Supply chains are much more
diverse geographically — and complex — than they used to be. They can be tens or hundreds of companies deep. The parts needed to build the
most advanced integrated circuit boards, for example, cross dozens of international borders before they reach Taiwan for assembly.Right now, s
of disruptions, but not the short-term effects — and there’s a big contrast between the two. For example, suppose that I run a company that
a product that costs several hundred dollars and uses the kind of cheap computer chips
sells
that run most electronics, and there is a crisis that closes several key plants that produce those chips. The disruption in
the supply of those chips in the long run might mean that some new plants are needed to
produce those chips and that the cost of those chips goes up
Siripurapu 24 [Anshu Siripurapu covers economics, energy, and geopolitics, and helps edit the
Daily News Brief. Before he joined CFR, Anshu was a reporter for Inside U.S. Trade, chronicling
trade policy under the Trump administration. He holds a BA in political economy from the
University of Southern California, "The Contentious U.S.-China Trade Relationship", Council on
Foreign Relations, 5-14-2024,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship] accessed on
10-24-2024// AF
The optimism that accompanied China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) twenty
years ago has vanished as Beijing continues to embrace state-led development, pouring subsidies into targeted industries to the
detriment of U.S. and foreign companies. Though U.S. consumers have benefited from the flood of cheaper goods from China, millions of
Americans have lost their jobs due to import competition. Meanwhile, investment by Chinese companies is raising national security concerns.
The United States has long accused China of pressuring American companies to hand over their technology, or of pilfering it outright. How to
respond to China now sits at the center of the U.S. political debate, with President Joe Biden following his predecessor, Donald Trump, in
adopting an aggressive economic approach.China began a decades-long process of economic reform in the late 1970s under the leadership of
Deng Xiaoping. His government loosened state control over the economy and allowed private industry to develop. In 1979, the United States
and China normalized relations as Chinese policymakers aimed to boost trade and investment, and in 1986 Beijing applied to rejoin the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the WTO’s predecessor. After protracted negotiations with the United States and
other WTO members due to Taiwan, China joined the organization in December 2001.
Glasser 22 [Dr Robert Glasser is a Senior Fellow with ASPI, and the former Head of its Climate and Security Policy Centre from 2021-2024.
He was previously the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative for Disaster Risk Reduction and a
member of the Secretary General’s Senior Management Team, "The geopolitics of climate and security in the Indo-Pacific", Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, 02-24-2022, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/geopolitics-climate-and-security-indo-pacific] accessed on 10-23-2024// zeej
In the past few years, much
ink has been spilled by international relations and climate experts on whether
tackling climate change is compatible with competition with China. At one extreme, there are China hawks
who argue that climate change is a ‘dangerous distraction’ for the US Defense Department that weakens
the American hand against China. At the other extreme are China doves, a group of whom wrote a letter in 2020
calling for an end to antagonism from the West towards China because it undermines global goals on
climate.1 The official US Government position under the Biden administration has largely been an
attempt to have its cake and eat it too—collaborate and compete by separating climate change policy from
other issues, such as human rights, trade and Taiwan. The Chinese Government hasn’t been particularly
keen to adopt that position.
Stalley 2-8-2022, Endowed Professor of Environmental Diplomacy & Associate Professor of
Political Science @ Depaul. (Phillip, "China’s climate change record: Beijing tends to meet its
targets, but sets the bar too low", NWI Times, )
There is still a chance that China will enhance its contribution to the fight against climate change.
It is worth noting that China is still developing the policies that will guide its approach to climate change
over the next decade. It has released two overarching documents for reaching carbon neutrality and an
emissions peak in 2030. Over the next year or so, it intends to release 30 sector- and province-specific
documents to guide industries such as steel, cement and transportation.
Two key developments at Glasgow could also nudge China to do more.
First, a considerable number of countries increased their climate pledges, which ratchets up pressure on
China.
More than 100 nations pledged to cut emissions of methane, a highly potent greenhouse gas, by 30% by
2030. India pledged to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2070 and, more importantly, indicated it
would potentially get half its electricity from renewable sources by 2030. There were also multicountry
pledges to end deforestation, phase out coal and cut international funding for fossil fuels.
