Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

CLOSE COMBAT - SURVIVABILITY

STREETCRAFT, BATTLE LESSONS
& EXERCISES

Infantry Battle School

2022
PID
 Amendments
Amdt No Date Amdt No Date
1 14/04/2021
2 06/05/2021
3 24/06/2021
4 16/08/2021
5 25/10/2021
6 8/11/2021
7 10/1/2022
8 1/2/2022
9 19/5/2022

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May 22
CONTENTS

Streetcraft, Battle Lessons and Exercises ........................................................................ x

Introduction x
Layout of the Pamphlet x
Instructional Techniques x
Safety Precautions x
Risk to Hearing xi
References and Associated Publications xii

CHAPTER 1 STREETCRAFT ................................................................................................ 1

Lesson 1. Urban camouflage and concealment ................................................................ 1

Camouflage and concealment 2
The use of shadow 4
Texture and colour 4
Common camouflage errors 5
Fig 1-1. Use of drops within a room ................................................................................. 6
Fig 1-2. Firing downwards ................................................................................................ 7
Fig 1-3. Camouflaging a loophole .................................................................................... 8
Fig 1-4. Use of net curtain ................................................................................................ 9
Fig 1-5. Challenger 2 with urban camouflage................................................................ 10

Lesson 2. Target indication and fire control ................................................................... 11

Target indication 12
Fire control 13
Fig 1-6. Spot map ........................................................................................................... 16
Fig 1-7. Target indication of buildings ............................................................................ 17
Fig 1-8. Enemy firing aperture ....................................................................................... 18

Lesson 3. Movement in the Urban Environment ............................................................. 19

Movement through the urban environment 20
Scaling obstacles and entering buildings 21
Fig 1-9. Two person lifts ................................................................................................. 24
Fig 1-10. Single person lifts............................................................................................ 25
Fig 1-11. Combination lift and top assist ....................................................................... 26

Lesson 4. House clearing................................................................................................... 27

Building entry 28
Exploitation 28
Creation and exploitation of a breach 29
Section grouping 29
Building clearance 29
Fig 1-12. Building clearance sequence ......................................................................... 31
Fig 1-13. NATO marking ................................................................................................ 32

Lesson 5. Building Defence ............................................................................................... 33

Preconstruction 33
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Preparation of buildings - Internal 34
Preparation of buildings - External 36
Fig 1-14. Props and wedges .......................................................................................... 39
Fig 1-15. Blocking stairways .......................................................................................... 40
Fig 1-16. Grenade holes ................................................................................................ 41
Fig 1-17. Wire obstacles in a room ................................................................................ 42
Fig 1-18. Building prepared for defence ........................................................................ 43

CHAPTER 2 CLOSE QUARTER BATTLE (CQB) .............................................................. 44

Introduction 44

Lesson 6. Rifle positions of carriage ................................................................................ 45

The low ready 46
The compressed alert position 46
The high ready 46
The index 47
The low carry 47
Fig 2-1. The low ready position ..................................................................................... 49
Fig 2-2. The compressed alert ...................................................................................... 50
Fig 2-3. The high ready .................................................................................................. 51
Fig 2-4. The index........................................................................................................... 52
Fig 2-5. The low carry..................................................................................................... 53

Lesson 7. Urban CQB Fundamentals ............................................................................... 54

Principles 55
Types of Building clearance 55
Verbal commands 56
Other factors in building clearance 56
The stack 57
The stack organisation 57
The stack principles 59
The stack Immediate Action (IA) 59
Use of light 60
Marksmanship challenges in the UE 60
Fig 2-6. Coordinated entry ............................................................................................. 62
Fig 2-7. Words of command ........................................................................................... 63
Fig 2-8. The No1 and No2.............................................................................................. 65
Fig 2-9. Examples of dangerous practice ...................................................................... 66

Lesson 8. The Doorway (Entry Point) ............................................................................... 67

Pre entry phases 68
The fatal funnel of fire 69
Types of door 69
Rolling the door 70
Accessibility check 70
Diminishing return 71
Fighting from the door 72
The use of grenades and distraction devices 74
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 Fig 2-10. Positioning of No1 & No2 on an entry point ................................................... 77
Fig 2-11. The fatal funnel ............................................................................................... 78
Fig 2-12. Inward opening door (Push) ........................................................................... 79
Fig 2-13. Outward opening door (Pull)........................................................................... 79
Fig 2-14. Roll with 2 ........................................................................................................ 80
Fig 2-15. Attack the crack .............................................................................................. 81
Fig 2-16. Door check, push door.................................................................................... 82
Fig 2-17. Diminishing return ........................................................................................... 83
Fig 2-18. Foot and body position when conducting a door roll ..................................... 84
Fig 2-19a. Hand signal to deploy L109 HE. ................................................................... 85
Fig 2-19b. Confirmation of grenade to No1. .................................................................. 85

Lesson 9. 5 Step Entry ....................................................................................................... 86

The immediate area 87
Dominant position 87
The Five Step Entry 88
The two-person clear 89
Methods of room clearance 89
Crisscross Technique 89
Buttonhook Technique 91
Combination technique 91
The three- and four-person clearing technique 92
Dynamic entry 93
Room clearance sequence 94
Fig 2-20. The immediate area ........................................................................................ 96
Fig 2-21. Types of room and dominant position within ................................................. 97
Fig 2-22. Crisscross technique ...................................................................................... 98
Fig 2-23. 5 Step entry ..................................................................................................... 99
Fig 2-24. Buttonhook technique ................................................................................... 100
Fig 2-25. No2 enters first............................................................................................. 101
Fig 2-26. Combination Technique ................................................................................ 102
Fig 2-27. 3 person-clear ............................................................................................... 103

Lesson 10. Shapes and formations ................................................................................ 104

Clearing corridors 105
Formations 105
Clearing L shaped spaces 107
Clearing T shaped space 108
Clearing intersecting corridors 109
Clearing a U shape space 109
Fig 2-29. Single stack formation .................................................................................. 111
Fig 2-30. Heavy stack (left) formation .......................................................................... 112
Fig 2-31. Split stack formation ..................................................................................... 113
Fig 2-32. V Stack formation.......................................................................................... 114
Fig 2-33. L-Shapes ....................................................................................................... 115
Fig 2-34. The barricade ................................................................................................ 116
Fig 2-35. The Hi – Lo formation ................................................................................... 117
Fig 2-36. Double barricade........................................................................................... 118
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 Fig 2-37. Intersection clearance (V Stack) .................................................................. 119
Fig 2-38. Clearing a U-shape ....................................................................................... 120

Lesson 11. Stairs and ladders ......................................................................................... 121

Stairs 122
Ladders 124
Fig 2-39. Two firers clear bottom landing .................................................................... 126
Fig 2-40. Two firers clear stairs to the first switchback ............................................... 127
Fig 2-41. Stairs cleared to next level ........................................................................... 128

Lesson 12. Occupancy Control ....................................................................................... 129

Controlling an occupant 130
Closing on an occupant 131
Conducting a person search 131
Conducting a dead check 132

Lesson 13. Constricted space ......................................................................................... 133

Constricted space 134
Severely constricted space 135
Occupancy control 135
Clearing furniture 136
Fig 2-42. Clearing furniture .......................................................................................... 138

Lesson 14. Room to room and securing ........................................................................ 139

Marking 140
Clearance 141
Fighting from room to room 141
Marshalling areas 141
Secure points 142
Re-clear 143
Fig 2-43. NATO marking .............................................................................................. 144
Fig 2-44. Marking a room ............................................................................................. 145
Fig 2-45. Use of doorways of cleared enclosures ....................................................... 146

Lesson 15. Manual Method of Entry (MoE) .................................................................... 147

Manual MoE Tools 148
Defeating an inward (push) opening door 149
Defeating an outward (pull) opening door 151
Defeating windows 152
Fig 2-46. The enforcer .................................................................................................. 154
Fig 2-47. Holding the enforcer ..................................................................................... 155
Fig 2-48. The Halligan tool ........................................................................................... 156
Fig 2-49. Door bolts ...................................................................................................... 157
Fig 2-50. Halligan tool levering a push door ................................................................ 158
Fig 2-51. Halligan Tool duckbill lever points ................................................................ 159
Fig 2-52. Halligan tool levering a pull door .................................................................. 160
Fig 2-53. Defeating sheet glass window with the Halligan Tool.................................. 161
Fig 2-54. Clearing shards from the frame with the web of the tool ............................. 161

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CHAPTER 3 SUBTERRANEAN ........................................................................................ 162

Introduction........................................................................................................................ 162
Fig 3-1. Training in Gibraltar tunnels ........................................................................... 162

Lesson 16. Subterranean categories and hazards ....................................................... 163

Structure categories 164
Threats and hazards 165
Fig 3-1. Corsham Mines Training Area (CMTA) ......................................................... 169

Lesson 17. Patrol Techniques and procedures ............................................................ 170

Subterranean operations considerations 171
Access point 172
Patrol techniques and procedures 172
Fig 3-2. Patrol equipment ............................................................................................. 175

Lesson 18. Subterranean CQB ........................................................................................ 176

The stack variations 177
Fundamentals 177
Complex Terrain 178
Movement 178
Marking 179
Tunnels 179
Shapes 182
Chambers 182
Equipment 184
Fig 3-4. Narrow tunnel .................................................................................................. 187
Fig 3-5. Narrow tunnel clearance ................................................................................. 188
Fig 3-6. Medium Tunnel ............................................................................................... 189
Fig 3-7. Medium tunnel clearance................................................................................ 190
Fig 3-8. Medium tunnel break contact drill variations .................................................. 191
Fig 3-9. Large tunnel .................................................................................................... 192
Fig 3-10. Large tunnel clearance ................................................................................. 193
Fig 3-11. Barricade variations ...................................................................................... 194
Fig 3-12. Clearing an intersection with additional firers .............................................. 195
Fig 3-13. Chamber with clutter ..................................................................................... 196
Fig 3-14. Small chamber clearance. ............................................................................ 197
Fig 3-15. Large chamber ............................................................................................. 198
Fig 3-16. Large chamber clearance ............................................................................. 199
Fig 3-17. Employment of GPMG. ................................................................................. 200
Fig 3-18. Employment of Sharpshooter ....................................................................... 200

CHAPTER 4 WEAPON EFFECTS ..................................................................................... 201

Section 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 201

Section 2. Small arms ....................................................................................................... 202

9MM Pistol 202
Rifle 202
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Medium and Heavy machine gun 203
Fig 4-1. 7.62mm penetration chart............................................................................... 203
Sniper rifle (L115A3 8.59mm) 203
Fig 4-2. Sniper capabilities. .......................................................................................... 203

Section 3 Grenades ........................................................................................................... 204

Section 4 Heavier infantry direct weapons .................................................................... 205

Anti-tank weapons 205
Anti-structure munitions (ASM) 205
40mm Cannon fire 205
Fig 4-3. The Boxer (left) and Ajax (right) armoured fighting vehicles. ........................ 206

Section 5 Tank weapons .................................................................................................. 207

Fig 4-4. Challenger 2, Iraq 2003. ................................................................................. 207

Section 6 Indirect weapons ............................................................................................. 208

Mortars (81mm) 208
Fig 4-5. Gun Equipment 155mm L131, AS90. ............................................................ 208

CHAPTER 5. COMMANDERS BUILDING CLEARANCE CONSIDERATIONS ............. 209

Introduction 209
Considerations 209
Scenarios 210
Scenario one 211
Scenario variation – Opposing open doors 215
Scenario variation - Mousehole 216
Fig 5-1. Wider planning considerations ....................................................................... 217
Fig 5-2. Low level tactical planning and groupings .................................................... 218

CHAPTER 6 BATTLE LESSONS AND BATTLE EXERCISES ....................................... 219

Section 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 219

Aim 219
Definitions 219
Scope 219

Section 2. Planning for a Battle Lesson or Battle Exercise ........................................ 221

Section 3. Preparation of a Battle Lesson and a Battle Exercise ............................... 223

Section 4. The Battle Lesson ........................................................................................... 226

General 226
Examples 226
Conduct 226
Sequence 226
Conclusion 229

Section 5. The Battle Exercise......................................................................................... 230

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General 230
Examples 230
Conduct 230
Sequence 231
Battle Preparation and the Battle Picture 232
Duties of the Instructor and Safety Supervisor — Live Firing 233
Competition 234

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May 22
Streetcraft, Battle Lessons and Exercises

Introduction

1. This publication has been produced to provide junior commanders and instructors a
single point of reference from which to deliver urban specific low level training. The
publication has been designed to enable any instructor to deliver the lesson content,
regardless of cap badge or experience. It is advised, however, that instructors should
attend the Urban Operations Instructors Course (UOIC) or Close Quarter Battle
Instructors Course (CQBI) to gain deeper Knowledge, Skills and Experience (KSE)
required to improve training delivery. This particularly applies to Urban Close Quarter
Battle (CQB) lessons where particular nuances exist and where repetitive training to
achieve ‘muscle memory’ is key to KSE development and a deeper understanding of
the Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs).
Layout of the Pamphlet

2. The pamphlet is written in lesson form, each lesson being divided into two parts:

a. Part A — Instructors Notes. This contains the information required by the

instructor to enable them to prepare for the lesson.

b. Part B — Conduct of the Lesson. This contains the matter to be taught and is
laid out in a proven sequence.
Instructional Techniques

3. Skill at Arms Instructors are taught how to deliver lessons on a qualifying course.
They will understand those basic instructional techniques required to deliver SAA
training. However, very rarely will a squad of soldiers all have the same learning
style. It is therefore essential that the instructor has the skills and experience to be
able to adapt their instructional methods to cater for the needs of those being trained.
The guiding principle is that all subject matter must be delivered regardless of the
level of experience and/or previous knowledge of the student.

4. There is of course latitude in the methods which can be employed by the instructor to
deliver this matter, but ultimately the lesson must deliver and practice the students on
the detail contained within the lesson in accordance with the Learning Specifications
(LSPECs) for that lesson.

5. Instructors are not permitted to omit detail or adapt drills to save time. Instructors
should always consult the chain of command if there is any doubt as to what is
required.
Safety Precautions

6. Before every lesson all weapons, spare barrels, ammunition containers and drill
cartridges must be inspected to ensure that no live ammunition is present.

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7. Prior to the use of Infantry Weapons, AFVs or Pyrotechnics for Live or Blank firing
Pamphlet 21, Regulations for Training with Armoured Fighting Vehicles, Infantry
Weapon Systems and Pyrotechnics is to also be consulted. The user must also
ensure they have the most up to date version of this publication
Risk to Hearing

8. Issued hearing protection is required by firers, supervisors and others in the close
vicinity of the firing point or area during all firing.

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References and Associated Publications

For the latest edition and/or amendments of each publication see ‘Catalogue of Army
Publications’ Parts 1 and 2, Army Code No. 12123 and/or British Army electronic Battle
Box (BAeBB).
Reference Code No Title
A 71855 CLOSE COMBAT – RANGES. Pamphlet No.21, Training
Regulations for Armoured Fighting Vehicles, Infantry Weapon
Systems and Pyrotechnics.
B 71807 CLOSE COMBAT – LETHALITY. SA80 System, Rifle 5.56mm,
L85A2/A3, Carbine 5.56mm, L22A2 and UGL 40mm L123A3.

C 71996 CLOSE COMBAT – LETHALITY. General Service Pistol L131A1.

D 71718 CLOSE COMBAT – LETHALITY. Grenades, Pyrotechnics and

Associated Equipment.
E 71882 Capability Directorate Combat Dismounted Close Combat Doctrine –
Volume 1, Infantry Company Group – Infantry Platoon Tactics.
F Urban Tactical Handbook.
G 71717 CLOSE COMBAT - SURVIVABILITY. Fieldcraft, Battle Lessons &
Exercises.
H DN 20/05 Subterranean Operations in the Urban Environment

I 70739 CLOSE COMBAT - LETHALITY. Sniping - Part 2. Fieldcraft & Battle

Exercises
J 71747 Military Engineering Volume II. Field Engineering. Pamphlet No2
Field Fortifications, 2006.

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Chapter 1 Streetcraft

Lesson 1. Urban camouflage and concealment

1-1 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach camouflage in the urban environment:

a. Camouflage and concealment.

b. The use of shadow.

c. Texture and colour.

d. Common camouflage errors.

1-2 Timings. Two 40 minute periods.

1-3 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period.

1-4 Stores.

Rifle fitted with sight and sling 1 per soldier

Magazine 1 per soldier
BFA 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
Camouflage cream 1 per soldier
Scrim As required
Screening / drape materials As required
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Thermal sight where available
Demonstrators as necessary
1-5 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the drills.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

Preliminaries
1-6 Safety Precautions. Normal.

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May 22
1-7 Revision. Question the squad on ‘Why things are seen’, then indicate area of
observation for the demonstration.

Introduction
1-8 Explain: Camouflage and concealment in built-up areas is as important to the survival
of troops and equipment as in any other environment. The changing patterns of
terrain and the differing nature of individual buildings make the task of blending with
the terrain challenging. All field craft demands strong leadership coupled with
professionalism and self-discipline from the soldier in its application. This requirement
is reinforced in the urban battlespace.
Camouflage and concealment

1-9 Explain and demonstrate: Soldiers. The need to break up the silhouette of helmets
and individual equipment exists in built-up areas the same as it does elsewhere, but
care must be taken not to negate the effectiveness of helmet fitted night vision
equipment.

a. Natural camouflage. Urban areas are generally devoid of plant life so scrim
should be attached to helmets and equipment to break up the outline of the
soldier. If operating within a park or similar environment scrim should be
complimented with natural camouflage.

b. Mission. Stabilisation tasks are likely to take place concurrently to Major

Combat Operations (MCO) so the application of individual camouflage (scrim,
foliage and cam cream) may be counterproductive to the mission (hearts and
minds). Commanders must weigh up the benefits to the mission against the
threat to friendly forces. The decision must be continually reviewed.

1-10 Explain and demonstrate: Fire positions. Urban areas provide plenty of cover from
view and fire which should, where possible and practicable, be used to conceal
personnel and materiel. Where such concealment is not possible, Urban Camouflage
Material (UCM) and locally available materials should be applied using innovation
and initiative. The following points should be noted:

a. Weapons should normally be sited well back from the window so that neither
the muzzle flash nor the person firing the weapon are visible from the outside.

b. Domestic curtains or window blinds, or hessian screens, may be used to help

disguise which windows are being used as firing positions, but they offer no
protection from enemy fire.

c. Consider the use of drops within a room to give the appearance of a wall from
which a firer can observe freely without being silhouetted (see fig 1-1).

d. A wide field of fire must be obtained by firing from alternative points, perhaps
from different rooms in the building. The weapon should not be sited closer to
the window to gain a wider field of fire.
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May 22
 e. Similarly, if firing downwards from a first or second floor window, the weapons
must be elevated (see fig 1-2), not placed closer to the window.

f. If loopholes are needed, they must be sited with care as they are usually
conspicuous unless close to ground level or under eaves. However, it is
sometimes possible to camouflage the hole by siting it through attachments to
buildings, such as advertising signs (see fig 1-3). Loopholes can be made in
empty buildings to deceive the enemy.

g. Care should be taken not to alter the external appearance of a building that
would make it stand out. For example, drawing curtains or closing doors when
all other buildings on the street have them open. When removing glass from in
front of a firing position consider breaking the glass partially to provide an
aperture while being less conspicuous.

h. Positions must be constructed in stages and camouflaged as they are prepared.

When the enemy has air superiority, work may be possible only at night. Care
must be taken to avoid light, sign or movement that will attract attention from the
air or by ground based observers, which will include the local population acting
as eyes and ears for the opponent.

i. If the enemy has Thermal Imaging (TI) capability, soldiers must be aware that
UCM and other drape materials will not, on their own, conceal vehicles or
positions. Thermal Camouflage Woodland (TCW) must be used in conjunction
with the UCM. Local materials can also be employed to increase the deception.
Care should also be taken to avoid giving a heat signature to an obviously
derelict building.

j. Distinctive buildings should be avoided, even if their protective qualities are

good, because they can be easily described by the enemy when calling for air
support, etc. The absence of glass in the windows of a room or house may
prematurely reveal the location of defending troops.

k. Consider the use of overt, dummy positions to draw the enemy away from
friendly forces.

l. Command posts and logistical echelons are easier to camouflage and better
protected if located underground. Antennas can be remoted to upper stories or
to higher buildings if possible. Field telephone cable should be laid in conduits,
in sewers, or routed through buildings if possible.

m. After camouflage is completed, commanders and the soldier should inspect the
position from the enemy’s viewpoint. They also should make routine and
periodic checks to ensure the camouflage fits in and does actually conceal the
position. If it does not look natural, the soldier should rearrange or replace it.

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May 22
1-11 Explain and demonstrate. Weapon signature. Consideration should be given to
muzzle flash, smoke, or dust produced while firing.

a. Flash. Muzzle flash can be seen most at night, dawn and dusk but is also
visible when the firer is in a particularly dark room. The use of drapes or
screening to the front of the firer will help to hide/subdue flash.

b. Smoke. Smoke works in the same way as the flash, however smoke from a rifle
will be detected on cold frosty days.

c. Signature. This is the disturbance to your front when firing. For example, a
weapon fired with the muzzle close to a net screen will cause the net to billow
outwards, giving away the firers position.

d. Where possible the enemy should be engaged through apertures in walls, doors
and shutters to hide weapon signature. In dry, dusty conditions the area around
firing points can be dampened with water or wet cloth to also suppress dust.

1-12 Explain and demonstrate: Vehicles. Vehicles can often find isolated positions under
archways or inside small industrial or commercial structures. When concealing
vehicles buildings with cellars should be avoided and if it is necessary to remove a
wall to make space, a check should be made to ensure it is not load-bearing. Steel or
concrete framed buildings may be the most suitable.
The use of shadow

1-13 Explain and demonstrate: Buildings throw sharp shadows, which can be used to
conceal vehicles and equipment provided an awareness of the sun’s position and the
time of day is maintained. Vehicles may have to be moved periodically as shadows
shift during the day. Emplacements inside buildings provide better concealment.
Soldiers should avoid areas that are not in shadow. Other features of shadows that
can prove useful are:

a. Avoid the lighted areas around windows and loopholes. Use the depth of the
room and use a fire position in the room’s shadow.

b. Shutters, blinds, net curtaining or cheesecloth, if common to the area in window

spaces, will provide additional shadow to be utilised (see fig 1-4). Alternatively,
hessian can be suspended inside the room to create a similar effect.
Texture and colour

1-14 Explain and demonstrate: Standard camouflage pattern painting of equipment is not
as effective in built-up areas as a solid, dull, dark colour hidden in shadows.
Camouflage painted vehicles should have the patterns subdued with mud or dirt.

a. Predominant colours are normally brown, tan, black, and grey rather than green
(see fig 1-5). Each camouflaged position must be checked for compatibility in
texture and colour.
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May 22
Common camouflage errors

1-15 Explain and demonstrate: Great care is required to avoid being silhouetted or sky-
lined. To defeat enemy surveillance, soldiers should be alert for common camouflage
errors such as:

a. Poor track discipline. Vehicles should be kept to hardened roads and tracks
wherever possible. Similarly, individuals must keep to the designated cleared
routes.

b. Shine or shadows. Poor positioning when taking up fire positions or observing

out of windows can result in shadows being cast around corners or through
doorways and sunlight reflecting off surfaces, both of which can betray a
soldier’s position.

c. Camouflage net. An unnatural colour or texture, camouflage net should not be

used in an urban environment.

d. Unnatural sounds and smells. The funnelling effect of streets and buildings
combined with weather conditions can carry smells while the hard surfaces of
buildings and walls can reverberate sounds alerting enemy to the presence of
friendly forces.

e. Movement. The eye is attracted to any movement but especially sudden

movement. This is particularly noticeable in the urban environment due to the
close quarters and harsh, linear features of the terrain.

Conclusion

1-16 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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May 22
 Fig 1-1. Use of drops within a room
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May 22
 Fig 1-2. Firing downwards
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May 22
 Fig 1-3. Camouflaging a loophole

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May 22
 View from inside

View from outside

Fig 1-4. Use of net curtain

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May 22
 Fig 1-5. Challenger 2 with urban camouflage
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May 22
Lesson 2. Target indication and fire control

1-17 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach the considerations for target indication and fire
control in the urban environment:

a. Target indication.

b. Fire control.

1-18 Timings. One 40 minute period.

1-19 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period.

1-20 Stores.

Rifle 1 per soldier

Magazine 1 per soldier
BFA 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Visual aids as necessary
Demonstrators as necessary
1-21 Preparation.

a. Prepare a suitable visual aid to show target indication of buildings.

b. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions and select:

(1) An arc of fire with reference points.

(2) Targets to use during demonstration and practice.

c. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

d. If possible, issue each soldier with a representative sight picture and mini
landscape target for indicating the position of the target.

Preliminaries
1-22 Safety Precautions. Normal. (Issue an arc of fire, number the squad i.e. fire team, D
fire team etc.).

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May 22
1-23 Revision. Indication of targets and Reaction to Fire Control Orders (FCO).

Introduction
1-24 Explain: The urban environment is congested and complex making target indication
and fire control difficult. While the lessons previously taught for the indication of
targets and fire control are relevant, there are additional methods and considerations
that can be employed to help facilitate swift target acquisition and subsequent,
affective suppression.
Target indication

1-25 Explain and demonstrate: Spot mapping. Identifying or referring to a piece of ground
in urban terrain using a six or eight figure grid reference can prove imprecise and
slow, often making it impracticable. An urban grid system sometimes referred to as a
spot map (see fig 1-6) should therefore be used to reference own location, the
location of flanking units or persons and those of enemies and other significant sites
or locations.
1-26 Explain and demonstrate: Target identification of buildings. Unlike a simple bunker
position a building provides multiple areas of interest or targets in the form of
windows, doors and mouseholes. To assist target identification a simple colour code
and numbering system is used to identify a point on a building when observing or for
target indication (see fig 1-7).

a. White is used to indicate the front aspect of the building. This is the aspect
where the front door is present and not necessarily the aspect facing the
observer.

b. Black is used to indicate the rear aspect of the building (opposite white aspect).

c. Red is used to indicate the right aspect of the building. This is in relation to the
white aspect if viewed from the front.

d. Green indicates the left aspect of the building (opposite red aspect). This is in
relation to white aspect if viewed from the front.

e. Each level of the building is numbered respectively: 1 – first floor, 2 – second

floor, 3 – third floor, etc.

f. Windows and doors are numbered from left to right for every floor, starting at 1
for each floor.

g. Target indication is given using a combination of colour and numbers (floor then
window/door No) e.g. ‘white, 2-1’ would indicate the front aspect of the building,
second floor, first window/door on the left.

1-27 Confirm by practice.

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May 22
1-28 Explain: Tracer. Studies and historical analyses have shown that only five percent of
targets in the urban environment are more than 100 metres away making the tracer,
with an ignition range of approx. 140m, ineffective as a method of target indication for
most engagements.

1-29 Explain: Indexing of targets. When conducting offensive operations in the

Contemporary Operating Environment, particularly Strike Operations, targets may be
indexed to prevent confusion and to provide a quick reference for locating and
communicating targets to other friendly forces. Targets are indexed into the following
categories:

a. Alpha. Target buildings are referred to as Alpha’s. If several target buildings

exist a suffix will usually be added; Alpha one, Alpha two etc.

b. Bravo. Target individuals are referred to as Bravo’s. The term Bravo’s is often
used to report armed individuals or persons of interest or are specific targets
that have been identified as high priority (to be neutralised or detained).

c. Charlie. Target vehicles are referred to as Charlie’s. Charlie’s are vehicles of

interest and may be affiliated with an Alpha or Bravo or may fit the description of
a specific threat (Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED)).
Fire control

1-30 Explain: The indication of targets and control of fire are as previously taught1 but
come with additional considerations specific to the urban environment and should be
supplemented with the methods above.

1-31 Explain: Full fire control order. Due to the confined nature of urban terrain a full fire
control order is only likely when the enemy is pre seen without compromise. An
example full fire control order utilising spot mapping, building identification and target
indexing is as follows:
“Delta Fire Team – 100m – right of Blue 2 (spot map reference) – Alpha Red Door –
White (front aspect) – 2 – 2 (Second floor, second window) – Enemy – Fire!”
1-32 Explain: Brief. Most likely to be utilised when first contacted. Due to the complex
environment the firing point may not be obvious. Use distinct building features to
assist indication. An example brief FCO is:
“Section – ¼ Right – Building with red door – Rapid – Fire!”
1-33 Explain: Individual fire control order. Engagement times in the urban environment
are short with the enemy presenting only fleeting targets so the use of individual fire
control orders passes the responsibility to fire to the individual. The individual fire
control order should not be used to suppress a target/bravo that is continually
‘popping’ up in the same window/area, a full fire control order should be given to
facilitate continual suppression as opposed to reactive suppression.

1 Pam 2. Close combat - Survivability. Fieldcraft, Battle Lessons & Exercises. Chapter 5 Lessons 19 - 21
13
May 22
1-34 Considerations. The following factors must be considered when engaging /
providing suppressive fire:
a. Hard cover. Buildings provide the enemy with an affective barrier against small
arms fire while the vertical walls of the buildings and shorter engagement
ranges reduce automatic weapon beaten zones making suppression more
difficult. Accurate, semi-automatic weapons, such as the SA80 and L129
sharpshooter rifle should be utilised to effectively suppress enemy within
buildings.

b. Accuracy. Recent urban operations have shown the wide use of firing
apertures as small as 20cm (see fig 1-8). Effective engagement of these
apertures requires a high degree of accuracy.

c. Firing points. The urban environment also provides the enemy with multiple
firing points. A single building can have several windows and doors, each a
potential firing point for the enemy. When suppressing an objective individual
soldiers must be allocated to suppress each potential firing point using the
colour code and numbering system. Failure to do so (by allocating a fire unit to
suppress a whole aspect for example) will result in firers concentrating all fire on
a single point giving the enemy freedom of movement to move to a different
firing point.

d. Angles. High rise buildings can be used by the enemy and friendly forces to
dominate areas. Accurate engagement from oblique angles will also require
superior marksmanship.

e. Exposure. The urban environment restricts arcs of observation and fire and
provides the enemy with cover from which to fire and manoeuvre resulting in
fleeting exposures that require soldiers to be able to engage accurately at short
notice.

f. Grenades. The underslung grenade launcher (UGL) provides accurate fire

against point targets such as windows up to 150m. With an arming distance of
14-28m the UGL projectile, on impact, explodes and is designed to penetrate up
to 63.5mm of steel, 300mm of concrete and cause casualties to 5m from the
explosion. This makes the UGL an extremely effective system for neutralising
positions/firing points within buildings particularly when coordinated with an
assault team as part of their pre entry strike/fires.

Conclusion

1-35 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

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May 22
 d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

15
May 22
 Fig 1-6. Spot map

16
May 22
 Fig 1-7. Target indication of buildings

17
May 22
 Fig 1-8. Enemy firing aperture

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May 22
Lesson 3. Movement in the Urban Environment

1-36 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach movement in the urban environment and
methods of scaling obstacles and entering buildings:

a. Movement through the urban environment.

b. Scaling obstacles and entering buildings.

