Forest Policy and Economics 90 (2018) 7–11

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Forest Policy and Economics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol

Deforestation and the Paris climate agreement: An assessment of REDD+ in T

the national climate action plans
Jonas Heina,b, , Alejandro Guarinc, Ezra Fromméd, Pieter Pauwb,e,f
⁎

a
CAU Kiel, Institute of Geography, Ludewig-Meyn-Straße 14, Kiel 24098, Germany
b
German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Tulpenfeld 6, Bonn 53113, Germany
c
International Institute for Environment and Development, 80-86 Gray's Inn Road, WC1X 8NH London, United Kingdom
d
United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security, Platz der Vereinten Nationen 1, Bonn 53113, Germany
e
Stockholm Environment Institute, Box 24218, Stockholm 104 51, Sweden
f
Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands

ABSTRACT

More than ten years after REDD + (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) entered the UN climate negotiations, its current state and future
direction are a matter of contention. This paper analyses 162 INDCs (Intended National Determined Contributions), or climate action plans, to assess whether and
how countries plan to use REDD + in their implementation the Paris Agreement. Our analysis suggests that REDD + continues to have political traction. Many
tropical countries still have expectations of REDD +, and hope that public and private donors will support chronically underfunded domestic conservation programs.
However, the expectations are not formulated in detail. We argue that until the questions of how to finance REDD+ and how to deal with the drivers of deforestation
are resolved, REDD is unlikely to move quickly from formulated INDCs plans to implementation on the ground.

1. Introduction: REDD +, the Paris agreement and INDCs symptomatic of inherent deficiencies in the REDD + mechanism, itself
symptomatic of contradictions in market-based conservation” (Fletcher
More than ten years after REDD + (Reducing Emissions from et al. 2016).
Deforestation and forest Degradation) entered the UN climate nego- Despite all the uncertainties and controversies surrounding REDD +
tiations, its current state and future direction are a matter of contention. among scholars, activists and development practitioners, the national
Some observers argue that REDD+ has a poor track record of achieving climate action plans (or INDCs: Intended National Determined
what it is supposed to achieve—i.e. reduce emissions—as suggested by Contributions) submitted as part of the Paris climate agreement de-
rising deforestation rates in REDD + posterchildren like Brazil, monstrate that many countries with tropical rainforests continue to
Colombia and Indonesia (Butler 2016; Enrici & Hubacek 2016; El have expectations of REDD +. In total, 56 countries indicate in their
Espectador 2017; SINCHI 2016). One main argument for explaining its INDC that they aim to implement REDD + as part of their contribution
poor track record is that so far REDD + has been unable to tackle the to address climate change (Pauw et al., 2016). The INDCs provide rich
root causes of deforestation, such as the demand for agricultural com- information on how countries intend to advance domestic climate po-
modities like palm oil, soy, cocoa and coffee (Bastos-Lima et al. 2017, licies including efforts to reduce deforestation and forest degradation
Weatherley-Singh and Gupta, 2015, Karsenty and Ongolo, 2012). (for the BRICs countries c.f. Bhan et al. 2017). They were key to
Others claim that the limited success of REDD + is due to poor im- reaching the Paris Agreement and will be instrumental to implementing
plementation at the national level, governance challenges and lack of it (Pauw et al., 2017). However, do they also move the current debate
progress in the wider climate change negotiations (Angelsen et al. 2017, on the future direction of REDD + beyond the known challenges?
Brockhaus et al., 2014, Cadman et al., 2017, Boer, 2018). In particular, We build on an analysis of all 162 INDCs1 to give an overview of the
it is argued that the absence of an international carbon market and current state of REDD + as reflected by countries' climate change
weak international emission reduction targets have hampered the im- commitments. In analyzing the INDC texts, we looked for references to
plementation of REDD + (Angelsen et al. 2017). A third group criticizes REDD +, land use change and deforestation, and assessed the docu-
REDD + more fundamentally arguing that “the current difficulties are ments according to six criteria: 1) reference to planned or existing

Corresponding author at: CAU Kiel, Institute of Geography, Ludewig-Meyn-Straße 14, Kiel 24098, Germany.
⁎

