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Vomfell, Lara; Stahl, Florian; Schomm, Fabian; Vossen, Gottfried

Working Paper
A classification framework for data marketplaces

ERCIS Working Paper, No. 23

Provided in Cooperation with:

European Research Center for Information Systems (ERCIS), University of Münster

Suggested Citation: Vomfell, Lara; Stahl, Florian; Schomm, Fabian; Vossen, Gottfried (2015) :
A classification framework for data marketplaces, ERCIS Working Paper, No. 23, Westfälische
Wilhelms-Universität Münster, European Research Center for Information Systems (ERCIS),
Münster

This Version is available at:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118643

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 Working Papers

ERCIS – European Research Center for Information Systems

Editors: J. Becker, K. Backhaus, M. Dugas, B. Hellingrath,
T. Hoeren, S. Klein, H. Kuchen, U. Müller-Funk, H. Trautmann, G. Vossen

Working Paper No. 23

A Classification Framework for Data Marketplaces

Lara Vomfell, Florian Stahl, Fabian Schomm, Gottfried Vossen

ISSN 1614-7448

cite as: Lara Vomfell, Florian Stahl, Fabian Schomm, Gottfried Vossen: A
Classification Framework for Data Marketplaces. In: Working Paper No. 23,
European Research Center for Information Systems, Eds.: Becker, J. et al.
Münster 2015.
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2 Markets and Marketplaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

3 Information Technology, Data, Marketplaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

3.1 Electronic Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2 Electronic Marketplaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3 Typology of Electronic Marketplaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4 Data as an Information Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4.1 The Marketability of Information Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4.2 Utility Value of Information Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4.3 Information Asymmetries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4.4 Cost Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.5 Distribution of Data on Electronic Marketplaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5.1 Value Attribution and Cost Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5.2 Pricing Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

5 Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

1
List of Figures
Figure 1: A Model of Electronic Marketplaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2
 3 

Type

Research Report

Title

A Classification Framework for Data Marketplaces.

Authors

Lara Vomfell, Florian Stahl, Fabian Schomm, Gottfried Vossen

contact via: {lara.vommfell, florian.stahl, fabian.schomm, vossen}@uni-muenster.de

Abstract

Trading data as a commodity has become increasingly popular in recent years, and data mar-
ketplaces have emerged as a new business model where data from a variety of sources can be
collected, processed, enriched, bought, and sold. They are effectively changing the way data
is distributed and managed on the Internet. To get a better understanding of the emergence of
data marketplaces, we have conducted several surveys in recent years in order to systematically
gather and evaluate their characteristics. This paper takes a broader perspective and relates data
marketplaces to the neoclassical notions of market and marketplace from economics. We provide
a typology of electronic marketplaces, and discuss their approaches to a distribution of data. Lastly,
we provide a distinct definition of data marketplaces in order to integrate these new businesses
into existing research frameworks, leading to a classification framework that can help structuring
this emerging field.

Keywords

Data as a Service, Data Marketplace, Data Marketplace Survey, Data Marketplace Development,
Classification
 4

1 Introduction

The Internet allows for almost ubiquitous transactions, access to and exchange of information, and
instant communication. Due to the unprecedented supply of data, the Internet has not only altered
how people relate to information but has also allowed for an increasing proliferation of data through
a facilitation of exchange. Besides the emergence of new markets and new products, it has lead
to a major transformation of existing markets. Prior to the Web 2.0 development, a data market
could be characterized as a private large-scale information exchange between major companies
[Miller, 2012]. In light of the newly available abundance of data sources as well as the variety of
storage and processing options, however, it is not surprising that data is increasingly both supplied
and demanded publicly on the Internet. Besides free databases such as Wikipedia or Wolfram
Alpha, (commercial/for-profit) marketplaces for data have emerged; examples of such marketplaces
include knoema.com, Microsoft Azure, Freebase, or datamarket.com (recently acquired by Qlik). In
this development, data services have been standardized to an extent that they can be offered as a
commodity.

We have conducted several surveys in the area of data marketplaces in recent years, in order to gain
an understanding of their offerings, their functionality, their business models, and their dynamics
[Schomm et al., 2013, Stahl et al., 2014]. However, a clear definition of a data marketplace is still
missing, as is an understanding of this development from an economical perspective. This paper
aims at closing this gap, by providing such a definition and integrating it with existing frameworks
of electronic markets and marketplaces.

Every new market is characterized by numerous participants entering and exiting while developing
resolutions and strategies for the number of challenges that every new market or product entails.
The high number of providers eventually leaving the field in the past few years illustrates that data
markets appear to be particularly challenging. Interviews with founders of the visualization tool
Swivel closed in 2010 yielded that, aside from the “usual” management issues, the main obstacle
to their business was that only users in the “single-digit” area were willing to pay for the services
[Kosara, ]. The Internet, the very medium that lead to the transformation of data markets in the first
place, is also one of the major threats to their economy: users are accustomed to have constant
access to information for free which results in a rather low willingness to pay for data. Companies
with a focus on data provision need to find suitable strategies to make revenue from their offering.

Considering how much those strategies are an alluring field of research for business administration
and information systems and how much the data market is discussed in the blogosphere, the lack
of formal research on the market is surprising. On the Internet, informal evaluations by journalists
and platform operators can easily be found. Informative examples are by [Dumbill, , Gislason,
, Miller, 2012, Miller, , O’Grady, ]. It should be noted that several of the offerings discussed there
are already out of business.