1-37 Timings. One 40-minute period.

1-38 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period. Can be delivered as a centralised,

narrated demonstration.

1-39 Stores.

Rifle 1 per soldier

Magazine 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
Cam cream as required
Lightweight infantry periscope as required
Demonstrators as necessary
1-40 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the factors
given and shown in the camouflage and movement sections.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

Preliminaries
1-41 Safety Precautions. Normal.

1-42 Revision. Methods of movement (Fieldcraft, Battle Lessons & Exercises)..

Introduction
1-43 Explain: Movement in urban areas is limited by poor communications and
observation, buildings, rubble, obstacles and the enemy and their locations. All
movement must be supported or capable of being supported by accurate direct fire
support. The passage of good, clear information and intelligence on enemy positions
is vital. This will reduce casualties and avoid the natural tendency to focus on the
nearest buildings.

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May 22
Movement through the urban environment

1-44 Explain and demonstrate: Individual movement. It is an individual soldiers

responsibility to apply the following methods when moving through the Urban
Environment (UE). Failure to apply these methods will leave the soldier exposed and
increase their chances of becoming a casualty.

a. Crossing a Wall. Movement over a wall should be covered by fire and only
conducted if the other side is clear. When moving, the soldier should roll over
the wall, keeping a low silhouette. The speed of movement and a low silhouette
will deny the enemy a target. This method of movement requires practice by all
soldiers.

b. Movement Around Corners. The area around a corner should be observed

before a soldier moves to it. A common mistake is to allow a personal weapon
to extend beyond the corner, signposting the soldier’s position and intention.

c. Movement Past Windows. Movement past windows presents hazards; the

most common of which is the mistake of exposing the head. The correct
technique to pass a window is to stay below the window level if possible. For
basement windows the most common mistake is not being aware of it. The
correct procedure for negotiating a basement window is either to avoid it or to
stay close to the wall of the building and step or jump past the window and
provide minimum exposure to view.

d. Use of Doorways. Doorways should be avoided if possible. They may be

covered by fire or booby-trapped. If a soldier must use a doorway, they should
move quickly through it to their next position, staying as low as possible to avoid
silhouetting themself. Pre-selection of positions, speed, a low silhouette, and
the use of covering fire should be employed when using doorways.

e. Moving Parallel to Buildings. Soldiers will not always be able to use the inside
of buildings to advance, so movement forward may be necessary outside
buildings. Movement should always be concealed and covered by smoke and
covering fire. Correctly moving outside a building, the soldier ‘hugs’ the side of
the building, stays in the shadow, present a low silhouette, and moves rapidly to
their next fire position. If an enemy inside the building fires on a soldier, they
expose them self to fire from other fire-team and section members. Enemy
further away or to a flank should be engaged by flank sub-units or direct and
indirect fire support.

f. Crossing Open Areas. Open areas, which includes streets and alleys, cannot
be avoided. They are natural killing areas, but can be crossed safely if certain
fundamental rules are applied:

(1) Preparation. Before moving, the next well covered position should be
selected. At the same time, the best route to take to get to that position,
which offers concealment and/ or speed of movement should be selected.
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May 22
 (2) Least Exposure. The shortest distance across streets and between
buildings should be used covered by smoke from hand grenades to
conceal movement. The cover provided by walls should be exploited for as
long as possible. By doing so, the individual will reduce the evidence of
their intentions and the time that they are exposed to enemy fire.

(3) Fire Support. Direct covering fire support is or can be provided.

1-45 Explain and demonstrate: Fire Team movement. Moving quickly as a fire team, from
building to building or across a street, is the best method of tactical movement.
Within buildings the fire team must ensure that every room is clear of enemy and
should use the protection of the building as cover for as long as possible. Fire team
movement between buildings must be covered by fire, preferably by another fire
team. Bunching or stacking should be avoided to minimize the effect of automatic
weapons and booby-traps. Movement can be made at street level or by using roofs
and underground systems. The threat of an effective counterattack will be most real
immediately after the successful capture of a building.

1-46 When moving from position to position, care must be taken to ensure that supporting
fire is not masked. On reaching the next position the individual or fire team should be
prepared to cover the movement of other members of the fire team or section.

1-47 The most common error made is to fire over cover rather than around it thereby
silhouetting against the wall or building to the rear and provide the enemy with a clear
target.

Scaling obstacles and entering buildings

1-48 Explain: Various means, such as ladders, assisted lifts, drainpipes, vines,
helicopters, or the roofs and windows of adjoining buildings may be used to reach the
top floor or roof of a building. In some cases, one soldier can climb onto the
shoulders of another and reach high enough to pull themself up. All actions must be
planned and coordinated utilising covering fire, smoke and/or diversionary measures
before executing, regardless of the method used.

1-49 Explain and demonstrate: The Use of Climbing Equipment. The use of climbing
equipment is heavily influenced by the amount, volume and weight of equipment the
soldier is carrying.

a. Ladders. Ladders offer the quickest method to gain access to the upper levels
of a building. Although ladders will not permit access to the top of some
buildings, they will offer some security and safety through speed. Units
deploying into an urban environment should be equipped with a lightweight,
portable, collapsible ladder. Ladders can also be built with resources available
throughout the urban area; for example, lumber can be taken from inside the
walls of buildings.

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May 22
 b. Grappling Hooks. The grappling hook should be sturdy, portable, easily
thrown, and equipped with hooks that can hold inside a window. The scaling
rope should have knots tied in the rope at intervals to make climbing easier. The
use of grappling hooks is the least preferred method for gaining entry to upper
levels of buildings as it is physically demanding and time consuming, however
once in defence they can be used to haul stores from ground level into
defended positions.

1-50 Explain: Scaling Walls. When forced to scale a wall during exposure to enemy fire,
all available concealment must be employed. Covering fire, smoke and diversionary
measures improve the chances of a success. When using smoke for concealment,
soldiers should plan for wind direction.

1-51 Explain: Rappelling. This is an entry technique for upper floors that soldiers can use
to descend from the rooftop of a tall building into a window. However, this method of
entry requires a safe and secure platform to operate from and some practice in the
techniques of abseiling. A diversion will be needed to distract the enemy whilst
abseiling is being conducted. Can be used for both offensive and defensive
operations.

1-52 Explain and demonstrate: Assisted Lifts. It is possible to scale the outside of
buildings by team effort utilising 2 or 3 person lifts. Be mindful that glass can stick to
soles of the boots and that the person supporting the soldier entering the building
may get cut. Some examples of lifts are:

a. Two Person Lift. Entry person stands facing the wall with their palms against
the building underneath the point of entry. Two lifters can lift the entry person by
their heels, the use of a plank or weapon or allow the entry person to climb onto
their shoulders. Once set the two lifters would stand fully up-right and lift the
entry person up (see fig 1-9).

b. Single Person Lift. The simplest method is the stirrup lift where the lifter stands
with their back against the wall underneath the point of entry with their legs
slightly bent at the knee. The stirrup method is adopted as follows:

(1) The lifter cups their hands together and places them onto the supporting
leg, just above the knee. Fingers must NOT be interlocked. Interlocking
the fingers will result in crush injury.

(2) The entry person stands opposite the lifter and places one foot in the
hands/stirrup. The entry person must ensure to use the same foot as the
lifters leg that is being used to support the stirrup: Left leg, left foot, right
leg, right foot. Failure to do so may result in injury to the lifter2.

2Placing the right foot onto the left leg of the lifter may result in the entry person striking the lifter in the face
with their left knee as they are lifted.
22
May 22
 (3) As the entry person steps into the stirrup the lifter lifts the stirrup upwards.
This can be done at the double for momentum. Alternatively, instead of
lifting from the foot the entry person can rest their shin in the lifter’s hands.

(4) A second method is for the lifter to use a plank of wood to assist with the
lift (see fig 1-10).

c. Combination Lifts and Top Assist. If entry has already been made either a
combination or top only assist can be used to assist subsequent soldiers to gain
access (see fig 1-11).

1-53 Confirm by practice.

Conclusion

1-54 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

23
May 22
 Fig 1-9. Two person lifts

24
May 22
 Fig 1-10. Single person lifts

25
May 22
 Fig 1-11. Combination lift and top assist

26
May 22
Lesson 4. House clearing

1-55 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach house clearing:

a. Building entry.

b. Exploitation

c. Creation and exploitation of a breach.

d. Section grouping.

e. Building clearance.

1-56 Timings. One 40-minute period.

1-57 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period. Can be delivered as a centralised,

narrated demonstration.

1-58 Stores.

Rifle 1 per soldier

Magazine 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
Cam cream as required
Lightweight infantry periscope as required
Demonstrators as necessary
1-59 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the factors
given and shown in the camouflage and movement sections.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

Preliminaries
1-60 Safety Precautions. Normal.

1-61 Revision. Section Battle Drills – The Attack (Fieldcraft, Battle Lessons & Exercises).

Introduction
1-62 Explain: All attacks on built-up areas involve gaining a foothold and then clearing the
area systematically to prevent its reoccupation by the enemy as the advance
27
May 22
 progresses. The basic assault group for clearing a house is a section as part of a
platoon. The complexity of the building, the enemy positions and defensives will all
affect how far the section can exploit. At all-time troops must be aware of
overextending and leaving themselves vulnerable to counterattack. Commanders
must set realistic targets that can be achieved.
Building entry

1-63 Explain: Breach. An exploitable breach is one through which armed and equipped
soldiers can move quickly, without hindrance and able to use their personal weapons
as they move.

1-64 Explain: In conventional operations, breaches can be made using windows or doors,
through tiled roofs, or by using explosives or large calibre direct or indirect fire
weapons. During strike (arrest and search) operations, the surprise and momentum
of the assault will be enhanced by the shock of the assault and the rapid exploitation
of the breach.

1-65 Explain: Top down entry. Clearing a building from top down is the preferred method.
Assaulting downwards drives the enemy out of the building and hinders their ability to
counterattack. To get into a position to create such a breach, walls should be scaled,
and use can be made of ladders (issued, purchased locally, or improvised) or
grappling hooks to gain entry. Consideration can also be given to the use of vehicles
or abseiling to assist entry and casualty evacuation. Careful consideration must be
given to the weight of the soldier’s individual load before they are tasked with a
forced entry. Too heavy a burden will seriously limit their agility.

1-66 Explain: Entry at Lower Levels. Top-down entry may not be feasible or realistic, for
instance when the building’s upper storeys are either too high or exposed to enemy
fire. When entering at ground or lower levels from a stand-off position, the point of
entry must be clearly identified and known by every member of the assaulting
section. The approach of the assaulting section and its reinforcements to the building
should be covered by smoke and small arms fire.
Exploitation

1-67 Explain: Entry must be exploited quickly. The following two points should be noted:

a. The Entrance. In conventional assaults, entry should be avoided through

windows and doors that can be booby-trapped and covered by enemy fire.
Rapid entry through a breach will maximise the effects of the blast, concussion
and the shock of the unexpected direction of the assault. Nevertheless, on
reaching the point of entry, the assaulting section should be prepared to enlarge
the entry point. When the only entry to a building is through a window or door,
supporting fire, including the use of grenade launchers, should be directed at it
immediately prior to its breach.
b. Grenades. If the ROE permits, grenades should be used to clear the first room
and reinforce the kinetic effect of the breach.
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Creation and exploitation of a breach

1-68 Explain: Whether the breach will be made manually or using explosives, the
breaching party must assemble as close as possible to the entry point to be able to
exploit the breach immediately. The commander should confirm the positions of the
assault team who should be in cover close to the entry point.

1-69 Explain: Whether making a manual or explosive breach to a building, the

commanders pre- entry point recce must:

a. Clearly identify the entry point.

b. Clearly identify the position for the cover group.
c. Identify the method of entry.
d. Confirm if possible, what is on the other side of the entry point.
e. Try to establish the floor plan behind the entry point.
Section grouping

1-70 Explain: The section should be organised into four groupings. Ideally, each assault
group should be flexibly organised into pairs with a weapon mix appropriate to the
task. The basic roles of each group are as follows:

a. Command Group. The section commander will control the speed of the
clearance and tactics to be adopted as the clearance progresses.
b. Cover Group. The cover group is commanded by the section 2i/c and will
deploy to provide fire support during the assault.
c. Assault Group 1 & 2. Assault groups are commanded by a senior soldier.
Building clearance

1-71 Explain: The drill for a section clearing a house is (See fig 1-12):

a. Cover group deploys to a position to cover the point of entry. (The group may
need covering fire and smoke during their move.)
b. The point of entry is made. Assault group two may be required to assist with the
MoE equipment.
c. After UGL has been fired and/or a grenade, or a dummy grenade, has been
‘posted’ through the point of entry, assault group enter and clear the first room.
A pre-arranged signal will be made to the section commander outside, once this
is done.

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 d. Command group and assault group 2 enter the cleared room3 ensuring a
linkman to the fire support group and the platoon commander is posted at the
entry point.
e. The linkman, or firer, mark the entry point with the relevant coloured flag (see fig
1-13).
f. The section commander then indicates next objective to assault group 2.
g. Any firers from assault group 1 & 2 not holding a threat stack and clear the third
room.
h. Concurrently the cover group enter the building. Depending on weapon mix the
cover group will join the stack ready to be tasked by the section commander or
will take over tasks such as linkman or security.
i. The section continues to clear until it has run out of manpower or has reached
the limit of exploitation. A message must be sent to the platoon commander that
either the area is clear, or the next section needs to be echeloned through and
continue the clearance. Radios will remain the primary method of
communication but must be backed up by linkmen.
j. Reorganisation by the section may take place either inside or outside the house
depending on the tactical situation. The section must cover likely enemy
counterattack routes or take up a new position to cover the sections next move
forward.
Conclusion

1-72 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

3 The command group should remain in cover, away from the building until room clear has been called.
30
May 22
 Fig 1-12. Building clearance sequence

31
May 22
 Fig 1-13. NATO marking
32
May 22
Lesson 5. Building Defence

1-73 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach internal and external preparation of buildings
for defence:

a. Preconstruction.

b. Preparation of buildings - Internal.

c. Preparation of buildings - External.

1-74 Timings. One 40 minute period.

1-75 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period.

1-76 Stores.

Defence stores As required

Screening / drape materials As required
PPE (glasses & gloves) As required
Demonstrators as necessary
1-77 Preparation.

a. The use of a Defended House will greatly enhance the delivery of this lesson.

Preliminaries
1-78 Safety Precautions. Normal.

1-79 Revision. Principles of defence and Urban defence groupings.

Introduction
1-80 Explain: While buildings offer some degree of protection against small arms and
indirect fire this protection will be limited and dependant on the type of structure.
Simply building sandbag positions within a structure may ironically make the building
more susceptible to collapse. Soldiers should therefore have an understanding of the
methods and considerations of the preparation of buildings and external spaces for
defence.
Preconstruction

1-81 Explain: Before work commences commanders must conduct a thorough

Surveillance Target Acquisition Plan (STAP) and comprehensive recce. Only once
these are conducted should positions be sited and work commence. When siting
positions the considerations previously covered in Camouflage and Concealment
must be adhered to. Those conducting the recce and subsequent siting of positions
33
May 22
 must consider the final location and height of a position to accurately understand the
arcs once work is completed.4
Preparation of buildings - Internal

1-82 Explain and demonstrate: Use of sandbags. Sandbags are used primarily to give
protection from blast, splinters and fragments, but also to create a suitable firing
platform. The main problem with their use is their weight in relation to the strength of
the floor on which they are placed.

1-83 Explain and demonstrate: Sandbags used for protection can be placed outside the
building to overcome the weight problem, but they will not last as long and will
indicate to the enemy which building is being defended.

1-84 Explain: It is not possible to say accurately how many sandbags can be laid on the
floor of a building as it depends on the specification of the building. However, the
following may be used as a guide:

a. Modern Domestic Dwellings. Modern domestic buildings were likely built to a

building regulation standard and the floors should be able to take two layers of
sandbags over the whole area, although if the floor span is greater than 4.0 m it
would be advisable to place a prop to support the floor at midspan. As an
alternative, a sandbag wall two sandbags wide may be built. If it is built close to
an outside wall or where the floor is supported by a load bearing wall, a
sandbag wall up to 2.0 m high should be possible, but elsewhere it should not
exceed 1.0 m high unless it can be placed on a grillage to spread the load over
about 1 m, in which case the wall might be increased to 1.5 m high.

b. Older Domestic Buildings. It is not possible to generalise on older buildings.

Usually, the floors are weaker than in modern buildings so, unless advised
otherwise by an engineer, the floors should not be so heavily loaded.

c. Shops and Department Stores. Shops and department stores are typical of
buildings in which the public is encouraged to enter. In modern buildings of two
or more storeys, the floors are likely to be about twice as strong as in a modern
domestic building. It is not possible to generalise for older buildings but there is
a good chance that the floors are as strong as in a modern building.

d. Factories. The types and designs of factories are legion and their strength
cannot be generalised. However, they should be at least as strong as modern
domestic buildings and the type of machinery and equipment installed indicates
the strength of the floors.

4 Standing at the window to a building and looking out will not give a true representation of the arcs covered
once the position is constructed. Commanders must consider where the exact location of the position will be
and the height and size of the aperture of the finshed position when siting. Multiple positions may be required
to achieve the desired affect/coverage.
34
May 22
1-85 Explain and demonstrate: Shoring up ceilings. Rooms occupied by the defenders
should be made strong enough to resist collapse. The aim should be to make a
framework whose purpose is not to stop the plaster from the ceiling falling but to
strengthen the ceiling so that the roof or other debris from higher up does not cause it
to collapse on the occupants.

a. The ceilings should be held up by props or struts (see fig 1-14), either purpose-
made equipment, such as Acrow props, or wood. When using timber and where
the ceiling is not more than 3.0 m from the floor, the props should be 120 mm
square or 120 mm in diameter or larger. They should be spaced not more than
1.5 m apart. Wooden wedges are needed to ensure that the props are a tight fit
when installed. In addition, timber spreaders must be used to ensure that the
load is properly transmitted from ceiling to floor and to avoid point loading which
over stresses the ceiling, particularly one that has timber joists.

b. When installing props, the floor on which the props are to be placed must be
strong enough to carry the load. If the floor is not directly on the ground,
additional props must be placed in the room or cellar below, immediately below
the props in the room above. It may be possible to avoid having to put in these
additional props if there are some party walls of sound construction in suitable
positions in the floor below on to which the props can bear. The props must not
be located such that they block the exits from the room.

c. If no props are available, an alternative means of protection is to use doors or

similar pieces of timber. The doors into rooms are removed from their hinges
and laid flat over the heads of the occupants, supported by wardrobes, packing
cases, etc. They will not stop the ceiling falling down but, if it does fall, the
soldier beneath should be adequately protected.

1-86 Explain and demonstrate: Mobility. Even though the defended building may be
strong and well protected, the defender must maintain his mobility. ‘Mouse holing’,
which is the creation of holes between party walls of rooms or adjacent houses, is
valuable and allows the defender to move unseen. A pickaxe, sledgehammer or
crowbar are the best implements for making a mousehole; explosives should not
normally be used. Each occupied room should have two exits in case one gets
blocked. The route for reinforcement or evacuation of casualties should be planned
and, if feasible, protected from blockage by rubble.

1-87 Explain and demonstrate: Stairways. The width of stairways should be reduced to
about 0.30 m to prevent the enemy rushing up or down them. This can be achieved
by laying coils of dannert wire on the stairs or by using nail boards. Nail boards are
planks of wood with nails driven through and laid point upwards. The nails should
protrude about 50 mm and be spaced about 120 mm apart. The use of these is
illustrated in fig 1-15. The boards must be secured so that the enemy cannot remove
them. If the stairways are never to be used by the defenders, they can be blocked
completely.

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May 22
1-88 Explain and demonstrate: Grenade Barriers. Some form of screen, such as wire
netting (chicken wire), should be placed over windows to prevent grenades being
thrown into rooms. While these are most effective when fastened to the outside of the
windows, they may indicate to the enemy which houses are being defended.

1-89 Explain and demonstrate: Grenade Holes. When defending upper floors, it may be
desirable to have holes in the floor already prepared, particularly in concrete floors,
through which grenades can be dropped on to an enemy who has penetrated the
floor below (see fig 1-16).

1-90 Explain and demonstrate: Barricading doors. Internal doorways, even when used
by the defenders, should have their width restricted to about 0.30 m, by using a chest
of drawers or packing case filled with stones or a stop nailed to the floor. This
reduces the possibility of the enemy rushing the entrance. Entrances not required,
particularly through a basement, should be completely blocked and secured with
nails.

1-91 Explain: Fire precautions. Electricity or gas supplies should be turned off. Where
possible, baths and any available tubs should be filled with water and buckets of
sand made available. It is rarely feasible to provide firefighting equipment throughout
a defended building, so action in the event of a serious fire must be pre-planned.

1-92 Explain: Flooding. A central heating system contains a large quantity of water,
particularly in a large building. If damaged by enemy action the ensuing flood can
make a cellar unusable. Flooding can also be caused by damage to the normal water
supply system and by back-flushing of the sewage system. These systems should be
isolated and cut off when possible.

1-93 Explain and demonstrate: Internal wire obstacles. On occasions, there may be
entrances which cannot be effectively guarded or effectively blocked, such as ground
floor windows. A barbed wire obstacle within the room, such as is illustrated in fig 1-
17, may not be expected by the enemy and so should help the defence.

1-94 A depiction of a building that has been prepared for defence can be found at fig 1-18.
Preparation of buildings - External

1-95 Explain: The purpose of any external work on a building when preparing it for
defence is to make it as difficult as possible for the enemy to enter the building.
Some or all of the actions given below may be relevant.

1-96 Explain and demonstrate: Fields of Fire. Obstacles blocking fields of fire should,
where possible, be removed. For example trees should be felled and buildings not of
use brought down. There will always be some areas of ground around a building into
which the defenders will be unable to fire. These will often be close to the building
itself and in the dead ground formed by adjacent buildings. The attacker must be
prevented from reaching these areas. The use of barbed wire and other obstacles

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May 22
 coupled with trip flares may be the best method. The employment of all obstacles
and their cover by direct or indirect fire must be an integral part of the defensive plan.

1-97 Explain: Fire Positions. External fire positions should be sited to engage the enemy
at up to the maximum effective range of the weapons deployed. If necessary,
consideration should be given to demolishing infrastructure such as streetlights,
pylons,and removing overhead wires in order to improve arcs of fire and ranges. Arcs
should overlap and each position should be mutually supporting. Fire positions
should have overhead cover where possible and withdrawal routes recce’d and
rehearsed.

1-98 Explain and demonstrate: Approaches. As well as blocking the entrances to the
defended building itself, it may be expedient to block approaches to the building,
particularly if they are covered from view, eg where sewers and other services are
connected.

1-99 Explain and demonstrate: Withdrawal / resupply routes. The construction of ‘rat
runs’ will provide safety for friendly forces to withdraw, resupply, reinforce or for
casualty evacuation. Where possible rat runs should provide cover from both view
and fire. Rat runs can be constructed using six foot pickets and hessian screen and
should include dog legs to further obscure movement (this method will provide no
protection from fire). Consideration must be given to the destruction of the rat run to
deny its use by the enemy. Prepositioning smoke grenades along the rat run will
assist to obscure the enemy’s view. Rat runs should be subjected to continuous
improvement during the preparation of the defensive position.

1-100 Explain and demonstrate: Windows. Apart from grenade barriers, a grid of barbed
wire across the ground floor windows assists in preventing access from the outside.

1-101 Explain and demonstrate: Removal of Climbing Aids. Anything that is attached to
the building, such as fire escapes, drainpipes or thick creepers, any tree close to the
building, or anything else which may assist the enemy in gaining access should be
removed or otherwise made unusable.

1-102 Explain: Protection from HEAT Rockets. It is difficult to protect a building against
the effect of a HEAT round. The jet from the round can penetrate, depending on the
actual weapon, in the order of 1.0 m of brickwork and 1.25 m of sandbag wall. The
best defence is to cause the projectile to detonate as far away from the building as
possible. This is not easy to achieve as it requires the erection of a screen into which
the projectile impacts at a stand-off distance from the building. A chain link or chicken
wire fence is a suitable screen. Ideally, it needs to be sited between 3 m and 6 m
from the building; anything less than 1 m away is of little value. While this type of
screen is useful, it is more applicable to semi-permanent defences against terrorist
operations than to field defences.

1-103 Explain: Protection against Helicopters. Where a tall building has a flat roof,
consideration should be given to the construction of a helicopter obstacle on the roof
to prevent assault on the building from the air.
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May 22
Conclusion

1-104 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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May 22
 Fig 1-14. Props and wedges

39
May 22
 Fig 1-15. Blocking stairways

40
May 22
 Fig 1-16. Grenade holes

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May 22
 Fig 1-17. Wire obstacles in a room
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May 22
 Fig 1-18. Building prepared for defence
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May 22
Chapter 2 Close Quarter Battle (CQB)

Introduction

2-1 The lessons in this chapter have been compiled and laid out in a manner to allow any
instructor to deliver content, regardless of experience or cap badge. There are,
however, many nuances that exist that cannot be covered within this publication. It is
therefore advised that instructors wishing to deliver CQB training attend the Urban
Operations Instructors course (UOIC) or Close Quarter Battle Instructors (CQBI)
course5.

2-2 The lesson content, sequence and time allocated have been designed so as not to
over burden the student with information prematurely and to allow ‘muscle memory’
to be gained before continuing to the next lesson. Enclosures should initially be
simple in layout/design and empty. Introducing complexities such as opposing doors,
furniture, constricted space or occupants into training to early will place excessive
cognitive burden on the soldier and result in a drop in performance and learning.

2-3 When conducting confirmation by practice the practice should incorporate all drills
taught in previous lessons as well as the new skill. Expect a drop in performance.
During practice soldiers will concentrate on the most recent drill taught to the
detriment of skills learnt in previous lessons. This enforces the need for repetitive
training and ‘muscle memory’, a competent soldier is concentrating on
scanning/engaging threats, not how to conduct a drill.

2-4 There are a myriad of drills for Urban CQB. Most drills have utility for what they were
designed but don’t necessarily have the same utility for Field Army, others are style
over substance. Instructors should not ‘blindly’ teach drills not included within the
Streetcraft Syllabus and should give serious consideration to their suitability for the
role they are training for.

5UOIC and CQBI are run by the Infantry Battle School, Brecon. UOIC open to All Arms Cpl – Capt. CQBI
open to Infantry LCpl – CSgt.
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Lesson 6. Rifle positions of carriage

2-5 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach the various positions of carriage when
operating in a CQB environment:

a. The low ready.

b. The compressed alert.

c. The high ready.

d. The index.

e. The low carry.

2-6 Timings. One 40 minute period.

2-7 Method. Basic instructional indoor or outdoor period.

2-8 Stores.

Rifle 1 per soldier

Magazine 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Demonstrators as necessary
2-9 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select a suitable area that offers clear line of
sight to 25m.

b. Place targets at 25 metres in enough numbers to ensure that each student has
a clear line of sight to at least one target without overcrowding.

c. If the lesson must be taken indoors, enough floor space must be provided so
that the targets can be placed a minimum of five meters in front of firers.

d. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

Preliminaries
2-10 Safety Precautions. Normal.

2-11 Revision. Rifle Lesson 13. Close Quarter Battle (CQB), CQB Positions.
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Introduction

2-12 Explain: Weapon carriage and handling must be of the highest standard when
operating in a CQB environment. Poor carriage and handling slow reaction times
when dealing with threats, obscures fields of view when covering and scanning for
threats and can result in flagging of friendly forces. Every soldier must understand
the positions of carriage, their limitations and when to employ them.
The low ready

2-13 Explain and demonstrate, squad imitating: The low ready Position (see fig 2-1) will be
the default position for the No1 and anyone covering a threat. The low ready position
allows the firer a maximum state of readiness to engage threats while allowing a
clear field of view to scan and clear their arcs of fire. The low ready position is
adopted as follows:

a. While adopting the usual CQB shooting stance the firer will bring the butt into
the shoulder.

b. While maintaining a proper grip of the rifle and with the rifle pointing in the
direction of threat, lower the muzzle to approximately 15 degrees; this allows
clear observation of threats and arcs to be cleared visually.

c. The muzzle will be no higher than the lowest portion of the closest possible
threat.

2-14 Confirm by practice.

The compressed alert position

2-15 Explain and demonstrate, the squad imitating: The compressed alert (see fig 2-2) can
be adopted within the stack and is also used to allow safe passage into an enclosure.
The compressed alert is adopted as follows:

a. From the low ready position and while keeping both hands on the weapon,
ensure the safety catch is applied then lower the muzzle until it is pointing at the
ground central and slightly forward of the operator’s feet.

b. As the muzzle is lowered the weapon pivots in the shoulder by the heel of the
butt and is held tight against the body.

2-16 Confirm by practice.

The high ready

2-17 Explain and demonstrate, squad imitating: The high ready (see fig 2-3) is used in
situations where waist high obstacles exist such as furniture or team members who
have taken a knee. It can also be adopted as a method of carry within the stack. The
high ready is adopted as follows:
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May 22
 a. Ensure the safety catch is applied and place the finger outside the trigger guard.

b. Keeping right hand on the pistol grip and left hand on the hand guard position
the butt of the weapon between the right elbow and hip.

c. Allow the weapon to angle naturally away from the body keeping the flash
eliminator in the line of site.

d. The weapon is held close to the body to make for a compact position, but
consideration must be given to the position of the magazine release catch and
any equipment located on the front of the body armour to avoid accidental
operation of the release catch.

e. A proper firing position is gained by pushing the weapon away from the body,
orientating it towards the threat before pulling the butt back in to the shoulder.

2-18 Confirm by practice.

The index

2-19 Explain and demonstrate, squad imitating: Indexing (see fig 2-4) the weapon allows a
firer to control and operate their weapon while freeing their none firing hand to carry
out tasks. This could be to move furniture, conduct a dead check or control an
occupant. To index the weapon the firer should:

a. Keeping the weapon orientated towards the threat lower the weapon to waist
height.

b. Clamp the butt of the weapon between the side of the body and inner right arm,
the firer must be conscious not to foul the path of the cocking handle.

c. Once the weapon is clamped in position tasks can be carried out using the left
hand.

d. The weapon can be fired from the index position in emergencies.

2-20 Confirm by practice.

The low carry

2-21 Explain and demonstrate, squad imitating: The low carry (see fig 2-5) is generally
used within a secure building as it allows the weapon to be carried in a manner that
reduces fatigue while minimising flagging of friendly forces. The sling must be used
to facilitate the low carry and is adopted as follows:

a. Safety catch must be switched to ON and index finger placed along the outside
of the trigger guard.

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 b. The weapon is lowered, pivoting in the shoulder until it is running parallel down
the right side of the firer.

c. The right hand remains on the pistol grip and holds the weapon against the
body.

d. The heel of the butt should remain in the front crease of the armpit to allow the
weapon to be pivoted back into the aim if required.

e. The left hand is now free to carry out tasks.

2-22 Confirm by practice.