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (J. Hein), [email protected] (A. Guarin), [email protected] (P. Pauw).
1
Once a party to the UNFCCC ratifies the Paris Agreement it is invited to turn its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) into an Nationally
Determined Contribution (NDC). We refer to INDCs rather than NDCs because more countries have submitted INDCs than NDCs.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2018.01.005
Received 3 November 2017; Received in revised form 19 January 2018; Accepted 20 January 2018
Available online 04 February 2018
1389-9341/ © 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).
J. Hein et al. Forest Policy and Economics 90 (2018) 7–11

strategies or institutions for implementing REDD; 2) mentions of REDD countries that include REDD + in their INDC (61%) refer to such a
+ monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) mechanisms; 3) national strategy for REDD+ implementation, including readiness
identification of sources of REDD + finance; 4) mentions of land tenure roadmaps and other similar documents. Some countries only mention
or forest governance; 5) reference to REDD + safeguards, including an existing REDD + strategy or the planned formulation of a strategy
issues of free prior and informed consent in the context of REDD; and 6) while others explain in detail which issues the strategy addresses. Be-
the level of detail about REDD implementation. In addition, we ana- lize, for instance, includes a paragraph on its REDD + strategy claiming
lyzed statements of conservation NGOs and donor agencies related to that it will “[…] address issues of deforestation and afforestation,
REDD + and INDCs as well as background literature on REDD + im- maintaining healthy forest ecosystems by sustainable forest manage-
plementation. ment […]” (Belize 2015). Indonesia, in contrast, has published a pro-
This paper is structured as follows. First, we analyze whether and gressive REDD+ strategy in 2012 which refers to free, prior and in-
how REDD + is included in INDC and show that REDD + features formed consent of local and indigenous communities, benefit sharing
prominently in the commitments made by many countries in their and to a land reform (Hein, 2016) but does not mention the strategy in
INDCs. Second, we demonstrate that despite all risks associated with its INDC (Republic of Indonesia 2015). It is surprising that Indonesia
the mechanism the expectations of REDD + are still high, in particular and others do not refer to their REDD + strategy in their INDC given the
in tropical rainforest countries. REDD + is still considered as a promi- formal importance of both documents in the UN climate negotiations.
nent instrument for mitigating climate change and to access climate
finance. Finally, we provide four explanations for REDD's continued 1.1.2. MRV
vitality, including but not only as part of the INDCs. Technical capacities for monitoring, reporting and verification
(MRV) systems are essential for assessing the avoidance of deforestation
1.1. Taking stock of REDD+ in the INDCs and greenhouse gas emissions, and are thus a fundamental for suc-
cessful part of REDD +. Sixteen out of the 56 INDCs that mention REDD
Most of the countries within the tropical belt, i.e. those which be- (29%) explicitly refer to current or planned technical capacities to
long to the main REDD + − target group, include REDD + in their monitor deforestation, carbon stocks and forest cover. Cambodia, for
INDC's mitigation strategies (Fig. 1). Together, these 56 countries ac- instance, reports that it would need “[…] continued support to develop
count for more than 70% of the absolute natural forest cover and two the REDD + MRV system in order to move on to the third phase of
thirds of the annual loss of natural forest2 within Non-Annex 1 coun- REDD + where it will receive performance based payments” (Kingdom
tries.3 Given that these countries included REDD + in their INDC, on of Cambodia 2015). Given the importance of precise monitoring and
paper REDD + has a vast potential for reducing greenhouse gas emis- verification systems to assess forest stocks and flows, this technical side
sions. of REDD implementation would require much firmer commitments -and
The way in which planned or ongoing REDD + activities are for- sound funding - from participating countries.
mulated in INDCs varies widely. Some countries, such as Costa Rica,
describe their REDD+ policies extensively while others make only 1.1.3. Finance
generic mentions about the instrument. The relevance of INDCs for Even though finance is critical for the successful implementation of
domestic land-use planning decisions differs from one country to an- a REDD + strategy, only 18 out of 56 countries (32%) refer in their
other, as countries do not include or refer to all domestic land use and INDC to specific financing instruments such as result-based payments
REDD + policies in their INDCs. Therefore, we analyze REDD + men- and carbon trade. So far, no REDD + financing mechanism has been
tions in INDCs according to the six criteria described in the introduc- developed under the UNFCCC. Most REDD+ programs and pilot in-
tion: REDD + strategy, MRV, finance, land governance/land rights, itiatives are therefore financed by multilateral and bilateral donors, and
safeguards, and level of detail of implementation. to a smaller extent through voluntary carbon markets (Norman and
Nakhooda 2015). In their INDCs, Ghana, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South
1.1.1. REDD + strategy Sudan, Togo and Nepal name market-based approaches (e.g. carbon
The formulation of a national REDD + strategy is required by the trade) whereas Brazil, Guyana and Papua New Guinea mention bi- or
Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC, 2010, Dec 1/CP.16) to make countries multilateral funds (e.g. FCPF, German REDD + early movers program,
eligible for international support for REDD +. Thirty-four out of the 56 Norwegian Forest and Climate Initiative) to implement REDD +. Some

Fig. 1. Countries referring to REDD+ in their INDC.