The only evaluations of the market with formalized standards are by S CHOMM, S TAHL, and VOSSEN
which surveyed the data market on a selected sample size in 2012 and 2013. They characterize
the market through an increasing “proliferation of data as a commodity” and identify several trends,
most notably a trend towards high quality data [Schomm et al., 2013, Stahl et al., 2014].

Paradoxically, the Internet, the very medium that has led to the emergence electronic data markets
in the first place, is also one of the major threats to their economy. Users are accustomed to have
constant access to information for free which results in a rather low willingness to pay for data.
Companies with a focus on data provisioning need to find suitable strategies to make revenue from
their offering.

Providing a definition for data marketplaces allows us to relate this development to traditional
markets and marketplaces as known from the field of economics, and to achieve clarity whenever
the term is used, which is currently not the case (as the term may refer to platform providers or
 5 

vendors alike — the difference will become evident later in this paper). A clear definition also allows
for further studies to clearly include and exclude providers of marketplaces, as we have done in
the latest iteration of our data marketplaces study currently in preparation [Vomfell et al., 2015].

The theoretical and empirical research concerning data, data markets, and data marketplaces is
filled with a number of different, partly contradictory terms: electronic markets, e-hubs, or data
vendors [Luomakoski, 2012]. Most of these terms do not properly describe the underlying concepts
concerned with data exchange. Furthermore, papers on data portals can be equally applicable as
papers on data markets themselves, depending on the author’s background and definition.

From an economics perspective, data marketplaces can be defined as electronic marketplaces

where the commodity data is traded. Data is an information good with special properties that make
its distribution quite particular. The differentiation between market and marketplace in economic
theory serves as a reference/model for establishing the difference between the concepts electronic
market and electronic marketplace. A discussion of the ways information technology changes or
facilitates the market functions compared to traditional markets is also included in this paper, and
two ambiguous concepts of electronic marketplaces are explained and discerned.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: After a short review of existing classification
models from neo-classical economics in Section 2, our own model of categorizing electronic
marketplaces is presented as a framework for provider characterization in Section 3; additionally,
the obstacles to the marketability of information goods are presented: the difficulty of value
attribution, information asymmetries, and the particular cost structure of information goods. How
those can be overcome in the case of data and how data is distributed and allocated on electronic
marketplaces is discussed in Section 4. Penultimately, a consideration of the relevance to our study
is given in Section 5, where we outline our latest survey results. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 Markets and Marketplaces

Neo-classical economics – the currently widely accepted economic model – consider marketplaces
to be the physical or virtual implementation of markets. Markets are defined as the economic place
where the interactions of buyers and sellers determine the price and the quantity of a good or a
service [Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2010].

On this functional market, the abstract place of trade, potential and realized trading relationships
determine the economic equilibrium of price and quantity of a product [Samuelson and Nordhaus,
2010]. Both the entirety or segments of the economic structure can be addressed with the term
“market” [Schwickert and Pfeiffer, 2000]. It serves three main functions:

Institution The market as an institution is a framework of rules that governs the behavior of the
participating agents. It assigns the roles of the agents (e.g., intermediary, seller, etc.) and sets
expectations and protocols on their behavior. Further, participants willing to trade find a medium
allowing them to satisfy their exchange goals [Schmid, 2000].

Transaction The market is constituted by the sum of all market-based transactions. In turn, the
market defines the process of transactions [Schmid, 1999]. The transaction itself is according to
[Richter and Nohr, 2002] constituted by four distinct phases: 1) the information phase where agents
collect information on products and form concrete exchange intentions in the form of bids and
offers; 2) the negotiation phase where negotiations on the product, the contract terms, and the price
are carried out and which ends in a contract; 3) the transaction phase where the contract is fulfilled
and the commodity is exchanged; and 4) the after-sales phase where customer service is crucial
to individualize and enhance the customer’s satisfaction and commit them. Other authors use
different phases, for example [Schmid, 1999] splits the information phase into an information and
 6

intention phase while aggregating the transaction and after-sales phase. In order to be considered
part of an electronic market, at least one transaction phase needs to be performed electronically.
Most researchers consider the information phase to be the minimal requirement as in this phase
demand and supply are matched globally and immediately [Schmid, 1999].

Pricing Mechanism Markets are a mechanism through which buyers and sellers interact to set
prices. To be more precise, the price is the equalizing element that coordinates the actions of
buyers and sellers on a market. Furthermore, prices signal the conditions of exchange to other
participants [Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2010]. The market as a pricing mechanism is closely linked
to the efficient market hypothesis: once supply and demand have equalized by the optimal price
that clears the market, the allocation of goods is pareto-optimal and social welfare is maximized
[Mankiw and Taylor, 2012, Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2010].

Additionally, some welfare economists attribute an innovation function to markets, i.e., the capacity
to innovate and evolve products, services, and structures [Kerber, 2007].

Opposed to the abstract economic construct of a market, marketplaces are the geographical,
concrete place of trade [Nieschlag et al., 1994]. It is the explicit place of encounter in terms of
time and location where market participants prepare and execute transactions [Grieger, 2003].
A marketplace is the infrastructure where market activities take place. It can be considered the
real interpreter of supply and demand that coordinates output [Schwickert and Pfeiffer, 2000]. The
constituting difference between market and marketplace is the level of abstraction: marketplaces
are the physical or virtual infrastructure that allows the abstract market to form.