Conclusion

2-23 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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May 22
 Fig 2-1. The low ready position

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May 22
 Fig 2-2. The compressed alert

50
May 22
 Fig 2-3. The high ready

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May 22
 Fig 2-4. The index

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May 22
 Fig 2-5. The low carry

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May 22
Lesson 7. Urban CQB Fundamentals

2-24 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach the fundamentals of CQB in the urban
environment:
a. Principles.
b. Types of building clearance.
c. Verbal commands.
d. Other factors in building clearance.
e. The stack.
f. The stack organisation.
g. The stack principles.
h. The stack immediate action.
i. Use of light.
j. Marksmanship challenges in the UE.
2-25 Timings. One 40 minute period.
2-26 Method. Basic indoor lecture.
2-27 Stores.
PowerPoint Presentation as required
Whiteboard as required
Visual aids as required
2-28 Preparation.
a. Set up and rehearse PowerPoint presentation.
b. Prepare and layout visual aids/handouts.
2-29 Safety Precautions. Nil.
2-30 Revision. Nil.
Introduction.
2-31 Explain: Building CQB drills are used for combat within a building’s hallways, stairs,
rooms, enclosures and other forms of small constricted spaces. Urban warfare
demands a high level of Situational Awareness (SA), requires collateral damage to
be kept to the minimum, that precision marksmanship must be used, and a
systematic and thorough clearance must be conducted to secure objectives or
targets and information. It is essential that those conducting the clearance have in
place a baseline knowledge of the techniques and drills which are common to all.

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Principles

2-32 Explain: The following principles must be applied to affect a safe clearance of rooms
and buildings:
a. Surprise. Surprise is key. Upon initial entry, the team has a few seconds to
exploit surprise when the enemy is at their most vulnerable. Surprise is gained
through deep Situational Awareness (SA), detailed planning, extensive
rehearsals, and the proper application of stealth.
b. Speed. Speed is defined as the rate at which a team enters and moves through
the objective. Speed will deny occupants the opportunity to fortify positions,
construct barricades, or prepare kill zones. Speed is relative and the key is to
be smooth and under control inside the building, moving only as fast as threats
can be successfully identified and neutralised. To maintain speed and
momentum in clearing a structure, concurrent activity must be maximised, and
team members must be proactive in predicting team activity so that they can
support it.
c. Shock Action. This is a sudden and explosive force that overwhelms any
coordinated or planned reaction from the occupants. Aggressive, deliberate and
positive actions will allow the team to dominate the situation. Explosive
breaches, diversionary devices, good verbal commands and precision
marksmanship are all key to achieving shock.
d. Initiative. Individual initiative is vital. Building and room clearance is a dynamic
activity. Troops will face threats, situations, and changing layouts often with time
at a premium. They must be able to react, adapt, improvise and understand the
impact of their actions. The situation may develop far faster than the
commander can control. In particular firers should be ready and flexible enough
to respond to whatever confronts them. In any event, firers must:
(1) Cover all immediate Danger Areas. A danger area is an area from which
a firer may be engaged or an area that is yet to be cleared by the entry
team, such as open or closed doors, small spaces, L-shapes, etc.
(2) Neutralise all threats. The use of precision marksmanship and correct
identification to determine and neutralise threats and non-threats.
(3) Protect other firers. Troops must protect team members throughout the
clearance of the structure. A proactive approach is essential for team
protection.
2-33 Confirm by questions.
Types of Building clearance

2-34 Explain: There are 5 methods of conducting a building clearance.

a. Dynamic. Employs an explosive, ballistic or mechanical breach, a diversionary
device, or use of fire support or sniper-initiated assault followed by rapid
movement through the objective. This method overwhelms the occupants with

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May 22
 its speed, surprise, and shock action, limiting their ability to plan, manoeuvre or
reorganise.
b. Stealth. This method requires an unopposed initial entry without verbal
commands. It utilises slow, silent movement, and the use of hand signals and
barrel nods for coordination.
c. Subdued. A combination of the dynamic and stealth methods, using controlled
speed with partial silence. It can be used to enter some buildings or rooms after,
or combined with, a dynamic entry. Movement through the objective is quiet, not
silent, and conforms to the actions of the point firer.
d. Limited Penetration. Troops can clear buildings or rooms without entering,
particularly if there are numerous windows. Alternatively, a single section may
be tasked to enter and seize a limited objective within the building and then
hold, whilst the rest of the assault force makes entry elsewhere in the building.
e. Co-ordinated Entries. A coordinated entry is when two or more teams enter
the building through different points of entry and levels at the same time or at
separate timed intervals (See Fig 2-6).
2-35 Confirm by questions.
Verbal commands

2-36 Explain: In order to maintain effective control and to ensure clarity of communication
during room and building clearance a number of commands and prompts are used.
These must be memorised, and their use frequently practiced during training (see fig
2-7 for examples).
Other factors in building clearance

2-37 Explain: Use of Cover. Individual soldiers should select suitable cover when moving
through the building. They should keep to the walls and avoid windows, doors, floor
and ceiling openings. They have to realise it is an individual responsibility to select
the cover, not the section commanders.
2-38 Explain: Booby Traps. Booby traps and IED are common, simple weapons
employed by all potential adversaries. Avoid the attractive, look for sign and avoid the
‘come on’. If found, they must be left alone for specialist attention. All other members
of the section/platoon need to be warned of the presence of booby traps. The exact
location of the device should be marked and at the point of entry a blue flag or blue
marker should be displayed to indicate the requirement for engineer assistance and
to act as a warning that a booby trap is in that house.
2-39 Explain: Automatic Fire. Unless forced by the threat, automatic fire should be
avoided. Most modern houses have concrete floors, walls and even ceilings and
these may cause rounds to ricochet and cause fratricide. In addition, if automatic fire
is used throughout the house, ammunition expenditure will be high and increase the
demand for resupply. Ideally, most shooting inside a house should be instinctive
double shots which will be far more accurate. Conversely, some houses have very

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 thin internal walls, shots will penetrate these walls and could again cause fratricide.
Pistols can be used where appropriate.
2-40 Confirm by questions.
The stack

2-41 Explain: The team stack is one method of moving a section or team around in a
controlled manner whilst still maintaining a good level of tactical awareness and
security. The team stack provides an excellent means of command and control inside
a building but can be vulnerable to a range of threats particularly when the team is
closed up. The stack may also be used with care in the immediate surrounds of a
building to gain entry but should consist of the minimum number of firers required
only, not the entire section.
2-42 Explain: It should be noted that experience gained during raids and compound
clearance operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to the widespread legacy use of
the stack. A TTP which was useful in those types of operational scenarios and
environments may not have the same utility in future operations. In particular its use
while patrolling, crossing streets and open ground, and moving between buildings
requires careful consideration. The effects of direct and indirect fire and IEDs can be
significantly greater on a stack than on a section using ground and fire and
manoeuvre correctly.
The stack organisation

2-43 Explain and demonstrate: Soldiers roles within the stack will change as the
movement / clearance progresses. Every soldier must remain alert at all times and be
prepared to move forward in the stack to provide support or take over as a No1 or
No2 when required. Firers should react to the situation ahead and not wait to be
ordered, if support is called for or a stoppage incurred for example. When moving
through a building the section will close within touching distance of each other and
organise as follows:
a. The No1. The first firer in the stack is known as the No1 and has their weapon
at the low ready, safety catch ON – finger resting on the safety catch while
constantly searching for and assessing threats or danger areas ahead (see fig.
2-8a). The safety catch should only be switched to OFF once a target has been
Pre Identified (PID) and can then be engaged in line with ROE.
b. The No2. The second firer in the stack is known as the No2 and is the
immediate support for the No1. The No2 moves up close to the No1 to where
they are touching but not pushing. They mirror the stance of the No1; are alert
with head up, looking ahead ready to react and support (see fig. 2-8b and c), a
No2 is said to be in ‘Close Support’ when stacked with a No1.
(1) Weapon Carriage. There are two accepted weapon positions for the No2
(and the remainder of the stack); each position has pro’s and con’s. The
commander must decide which is to be used and that position adopted as
a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The stack should not adopt a mix

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 of weapon positions. The safety catch must be ON regardless of the
position adopted.
(2) High Ready. The high ready greatly reduces flagging6 (pointing of weapon
at friendly forces) within the stack. The high port can, however, cause
fatigue amongst firers and affect initial accuracy on target (due to weapon
weight and momentum causing overshooting the target as the weapon is
brought into the aim) and the requirement to move the butt in to the
shoulder.
(3) Compressed Alert. The compressed alert reduces flagging if maintained
correctly7. The compressed alert also assists in keeping the soldiers mind
focussed by maintaining two hands on the weapon without the additional
fatigue experienced with the high ready. A weapon in the compressed
alert, however, is more difficult to bring to bear against a threat in the firers
immediate area and if not adopted correctly and rigidly enforced can
increase the risk of flagging.
c. Command. The commander should be in the best position to control the team
and maintain situational awareness, usually No3. The 2IC will be in the rear 1/3
of the stack, usually No 6.
d. All other firers will stack in the same manner as the No2. While firers in the
centre of the stack may not have an immediate role they should still be alert and
searching for threats. For example the fourth firer should be looking along the
wall and floor for immediate threats (firing holes, booby traps etc). The fifth firer
should be scanning for threats above (mouseholes, air vents etc).
e. Method of Entry (MOE). A two-person MOE team should bring up the rear of
the section stack, equipped with an Enforcer and Haligan Tool/Crowbar. (MOE
will be covered in later lessons)
f. Attachments. Sections operating in the UE may receive specialist assistance.
Generally attachments should be located to the rear of the stack but their role
should be considered when positioning.
(1) Medic(s). Fighting in the UE will require a higher standard of battlefield
first aid. Having soldiers within the section with a higher level of training
may be required. The infantry section could receive non organic assets to
assist.
(2) Engineers/Pioneers. Explosive Method of Entry (EMoE) will require
Engineer or Pioneer support.
(3) Military Working Dogs (MWD). A MWD team consists of an MWD
handler and MWD. The Team increases a commander’s freedom and
flexibility in planning and prosecuting urban operations.

6 Flagging refers to the pointing of a friendly muzzle at friendly forces. Flagging can occur with poor weapon
handling, particularly when positioned within the stack.
7 When fatigued or under pressure soldiers will begin to adopt a ‘patrol position’ which results in flagging.

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2-44 Explain: Crowding. Before adopting the stack commanders must always consider
the threat. Teams are vulnerable when bunching in one room, hallway or stairwell for
any longer than necessary. A single grenade or contact could cause numerous
casualties. Once a room has been secured, assaulting teams should spread out as
quickly as possible. This will be covered in more detail in later lessons.
The stack principles

2-45 Explain: The No1’s eyes and weapon must work in unison and the method of target
acquisition (EBS, LLM, Red Dot) well practiced so targets can be engaged with both
eyes open, immediately.

2-46 Explain: The No1 must endeavour to maintain a stable fire position when moving or
conducting any drills (The No1 may only fire when moving if trained to do so).

2-47 Explain: The No1 must endeavour to open and clear any arc from a position of cover,
as much as possible, keeping the front of their body facing toward any threat (this is
where the body armour offers most protection).

2-48 Explain: All firers within the stack must be able to accurately engage threats, at short
notice. Movement must be planned, and carried out in a controlled, methodical
manner to allow accurate fire, from stable fire positions whilst minimising the chance
of fratricide (blue on blue).

2-49 Explain and demonstrate: Muzzle before flesh. It is impossible to predict the
movements or actions of an individual, particularly when in contact. When in close
proximity to other firers and engaging targets or adopting fire positions firers must
think ‘muzzle before flesh’; flesh referring to other firers and body parts. Failure to do
so will inevitably result in fratricide.

2-50 Explain and demonstrate: Only point firers8 are to adopt the stance of a No1 (weapon
in the low ready) firers further back in the stack MUST adopt the stance of a No2
(compressed alert or Hi ready), see fig 2-9 for examples of dangerous practice.

2-51 Explain: Soldiers can communicate within the stack by voice, hand signal or physical
contact (shoulder squeeze). Whether static or moving, the soldiers are to always
maintain maximum situational awareness and observation of arcs (head and eyes
up).

2-52 The minimum manouvre unit is a No1 with a No2 in close support.
The stack Immediate Action (IA)

2-53 Explain and demonstrate: IA. It is essential that all members of the stack are well-
rehearsed and practiced in the actions to be taken if a stoppage is incurred. The
following should take place in the event of a stoppage:

8Point firer refers to the firer closest to the threat and in a position to engage (a No1). A point firer does not
have friendly firers between them and the threat.
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 a. Unless committed (already began the 5 step entry) the individual should inform
the remainder of the team by calling “stoppage” and immediately move out of
the area via the safest route possible while creating space for the support firer
to continue the task.
b. The firer should clear the stoppage while joining the rear of the stack.
c. If the firer is already committed (begun the 5 step entry) they should
immediately call stoppage, transition to their secondary weapon and continue
on task.
d. The call of stoppage should immediately initiate movement of a support firer into
the enclosure.
e. The stoppage should be cleared once the 5 step entry has been completed and
when safe to do so under cover of the support firer.
Use of light

2-54 Explain: The use of light will be unavoidable when clearing buildings at night or when
entering dark enclosures. Where additional illumination is required firers should,
where possible, utilise IR in conjunction with night vision devices (NVDs). If
affectively clearing and/or searching a room using IR is not possible white light
should be used. Any light, whether IR or white, should be switched off as soon as the
search/task is complete.
2-55 Explain: The Laser Light Module (LLM) spot light can be affective at blinding enemy
combatants when entering an enclosure, particularly when they are equipped with
NVDs. The use of the spot light can also be an affective tool when controlling
occupants within an enclosure.9
2-56 Explain: Firers must treat light as an extension of their weapon and as such should
not ‘flag’ other firers; flagging firers with light silhouettes them to the enemy making
them an easier target10. In addition firers should not prematurely give away their
position by switching on lights before they are needed.
2-57 Explain: In addition to the LLM firers should be equipped with a strong, handheld
torch for use when clearing constricted spaces, lofts and for use in conjunction with
the pistol.
Marksmanship challenges in the UE

2-58 Explain: Typically surfaces in the UE will be hard, smooth or flat. This reduces the
effect of ammunition and increases the chance of ricochets. Firers must consider
arcs at all times and keep effectively spaced out and away from walls when stacking.

9 Illuminating an occupant with the LLM spotlight blinds and adds to their confusion which can help to subdue
the individual.
10 Particularly pertinent to firers entering an enclosure. Firers must not initiate light until their arcs are clear of

friendly firers.
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2-59 Explain: 90% of all engagements in the UE will be 50m or less. Engagement times
are short meaning deliberately aimed shots will be harder to achieve. Soldiers must
be prepared to engage accurately at short notice.
2-60 Explain: Recent operations has shown wide use of firing apertures as small as 20cm
in the UE. Effective engagement of these apertures at ranges up to 50m requires a
high degree of accuracy.
2-61 Confirm by questions.
Conclusion
2-62 End of Lesson Drill.
a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.
b. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.
c. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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 Entry point A
Obj 1

LoD/FUP

Obj 2

Entry point B

Coordinated entry into one objective Coordinated entry into two objectives

Fig 2-6. Coordinated entry

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1. “Clear”. This command notifies the rest ensures that the firer does not stand
of the team that the room is clear and up in front of another firer’s line of fire.
that they can enter and continue with
the assault. “Clear” also allows the 7. “Big Room”. This warning indicates
initial entry team to close with and that a firer has come upon a large
control occupants or clear other danger enclosure. ‘Big Room’ automatically
areas inside the room. Outside the summons supporting firers.
room the rest of the team can proceed
with the clearance of the building, 8. “Stack on me/ with me”. This alerts
passing the room that has just been firers holding, covering or moving to the
assaulted. No one should move forward same area, to drop their muzzles and
before “clear” is given. stack up behind that firer giving the
command.
1. “Support”. “Support” is a call for
9. “Stoppage”. This warns other firers
assistance. The firer should indicate the that the caller has some form of
number of firers that are required to
stoppage with their weapon . On
provide support. Support firers require
hearing the call, the closest firer must
direction on arrival. move to support.
2. “Go left / Go Right!”. Used in 10. “Hold”. This means “stop” or “no”.
conjunction with other commands such
“Hold” stops all movement.
as “Support”. For example “Support 1,
Go left”.
11. “Shot”. “Shot” is used when shooting
from room to room, hallway to room, or
3. “Coming In”. “Coming In” is used room to hallway. If one firer calls out
when entering the marshalling area or
“shot”, all others stop and call out
when a firer enters a room in response
“shot”. If possible, the firer checks right
to a call for support. and left to ensure that there is a clear
line of fire and then takes the shot. After
4. “Coming Out”. This is used by firers the engagement, “clear” is required to
as they leave a cleared room. The firer
re-initiate movement.
ensures that his muzzle is pointing into
the floor, checks left and right before 12. “Magazine / Up”. When a firer calls
exiting the enclosure whilst calling
“Magazine”, the firers to the left and
“Coming Out”. This ensures that the right will confirm the call “Magazine”
firer will not cross another firer’s line of
and cover the firer while they reload.
fire or walk into crossfire.
The responding firer must cover the
firer until completion of the reload.
5. “Last Out”. The last firer exiting a
Once the firer has completed the
cleared room calls “Last Out” indicating
reload, they will call “Up”. This indicates
that there are no firers left in the room.
that they are ready to proceed.
They should also check that the room
has been correctly marked. 13. “Ready”, “Move!”. These commands
initiate action. The word “Move” is used
6. “Standing/Stand”. This command is rather than “Go” , which may be
given to coordinate movement before
confused with “No” in the heat of the
standing up inside an enclosure. The
moment.
firer calling ‘stand’ waits to be told to
stand by a standing firer already
14. “Coming through”. Used when
within that enclosure. A lone firer moving through a friendly held building.
should check left, right, and rear
before proceeding to stand. This will
63
May 22 Fig 2-7. Words of command
15. “Plate me”. Usually called for by an
individual conducting a search or dead
check. Requires an additional firer to
provide protection; back plate to side of
person conducting the task.

16. “Clear corridor”. Used when a threat

of over penetration exists. Clears all
firers from the corridor.

64
May 22 Fig 2-7. Cont. Words of command
 a. The No1 b. The No2 c. No1 & 2 (No2 in ‘Close support’)

Fig 2-8. The No1 and No2

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May 22
 Firers have failed to apply the ‘Muzzle before
flesh’ principle.

Firers further back in the stack with weapons

up.

Fig 2-9. Examples of dangerous practice

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May 22
Lesson 8. The Doorway (Entry Point)

2-63 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach the methods used to assess the accessibility
of a doorway and the procedure of fighting from the doorway:

a. Pre entry phases (PACE).

b. The fatal funnel.

c. Types of door.

d. ‘Rolling’ the door.

e. Accessibility check.

f. Diminishing return.

g. Fighting from the doorway.

h. The use of grenades and distraction devices.

2-64 Timings. Two 40 minute periods.

2-65 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period.

2-66 Stores.

Rifle 1 per soldier

Magazine 1 per soldier
BFA 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Cam cream as required
Demonstrators as necessary
2-67 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the drills.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

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2-68 Miscellaneous.

a. The principles of the stack must be enforced at all stages of training.

b. Students must master the ‘high risk roll’ before being permitted to conduct the
‘low risk roll’ during exercises.

c. Under no circumstances are L109 grenades to be used under instruction.

d. Under no circumstances are L107 Distraction Devices to be used for instruction

and/or training.
Preliminaries
2-69 Safety Precautions. Normal.

2-70 Revision. Principles of the stack (particularly the No1 & No2).

Introduction
2-71 Explain: While the actions of clearing an enclosure are important the actions
conducted before making entry into an enclosure are equally as important. When
conduced correctly ‘fighting from the doorway’ can clear, in some cases, as much as
90% of a room without setting foot through the door.
Pre entry phases

2-72 Explain: PACE. The pre entry phases can easily be remembered using the
pneumonic PACE:

a. Preparation.

(1) Assess the type of door, the doorway and the area around it (specifically
where troops stack up) for booby traps or obstacles.

(2) Position No1 and No2 if required for door check (this may require a
preliminary roll of the door).

(3) The No1 and No2 correctly positioned.

(a) Firers should be as close as possible to the door without exposing

their muzzle.

(b) Firers should be positioned away from the wall to achieve a 45

degree angle into the enclosure (see fig 2-10).11

(4) Prioritise open doors before closed.

11 This best positions firers to observe and subsequently enter an enclosure while minimising the threat of
fratricide.
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May 22
 (5) Soldiers must plan and prepare according to the threat and type of door.

(6) Consider grenades and the suitability of employment.

b. Access the room. Breach a locked door and remove any obstacles that block
the doorway.

c. Clear from the doorway. The No.1 will roll the door. A HE grenade can be
used prior to the rolling of the door. Soldiers should always be prepared to enter
the room as soon as the roll is complete, so as not to lose any initiative gained.
The No.1 should make mental notes of the inside of the room for the
subsequent entry.

d. Enter the room. Conduct the 5 step entry and physically clear the room
(minimum of two soldiers).
The fatal funnel of fire

2-73 Explain: The fatal funnel of fire is an imaginary cone that starts in the centre of the
doorway and extends between two to three feet on either side of the door (see fig 2-
11). This is the point at which a defender would fire at if entry were made into a room.
This is especially true if the room is dark and the entry point is illuminated naturally or
lit up by entry person’s tac-light.
Types of door

2-74 Explain: There are generic types of doorways that are prevalent in everyday life.
Inward Opening, Outward Opening, Open Doorway and Closed Doorway. To be able
to successfully identify and execute the correct formation to clear these doorways is
key. The type of door that is encountered by the team will determine the decisions
and actions that the team take to make entry into the enclosure.

a. Inward Opening (Push). Inward opening doors swing inward towards the
interior of the room (away from you). Hinges will not be visible as the door
will be set into the frame of the door (see Fig 2-12).
b. Outward Opening (Pull). Outward opening doors swing toward the exterior
(toward you). Hinges will be visible (see Fig 2-13).
c. Right / Left Hand Door. Right hand doors have the locking mechanism/door
handle on the right. Left hand doors have the locking mechanism/door
handle on the left.
d. Open Door. A door is considered open when there is a visible crack
between the door and the jamb (being able to see into the room) or the door
is completely open.
e. Closed Door. The door is completely shut.
2-75 Explain: Information required on each door. Whenever a door is encountered, the
point firer will need to work out whether the door is closed/open, which side of the

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May 22
 corridor it is on (left/right), whether it is inward/outward opening (push/pull) and if it is
a right or left opening door and then relay that information to the remainder of the
team, for example: “Closed door right, pull right”. In this example the door is a closed
door located on the right side of the corridor, the door will open into the corridor and
the door handle is on the right hand side of the door.
Rolling the door

2-76 Explain and demonstrate: The term ‘rolling’ the door is used to describe the
technique of moving past a doorway that is forward of the FLOT. Rolling the door
minimises the risk of potential shoot through from threats within the enclosure by
taking maximum advantage of the protection provided by the combat body armour
ballistic plate. It also ensures a maximum state of readiness to react to any unknown
threats within the enclosure. Rolling a door may be required when bypassing rooms
or to correctly position the assault team prior to entry (to conduct door checks and
attack the crack) The ‘roll’ of a CLOSED door is conducted as follows:

a. A firer conducting a ‘roll’ of any door will be considered as a No1, and the
doorway and the enclosure within, considered the direction of threat. The No1
always has their weapon at the low ready position.

b. The roll begins from the safe side of the doorway and moves in an arc around
the door.

c. The No1’s body and feet must be perpendicular (face on) to the doorway
throughout the roll.

d. Movement past the door can be conducted at speed but should be in a

controlled manner while adhering to points a – c above.

e. A door roll can be carried out with two (or more) firers where multiple threats
exist, for example within a corridor where a threat exists beyond the doorway.
As the No1 rolls the door, the second firer moves behind them, using the No1
as cover, past the doorway. As soon as the second firer passes the door, they
cover the long threat beyond the doorway. This drill is referred to as “Roll with
2” (see fig 2-14) (If no long threat exists the words of command “Roll with
one” will be used and the point firer will roll alone).

f. Once the No1 begins the roll the No2 immediately adopts the stance of a No1,
covering the door.
2-77 Confirm by practice.
Accessibility check

2-78 Explain and demonstrate: The point firer will inform the team that there is a Closed
Door. The section commander will then order “Roll with 1 / 2” depending on the
threat. On completion of the roll the following will take place:
a. Direction of opening. Once the door has been rolled the firer that has the best
view of the door opening (where the handle and locking mechanism meet the
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May 22
 door frame and the opening of the doorway if the door were to be opened) will
become the No1. For simplicity this is known as ‘Attack the Crack’12. This can
be communicated by the command “I / you have the crack” (with training both
firers should be able to correctly identify who is holding the threat and conduct
the check without the need for verbal confirmation). This ensures that any threat
opening the door can be neutralised immediately (see fig 2-15). The other firer,
regardless of whether they conducted the roll, will become the No2 and will
subsequently conduct the accessibility check on the door. The opposite firer will
then conduct the door check.

b. The No2 will drop their muzzle and do the following:

(1) Quickly assess the entry point for booby traps and other obstacles.

(2) Check for door bolts. Door bolts are usually located in the upper and lower
third of the door. On inward (push) opening doors the No2 should push
against the top corner of the door (opposite the hinges) using the hand
and the bottom corner of the door using the toe of the boot (see fig 2-16).
A door that fails to flex inwards when conducting this check usually
indicates the presence of a deadlock and will require the assistance of the
MOE team. On an outward (pull) door only a visual check is conducted; a
pull door will not flex when pushed against as it is held in place by the door
jam.

(3) After conducting the door bolt check the No2 will place their hand on the
door handle and await a confirmatory nod to report ready from the No1.
On receipt of the nod the No2 will try to open the door using the door
handle.

(4) If entry is successful, the No2 will push or pull the door fully open (The
Halligan bar can be used to prop open spring-loaded doors).

c. Once the door is open the assault team should carry out the drills for fighting
from the doorway (covered later in this lesson).

d. If at any point the door is locked and does not open the firer conducting the door
check will shake their head left and right to signify “No” the door is locked. The
Section Commander will then, depending on their orders, decide to bypass or
call for breaching equipment.

2-79 Confirm by practice.

Diminishing return

2-80 Explain and demonstrate: Diminishing return is the terminology used to describe the
check conducted by both the No1 and No2 stacked on an open door prior to rolling

12Attack the crack has no bearing on the direction the assault team enter once the door is opened. Once the
door is opened attack the crack has no relevance and open door drills are to be conducted.
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May 22
 the door (fighting from the doorway) or prior to conducting a dynamic entry. The
purpose of the check is to clear as much of the dead space immediately left and right
of the door and as far into the enclosure as is possible without moving from their
stack location / cover. A diminishing return is conducted as follows (see fig 2-17):

a. Both firers stack as previously taught.

b. Keeping their feet fixed in position each firer leans their body to the left or right
depending on which side of the door they are stacked (left side lean left, right
side lean right weapon should be in the low ready position.

c. Firers clear as much as is possible of dead space immediately left / right of the
doorway.

d. With feet still fixed in position firers now lean in the opposite direction in an
attempt to clear as much of the enclosure as is possible.
e. If a hostile threat is encountered firers will deal with the threat within the ROE
and subsequently inform the commander. Non-hostile threats should be dealt
with as per Occupancy Control drills. Under no circumstances are firers to enter
the room unless a significant tactical advantage can be gained.
Fighting from the door

2-81 Explain and demonstrate: Open Door. Fighting from the door offers great depth into
an enclosure allowing the assault team to clear as much as 90% of the space without
entering the room. After carrying out a diminishing return the No1 should, where
possible, roll the door. In areas of high threat, the door roll should be a methodical
and deliberate action allowing the enclosure to be cleared as thoroughly as is
possible from outside the enclosure. In low threat areas the door can be rolled in a
similar manner to that of a closed door; less deliberate and at an increased pace. A
high threat roll is conducted as follows:

a. A firer conducting a ‘roll’ of any door will be considered a No1, and the doorway
and the enclosure within, considered the direction of threat. The No1 always
has their weapon at the low ready position.

b. The person conducting the roll should not be the individual that conducted the
door check and / or opened the door.

c. The roll begins from the safe side of the doorway and moves in an arc around
the door.

d. The No1’s body and feet must be perpendicular (face on) to the doorway
throughout the roll.

e. Movement will be sideways by taking small sidesteps, moving the trailing foot to
the instep of the leading foot and then moving the body, weapon and leading
foot as one. Moving the leading foot first will cause the firer to “step out” (lead
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May 22
 foot being ahead of body and weapon due to the need to maintain balance) and
should be avoided.

f. When moving a conscious effort must be made to avoid ‘stepping’ out and
prematurely alerting any potential threat within of your presence. Instead the
upper body should be positioned over the leading foot as much as is possible
(head, weapon and leading foot in alignment) while still maintaining a stable fire
position (see fig 2-18). This will allow immediate use of the weapon system to
neutralise any threats within the enclosure.

g. If a hostile threat is encountered, the No1 will deal with the threat within the
ROE and subsequently inform the commander. If a non-hostile threat is
encountered, the No1 will deal with this according to Urban Occupancy Control
drills. Under no circumstances is the No1 to enter the room unless a significant
tactical advantage can be gained.

h. The drill is complete when the firer has completely ‘rolled’ the door and is on the
opposite side of the doorway.

i. A ‘Roll with 2’ should take place where a threat exists beyond the doorway.

j. The ability to fire from the left shoulder when rolling a door right to left will
maximise the use of cover and minimise exposure of the firer prematurely. The
following must be observed:

(1) Rifle sights must be fitted with the CQB (red dot) sight. Live firing practices
are not to be conducted unless the CQB sight is fitted and zeroed.

(2) SUSAT and Iron Sights are not to be used when firing from the left
shoulder. Attempts to do so will cause the head to become too close to the
cocking handle during ejection and serious injury is likely.

(3) In training, eye protection and gloves are to be worn. Care must be taken
to prevent ejected cases from hitting exposed skin: this may include rolling
sleeves down and closing the collar on jackets to prevent burn injuries.

k. The assault team should carry out the 5-step entry drill as soon as the door roll
is complete where possible lead by the No1 (the person that conducted the roll).
This will be covered in the next lesson.

Note: The roll should be smooth and conducted at a speed that allows the firer to
effectively scan the enclosure and engage threats accurately (failure to ID targets and/or
affectively engage indicates the firer is moving too fast for their ability). Early in training the
roll may feel slow and clunky, this is to be expected. With practice the firers pace and
fluidity will improve.

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May 22
Note: Some firers may find it easier to adopt a ‘boxing stance’ (one foot forward, one
rearwards). Lead foot should be forward, the remaining principles remain the same (body
armour towards the threat, don’t step out).

2-82 Confirm by practice.

The use of grenades and distraction devices

2-83 Explain: The L109 Grenade in clearing a structure. The L109 can be a double-
edged weapon and must be handled and used with care. The grenade can cause
casualties and fatalities to you and or your assault team if not correctly employed.
Primarily the HE grenade will be used when the assault force or entry team receive
enemy fire from an enclosure within an objective structure.