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J. Hein et al. Forest Policy and Economics 90 (2018) 7–11

countries have high expectations of REDD +. For instance, Angola climate policies “[…] require full compliance with Cancun's safeguards
considers potential income from REDD + projects ‘substantial’ on REDD +, as well as, securing the indigenous people's Prior, Free and
(Republic of Angola 2015) and Rwanda intends to finance its green Informed Consent” (Government of Costa Rica, Ministry of
growth and climate resilience strategy through selling REDD + and Environment and Energy 2015). The rights of indigenous peoples to be
CDM credits (Republic of Rwanda 2015). Vietnam expects international consulted and informed about projects that could affect their liveli-
support for the implementation of its payment for forest environmental hoods is enshrined in ILO convention 169 of 1989. To date only 22
services (PFES) scheme (Government of Vietnam 2015). Togo has cal- countries - most of them Latin American - have signed this convention,
culated that it would need US$ 500 million to implement land-used suggesting that the issue of indigenous peoples' rights remains con-
based mitigation activities and encourages “[…] investments in miti- tentious and within the purview of domestic policy.
gation projects on its own soil, thanks in particular to the Clean De-
velopment Mechanism (CDM) and the REDD + Programed” (Republic 1.1.6. Details on implementation
of Togo 2015). However, 68% of the INDCs that mention REDD + do Given the limited guidance by the UNFCCC, INDCs vary in length,
not explain how it will be financed. None of the countries in the global form, content and scope (Mbeva & Pauw, 2016). From this perspective,
North that currently support REDD + activities or that might want to do REDD + does not appear to be the highest priority for many countries,
so in future mention REDD + in their NDCs. This should not be seen as even those that are rich in tropical forests. Only a few of the countries
an indication of reduced political traction: with the exception of New that mention REDD + in their INDC (e.g. Cambodia, Costa Rica,
Zealand and Turkey, INDCs of Annex I countries do not mention other Guyana, Myanmar, Nepal and Papua New Guinea) have been clear
forms of international support either (Pauw et al., 2016). However, it about how REDD + will be put into practice. Although this makes it
nevertheless contrasts both the dependence of REDD + on voluntary more difficult to understand implementation planning, the description
bilateral and multilateral support in the absence of a financial me- of implementation planning in INDCs was not required by the UNFCCC
chanism under the UNFCCC, as well as the tendency of low- and lower- (see UNFCCC, 2014), and most countries include information on im-
middle income countries to make the implementation of their INDC's plementation only in general terms (see Pauw et al., 2016).
mitigation and adaptation contributions dependent upon receiving in-
ternational support (Pauw et al., 2017). 2. What is maintaining the political momentum for REDD +?

1.1.4. Land governance and land rights Our analysis of 162 INDCs shows that expectations of REDD + are
Land and forest governance reforms are often considered as pre- still high. Despite the fact that formulation guidance by the UNFCCC
conditions for implementing REDD + (Awono et al. 2014; Larson et al. does not mention REDD +, 56 countries include it in their INDC. What
2013; Naughton-Treves and Wendland 2014; Resosudarmo et al. 2014), keeps REDD + relevant in national and international climate change
but only 10 out of 56 countries that mention REDD in their INDC (18%) mitigation agendas? Below we discuss four reasons that help explain
address forest governance, spatial planning and land tenure. Cameroon why REDD + is still pushed politically, albeit in different ways: REDD
and the Ivory Coast, for instance, explicitly refer to policy coherence + as a low hanging fruit, demand for green aid, and a push by NGOs as
between national spatial and development planning and REDD + well as donor countries for REDD +.
(Republique du Cameroun 2016; Republique de la Côte D'Ivoire 2015).
Rwanda indicates plans to systematize land registration and land tenure 2.1. REDD + as a low hanging fruit
(Republic of Rwanda 2015). Indonesia refers to past reforms which
include a forest moratorium, to strengthening of conservation and Since its inception, REDD + has been considered the “low hanging
protection of its forests and to the involvement of local communities fruit” among available mitigation policies. The idea of REDD + as a
through social forestry programs (Republic of Indonesia 2015). The low cost-efficient win-win instrument to reduce net carbon emissions while
number of INDCs that address forest governance, spatial planning and contributing to biodiversity conservation and rural development at the
land tenure suggests that land governance reforms are difficult, do not forest margins was promoted by influential policy reports such as
enjoy much political support and are probably considered as fully do- Nicholas Stern's “Review on the Economics of Climate Change” (Stern,
mestic policy issues that are beyond the mandate of the UNFCCC. 2007) and Johan Eliasch's review “Climate Change: Financing Global
Forests” (Eliasch, 2008). Today, this perception has changed but REDD
1.1.5. Safeguards + is still perceived as having lower opportunity costs than reducing
To avoid some of potential negative effects of REDD, the UNFCCC emissions from fossil fuel combustion (Angelsen et al. 2014). The idea
decided in Cancun to establish a number of social and environmental that forest management can be changed “more quickly than phasing out
safeguards (UNFCCC decision 1/CP. 16), including principles for of fossil fuels” (Houghton et al. 2017) is still widespread. For policy
transparency and respect for indigenous peoples. Only 4 out of 58 makers in the North, REDD + is attractive because it transfers obliga-
countries (7%) mention REDD + safeguards or free, prior and informed tions to the global periphery and avoids hard emission cuts. However,
consent - a mechanism used to ensure that indigenous and other local as outlined above, the interests of donors from the North are not
communities fully understand, and agree, with the terms of their in- manifested in the INDCs but are reflected through bilateral and multi-
volvement in REDD + projects. Cambodia for instance announces that lateral aid for REDD +. For example, in the case of Germany, the na-
it will establish a Safeguards Information System as requested in the tional sustainability strategy mentions investments in REDD + abroad
relevant decisions of the UNFCCC. Costa Rica explicitly mentions its (Federal Government of Germany, 2012). Norway has established re-
commitment to universal human rights and states that Costa Rica's sult-based partnerships with seven partner countries and claims to have
contributed to 20 million tons of emission reduction abroad (in 2016)
2
which correspond to 40% of Norways annual emissions (Government of
The calculation is based on the FAO Global Forest Resources Assessment Norway, 2017).
2015 (FAO, 2015). In cases where country-specific data for the period of
2010–2015 was not available, data for the period of 2005–2010 from the FAO
2.2. Demand for green aid
Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010 (FAO, 2010) was used.
3
We refer here to all Non-Annex I countries, as per UNFCCC classification. In
the 1992 UNFCCC, ‘Annex I’ countries were member states of the Organisation REDD + could be an important source of funding for conservation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (as of 1992) plus a number programs in the Global South. Many countries that mention REDD + in
of additional states with economies in transition; ‘Non-Annex I countries’ be- their INDC have received a substantial amount of biodiversity con-
came a synonym for developing countries servation aid in the past (see Miller et al. 2013). A high-ranking official