3 Information Technology, Data, Marketplaces

The rapid development of modern information and communication technology (ICT) also constitutes
the development of a new medium through which market relations, transactions, and information
can be processed and realized [Schmid, 1999]. This new medium enabled by ICT is an electronic
infrastructure which companies, individuals, and governments can use to create virtual market-
places where they previously did not exist [Coppel, 2000]. These marketplaces have mostly been
characterized as B2B, B2C, C2C, G2C (i.e., business-to-business or to customer or government)
up to now. Indeed, ICT has led to the creation of virtual trading areas where products, services,
and information are sold [Richter and Nohr, 2002]. However, due to the on-demand availability of
large computing power and high-capacity storage as a service from the cloud, in combination with
application service provisioning, even other categories of goods have emerged, most notably data.
Data in various forms (raw, processed, etc.) can nowadays be traded just like any other form of
goods, and platforms supporting this resemble traditional marketplaces. Through the dissolution
of traditional barriers of market entry, product distribution, and product differentiation substitution
effects and competition have increased. The ICT integration has entailed several configurations of
traditional market mechanisms like more flexible price setting or faster transaction performance
but its defining new quality is the mechanization of information processing, leading to a drastic
increase in the information production [Schmid, 2000].

This reshaping is not without consequences to the current set of definitions. The position of
electronic markets in the existing framework is not self-evident because they could either be
subordinated as submarkets or could embody a new type of markets. One fundamental drawback
to the clarification of this question is the fact that up to date no unitary definition of electronic
markets and marketplaces has been established. A patchwork of several definitions ranging from
electronic markets as agora [Schmid, 1999] to information systems [Grewal et al., 2001] hampers
the research. We suggest the relationship between electronic markets and electronic marketplaces
to be analogous to the (often neglected) distinction between real-world markets and marketplaces.
 7 

3.1 Electronic Markets

As implied above, “the electronic market as an electronic medium is based on the new digital
communication and transaction infrastructure” [Schmid, 1999]. Accordingly, electronic markets
are submarkets qualified by the electronic infrastructure they are founded on [Bieberbach and
Hermann, 1999]. Analogously to the economic market definition, an electronic market is the
abstract summary of all market-based allocation on the basis of electronic media [Schwickert and
Pfeiffer, 2000].

Understood as a submarket, the three main market functions defined above – institution, transaction,
and pricing mechanism – remain unchanged on electronic markets. Electronic markets deviate
from the traditional realization mainly in two regards: the implementation of the institution function is
more complex because the ubiquitous nature of electronic markets makes the assignment of rules
and language difficult and it deviates in pricing [Schmid, 1999]. As in traditional markets, pricing
is the principal signal of the value and the conditions of the offered good. The price composition
with regards to transaction costs and the cost structure of virtual goods may be different. Since
transaction costs are one of the main elements in pricing, the facilitation via ICT leads to a drastic
drop in the costs of a good [Bakos, 1997].

Electronic markets are typically discussed in terms of their transformation power and can be
considered a convergence of the market towards a perfect market [Grieger, 2003]. With regard
to the higher accessibility, lower entry barriers, and their ubiquity, electronic markets carry a high
advantage over traditional markets [Schmid, 1999]. Given their higher transparency, electronic
markets are usually attributed an improved allocation coordination [Schmid, 1999]. Those advance-
ments give them an advantage over traditional forms of market organization. Especially transaction
cost theory asserts that by implementing electronic infrastructure the transaction costs become
negligible, improving the competition and almost completing the conversion towards a perfect
market [Strader and Shaw, 1997]. However, the necessary infrastructure investments oppose this
at least partly.

3.2 Electronic Marketplaces

Following the previous distinction between markets and marketplaces, an electronic marketplace
is the concrete agency or infrastructure that allows participants to meet and perform the market
transactions, translated into an electronic medium. Yet, the term is often used to describe various
concepts of e-commerce and market organization or as a synonym for electronic markets. [Wang
and Archer, 2007] present a summary of prevalent definitions and group them concept-wise. They
outline two fundamental types in the mass of definitions: electronic marketplaces as governance
structures and as business models which can be characterized as follows:

The Business Model dimension is effectively the definition of an electronic marketplace: the
concrete virtual institution and place of exchange that joins supply and demand and supports the
trade between providers and customers, i.e., transferring the market function into an electronic
infrastructure. Any type of business action on online platforms or any type of electronic venture falls
into this dimension with no regard to whether they are based on competition or on collaboration
[Wang and Archer, 2007].

Definitions covered by the Governance Structure dimension actually refer to electronic markets in
the abstract sense. As such, those definitions do not really reference electronic marketplaces.
 8

3.3 Typology of Electronic Marketplaces

Electronic marketplaces manifest in different shapes and can be categorized in various dimensions.
As a result of the overlapping definitions of electronic marketplaces, the categorizations are equally
confusing. Each model uses different definitions which makes a general classification of the various
forms of business models difficult.

In their literature review, [Wang and Archer, 2007] find nine common categories of electronic
marketplaces: number of participants; relationship dimension; participant behavior; ownership;
industry scope; market mechanism; products; power asymmetries and fee structure. Some
models implement all or most of these categories, e. g., [Schwickert and Pfeiffer, 2000, Alt et al.,
2002, Grieger, 2003, Skjøtt-Larsen et al., 2003]. Although those models are capable of reflecting
every particular manifestation of specific platforms, they do not allow for meaningful conclusions
on the prevalence of categories in quantitative empirical research. For example, the application of
the model by [Alt et al., 2002] in a study with 31 samples returned zero findings in six categories
which illustrates that simpler models with less categories enable a more concise typology.

Other models, e. g., [Fischer and Winkler, 2002, Richter and Nohr, 2002, Ganesh et al., 2004,
Ordanini, 2006], differentiate providers based on the relationship dimension into buyer-biased,
seller-biased, and neutral. Those simpler models, however, often merge several dimensions,
especially the ownership and the relationship dimension, without specifying that they are indeed
distinct dimensions. Concerning the evaluation of data marketplaces, an examination of the
prevalent forms of electronic marketplaces with regard to the relationship dimension and the
market/hierarchy differentiation is most interesting.