2-84 Explain: Considerations. Before using HE grenades the following must be taken into
consideration:
a. Structure. In lightly constructed buildings there is a risk that fragments may
penetrate internal walls, risking injury to friendly forces in adjacent rooms. The
overuse of grenades may also cause total, or partial, collapse of walls.

b. Friendly forces. The location of friendly forces must be considered to avoid

friendly casualties.

c. Enclosure. The size and layout of the enclosure and the presence of obstacles
should be considered prior to deploying the L109 to prevent the grenade
bouncing back to the assault group and to ensure maximum effect within the
enclosure.
2-85 Explain: Placement. The grenade should be placed deep inside the enclosure to
better contain the blast and to increase the distance between point of detonation and
the entry team. The entry team need to be aware that this may drive any threats
within the enclosure to the entry point. The detonation of the grenade can create a
vast amount of dust and smoke making a thorough clearance of the room difficult.

2-86 Explain and demonstrate: Deployment of L109. The order to deploy the L109 will
normally be given by the commander by adding the colour ‘RED’ to the order (“Door
left RED”, “Roll one RED (closed door)”). It can, however, be called upon by the No1
should they believe there to be a threat within the enclosure or after receiving fire
from within an enclosure (particularly heavily defended enclosures). This will be done
by issuing a signal to the remainder of the stack by raising the left hand with a closed
fist (see fig 2-19a) whilst still maintaining control of the weapon with the right. On
receipt of the order or signal the following should take place:

a. The No2 in the stack removes the grenade, preferably from the pouch of the
No1.

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May 22
 b. The No2 will adopt a grip of the grenade in the left or right hand as taught
depending on the side of the doorway they are on (right side of doorway left
hand, left side of doorway right hand).

c. The No2 will show the No1 the grenade by holding it far enough over their
shoulder that it enters the No1’s peripheral vision (see fig 2-19b), the No1 must
always observe the doorway.

d. The No1 will acknowledge the grenade by nodding the head to signify they are
ready for the grenade to be deployed.

e. The No2 removes the pin from the grenade and then firmly grasps the No1’s
body armour by the collar with their free hand; this grip is maintained until the
grenade has initiated to ensure the No1 does not follow the grenade into the
enclosure.

f. The No2 manoeuvres the No1 to a position from which they can deploy the
grenade taking maximum advantage of the protection afforded by the No1’s
body armour plate. The No1 maintains their weapon covering the enclosure.

g. The No2 places the grenade deep inside the enclosure whilst shouting “FRAG
OUT” to alert other members of the assault force.

h. The No2 moves back into cover while maintaining a grip of the No1. The No1
should only be pulled into cover by the No2 if they attempt to follow the grenade
into the enclosure or if they fail to take cover.

i. The No2 releases their grip as soon as the grenade initiates and the No1
conducts a roll of the doorway before conducting the 5-step entry.

2-87 Explain: L107 Distraction Grenade. The L107 distraction grenade is a bursting type
grenade which is designed to distract and disorientate by producing six loud bangs at
short intervals without a fragmentation hazard. Distraction Grenades produce a loud
bang and a brilliant light which causes a great deal of confusion and disorientation.
The confusion and disorientation are due to a ‘sensory overload’ of hearing and sight.
This overload only lasts a couple of seconds and provides the assault team with a
window of opportunity to enter and dominate the enclosure with little resistance.
Distraction grenades should be used whenever possible to aid the entry team.

2-88 Explain: Placement of the L107. Threats within an enclosure are likely to be focused
on the entry point so placement of the distraction grenade should be 3-5 feet inside
the doorway for maximum blinding and concussive affect. It should be tossed below
knee level and outside the swing of the door to avoid the possibility of the door
closing and sweeping the distraction grenade back outwards the assault team.

2-89 Explain and demonstrate: Deployment of the L107. The order to deploy the L107
will normally be given by the commander by adding the colour ‘AMBER’ to the order
(“Door left AMBER”, “Roll one AMBER (closed door)”). It can, however, be called
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May 22
 upon by the No1 should they believe there to be a threat within the enclosure. This
will be done by issuing a signal to the remainder of the stack by raising their left hand
and alternating between a closed fist and open hand several times whilst still
maintaining control of their weapon with the right hand. On receipt of the order or
signal the drill conducted are as per the L109 Grenade with the following differences:
a. The No2 will release their grip on the No1 immediately after deploying the L107.

b. The No1 will conduct the 5 step entry once the L107 begins to initiate.
2-90 Confirm by practice.

Conclusion

2-91 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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 Fig 2-10. Positioning of No1 & No2 on an entry point
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May 22
 Fig 2-11. The fatal funnel

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May 22
 Door set into Hinges Door flush with
not visible frame Hinges visible
the frame

Fig 2-12. Inward opening door (Push)

Fig 2-13. Outward opening door (Pull)

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May 22
 Fig 2-14. Roll with 2

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May 22
 Fig 2-15. Attack the crack

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May 22
 Checking for top door bolt Checking for bottom door bolt

Fig 2-16. Door check, push door

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May 22
 Fig 2-17. Diminishing return

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May 22
 Rolling left to right Rolling right to left
Fig 2-18. Foot and body position when conducting a door roll
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May 22
 Fig 2-19a. Hand signal to deploy L109 HE.

Fig 2-19b. Confirmation of grenade to No1.

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May 22
Lesson 9. 5 Step Entry

2-92 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach the 5 Step Entry procedure and subsequent
method for clearing a room/enclosure:

a. The immediate area.

b. Dominant position.

c. 5 Step Entry.

d. The two-person clear.

e. Crisscross technique.

f. Buttonhook technique.

g. Combination technique.

h. Dynamic entry.

i. Three-person and four-person entry technique.

j. Room clearance sequence.

2-93 Timings. Two 40 minute periods.

2-94 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period.

2-95 Stores.
Rifle 1 per soldier
Magazine 1 per soldier
BFA 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Cam cream as required
Demonstrators as necessary
2-96 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the drills.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

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2-97 Miscellaneous.

a. Consideration should be given to the inclusion of dead check drills (Occupancy

Control) if targetry / enemy are to be used during the confirmatory exercise
stage.

b. The principles of the stack must be enforced at all stages of training.

c. Practice and confirmation should include rolling of doors, door checks and
fighting from the door to build muscle memory.
Preliminaries
2-98 Safety Precautions. Normal.

2-99 Revision. Rolling the door and door checks.

Introduction
2-100 Explain: An assault team is at their most vulnerable when entering an enclosure.
Threats could be hidden anywhere within the enclosure and will undoubtedly be
focussed on the bottle neck of the doorway. Failure to understand and follow the 5-
step entry will increase the risk of casualties and slow the clearance.
The immediate area

2-101 Explain: The immediate area is defined as the area just inside the doorway. It
occupies a six-foot radius where a person or obstacle could impede the movement of
the firer or assault team (see fig 2-20).
Dominant position

2-102 Explain and demonstrate: A dominant position is a position that allows the firer to
gain positive control over the room and its occupants with mutually supporting fields
of fire and maximum coverage of any dead space. Dominant positions will be
dictated by several factors including type of room, entry points and threat areas. A list
of the most common types of room encountered are below; see fig 2-21 for dominant
positions for each type of room.

a. Centre fed room. This is a room where the door is located centrally in one of
the walls. The layout permits a rapid entry and clearance with all firers able to
occupy the room.

b. Corner fed room. This room will have the door located on one of the corners of
the room. Whilst the TTP for clearing the room remains unchanged the entry
team will be forced initially to move deeper into the room to avoid the fatal
funnel.

c. Short wall room. This is a room where the door is located on the end 1/3 of a
rooms wall. Establishing a dominant position will be the same as any other

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 room entry, albeit the No2 will have to clear their corner and then push deeper
into the room to avoid the fatal funnel.
The Five Step Entry

2-103 Explain and demonstrate. When entering a room or building there are five steps that
must always be taken in order to successfully dominate the enclosure. Where
possible they should be conducted after fighting from the door with the person that
conducted the door roll entering first as they will have better situational awareness of
what is inside the enclosure. The five steps are:

a. Clear the Doorway. This is done by visually checking the door for any
obstacles, IED’s, or other forms of booby trap. On entry the firer must move
smoothly through the doorway without stopping.

b. Clear the Immediate Area. This is done when entering the room, if an
occupant, threat or an obstacle is in the path to the dominant position, it must
be moved or cleared on the move to allow support firers to enter the
enclosure13.

c. Clear your Corner. On entering the room, the priority, as an individual or pair,
will be to clear the immediate corner of the room. This can be done visually on
the move. Items of furniture located in the corner will require support to enable
the threat to be held and the 5 step entry to be completed.

d. Sweep Arcs of Fire. This is done while on the move, starting from your corner
and prior to establishing a good dominant position. You should collapse your
arc of fire six feet off the deepest firer in the room.

e. Establish a Dominant Position. Any dominant position should be out of the

fatal funnel and away from the wall. This leaves enough room for supporting
team members to move in behind the initial entry pair and prevents them fouling
arcs of fire.
Note: Early in training soldiers will rush when conducting the Five Step Entry. The entry
should be smooth and conducted at a speed that allows the firer to effectively scan the
enclosure and engage threats accurately on the move (failure to ID targets and/or
affectively engage indicates the firer is moving too fast for their ability). Early in training
soldiers should be encouraged to move slowly (walk). With practice the firers pace and
fluidity will improve (speed should be a brisk walk).
2-104 Explain: Once each firer has completed the 5 step entry, they must communicate
any threats to each other. If no threats exist each firer will call “Clear left/right”. There
is no set sequence for the firers to call out, but arcs must be cleared before calling.
“Room Clear” and the room layout must be communicated back to the section

13Loitering in the immediate area and fatal funnel is not only dangerous for the firer it also blocks the entry
point for subsequent firers to enter and provide immediate support.
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 commander (doorway right, window left - using the entry point as reference) as soon
as possible.
The two-person clear

2-105 Explain: A structure is made up of several component parts: enclosures or rooms,

L-Shapes, T-Shapes, hallways and stairs. Breaking a structure down into its
component parts ensures that the clearance is methodical, systematic and thorough.
The two-person clear is the first part in this systematic approach to building clearance
and the minimum number of firers required to clear enclosures.
Methods of room clearance

2-106 Explain: There are three methods in which an assault pair can enter an enclosure,
crisscross, buttonhook and combination method. Regardless of the method adopted
the No1 and No2 must always remain flexible. For example, while the crisscross
technique is the preferred method of entry the No1 may require to switch to a
buttonhook manoeuvre during entry to neutralise a threat. The No2 must immediately
react and complete the 5 step entry in the opposite direction of the No1.
Crisscross Technique

2-107 Explain and demonstrate: The Crisscross Technique (see fig 2-22) is used by two
team members to enhance control and facilitate entry into a room. This is the
preferred method for entering an enclosure as it minimises exposure of the side of
the body to any threats located in room corners that have yet to be cleared; the
corners left and right of the doorway (the clearance of the far corners of the room
having been conducted during the roll).

2-108 After entry is gained and a roll of the open door (fighting from the doorway) has
been completed the No1 will immediately initiate entry by signalling via barrel nod to
the No2. On receiving a barrel nod from the No1 the No2 must immediately ensure
their safety catch is applied and lower their barrel to the compressed alert position.
This movement signals ‘move’ to the No1 and allows safe entry into the enclosure.
Should the No2 fail to adopt the compressed alert position they must be prompted
using the word of command “Break”. Once the No2 lowers their barrel the No1 will
carry out the following (see fig 2-23a):

a. Clear the doorway. If not already cleared during the roll.

b. Clear the immediate area. Crossover (Crisscross), through the doorway,

clearing on the move.

c. Clear their corner. Movement through the doorway should allow the corner to
be cleared as soon as is possible while maintaining body armour plate towards
the threat (uncleared corner). The following is a suggested method of moving
through the doorway (after a roll has been completed):

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 (1) Firer takes a step towards the doorway with the foot closest to the wall
(when stacked to the right of the door the right foot, left of the door the left
foot).

(2) Firer takes a second step forward; foot should be central to the doorway.

(3) Firer takes a sidestep through the doorway while leaning slightly over the
leading foot. This ensures the firer can immediately clear the corner and
engage any threats.

(4) Firer takes a forward step to immediately clear the doorway and allow
entry of the No2.

(5) Weapon is in the low ready position throughout with muzzle trained
towards the uncleared corner.

(6) Movement should be smooth and continuous.

d. Sweep arcs of fire.

e. Establish a dominant position.

2-109 Explain and demonstrate: The No2. On receiving the signal to initiate entry from the
No1 (barrel nod) the No2 will immediately ensure their safety catch is applied and
lower their barrel to the compressed alert position. The No2 will then carry out the
following (see fig 2-23b):

a. The No2 will immediately follow the No1.

b. Clear the doorway. On entry the No2 will clear the doorway.

c. Clear the immediate area. After clearing the doorway and once the No1 is
clear of arcs the No2 readopts the low ready (adopting the stance of a No1).
The No2 will crossover (crisscross), through the doorway, moving to the
opposite side of the No1, clearing on the move in the same manner as the No1.

d. Clear their corner.

e. Sweep arcs of fire. As the No.2 moves toward their dominant position, they will
reduce their arc of fire.

f. Establish a dominant position.

2-110 Confirm by practice.

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Buttonhook Technique

2-111 Explain and demonstrate: The Buttonhook Technique (see fig 2-24) is the least
preferred method for room entry as it exposes the firers flanks to the uncleared
portions of the enclosure. If after conducting the roll of the door the No1 is faced with
a corner fed room, to avoid conducting a buttonhook manoeuvre, the No1 should
allow the No2 to enter the enclosure first by carrying out the following drill (see fig 2-
25):

a. Once the final roll of the door has been conducted the No1 identifies a corner
fed room.

b. The No1 lowers their barrel (compressed alert) to allow the No2 to enter the
enclosure safely and to signal move.

c. The No2 immediately conducts the 5 step entry into the enclosure in a
crisscross manoeuvre.

d. The No1 immediately follows the No2 into the enclosure and conducts the 5
step entry as previously taught.

2-112 Confirm by practice.

Combination technique

2-113 Explain and demonstrate: The Combination Technique is used to assist control and
facilitate room entry by two team members and is utilised when the assault pair are
located on the same side of the doorway / entry point. The Combination Technique
sees one firer moving in a crisscross manner and the other in a buttonhook
manoeuvre. A combination technique entry is conducted as follows:

a. Once the No1 has conducted the final roll of the door the No2 will place their left
hand on the shoulder of the No1 to indicate ready.

b. The No1 will immediately enter the enclosure conducting a crisscross

manoeuvre where possible. This is the preferred method as it minimises
exposure of the side of the body to any threats located in room corners that
have yet to be cleared. The room layout or potential threat identified during the
roll may require the No1 to conduct a buttonhook manoeuvre.

c. The No2 will enter immediately after the No1 and move in the opposite direction
(see fig 2-26).

2-114 Confirm by practice.

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The three- and four-person clearing technique

2-115 Explain: The use of a three-person or four-person team will provide a faster, more
effective means to enter and clear large or complicated enclosures. The use of a
third or fourth person can be planned and executed prior to entry by using the words
of command “Three/Four person clear”. The two-person assault team may also
request the support of additional team members after conducting a roll or after
gaining entry by using the words of command “Support 1” or “Support 2”. The drills
for the No1 and No2 are as previously taught.

2-116 Explain and demonstrate: The No3. Where possible the No3 should be positioned
behind the No1 prior to entry, this may require the No3 to roll with the No1 as per the
drill ‘Roll with 2’. Where this is not possible due to threat or restricted space the No3
can be positioned behind the No2. On entry the No3 will conduct the following (see
fig 2-27):

a. Follow into the enclosure after the No2.

b. As the No1 and No2 clear their immediate area the No3 clears the area to their
front.

c. While the No1 and No2 move sideways towards their dominant positions the
No3 moves to a position, inside the room, halfway between the door and the
No1.

d. The No3 will not follow the route of the No1 if the No1s movement down the
wall is impeded near the doorway.

e. If ‘Support 1’ is called for after a two-person entry is made the No3 will take up a
position covering the number that called for support.

2-117 Explain and demonstrate: The No4. Where possible the No4 should be positioned
behind the No2 prior to entry, this may require the No4 to roll with the No2 as per the
drill ‘Roll with two’. Where this is not possible due to threat or restricted space the
No4 can be positioned behind the No3. On entry the No4 will conduct the following
(see fig 2-28):

a. Follow into the enclosure after the No3.

b. As the No1 and No2 clear their immediate area the No3 clears the area to their
front.

c. While the No1 and No2 move sideways towards their dominant positions the
No4 moves to a position, inside the room, halfway between the door and the
No2.
d. The No4 will not follow the route of the No2 if the No2s movement down the
wall is impeded near the doorway.

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 e. If ‘Support 2’ is called for after a two-person entry is made the No4 will follow
the No3 into the enclosure and move to support the opposite team member
from the No3.

2-118 Confirm by practice.

Dynamic entry

2-119 Explain and demonstrate: Situations will occur when fighting from the door is not
possible and the safest option is to carry out a dynamic entry, opposing open doors
for example. Dynamic entry employs an explosive or diversionary device-initiated
assault followed by rapid movement into the enclosure. Due to the increased risk of
entering a room that hasn’t been partially cleared by fighting from the doorway, the
dynamic entry should be conducted using a 3-person clear as a minimum. A dynamic
entry should be conducted as follows:

a. Firers stack on the door and carry out their diminishing returns.

b. Where possible deploy L107 Distraction or L109 HE as previously taught.

c. The 5 step entry should be conducted immediately on the L107 Distraction

grenades first report.

d. The 5 step entry must only be conducted once the L109 HE has initiated.

e. Because a roll of the door has not been conducted firers will require to conduct
a sweep of the centre of the enclosure during entry to neutralise any threats
before clearing their corner. This should be conducted with body armour
towards the threat and whilst on the move. Where possible this initial sweep
should be conducted as the firer moves towards the threshold of the door. The
following is a suggested method of moving through the doorway:

(1) Firer takes a step towards the doorway with the foot closest to the wall
(when stacked to the right of the door the right foot, left of the door the left
foot).

(2) Firer takes a second step forward, pivoting on the trailing foot and at the
waist so that body is face on to the doorway. Leading foot should be
central to the doorway (The firer should conduct the initial sweep of the
centre of the room during steps (1) & (2), neutralising any threats on the
move).

(3) Firer steps through the doorway, pivoting on the leading foot and at the
waist (so that the body armour is face on to the corner / threat), moving
through the doorway in a crisscross manner where possible.

(4) Firer takes a forward step to immediately clear the doorway and allow
entry of the No2.

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 (5) Weapon is in the low ready position.

(6) Movement should be smooth and continuous.

(7) The No2 enters immediately behind in the same manner, moving in the
opposite direction of the No1.

(8) The No3 enters immediately behind the No2 and moves to a dominant
position left or right of the entry point (the firer must make an assessment
during entry where they can provide the best support).

Note: The movement through the doorway should be smooth and continuous. If positioned
correctly on the door pivoting on the foot should be minimal with most pivoting taking place
at the waist and hips.

2-120 Confirm by practice.

Room clearance sequence

2-121 Explain: Once the 5 step entry has been completed the room should be cleared in
the following sequence:

a. Dominate the room. Surprise and speed are key. As entry is made, the firers
identify and eliminate threats on the move and then establish dominant
positions.

b. Neutralise all Threats. A threat is any person who displays weapons or

violence of action. A threat must be neutralised immediately. Threats can be
identified by:

(1) Reading the body language of the individuals.

(2) The face may indicate intent.

(3) A weapon or threatening actions.

(4) Force must follow Rules of Engagement (ROE) but time for assessment
will be very short.

c. Control all the Occupants. Control of the occupants begins immediately upon
entering the room with the verbal command, “Get Down, Get Down, Get Down”,
whilst sweeping the arc of fire. The occupants must be directed by command
and gesture to the centre of the room. Once centralised there, they must be
guarded as must the dead and wounded. Non-combatants should be treated
correctly, reassured and if possible, questioned to identify other possible
threats.

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 d. Search the Living. All occupants, including the wounded, should be hastily
searched for weapons. On orders, all occupants of rooms should be marshalled
into one room in order to ease their management, the preservation of evidence
and the provision of security and protection.

e. Check the Dead. Before team members move through or past a room, the
suspected dead should be thoroughly checked, and their status confirmed.
They will also conduct a weapons sweep. Depending on the type of the
operation, the preservation of forensic evidence may require to be conducted.

f. Search the Room. The room should be searched unless the plan is to move
directly to a target.

g. Situation Report. The assault group commander reports the status of team
members and occupants inside of the room.

h. Consolidation. During this stage, the room is secured, vulnerable points and
enemy counter-attack options are covered, reorganisation occurs including
marking the room clear, and, if part of a strike operation, exploitation
commences.

i. Evacuate on Command/Secure. On clearing a room or floor the section

commander will inform the platoon commander who will then decide whether to
conduct a passage of lines with an echeloned section. Throughout a running
commentary will be maintained until the whole building is cleared and secured.
Manoeuvre forward or evacuation from the building will be controlled by the
platoon commander or Coy HQ. It may be necessary for some of the assaulting
platoon to remain on the objective to maintain security.

Conclusion

2-122 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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 Fig 2-20. The immediate area

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 Fig 2-21. Types of room and dominant position within

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 Fig 2-22. Crisscross technique

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 a. The No1 b. The No2

Fig 2-23. 5 Step entry

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 Fig 2-24. Buttonhook technique
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May 22
 After conducting the roll,
the No1 lowers their
barrel to indicate to the
No2 they are to enter
first

The No2 immediately

criss-crosses into the
enclosure conducting
the 5 step entry clearing
remaining area of threat

The No1 enters

immediately after the
No2 conducting the 5
step entry.

Fig 2-25. No2 enters first

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 Fig 2-26. Combination Technique
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 Fig 2-27. 3 person-clear Fig 2-28. 4 person-clear

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Lesson 10. Shapes and formations

2-123 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach the formations and procedures for clearing
corridors and shaped spaces:

a. Clearing corridors.

b. Formations.

c. Clearing L shaped spaces.

d. Clearing T shaped spaces.

e. Clearing intersecting corridors.

f. Clearing U shaped corridors.

2-124 Timings. Two 40 minute periods.

2-125 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period.

2-126 Stores.
Rifle 1 per soldier
Magazine 1 per soldier
BFA 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Cam cream as required
Demonstrators as necessary
2-127 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the drills.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

2-128 Miscellaneous.

a. The principles of the stack must be enforced at all stages of training.

Preliminaries
2-129 Safety Precautions. Normal.

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2-130 Revision. 5 Step Entry and room clearance sequence.
Introduction
2-131 Explain: There are different types of generic shapes within a structure, the first
being the two types of L Shapes (Left and right). Second are T Shapes and
Intersecting Corridors (Cross Junction). All firers must be able to identify each of the
different types of shape to enable a successful set up of the Stack Formation and
subsequent clearance around that particular shape.
Clearing corridors

2-132 Explain: Corridors provide the enemy with longer lines of observation and fire,
routes for movement or the siting of obstacles to force delay and canalise the
attacker into positions best suited to attack by IED or booby trap. A corridor must be
secured, and that security maintain during the clearance of a building. Three factors
are important to corridor clearance and maintaining all round security:

a. Be Alert. Firers must keep their head and eyes up while moving down a
corridor with point firers scanning constantly to the front to identify threats.
Identified threats, danger areas or areas to clear must be communicated quickly
and clearly to the rest of the team.

b. Control. The rate of movement should be strictly controlled to ensure that

threats are identified and engaged. Moving too fast could cause firers to miss
danger areas, leaving a threat to the team’s rear.

c. Security. Security must be maintained as the team progresses down the

corridor. At least one firer should always maintain point security to protect the
rest of the team. If there are two point firers, they should employ interlocking
arcs of fire and observation down the corridor.
Formations

2-133 Explain: Four types of formation can be used to clear a straight corridor and to
subsequently prepare the team to clear various shapes (L, T and intersection). When
selecting the type of formation to be used commanders must carefully consider the
nature of the threat before the formation is adopted.

2-134 Single stack. The team will be positioned in single file and can be adopted on
either side of the corridor dependant on the threat; the stack should be formed along
the same wall as any door encountered. The single stack is generally used in narrow
corridors (see fig 2-29).

2-135 Heavy stack. A corridor may have all the doors into rooms on one side. When this
happens the heavy stack formation can be employed to provide increased security
and flexibility. The formation requires a team member to move onto the entrance free
side of the corridor and become a second No.1. Working with the original No.1 he will
provide increased corridor security and have the ability to observe into threat areas.
The room entry techniques remain as before (see fig 2-30).
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2-136 Split Stack. The ‘split stack’ formation divides the formation equally to each side of
the corridor. The point firer can see each other within their peripheral vision which
improves SA and enables them both to identify and engage threats to their front. As
point firers in their respective stacks, they are responsible for corridor security and
employ interlocking arcs to cover a danger area (see fig 2-31):

a. Single door. The drill for clearing a single door will be conducted as previously
taught by the team located on the same side as the door. The team on the
opposite side of the corridor to the door will maintain long security down the
corridor throughout.

b. Two or more opposing doors. Two opposing doors form opposing danger
areas which must be cleared simultaneously. The clearing of these areas
should be coordinated by the commander verbally or by hand signal. The doors
and enclosures should be cleared as previously taught.

2-137 Explain and demonstrate: V Stack. In the ‘V Stack’ formation is similar to the heavy
stack with the addition of a third firer located approximately one firer behind and
central to the lead firers. Although slightly staggered behind the lead firers, this
additional firer provides corridor security to the front. This enables the two lead firers
to maintain interlocking arcs and gain observation into flanking rooms without
sacrificing security down the corridor. With its maximum use of cross coverage and
point security, the V is extremely effective method of dominating a wide corridor (see
Fig 2-32). The V Stack can be formed from any stack. The word of command ‘V
Stack’ can be given by the Commander or No1. On receipt of the command the
following should take place:

a. If the command is issued by the Commander the No1 will immediately confirm
the order and report ready, “V Stack, Ready”.

b. Next the second and third person in the stack (not the commander) will report
ready; “2 Ready”, “3 Ready”.

c. On receiving confirmation from the No3 the Commander will issue the word of
command “Move”.

d. On receipt of the word of command ‘Move’ the No2 will move to the other side
of the corridor adjacent to the No1 and adopt the low ready position and
interlock arcs with the No1 onto the opposite side of the corridor and into
flanking enclosures.

e. The No3 will move with the No2 and take up a position central but to the rear of
the No1 and No2. Once in position they are to adopt the low ready position and
provide corridor security to the front.

f. Once the No3 is in position the No1 will change arcs to interlock with the No2
onto the opposite side of the corridor and into flanking enclosures.
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2-138 Explain: The V Stack is not suitable for narrow corridors or confined spaces and
should only be utilised where there is enough space to allow clear arcs of fire for the
rear firer (remember, muzzle before flesh).

2-139 Confirm by practice.

Clearing L shaped spaces

2-140 Explain: There are two types of L shape and three techniques for clearing L-Shaped
rooms / spaces. Teams must be able to recognise the type of L Shape, adopt the
correct technique, and clear correctly. As firers move towards an L-Shape they
should not over-expose themselves to it. The first firer to identify the L shape should
inform the remainder of the team “L shape left/right”.

a. L shaped room. This is a single room with a partial wall or partition on one side
and an opening on the other side. The corner created by the wall makes up the
L-Shape. This type of room should be cleared as two different enclosures, with
each enclosure being dominated and cleared separately. The initial entry and
clearing techniques remain as described previously taught (see Fig 2-33a).

b. L shaped hallway. This is a hallway that turns off to either the left or the right.
The corner where the hallway changes direction is the L-Shape. As the firers
turn down the L-Shape, that section will be cleared as a separate enclosure
(see Fig 2-33b).

2-141 Explain and demonstrate: Barricade. The barricade is used to clear an L-Shape.
The barricade is initiated by the Commander and conducted by the No1. On
receiving the word of command “barricade” the No1 will conduct the following (see
fig 2-34):

a. Move to a position just short of the corner of the L shape. When ready they will
turn into the corner and position themself close to the wall opposite the corner
to achieve the maximum arc of fire into the new space without exposing
themself.

b. The No1 will then clear the new space in a manner like that of ‘rolling the door’,
keeping their body, weapon and head aligned to avoid over exposure.

c. Once the new space is clear the No1 will use the corner as cover and report
“clear”.

d. Once clear the No1 can call for additional support if multiple threats (doorways)
or a particularly large hallway is identified. On receipt of the word of command
“support one” the second firer should move across the corridor adjacent to the
No1. Once in position the No1 and No2 should interlock arcs. In confined
spaces this can be conducted using the ‘bump’ method where the support firer
bumps the No1 across the corridor while adopting a fire position on the corner.

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 e. The barricade can be conducted in a dynamic movement in low threat areas by
stopping short of the L shape and ‘popping around the corner. The firer should
still utilise the cover provided by the corner to scan the route ahead before
continuing.

f. The barricade can also be used to clear around the corner of walls or buildings.

2-142 Explain and demonstrate: The High/Low. The high / Low technique (i.e. one firer
standing, the other kneeling, is used when the hallway is too narrow to allow two
firers to operate side-by-side or if enemy fire is received after conducting the
barricade. By utilizing the High / Low technique the team can utilize two firers to
observe or engage an L-Shape while utilizing the cover provided by the corner of the
wall (see Fig2-35). If after conducting a barricade the No1 identifies multiple threats
or received enemy fire the command “support one Hi/Lo” should be given. The
following will then take place.

a. The No1 will drop to the kneeling position and continue to cover the threat.

b. The No2 moves immediately behind the No1 adopting the standing low ready
position and reports “ready”.

c. The No1 will then cover the outside wall, the No2 will cover the inside wall.

d. The No1 must request to stand before standing. The No2 must ensure their
safety catch is ON before giving the order to “stand”.

2-143 Confirm by practice.

Clearing T shaped space

2-144 Explain: A T-shape junction is created when a corridor ends and branches off to the
left and right. The T-shaped junction is essentially two L-shapes that must be cleared
simultaneously as there can be threats from both new directions. Once the junction is
cleared a decision will be made on the direction to move to continue clearing the
structure i.e. “hold left clear right”, two firers should be left to maintain corridor
security as the assault team move off in the new direction.

2-145 Explain and demonstrate: Double barricade. A double barricade is similar to the
barricade that is used to clear L-Shapes but is conducted by two team members and
used to clear a T-shape. Both team members will begin the action side by side
utilising interlocking arcs to clear opposing corridors. Clearing opposing corridors
allows more of the corridor to be cleared without exposing team members around
corners. The latter part of the drill must be coordinated between the No1 and No2 to
clear the remaining space simultaneously (see fig 2-36). The actions to be carried out
on receipt of the words of command “double barricade” are:

a. No1 reports “1 ready”.