Like any country, China’s climate actions are driven primarily by domestic political considerations.
However, over the past three decades Chinese policy has responded to – and been shaped by – external
forces including diplomacy, advocacy and scientific exchange.
Developing countries, in particular, can influence China’s approach to climate change. Because China has
long positioned itself as a leader of the developing world and is sensitive to its international image, it can
be hard for Beijing to resist pressure from other developing countries. The fact that several countries,
such as India, Indonesia and Vietnam, made bolder-than-expected pledges at Glasgow could induce
Beijing to offer more aggressive targets for controlling emissions.
The second key development is that the United States and China achieved a much-needed thaw in their
relationship at Glasgow and laid a foundation for future cooperation.
Climate negotiations
Although there is some debate about whether the climate benefits more from Sino-American
competition or cooperation, there was concern that hostility between China and the U.S. could derail
the talks.
Therefore, it was a welcome relief when late in the summit China and the U.S., the second largest
greenhouse gas emitter, released a joint declaration outlining their shared commitment to combating
climate change.
They agreed to establish a “working group on enhancing climate action in the 2020s” and to meet early
in 2022 to address methane emissions. China also indicated it would release a national action plan for
methane. This is significant because China did not sign the Global Methane Pledge and has not
traditionally included noncarbon greenhouse gases – about 18% of China’s total emissions – in its
commitments.
Will developing country pressure and U.S.-China cooperation be enough to persuade China to take more
aggressive action? Only time will tell, but Glasgow may have been the crossroad where China and the
rest of the world chose a more sustainable path.
[The United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) is an initiative that engages institutions of higher education with the United
Nations in supporting and contributing to the realization of the Organization's purposes and principles, including the promotion and protection
of human rights, access to education, sustainability and conflict resolution, "Food Security, Climate Change and the Sustainable Development
Goals", 03-xx-2015, https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/food-security-climate-change-and-sustainable-development-goals] accessed on
10-23-2024// zeej
In the next 30 years, food supply and food security will be severely threatened if little or no action is
taken to address climate change and the food system's vulnerability to climate change. According to the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), the extent of climate change impacts on individual regions will vary over time, and different societal and
environmental systems will have varied abilities to mitigate or adapt to change. Negative effects of climate change include
the continued rise of global temperatures, changes in precipitation patterns, an increased frequency of
droughts and heatwaves, sea-level rise, melting of sea ice and a higher risk of more intense natural
disasters. The IPCC states, Taken as a whole, the range of published evidence indicates that the net damage costs of climate change are
likely to be significant and to increase over time. Future projections in global yield trends of both maize and wheat indicate
a significant decline; these declines can be attributed to the negative impacts of climate change arising
from increasing greenhouse gas emissions. In many parts of less developed countries in Africa and Central America, maize
is a key component in the daily diet and plays a key role in achieving food security in those areas, with nearly
950 million metric tonnes consumed annually. Wheat also plays a central role in diets. With nearly 700
million metric tonnes consumed annually on a global basis, wheat alone provides over 20 per cent of the
world's calories and protein. To ensure food security for the predicted population of 9.6 billion people
by 2050 the FAO predicts that food production must increase by at least 60 per cent to meet the demand, and
a report from Tilman et al. in 2011 projected that food production must increase by 100 per cent to meet the projected food demand. With
yields declining, and demand for both the amount and quality of food increasing (due to increased
disposable income amongst developing countries) intervention is a must. The negative effects from
climate change will cause changes in global weather patterns and cycles that will be both
unpredictable and long term. It is foreseen that the fishing industry will also experience significant
disruption, with salt water and fresh water fishing at risk. This situation implies a great urgency, as the children who are
born in today's world will not have reached graduation age before these problems will have materialized, unless immediate action is taken.
We have already seen climate effects on yields in a number of areas, including Europe and southern
Asia, since the last IPCC Assessment Report in 2007. Unfortunately, it is the populations in many tropical
areas and the southern parts of Europe and North Africa who will pay a great price. These population
groups - especially the poor - are the most vulnerable in terms of failing harvests, higher prices and malnutrition
in the near future. This multi-faceted crisis will only increase pressure in other areas of the world to increase
production, whilst basic living conditions in deprived areas further decrease.