All transactions between suppliers and buyers can be classified as either hierarchical or market-
based. In the market, the quantity and price of a good are determined by market forces among
competitive offerings whereas hierarchical relations are characterized by pre-determined limitations
for a specific price and specific buyers or suppliers. The relative advantages of the strategies
depend on the transaction costs and the structure of the good [Malone et al., 1987].

As such a model has not yet been developed, we present a new model incorporating the mar-
ket/hierarchy divide as well as the correlations between the nine categories identified by [Wang
and Archer, 2007]. The high correlations between number of participants, relationship dimension
and market mechanism and further between ownership and power asymmetries allow for an
aggregation of categories [Wang and Archer, 2007].

First, providers are placed on a scale between hierarchy and market. Furthermore, marketplaces
are categorised based on their ownership, which can be a) private, i. e., owned by a single
company (seller or buyer); b) consortia-based, i. e., owned by a small number of companies (seller
or buyer); and c) independent, i. e., the marketplace is run as platform without any connection to
sellers or buyers. The differentiation between vendor-based and marketplace-based electronic
marketplaces has some implications. While marketplaces as platforms are inherently independent,
marketplaces driven by vendors (or buyers) are likely to be biased in their respective favour.

Based on these dimensions, our model differentiates six business models. On the hierarchy level,
privately owned platforms typically facilitate the procurement or selling of its owner (a company) in
closed systems and only allow for one-to-many or many-to-one relations. In between hierarchy
and market, consortia-based platforms implement many-to-few or vice versa relations and are
typically a collaboration of several companies in the same industry that seek to facilitate their sales
or procurement processes. Those platforms are closed because the entry into the platform (into
the consortium) is only theoretically possible.

On the market level, many-to-many platforms are usually operated by an independent intermediary
and only have minimal entry restrictions. Many-to-many platforms where the operator is also
 9 

Orientation Ownership Business Model

hierarchy

buy-side sell-side
private
system system

buy-side consortium sell-side

consortium
platform marketplace platform

= supplier
two-sided
independent = buyer
marketplace
= platform

market

Figure 1: A model of electronic marketplaces discerning between three ownership types, inspired
by [Richter and Nohr, 2002] and [Fischer and Winkler, 2002, cited from [Winkler, 2005]].

trading on its own marketplace are a special case. Those platforms are not independent and
neutral because the operator runs the platform with the biased interest of facilitating his sales
[Luomakoski, 2012]. The operator and the competing suppliers on the platform together form
the supply side even though the association between the agents may not be formalized. For the
purpose of our model, they are consortium marketplaces because they operate in a similar way to
real consortia. The competition on consortium platforms is higher than on pure hierarchic systems
but still lower than on marketplaces due to the entry restrictions [Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2010].

This model, depicted in Figure 1, intends to close the gap between theoretical models that are
hard to apply in empirical studies and simpler models with little explanatory power and a simplified
focus on the ownership. Through the aggregation of ownership, power asymmetries, and number
of participants into six different business models the number of types is manageable while allowing
for meaningful conclusions. Another interesting finding could unfortunately not be incorporated
into the model. VAN H ECK and R IBBER assert that open platforms have a long reach and tend to
have a simpler functionality owed to the need for compatibility whereas closed platforms manage
to accomplish a more complex functionality due to their fewer participants [Van Heck and Ribbers,
1997, cited from [Grieger, 2003]].

3.4 Data as an Information Good

Data1 are pieces or units of information. Their connection becomes evident when considering
that information is built upon data. Data consists of uninterpreted, structured characters without
meaning on their own. When data is provided with a context and a purpose it results in information
[North, 2011]. In economics, information always has a double meaning. First, it is an assumption
in the economic system: as a “state of awareness” [Bates, 1990], information is considered
to be perfect, complete, and instantly available to all agents free of charge. It is one of the
main assumptions of economic theory and a key condition for a perfect market [Samuelson and
Nordhaus, 2010]. Secondly, information is often considered a scarce private good, demanded and
supplied by agents on information markets. Those two concepts only seem contradicting because

1 While technically plural, from now on the singular form of data will be used similar to the way the term information is

used.
 10

they are very different sections of theory: one is an assumption of economic theory, the other a
subject of theory [Bates, 1990].

First and foremost, one needs to bear in mind that it is not actually information that is traded on
markets but data which is then processed to information or knowledge [Linde, 2009]. The lower
level of abstraction of data allows its exchange and turns it into a tangible good, an information
good. Information goods are defined as “everything that can be digitalized” [Shapiro and Varian,
1999], meaning that at least potentially, the underlying data can be exchanged.

3.4.1 The Marketability of Information Goods

Information goods have some anomalous features that make studying their economy difficult. It
has long been debated whether they are economic goods at all because “information violates some
features generally attributed to consumer goods” [Bates, 1990]. The definition of an economic good
itself is subject for debate, the general concept usually describes economic goods broadly as a
means to an end for human need satisfaction [Bates, 1990]. When it comes to determining whether
something is an economic good, however, most authors fall back on more pragmatic requirements
like transferability, utility, and value attribution or the demand for them [Bieberbach and Hermann,
1999]. In any case, information goods can be established as economic goods because all named
criteria are fulfilled.