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 b. No2 Moves adjacent to the No1 and reports “2 ready”.

c. The No1 and No2, both in the low ready position, interlock their arcs each
covering their opposing corridor.

d. The order to move can be given by the Commander verbally or by the No1
using a barrel nod or word of command “move”.

e. No1 and No2 move towards the junction, remaining level, clearing opposing
corridors.

f. Firers should clear as much of the opposing corridors without exposing

themselves or crossing muzzles. When they can clear no further one firer must
report “ready” to coordinate the next movement.

g. On receipt of the command “ready” the second firer will order “move” to
initiate the double barricade. The No1 and No2 then, in a dynamic movement,
pivot simultaneously and clear the remaining uncleared space before adopting
the barricade position on their own corridor.

h. Forward movement can be halted at any time by the commander or any of the
clearing pair using the word of command “Hold”.

2-146 Confirm by practice.

Clearing intersecting corridors

2-147 Explain and demonstrate: Intersections are cleared in the same manner as a T-
shape junction utilising the double barricade technique of clearing. The techniques
difference is that the manoeuvre is conducted from the ‘v stack’ with the No3
providing protection on the long threat until the double barricade has been completed
at which point the No3 will move across the intersection (see fig 2-37).

2-148 Explain and demonstrate: The No3 should not move across the intersection if there
is no safe location for them to move to. Instead they should stay in location and cover
the long threat from the safe side of the intersection.

2-149 Once in position firers should report “Clear” and report any threats to their front.
Once the Intersection is cleared a decision will be made on the direction to move in
order to continue clearing the building.

2-150 Confirm by practice.

Clearing a U shape space

2-151 Explain: U-Shaped corridors are unusual but may be found in airports, hospitals,
public buildings and underground systems, etc. In order to clear a U-Shape, firers
must continuously maintain interlocking arcs of fire in the corridor as they move with
either the V or Split Stack formation (see fig 2-38).
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Conclusion

2-152 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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 Fig 2-29. Single stack formation

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May 22
 Fig 2-30. Heavy stack (left) formation

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 Fig 2-31. Split stack formation

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 Fig 2-32. V Stack formation

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May 22
 a. L Shape room b. L Shaped corridor

Fig 2-33. L-Shapes

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May 22
 Fig 2-34. The barricade
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May 22
 Fig 2-35. The Hi – Lo formation

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 Fig 2-36. Double barricade

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May 22
 Fig 2-37. Intersection clearance (V Stack)

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May 22
 Fig 2-38. Clearing a U-shape

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May 22
Lesson 11. Stairs and ladders

2-153 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach the clearance of stairs and the use of
ladders:

a. Stairs.

b. Ladders.

2-154 Timings. One 40-minute period.

2-155 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period.

2-156 Stores.

Rifle 1 per soldier

Magazine 1 per soldier
BFA 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Ladders as necessary
Demonstrators as necessary
2-157 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the drills.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

c. Different types of ladders should be used.

2-158 Miscellaneous.

a. The principles of the stack must be enforced at all stages of training.

Preliminaries
2-159 Safety Precautions. Normal.

2-160 Revision. 5-step entry.

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Introduction
2-161 Explain: Stairs are found in all buildings of two or more levels and will also feature in
buildings with cellars. They are used for communication between floors and as a means of
escape in an emergency. They can be open or closed in design and may be a major
feature of buildings such as hotels. The stairs can have open or closed treads and
bannisters and will have landings with doors which provide entry onto the building’s
various levels. Clearing stairs is extremely challenging, particularly when clearing up. All
soldiers must know the procedure to clear stairs to enable them to be cleared quickly and
to avoid friendly casualties.

2-162 Explain: In the case of multi storey buildings, the clearance and holding of the
stairwell will be necessary to deny the enemy vertical and horizontal manoeuvre
opportunities and to prevent a counterattack. The clearance and holding of the stairwell
will be required before the clearing of the first and subsequent floors commences.
Stairs

2-163 Explain. Stairs are extremely problematic to clear when held by a determined
enemy. Where possible stairs should be avoided with entry into upper and lower levels
being gained by mouseholing through floors and ceilings or by entering through windows
and roof tops.

2-164 Explain and demonstrate: Clearing up stairs. A minimum of three firers will be
required to clear up a stairwell. As previously taught a minimum of two firers will enter and
clear the bottom landing carrying out the 5 Step Entry. No1 will then cover up the centre of
the stairwell while the No2 calls for “support 1” (Known as the No3 for the purposes of
this explanation) (See Fig 2-39).

a. No2 and No3 will move up the stairwell. The outside firer’s (No3) focus will be
checking for occupants or IED’s lying on the stairs. The inside firer’s (No2) focus will
be towards the upper landing, covering any door or constricted space that is visible.
The pair will coordinate the move up the stairs with the use of the commands
“Ready” and the response “Move” (See Fig 2-40).

b. Where an open staircase exists the No2 will first clear to the switchback. Once
cleared the No2 will begin to clear to the upper level by sweeping their arc through
the staircase.

c. Where a closed staircase exists the No2 will conduct the Barricade drill at the
switchback before continuing the clearance to the next level.

d. Once the No2 and No3 reach the switchback the No1 moves their muzzle away
from the two firers moving up the stairs. If there are several levels the No1 will
continue to cover up the centre of the stairwell to the upper levels.

e. Where multiple levels exist the No2 will call for “Support 1” once the first
switch back has been cleared. The support firer will move immediately to the switch

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 back and cover the upper levels backwards allowing the No2 and No3 to clear to the
first landing (see fig 2-41).

f. As the No2 and No3 clear the first landing they will call out threat areas to allow
the commander to formulate the sections next movements. Once “Clear” has been
called the rest of the stack must start to move down the stairs. Coordination should
be done on the move so that the team does not spend too long on the stairwell.

2-165 Confirm by practice.

2-166 Explain and demonstrate: Clearing down stairs. A minimum of three firers will be
required to clear down a stairwell. As previously taught a minimum of two firers will enter
and clear the upper landing carrying out the 5 Step Entry. No1 will then cover down the
centre of the stairwell while the No2 calls for “support 1” (Known as the No3 for the
purposes of this explanation).

a. No2 and No3 will move down the stairwell. The outside firer’s (No3) focus will
be checking for occupants or IED’s lying on the stairs. The inside firer’s (No2) focus
will be towards the lower landing, covering any door or constricted space that is
visible. The pair will coordinate the move down the stairs with the use of the
commands “Ready” and the response “Move”.

b. Where an open staircase exists the No2 will first clear to the switchback. Once
cleared the No2 will begin to clear to the lower level by sweeping their arc through
the staircase.

c. Where a closed staircase exists the No2 will conduct the Barricade drill at the
switchback before continuing the clearance to the next level.

d. Once the No2 and No3 reach the switchback the No1 moves their muzzle away
from the two firers moving down the stairs. If there are several levels the No1 will
continue to cover down the centre of the stairwell to the lower levels.

e. Where multiple levels exist the No2 will call for “Support 1” once the first
switch back has been cleared. The support firer will move immediately to the switch
back and cover the lower levels backwards allowing the No2 and No3 to clear to the
first landing.

f. As the No2 and No3 clear the first landing they will call out threat areas to allow
the commander to formulate the sections next movements. Once “Clear” has been
called the rest of the stack must start to move down the stairs. Coordination should
be done on the move so that the team does not spend too long on the stairwell.

2-167 Explain and demonstrate: When beginning a clearance of a staircase from the
middle levels a minimum of four firers will be required to begin the clearance, one will
cover the upper levels, one will cover the lower levels and two to conduct the clearance.
The drill to clear up or down is then as previously taught.

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2-168 Confirm by practice.

Ladders

2-169 Explain: Ladders are an essential piece of equipment in the UE and can be used to
assist entry into a building or into upper levels through mouse holes or into loft spaces.
Use of ladders, however, comes with inherent risks. Use of primary weapon systems will
be hindered and firers will be exposed, particularly when moving up a ladder. For these
reasons the drills employed when utilising ladders must be known and practiced by all to
ensure swift movement and clearance while minimising risk to firers.

2-170 Explain and demonstrate: Clearing up a ladder. The following drill should be
carried out when clearing up a ladder:

a. A member of the MOE team deploys ladder, holding it in position. The ladder
should not be held by the rungs as this is likely to result in injury.

b. Once the ladder is in position the assault pair will move to the bottom, No1 will
transition to their secondary weapon. Keeping their secondary weapon pointed
upward to the top of the ladder-well, they will begin to climb. As soon as there is
room on the ladder, No2 will transition to their secondary weapon and start climbing.
Only No1 will maintain security up the ladder.

c. No1 will crouch as they near the opening ensuring not to expose themselves
into the space/opening above. When they can go no further, they will remove their
torch if they have not done so already.

d. Once ready, the firer will “Pop” their head and weapon (using a compressed
hold) through the opening and conduct a preliminary clearance of the space.

e. Depending on the opening and the balance of the firer the torch can be held
with the left hand or placed on the edge of the hatch pointing into the enclosure.

f. Once the preliminary clearance has been conducted the No1 will continue the
5-step entry as taught ensuring to make room for the No2 as quickly as possible.

g. The No2 will immediately follow the No1 and conduct the 5-step entry to the
opposite direction from the No1 as previously taught.

h. Follow on firers will remain at the bottom of the ladder-well until “Clear” has
been called. They may either transition or control their primary weapon until they are
at the top.

i. The rifle can be indexed during the climb if a secondary weapon is not
available.

j. Confined space may only allow one person to conduct the drill. Speed and
accuracy will be required.
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2-171 If conducting a room clearance, the assault team identify a ladder well / loft opening
the firer that identified the ladder well / loft opening will immediately call for “support 1 loft
/ mousehole” while continuing with the 5-step entry. The support firer will immediately
move into the enclosure and cover the opening while the assault team clears the
enclosure. Once the enclosure is clear the space above can be cleared as previously
taught.
2-172 Use of grenades should be avoided when fighting into lofts / roof spaces. When
used consideration must be given to the ceiling construction to avoid penetration, collapse
and fire.

2-173 Confirm by practice.

2-174 Explain and demonstrate: Clearing down a ladder. Two firers move up to the
ladder-well. No1 holds cover as No2 deploys a distraction grenade as previously taught.
Immediately on initiation of the distraction grenade, both firers make entry down the
ladder-well and conduct a five-step entry as taught. Whether using a diversionary device,
or not, speed is the only effective way to clear down a ladder.

2-175 The use of periscopes or improvised periscopes may, if light allows, be used to
clear the space below prior to entering down the ladder.

Conclusion

2-176 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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 1

Fig 2-39. Two firers clear bottom landing

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 3

Fig 2-40. Two firers clear stairs to the first switchback

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 Fig 2-41. Stairs cleared to next level
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Lesson 12. Occupancy Control

2-177 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach how to deal with and control occupants
during urban CQB:

a. Controlling an occupant.

b. Closing on an occupant.

c. Conducting a person search.

d. Conducting a dead check.

2-178 Timings. One 40 minute period.

2-179 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period.

2-180 Stores.
Rifle 1 per soldier
Magazine 1 per soldier
BFA 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Demonstrators as necessary
2-181 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the drills.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

Preliminaries
2-182 Safety Precautions. Normal.

2-183 Revision. Person search – Initial and detailed.

Introduction
2-184 Explain: When conducting CQB operations within the urban environment the
possibility of encountering occupants inside rooms and buildings is extremely high.
Occupants will not always be hostile and may be local civilians and even hostages.
To that end a robust set of actions are required to enable the swift management and
control of occupants when clearing through buildings and enclosures.

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Controlling an occupant

2-185 Explain: There are two types of occupancy control used during CQB operations,
these are verbal and physical. The key to both types is to get the occupant into the
centre of the room/space so that searches can be conducted without impeding the
flow of movement through the enclosure.

2-186 Explain and demonstrate: Verbal. The occupant is controlled using a loud, firm and
commanding voice and clear direction. Contact should not be made with the
occupant until necessary for search purposes. Verbal commands that will be used
are:

a. “Get down, Get down, Get down!”. Immediately controls the occupant and
places them into a position that is less threatening to the assault team.

b. “Crawl/move towards me (or designated area)!”. This command is used

when an occupant is in a small space or an area of the enclosure where the
firer does not want the occupant to be. The firer should always attempt to move
an occupant into an area that is safe enough to conduct a search.

c. “Head down, Arms out, Cross your legs!”. Given once the occupant is in the
sitting position ready to be searched and secured.

d. Hand signals. Verbal commands should be kept clear and simple. Hand
signals should be used in conjunction with verbal commands in situations the
occupant may not speak the same language. For example, a gesture with the
left hand pointing towards the ground will generally be understood by most to
get down.

e. Room clearance. Verbal control of an occupant should take place immediately

upon entering an enclosure and continue throughout the clearance of the
enclosure. The assaulting team may require additional support to control the
occupants to allow the enclosure to be cleared as previously taught.

2-187 Explain and demonstrate: Physical. Physical control is the use of physical force to
control/move an occupant. This may be required when the occupant is none
compliant to verbal commands. Physical control will also be required when there is
insufficient time or space to control the occupant verbally. This is likely to take place
within the immediate area after making entry, dependant on the threat the occupant
can be pushed out of the immediate area and towards the centre of the room or
physically pinned against the wall.

a. Immediate area low threat. An unarmed occupant believed to be of low threat

within the immediate area should be pushed out of the way and towards the
centre of the enclosure. The firer should:

(1) Index the weapon.

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 (2) Use the non-firing hand to push the occupant into the centre of the room.

(3) Immediately call for support if conducting a two-person entry.

(4) Continue to complete the 5-step entry ensuring the occupant remains
within the peripheral vision as they sweep their arc of fire.

b. Immediate area high/unknown threat. An occupant encountered within the

immediate area that is believed to be an immediate threat should be pinned
against the wall to stop them bringing a weapon to bear or interfering with the
clearance of the enclosure. The actions to be carried out are

(1) Index the weapon.

(2) With the non-firing hand, strike the occupant in the chest and ride your
arm up the body to the chin.

(3) Push the occupant and pin them up against the wall.

(4) If a two-person entry was conducted call for support.

(5) Keep the occupant pinned to allow the other firers in the enclosure to carry
out the clearance.

(6) Once the room is clear the occupant is moved to the ground and secured.
Closing on an occupant

2-188 Explain and demonstrate: ‘Closing’ refers to reducing the space between firer and
occupant and must be conducted systematically to ensure the occupant is covered
throughout. Closing should be conducted as a pair with communication throughout.
Both firers may require to close on the occupant in larger enclosures, this should be
done ensuring one foot on the ground using the words of command ‘move’ and ‘hold’.
At no point should firers cross in front of another.
Conducting a person search

2-189 Explain: The procedure for conducting an initial and detailed search is as per
Military Annual Training Tests. The location and time of search will be determined by
orders and the current threat but as a guide the following should be adhered to:

a. Initial. The initial search must be conducted immediately and before moving the
occupant to the marshalling area.

b. Detailed search. A detailed search must take place at the earliest and safest
opportunity. This can be done in the room the occupant was encountered but
this may not be possible due to the threat. A detailed search must take place in
the marshalling area if not conducted already.

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Conducting a dead check

2-190 Explain: Any threat encountered and engaged when entering an enclosure must be
considered a threat until such time it has been confirmed neutralised. The firer that
engaged the threat must keep the threat within their peripheral vision throughout the
5-step entry. Calling “Support 1” will allow the threat to be covered by the support
firer while the 5-step entry is completed. Once the 5-step entry has been completed
the following should take place:

a. The firer conducting the dead check will announce “I have dead check”. They
will wait for a response “take it” from a second firer who can provide cover and
provide plate protection throughout the check14 (plate me). Once the response
is given the firer will close on the threat.

b. The firer will then switch to the index keeping the weapon orientated on the
threat.

c. Any weapons are removed from the body and surrounding area.

d. Suspected dead must be thoroughly checked, and status confirmed by checking

for vital signs.

e. Mark the dead threat with a cyalume as per unit SOP’s to indicate to other firers
that it has been searched.

f. If vital signs are found first aid must be given and the combatant extracted
through the CasEvac chain.
Conclusion
2-191 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

14The firer providing plate protection should be positioned between the person conducting the dead check
and the threat, adopting the stance of a No1 until the check is complete.
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Lesson 13. Constricted space

2-192 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach the clearance of constricted spaces and
furniture:

a. Constricted space.

b. Severly constricted space.

c. Occupancy control.

d. Clearing furniture.

2-193 Timings. One 40 minute period.

2-194 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period.

2-195 Stores.
Rifle 1 per soldier
Magazine 1 per soldier
BFA 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Demonstrators as necessary
2-196 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the drills.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

c. Where possible furniture should be positioned within enclosures.

2-197 Miscellaneous.

a. The principles of the stack must be enforced at all stages of training.

Preliminaries
2-198 Safety Precautions. Normal.

2-199 Revision. Occupancy control.

Introduction

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2-200 Explain: Each type of structure encountered in the urban environment has its own
characteristics and constricted spaces. Commercial buildings will have store
cupboards and toilet cubicles while residential dwellings will have wardrobes and
furniture. These constricted spaces are large enough to hide any potential threat but
too small to clear with a conventional assault team. Communication, practice and
teamwork are key to the clearance of these spaces while minimising the danger from
threats hidden inside.
Constricted space

2-201 Explain: A constricted space is defined as any space that is too small for two firers
to carry out the 5 Step Entry. Some examples of a constricted space are a small
toilet, storeroom, certain types of attic spaces and wardrobes.

2-202 Explain and demonstrate: The constricted space should be considered a room and
cleared like any other enclosure using the 5-step entry. Once the main enclosure has
been cleared the following actions will take place:

a. Firer identifying a constricted space communicates to the remainder of the

assaulting team “Constricted space”.

b. Once the remainder of the room has been cleared the firer that identified the
space will move closer maintaining an alert position.

c. If the enclosure is fitted with a closed door the assault team stack and carry out
the drills for a closed door.

d. Once the door is open the enclosure within will be cleared by the No1.
Wardrobes and extremely small enclosures can be cleared visually. Larger
enclosures such as cupboards may require the No1 to enter the enclosure.

e. The No2 remains outside the constricted space but alert and ready to provide
immediate support if required.

f. Diversionary devices should not be used in small constricted spaces as the

smoke produced may prevent the firer from identifying a danger area or threat
within.

2-203 Small rooms such as storerooms would usually be identified prior to the 5 step entry
unless a dynamic entry had been conducted. If during the 5 step entry the No1
identifies a room is smaller than expected they should immediately call “small room”
or “constricted space”. The No2 should then hold their position outside the enclosure
but alert and ready to provide immediate support if required.

2-204 Confirm by practice.

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Severely constricted space

2-205 The small confines of a constricted space may limit manoeuvrability and restrict
employment of the rifle, in such conditions the firer should conduct the following drill
to allow a safe transition to their secondary weapon:
a. On identifying a severely constricted space the firer should alert the No2 using
the words of command “constricted space, transitioning”.

b. On hearing the command the No2 should take a sidestep left or right
(depending on which side of the space they are), bring the weapon in to the low
ready position (remembering ‘muzzle before flesh’) and adopts the stance of a
No1; covering the threat.

c. Once the No2 is covering the threat the No1 removes their torch, holding it in
their left hand, and transitions to their secondary weapon.

d. Once the transition is complete the No1 will report “Ready”.

e. On receipt of the command the No2 ensures their safety catch is applied,
lowers their weapon and moves back into the position of No2 before reporting
“Move”.

f. The No1 then clears the enclosure as previously taught.

g. If already committed the No1 should transition immediately and continue the
clearance.

2-206 Confirm by practice.

Occupancy control

2-207 Explain and demonstrate: The lack of space when clearing constricted areas means
that occupants are likely to be extremely close and will require rapid identification and
actions to neutralise or control occupants. Civilians and non-combatants are likely to
hide in these confined spaces so strict fire discipline must be maintained when
conducting the clearance. Consideration should be given to the following:

a. Armed threat. The threat should be neutralised in line with the rules of
engagement. Once neutralised the No1 should call for support from the No2.
The No2 should drag the body clear of the enclosure to allow the No1 to
complete the clearance.

b. Unarmed occupant. The No1 will verbally or physically control the occupant
until they are out of the constricted space. The No1 will most likely need to take
a rearward step to put space between them and the occupant to allow verbal
control. Whichever method is used the No1 must control the occupant and
move them out of the enclosure to allow the No2 to take over the clearance of
the constricted space.

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2-208 Confirm by practice.
Clearing furniture

2-209 Explain and demonstrate: When carried out correctly the 5-step entry allows a
systematic and methodical clearance of an empty enclosure. Most rooms, however,
are likely to contain furniture. Commercial buildings may contain desks, filing cabinets
and lockers whereas residential properties are likely to contain beds, wardrobes and
sofas. Each of these items of furniture has the potential to hide a threat and as such
must also be cleared systematically. As with most actions’ communication and
teamwork are key. Once the 5-step entry has been completed and the members of
the assault team have reported clear they will conduct the following (see fig 2-42):

a. The No1 will indicate which item of furniture is to be cleared first. Furniture
should be cleared methodically starting closest to the firers before moving
deeper into the enclosure.

b. Movement towards the furniture should be coordinated. Once an item of

furniture has been identified the person clearing will report “ready”. The person
covering will order “move”.

c. Should the person covering feel they need to move position to provide better
cover they will order “hold”. The person clearing will then hold their position and
provide cover while the person that was covering moves. Once in a better
position to provide cover the cover person will order “move” to allow the
clearance to continue.

d. The item of furniture will then be checked and reported “clear” when complete.

e. “Room clear” is only given once all items of furniture have been checked.

f. The firer conducting the clearance of the furniture may choose to switch to
secondary weapon while clearing.

g. Support may be required to clear larger items of furniture.

h. Smaller items of furniture may be cleared by both firers simultaneously by

moving down their respective walls.

Conclusion

2-210 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

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 c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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 Fig 2-42. Clearing furniture

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Lesson 14. Room to room and securing

2-211 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach how to fight room to room and secure a
building:

a. Marking.

b. Fighting from room to room.

c. Building clearance.

d. Marshalling areas.

e. Secure points.

f. Re-clear.

2-212 Timings. One 40 minute period.

2-213 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period.

2-214 Stores.
Rifle 1 per soldier
Magazine 1 per soldier
BFA 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Ladders as necessary
Demonstrators as necessary
2-215 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the drills.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

Preliminaries
2-216 Safety Precautions. Normal.

2-217 Revision. Room clearance (5 step entry, may include occupancy control and / or
constricted space).

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Introduction
2-218 Explain: While the stack allows easy control of the section its use must be
controlled to minimise exposure of the section in open areas and corridors. In
addition, the system of marking of cleared areas must be known and understood by
all to ensure rooms are correctly marked allowing subsequent callsigns to move
through cleared objectives quickly and to avoid clearing rooms already cleared.
Marking

2-219 Explain: A comprehensive system of NATO standardised markings (see fig 2-43) is
used to indicate the buildings use or whether a building or room is clear of the
enemy, whether booby traps or IED are present, or that casualties may have been
gathered in a particular place. Marking the room or building is mandatory and must
follow the unit SOIs. This aids SA and improves communication. Although there are
many different methods used to mark a room or building, the most preferred is the
cylume. Cylumes are highly visible during both daylight hours and periods of reduced
visibility. There is also the ability to use IR cylumes for “black light” clearances.
a. The firer will mark the room by placing a cylume in the doorjamb furthest from
the marshalling area; this is usually the direction that the team are going.
Marking the room in this manner will assist with the echelon of friendly forces
(see fig 2-44).
b. A Single Room. Once the enclosure is clear and before the entry team leave
the room, a nominated firer will announce, “I have the mark” and will be
responsible for marking the room. The opposite member of the team will reply
“take it”. As the team exit the room they will call, “Coming out”. When the last
firer exits the room they will announce, “Last out”.
c. Adjoining Rooms. Once entry into the building has been achieved the section
commander will control the move through the rooms and levels ensuring that
momentum is maintained, the clearance is thorough, and marking is carried out.
The room can be marked in several different ways:
(1) The entry team on the initial clear can call for support and the support
firers can mark the room.
(2) If a three-person entry, the firer that does not have a job will mark the
room.
(3) If the rest of the stack can mark the room if they are moving through it.
(4) Once the rooms are cleared, those firers can mark the rooms as they
move back to the stack.
d. Rooms and buildings must be marked as clear and that members are
nominated to carry this action out. If cylumes are not available, then marking
must be improvised. Failure to mark a room or building may cause confusion
and lead to the re-clearance of the structure.
e. Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT). Consideration must be given to the
marking of the FLOT to avoid fratricide from friendly forces, particularly where
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 fire support is being provided throughout the clearance of the building. The
FLOT should be marked on the friendly side of the building by hanging
flags/markers out of windows and doors.
Clearance

2-220 Each room needs to be completely cleared and secured before moving on to the
next room, likewise each floor before moving on to the next. If rooms do have
vulnerable points, then soldiers should be left behind to secure them to prevent an
enemy counterattack.
Fighting from room to room

2-221 Explain and demonstrate: A team using the stack can be vulnerable in a high threat
situation. To reduce this risk, entry teams can use rooms already cleared as short-
term staging areas for the clearance of the next room. The team stack is still utilised
but will form on the move towards the next room.

a. Once a room is cleared, the firer who is providing long security down the hall
steps back (whilst continuing to cover their arc) and takes up a barricade
position in the doorway of the cleared room and continues to maintain security
to the front (see fig 2-45).

b. If not already done so the firer holding the long threat will indicate the next
threats to the section commander and the remainder of the section.

c. The second firer will receive a clear indication of the next enclosure/space that
has to be cleared from the section commander. At this point any coordination
will be done from within the enclosure before the team move back out into the
hallway and advance to the next enclosure/space to be cleared. If the assault
force is using the split stack hallway formation, then the move to clear the next
enclosure will be coordinated across the hallway by the second firer. This
coordination can be done either using verbal commands or using the squeeze
method.

d. The assault team forms the stack on the move as it exits the enclosure; this
ensures that any opposing danger areas can be cleared simultaneously. When
the next enclosure/space has been cleared, the procedure is repeated until the
structure has been cleared.
Marshalling areas

2-222 The Marshalling Area will act as the control point through which all agencies must
pass. Ideally the area should be managed by the platoon Sgt who will maintain the
SA within the building. It should be positioned inside the objective and is usually
located in the first room or rooms after the entry point. It should be large enough to
house the entire assault group, any supporting elements, and the estimated number
of occupants. The area will also be used to conduct the re-organisation and should
be organized as follows:
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 a. Occupant handling location.

(1) Dirty area: For any occupant not subjected to a detailed search.

(2) Clean area: For any searched occupants.

(3) Threat area: For known threats.

b. Medical area.

(1) Location of the CMT.

(2) For all injured occupants who must be separated by classification; Cleared
and Threats.

(3) An RV for injured troops which should be kept separate from the building
occupants and if possible, in an adjoining room.

c. Location of EOD support.

d. Location of RMP and other specialists awaiting a call forward.

e. Location of Pl Comd. When not involved in clearing and securing and all
assault group members after the objective has been is secured before
exfiltration.

f. Location of exfiltration point. This point is usually located near the

Marshalling Area and will normally be the same as the breach point. However,
you will need to plan for an alternate exfiltration point.
Secure points

2-223 Secure Points are established throughout the clearance to defend the building and
protect from counterattack. As a room is cleared potential entry points that could be
used by the enemy to counterattack or re infiltrate must be covered. Where possible
strongpoints / chokepoints should be identified that allow multiple entry points to be
covered by individuals to free up manpower for stacking. After “Building Clear!” is
called out (repeated by every firer) firers not holding a strong point move back to the
Marshalling Area / Entry point, checking for lone personnel who may be either
wounded or dealing with a missed occupant.

a. If possible, a firer should be posted at the entrance to each individual enclosure.

If there are more enclosures than firers, Strong Points will be positioned at
critical choke points. These Strong Points must be mutually supporting, always
have all round protection and maintain visual contact with each other. The Sect
Comd / 2IC will move freely between the strong points to carry out a complete
head check (if needed) before preparing the section to leave the objective.

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 b. For a pre-determined entry, the Pl Comd may pre-plan the locations of Secure
Points. They will usually be sited hastily by the Sect Comd after an
undetermined entry. The Pl Comd and Sgt must know how many secure points
have been set up to ease the post assault head check.
Re-clear

2-224 It may be necessary to re-clear the objective if:

a. Firing restarts inside the objective. If firing re-starts inside the objective, re-
clearance starts from the last secure point closest to the firing and continues
until the last room has been re-cleared. The firers must treat the objective as if it
is no longer secure.

b. Unmarked Room. If a firer comes to a room that is not marked, they must first
challenge into the room to ensure that no friendly forces are inside. If no
response is received, the firer holds security and calls for support. When
support arrives, the two firers will make entry into the enclosure, clear it and
properly mark it.

2-225 During a re-clearance the Pl Sgt will keep the Marshalling Area security in place,
releasing the remainder of the firers to support the clearance.

Conclusion

2-226 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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 Fig 2-43. NATO marking

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 Fig 2-44. Marking a room

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 Fig 2-45. Use of doorways of cleared enclosures

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Lesson 15. Manual Method of Entry (MoE)

2-227 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach the tools and methods of Manual MoE:

a. Manual MoE tools.

b. Defeating an inward opening door.

c. Defeating an outward opening door.

d. Defeating windows.

2-228 Timings. One 40 minute period.

2-229 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period.

2-230 Stores.
Rifle 1 per soldier
Magazine 1 per soldier
BFA 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Enforcer as necessary
Halligan tool as necessary
Sledgehammer as necessary
Crowbar as necessary
Demonstrators as necessary
Rhino Rig if available
Wooden chocks for Rhino Rig
Spanner for Rhino Rig
2-231 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the drills.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

c. The use of a Rhino Rig or similar will greatly enhance this lesson.

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Preliminaries
2-232 Safety Precautions. Normal.

2-233 Revision. The Doorway – Door check.

Introduction
2-234 Explain: Manual Method of Entry has a significant role in Urban Operations. When
entry teams are denied access to their chosen entry point it is vital the tools needed
to gain access are readily available, and the chosen breacher is fully competent in
the carriage and use of these tools so the entry team can make entry into the
enclosure as quickly as is possible to minimise exposure to the fatal funnel and to
allow the assault team to conduct the clearance.
Manual MoE Tools

2-235 Explain and demonstrate: The Enforcer. The Enforcer (see fig 2-46) is a single
person operated tool, designed for use in confined spaces for inward opening doors.
It is the original most reliable door opener. It is 16Kg of hardened steel combined with
a unique design that impacts at approx. 3.5 tons which means that it will, defeat most
residential doors even those reinforced. With the correct technique of striking the
door and the full understanding of where to strike, most doors can be defeated within
several seconds. A sling can be fitted to aid carriage. The use of the Enforcer is
critical in gaining access to structures or enclosures when inward opening doors are
locked and therefore obstruct the entry team gaining access. It is vital that the
breacher knows exactly what their role is within the stack, how to hold and operate
the Enforcer so a successful breach can occur fast with the minimum of fuss and as
smooth as possible.

2-236 Explain and demonstrate: Holding the enforcer. The Enforcer is held with the arms
at right angles to the floor with a firm grasp of the handles. The door is struck with
power and motion from the hips and shoulders for optimum results. The Enforcer has
two handles one rear and one front of the centre designed for the correct hold and
grip to make the best effect when striking the contact point on the door. The stance of
the Breacher before and during the strike is critical for optimum results. Depending
on which way the door opens dictates which way the Breacher faces to strike, as the
door frame must be considered due to the risk of the Breacher catching and
potentially causing damage to their wrists on the door frame (see fig 2-47).