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J. Hein et al. Forest Policy and Economics 90 (2018) 7–11

of an Indonesian sub-national forest authority argued that “[…] we challenges. Specific measures or plans with regard to financing REDD +
want compensation for protecting our national parks from international are scarce, drivers of deforestation are hardly mentioned, and details of
donors” (Hein et al. 2017), and Brazil's INDC states clearly that the implementation —including, crucially, finance and MRV — are thin.
“[…] implementation of REDD+ activities and the permanence of re- That some of the aspects of REDD + implementation are not fully de-
sults achieved require the provision of adequate and predictable results- veloped in INDCs is not surprising, as many of them, such as indigenous
based payments in accordance with the relevant COP decisions on a peoples' rights or land tenure, are contentious issues in the domestic
continuous basis” (Federative Republic of Brazil 2015). Costa Rica's policy arena. Moreover, REDD + is one of other mechanisms available
national Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) scheme was from its to countries to reduce deforestation, and the INDCs are only one among
beginnings supported by donors such as the Global Environmental Fa- many other policy statements used by countries regarding climate
cility (Murillo et al. 2011; FONAFIFO 2014). Vietnam has also received change mitigation. For example, Brazil, which has the world's largest
donor support for its PES scheme and ideas to link it with a donor fi- tropical forest cover, and which has been generally successful at re-
nanced REDD + schemes are under discussion (Trædal et al., 2016). ducing deforestation (in the past), includes only one sentence about
From a recipient-country perspective, a global REDD + mechanism REDD + in its INDC. Depending on national circumstances, other
could help to close financial gaps, and might help to maintain national documents might be more relevant for explaining the future directions
PES schemes and protected areas. of domestic forest policies.
Avoiding tropical deforestation is a crucial part of achieving global
2.3. Objectives and priorities of NGOs climate change mitigation targets, and REDD + —despite all its short-
comings—is the only existing mechanism legitimized and recognized by
Just as governments see potential in REDD + as a mechanism to all members of the UNFCCC. So far REDD + has been able to keep its
fund public conservation programs, non-governmental organizations momentum, but—if the INDCs are any guidance—for most countries
were early to identify REDD's potential for supporting private con- the path to implementation is still long.
servation initiatives. From the beginning, conservation NGOs have been Until the question how to finance REDD + and how to deal with the
involved in lobbying for integrating forest conservation into the drivers of deforestation such as oil palm, soy and cattle ranching are
UNFCCC by implementing REDD + pilot projects in many tropical resolved, REDD + is unlikely to move quickly from paper to im-
countries and designing accounting and social-environmental standards plementation on a larger scale.
for voluntary market REDD + projects (Hein and Garrelts, 2014).
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