Information goods mirror the issues of non-rivalry and non-excludability in the consumption of public
goods [Linde, 2009]. The provision of public goods on markets is always inefficient if functioning at
all. Both issues reduce supply and demand: non-rivalrous goods are available in an almost infinite
amount which reduces the incentives for private producers to supply the good. For consumers there
is little incentive to pay for non-excludable goods because of free-riding opportunities. [Mankiw and
Taylor, 2012]

Technically, both limitations apply which would mean a complete non-marketability of information
goods. The issues can be resolved when differentiating information goods. [Bates, 1990] proposes
a distinction between different information goods based on the impact their consumption has on
the stock value, i. e., “[t]he expected value of information at any particular point” [Bates, 1990], is
influenced by the number of exchanges of the information.

The distinction is founded on the assumption of rivaling consumption. For information with positive
network effects, a high number of exchanges is at minimum neutral, often beneficial to the
producer’s stock value. Such information goods, for example entertainment, can be considered
public goods with non-rivalrous consumption [Bates, 1990]. Certain information without network
effects such as sensitive market information loses value when consumed by a large number of
individuals. Therefore, producers consider the loss in stock value a marginal cost which makes
the good subject to rivalry in consumption with pricing as a coordinating mechanism [Bates,
1990]. In the case of regular economic goods the individual consumption is influenced by other’s
consumption choices because of scarceness considerations. In the case of information goods the
consumption is rivalrous because of the decreasing value of the information.

The marketability of a product is also highly dependent on its standardization. Complex products
that require high amounts of individualization and consumer input are usually not traded on markets
because the transaction costs (the costs of implementation to be more precise) for them are too
high. When integrating the acquisition of these products into hierarchical structures the transaction
costs are significantly lower [Luomakoski, 2012]. Products with a simpler structure that presuppose
very little and that therefore feature lower transaction costs are more likely to be traded in market
structures because of the higher price competition [Malone et al., 1987]. However, even on markets
the competition remains low as long as the products differ significantly from each other in terms
of form, quality, and functionality because they are not directly comparable. Producers of these
 11 

unique goods act as monopolists and set prices as such. The more homogenous products are, the
more competitive is their market. Commoditization is often confounded with commodification which
is the economization of social values in the Marxist context where commoditization is the process
of de-individualization and standardization of products [Rushkoff, 2005, Langman, 2012]. At the
end of commoditization stand commodities, products so standardized that they can be acquired
unseen [Kaplan and Sawhney, 2000]. For commodities, the price is the main factor of difference
between offerings which means complete competition among the producers [Langman, 2012].

In the case of data, its procurement on markets is a rather new phenomenon [Schomm et al.,
2013]. The different competing providers offer still differentiable products that are approximating. It
is rather unlikely that data will exhaust the entire spectrum of commoditization because the scope
of commoditization is naturally limited for data because the content of the information (i. e., what
buyers make of the data) cannot be standardized. Furthermore, information is valuable due to its
uniqueness which also confines the demand for commoditization. That said, the persistence of
the data market is dependent on a standardization of completeness and quality. Only with lower
transaction costs and an improvement in data quality are buyers willing to realign their procurement
in favor of markets [Rostkowski, 2014].

The level of commoditization on the data market is highly relevant. On the one hand, the progression
of commoditization can potentially predict the further development of data markets. If, after the
initial overture into commoditization, the data offered remains rather unique and differentiated, the
market will presumably remain fragmented, differentiated by product functionalities and qualities.
Producers tend to have higher profits as customers are less price sensitive. A progression in the
direction of commoditization on the other hand implies less differentiated, more stable competition
and a convergence towards a perfect market [Reimann et al., 2010]. Information quality and
implementation standards are factors which allow for commoditization. An indicator for the state of
commoditization is, in turn, the level of competition because it shows how comparable the offerings
are. The specificity of the data can indicate how comparable the data products are. Also, the
flexibility of producers in terms of accommodation of consumers’ demands can provide clues.

Secondly, when considering data markets as an illustration and real-time use of the opportunities
offered and enabled by Cloud Computing, the obstacles and concerns raised in the proliferation of
data on data marketplaces should be reflected in the research concerning Cloud Computing.

Even with an increasing commoditization, the economy of data remains subject to imperfect market
mechanisms because some properties of information goods and subsequently data make it prone
to inefficiencies or even market failure [Linde, 2009]. All those properties are related to the pricing
of information goods. Prices signal the value attributed to a certain good, moderate demand
and supply, and coordinate production and consumption [Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2010]. The
equilibrium price is composed by consumers’ value attribution, their willingness to pay for it, and
the producers’ cost calculations. In the case of information goods value attribution, information
asymmetries, and the cost structure hamper appropriate pricing.

3.4.2 Utility Value of Information Goods

Two qualities of data make assigning value to information difficult: the decreasing value of infor-
mation and the fact that information is an experience good. For traditional goods, neo-classical
economics predict that the price is determined on the market by the price consumers and suppliers
are willing to trade the product for [Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2010]. While the willingness to pay
varies for every consumer and every good depending on their preference order and consequently
their utility assessment, the utility of information goods is evaluated even more heterogeneously
[Shapiro and Varian, 1999]. Due to the non-consumability of information, meaning that after
every transfer all previous holders still have the information, the stock value decreases with ev-
 12

ery additional exchange [Bates, 1990]. The expected value of an information good is therefore
interdependent and fluid.

The evaluation of the real value is limited by the second quality of information. As an experience
good the utility of information is only rateable after its use. Different from other goods there is
virtually no way of previewing or testing the information to reduce buyers’ uncertainty which leads
to the information paradox formulated by [Arrow, 1962]: “its value for the purchaser is not known
until he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost”. Additionally, the
consumer cannot or only with considerable effort check the quality and trustworthiness of the
information which therefore remains unknown, possibly even after the consumption [Shapiro and
Varian, 1999]. In short, consumers can neither know how much the information is worth, nor can
they be certain that it keeps its stock value after the acquisition.