2-237 Explain and demonstrate: The Halligan tool. The Halligan Tool (see fig 2-48) is a
single person operated tool. It has been designed and manufactured for levering,
puncturing and glass breaking which makes it a very effective tool for defeating
locked outward opening doors, grills and windows. There are several parts to the tool
including a spike, a duckbill and the metal cutter or claw which all contribute to the
tools other uses of breaking and raking glass, breaking padlocks hasps, defeating
hinges and lifting floorboards. The Halligan Tool comes in various lengths, sizes and
weights. The head and claw are forged from high alloy steel which is heat treated for
maximum strength and this is attached to a stress proof bar which can be made
electrically non-conductive. This tool is extremely durable and virtually unbreakable.
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 For tactical reasons it can come coloured in black or alternative chrome finish. A sling
can be made with bungee cord and fitted to aid in the carriage. There is however
purpose made slings that provide adjustable straps, non-slip grip and comfortable for
the carrier. Care must be taken when handling the Halligan Tool due to the sharp
edges. These should always be considered when it is slung on the carrier for their
and others safety. When placed on the ground the Halligan Tool must be placed with
the spike pointing down.

2-238 Explain and demonstrate: The sledgehammer. The Sledgehammer is a single

person operated tool and is available in different sizes and weights. The way it is
constructed varies too. The handle is either made from the conventional wood or a
durable, fibre glass core with a polypropylene jacket for greater strength and
substantial weight reduction to that of the wood. The head is drop forged from high
carbon steel which is hardened and tempered. The Sledgehammer compliments the
Halligan Tool well by allowing the operator to bang the back of the claw to gain
purchase into the gap being used for leverage to open the door. Depending on the
Sledgehammers length, it can be carried in the Tactical MOE Backpack.

2-239 Explain and demonstrate: The crowbar. The crowbar is a single person operated
tool. It is a very useful tool for method of entry and can have multiple purposes, the
main one being able to aid in opening outward opening doors and windows. It can be
used alongside the Halligan Tool to force apart two objects such as a door and its
frame acting as a lever. The most typical choice of material for a crowbar is steel or
iron, as these materials are strong and resilient. They can also be made from
titanium which has the advantage of being lighter, non-magnetic and spark-resistant.
The most common Crowbars are forged from a hexagonal or sometimes cylindrical
stock. This tool can be carried in Tactical MOE backpack.

2-240 Explain and demonstrate: Tactical MOE Backpack. The Tactical MOE Backpack Is
a system designed to hold and secure MOE tools. The hook and loop cover keep
tools quiet and hidden while allowing instant access. It is padded with fully adjustable
shoulder straps, so the operator can keep it on the back whilst colleagues can easily
reach and gain access to the tools. Each tool is fully secured in its own compartment
and the strap system. There are also under the leg straps to keep the pack in place
during running and climbing. The straps prevent the pack from falling to one side or
going over the head during extreme body movements.
Defeating an inward (push) opening door

2-241 Explain: Many doors, whether commercial or residential, are likely to be fitted with
locks; in some cases, several. Failure to identify the position and number of locks can
result, needlessly, in a failed entry; at the very least it will slow down the assault and
fatigue the entry team. There are many types of lock ranging from a standard mortice
lock to multi-point locking systems which are often found in PVCu doors.
Understanding how these locks work and their week points will aid in defeating them
swiftly with minimum effort.

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2-242 Explain: As a rule of thumb Non-PVCu doors locking mechanisms will be in three
locations, the top, centre and bottom of the door opposite the hinges. The main
locking mechanism usually being located centre section of the door opposite the
hinges and can usually be identified by the door hardware (handle) and potentially a
keyhole. In addition, door bolts may be fitted in the top and bottom corner of the door
(see fig 2-49).

2-243 Explain and demonstrate: Assault team. When conducting the door check the
assault team must identify the position of any locking mechanisms and communicate
this to the MoE team. As the MoE team move forward the No1 must continue to
cover the threat while the No2 indicates where to strike the door and attack the
correct lock first. Once a lock is defeated the No2 will indicate the next point to strike.

2-244 Explain and demonstrate: Top Lock. If, after conducting a door check, there is
believed to be a top lock on an inward opening door the MoE team will require to
attack the lock with the Enforcer. Attacking the top lock of a door with the Enforcer is
the most arduous for the operator. If all three contact points need attacking i.e. top,
middle and bottom then start at the top and work downwards. The position of the
Enforcer is turned upside down 180 degrees and raised above the head. The
Breacher stands side on to the door with either their left or right shoulder towards,
depending on position of the locks. Their feet are shoulder width apart in a strong
firm stance and the power and movement comes from the hips as the enforcer is
directed towards the strike point. This is repeated until the lock is defeated.

2-245 Explain and demonstrate: Centre Lock. Attacking the centre lock on majority of
doors is the main focus point as this is where the strongest locks are usually
positioned. It is very important that the strike point, to defeat the lock is identified
quickly. Ideally the strike should be between the handle of the door and the door
frame, causing optimum stress to the locking mechanism. If this is not possible then
the door should be struck just above the door handle in line with the lock. The door
frame and centre of the door should be avoided as these are strong points which will
hinder and delay entry. The side on stance is adopted. The person that conducted
the door check can place a foot and apply pressure to the bottom of the door, in
order to aid the Breacher. This method keeps the tension on the door and lock and
ensures the maximum transference of kinetic energy to the locking mechanism.

2-246 Explain and demonstrate: Bottom Lock. Attacking the bottom lock, holds the same
principals as the centre lock with the added advantage of having a lower centre of
gravity so more power can be produced to defeat the lock quicker.

2-247 Explain and demonstrate: Successful entry. As soon as the Breacher has
defeated the lock and the door opens, making it accessible for the entry, the
Breacher must turn and move away from the immediate area of the doorway
negating any hindrance of the entry team and return to the rear of the stack.

2-248 Explain and demonstrate: Halligan tool. While the Halligan tool is predominantly
used to lever pull doors it can also be used to assist breaching push doors by
removing the flex from the door and applying additional pressure to the locking
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 mechanism. To attack a push door with the Halligan tool the claw should be wedged
between the door and frame as close to the locking mechanism so that the curve is
away from the user (see fig 2-50). With correct purchase pushing the halligan tool
towards the door will now apply pressure to the locking mechanism.

2-249 Confirm by practice.

Defeating an outward (pull) opening door

2-250 Explain and demonstrate: Defeating the locking mechanism. The Halligan Tool is
multi-purpose; its main role is to aid the entry team to defeat a locked outward
opening door. It’s perfectly forged to lever open a door when used correctly. The
assault team, having conducted their door assessment will direct the Breacher to the
correct side and part of the door to be attacked. The MoE team will then carry out the
following:

a. Door check. The Breacher must conduct their own check of the door gap
before inserting the Duckbill making sure the locking system does not obstruct
the tool (see fig 2-51).

b. Insert the duckbill. The MoE No1 must insert the duckbill of the tool between
the door frame and the door directly above the locking mechanism with the bar
of the tool running horizontally along the door (see fig 2-52). The duckbill must
be hammered into the gap until it hits the door stop to ensure enough purchase
on the door for leverage. The No1 must hold the Halligan tool in position while
the No2 uses the enforcer or sledgehammer to strike the duckbill into position.

c. Levering. Once the Duckbill is in place the No1 will then lever the tool
outwards, forcing the door away from the frame and putting pressure on the
lock to defeat it. If the lock is weakened but not broken the Duckbill can be
inserted at any point up and down the gap, depending on where the hold is on
the door, to achieve the aim.

d. Successful entry. Once the lock or locks have been defeated and the door
comes free, the Breacher using the duckbill is to pull the door completely open
and hold it, if possible, with themselves flush against the wall, in order for the
assault team to make an unobtrusive entry. The Halligan tool can then be slung
for later use as the Breacher joins their place in the stack for the assault.

2-251 Explain and demonstrate: Defeating the hinges. The main use of the Halligan tool
claw when making entry is defeating the hinges on an outward opening door which
are clearly visible to the Breacher. The gap of the claw can be inserted over the
hinge and levered upwards to weaken and pull out the hinge. Once the hinges have
been defeated the duckbill can be used in the gap above the top hinge to lever the
door out of its frame and pull it open as much as possible giving the assault team a
clear entry point.

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2-252 Explain and demonstrate: Defeating padlocks. The Hallogan tool spike is a very
good tool to defeat padlocks by inserting between the bars, twisting and levering
away to snap the lock. It is also made to insert into locks and latches without slipping
out.

2-253 Confirm by practice.

Defeating windows

2-254 Explain and demonstrate: Entering through windows has inherent risks that, if not
cleared correctly, can result in deep lacerating wounds and potentially fatal injuries.
Before deciding to utilise a window for entry consideration must be given to the
enemy threat and type of glass to be defeated; toughened, laminated glass is difficult
and time consuming to defeat. To clear a sheet glass window a breacher should:

a. Using the wall as cover strike the glass in the lower corner, near to the frame
with the spike (see fig 2-53).

b. Use the halligan tool to strike any remaining large shards of glass.

c. Forcefully run the web of the tool (between the spike and duckbill) along the
sides and bottom of the frame several times to clear any remaining small shards
(see fig 2-54).

d. With downwards force run the machined grooves of the grips back and forth in a
sawing motion along the full length of the bottom of the frame. This sawing
action clears any smaller shards from the frame.

e. If possible, a ballistic blanket or thick cover should be placed over the bottom of
the frame to further protect soldiers as they enter.

f. When attacking laminated glass, the upper corner should be struck with
subsequent strikes seeking to elongate the hole down to the bottom of the
frame. This should be done on both sides of the window before finally
attempting to break the glass away from the top of the frame.

g. A written detailed risk assessment must be carried out prior to any glass
defeating training taking place. The following PPE must also be worn:

(1) Glasses.

(2) Gloves (leather gloves minimum).

(3) Respirator (glass releases fine particulates when broken).

(4) Kevlar protective arm sleeves (further Kevlar protection required if entering
through window).

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Conclusion

2-255 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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 Fig 2-46. The enforcer

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 Attacking top door bolt (side view) Attacking centre lock (side view)

Fig 2-47. Holding the enforcer

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 Web

Spike

Duckbill

Machined grips

Metal cutter /
Claw

Fig 2-48. The Halligan tool

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 Door bolts usually fitted top and / or
bottom

Fig 2-49. Door bolts

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 Fig 2-50. Halligan tool levering a push door

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 Insert duckbill here

Do not insert duckbill

here

Insert duckbill here

Fig 2-51. Halligan Tool duckbill lever points

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 Fig 2-52. Halligan tool levering a pull door
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 Fig 2-53. Defeating sheet glass window with the Halligan Tool

Fig 2-54. Clearing shards from the frame with the web of the tool

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Chapter 3 Subterranean

Introduction

3-1 While subterranean systems are not unique to the urban environment the physical
systems that support urban areas create many varied subterranean systems. No two
subterranean systems are the same but they usually share common characteristics.

3-2 While the thought process of many may be to avoid and/or deny subterranean
systems recent conflicts have shown that both state and non-state adversaries possess
the will and engineering expertise to extend/connect existing passageways and excavate
entirely new ones to exploit the concealment and protection provided by the existing urban
subterranean systems. Urban subterranean systems cannot therefore be aboandoned for
the enemy to exploit or treated as a discrete terrain.

3-3 Training in the subterranean environment should not be classed as niche or

conducted just to provide a change of scenery. It should be held in the same regard as
training in the urban surface space, only then will soldiers become proficient with the TTP’s
specific to this terrain.

3-4 While the subterranean space is represented in most urban training facilities it is
generally of a basic standard only facilitates movement from one building to the next. Units
wishing to conduct a thorough subterranean training package should seek to use training
areas such as Corsham Mines Training Area or Gibraltar Tunnels.

a. Corsham Mines Training Area (CMTA). CMTA is a 35 acre Bath stone quarry
(Cat 1) made up of over 60 miles of tunnels that were converted to a ‘cold war city’
(Cat 3) in the late 1950’s. The mines are now available for military training and
facilitate training across varying types of terrain.

b. Gibraltar Tunnels. Gibraltar contains approximately 34 miles of tunnels, some

of which can be used for military training.

Fig 3-1. Training in Gibraltar tunnels

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Lesson 16. Subterranean categories and hazards

3-5 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach the categories of subterranean systems and
the inherent threats and hazards of operating in the subterranean environment:

a. Categories.

b. Threats and hazards.

3-6 Timings. One 40 minute period.

3-7 Method. Basic instructional indoor or outdoor period.

3-8 Stores.

Rifle 1 per soldier

Magazine 1 per soldier
BFA 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Demonstrators as necessary
3-9 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the drills.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

Preliminaries
3-10 Safety Precautions. Normal.

3-11 Revision. Nil.

Introduction
3-12 Knowledge of the nature and location of subterranean systems is of great value to
both the attacker and defender in the urban environment. Recent operational experience
has shown that adversaries possess the will and engineering expertise to extend/connect
existing passageways and excavate entirely new ones to exploit the concealment and
protection provided by existing urban subterranean systems. Urban subterranean systems
cannot therefore be abandoned for the enemy to exploit.

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Structure categories

3-13 Explain: Categories. Subterranean structures are divided into the following three
categories:

a. Category one - caves, natural cavities and tunnels. Many of these features
were formed by natural processes but may have been developed for human
use. Tunnels may have been constructed for a range of uses including burial
(catacombs) or mining minerals or water supply. Category one structures are
further subdivided by the extent to which they have been developed:

(1) Rudimentary. Rudimentary structures lack basic infrastructure or even

engineered support to reduce the risk of structural collapse (see fig 3-1a).

(2) Sophisticated. Sophisticated structures will have some form of structural

reinforcement to enhance the natural support of the surrounding ground,
to reduce the risk of collapse, or damage by earthquakes or flowing
groundwater. These structures will also usually be larger and have life
support infrastructure such as ventilation shafts, electricity power supply
and therefore potentially lighting and powered drainage and ventilation.

b. Category two - urban subterranean systems. Urban subterranean systems

are built to support the civilian population and will be the most common
category in the urban environment. Their location, foundation, design and depth
will be determined by the subterranean geological conditions. Some may be
able to withstand military strikes due to their depth and/or construction materials
but are not designed to. It is important to remember that civilians who have not
been able to escape will seek protection from combat by occupying urban
subterranean systems. Category two structures are further subdivided into
substructures and civil works:

(1) Substructures. These include basements, shelters and car parks. These
may appear like sophisticated category one structures but usually have
explicitly designed structural reinforcement or shoring and are therefore
more robust.

(2) Civil works. These works include aqueducts, sewers, passageways,

underpasses, rail and road transportation and utility tunnels.

c. Category three - underground facilities. Underground facilities are

sophisticated, complex structures specifically designed and built to provide
maximum concealment and protection for the people and equipment within
them (see fig 3-1b). They are generally hardened and protected using a variety
of means including bomb traps, blast doors, blow throughs and strongpoints.
Underground facilities usually rely on ‘umbilical structures’ to function. For
example: electrical power generators and supply lines; communications
antennas, satellite dishes and connecting wire or fibre optic cables; life support
and environmental controls such as heating, ventilation, water storage, supply
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 and waste disposal; means of descent such as escalators, lifts or even narrow-
gauge rail. The effectiveness of underground facilities can potentially be
reduced if the critical umbilical structures can be made inoperable. Back-up
facilities may, however, have been installed to enable the facility to continue
operating for extended periods without support from umbilical structures.
Construction standards vary, but they are subdivided into shallow and deep
based on the depth and amount of overburden (soil and rock) above them.

(1) Shallow. An underground facility with 20 metres or less overburden.

Examples include silos, cut-and-cover facilities and basement bunkers.

(2) Deep. An underground facility with more than 20 metres overburden.

Examples include protection sites for government officials, military
operations facilities and research and production facilities for weapons of
mass destruction.

3-14 Explain: Supporting infrastructure. Underground facilities may include the following
external umbilical structures with some having robust internal redundancies:

d. Power, such as above-ground power lines, buried power lines, substations,

transformers, power generators and batteries.

e. Communications, such as: landline wire and fibre optic cables, buried antennas,
surface antennas, satellite dishes, internal and external networks.

f. Life support and environmental controls, such as heating, ventilation and air
conditioning, water lines/pipes or storage tanks, vents, water chillers, sewage
disposal, dehumidifiers, carbon dioxide scrubbers, chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear filters, blast vales and air handlers.

g. Transportation, such as access ways, vehicles, trains, conveyors, escalators

and elevators.
Threats and hazards

3-15 Explain: The threats and hazards of the subterranean pose greater danger and
challenges than surface operations. These challenges are grouped into the following four
categories:

h. Environmental and atmospheric hazards.

i. Material and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards.

j. Structural hazards.

k. Psychological hazards.

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3-16 Explain: Environmental and atmospheric hazards. Environmental and atmospheric
hazards are the most complex and dynamic of the four categories and, next to the enemy
and structural failure, pose the greatest hazard. Every action that any actor takes
underground may make the environment worse. Everything from weapons fire to breathing
(consuming oxygen and exhaling carbon dioxide) can make the environment more
dangerous. Without understanding and planning for the environment, units may suffer
casualties before making contact with the enemy.

l. Air quality. Many contributing factors may result in dangerously poor air quality
within subterranean systems. Poor air quality can physically stress personnel
and reduce their stamina and effectiveness. There can be significant differences
in air quality between the floor and the ceiling of a subterranean space due to
the layering of gases. These potential differences are important to understand
when monitoring air quality. Personnel need to be alert to the symptoms that
may indicate poor air quality and be aware of the danger percentages of gases
so that they understand air monitor readings. The most common factors that
cause poor air quality are:

m. Fire. Subterranean fires rapidly consume oxygen, are a direct hazard to

personnel and equipment and can cause combustibles such as explosives or
fuel containers to explode. Carbon dioxide extinguishers should not be used in
the subterranean terrain.

n. Overpressure. The overpressure created inside subterranean spaces by the

use of explosives and weapons can be significantly higher than on the surface.

o. Radio communications. Strained communications, degraded position,

navigation and timing systems and confined space in unknown terrain combine
to make navigation, command and control and battlespace management
extremely difficult.

p. Obscurants. Obscurants such as smoke and dust from explosive breaching of

barriers, fire, weapons discharges and explosions tend to persist for much
longer due to reduced air movement. Obscurants rapidly degrade the ability to
see and make sense of the immediate surroundings.

q. Water. Water can be especially dangerous in underground systems. In addition

to natural or deliberate flooding, water traps may have been constructed to deny
access to other parts of a subterranean facility or to reduce the effects of gases
and explosives. Drowning is a real risk when attempting to traverse a water trap
which may be deliberately or inadvertently become electrified due to collateral
damage.

r. Movement hazards. Category one structures can contain numerous hazards to

movement: vertical shafts, steep slopes, uneven flooring, holes, deadfalls and
natural and man-made obstacles. Category two structures will have movement
hazards related to their civil functions including fuel, steam or water pipes,
valves, and cables. Category three structures will have obstacles designed to
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 attrite and delay attacking forces. All movement hazards will be difficult to detect
in low or no light or obscured conditions.

s. Vermin. Subterranean systems may be inhabited by venomous insects,

reptiles, bats or rodents. Some systems may also be inhabited by larger land,
most notably feral dogs, or aquatic animals.

t. Human waste. Construction standards for the removal of human waste vary
enormously, but damage may stop even the best from working. Operating in
such conditions may expose friendly forces to dangerous hygiene issues and
bacterial infections.

3-17 Explain: Materiel, toxic industrial and chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear hazards. Items of materiel located in storage areas, laboratories or missile launch
sites are dangerous to handle and operate around. Extreme caution is needed as rocket
fuels or toxic chemicals can combust and contribute to poor air quality and they also
prevent or limit the use of certain munitions and explosives within these facilities. If
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents are used in tunnels, concentrations
would be higher and persist longer than on the surface as they would not be dissipated by
air movement.

3-18 Explain: Structural hazards. Construction standards of subterranean facilities vary.

Caution is required when breeching or using weapons inside a subterranean structure to
avoid an inadvertent collapse. Engineer advice should always be sought on the type of
munitions that may be used and those that should be avoided when clearing a
subterranean complex. Tunnels and passageways can, however, be deliberately collapsed
to deny access or to trap attacking forces inside, but this should be avoided without a clear
understanding of the rock mass. A sudden collapse may lead to wider unintended
consequences that thwart the commander’s intent.16 Before entering and while inside a
subterranean system, personnel need to be alert for the signs that may indicate instability
and may cause a collapse: loose rocks or dislodged construction materials overhead;
damaged, cracked or dislodged shoring; indications of fire damage to the support
structure; water running down the walls. When a structural hazard is identified, its location
and description must be relayed to the whole team and to the surface support team. The
hazard must be marked and avoided.

3-19 Explain: Psychological hazards. Descending into dark and unknown subterranean
spaces increase feelings of isolation, claustrophobia and fear. These can combine to affect
soldiers’ psychological well-being and self-confidence even before direct contact with the
enemy. Commanders must account for these psychological hazards when planning,
conducting and after the operation as they influence the unit’s ability to accomplish their
subterranean mission and may have medium to long-term effects. Measures to mitigate
these psychological hazards include leadership training, mental resilience training, sleep
discipline and by minimising the time spent underground by rotating teams on a regular
basis.

3-20 Confirm by questions.

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Conclusion
3-21 End of Lesson Drill.

u. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

v. Confirm by questions and practice.

w. Normal safety precautions.

x. Pack kit.

y. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

z. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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 a. CMTA Cat 1 Rudimentary.

b. CMTA Cat 3 Underground facility

Fig 3-1. Corsham Mines Training Area (CMTA) 15

15
CMTA is a 35 acre Bath stone quarry (Cat 1) that was converted to a ‘cold war city’ (Cat 3) in the late 1950’s. The
mines are now available for military training.
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Lesson 17. Patrol Techniques and procedures

3-22 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach the techniques and procedures when
operating in the subterranean environment:

a. Subterranean operations considerations.

b. Access point.

c. Patrol techniques and procedures.

3-23 Timings. One 40 minute period.

3-24 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period.

3-25 Stores.

Rifle 1 per soldier

Magazine 1 per soldier
BFA 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Demonstrators as necessary
3-26 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the drills.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

Preliminaries
3-27 Safety Precautions. Normal.

3-28 Revision. Subterranean categories and hazards.

Introduction
3-29 Patrolling in the subterranean environment can be extremely dangerous. The
unknown terrain, structure, lack of ambient light and available support due to restricted
access and routes can soon become disorientating putting patrol members under extreme
pressure, both physically and psychologically. It is important that all patrol members are
aware and rehearsed in the specific risks and patrol techniques to enable a safe and
efficient patrol.

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Subterranean operations considerations

3-30 Weapon systems in tunnels. The confined space of tunnels and sewers amplifies
the sounds of weapons firing to a dangerous level. The overpressure from explosive
natures exploding in a sewer or tunnel can have adverse effects on friendly troops such as
ruptured eardrums and wounds from flying debris. Additionally, gases found in sewers can
be ignited by the blast effects of these munitions.

3-31 For these reasons, small-arms weapons should be the principal weapon systems
employed in tunnels and sewers. To be fully effective firers require to be well practiced in
CQB shooting and firing from different positions.

3-32 Friendly troops should be outside tunnels or out of range of the blast and pressure
effects when mines or demolitions are detonated. The provision of additional ear protection
for subterranean operations should be considered.

3-33 Clothing. Movement underground will soon degrade a soldier’s personal equipment
and clothing. Simple ‘over clothing’ without buttons and zips (such as coveralls) is
preferable to standard combat kit that is easily destroyed by abrasion. Protection on
elbows and knees should be considered essential. In natural cave systems with water,
cold injuries are a very real risk due to the wind-chill factor. In dryer or manmade systems
heat injuries are equally likely due to the increased heat and level of physical activity
required.

3-34 Load Carrying. The use of standard VIRTUS in confined spaces may be considered
impractical. Multiple low volume drag bags (attached to an individual’s belt) (for example,
small ‘canoe bags’) with a reduced number of straps and buckles should be used in
preference to webbing and bergens that would soon be rendered useless.

3-35 Lighting. Some form of illumination is essential in any underground environment.

Head or body mounted illumination sources will free up an individual’s hands. A secondary
source of illumination is also essential as light failure underground has serious
implications. Light sources become a natural target; IR illumination with NVGs should be
considered.

3-36 Communications. Traditional HF and VHF equipment may be virtually useless

underground. The only reliable means of communication to the surface is therefore to lay
line or via link men. PRR is extremely useful at communicating at section and Pl level.

3-37 Navigation. Although a compass works efficiently underground navigation within an

unfamiliar three dimensional environment is extremely time consuming. Groups entering a
complex system are left with no alternative other than to draw a simple sketch map with
bearings and approximate distances in order to maintain their own orientation and to find
their way out again. Consideration may be given to the use of way-markers or laying cord
although these could be repositioned, if left unattended, by a defending force. On very rare
occasions the use of a compass can be impossible due to local magnetic anomalies. Such
situations would be obvious before venturing underground.

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3-38 Resupply. It is extremely difficult to secure a resupply route within a three
dimensional environment. Troops operating underground should therefore be as self-
sufficient as possible. This practical limitation reduces the duration which troops can
operate underground.

3-39 CASEVAC. The evacuation of casualties from an underground environment provides

some practical problems. Cave rescue organisations around the world use a simple rule of
thumb ‘for every 1hr you walk into a tunnel it will take up to 10hrs to carry a stretcher out’.
In a tactical setting, evacuation may be more complex. Careful consideration must be
given to the method of evacuation for casualties – specialist or improvised stretcher
systems may be necessary. Even with what would be considered minor injuries,
constricted sewer passages and complicated tunnels often make movement extremely
difficult.

3-40 Ladders / Rope. In complicated natural and sewer systems it will often be necessary
to use rope and ladders to gain access and to move underground. This practical limitation
will also apply to any defending forces underground. Fixed or in situ ropes and ladders
found in any underground environment should be treated with caution as such locations
often channel assaulting troops. Rope descent techniques may be required to descend
shafts in excess of 10m, and a practical method of return considered.

3-41 Confirm by questions.

Access point

3-42 The access point to a subterranean system can vary in complexity depending on the
type of subterranean system. For example, a natural cave system may have an
unrestricted opening allowing easy access while a secure underground facility may have
large, thick, steel security doors. While access is ordinarily achieved by breaching such
barricades, consideration must be given to achieving surprise by gaining entry from an
unexpected direction. For example, via a ventilation shaft. Whatever the type of access
point it must be secured prior to entering the subterranean system.
Patrol techniques and procedures

3-43 Patrols of subterranean passages within a platoon or company area should normally
be the responsibility of a patrol of section size. Only in extremely large subterranean
features should the size of a patrol be increased. All patrol members must be adequately
equipped before conducting a subterranean patrol (an equipment list can be found at fig 3-
2). Once organised, rehearsed and equipped the following should take place:

a. The area around the entrance is secured and any manhole covers are removed
/ doors opened. This should be conducted by a supporting callsign or the
Platoon HQ group.

b. A 15 minutes listen and watch is maintained to detect for human activity within
the tunnel and to allow any concentrations of hazardous gas to dissipate.

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 c. If available, air quality monitors mounted on ground reconnaissance vehicles
should be deployed to check the air quality further into the tunnel.

d. Alternatively, the first assault pair descends into the tunnel and clears the first
enclosure / length of tunnel. Once secure they use their personal air quality
monitor to check the air is safe and determines how much the patrols
movement will be restricted, observing each other for signs of harmful effects of
gasses.

e. The assault pair should be attached to a safety rope to allow them to be pulled
to safety should they become ill or is exposed to danger.

f. Once clear the patrol commander enters the tunnel with the remainder of the
patrol and begins to move along the chosen route.

g. Dependant on the type of subterranean system consideration should be given

to the use of a safety rope linking all patrol members, particularly within mines,
cave systems and tunnels with fast flowing water. Should any patrol member
lose their footing or fall the remainder of the patrol act as anchors and pull the
patrol member to safety.

h. The lead scout should always be supported by a No2 with both patrol members
following the principles of the No1 and No2. This will be covered in more detail
in the next lesson.

i. The commander should be a tactical bound behind. Positioned to enable control

of scouting group while navigating and recording information on the
passageways16.

j. The remainder of the patrol should maintain five meter interval spacing. If water
in the tunnel is flowing fast and/or there are slippery obstacles, the intervals
should be increased to reduce the risk of everyone falling if one person slips.

k. The rear soldier is tasked to provide rear security and marks the route with
chalk or spray paint and infra-red cyalumes to help navigate the way back and
mark the route taken for friendly forces should the patrol require assistance.

l. The patrol commander notes the bearing and distance/pace counts for each leg
of the route, possibly from one turn to another. When a manhole cover to the
surface is found, it should be opened to determine its location – which the patrol
commander records. The use of recognition signals must be used to prevent a
friendly fire incident when the cover is exposed. While the manhole is open, the
patrol should attempt to establish radio communications and send a situation
report.

16 Dimensions, changes in construction and shoring, footing, slopes, changes in direction and junctions.
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 m. Once the patrol has returned and submitted its report, the commander needs to
decide how to defend or deny the tunnel. If the tunnel is used, patrol members
should act as guides.

3-44 Confirm by practice.

Conclusion
3-45 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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 All patrol members must carry:
1 A sketch map of the subterranean passageways with magnetic north, the patrols
route, bearings and distances marked. This provides all patrol members with the
means to find their way back to the surface if they become separated. If the patrol
route crosses into an adjacent unit’s battlespace, the boundary(ies) must also be
marked on the sketch map. This will enable the patrol commander to tell the
surface team when they are approaching a boundary and seek clearance to move
into the adjacent unit’s battlespace and reduce the risk of a friendly fire incident.
2 Compass – noting that its accuracy may be affected by magnetic rock, metal
construction materials or electrical cables.
3 Respirator
4 Personal air quality monitor
5 Personal Oxygen Generator (POG)
6 Protective gloves and knee pads
7 Hearing protection
8 Whistle
9 Chicken or screen wire to wrap around boots to improve footing on slippery
surfaces
10 Night vision devices and IR source.
11 Thermal optics
12 Head torch
13 Cyalumes – IR and coloured
14 Carabiners
15 Water and rations
In addition, the patrol must carry:
1 A safety rope – to which each patrol member is clipped on with their personal
carabiner
2 Radio or field telephone and 500m line. The line should be marked every 10m
and 100m to aid navigation
3 Tools to open manhole covers
4 Means to mark features along the route: chalk, spray paint or IR cyalumes
5 Spare batteries for all items
6 Feelers for detecting tripwires

Fig 3-2. Patrol equipment

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Lesson 18. Subterranean CQB

3-46 Aim. The aim of the lesson is to teach the employment of urban CQB when operating
in a subterranean environment:

a. The stack variations.

b. Fundamentals.

c. Complex terrain.

d. Tunnels.

e. Shapes.

f. Chambers.

g. Equipment.

3-47 Timings. Two 40-minute periods.

3-48 Method. Basic instructional outdoor period.

3-49 Stores.

Rifle 1 per soldier

Magazine 1 per soldier
BFA 1 per soldier
Fighting Order 1 per soldier
Combat helmet 1 per soldier
PPE (glasses & gloves) 1 per soldier
Demonstrators as necessary
3-50 Preparation.

a. Reconnoitre the training area and select positions to best illustrate the drills.

b. Rehearse the demonstrators, preferably immediately prior to the squad arriving.

Preliminaries
3-51 Safety Precautions. Normal.

3-52 Revision. Patrol techniques and procedures (Subterranean entry drills).

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Introduction
3-53 Explain: In larger cities, subterranean features include sunken garages and multi-
level car parks, underground passages, railway lines, utility tunnels, sewers and storm
drains. Many of these features will allow the movement of troops. Even in smaller
European towns, sewers and storm drains permit soldiers to move beneath street level
during operations. While the stack and building clearance drills still have utility in this
environment it is important to know and understand their limitations and the variations
specific to this terrain.
The stack variations

3-54 Explain: The principles of the stack still hold relevance in the subterranean
environment and must always be enforced17. The increased risk of trip wires and
boobytraps does, however, require additional consideration with the responsibility resting
with the No2 (unless space allows for a dedicated firer to be nominated). The No1 and
No2 stack as previously taught with the following variation.

a. The No1 position and stance is as previously taught. Primary focus is always
the threat. The use of low ready is particularly important in the subterranean
environment where low light levels and the increased risk or trip hazards and
holes/drops is present.

b. The No2 will be positioned slightly left / right of the No1 to allow scanning of the
immediate area in front of the No1. Primary focus will be the identification of hazards,
trip wires, booby traps and holes. The No2 must still be prepared to adopt/support
the position of No1 at all times.

c. The No2 may require to utilise the laser of the LLM to assist in identification of
trip wires18. If using the LLM the No2 must ensure their safety is on and that they are
positioned appropriately to negate ‘flagging’.

d. Should the No2 identify any threats or areas of concern they should halt forward
movement using the word of command “HOLD”.

Fundamentals

3-55 Explain: Tunnels, just like corridors, provide the enemy with longer lines of
observation and fire, routes for movement or the siting of obstacles to force delay and
canalise the attacker. As with clearing corridors there are three factors important to tunnel
clearance:

a. Be alert. Firers must keep their head and eyes up while moving down a tunnel
with point firers scanning constantly to the front to identify threats. Identified threats,
danger areas or areas to clear must be communicated quickly and clearly to the rest
of the section.

17 Chapter 2, Urban CQB Fundamentals.

18 The trip wire will break the beam of the laser making it identifiable to the No2.
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 b. Control. The rate of movement should be strictly controlled to ensure that
threats are identified and engaged. Moving too fast could cause firers to miss danger
areas, leaving a threat to the team’s rear.

c. Security. Security must be maintained as the team progresses down the

tunnel. At least one firer should always maintain point security to protect the rest of
the team. If there are two-point firers, they should employ interlocking arcs of fire and
observation down the tunnel.

Complex Terrain

3-56 Explain: The subterranean environment, just like the urban, is extremely complex
which precludes a ‘one size fits all’ approach to TTP’s. For example, the drills for Urban
CQB still hold relevance but so to do the drills for other complex environments such as
trench clearance and fighting in woods and forests (FIWAF).

3-57 Explain and demonstrate: Subterranean systems may consist of short, winding
tunnels or long straight tunnels. Just like FIWAF, contacts within the subterranean
environment should be categorised as long or short:

a. Short contact. Short contacts are predominantly categorised by contacts under

50m. Due to the short distance and restrictions on manoeuvre short contacts should
be cleared using closing whilst firing and cadence firing. Consideration must be given
to the level of training of the soldier and type of position (50m may increase or
decrease in relation to the level of training and type of position; a bunker will require
more accurate suppressive fire).

b. Long contact. Contacts from more than 50m away are generally classed as
long contacts and will require to be cleared using fire and manoeuvre. The confines
of the subterranean system will dictate the length of bounds; narrow tunnels will
require shorter bounds to avoid fratricide and cutting off the suppressing fire. The
type of subterranean system, light levels and going under foot will dictate the rate of
advance. In addition, adopting the prone position should be avoided due to the
increased risk of casualties from ricochet19.

Movement

3-58 Explain and demonstrate: The use of stack formations is as previously taught. For
example, heavy stack left should be used for a tunnel that curves to the left, split stack for
long straight tunnels and V-Stack for wider tunnels.

3-59 Explain: The extreme darkness makes it easy to miss/bypass adjoining tunnels,
particularly when in contact. All tunnels must be cleared or held. A minimum of two firers
should be used to ‘hold’ a tunnel (threat) and allow the patrol to continue on their current
task/route. Soldiers must bring any tunnels to the attention of the commander if not cleared
or being held.

19 Rounds ricochet off flat surfaces, such as concrete floors, and travel along them.
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Marking

3-60 Explain and demonstrate: While cylumes remain the easiest method of marking
excessive use can affect the image of NVG’s. Marking should follow the same convention
as urban with the following considerations:

a. Cylumes should be used to mark routes and cleared areas.

b. While cylumes are one of the easiest methods of marking their use can affect
NVG’s and also illuminate friendly forces. Cylumes should be taped up leaving only a
10mm hole/strip exposed. This minimises disruption to NVG’s and avoids illuminating
friendly forces. The cylumes must be placed so that the exposed part of the cylume
faces away from the direction of enemy.

c. All cylumes appear green through NVG’s so consider a marking convention for
specific indicators. Two cylumes on the back of the helmet to indicate a commander
for example.

Tunnels

3-61 Explain: Narrow tunnels. A narrow passage (see fig 3-4) is a passage that only
allows movement in single file. The funnelling effect of the passage increases the
effectiveness of enemy fire whilst restricting the number of friendly firers to a single barrel.

3-62 Explain and demonstrate: Narrow tunnel clearance. Narrow passages devoid of
cover should be avoided / denied where possible. Where movement through such
passages is unavoidable strict actions on must be in place to neutralise any threats swiftly.
To clear a narrow passage drills, similar to those used for trench clearance, should be
employed (see fig 3-5):

a. Movement should be from cover to cover where possible with the scouting /
assaulting pair a tactical bound ahead of the remainder of the section.

b. The lead scout will be the No1 and act accordingly; weapon in the low ready
position.

c. Any enemy should be engaged as per the ROE. The No1 must close whilst
firing to swiftly neutralise the threat (see fig 3-5a).

d. Should the No1 encounter a stoppage or need to change magazine they should
immediately inform the No2 while dropping to the prone position.

e. The No2 must immediately move past the No1 and continue to close whilst
firing, taking over as the No1 (see fig 3-5b).

f. The No1 stacks on the No2 while concurrently clearing their stoppage /
changing magazine (see fig 3-5c).

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 g. This continues until the threat has been neutralised or the position has been
cleared (see fig 3-5d).

h. If a casualty is sustained it must be communicated back to the section

commander while continuing to advance.

i. Support firers should be launched forward to support the advance only.

Casualties will be treated and backloaded once the section arrives at the casualty’s
position.

j. Where available ballistic shields will greatly enhance survivability during such
clearances.

k. Longer tunnels may require the section commander to launch an additional

assault pair to provide support, a tactical bound behind the assault pair. The
remainder of the section should remain in cover until it is safe to move forward.

3-63 Explain and demonstrate: Narrow tunnel break contact. Extracting out of a narrow
tunnel in contact is extremely difficult. Suppressive fire as you extract will be less accurate
and the ability to swap between firers more difficult. In addition, the funnelling nature of the
tunnel makes inaccurate enemy fire affective due to ricochet making casualties highly
likely. It is for these reasons that movement along narrow tunnels should be avoided;
particularly long tunnels devoid of cover. If in contact and closing whilst firing onto the
enemy is not an option and extraction is necessary, the following drill should be employed:

a. Point firer should seek to regain the initiative by laying down a heavy rate of fire.
Consideration should be given to the use of UGL if safe to do so.

b. The point firer, guided by the No2 will begin to take rearward steps, body
armour remains face towards the enemy, firing whilst moving.

c. The No2 guides the No1 by holding the collar of the body armour and is always
prepared to assume the position of the No1.

d. If a stoppage is incurred the No1 immediately calls “Stoppage!” while dropping

to the prone position.

e. Once stoppage is called the No2 must immediately step over the No1 and
resume suppression.

f. Once suppression has continued the No1 stands up and immediately rectifies
the stoppage/reloads and assumes the position of the No2 guiding the No1
rearwards.

3-64 Explain: Medium tunnels. A medium tunnel (see fig 3-6) is similar in size to that of a
corridor found in a commercial building, the smaller allowing two firers to operate

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comfortably side by side with larger tunnels accommodating the employment of the V-
Stack. The employment of these formations is as previously taught.

3-65 Explain and demonstrate: Medium tunnel clearance. Clearance of medium tunnels
can be achieved by utilising individual fire and manoeuvre (Long contact) and / or closing
whilst firing at close quarters (short contact) (see fig 3-7).

3-66 Explain and demonstrate: Medium tunnel break contact. Breaking contact in a
medium sized tunnel can be achieved by utilising the tunnel break contact drill as
previously taught20. The following considerations should be applied:

a. If not already adopted the section should move into a split stack formation and
conduct the tunnel drill as previously taught.

b. In narrower tunnels the section may require to adopt a single stack to provide a
movement corridor for extracting troops (see fig 3-8).

3-67 Explain: Large tunnels. Large tunnels (see fig 3-9) are similar in size to roads and
streets, wide enough to support vehicle movement and in some cases wide enough to
accommodate a full section in extended line. While split stack and V stack can still be
utilised to great effect larger tunnels will allow the employment of more conventional
formations such as extended line, arrowhead and half attack.

3-68 Explain: Large tunnel clearance. The size of large tunnels allows fire and
manoeuvre to be conducted at pairs up to fire team level and the employment of more
conventional tactics for clearance (see fig 3-10). Consideration must be given to fire control
and strict anti-fratricide measures.

3-69 Explain: Large tunnel break contact. Breaking contact in a large tunnel can be
achieved using conventional baseline break contact drills. Where the tunnel is only wide
enough to facilitate pairs fire and manoeuvre the fire team not suppressing should extract
any casualties and move directly to the rally point in single file against the safest side of
the tunnel.

3-70 Explain: Severely restricted tunnels. A severely restricted passage is a passage

that only allows soldiers to crawl or walk but with head, possibly trunk, hunched forward.
Their ability to fire personal weapons or use protective equipment may be reduced.

3-71 Explain: Severely restricted, passages should be avoided / denied where possible as
any form of fire and manoeuvre is extremely difficult; impossible in the case of a severely
restricted narrow passage. The following actions should be considered when movement
through such passages is unavoidable:

a. The point firer should consider switching to secondary weapon to assist with
movement. Consideration must be given to the use of IR torch / IR flood with night
vision.

20 Close Combat - Survivability. Fieldcraft, Battle Lessons & Exercises Lesson 28. Section Break Contact Drills
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 b. A thermal sight, attached to the body via a sling, will assist scanning deeper into
the tunnel.
c. The lead scout should be attached to a safety rope so that they can be retrieved
from danger. This must be practiced and rehearsed.

Shapes

3-72 Explain: The clearance of shapes is as previously taught21 with the additional
considerations below.

3-73 Explain and demonstrate: Barricade. The barricade is conducted as previously

taught. The shape/curve of the tunnel may require the firer to ‘roll’ further into the opening
of the tunnel (see fig 3-11a). Alternatively, the firer can request support and ‘bump’ across
the tunnel opening (see fig 3-11b).

3-74 Explain and demonstrate: Intersection and use of V-Stack. The clearance of an
intersection and use of V-Stack are as previously taught. Larger tunnels may, however,
allow the employment of additional firers (see fig 3-12).

Chambers

3-75 Explain: Chambers are common spaces found in tunnel networks used for a
multitude of purposes. They can either be single chambers or interconnected with other
chambers of similar or varying size. Chambers may be empty or may be cluttered with
furniture, vehicles, stores and structural columns (see fig 3-13 – to follow). Chambers must
be cleared and never bypassed. The size and shape of the tunnel and chamber will
determine the method of clearance.

3-76 Explain and demonstrate: Small chamber. The following is a suggested method of
clearing a small chamber:

a. No1 identifies chamber / T junction left / right and informs the remainder of the
team.

b. The commander maintains long security by ordering heavy / split stack.

c. Once heavy / split stack is adopted the commander orders “Barricade left /
right”

d. The No1 conducts the Barricade (see fig 3-14a) then reports back threats, small
chamber etc. Smaller chambers may be cleared visually from the position of
barricade.

e. Where the chamber cannot be cleared from the position of barricade, due to
size, infrastructure or structural columns for example, the commander will order “2 / 3
person clear” (3 person clear preferred).

21 Chapter 2, CQB – Shapes and formations.

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 f. Assault team stack on the No1 and signal ready from the rear verbally or via left
shoulder squeeze (3 to 2, 2 to 1).

g. On receiving the signal ready the No1 initiates the entry into the chamber and
conducts the 5-step entry.

h. No1 and No2 move along the closest wall and adopt a dominant position. No3
moves into the chamber and holds just past the corner. Dominant position being both
closest corners if possible (see fig 3-14b) No 2 holds centre between No1 and No3.

i. Additional workforce can be requested using “Support 1/2”.

j. Enclosure is cleared as previously taught.

k. Anti-fratricide measures and communication must be maintained between the

assault team and cover team, particularly as the assault team approaches the
opposite side of the chamber.

3-77 Explain: Large chamber. A chamber that is too large for a single assault team to
clear is classed as a large chamber (see fig 3-15) and can, in some instances, be larger
than a football pitch. The size of the enclosure will determine the number of troops
required to effectively clear the space. A simple method for clearing larger chambers is
detailed below (see fig 3-16):

a. Point firer identifies an enclosure / L shape and communicates it to the

remainder of the section.

b. The commander maintains long security by ordering heavy / split stack. In a

larger tunnel the commander may order a fire team into extended line.

c. Once heavy / split stack is adopted the commander orders “Barricade left /
right”.

d. After conducting the Barricade the No1 reports back threats, large chamber etc.
Where possible an approximate size of the chamber should be given. This will allow
the commander to assess the number of troops required.

e. The Section Commander must liaise with the Platoon Commander should they
feel the enclosure is too large to clear alone.

f. While maintaining long security the commander orders “fire team / 6 person
clear”.

g. Assault team stack on the No1 and communicate ready from the rear forwards
via verbal or left shoulder squeeze.

h. The commander should be positioned third in the stack, the 2ic should be
located with the cover group.
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 i. Once the No1 receives the signal ‘ready’ they enter the enclosure and move
along the closest wall until they reach their dominant position or until told to hold by
the commander.

j. The No2 moves in support of the No1. Firers behind the No2 have their
weapons trained into the enclosure.

k. The last person in the stack holds just passed the first corner (position of
barricade).

l. Remainder of the assault team spread out between the first and last firer.

m. Under control of the commander the assault team clear to the opposite side of
the enclosure, this should be done in extended line utilising fire and manoeuvre
where required (high threat).

n. Anti-fratricide measures and communication must be maintained between the

assault team and cover group. The section commander must move the cover group
forward throughout the clearance. This must be conducted keeping one foot on the
ground.

o. The above drill can be conducted at section or platoon level. Section

commander controlling fire team fire and movement, platoon commander controlling
section fire and movement.

Equipment

3-78 Explain: Consideration must be given to the type of subterranean environment the
section will be operating in and the equipment required. For example, MoE equipment is
likely to be less useful if moving through a sewer system. Below are items that may be
required and carried in place of the MoE equipment:

a. Safety rope, harnesses and carabiners.

b. Additional cylumes.

c. Field telephone and 500m line (marked at 50m intervals to aid judging
distance).

d. Comms cord – 500m para cord (marked at 50m intervals to aid judging
distance).

e. Medical pack

3-79 Explain: Night vision. The advancement in technology has made NVDs readily
available to all. It must be assumed that any force, regardless of type, will also be
equipped with NVDs. Due to the lack of ambient light most Night Vision Devices will
require additional illumination (Infra-Red (IR)). The use of the Laser Light Module (LLM)
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will greatly enhance the effectiveness of NVDs and can also assist in blinding the enemy if
they too are equipped.

3-80 Explain: Thermal. Not as readily available as IR NVDs thermal sights are likely to be
equipped by a regular force or well-equipped irregular force only. Not limited by low light
levels thermal sights offer a huge advantage over IR NVDs and should be utilised to clear
passages prior to movement, particularly longer tunnels where they can view well beyond
the capability of IR NVDs.

3-81 Explain: Drones and remote vehicles. The use of drones and remote vehicles can
increase the survivability of the section by locating obstacles and clearing areas such as
long narrow tunnels. The operator will require to maintain line of sight due to the signal
degradation produced by the terrain.

3-82 Explain: Weapons. The type of subterranean system should be considered when
orbatting / employing support weapon systems. The GPMG, for example, will have little
utility in confined, winding rudimentary tunnel systems but may be useful in complex
subterranean systems with long and wide tunnels. In addition to the type of subterranean
system the risk of ricochet should also be considered and may restrict the use of automatic
fire.

a. GPMG. Predominantly used to hold / suppress adjoining tunnels while clearing

(see fig 3-17). The use of 1B1T and 4B1T ammunition should be avoided due to the
increased ricochet hazard associated with tracer.

b. Sharpshooter. Useful for clearing longer tunnels and neutralising enemies

positioned at the end of long tunnels prior to friendly force movement. Can also be
used to suppress positions in longer tunnels by bounding forward with the assault
group (see fig 3-18 – to follow).

c. Grenades. The use of grenades must be considered at all stages of Sub T

operations. During planning the type of subterranean system should be considered;
rudimentary tunnels with no structural support or type 2 tunnels with utility pipes (gas
and water) may restrict the use of HE.

3-83 Conclusion

3-84 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions to and from the squad on the lesson.

b. Confirm by questions and practice.

c. Normal safety precautions.

d. Pack kit.

e. Summary. Emphasise three or four main points from the lesson.

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 f. A forecast of the squads next lesson in this subject.

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 Fig 3-4. Narrow tunnel

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 a.

b.

c.

d.

Fig 3-5. Narrow tunnel clearance

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 Fig 3-6. Medium Tunnel

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 Fig 3-7. Medium tunnel clearance

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Wider medium tunnels will allow firers to extract from the split stack using previously taught break
contact drill (Fieldcraft tunnel break contact drill).

Narrower tunnels may require the section to adopt a single stack to provide a movement corridor
for extracting firers.

Fig 3-8. Medium tunnel break contact drill variations

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 Fig 3-9. Large tunnel

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 Fig 3-10. Large tunnel clearance

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 a. Barricade – No1 rolls further to see beyond/into contours of tunnel.

b. Barricade. “Support one bump”. No1 is ‘bumped across by the No2, firers
then interlock arcs.

Fig 3-11. Barricade variations

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 Fig 3-12. Clearing an intersection with additional firers
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 Image to follow

Fig 3-13. Chamber with clutter

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 a. The No1 conducts the barricade drill.

b. Assault team adopt dominant positions along the closest wall.

Fig 3-14. Small chamber clearance.

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 Fig 3-15. Large chamber

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 Fig 3-16. Large chamber clearance
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 Fig 3-17. Employment of GPMG.
GPMG gunner placed to cover adjoining tunnel to allow position to be cleared.

Fig 3-18. Employment of Sharpshooter

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Chapter 4 Weapon effects

Section 1. Introduction

4-1 The characteristics and nature of combat in built-up areas affects the choice of
weapon required. Commanders at all levels should consider the following factors
when selecting the effect, they need:

a. Hard, smooth, flat surfaces are characteristic of urban targets. Rarely do rounds
impact perpendicular to these flat surfaces. This reduces the effect of a round
and increases the threat of ricochets. The tendency of rounds to strike glancing
blows against hard surfaces means that up to 25% of impact fused explosive
rounds may not detonate.

b. Engagement ranges are close. Studies and historical analyses have shown that
only five percent of all targets are more than 100 metres away. About 90
percent of all targets are located 50 metres or less from the identifying soldier.
Few personnel targets are visible beyond 50 metres and usually occur at 35
metres or less. Minimum arming ranges and troop safety from back-blast or
fragmentation effects should be considered.

c. Engagement times are short. The enemy presents only fleeting targets. Enemy
held buildings or structures are normally covered by fire and often cannot be
engaged with deliberate, well-aimed shots.

d. Conventional urban fighting often becomes confused mêlées with several small
units attacking on converging axes. The risks from friendly fire, ricochets, and
fratricide must be considered during the planning phase of operations and
control measures continually adjusted to lower these risks. Commanders and
soldiers alike must be aware of the locations and intentions of friendly forces
and clearly mark their own progress to avoid the potential for fratricide.

e. The enclosed nature of combat in built-up areas means that the weapon’s
effect, such as muzzle blast and back blast, must be considered as much as the
round’s impact on the target.

f. Modern engineering and design improvements mean that most large buildings
constructed since WW2 have some resilience to the blast effects of bomb and
artillery attack. Corners or parts of floors may collapse but the core of the
building will retain its strength. Even though modern buildings may burn easily,
they often retain their structural integrity and remain standing. Once high-rise
buildings burn out, they are still useful for combat purpose and are almost
impossible to damage further. A large structure can take 24 to 48 hours to burn
out and become cool enough for soldiers to enter.

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Section 2. Small arms

9MM Pistol

4-2 The pistol enables the individual to engage targets at close range, to an effective
range of 45m. It is effective in buildings and room clearance.
Rifle

4-3 Close combat is the predominant characteristic of urban engagements and the rifle is
the most common weapon fired in built-up areas. Small, fleeting targets are difficult to
hit from bunker apertures, windows, and loopholes. This requires pinpoint accuracy
with weapons fired in the semi-automatic mode. Killing an enemy through an 20cm
loophole at a range of 50 metres is a challenge, but one that may be common in
combat in built-up areas.

4-4 The performance of ball ammunition is affected by several variables including range
from the target, material against which it is fired, manufacture quality and age. The
penetrative effect of ammunition depends on both the velocity and stability of the
round; the greater the range, the lower the velocity. Consequently, at very short
ranges a round will not be fully stable, and this may lessen the effect of the greater
velocity.

4-5 Weapon Penetration. The penetration that can be achieved with 5.56mm rifle
significant numbers of rounds are fired. Nevertheless, inside buildings the 5.56mm
round may penetrate interior walls and furniture. Consideration should be given to the
risk of ricochet to friendly forces both when firing at enemy positions ammunition
round against exterior walls of brick or concrete is limited unless.

4-6 Protection. The following common barriers in built-up areas stop a 5.56mm round
fired at less than 50 metres:

a. One thickness of sandbags.

b. 5cm concrete wall (not reinforced).

c. 55 gallon drum filled with water or sand.

d. Small ammunition can filled with sand.

e. Cinder block filled with sand (block will probably shatter).

f. Brick veneer.

g. Car engine block.

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Medium and Heavy machine gun

4-7 Weapon Penetration. Like the 5.56mm round, the ability of 7.62mm and 12.7mm
(0.5 inch) rounds to penetrate is affected by the range to the target and type of
material it is fired against. The 7.62mm round is affected less by range than the
5.56mm, whilst the 12.7mm’s penetration is reduced least of all. The table below
explains the penetration capabilities of a single 7.62mm (ball) round at closer ranges:

Fig 4-1. 7.62mm penetration chart.

4-8 For hard targets, 12.7mm penetration is affected by obliquity and range. Both armour
piercing and ball ammunition penetrate 36cm/14 inches of sand or 71cm/28 inches of
packed earth at 200 metres, if the rounds impact perpendicular to the flat face of the
target.

4-9 Weapon Effects. It should be noted that the AK47 (7.62 x 39mm) is the most
common assault rifle in the world and that the penetrative qualities of its ammunition
are significantly greater than those of 5.56mm ball. The 12.7mm heavy machine gun
can be fitted to several different platforms, and in view of the excellent penetrative
capacity of its ammunition, it can be the weapon of choice in the urban environment.
Sniper rifle (L115A3 8.59mm)

4-10 Snipers exploit the long range, high hit rate probability and penetrative effect of the
8.59mm round fired from the L115A3 rifle to achieve significant physical and
psychological effect. Commanders should understand the effects of the weapons and
optics that a sniper carries in order to fully utilize this capability. The table following
summarises the capabilities of the equipment employed by snipers.

Fig 4-2. Sniper capabilities.

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Section 3 Grenades

4-11 Grenades. Grenades, whether thrown by hand or projected by a weapon, provide a

useful method of delivering significant effect very quickly. HE hand grenades are an
essential weapon for assaulting and clearing buildings. Grenade ammunition
expenditure is likely to be heavy. The overuse of HE grenades in lightly constructed
buildings may cause total, or partial, collapse of walls. There is a risk that fragments
may penetrate internal walls, risking injury to friendly forces in adjacent rooms.

4-12 Effects.

a. L109A1, Hand Grenade. The hand grenade L109A1 incapacitates a protected

man at five metres and an unprotected man at 20 metres.

b. Under-slung Grenade Launcher (UGL). On impact, the UGL projectile

explodes and is designed to penetrate up to 45mm of steel, 300mm of concrete
and cause casualties to 5m from the explosion. The UGL burst safety distance
of 450m in the open may be reduced by the nature of urban terrain.

c. Grenade Machine Gun (GMG). On impact, the projectile explodes and is

designed to penetrate up to 50mm of steel, 350mm of concrete and cause
casualties to 5m from the explosion. The GMG burst safety distance of 165m in
the open may reduce by the nature of urban terrain.

d. L13 Grenade Hand, Anti-Riot, Irritant. The anti-riot, irritant hand grenade (CS)
is effective at 25-35 metres (dependent on wind) from burst.

e. L107 Grenade, Hand, Distraction. The L107 distraction grenade is a bursting

type grenade which is designed to distract and disorientate by producing six
loud bangs at short intervals without a fragmentation hazard.

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Section 4 Heavier infantry direct weapons

Anti-tank weapons

4-13 Javelin. The primary role of Javelin is to defeat main battle tanks and other
armoured vehicles, although it is also effective against structures. The warhead will
penetrate 1500mm of concrete or sandbag structure and create an over-pressure
effect inside. If fired against soft surfaces (i.e. glass, wood, etc.) the larger secondary
charge may not detonate. Against a robust structure the penetration will only create a
fist size hole. Although such a hole cannot provide access for a man, it may provoke
collapse.

4-14 NLAW. NLAW is primarily used to defeat light armoured vehicles and neutralize
fortified firing positions. Because the shaped charge warhead has a narrow blast
effect, NLAW has limited anti-structure effect. However, blast and shock may be
enough to neutralize the personnel within a building for a short period. Against
structures, shaped- charge weapons such as NLAW should be aimed about six
inches below or to the side of a firing aperture in order to increase the probability of
killing the enemy behind a wall.
Anti-structure munitions (ASM)

4-15 The ASM is a one-man disposable, fire and forget weapon for use primarily against
urban structures and bunkers and in a secondary role against light AFVs and soft
skinned vehicles. With a combat effective range of between 15m-400m, the ASM has
a tandem warhead break-in charge (BIC) and a follow-through bomb (FTB) that will
penetrate concrete structures and enable physical access. The purpose of the BIC is
to create a hole sufficiently large to enable the FTB to detonate within a wall, thereby
both neutralizing any occupants and creating access for fighting troops.
40mm Cannon fire

4-16 General. The CT40 40mm cannon and 7.62mm coaxial machine gun, mounted on
Ajax, can provide substantial firepower to the infantry. The 40mm cannon can be
utilised from either a stand-off or from an intimate support position. Two types of
ammunition are available as follows:

a. Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS). Is suitable for

engaging light armoured vehicles and soft-skinned vehicles out to 1500m,
penetrating 150mm armour (BMP 3) multiple hits.

b. General Purpose Round – Point Detector Tracer (GPR). Is designed for use
in the Urban Environment against light targets and non-protected light vehicles.
Range up to 3KM.

4-17 Limitations. There are several limitations to the use of 40mm cannon in the urban
environment:

a. 40mm cannon may be restricted in elevation and traverse within a built up area.

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 b. GPR rounds can have limited effect against harder structures, i.e. concrete or
reinforced buildings.

c. The weapon platforms may have difficulty in manoeuvring in an urban

environment due to size restriction and weight. Obstacles will also prove more
difficult to negotiate in an urban setting.

Fig 4-3. The Boxer (left) and Ajax (right) armoured fighting vehicles.

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Section 5 Tank weapons

4-18 Despite the tank’s vulnerability to short-range anti-tank weapons, the physical and
psychological impact and the shock effect of armour, at close range, in conjunction
with infantry, can be overwhelming in urban close combat. The range, accuracy,
destructive potential and absence of minimum range of the tank armament are
enhanced by the tank’s protection and mobility.

4-19 Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) is the principal anti-
armour round for the L30 120mm rifled gun and is designed for engaging enemy
armoured vehicles out to a range of >2000m. Its utility against buildings and bunkers
is limited.

4-20 High Explosive Squash Head (HESH). HESH rounds are suitable for engaging
bunkers, armoured and soft-skinned vehicles out to a range of 1500m or area targets
out to 8000m. HESH has great utility in an urban environment due to its explosive
effect and is particularly useful against concrete reinforced urban structures in
support of assaulting troops.

4-21 The smoke round has a range of up to 8000m and provides excellent cover for
defiles and choke points in urban areas. However, the smoke is generated by white
phosphorus and the use of such ammunition may therefore be restricted by extant
ROE.

4-22 The two 7.62mm machine guns mounted on the Challenger II tank, one coaxially
mounted with the main armament and one located above the loader’s hatch, are
particularly effective for suppressive fire. The loaders GPMG should be used with
care as the firer will be exposed to direct and indirect fire.

Fig 4-4. Challenger 2, Iraq 2003.

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Section 6 Indirect weapons

4-23 General. The urban environment greatly restricts low angle indirect fire. Mortars and
artillery operating in the high angle are less affected. For low angle artillery fire, dead
space is about five times the height of the building behind which the target sits. For
mortars and artillery operating in the high angle, dead space is only about one-half
the height of the building. Both mortars and artillery firing in the high angle can
therefore provide effective indirect fire support during urban operations.

4-24 Lethality. In open terrain the 105mm shell has a lethal radius of 40m (ground burst)
and 50m (air burst), and the 155mm shell 55m (ground burst) and 85m (air burst).
GMLRS rockets have a lethal radius of 80m for ground burst, but which varies with
altitude for air burst. In built up areas the range of the blast and fragmentation of the
shell or rocket may be lessened by the physical obstruction of the buildings, although
hard surfaces may increase the ricochet range and effect of the explosion.
Mortars (81mm)

4-25 The multi-option fuze on mortar rounds makes them particularly effective weapons in
urban terrain. Delay settings can slightly increase penetration and proximity bursts
can increase the lethal area covered by fragments. Tall buildings can cause
proximity-fused mortar rounds to detonate prematurely if they pass too closely.

Fig 4-5. Gun Equipment 155mm L131, AS90.