3.4.3 Information Asymmetries

The problem of value attribution is closely linked to the issue of information asymmetries. With
the non-transparency of value on information markets, consumers do not possess all relevant
information which can in turn lead to market failure.2 As in Akerlof’s (1970) “lemon market” sellers
hold asymmetrically more knowledge on the quality than buyers leading to a process of adverse
selection. When consumers are unable to attribute the correct value they lower their willingness to
pay to match the assumed lower value of the product. Suppliers of high quality products or services
eventually leave the market due to the low prices, effectively lowering the prices further which can
result in the collapse of the market [Akerlof, 1970]. Products with varying degrees of quality are
especially prone to adverse selection processes as opposed to commodities [Akerlof, 1970].

The incentive for producers to strategically exploit those asymmetries is high and can only be
countered by research effort on the consumer’s side [Linde, 2009]. Although information cannot
really be tried without consuming it (i.e., “A RROW’s information paradox”), several measures can
be taken to maintain market efficiency.

3.4.4 Cost Structure

In competitive markets the cost structure of the good determines its price because it is sold at
marginal cost [Mankiw and Taylor, 2012]. The cost structure of information goods is quite particular
and can best be summed up as “costly to produce, cheap to reproduce” [Shapiro and Varian,
1999]. This means that the fixed costs of production dominate the variable costs. The cost of
production of the very first copy, the development and acquisition of all necessary resources is
immense [Shapiro and Varian, 1999]. The costs of every additional copy, the marginal cost, tends
towards zero, reflecting the easy reproducibility and distributability of information [Bates, 1990].
The domination of variable costs benefits large producers. Only those producers can effectively
exploit economies of scale and use their high market share to counter the low profits per unit
[Shapiro and Varian, 1999].

According to neo-classical theory, information goods would not be produced because in a com-
petitive market producers have to lower prices in the long term until the products are sold at
marginal cost [Shapiro and Varian, 1999]. With marginal costs of zero there would be little incentive
for producers to operate. Obviously, as information goods are being produced, the real cost
and market structures are more complex which allows for the provision. For some information
goods like books the price is shaped by the value of the medium of distribution which makes the
marginal costs significant and allows for normal market mechanisms. But also other goods without
2 It should be noted that “information” in this paragraph refers to the assumption of perfect information in economic theory

as explained in Section 3.4.

 13 

distribution costs like data have a marginal cost when bearing in mind the argumentation of B ATES
explained above that considers the loss in stock value by each exchange a marginal cost. It means
that there is a limit to the number of times producers can sell an information until it becomes
worthless which is why they set a certain price to retrieve the production costs [Bates, 1990]. It can
be considered the price of exclusivity that consumers pay in order to reduce the availability of a
particular information to the public.

3.5 Distribution of Data on Electronic Marketplaces

The preceding paragraphs are mainly concerned with fitting the concept of information goods into
existing frameworks on economic goods and with identifying in what way their production and
distribution differs from physical goods. In light of the fact that there is a market for data some
of the issues outlined may seem unrealistic and purely theoretical. Those preparatory remarks
are necessary though to understand the practical models that evolved around the economics of
data distribution. This section deals with how consumers attribute value to data, how producers
calculate their prices, and how exactly data can be priced on electronic marketplaces.

3.5.1 Value Attribution and Cost Calculation

In practice, the issue of interdependent expected values where the acquired information may lose
stock value after the purchase is less severe than in theory. Customers are willing to pay for the
data if guaranteed a limited spreading. The second issue of information asymmetries owed to only
experiencable utility can be countered by a number of measures and institutions. Formal institutions
like contracts contain the scope of the product or certifications guarantee a sufficient quality so that
consumers trust the provider enough to pay for the offered information [Akerlof, 1970]. Informal
institutions like reputation or reviews are also common means of reducing information asymmetries
[Holmstrom, 1985]. Most news distributors work like this: today’s news are credible because they
have proven to be so in the past.

Additionally, the main factor in value attribution to data has shifted away from the content of
the information. The economy of data is characterized by an oversupply of data which makes
processed and structured data far more valuable than the content itself. The main challenge for
consumers lies no longer in paying the appropriate amount for the data but rather in finding the
right data. The function of data vendors moves to curating relevant, meaningful data and providing
stable access to the cleaned and formatted data [Shapiro and Varian, 1999]. In consideration of
the sheer amount of data that converges towards commoditization, producers need to differentiate
their offering not only by the content of their data but by high quality dissemination, processing,
enrichment, and conveyance. The real service of data providers is stabilized access to protected,
formatted quality data [Ge et al., 2005].

3.5.2 Pricing Strategy

Although a number of considerations should be made when establishing a business model the main
challenge remains pricing. Data distributors find it difficult to choose an appropriate pricing strategy
because strategies for information goods embedded in tangible media cannot be transferred to
digital data [Lee et al., 2006]. The most effective strategy to incorporate those issues is price
discrimination. In markets with one fixed price consumers with a low price elasticity would be
willing to pay more for the product than the given clearing price [Mankiw and Taylor, 2012]. In order
to reach those segments and increase the profit different pricing strategies need to be applied. It
should be noted that price discrimination is only possible in imperfect markets [Mankiw and Taylor,
 14

2012]. S HAPIRO and VARIAN identify three general strategies for information goods: personalized
pricing, group pricing, and versioning [Shapiro and Varian, 1999].

Personalized Pricing – sometimes called first-degree or full price discrimination – means that each
individual is offered the product at a different price. It aims at maximizing profit by exploiting each
customer’s individual willingness to pay. The individualization requires a high level of information on
the customers and can be based on location, past purchases, or demographic factors [Shapiro and
Varian, 1999]. This model is practically impossible to implement for legal, technical, and economic
reasons [Mankiw and Taylor, 2012].

Group pricing or third-degree price discrimination is essentially aggregated personalized pricing.

The prices do not differ because of individual features but rather because of group affiliation
which enables easier application [Shapiro and Varian, 1999]. Group pricing factors in distinct
price elasticities in different market segments and reflects those in price disparities and different
accesses [Shapiro and Varian, 1999].

Versioning means that different versions of the good can be differentiated and are sold at different
prices. Possible points for differentiation are different qualities, delayed access, or technical support.
When using the former strategies, producers must identify the customer segments themselves.
Versioning causes customers to reveal information about their willingness to pay themselves: by
choosing a certain version from a transparent product palette line they self-classify [Shapiro and
Varian, 1999]. Versioning is particularly attractive when the information is easily differentiable,
e. g., lower qualities can easily be produced [Lee et al., 2006]. This pricing strategy often leads
to freemium-models where lower quality versions are given away for free in order to make use
of lock-in effects, gain first-mover advantages, standardize, or raise brand-awareness [Lee et al.,
2006].

Several business models emerge from those pricing strategies. Since a complete review on all
possible and realized business models would go beyond the scope of this section, here the most
common will be highlighted. Most pricing models offer either a time or an amount based plan
[Balazinska et al., 2011]. Time based plans charge monthly or annually and are flat rates with
full access or subscription plans with varying quantity limits [Muschalle et al., 2013]. The price
discrimination in this model is basically versioning as consumers choose the subscription fitting
to their needs and willingness to pay. Quantity-based models charge per unit (query or tuple)
retrieved [Stahl et al., 2013]. Pure Pay-per-Use models are rather rare due to the marginal cost
structure of data [Stahl et al., 2013]. Often, it is combined with a hybrid pricing model. Hybrid
models can form in both categories and charge different prices at certain limits. Two-part-tariffs
cover the high fixed costs with a fixed subscription combined with a use-dependent tariff [Muschalle
et al., 2013]. Freemium is a similar concept where consumers can use the service free of charge
for a limited amount of time, functions, or data before paying the full price [Stahl et al., 2013]. Other
conceivable pricing models like auctions or individual price discrimination are quasi non-existent in
reality [Stahl and Vossen, 2013]. Readers further interested in the topic are referred to [Balazinska
et al., 2011, Muschalle et al., 2013, Stahl et al., 2013].

4 Discussion

Following the integration of electronic data marketplaces into the existing neo-classical framework
for markets, several qualifiers and disqualifiers can be developed to allow for a clear identification
and characterization of data marketplaces as electronic marketplaces. In particular, the following
criteria are defined:

1. The providers’ primary business model needs to be providing data.

 15 

2. The providers offer an infrastructure to upload and to browse or download to buy and sell
machine-readable (e.g., RDF or XML) data of other users. The data has to be hosted by the
providers and it needs to be clear whether the specific data comes from the community or the
operator. This type is the electronic marketplace in the narrow sense.

3. The providers offer or sell proprietary data they host themselves. Whether they created or
collected the data themselves or acquired them from other providers is not a criterion, there must,
however, be transparency and traceability on the data sources. Providers of analyzed data must
disclose the sources and methods of calculation.

4. The data analyzing tools must be online tools and provide storable data as their main offering.
They need to use proprietary data in their calculations; services like algorithm-based analyses of
customers’ data or the provision of crawling code do not classify for this type.

Additionally, several disqualifiers are necessary when trying to draw conclusions on the data
marketplace as a distribution medium. One criteria is the machine-readability of the data. It can
be argued that only machine-readable data successfully indicates a commoditization of data on
marketplaces. Otherwise, the information is simply shared because users personally deem them
useful without being concerned about allocability and effective distribution. This rule applies for
example to Wikipedia: its marketplace-like infrastructure allows users to freely upload or access
information which is not machine-readable though. Data vendors only linking to data locations
without hosting them (like KDnuggets.com’s list of data sets) also do not fulfill the criteria. Online
tools that process the user’s data or re-use them in software products without use of proprietary
data like OpenCalais.com are other examples for providers not fully matching the criteria. Software
as a service (SaaS) suppliers are also disqualified based on the non-storability of their data.

Some offerings that meet all requirements are generally disregarded. Government agencies or
non-government organizations providing free data can only tangentially relevant as they publish
data as a side effect of their general purpose and are not set on commoditizing data or even
finding an appropriate business model. A large number of cities, provinces, and countries – the
Global Open Data Index counts 79 countries – participate in the Open Government movement
[Global Open Data Index, 2014]. This movement aims at publishing government data to allow for
more transparent and citizen-orientated participation and innovation [O’Reilly, 2010]. Transnational
organizations like the United Nations or the World Bank and NGOs like interaction.org promote
their objectives by sharing their findings. The research on this emerging field is still developing, two
notable works are by [Chun et al., 2010] and [Scholl et al., 2012]. Institutional data providers do
hold special relevance with regard to the number of participants as they are one of the few types
that work in a consortium-like fashion.

5 Relevance

The purpose of defining data marketplaces is to closely monitor relevant real implementations of
the opportunities offered by a cloud infrastructure. Empirical research on this emerging field is still
scarce. Three surveys on data marketplaces have been conducted between 2012 and 2014. The
most current one, which is still to be published, has employed the definition system presented here
[Schomm et al., 2013, Stahl et al., 2014, Vomfell et al., 2015].