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Chapter 5. Commanders building clearance considerations

Introduction

5-1 The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the section commanders thought processes
when clearing a building. The sequence of clearing through a building will be dictated
by many factors such as floorplan, size of building and threats, to name a few. There
are so many variables it is impossible to cover all in this publication.
Considerations

5-2 When conducting building clearances it is important the Section Commander remains
calm. The ability to remain calm will help the Commander remain situationally aware,
assimilate information and make informed choices. The section will often be faced
with multiple threats so the ability to think clearly and prioritise threats quickly is
critical to success.

5-3 To assist in decision making the section commander must simplify what is presented
to them. Failure to do so will result in excessive cognitive burden, hesitation when
making decisions and exposing soldiers unnecessarily to threats. When deciding
which threats/enclosures to clear first the commander should consider:

a. Shapes. Infrastructure in the urban environment predominantly forms angular

shapes. Buildings and rooms are square or rectangular, corridors form L shapes
and intersections. Breaking the environment down into simple shapes allows
the commander to identify the method required to deal with them. For example
a corner in a corridor forms an L shape, cleared by conducting the Barricade
drill, opposing doors in a corridor form an intersection and cleared using V-
Stack or split stack.

b. Prioritising threats. Rarely will the section be faced with a ‘perfect scenario’. L
shapes will be complicated by opposing threats. Opposing threats will be
complicated by constricted space. When prioritising threats the commander
must consider:

(1) The floor plan. While the exact floorplan may not be known the
Commander should have an idea of the overall size and shape of the
building. Where possible the Commander should use the layout of the
building to their advantage. For example understanding where the external
walls are situated and clearing along them reduces the risk of the section
becoming over extended and surrounded by multiple threats.

(2) Maintain balance. The commander must ensure the section remains
balanced. Failure to remain balanced leaves the section exposed and can
result in fratricide.

(3) Fatal funnels. Movement through a fatal funnel is inevitable. Where

movement through a fatal funnel is unavoidable, opposing threats for
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 example, the commander should prioritise the safest option; clearing open
doors before closed22. Where opposing open doors exist the commander
should aim to clear both enclosures simultaneously where possible.

c. Friendly forces. The location of friendly forces must be considered.

Understanding the floorplan and maintaining balance will help to avoid fratricide,
particularly where the threat of over penetration exists. The location of non-
organic fire support must also be considered, particularly accurate marking of
the FLOT.

d. Holding threats. Once the commander has prioritised threats and identified the
next area to be cleared all remaining threats must be held by posting firers to
cover those threats.

e. Speed. While speed is a principle of CQB, speed is relative and a commander

should not sacrifice safety for speed. Rushing the estimate, failing to properly
brief or pressuring firers to hurry is certain to result in friendly casualties. If a
section commander cannot account for the location of their soldiers or their
progress through the building, they are moving too fast and have lost or run the
risk of losing control of the attack. A commander should not be afraid to hold all
movement to regain situational awareness.
Scenarios

5-4 The following scenarios highlight some of the common problems a commander may
face when conducting building clearances and explains the thought processes when
dealing with them. The solutions represent a method to the given problem in order to
demonstrate the thought processes highlighted earlier in this chapter, other solutions
will exist and commanders must use their own initiative when conducting their
estimate.

22 Clearing a closed door before open exposes the team to view and fire from the open door.
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Scenario one

Room 1
• Assault group 1 enter and clear room 1 and hold threat (doorway). Section
Commander and assault group 2 are in cover, away from the building during
clearance and only move forward and enter the building once room clear is given.

• Only one threat exists (doorway). Internal walls are masonry so commander
indicates doorway as next objective to assault group 2. Conscious the doorway
opens into a corridor with the potential of multiple threats beyond the commander
orders “door, clear AMBER”.
Corridor
• Assault group 2 stack, deploy L107, enter and clear the corridor. Firer to the left
reports “clear left, short corridor, opposing doors – open door left, closed
right”. Firer to the right reports “right clear, L shape left”.

• To secure the corridor the commander sends a support firer to the soldier on the
right and orders “Hold left, Barricade right”.

• Firer to the left holds the opposing threats while the assault pair conduct a
Barricade. On completion of the Barricade the assault team report “Clear, long
corridor, open door right 3 metres”.

• The commander has now secured the first section of corridor and is faced with
several threats, two opposing doors and a long corridor. The commander now
considers:

o The floor plan. Before entering the building, the commander assessed the
size and shape of the building. While clearing right would keep the team
against the external wall it would require stretching the section along the
length of the building, unnecessarily overextending the section.

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 o Maintain balance. Not an issue at this point of the assault.

o Fatal funnels. While the threats to the left are opposing one of the doors is
closed. The commander prioritises the open door.

• Having prioritised the threats the commander now issues his QBO’s.
“Hold right (firer maintains barricade), Roll 1 open door (support firer moved to support
firer holding opposing threats and becomes the assault pair, no long threat), hold closed
door (support firer moved forward to cover closed door)”
• Commander remains in room 1 throughout.

Room 2
• Assault pair enter and clear room 2 and report “Room clear, window right”.

• Remaining in room 1 the commander considers:

o The floor plan. The commander now knows that they have cleared the
gable end of the building and that the section is protected by the external
walls on three sides.

o Maintain balance. Clearing the long corridor on the right would overextend
the section and risk fratricide when clearing room 3.

o Fatal Funnels. Moving a firer from room 2 to assist the clearance of room 3
would require movement through the fatal funnel of room 3. Commander has
enough manpower to push support forward from the rear.
• Having prioritised the threats the commander now issues QBO’s for the next
clearance:

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 “Hold room 2 (assault pair hold in room 2, covering window), Roll 1 closed door
(support fire moved forward to support firer covering closed door who now becomes
the No1 for the clearance).”
• Section commander remains in room 1 throughout.

Room 3
• Assault pair conduct door check and gain entry. During fighting from the doorway
the No1 calls “large room”.

• Firer from room 2 immediately joins the assault team leaving one firer behind to
cover the window.

• Assault team enter room 3, left firer reports “Window left, door front, dead space
left 3 metres”. Right firer reports “Right clear, hold left” then proceeds to move
along the wall on their right to clear the dead space from depth. Once dead space is
cleared firer reports “Room clear”.

• Moving into the corridor between rooms 2 and 3 the commander now considers:
o The floor plan. The section has now cleared the majority of the floor and
has two potential entry points that need to be covered.

o Maintain balance. The section has moved forward on the left, continuing
forward (clearing through the door at the end of room 3) will result in the
section being unbalanced.

o Fatal funnels. End of room 3, movement through can be avoided.

• To maintain balance the commander decides to hold room 3 and to clear along the
corridor on the right and issues QBO’s:

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“Hold left (room 3 held by two firers, one covering the window the other the door),
advance right (person barricading the corridor plus support firer advance along the
corridor).”

Corridor Cont.
• Assault team clear along the corridor ignoring the door on the right which is covered
by fire support from neighbouring building.

• Commander reports progress to fire support and prompts a support firer to mark the
FLOT to the fire support.

• As the assault team approaches the corner the lead firer reports “L Shape left”.

• Commander orders “Barricade left”, remaining a tactical bound behind with any
firers not holding a threat.

• Assault team conducts barricade and reports “short corridor, open door left 2
metres, open door right end of corridor.”

• Understanding the floorplan of the building the commander is certain the door to the
left leads to room 3 and the door on the right leads outside. For confirmation laser
handshakes are conducted between room 3 and the corridor. Once confirmed the
corridor is then cleared to the external door.
Consolidation
• Once the floor is cleared the commander ensures all threats are covered (potential
entry points, windows etc) and reports clear to the Pl Comd.

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Scenario variation – Opposing open doors

• In this scenario the opposing threats are both open. This leaves the commander
several options:

o Roll one enclosure then the other. This option should be avoided as it
exposes the first assault team to the fatal funnel of the second enclosure.

o Simultaneous “Roll with 1”. While simultaneously fighting from the door
avoids committing forces into uncleared rooms there is likely to be
insufficient space to facilitate firers rolling back to back unless operating
within a commercial building.

o Simultaneous dynamic entry. Both assault teams enter simultaneously

after deploying L109 or L107 (additional synchronisation necessary if
deploying L109). This option, however, commits forces into unknown spaces
and leaves them particularly vulnerable to any threats within.

o Dynamic entry into the first enclosure then immediate roll of the
second. Minimises the use of dynamic entry.

o Barricade one enclosure while rolling the other. Essentially holds one
threat while the other is cleared using fighting from the door. Still exposes
firers to opposing fatal funnels but minimises exposure.

• While some options are more favourable than others it would be wrong to assume
that one option will suit all situations. The commander and point firer must make an
assessment based on the current situation and enemy threat and then decide which
method is the safest.

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Scenario variation - Mousehole

• In this scenario a mousehole is present from room 1 into room 2 (or the commander
created one).

• While the mousehole may create additional problems for the initial entry into room 1
it makes the subsequent clearance of the building easier. In this scenario the
commander should clear into room 2 from room 1 for the following reasons:

o Clearing into room 2 allows the section to form a secure area across the
gable end of the building from which they can clear along the length.

o Clearing into room 2 avoids clearing into a corridor and exposing the section
to multiple threats.

o Once room 2 is cleared the section will be able to clear a lot of the corridor
from depth before committing.

o Once cleared the section can remain balanced by pushing forward on two
fronts (left and right) in a caterpillar fashion – Room 2 (Left) into corridor then
holds door to room 3, Room 1 (Right) into corridor then barricades long
threat corridor, Left then clear room 3 and holds, Right then clears to end of
corridor and barricades then holds.

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 Fig 5-1. Wider planning considerations

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 Fig 5-2. Low level tactical planning and groupings
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Chapter 6 Battle Lessons and Battle Exercises

Section 1. Introduction

Aim

6-1 The aim of this chapter is to give guidance on the planning, preparation and conduct
of Battle Lessons and Battle Exercises.
Definitions

6-2 The Battle Lesson. A Battle Lesson is a lesson which combines previously taught
individual skills of fieldcraft, weapon handling and minor tactics. It may be given using
demonstration troops followed by practice or as a tutorial, but always stopping at
various stages to emphasize weaknesses in a particular aspect by individuals or the
squad as a whole. It should always be progressive. Battle Lessons will invariably be
conducted ‘dry’ or with the use of blank and/or pyrotechnics.

6-3 The Battle Exercise. A Battle Exercise is a test to confirm that a Battle Lesson has
achieved its aim. It may be run in the form of a competition but should be allowed to
run its course before debriefing individuals or the squad as a whole. Where it is
determined that live ammunition is needed in order to bring out the training objectives
it would be normal practice to progress to live via the use of blank; this would depend
on the state of training of the individuals/squad to be exercised.
Scope

6-4 This chapter gives guidance to company level officers, WOs and NCOs and those in
the training organisation, who have responsibility for individual, section and platoon
level training where Battle Lessons and Exercises will be needed to achieve
particular training objectives in the following areas:

a. The handling of personal or section or platoon weapons in various tactical

situations.

b. Basic individual skills and drills e.g. use of cover and rolling the door.

c. Minor tactics.

6-5 This chapter seeks to bridge the gap between the information and skills contained in
this publication and the individual weapon training and tactical doctrine pamphlets. It
explains how the tactical skills/drills should be taught initially as a Battle Lesson and
gives some examples; and later how these Battle Lessons can be practised, and
soldiers tested in a Battle Exercise to confirm previous lessons and assess
performance standards. Examples of Battle Exercises are also given. The examples
are illustrative and do not attempt to cover all the subjects that need to be taught and
tested.

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6-6 The information in this chapter is to be used as a guide to plan and conducting a BL /
BE. Detailed information is found in Chapter 3 to Reference C, which must be read
and fully understood.

6-7 Night Training. Night training forms a very important stage in the training of all
soldiers. Although no particular Battle Lesson or Exercise is designed specifically for
night training, selected lessons or exercises may be used. As this form of training
carries more constraints than training in daylight Planning and Conducting Officers
must be familiar with all the safety aspects applicable to it and especially where live
firing is involved.

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Section 2. Planning for a Battle Lesson or Battle Exercise

6-8 The scope and success of each lesson or exercise will depend on the imagination,
ingenuity and initiative of the Planning and Conducting Officers. For a
lesson/exercise to be successful it must be realistic, interesting, progressive and
demanding, both physically and mentally. The essentials are:

a. A Clear Aim. The aim of each lesson/exercise should be kept simple and its
purpose borne in mind throughout the planning, preparation and conduct.

b. Precise Training Objectives. (A clear appreciation of the lessons to be learnt.)

In order for the aim to be achieved, various aspects of a soldier’s performance
must be exercised. The lesson/exercise should be constructed or geared so
that these aspects are emphasized. Due consideration must be given as to
whether it is better to use blank ammunition rather than live. For example, the
training objectives concerned with minor tactics are more likely to be achieved
on a two sided Battle Exercise using blank ammunition rather than having the
constraints of live firing safety imposed.

c. Thorough Preparation. There are no short cuts when preparing a

lesson/exercise. Its value will usually be in direct proportion to the amount of
planning and preparation put into it. The tactical and administrative preparations
are equally important. If administration is not sound the lesson/ exercise will not
flow properly and valuable lessons and time will be lost.

d. Simplicity. A complicated lesson/exercise is difficult to organize and conduct

and only serves to confuse those being taught or exercised.

e. Realism and Interest. The lesson/exercise should be made as realistic as is

possible but always within the regulations imposed by Pamphlet No 21
(Reference C) and the AOSP pamphlets. Correct use of camouflaged targets,
effects guns, pyrotechnics or live enemy is of major importance. Annex A gives
some suggestions about the use of targetry and how fire can be simulated.

f. Supervision. The enemy and supervisory staff need to be fully briefed on all
aspects of the lesson/exercise and must know what to do in any situation.
Soldiers will learn by their mistakes if they are properly supervised and are not
allowed to get away with faults in such fundamental drills as weapon handling,
use of cover and movement. Supervisors need to comply with the dress of the
exercising soldiers if they are to play an active part in the exercise scenario.

g. Qualifications and Standards. Planning and/or Conducting Officers must hold

the qualifications they need in order to plan and conduct any lessons/exercises
involving blank, pyrotechnics or live ammunition. They must also be aware of
the qualifications required for all safety supervisory staff; the regulations are to
be found in Pamphlet No 21 (Reference C). Also, planning must take account of
the standard of training of those to be exercised as this may prohibit their

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 participation in certain exercises involving live firing; in all cases reference C is
to be read and the rules contained complied with.

h. The Written Instruction. The production of a written instruction is mandatory

and detailed guidance can be found in Reference C. Further information is
found in Section 3 para 1009 sub para d.

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Section 3. Preparation of a Battle Lesson and a Battle Exercise

6-9 Preparation should be considered in the following sequence:

a. The Aim. This should have been established at the planning stage and may
well have been stated by the company commander/Exercise Director. If a broad
aim has been given to cover a training session where several Battle
Lessons/Exercises are to take place the person responsible for the planning
and preparation must ensure that each Battle Lesson/Exercise is given its own
clear and simple aim.

b. Considerations. Think how you will achieve the aim or aims and consider the
following factors:

(1) An area suitable for the lesson/exercise. Then, in sequence, a briefing/

administrative area, a battle preparation area and a re-exercise area.

(2) The training objectives that need to be covered to achieve the aim.
Consider how certain situations may be incorporated in the lesson/
exercise to bring out these points.

(3) The standard and number of soldiers to be exercised.

(4) Where applicable, the availability and qualifications needed for any range
safety staff.

(5) Time available.

(6) Dress, weapons, ammunition, pyrotechnics, equipment and other stores

that may be required.

(7) Enemy; live or targetry of various natures.

(8) What part you are to play; i.e. to act as the patrol/section commander, act
a part in the battle picture or remain as an exercise supervisor and
instructor.

c. Reconnaissance. The following guidelines are given and should be given due
consideration where applicable:

(1) The area should be:

(a) Realistic and suitable for the lesson/exercise.

(b) Away from distractions.

(2) Arrange your area or route so that you retain as much flexibility as is
possible. For example, try to select a different return route so that,

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 provided it does not detract from realism or impinge on safety, the next run
of the lesson/exercise can start immediately the previous one has finished.

(3) Ensure that:

(a) None of the background areas affect the lesson/exercise by sight or

sound.

(b) You are able see faults front to rear without detracting from realism
or constraining those being exercised.

(4) Select sites for:

(a) An administrative/briefing area.

(b) A battle preparation area.

(c) An ammunition point (if applicable).

(d) A concurrent activities area.

(5) Assign instructor/supervisory/administrative staff as necessary.

(6) Work out a system of work for the various stands; i.e. how the rotation of
those being exercised will be organized.

(7) Walk the route/s and have a dry run of the lesson/exercise. If live firing is
involved, then a live firing rehearsal should be conducted whenever
possible. From the information you have collected jot down enough notes
so that you can subsequently write a brief to cover the practical phase/s of
the lessons/ exercises.

d. Briefing/Written Instructions. To ensure that all personnel involved are fully

conversant with their responsibilities a written instruction should be produced
and/or a verbal briefing given. Where the use of blank, pyrotechnics or live
ammunition is being used or in any other setting where a risk assessment is
involved (e.g., any planned water obstacle crossing) an EASP/RASP is
mandatory (see reference C for detailed guidance and examples). An EASP is
also mandatory if BATSIMs are being employed or the ECO is using a written
instruction produced by another person. The amount of detail to be included in
an EASP/RASP will depend on the training and administrative complexity of the
Battle Lesson or Exercise concerned. It should contain enough detail to allow
another officer or NCO to take over and run the exercise/lesson at short notice.
Where safety is concerned it must, as a minimum include a comprehensive set
of safety orders. For a very simple ‘dry’ lesson/exercise where only a verbal
briefing is considered necessary an EAM may be produced and should contain

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 as a minimum, the aim and lessons to be learnt and the method in which it is to
be conducted.

e. Post Lesson/Exercise Considerations. After the lesson/exercise is over, and

in order to ensure that training is progressive, the instructor should consider:

(1) To what extent the aim/training objectives have been achieved.

(2) If not, what further lessons/exercises are necessary to achieve them and
what aspects must be covered in greater detail.

(3) Could the lesson/exercise have been organized better, or the subject
matter have been better presented to make the learning process easier.

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Section 4. The Battle Lesson

General

6-10 The definition of the Battle Lesson is given in the Introduction to this Chapter, which
together with Sections 1 and 2 should be read before studying this Section.
Examples

6-11 Examples of three Battle Lessons are given at the end of this Section. These are for
illustrative purposes only. It is the responsibility of the instructor to ensure that the
drills and/or tactical doctrine are updated where necessary.
Conduct

6-12 The length of each lesson/demonstration will vary with the subject being taught and
the time available. The teaching phase can be conducted using normal lesson/lecture
techniques or by a demonstration. On some occasions a combination of both may be
applicable. It is often best to teach a stage of the subject then confirm by practice
before moving onto another stage. Phase 2, the final practice, should be run once all
the stages of instruction have been completed. The importance of the final practice
must be emphasized. It serves as a confirmation of the subject taught and ensures
that the soldiers or sub-unit’s skills are enough to tackle a Battle Exercise in the
same subject. The sequence listed below should be followed.
Sequence

6-13 The sequence of a Battle Lesson should be, where applicable, as follows:

a. Preliminaries.

(1) On arrival of demonstration troops:

(a) Layout stores and ammunition.

(b) Carry out normal safety precautions — demonstration troops and

enemy; a thorough physical check of all weapons, magazines,
ammunition pouches, pockets, helmet linings and other personal
clothing and equipment is to be conducted.

(c) A declaration is to be taken from all troops that they have no live
ammunition in their possession.

(d) Remind all troops they are responsible for ensuring that every round
they fill into a magazine, ammunition stowage bin, clip or belt, is
blank.

(e) The ECO and Exercise Assistants are to ensure that BFAs and
associated equipment are correctly fitted.

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 (f) Brief and rehearse demonstration troops and enemy.

(2) On arrival of troops:

(a) Carry out normal safety precautions.

(b) A declaration is to be taken from all troops that they have no live
ammunition in their possession.

(c) Remind all troops they are responsible for ensuring that every round
they fill into a magazine, ammunition stowage bin, clip or belt, is
blank.

(d) The ECO and Exercise Assistants are to ensure that BFAs and
associated equipment are correctly fitted.

(e) The ECO is to sign the AFB 159B

(f) Check all weapons, blank magazines and blank firing attachments. A
thorough physical check of all weapons, magazines, ammunition
pouches, pockets, helmet linings and other personal clothing and
equipment is to be conducted.

(g) Issue safety brief applicable to the lesson.

(h) Give out the squad organization and detail command appointments.

(i) Number off, if it is a team lesson.

(j) Describe how the instruction will progress, how it will be covered in
stages and, if applicable, how a scoring system will work.

(k) Distribute stores and ammunition (if required at this stage).

(l) Carry out initial battle preparation if required.

b. Revision. Revise only those skills or knowledge that have a direct bearing on
this lesson.

c. Introduction. This must include:

(1) The aim — the subject matter to be taught.

(2) The ‘reason why’ — which should be related to the battle purpose.

(3) An incentive — something that will affect the soldiers personally if

possible.

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 d. The Lesson.

(1) Phase 1 — The Teaching Phase. Teach each stage of the lesson in the
following sequence:

(a) Explain and/or demonstrate the new knowledge or skills (the squad
imitating).

(b) Confirm by practice by means of a walkthrough/talk through and/or

questions.

(c) If necessary, carry out a short quick-time practice to confirm and fault
check.

(2) Phase 2 — The Final Practice. This is confirmation of all stages of the
lesson as an exercise. The following considerations apply:

(a) Re-issue stores; and ammunition if required.

(b) Confirm squad organization and brief on the conduct of the final
practice.

(c) Initial Battle Picture. To introduce realism into the exercise. This
should give a brief background to the forthcoming operation and give
the following details to assist in battle preparation: i. Place. Where
battle preparation is to take place. ii. Time. How long they have to
complete it. iii. Threat. The direction of the enemy.

(d) Final Battle Preparation. Carried out in the preparation areas. This
allows refurbishment of camouflage and preparation of the group,
their weapons and equipment issued specifically for the final practice.

(e) Final Battle Picture. This should be given as a tactical brief. Give
the student(s) the task they are to carry out. It should be given from a
concealed position overlooking the exercise area.

(f) Exercise. This confirms your lesson. Consider:

i. Control. Enough to ensure that the exercise runs smoothly.

ii. Fault checking. Only when repeated faults are made.

iii. Interference. Never, unless safety is involved.

(g) Debrief. At the end of exercise stage soldiers should:

i. Clear weapons (where applicable) by being given the following

order: “Stop”, “Unload”.

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 ii. Be reminded of the aim.

iii. Have their faults discussed from the critique sheet. Prior to the
debrief the enemy should be asked for points on the
performance of the troops.

iv. Be given encouragement and praise where due.

(h) Re-Exercise. It is unlikely that there will be time to carry out a re-
exercise phase. If there is, it should be carried out on a new area
with a new Battle Picture. Feedback should again be given
comparing both exercises, noting good and bad points.
Conclusion

6-14 End of Lesson Drill.

a. Questions from and to the squad.

b. Unload, clear weapons, empty magazines and centralize ammunition (where

applicable).

c. Carry out normal safety precautions to include a thorough physical check of all
weapons, magazines, ammunition pouches, pockets, helmet linings and other
personal clothing and equipment.

d. Pack up all stores.

e. Declaration. (Where applicable but only if not done as a central declaration —

see paragraph below).

f. Sign AFB 159A. g. Summary and look forward.

6-15 Concurrent Lessons. When lessons are running concurrently the following drills are
to be carried out at the end of the training period in addition to the individual lesson
sequence:

a. Normal safety precautions and declaration (where applicable).

b. Sign AFB 159A (where applicable)

c. Pack up all stores.

d. Summary by OIC on lessons as a whole.

e. Look forward to Battle Exercises on the subject.

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Section 5. The Battle Exercise

General

6-16 The Battle Exercise is the logical follow-on from the Battle Lesson. It gives individual
soldiers, the team, or group, opportunities to show their ability and use their initiative
in realistic situations covering all phases of war.

6-17 The key to success when planning the Battle Exercise is realism. Realism depends
upon the imagination, involvement and planning of the officer or NCO concerned.

6-18 The definition, detailed planning considerations and preparation of a Battle Exercise
is explained in the Introduction to this chapter and at Sections 2 and 3. These should
be read before studying this Section.
Examples

6-19 Examples of Battle Exercises are given at the end of this Section. It is stressed that
these are for illustrative purposes and it is the responsibility of the Planning and/or
Conducting Officer to ensure that the detail is both current and safe.
Conduct

6-20 The Battle Exercise may be conducted at two different levels:

a. The Practice Exercise. This is designed to improve the soldier’s performance

in a particular skill or tactic. The following aspects are to be noted:

(1) Concurrent activity may be related to the exercise.

(2) The ‘remind’ phase is to be included in the initial brief, indicating to the
soldier what is expected of them during the exercise.

(3) The exercise should be run on a competitive basis and the soldier’s
progress assessed.

b. The Test Exercise. This is designed to assess the soldier’s performance in an

aspect of training which, if satisfactory, will enable them to progress onto the
next stage. A soldier may be tested in this manner at any stage of their service.
The following aspects are to be noted:

(1) Concurrent activity must be planned so that it does not affect the fair
assessment of all troops.

(2) There is no ‘remind’ phase.

(3) The soldier must be made aware that the exercise is a test of skills and
that they will be assessed throughout.

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Sequence

6-21 The sequence of the Battle Exercise is as follows:

a. Preliminaries.

(1) On arrival of demonstration troops/safety supervisors:

(a) Carry out normal safety precautions and checks.

(b) Layout stores and ammunition.

(c) Brief and rehearse demonstration troops/enemy/safety supervisors.

(2) On arrival of troops to be exercised:

(a) Carry out normal safety precautions to include a thorough physical

check of all weapons, magazines, ammunition pouches, pockets,
helmet linings and other personal clothing and equipment.

(b) A declaration is to be taken from all troops that they have no live
ammunition in their possession.

(c) Remind all troops they are responsible for ensuring that every round
they fill into a magazine, ammunition stowage bin, clip or belt, is
blank.

(d) The ECO and Exercise Assistants are to ensure that BFAs and
associated equipment are correctly fitted.

(e) Sign AFB 159B.

(3) Issue a safety brief.

(4) Give out squad organization, command appointments and number off if it
is a team exercise.
(5) Explain (where applicable): (a) The Layout of the Exercise, Ammunition
Point, Battle Preparation Area, Line of Departure, Administrative Area,
Concurrent Activity Area. (b) The System of Work. Who will be exercised
first, who will start concurrent activity first and how the changeover will
work. (c) The Competition. Outline the subjects to be exercised and tested
and the scores to be attained.

(6) Distribute stores.

(7) Carry out initial battle preparation

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 b. Revision. Remind and revise points applicable to the particular exercise. This
does not apply if the exercise is being conducted as a test.

c. Introduction. (1) Approach. (a) The ‘reason why’ which should be related to the
battle purpose. (b) Incentive. Plan something that will affect the soldier
personally if possible. (2) Aim. The aim of the exercise.

d. Battle Picture. Include orders/brief.

e. Final Battle Preparation.

f. Conduct Exercise or Test. Include individual debrief.

g. End of Exercise Drills. As per The Battle Lesson — see Section 4.

h. Re-Exercise. Only if necessary and preferably on a new area.

Battle Preparation and the Battle Picture

6-22 Battle preparation and the battle picture stages help to introduce realism into the
exercise which must be maintained throughout. As a general rule remember that the
battle picture is often the method used for explaining the situation to the soldiers. The
following factors should be considered when carrying out these stages:

a. Battle Preparation. A separate area should be designated for battle preparation.

When briefing soldiers for the battle preparation phase include the following:

(1) Indicate the area where the preparation is to be carried out.

(2) Say how long is available.

(3) Point out the direction of the enemy.

(4) State the time and place for orders/brief.

b. Assessment. If a soldier’s or sub-unit’s battle preparation is to be marked as

part of the overall performance competition, it is recommended that the marks
allocated for this subject be divided in half. Half should be awarded prior to the
exercise and the remainder at the end. This allows the soldier’s preparation to
be tested under exercise conditions and will reveal weaknesses such as the
attachment of camouflage and serviceability of weapons and equipment.

c. Battle Picture. In all situations especially for sub-unit exercises the battle picture
should be given from a concealed position overlooking the exercise area so that
it can be related to the ground.

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Duties of the Instructor and Safety Supervisor — Live Firing

6-23 The duties and role of the Instructor will vary with the type of exercise being run.
Where the exercise is conducted as a ‘dry’ run practice, they will be primarily
concerned with giving encouragement and advice to the soldier. However, advice
should only be given when strictly necessary as soldiers should be allowed the
maximum scope for making their own decisions and mistakes. For all exercises
involving live firing the regulations contained in Pamphlet No. 21 (Reference C) are to
be followed. During such firing the instructor acts as a Safety Supervisor where his
primary concern is that of safety. The Conducting Officer must decide if a Safety
Supervisor is to be detached from the exercise setting and purely act in a safety
supervisory role or whether they are also to play a part within the battle picture.

6-24 In all cases the Instructor’s role can be summarized as follows:

a. Briefing of Firers.

(1) Check or mark preparation for battle.

(2) Instil a sense of urgency.

(3) Repeat the vital safety points.

(4) Remind soldiers of the battle picture and indicate the route.

(5) Supervise the loading and ‘making ready’ of the soldiers’ weapons.

b. Accompany the Firers.

(1) Ensure the safety of the exercise.

(2) Channel the soldiers along the correct route.

(3) Check faults. This may be done verbally during a practice battle exercise
but it should be kept to a minimum. During a test exercise the points
should only be noted for the debrief.

(4) Encourage and advise but only in the case of the instructional exercise.

(5) Order “Unload” and clear all weapons before moving to the debrief area.

c. Debrief Firers.

(1) Remind them of the aim.

(2) Discuss faults and award scores as necessary.

(3) Encourage and praise where due.

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 (4) Summarise.
Competition

6-25 Whenever possible all exercises should be made competitive by awarding or

deducting marks in accordance with the Instructor’s or Safety Supervisor’s
assessment of the performance achieved. For the majority of exercises a selection of
the following headings may be used:

a. Battle Preparation.

b. Weapon Handling.

c. Streetcraft.

d. Observation.

e. Tactics.

f. Use of Cover.

g. Reaction.

h. Fire Positions.

i. Fire Effect.

j. Control. Use of hand signals and communication.

6-26 Instructors (or Safety Supervisors) should allocate points for the soldiers’
performance under several selected headings. A suggested balance for marking is
given below:
Headings Points
a. Battle Preparation 15

b. Weapon/Equipment Handling 15

c. Fire Position and Movement 15

d. Skills/Technique or Fire Effect to be Achieved/Tested 50

e. Instructor’s Discretion, e.g., Bonus points for achieving

HPS in sub-paragraph d. above HPS 100

6-27 Standards

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 a. Pass Standards for Recruits or young soldiers. 50%

b. Pass Standards for Trained Soldiers. 70%

c. Soldiers are to achieve pass standards under each heading/stage in order to

pass the whole test/exercise.

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