The last survey has looked at 72 specific manifestation combinations among data providers to
characterize data markets and to identify trends in their business models. Through empirical
research using the provider definition outlined, it becomes evident that the technical side of
information provisioning is far less severe than its economic side, e. g., choosing the appropriate
pricing strategy. Most issues presented here from a theoretical perspective can be cleared through
price differentiation or a reframing of marginal costs. Arrow’s information paradox, however, remains
 16

unresolved: the providers are very reluctant to provide access to their data and prefer to not close
every potential business deal rather than give out more than the absolutely necessary information.
Apparently, the commonly assumed adaption to on-demand services through facilitated access is
somewhat limited by pricing concerns. As long as data pricing and data access remain constrained
by such concerns, their ubiquitous implementation and distribution will stay relevant for only a small
group of users.

Regarding the pricing models, flat rates enjoy a clear advancement over pay-per-use models
among the surveyed data providers, often combined with freemium models. Whether this is to
accommodate customers or to make use of lock-in effects should be subject to future research.
Customers might be unsatisfied with granular pricing models that also restrict unfocused data
exploration and prefer simpler subscriptions. Up to now, flat rates remain the most attractive pricing
model for providers because of the more stable revenue generated by subscription plans without
additional costs due to the marginal costs of zero. Furthermore, pay-per-use models have not (yet)
reached the necessary level of sophistication necessary to prevent arbitrage exploitation. Research
is currently conducted to find technical and policy amendments [Balazinska et al., 2011]. Until
then, the trend towards flat rates is not surprising and most likely indicates a rather low competition
among the providers so that they still have plenty of options for differentiation and that pricing
competition is not very pronounced.

The study presented by [Vomfell et al., 2015] suggests two distinct scenarios with very different
data access requirements. In the first scenario, the data is used as a type of manufacturing input.
The customer expects complete, formatted, and reliable data. In order to process the acquired
data further and use it as a basis for the production of another good, its quality must be extremely
high and the access to it must be reliable. However, it does not need to be very specific and
pre-analyzed. In the second scenario, the data is considered an add-on in the process of decision
making and a specialized product that can be spot purchased whenever necessary or be acquired
on a regular basis. Its quality is not of crucial importance compared to the importance of its
specificity. In the add-on scenario, the customer does not depend on the data quality but rather
expects a higher individuality of the product to match their particular wishes while data buyers in the
first scenario would more likely expect a constant standard which they can depend on. Examples of
the first scenario are the financial data APIs offered by xignite, Bloomberg PolarLake, or Interactive
Data. The specialized inputs in the second scenario could be some enrichment services like
CrowdSource, crawling services like 80legs or address sellers like xDayta [Muschalle et al., 2013].

In general, hierarchical structures are more prevalent among the providers than intermediate
platforms [Vomfell et al., 2015]. This could possibly be linked to the reach/scope hypothesis
touched upon in Section 3.3. The more obvious explanation is, considering that the data market is
mainly a B2B market, that hierarchical relationships are easier to implement which is a favorable
feature in a B2B markets. Also, private customers tend to have a lower willingness to pay for
data [Potoglou et al., 2013]. The data market are observed in the provider sample seems to
orientate towards a mainstream market also targeting non-technical companies and users: a high
number of providers offers several, some even all, access possibilities but limits the number of data
formats. The restriction to mostly standard formats like reports or CSV probably aims at reducing
presupposition on data use. The high number of API accesses indicates that this development
does most likely not involve a withdraw from the initial target group.

6 Conclusion

The development of IT have brought along innovations in both technical and commercial areas
which have led to the emergence of new business models for data exchange. The question of
how to make data provisioning profitable is relevant to entrepreneurs and academic research alike.
Still, the successful distribution of data is impeded by complex pricing mechanisms combined
 17 

with a generally low willingness to pay on the buyers’ side. Well-studied economical principles
for marketplaces and information goods can, as elaborated upon in this paper, help explain and
mitigate those concerns which make an integration of electronic data marketplaces into the existing
economic framework necessary. The provision of such a theoretical foundation as in this paper
complements previous studies by ourselves and others regarding the dynamics of data services. It
allows for further research regarding the business models of data providers, pricing strategies, and
the distribution of data.

As we have said earlier, the Internet and the cloud have enabled a number of service developments
in recent years. Many of these resemble traditional phenomena from the real world, or try to
transform such phenomena to the virtual world, often even without realizing what is going on. It
then happens that only after a while the originators of such a transition discover that what they
consider “new” in the virtual world has had quite a tradition in the real world already, and there are
indeed underpinnings that could help to a better understanding of the virtual world.

It is our conviction that this study can help to avoid to unnecessarily explore what has been explored
already in other domains. At the same time, this study ensures that a common language is at hand
to understand what is happening on the data market and on data marketplaces.

Several further research topics immediately arise, in particular when considering data markets,
as we have mentioned, as an illustration and real-time use of the opportunities offered by the
cloud. Indeed, the obstacles and concerns raised in the proliferation of data on data marketplaces
should lead to research concerning Cloud Sourcing and Computing. Pricing strategies, trading
options, or auctioning systems are all to be reconsidered for data marketplaces, and to be adapted
to the digital nature of the goods being at stake. Moreover, as any markets, even data markets will
undergo, or already have undergone, a diversification into “black” and “white” markets, where data
is traded illegally in the former. To this end it will be both interesting and relevant how to detect this,
and how to protect data from being traded on a black market.

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